ML20058B887
| ML20058B887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/15/1990 |
| From: | Mariotte M, Riccio J NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-55FR29043, FRN-56FR64943, RULE-PR-2, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-54 AD04-2-109, AD4-2, AD4-2-109, PR-901015, NUDOCS 9010310055 | |
| Download: ML20058B887 (12) | |
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'90 OCT 15 P3 :35 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION y'g((Cy,,y' i
Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal )
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10 CFR Parts 2, 50 and 54
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55 Egd. Etg. 29043
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INTRODUCTION The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a rule which would establish the requirements that an applicant must meet in order to renew the operating license for a nuclear power plant.
We are opposed to extending nuclear power plant licenses beyond their current 40 years. At the rate at which many reactor components are aging, many nuclear power plants may be permanently closed due to safety and economic factors well before the expiration of their current licenses. In fact, in large part due to aging problems and associated maintenance costs, nuclear power plants are now more expensive to operate than coal plant despite a significant fuel l
cost advantage for nuclear.
Yet at the behest of the nuclear industry the NRC has spent taxpayers' money on extending nuclear, power plant licenses and promulgating this proposed rule.
These [
grri resources would have been better spent to ensure that the current 4'
generation of reactors can operate safely for the duration of their ip'~,
licenses. However, the proposed rule has been issued and thus must.
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be addressed. Our specific comments follow.
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i I. NRC'S " GENERIC DET'3RMINATION" THAT THE CURRENT LICENSING DASIS PROVIDES APEOUATE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND_ SAFETY IS BO"/H ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
1 The NRC regulatory approach to nuclear power plant license renewal is premised on tha vpinion that "vitt the exception of age-related degradation, the current licensing basis for each reactor provides and maintains an acceptable level of safety for operation during any renewal period." In other words, the NRC is simply asserting that all existing reactors are safe enough; when in fact many reactors do not even meet their " current licensing basis." This assertion is based upon the specious argument that because a l
reactor has operated without meltdown for 20 years its safety level is adequate for 20, 40 or 60 years more. This argument neither stands the test of logic nor reality.
This fact was recognized by Hal Lewis Subcommittee Chair of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
Mr. Lewis stated that:
the general argument that the fact th;t one has operated safely for a finite period of time proves that the saft level is adequate is just not statistically rigt because there isn't that much history in the industi And its a trap. Because other agencies, for. exampl6, people have used the argument that they had 24 successful Shuttle
- flights, to show the level of safety was adequate.
And in retrospect, af ter one disaster, it turned out not to be.
The Soviets, after Chernobyl, suddenly discovered that the level of safety they had before Chernobyl was not adequate. But the day beforce Chernobyl they would have said it was adequate on the.
basis of operating history.
(Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,- Subcommittee. on Regulatory Policies and Practices: License Renewal, ACRS-T-1789, March 26, 1990, pp. 153, 154.)
l i
r While the ACRS recognized the shortcomings of the proposed rule l
l the staff continues to support this untenable position.
After 24 l
space shuttle flights without an accident the level of safety was i
thought to be adequate. However, the 25th flight proved NASA woefully wrong. If the 41st year of operation proves the NRC as equally misguided the consequences will make the Challenger disaster seem insignificant.
Under the proposed rule the licensee / applicants will be required merely to compile a list of the documents which make up the reactor's current licensing basis. The NRC is neither going to review these documents nor confirm that the reactor is in comp 1!ance with the regulations imposed under the current license.
This is thoroughly unacceptable. The NRC itself admits in NdREG 1317 that the current licensing basis for the nations nuclear power plants is " outdated and of tentimes poorly recorded. "
Yet the proposed rule does nothing to rectify the situation. Requesting l
that the utilities list the relevant documents and are able to retrieve them is not regulation and can in no way help the NRC l
l substantiate the condition of the nuclear power, plant. The NRC acknowledges that the proposed rule is " founded upon the generic 1
determination that each nuclear power plant's licensing basis, 11 complied with, provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection throughout the renewal term" (emphasis added). Not only is this
" generic determination" unsubstantiated, but absent a showing of compliance it is both arbitrary and capricious.
