ML20207F140
| ML20207F140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1985 |
| From: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Shiffer J PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204J197 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197 NUDOCS 8701050458 | |
| Download: ML20207F140 (68) | |
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UNITED STATES 3
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Docket No.:
50-275 Mr. J. D. Shiffer, Vice President Nuclear Power Generation c/o Nuclear Power Generation. Licensing Pacific Gas & Electric Company 77 Beale, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106
Dear Mr. Shiffer:
Subject:
Issuance of Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment Enclosed for your information is a copy of the " Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity of Hearing" related to your application request of January 30, 1985, to modify the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Technical Specifications to provide for two unit operation with a common control room and to clarity the testing requirement for Diesel Generator No. 3.
This Notice has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
Sincerely, i
George I( Knighton, ief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Federal Register Notice cc: See next pace 87 PDkIOfff8861230
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I Diablo Canvnn Mr. J. D. Shiffer, Vice President Nuclear Power Generation c/o Nuclear Power Generation, Licensing Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Peale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
Resident Inspector /Diablo Canven NPS Pacific Gas & Electric Company c/o US Nuclear Requia'.ory Commission Post Office Box 7442 P. O. Box 369 San Francisco, California 94120 Avila Beach, California 93424 Mr. Malcolm H. Furbush Ms. Raye Fleming Vice e esident - General Counsel 19?O Mattie Road Pacific Gas & Electric Company Shell Beach, California 93440 Post Office Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 Joel Reynolds, Esq.
John R. Phillips, Esq.
Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Center for Law in the Public interest California Public Utilities Commission 10951 West Pico Boulevard 350 McAllister Street Third Floor San Francisco, California 94102 Los Angelas, California 90064 Mr. Frederick Eisslar, President Mr. Dick Blankanburg Scenic Shorelire Preservation Editor & Co-Publisher Conference, Inc.
South County Publishino Company 46?3 Fore Mesa Drive P. O. Box 460 Santa Barbara, California 93105 Arroyo Grande, California 93470 Ms. Elizabeth Apfelberg Rruce Norton, Esq.
1415 Cozadern Norton, Rurke, Berry A French, P.C.
San Luis Obispo, California 93401 202 E. Osborn Road P. O. Box 10569 Mr. Gordon A. Silver Phoen,x, Arizona 85064 Ms. Sandra A. Silver 1760 Alisal Street Mr. W. C. Ganoinff San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Westingbruse Electric Corporatice P. O. Box 355 Harry M. Willis, Esq.
Pittsburgh, Pennsvivania 15230 Seymour & Willis 601 California Street, Suite 2100 David F. Fleischaker, Eso.
San Francisco, California 94108 P. O. Box 1178 Oklahoma City, Oklahera 73101 Mr. Pichard Hubbard MHB Technical Associates Suite V 1725 Hamilton Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Mr. John Marrs, Manacina Editor San Luis Obison County Telegram Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P. O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, California 93406
I Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Mr. Thnnas Devine Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Goverrrent Accountability Projact r50enix, Arizona 85073 Institute for Policy Studios 1901 Oue Street, NW u r. Lee M. Gustafson, Director Washincton, DC 20009 ederal Agency Relations Dacific Gas & Electric Company 1050 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 1180
- ashington, DC 20036 a
- egional Administrator - Region V LS Nuclear Reculatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Michael J. Strunwasser, Esq.
Special Counsel to the Attorney General State of California 3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800 Los Angeles, California 90010 Pr. Tom Harris Sacrenanto Bee 21st and 0 Streets Sacramento, California 95814 Pr. H. Daniel Nix California Energy Connission 1516 9th Street, MS 18 Sacramento, California 95814 Lewis Shollenberger, Esq.
