ML20207K957
| ML20207K957 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1986 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SBN-1171, NUDOCS 8607300147 | |
| Download: ML20207K957 (22) | |
Text
_
SEABROOK STATION Engineering Office NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION July 25, 1986 SBN-1171 T.F.
B3.0.0, P2.6.3, B7.1.3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Atteation:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 Subj ect :
10CFR50, Appendix J, Type C Leak Rate Testing
Dear Sir:
Included as Attachment 1 is our position on the applicability of Type C Leak Rate Testing to containment isolation valves in the Low Head Safety Injection System (RHR).
Included as Attachment 2 are FSAR changes reflecting this position. These changes will be incorporated into a future amendment of the FSAR.
Very truly yours, Ass /
John DeVincentis Director of Engineering Attachments 1
cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List 00 l (
Seabrook Station Construction Field Office. P.O. Box 700 Seabrook, NH O3874
Diane Curran, Esquira Pater J. Mathawa, Mxyor Harmon & W2ico City Hcil 2001 S. Street, N.W.
N wburyport, MA 01950 Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 Judith H. Mizner Silvergate, Gertner, Baker, Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Fine, Good & Mizner Office of the Executive Legal Director 88 Broad Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Boston, MA 02110 Tenth Floor Washington, DC 20555 Calvin A. Canney City Manager Robert A. Backus, Esquire City Hall 116 Lowell Street 126 Daniel Street P.O. Box 516 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Manchester, NH 03105 Stephen E. Merrill, Esquire Philip Ahrens, Esquire Attorney General Assistant Attorney General George Dana Bisbee, Esquire Department of The Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Statehouse Station #6 Office of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Chairman, Board of Selectmen Mr. J. P. Nadeau RFD 1 - Box 1154 Selectmen's Office Kennsington, NH 03827 10 Central Road Rye, NH 03870 Carol S. Sneider, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Department of the Attorney General Chairman of the Board of Selectmen One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Town of Newbury Boston, MA 02108 Newbury, MA 01950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. William S. Lord U.S. Senate Board of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 Town Hall - Friend Street (ATTN: Tom Burack)
Amesbury, MA 01913 Richard A. Hampe, Esq.
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1
Hampe and McNicholas 1 Pillsbury Street 35 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 Concord, NH 03301 (ATTN: Herb Boynton)
Thomas F. Powers, III H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Town Manager Office of General Counsel Town of Exeter Federal Emergency Management Agency 10 Front Street 500 C Street, SW Exeter, NH 03833 Washington, DC 20472 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esquire RFD Dalton Road Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Brentwood, NH 03833 Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
P.O. Box 360 Holmes & Ells Portsmouth, NH 03801 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03842 Robert Carrigg Town Office Mr. Ed Thomas Atlantic Avenue FEMA Region I North Hampton, NH 03862 442 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse Boston, PA 02109
8 o
SBN4171 ATTACRMENT 1 The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) at Seabrook Station satisfies the following design criteria.
o The system is Safety Class 2.
o The system is Seismic Category I.
o The system is protected against missiles.
o The system ia 6ected against the dynamic effects associated with pipe ruptures.
o Active electrical components are classified as IE and receive emergency power from the diesel generators.
Failure of a diesel generator results in the loss of one train of active ECCS com-ponents. The redundant diesel will continue to power the fully redundant ECCS train.
The Low Head Safcty Injection (RHR) portion of the ECCS operates in three distinct and successive modes following the occurrence of a design base LOCA. Upon generation of a safety injection ('S') signal immediately following the accident, the RHR pumps (RH-P-8A and RH-P-8B) take suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and discharge to all four RCS cold legs. During this cold leg injection phase, the RHR discharge header is common to both redundant pumps.
When the RWST reaches the " Low-Low" level, the containment sumps' isolation valves open and the system is switched over to the cold leg recirculation mode.
During this mode, the RHR pumps take suction from the containment sump and discharge to a suction header common to both Centrifugal Charging (CS) pumps and both high head Safety Injection (SI) pumps as well as directly to the RCS cold legs. Previously, Seabrook's emergency oper-ating procedures in compliance with the FSAR mandated closure of the valves (RH-V21, V22) on the discharge crosstie line between the two RHR trains during this switchover process. However, these procedures have been revised to leave these valves open and close one of the cold leg / containment isolation valves (RH-V14, V26) during the switchover.
These changes are reflected in the revised FSAR pages included in.
Approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> after the onset of the accident, the system is switched over to the hot leg recirculation mode.
During this mode, the RHR pumps continue taking suction from the containment sumps and discharge to two RCS hot legs via the common discharge header as well as to the suction of the CS and SI pumps.
t
.s SBN-g,y,
ATTACHMENT 1 (Continued)
Given the above system alignments and the fact that a sufficient re-circulating water inventory will be available to the ECCS, a water seal will be maintained at containment penetrations X-II, X-12, and X-13 or against the corresponding isolation valves (RH-V14, V26, V32, V70) outside containment when closed for 30 days following the onset of a design base LOCA. This water seal will be maintained at a pressure in excess of 1.10Pa regardless of any single active failure.