The NRC must
l review the documents which make up the current licensing basis and examine the plant itself in order to determine whether the licensee has complied with the current licensing basis.
To do otherwise would be an abrogation of the Commission's duty to ensure the public health and safety.
The proposed rule requires that the information provided the NRC must be complete and accurate in all material aspects and that each licensee must notify the NRC of information having significant implications for public health and safety. While requirlf.; veracity on the part of licensees, the NRC then proceeds to undermine its own regulation. A licensee only violates the provisions of this section if the licensee
" fails to notify the Commission of information that the applicant or licensee has identified as having a significant implication for public health and safety or the common defense and security." Therefore, if a licensee fails to-identify or document a significant safety issue the applicant is in no danger of violating the requirements o the rule.
This regulatory charade is not only self defeating, it's dangerous!
Under the NRC's proposed rule a licensee / applicant is actually di:ssuaded from thoroughly exploring the safety implications of-the,i.
1;l, license renewal. This iu neither appropriate nor acceptable.
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.MD The rule, if ever implemented, must ensure that that the nuclearn.y g o f;r power plant can operate without further endangering the public.
The NRC's history of regulatory enforcement is'not'such that;theagjf, public can or should take the ecaf fs arbitrary determinationy of -
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safety on faith.
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II. THE PROPOSED RULE MUF *? ENSURE THAT THE LICENSEE / APPLICANT COMPLY _WITH THE LICENSING BASIS AT THE TIME THE RENEWAL TAKES EFFECT, RATHER THAN WHEN THE APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED i
The renewed license will supersede the existing operating license.
Thus the length of the renewal will depend on the time remaining on the original license plus the requested renewal term. Since the proposed rule allows applications for reactors only 20 years old, a 20 year old reactor could receive a renewed license of 40 years--
20 years remaining form the original license and a 20. year extension.
Thus, decisions about age related degradation and its impact on relicensing may be based upon only 20 years of actual operating experience. The licensee / applicant thereby forgoes the knowledge available from an additional 10 to 20 years of operation under.the original license. It is entirely conceivable that new age-related-problems may evolve in the 20 years remaining on the original operating license that will not be taken into consideration in the renewal decision.
The NRC's proposed rule acts to insulate the licensee from havl;ng T
to address age-related problems encountered.in the 20 years between
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the application for a renewed license and the end-of the-original:' y 40 year license. The 20 year period between the application and the-renewal should be narrowed.
The renewed license should not:
supersede the existing license thereby giving the NRC.the regulatory carrot-.to insure that the industry ' complies withJ the1 ffh
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" current" licensing basis. The proposed rule must ensure that the licensoe/ applicant meet the " current" licensing basis, e.g.
the licensing basis at the time the renewal takes effect, rather than at the time the application is submitted.
III. THE NRC'S PROPOSED RULE MISREPRESENTS THE NATURE OF GENERIC SiAFETY ISSUES AND FAILS TO REOUIRE THAT GENERIC AND UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES BE ADDRESSED PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF A RENEWED LICENSE.
The NRC's proposed rule does not require that Generic and Unresolved Safety Issues (USI GSI) be addressed prior' to receiving a renewed license. Since the current licensing basis is deemed
" sufficient" to protect the public health and-safety, anything beyond the requirements of the current lu.snsing basis are considered safety
" enhancements".
Additionally, the NRC: has.
determined that "(t)he USI and GSI resolution process is limited to 1ssues that are not of such gravity that immediate action (remedy I
or shutdown) is required."