US Nuclear Regulatory Connission
, Reaion V 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596
__ Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors
- non 220 County Courthouse Annex San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Pirector Energy Facilities Siting Division Erecov Resources Conservation and Development Commission 1516 9th Street Sacramento, California 95814 President California Public Utilities Connission California State Building 350 McAllester Street San Francisco, California 94102 Wr. Joseph 0. Ward, Chief Dadiological Health Branch State Department of Health Services 714 P Street, Office Building *8 Sacramento, California 95814 e
9
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i Exhibit 6 Quality Audit Summary Report Audit Date:
11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Report Applicable Documents: NRC Region V Instruction No. 1303 and Supplemental Safety Evaluation Reports
- 21, #22 and #26.
An audit was performed on the NRC Region V Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program (AMP) to determine if NRC Region V Instruction No. 1303 requirements--the standard for all NRC staff work in the AMP--and Supplemental Safety Evaluation Re-port #21, #22 and #26 policy statements were implemented.
The audit addressed interface with individuals making allega-tions and expressing concerns which pertained to design, con-struction, operation, and management of safety-related stuctures, systems and components at Diablo Canyon.
The auditor conducted telephone interviews with allegers and reviewed affidavits pre-pared by allegers.
An audit was then performed on the NRC Region V responses to allegations and to a series of questions and concerns raised by Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor to the House Interior Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment (Udall Committee), about the 19 77 Nuclear Services Corporation's in-dependent audit of Pullman Power Products.
This audit con-cluded that Pullman's construction program did not meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Quality Assurance requirements.
There has been a major breakdown in the NRC staff Alle-gation Management Program.
Several Program Deficiencies in the implementation of Region V Instruction No. 1303 requirements and SSER policy statements have been identified, including a series of materially false or misleading statements by the staff to Dr. Myers.
The NRC Staff did not implement their procedure requirements for confirmation of allegations.
The Staff did not impiment their procedure and policy statements for pledges of confidentiality to allegers.
The Staff did not implement their procedures and policy statements for handling of allegations.
The Staff did not refer allegations of wrong-doing to the NRC Office of Investiga tions in a timely manner and in some cases not at all.
The Staff did not conduct systematic examination and analysis for each allegation it received.
The Staff did not provide responses to numerous concerns and allegations.
In many instances the Staff turned allegations over to the Pacific Cas & Electric Company for responses but failed to report that those allegations were i
turned over to PG&E as required by SSER #26.
The failure to implement procedures for handling of al-
[
legations resulted in at least ten material false and/or mis-leading statements by the NRC Staff.
Most of these false or misleading statements were in response to concerns raised by
s Dr. Myers of the Udall Comittee.
The NRC stated that they did not do a comprehensive re-construction of Pullman?.s construction program activities which may have contributed to these false and/or misleading statements.
Region V did not implement the procedures for Employee Discrimi-ination/ Complaints, which resulted in a material false statement by the Region V Administrator concerning referraloof wrong-doings to the NRC Office of Investigation in a timely manner.
The breakdown in the NRC Diablo Canyon Allegation Manage-ment Programs raises questions about the Staff's ability to assure the safe operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant.
Too many safety-related issues have not been adequately resolved and the Region V Staff has shown an unwillingness to forth-rightly address the allegations and concerns raised.
The Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program should be removed from the jurisdiction of Region V and other previous staff responsible for its implementation, with certain excep-tions such as the Office of Investigations.
An unbiased, in-dependent organization should be appointed to oversee the Al-legation Management Program and review all allegations made, past and present, to assure that all significant issues have been properly addressed and resolved.
Harold Hudson Quality Assurance Auditor s
Audit Action Request #1 Audit Date 11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Allegation Management Program
-- Material False Statements by NRC Region V Staff to Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor to House Interior Subcommittee on Energy and Environmnet (Udall Committee).
Referenced' Documents:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter, 6-13-84, from Office of Congressional Affairs to Dr. Myers (Udall Committee), NRC Region V Reports Nos. 50-275/83-37 and 50-323/83-25 and SSER #22.
Findings:
The NRC Office of Congressional Affairs has provided responses by NRC Region V Staff to concerns raised by Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor to the Udall Committee, in regards to a 1977 independent Internal Audit performed by Nuclear Services Corporation on Pullman Power Products at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant.