This seal will preclude any isolation valve seat leakage of contain-ment atmosphere via these penetrations.
In addition, the design of all isolation valves for these penetrations for which stem / packing leakage is of concern (i.e., valves outside containment which may be closed at any time following an accident) allows for such leakage only from the high pressure side of the valve. Given that the water seal will always be at a pressure higher than containment, containment at-mosphere leakage from the valve stems and/or packing is precluded.
The containment isolation valves associated with penetrations X-II, X-12, and X-13 are therefore not subj ect to Type 'C' testing. These valves are listed in revised FSAR Table 6.2-83 included in Attachment 2.
--...~..-
N TABLE 6.2-83 (Sheet 3 of 13)
L Z
co Appl.
Pot.
Cont.
Cen.
Bypass Valve Pene-Lesign or Loc Length of Valve Valve Position tra-Criteria Line Through-Figure Inside/
Type Pipe Pos2 tion or Reg.
Fluid Size Essential Line 6.2-94 Isolation Outside C
( f t-in)
Nor-Shut-Accf (8)
Guide (1)
System Name Contained (In)
Systems Leakage Sheet Valve Number (2)
Tests (3)
Type Operator mal down denE IL-10 E
Residual Reactor 12 No No 2
12 "-RC-V88 I
Yes 21-0 Cate Motor C1 0
C1 Rest Coolant Removal 3
3"x4"-RCA-V89 I
Yes 9-0 Relie f Self Pump Fuction (Loop IV/
Hot Leg) x-11 I,E Resid.at Borated 8
Yes No 4
8"-RH-V14 0
9ev MD 0-8 Cate Motor 0
C1 0
Reat Water Removat 6
6"-RH-V31 I
- e b 106-2 Chec k Self 6
6"-RH-V15 I
be*M ) 109-5 Check Self 3/4 3/4"-RH-V28 I
hdb 35-0 Clobe Pneumatic C1 C1 C1 N
K-12 I, E Residual Borated 8
Yes No 4
8"-RH-V26 0
m/c 2-8 Cate Motor 0
C1 0
g Reat Water Removal 6
6 "-RB-V 30 I
beeM> 130-6 Check Self
- c=
6 6"-RH-V29 I
WyM) 128-1 Check Self U
- C 3/4 3/4"-RH-V27 1
-lpes-))O 34-6 Clobe Pneumatic C1 C1 C1 H
X-13 1.E Residual Borated 8
Yes No 3
8"-RH-V32 0
hko 6-6 Cate Motor C1 C1 C1 Heat Water Removal 3/4 3/4"-RH-V49 I
%h 34 -1 Clobe Pneumatic C1 C1 C1 8
8"-RH-V70 0
hh3 6-5 Cate Motor C1 C1 C1 8
8"-RH-V50 I
hdh 53-5 Check Self 8
8-RR-V51 1
-Voo-Ah52-11 Chec k Self X-14 I,E Containment Borated 8
Yes No 7
8 "-CB S -V 11 0
Yes 2-8 Cate Motor C1 C1 0
Spray Water 8
8"-CBS-V12 I
Yes 4-4 Check Self x-15 I,E Containment Borated 8
Yes No 7
8"-CBS-V17 0
Yes 2-8 Cate Motor C1 C1 0
Spray Water 8
8"-CBS-V18 I
Yes 4-4 Chec k Self X-16 I
containment Contain-8 No Yes 10 8 "-COP -V4 0
Yes 2-9 Butterfly Pneumatic C1 0
C1 On-Line ment Purge Atmosphere 8
8 "-COP-V 3 I
Yes 1-4 Butterfly Pneumatic C1 0
C1 (Ex hau s t) e e
e
's SB.1 & 2 Amendment 56 FSAR November 1985 TGJCs the automatic and manual switchover sequence, the two residual heat removal pumps would take suction f rom the containment sump and deliver borated water direc tly to RCS cold legs. A portion of the Number 1 residual heat remova pump discharge flow would be used to provide suction to the two charging pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. A portion of the discharge flow from the Number 2 residual heat removal pump would be used to provide suction to the two safety injection pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. As part of the manual switchover procedure (see Table 6.3-7, Step 4), the suctions of the safety injection and charging pumps are cross connected so that one residual heat removal pump can deliver flow to the RCS and both safety injection and charging pumps, in the event of the failure of the second residual heat removal pump.
Af ter approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, cold leg recirculation is terminated and hot leg recirculation is initiated. This is done to terminate any boiling in the core should the break be in one of the RCS cold legs. During this phase of recirculation, the SIP's discharge is aligned to supply water to all four RCS hot legs and the RHRP's i
discharge is aligned to supply water to RCS hot legs 1 and 4.
The CCP's do not have the capability to feed the hot legs and continue to supply the cold legs.