In the background provided for the proposed rule, the NRC claims that "all unresolved GSIs generally address only enhancements of safety." (55 FR 29046). However in NUREG-1412, Foundation for the Adequacy of the Licensing Basis, the NRC interpretation states that-
"(i)t should be noted, however, that GSIs generally address only enhancements of safety or restoration of a safety marain orlainally
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l estimated to be cresent, because an adequate level of protection of the public health and. safety currently.is believed to exist at all operating nuclear power plants. "
(emphasis added]
(NUREG-1412,:
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- 1. 3.4, p.1-7). The deletion of thia-language from the proposed rule is informativo. It acknowledges that the implementation of GSI resolutions is necessary to restore the mergin of safety believed to exist prior to the discovery of the generic issue.
To allow 4
nuclear power plants to be relicensed without implementing the GSI resolutions means that the NRC is allowing a degradation of the l
safety afforded the public.
In fact, by renewing the license i
absent implementation of GSI resolutions, the NRC will allow j
operation of a nuclear power plant which it knows is more-dangerous than the plant it originally licensed.
To-act in this I
manner is not only irresponsible but negligent.
GSIs should be l
resolved prior to the issuance of a renewed license.
l Once an issue is labeled " generic" the individual plant being licensed is no longer required to resolve the issue prior to operation.
The Kemmeny Commission stated that "this would be 1
acceptable if there were a strict procedure within NRC to assure a a
timely resolution of generic problems... However, the evidence indicates that labeling of a problem as " generic" may provide a convenient way of postponing decision on a difficult question."
(Kemmeny @
p.
- 20) Resolution of Generic and Unresolved safety issues does not mean solution.
Generic safety issues have a way of-becoming unresolved safety issues. And even once " resolved" by the NRC the issue is rarely solved.
To renew an operating license'for.
20 to 40 more years absent implementation of GSI and_ USI
" resolutions" is not regulation; but abdication of the Commission's statutory responsibility.
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IV. NRC'S ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION THROUGH
- ESTASJ,,ISHED EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS" MERELY SERVES TO DEGRADE i
THE OPERATIONAL SAFETY MARGIN AND UNDERMINE THE NOTION OP DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH To address the problem of age-related degradation of the reactor the NRC's rule requires that the licensee / applicant identify those i
structures, systems and components (SSCs) susceptible to aging and i
to have an " established effective program" to ensure that the SSC will continue to perform its safety function; will not' f ail'in such I
a way as to prevent another SSC from performing its safety function; and will continue to function with sufficient reliability i
during the renewal term. This effort on the part of the NRC to address the problem of aging, it is bound to fall short of the-s mark. The regulatory philosophies already instituted by the NRC' actually serve to undermine the NRC's notion of defense-in-depth!
and allow for a degradation of the nuclear power plants operational safety margin.
3 The NRC proposed rule on fracture toughness requirements for pressurized thermal shock is an excellent-example of where:
" established ef fective programs" have been undermined by the NRC:inQ,
.. e g ic order to further administrative ends.
While the staff?s7yt
,wgbb regulatory analysis-attempts to rationalize its failure to chan the screer.ing
- criteria, the discussion before the Advisory]y~
Committee on Reactor Safeguards is~much more telling.
Thereasonsp to be gleaned from the discussions before the ACRS has little to do" with the safe operation of reactors with embrittled RPVs nor
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it concern the " adequate protection" of the public health and safety.
The staff's rationale is actually based on its desire to avoid reopening the entire PTS issue.
Regardless of the regulatory analysis presented in support of the proposed rule, the fact.is that the NRC staff is not basing its decisions on the basis of safety considerations but on administrative expedience, j
On March 23, 1989, Dr. Neal Randall presented the Staff's case to the ACRS.
Discussions between Dr. Seiss of the ACRS and Dr.
Randall are most enlightening.
In response to a question from Dr.
Seiss, Dr. Randall commented that the proposed rule will give more-conservative results for a little more than half of the plants under consideration.
Dr. kandall later went on to attempt to address the question, "shouldn't we also change the screening criterion because the formula used to derive the probabilities in the original rule was the old PTS formula.
And now we're going to change the formula."
(Transcript of JOINT-ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MATERIALS AND METALLURGY / STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING ON REVISED PTS RULE AND EMBRITTLEMENT OF RPV SUPPORTS ; - p. 3 7,,
(March 23,-
1989).