Region V's responses to Dr. Myers contain eight material false or misleading statements with regard to their investigation of the NSC Audit and PG&E and Pullman responses.
Two additional false statements by the NRC staff were identified.
I.
(Background Question #2)
Dr. Myers raised concerns about the scope of the NSC Audit.
He asked Region V the following questions:
(1) "Did NSC fulfill its commitment to verify the adequacy of installed hardware?"
(2) "If not, what was the reason for its not having done so?"
Region V responded in part that, " Based on our review of the scope of work assigned to NSC, it clearly looks as if NSC should have focused on installed hardware."
This is a materially misleading statement based on the omission of pertinent information.
The Region V response indicates that the audit should have emphasized hardware and that "(t)he Staf f does not know the precise reasons NSC did not direct their audit toward hardware."
The Staff has omitted that hardware was only one of three areas NSC committed to review in the scope of the Pullman audit, and that the scope of the hardware review was to be extremely limited.
The July 28, 1977 Proposal For Independent Internal Audit of Pullman-Kellogg's Efforts at Diablo Canyon by NSC states in paragraph 2 that "(t)he Audit scope will include:
Review of the overall adequacy of the existing quality A.
assurance program against current NRC requirements.
B.
Review of the implementation of the quality assurance program.,
l Review of the workmanship of field fabricated and installed C.
items."
An August 1, 1977, teletype letter to NSC's Jack Webber from R.T. Walter for E.F. Gerwin, directs NSC's to proceed with necessary efforts to buplement the audit with the following corrections and clarifications to NSC's Proposal:
Page 1, paragraph 2.0, Scope of Services, add sentence to er.d of this paragraph to include review of personnel and organization adequacy.
Under items in same paragraph include installation of all fabricated piping.
By way of clarification, Pipe is understood to include installation of prefabricated pipe and is not limited to field fabrication.
Actually, I would prefer greater emphasis with de-emphasis of 2" and smaller.
In closing, Gerwin instructed that "the audit plan should be reviewed, and submitted to Pullman Power Products
- prepared, in Williamsport prior to commencement of the site audit."
An August 8, 1977, Pullman Interoffice Correspondence to E.F.
Gerwin from A.A. Eck concerning " Systems Audit by NSC" recorded actions taken during meetings between Pullman, PG&E and NSC for the purpose of defining the scope of work to be performed by NSC.
Pullman presented problem areas to NSC and NSC recommended "a complete systems review on sampling plan PG&E's Stan Bates recommended "that in addition to basis."
areas reviewed as " problem areas" that we add " site organiza-tional structure" and system of reporting to area for review by NSC."
Prior to the site audit, NSC presented their Audit Plan to Pullman and it was accepted for implementation.
The Nuclear Services Corporation Audit Plan For An Independent Internal Audit of Pullman-Kellogg's Diablo Canyon Project, no date, stated in paragraph 1.2:
The audit is intended to encompass the con-struction efforts from contract initiation to the present and will include investigation of the items discussed in the following paragraphs:
Initiation of the Contractors Quality Assurance oProgram, modifications and revisions to the QA and the adequacy of the current QA program.
- program, Investigation and evaluation of the Contractors oorganization; personnel qualifications; instructions, procedures, and drawings; document control; pur-chased material control and identification; special process control; nonconforming reporting and close-corrective action; quality assurance records out; including inspection, nonconforming materials,
~
discrepancies and corrective action; audits, Investigation and evaluation of implementation o
of the Contractors functional application of selected work including representative sampling of systems from each unit.
The Audit Plan indicated that the following systems would be investigated and evaluated:
Feedwater Systems Unit 1 and 2, Main Steam Unit 1, CVCS System Unit 2, RHR System Unit 1, Safety Injection System Unit 1, Containment Spray System Unit 1 and Component Cooling Water System Unit 1.
The Audit Plan states that "(t)he systems review will include physical inspec-tion and verification of installed components, welds, attach-ments, restraints, and the following items:
a.
Procurement Specification.
b.