6.3.2.2 Equipment and Component Descriptions The component design and operating conditions listed in Table 6.3-1 are l
specified as the most severe conditions to which each respective component 50 is exposed during either normal plant operation, ce during operation of the ECCS. For each component, these conditions are considered in relation to the code to which it is designed. By designing the components in accordance with applicable codes, and with due consideration for the design and operating conditions, the fundamental assurance of structural integrity of the ECCS corponents is maintained.
Components of the ECCS are designed to withstand the appropriate seismic loadings in accordance with their safety class as given in Table 3.2-2.
Descriptions of the major mechanical components of the ECCS follow:
i a.
Accumulators The accumulators are pressure vessels partially filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. During normal operation, each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in series. Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open and borated water is forced into the RCS. One accumulator is attached to each of the cold legs of the RCS.
Mechanical operation of the swing disc check valves is the oily action required to open the injection path from the accumlators to the core via the cold leg.
6.3-5
~
b.
Passive Failure Criteria The following design philosophy assures the necessary redundancy in component and system arrangement.in order to meet the intent of the General Design Criteria on single failure as i.t specifically applies to failure of passive components in the ECCS. Thus, for the long term, the system design is based on accepting either a passive or an active failure.
- 1.,
Redundancy of Flow Paths and Components for Long Term Emergency Core Cooling In design of the ECCS, Westinghouse utilizes the following criteria:
(a)
During the long term cooling period following a loss of coolant, the emergency core cooling flow paths shall be separable into two subsystems, either of which can provide minimum core cooling functions and return spilled water from the floor of the containment back to the RCS.
(b) Either of the two subsystems can be isolated and removed from service in the event of a leak outside the containment. Aedun danS Mo +or OP.erated Valve,5 8VYanSec$
in s er ies a< e pronded For +%is sson a 4 ;cn funcM an, (c) Adequate redundancy of check valves is provided to tolerate failure of a check valve during the long term as a passive component.
(d)
Should o,ne of these two subsystems be isolated in this long term period, the other subsystem remains operable.
(e)
Provisions are also made in the design to detect leakage from components outside the containment, to collect this leakage, and to provide for maintenance of the af fected equipment.'
A single passive failure analysis is presented in Table 6.3-6.
It demonstrates that the ECCS can sustain a single passive 1
failure during the long term phase and still retain an intact f16w path to the core to supply sufficient flow to maintain the core covered and af fect the removal of decay heat.
The procedure followed to establish the citernate flow path also isolates the component which failed.
Thus, for the long term emergency core cooling function, adequate core cooling capacity exists with one flow path removed I
from service.
?
1 i (.
i 6.3-15
.,e n.,
's SB 1 & 2 Amsndment 58 i
FSAR April 1986 i
to actuate the spray, but not high enough to seat the check valves referenced above. This would result in a continued high flow rate from the tank until the RWST isolation valves (CBS-V2, V5) are closed (approximately 75 seconds after "1o-1o-1" signal by Table 6.3-10.
From this point there is at least 5.1 minutes of operation at 1,800 gpm, for a total of 6.4 minutes before the
" empty" alarm sounds. There is at least 31.0 minutes of operation between the "lo-lo-1" and possible vortexing in this case.
g g*1 The limiting single failure for the design is the failure of one of the RWST isolation valves (CBS-V2, -V5) to close.
If one of these valves does not close, the flow rate drops from 16,400 to 9,100 gpm (not 1,800).
At this high flow rate, the " empty" alarm will sound, alerting the operator to immediately shut off any pumps still taking suction from the tank. There is sufficient volume between the " empty" alarm and the calculated vortexing level for at least 1.9 minutes of operation for shutting off the pumps.
l j u) O AS 5%
Following the automatic and manu switchover sequence, the two residual 53 heat removal pumps would take etion from the containment sump and deliver boratedwaterdirectlytoltjfdjRCScoldlegs.
A portion of the Number 1 residual heat removal pump discharge flow would be used to provide suction to the two charging pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. A portion of the discharge flow from the Number 2 residual heat re-moval pump would be used to provide suction to the two safety injection pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. As part of the manual switchover procedure (see Table 6.3-7, Step 4), the suctions of the safety injection and charging pumps are cross-connected so that one residual h'est removal pump can deliver flow to the RCS and both safety injection and cha'rging pumps, in the event of the failure of the second residual heat removal pump.
See Section 7.5 for process information available to the operator in the control room following an accident.
45 f
n e
9 6.3-18b
SB 1 & 2 Amandment 56 FSAR November 1985 6.3.3 Performance Evaluation Chapter 15 accidents that result in ECCS operation are as follows:
Inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve (see a.
Section 15.1.4).
b.
Small break LOCA (see Section 15.6.5).
c.
Large break LOCA (see Section 15.6.5),
d.
Major secondary system pipe failure (see Section 15.1.5).
Steam generator tube failure (see Section 15.6.3).
e.
Safety injection is actuated from any of the following Low pressurizer pressure.
a.
b.
Low steamline pressure.
High containment pressure.
c.
d.
Manual initiation.