The discussion between Dr. Seiss and Dr.-Randall continued as follows:
DR. RANDALL:
The first reason I don't want to i
change the screening criterion is that if we do so,we 9
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will have to reopen the whole issue of-PTS.
DR. SEISS:
This is a non-technical reason.
DR. RANDALL:
I can't --
g DR. SEISS:
I mean DR. RANDALL:
Characterize it any way you like.
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,h can' t believe I can sell the idea, you know, that this
was a neat mathematical process where we've picked an acceptable probability and we've read of f a screening criterion, and how if we calculated a
different t
probability, we're just making a delta change in the screening criteria, and are happy.
(Id. at 39).
As the above discussion reveals, the staf f's analysis and decision to change the method for calculating RTm without making a concomitant change in the screening criterion is unscientific at i
best.
It is, in fact, both arbitrary and capricious.
Dr'.
Randall's inability to present a cogent argument in support _of the staff's position brings into question the regulatory analysic submitted in support of the proposed rule.
Furthermore, it reveals a lack of concern for the role of the NRC as protector of the public 11th and safety.
The NRC's lead plant in the effort to extend plant life, Yankee
- Rowe, has recorded reference temperatures for. PTS which are-significantly higher than regulations allow.
This seriously calls into question the plants ability to operate past another refueling let alone another 20 to 40 years. If the plant continues to operate and the vessel cracks a meltdown is inevitable. What will be the NRC's response to the victims-of. its shortsightedness? How can the -
Commission and staff justify the risk for mere administrative' expedience?
Other " established - ef fective programs" are undermined by ill.
founded regulatory theories such as " leak-before-break".
Simply stated, the " leak-before-break" theory concocted by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission-postulates that reactor piping will leak prior to breaking thereby allowing utilities to identify the crack and shut down the reactor to undertake repairs. Theoretically the utilities will discover the leak before the pipe ruptures and precipitates a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) which in turn could lead to core meltdown. However, the former Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reported to the Commission that, " leak-before-break is not an established law. "
Denton went on to state.that, if there really is a pipe out there somewhere that is cracked half way through or 55 percent of "Se way through before it begins to leak, then there is very little time to detect the leakage and take proper corrective action."
The NRC staff also expressed its reservations about the leak-before-break theory in a meeting with General Electric, the Electric Power Research. Institute (EPRI) and-those utilities experiencing IGSCC or pipe thinning. The staff noted that, measurable pipe leakage should occur before pipe structural failure. However, the leak-before-break concent cannot be the solg basis for continued safe operation." (emphasis added)
Relying upon ill-founded theories such as " leak-before-break" only
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serves to undermine the notion that these plants can operate safely up to and beyond the 40 year license. Four nuclear power plant workers were scalded to death at the Surry reactor yet ~ the NRC still uses this " theory".
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2.
CONCLilSION The oldest nuclear power plant in the nation, Yankee Rowe, began
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commercial operation in June - of 1961 and its current license expires in 2000. Yankee Rowe, however, is an anomaly. Both plants licensed before Rowe and ten of the eleven reactors licensed in the
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following six years have been permanently shut down--the majority of these plants having operated for less than 10 years. Despite the industry's experience to date, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the nuclear industry have been expending significant resources in an attempt to extend nuclear power plant licenses beyond 40 R
years.
These funds would have been better spent addressing issues pertaining to the safety of. plants during their operating license not wasted on some pie in the sky etfort to support a crippled and crumbling industry.
However, it again appears that the-tail is wagging the dog, and the nuclear industry is dictating the terms under which it wishes to operate. Perhaps someone should remind the NRC that the "R"
stands for Regulatory not "Rahl Rah!"; and that the Commission is answerable to the public not the nuclear industry.
Submitted by y$
s.
m1 ames P. Riccio Michael Mariotte
',,/
Nuclear Power Campaign Coordinator.
Executive Director l
Greenpeace Action
= Nuclear Information'E.
Resource Service l
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