A safety injection signal will rapidly trip the main turbine, close all feedwater control valves, trip the main feedwater pumps, and close the feed-l water isolation valves.
Following the actuation signal, the suction of the centrifugal charging pumps is diverted from the volt.'me control tank to the refueling water storage tank.
Simultaneously, the valves isolating the charging pumps from the injection header automatically open. The safety injection pumps also start automatically but operate at shut off head when the RCS is at normal pressure.
The passive 5'-
injection system (accumulators) and the low head system (residual heat removal pumps) also provide no flow at normal RCS pressure.
Figure 6.3-2 is a simplified illustration of the ECCS. The notes provided with Figure 6.3-2 contain information relative to the operation of the ECCS in its various modes.
The modes of operation illustrated are full operation of all ECCS components, cold leg recirculation with residual heat removal pump Number 2 l
i operating, and hot leg recirculation with residuaLheat removal pump Number 1 l
rep [epnta[iv%f[e[opha/on[kEKS dfri[>
_ C,tinaj
~
D ar tywo ans Lag times for initiation and operation of the ECCS are limited by pump startup time and consequential loading sequence of these motors onto the safeguard l
6.3-19
SB 1 & 2 FSAR NOTES TO FIGURE 6. 3-2 (Sheet 1 of 19) g0 DES OF OPERATION MODE A - INJECTION This mode presents the process conditions for the case of maximum safeguards, i.e., all pumps operating, following accumulator delivery. Two recidual heat removal (RHR) pumps, two safety injection (SI) pumps, and two centrifugal charging (CC) pumps operate, taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and delivering to the reactor through the cold leg connections.
Note that the flow from each puap is less than its maximum runout since the pump discharge piping is shared by the two pumps of each subsystem. Note also that the SI pump branch connections to the residual lines are close to their discharge into the accumulator lines. thereby minimizing any increase in the RRR branch line head loss due to the combined flows of the RHR and SI pumps.
MODE B - COLD-LEG RECIRCULATION This mode presents the process conditions for the case of cold-leg recirculation assuming residual heat cemoval (RHR) pump No. 2 operating, safety injection pumps 1 and 2 operating, and centrifugal charging (CC) pumps 1 and 2 operating.
It is assumed that the spray pumps have emptied the RWST at this time.
In this mode the safeguards pumps operate in series, with only the RHR pump capable of taking suction from the containment sump.
The recirculated coolant is then delivered by the RHR pump to both of the SI pumps which deliver to the reactor through their cold-leg connections and to both of the CC pumps which deliver to the reactor through their cold-leg connections.
The RHR pum also delivers flo,w directly to the reactor through two cold _
a e
rm n cu MODE C - HOT-LEG RECIRCULATION This mode presents the process conditions for the case of hot-leg recirculation, assuming residual heat removal (RHR) pump No. 1 operating, centrifugal charging (CC) pumps 1 and 2 operating, and safety injection (SI) pumps 1 and 2 operating.
In this c ide, the safcguard's pumps again operate in series with only the RHR pump taking suction from the containment sump.
The recirculated coolant is then delivered by the RHR pump to both of the CC pumps which continue to deliver to the reactor through their cold-leg connections and to both of the SI pumps which deliver to the reactor through their hot-leg connections.
The RHR pump also delivers directly to the reactor through two hot-leg connections.
531&2 A=and= ant 39 FSAR
.ty 1986 NOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-2 (Sheet 3 of 19)
VALVE ALIGNMENT CHART (Cont'd)
OPERATIONAL MODES VALVE NUMBER A
B, C_
21 C
0 0
22 0
@O o
55 23 0
@-C 0
24 0
0 C
25 C
C 0
26 0
@ -C C
27 C
C C
28 0
C C
29 C
0 0
30 C.
C C
31 C
C C
35 0
l 0
0 g,
0 = OPEN C = CLOSED r.-
.--,y-
.,u
.rr.
e TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 2 of 10)
Cowponent Failure Mode ECCS Operation Phase
- Effect on System Operation eaFailure Detection Method Remarks 4.
Motor operated Fails to close Injection - cold legs Failure reduces redundancy Valve position indication Valve aligned to globe valve on demand, of RC loops.
of providing isolation (open to closed position close upon actuation CS-Vl96 of HHSI/CH pump miniflow change) at HCB. Valve by a SI "S" signal.
(CS-Vl97 line. No effect on safety closed position monitor analogous) for system operation.
light and alarm for group monitoring of components at MCB.
6L-5.
Motor operated Fails to close Injection - cold legs Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection as Valve aligned to gate valve on demand, of RC loops.
of providing isolation of that stated for item #1.
close upon actuecion CS-V143 HHSI/CH pump discharge to by a SI "S" signal.
(CS-V142 normal charging line of taalogous)
CVCS. No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate isolation valve us 08 (CS-9142) provides backup ng normal CVCS charging line U2 >=
isolation.
ll,,
N S*
6.
Mo to r. ope ra ted Fails to open Injection - cold legs Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detectio; Valvealignedtoopenl of it'id flow paths from as that stated for item, upon actuation by a g
gate valve "on demand, of RC loops.
u HHSI/CH pumps to the RCS.
gg nS" signal.
SI-V138
"* 'If*** ** **I**Y f**
(SI-V139 P*'***
taalogous)
Alternate isolation valve gg B
(SI-V139) opens to provide backup flow path from HHS!/
g l % 0.
Cil pumps to RCS.
57 s$ $a
>= rt OD (n Ch WD
m Motov opertdcJ Fa:Is +o clcse bueold;m _.
Fabe uc}xes redadanc3 5 ame me%od e f D
)
, _ gate vawe on dem ud ceia legs c,..
oS p wa.y us i/4g pomp d etecAion as we+.
u - v "t Rc loors disc.4 aroe-nos ea $ isela k oa sta+ed 4-t h
+o cofd tqs ch RCS, do e ((ect
-$t k.
l on eMect oe 6a fefu Fe.r ytem opev o ticn, Altern ate isol at.on
(
valve T^Isj'o R H - V-2 ro.oill c./o se(She.d to isol te a l f cr,s a fe
)
be FluJ pa th to cold le3s, Co ponent Failure Mode ECCS Operation Phase
- Effect on System Operation
- Failure Detection Me+. hod Remarks
- 11. Motor Fails to close Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection Valve is electrically l operated on demand, legs of RC loops.
of providing flow isolation as that stated -for item #4.
interlocked with iso-gate valve of Containment Sump from lation valve CBS-V8 CBS-V2 RWST. No effect on safety and RH-V35 and may not (CBS-V5 for system operation.
be opened unless these analogous)
Alternate check isolation valves are closed, for valve CBS-V55 provides manual operation from backup isolation.
main control board.
Valve opens automati-cally on "S" signal.
method of d ' tee l,
/
[ilstocle'se Recirculat[on - cold Failure r uces redundancy Sa
- 12. Motor on operatfd gate
'on demand /
legs of RC loops./
of providing 1.RSI/RjiR pump a/ that stated or item f4 ft,
/
va4ve RH-V22
/
/
train e4paration for
[
recirdulation of fluid to f
(RH-V21 f
analogous)
/
cold legs of RCS'.
No m
effect on safety for syst9m os
/
dperation. Alternate iso'-
/
[
p/ lation valve' RH-V21 provides
/
backup is,olation for i.HSI/
/
e N
RHR pump train separation.
- 13. Motor operated Fails to close Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection Valve is electrically l globe valve on demand.
legs of RC loops.
of providing isolation of as that stated for item f4.
interlocked with iso-5t-lation valves RH-V35 SI-V93 HHSI/SI pump's miniflow and RH-V36 and may line isolation from RWST.
No effer.t on safety for not be opened unless system operation. Alter-these valves are nate isolation valves SI-V89 closed.
and SI-V90 in each pump's miniflow line provide back-up isolation.
- 14. Motor operated Fails to close Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection Same remark as that globe. valve on demand.
legs of RC loops.
of providing isolation of as that stated for item #4.
stated for item #16. jf,
.,g SI-V90 HHSI/SI pump SI-P-6A mini-g O
(Sl-V89 flow isolation from RWST.
mo analogous)
No effect on safety for h[
systee operation. Alter-ma nate isolation valve SI-V93 in main miniflow
- re line provides backup
$w isolation.
ue
e TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 6 of 10)
Component Failure Mode FCCS Operation Phase
- Effect on System Operation
- Failure Detection Method Remarks
- 15. Motor operated Fells to open Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detectio Valve is electrically l gate valve on demand, legs of RC loops, of providing NPSH to suc-as that stated for item interlocked with iso-5 RH-V35 tion of HHSI/CH pumps from LMSI/RNR pumps. No safety
- go lation valves SI-V90, 7-SI-V89, SI-V93, RC-V23, effect on system operation.
RC-V22 and CBS-V8.
Minimum HPSH to NHSI/CH Valve can not ba opened pump suction will be met by unless valve SI-V93 or flow f rom LHSI/RHR pump
$1-V90 and SI-V89 RH-P-88 via cross-tie line valves are closed; and opening of isolation valve RCS-V23 or valve CS-V460 or CS-V461 RCS-V22 is closed, and isolation valve RN-V36.
and CBS-V8 is open.
- 16. Motor operated Falls to open Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detectio Valve is electrically l gate valve on demand.
legs of RC loops.
of providing NPSH to suc-as that stated for item interlocked with iso-
$4.
Rd-V36 tion of HHSI/h1 pumps from LHSI/RRR pumps. No effect g*
lation valves, SI-V90, on SI-V89, SI-V93 CBS-Vl4, D3 on safety for system opera-RC-V88 and RC-V87.
ud>-
tion. Minimum NPSH to NHSI/
Valve cannot be opened SI pump suction will be met unless valve SI-V93 by flow from LHSI/RNR pump or SI-V90 and SI-V89 b4 RH-P-8A via cross-tie line valves are closed; and opening of isolation valve RC-V88 or valve CS-V460 or CS-V461 RC-V87 is closed and and isolation valve RM-V35.
valve CBS-Vl4 is open.
- 17. Motor operated Fails to open Recirculation - cold Failure reJuces redundancy Same method of detection l
gate valve on demaad.
legs of RC loops, of providing fluid flow as stated for ite CS-V4b0 through cross-tie between 90 (CS-V461 suction of HHSI/CH pumps t
analogous) and HHSI/SI pumps. No ef fect on safety of system operation. Alter-nate isolation valve (CS-V461 opens to provide backup flow path through 3,
cross-tie line.
og m a 0 3
- 18. Motor operated Falls to close Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection
$[(I gate valve on demand, lege of RC loops.
of providing flow isolation as that stated for item #4.
"]
CBS-V47 of HMSI/S! pump suction 56 -
(CBS-v51 from RWST. No effect on n
analogous) safety for system operation.
j$,
to en Alternate check isolation valve (CBS-V48) provides backup isolation.
m
,,I' 6
d TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 7 of 10)
Component Failure Mode ECCS Operation Phase
- Effect on System Operation
- Failure Detection Method Remarks
- 19. Motor operated Fails to close Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection gate valve on demand.
legs of RC loops.
of providing flow isolation as that stated previously g
LCV-112D of suction of HHSI/CH pt.mps for failure of item during (LCV-Il2E from RWST. No effect on injection phase of ECCS analogous) safety for system operation.
operation.
Alternate check isolation valve (CBS-V58) provides backup isolation.
l
- 20. Residual Fails to Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection heat deliver work-legs of RC loops.
of providing recirculation as that stated previously g
pump RH-P-8A ing fluid.
of ecolant to the RCS from for failure of ites during (pump RH-P-8B the Containment Sump.
injection phase of ECCS analogous)
Fluid flow from LHSI/RHR
' operation.
pump RH-P-8A will be lost.
Minimum recirculation flow requirements for LHSI flow will be met by LHSI/
tn" RHR pump RH-P-8B deliver-H ing fluid.
l x2 th
- 21. Safety Fails to Recirculation - cold Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection I
injection deliver work-or hot legs of RC of providing recirculation as that stated previously pump SI-P-6A ing fluid.
loops.
of coolant to the RCS from for failure of item during (pump SI-P-6B the Containment Sump to injection phase to ECCS analogous) cold legs of RC loops via operation.
RHR and SI pumps. Fluid flow from HHSI/SI pump SI-P-6A will be lost.
Minimum recirculation flow
. requirements for HH5I flow will be met by HHSI/SI pump SI-P-6B delivering working fluid.
f
- 22. Motor operated Tails to close Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection gate valve on demand, legs of RC loops.
of providing recirculation as that stated for item #4.
p 2 k O
RH-V14 of coolant to the RCS frca g
4 the Containment Sump to hot legs of RC loops. Fluid
, y gg
,g)g h $.
RIY'YSA P'Y"54# # 5 "I ""# "' 5 U E E +5* O
- vi c
nue o flow to cold legs of RC MCO FCfWegf s to ho t* ld 3 4 Ch RC
- ev L H51/MR pump g u jo p fo be me}- b3 loops.[ffi imum r9circu-o
'equ)teme/ts g @ $ & M M i ab3 % hIOId iO w
I
.latio to h gs of loop byj HSJ 'R RC hok IC$ 5 d*
1 V53 NN l
vil b Pu
- 85 p cir ula i
$g/$t pompg f 14 t RC hot gs[d1 t/y and Ata'HHSI'/SI pumps.
e TABLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 8 of 10)
Cooponent Failure Mode ECCS Operation Phase
- Effect on System Operation
- Failure Detection Method Remarks 7 Motor operated Fails to,open Recirculation p hot Failure reduces rydundancy Valve position }ndication
[
gate valveI on demad3.
legs of RC loops.
of providing recirculation (closed to operf position g
/
/
of coolant to,,the RCS from change) at B.
Valve RH-V22/
(RM-921
,/
the Containment Sump to close poj tion monito analogous) the hot)(gs of RC loops lightp ud alarm at NCh.
Fit:id flow from LHSI/
Inj ddition, RHR pump
/
pu g RH-P-8A will by/Iost.
fischarge pressbre (PI-614) j j
,e
[
/
Minimum recirculation flow
/at MCB.
/
' requirements to h'ot legs
{
i f
or RC loops will be met by LHSI/RHR pump RH-P-8B recirculating fluid to RC hot legs directly and via HHSI/SI pumps.
Motor operated Fails to open Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection as y
g ".
gate valve on demand.
legs of RC loops, of providing recirculation that stated for iten of coolant to the RCS from N
RH-V32 Yk y
- xs 9 (RH-V70 the containment sump to the analogous) hot legs of RC loops. No y
effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isola-tion valve (RH-V70) opens to provide flow path to RCS hot legs via LHSI/RHR pumps.
l Fails to close Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection
%. Motor operated gate valve on demand.
. legs of RC loops.
of providing recirculation as that stated for item #4.
g 7,.h RH-V26 of coolant to the RCS from the Containment Sump to hot legs of RC loops. Fluid flow from LHSI/RHR pump
/ ort [8l'E RII-P-8B will continue to C./050re
/:7acd y ISO /G flow to_ cold less of RC g gl gyg f 3 ggg 2
loops.j ni um re irculat on "fl re ir nts to hot reCJrCU G / Ort [/od Wgiff ~ k k 1 gs o RC cops ill be mofs fo hoy lc 3 o[- RC. $@
et b LH /RH pump RH -8A
{g rec' cu ting luid di ctly fg g g yg gU j
g a to C t le and by HS gq$
gjjk pdMp 8N-h-kd
, f, O bO CD u (dd M I 3 9
lati 1 d th RC t
legs via HSI/S1 pumps 4
y g
y;g gg f 0m P5-
a TASLE 6.3-5 (Sheet 9 of 10)
Component Failure Mode, ECCS Operation Phase eEffect on System Operation
- Failure Detection Method Remarks Motor operated Fails to close Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundar.cy Same method of detection l
gate valve on demand, legs of RC loops.
of providing flow laolation as that stated for item f4
.D SI-Vl!2 (SI-Vill of HMSI/S1 pump flow to cold analogous) lege of RC loops. No effect on safety for system opera-
,l tion valve SI-VI!4 provides backup isolation against flow to cold lege of RC loops.
Motor operated Falls to open Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection as gate valve on' demand.
legs of RC loops.
of providing recirculation that stated for item #6.
.2[:>
SI-V102 (SI-V77 of coolant to the hot lege In addition. SI pump dis-
'c analogous) of RCS from the Containment charge pressure (FI-919)
Sump via 18151/S1 pumps.
and flow (FI-918) at NCB.
Minimum recirculation flow cn requirements to hot lege cp of RC loops will be met by
],_.
i IJISI/RHR pump RN-F-84 and M*
RM-F-85 recirculating fluid N
from Containment Sump to hot lege of RC loops and HMSI/SI pump SI-F-65 recirculating fluid to hot lega 2 and 3 of RC loops through the open-ing of isolation valve SI-V77.
Motor operated Fails to close Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection gate valve on demand.
legs of RC loops.
of providing flow isolation as that stated for item #4.
,)/
SI-VII4 of IntSI/S1 pump flow to cold g
lege of RC loops. No effect on safety for system opera-1 tion. Alternate isolation valves SI-Vil2 and SI-Vill in cross-tie line between o it-
)
letSI/SI pumps provides back-j g l
up isolation against flow aa to cold lege of RC loops.
[I
's eta
~ n OD vt Vt Os l
I i
e l
TABLE 6.3-5 j
(Sheet 10 of 10)
Failure Mode ECCS Operation Phase
- Effect on System Operation
- Failure Detection Method Remarks l
Component Residual Fails to Recirculation - hot Failure reduces redundancy Same method of detection l
heat deliver legs of RC loops, of providing recirculation as that stated previously 5(*
of coolant to the RCS from for failure of ites during 8 removal working fluid, the Containment Sump to injection phase of ECCS pump RH-P-8A the hot legs of RC loops.
operation.
(Pump Fluid flow from LHSl/RHR RH-P-tlB pump RH-P-8A will be lost.
analogous)
Minimum flow requirements to hot legs of RC loop will be met by IJ1SI/RHR pump RH-P-85 recirculating fluid to RC hot lege directly and via HMSI/S1 (n
to Pumps.
M CA e
>Wm N
List of abbreviations and acronyms RC
- Reactor Coolant CH, CS - Charging RCS
- Reactor Coolant System HHS1
- High Head Safety injection LHSI
- tow Head Safety injection RHR, RH - Residual Heat Removal g
- Refueling Water Storage Tank LOCA
- Loss of Coolant Accident SI
- Safety injection MCS
- Main Control Board Z
- Volume Control Tank k
- Net Positive Suction Head ym CBS
- Containment Spray tr ca.
& H
- 1 (D
3
- rt (D w u Ch e
TABLE 6.3-7 (Sheet 1 of 3)
SEQUENCE OF SWITCHOVER OPERATIONS (BASED ON NO SINGLE FAILURES)
The following manual operator actions are required to complete the switchover from the injection mode to the recirculation mode.
During the injection mode, the operator verifies that all ECCS pumps are operating and monitors the RWST and reactor building recirculation sump levels in anticipation of switchover.
Component cooling water flow to the residual heat removal heat exchangers is automatically initiated on a 'T' signal. The operator verifies th'at the component cooling water inlet isolation valves to the residual heat r.emova l heat exchangers are open prior to switchover initiation. Motor control centers E522 and E622 are energized and the engineered safeguards signal is reset prior to switchover.
The following manual actions must be completed in a timely manner following switchover initiation to align the charging pumps and safety injection pumps 4
suction to the residual heat removal pumps discharge.
SWITCHOVER STEPS The RWST " low-low" level signal in conjunction with an
'S' signal automatically initiates the opening of the containment sump isolation valves (CBS-V8/V14).
STEP 1 When each sump isolation valve (CBS-V8/V14) has reached the full open position, take immediate action to close the corresponding RWST/RHR pump suction isolation valve (CBS-V2/V5).
3 STEP 2 Close the three safety injection pump miniflow isolation valves (SI-V89/V90/V93).
STEP 3 [ Close [he,pwo valMes in the RHR c ssov line dodnstre of e
heat /exchangersMRH-Vp[V22).
[
STEP 4 Open the two parallel valves in the common suction line between the charging pump suction and the safety injection pump suction (CS-V460/V461).
STEP 5 Open each valve from each RHR purup discharge line to the charging j
pump suction and to the safety injection pump suction (RH-V35/V36).
I STEP 6 All ECCS pumps are now aligned with suction flow from the containment sump. Verify proper operation and alignment of all ECCS components and proceed to complete the following manual actions to provide redundant isolation of the RWST from the recirculation fluid.
cokl leg i rsj ec Wiort p a /f isola } ion s/n/vc bm },e s,n
{
C lose c., e of MR An+ e < ct, u o e,-s (an-vM o, gn-vu).
4,
s~s SB 1 & 2 FSAR TABLE 6.3-7 C
(Sheet 2 of 3)
STEP 7 Close the valves in the lines from the RWST to the safety injection pump suction (CBS-V47/V51).
STEP 8 Close the valves in the lines from the RWST to the charging pump suction (LCV-112 D and E).
The ECCS is now aligned for cold leg recirculation as follows:
a.
Both residual heat removal pumps are delivering from the containment sump directly to RCS cold legs and are also delivering to the suction of the safety injection and charging pumps, two b.
Both safety injection and charging pumps are delivering to the RCS cold legs.
SWITCHOVER FROM COLD LEG RECIRCULATION TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION At approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> after the accident, hot leg recirculation shall be initiated. The following manual operator actions are required to perform the switchover operation from the cold leg recirculation mode to the hot leg recirculation mode.
SWITCHOVER STEPS
]
STEP 1 Close the residual heat removal pump discharge cold leg header f
isolation valvenf (RH-V14/V26)f us hich remai.4ed open doriny cod Ic $ recircu I a+Co n.
{
T EP y Open'the residual)6 r removal ptf
'discharg t assover7[shhitQton
/
vdvesdRH-V21/y2'2)
[
/
STEP M Open the residual heat removal pump discharge hot leg header isolation valves (RH-V32/V70).
STEP M Stop safety injection pump No.
1.
N STEP X Close the corresponding safety injection pump discharge crossover header isolation valve (SI-V112).
STEP Open the corresponding safety injection pump discharge hot leg header j
isolation valve (SI-V102).
b STEP ')T Restart safety injection pump No. 1.
STEP [ Stop safety injection pump No. 2.
STEP ')k'O Close the corresponding safety injection pump discharge crossover isolation valve (SI-V111).
l l
L
f 1
SB 1 & 2 FSAR TABLE 6.3-7 (Sheet 3 of 3)
STEP h67 Close the safety injection pump discharge cold leg header isolation 3
~
valve (SI-Vil4).
STEP )(AD0 pen the corresponding safety injection pump discharge hot leg header isolation valve (SI-V77).
STEP )(/tRestart safety injection pump No. 2.
Tha ECCS is now aligned for hot leg recirculation as follows:
a.
Both residual heat removal pumps are delivering from the containment sump directly to the RCS hot legs and are also delivering to the suction of the safety injection and charging pumps.
b.
Both safety injection pumps are delivering to the RCS hot legs.
Both charging pumps are delivering to the RCS cold legs.
c.
.e,
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 45 FSAR June 1982 i
i
'%. s TABLE 6.3-10 MANUAL SWITCHOVER SEQUENCE Maximum Estimated RWST Time (Sec)
Duration Outflow From To Action (Sec)
(GPM) f Start RWST 10-10-1 signal 0-29 CBS-V8, -V14 opening 29 16,400 30-60 Locate CBS-V2, -V5 switches 30 16,400 60-75 CBS-V2, -V5 closing 15 16,400 75-105 Locate SI-V89, -V90, -V93 30 1,800 switches 105-115 SI-V89, -V90, -V93 closing 10 1,800
/ 11 Locate'
-V21, iv swi en I 1,E'O I f)514 I
/1 155 f,V 1, -VJ osing
)
, 00 155-185 Locate CS-V460, -V461 switches 30 1,800 185-195 CS-V460, -V461 opening 10 1,800 195-225 Locate RH-V35, -V36 switches 30 1,800 225-235 RH-V35, -V36,pening 10 1,800 M
jf g-jy[
L.ecsfe Rll-VI$ 3G;kCh 30 I
i
/4$-/So S ll-V/h C/o Siny
/[
/, 60 0 i
I
-.--_-__----___-__.J