Receiving inspection of items including piping spool pieces, hangers, snubbers, anchors, valves, and support components, inspecting consumables such as film, dye penetrant, and NDE equipment, welding materials.
Storage of components, materials, consumables.
c.
d.
Installation, erection, fitup, welding, cleaning, inspection, and testing."
The NRC Region V conclusion that the NSC Audit should have focused on hardware is misleading.
NSC committed to and Pullman accepted a three-part audit:
1.
Initiation of the QA program, modification and revisions to the program, and the adequacy of the current QA program.
2.
Implementation of the QA program.
3.
Investigation and evaluation of functional application of selected work including representative sampling of systems from each unit.
The NSC Audit Report to Pullman does not specifically indicate what systems were actually sampled.
The Audit Report was not organized around hardware systems but on the 18 point criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
But hardware systems were reviewed.
Where NSC identified hardware findings, they were reported under the appropriate 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria heading.
On balance, NSC performed the limited hardware review included in the contract, but organized its conclusions around program Within violations, rather than physical equipment deficiencies.
that format, findings on hardware were presented.
This is now a common and acceptable format within the industry.
There has been much criticism by PG&E and Pullman that NSC did an inadequate job of identifying findings to a specific hardware ___ _ _ _. _
Yet Pullman is as much responsible for the deficidhcy NSC submitted an Audit Plan which was approved by system.
The Audit Plan implementation was subject to daily as NSC.
Pullman.
coordination and review by Pullman.
Any changes to the Audit But Plan would have to have been generated at this time,.
Pullman internal memos and memos to during this time span, related to the Audit, do not indicate their corporate office, It is not until PG&E dissatisfaction with the audit methods.
12 and 13, and Pullman had a series of meetings on January 11, 1978, that a concern was raised about verifying findings to specific systems.
NSC performed a three-part audit which included a "repr at in a format that later satisfied Pullman, PGEE and the NRC, the time the format was prepared in conjunction with Pullman.
t NSC's deficiency was cosmetic.
It produced the Region V's At worst, substantive results for which NSC had been hired.
response to Dr. Myers is a materially misleading statement.
II.
(Background Question #5) l Dr. Myers raised concerns about the Pipe Rupture Restraint He asked Region V, "Why had welder generic cracking problem. deficiencies not been detected and corrected date by Pullman's QC/QA Program?"
NRC Region V responded in part:
The original inspection process specified for these welds did not anticipate this type of failure (lamellar tears) and was not suitable for their detection.
Therefore, even though the QC Inspectors performed their inspections properly they were not able to detect the flaws The due to the inspection technique specified.
problem was ultimately identified when performing A suitable routine repairs to the restraints.
nondestructive examination method was specified and applied as a part of the corrective action program.
based on the omission of This is a material false statement, Region V only addresses nondestructive pertinent information. inspection and does not address other QA/Q detecting and attempted corrective action for the Pipe The Freed memorandum Rupture Restraint cracking problem.
referenced by Dr. Myers identifies the basic causes of the problem as joint design, base material, indiscriminate material All of these issues were removal and inadequate preheat. identified by or made known to P 1
l the course of construction, but the generic nature of the cracking problem was not perceived.
and corrective action Pullman's detection (identification) included: _
A.
DR 82654, 12-24-74, first identification of a crack in base material that was laminar in nature.
B.
A 4-25-75 Pullman Interoffice Correspondence from the QA/
QC Manager to inspectors stating that the A.W.S. Code required preheat when welding structural members if the material thickness exceeded 3/4".
C.
A 5-6-75 revision to ESD 243 making verifigation of pre-heats a QC function instead of a production function.
D.
PG&E performed an audit on 9-17-75 and 9-19-75, and found that Pullman's QA personnel allowed welders to weld with-out verifying minimum preheat and interpass temperatures.
Pullman issued DR 82969 identifying that rupture restraints had welds completed without proper preheat.
E.
Because of the continuing problems with weld cracking in restricted joints, the QA/QC Manager on 10-23-75 issued an Interoffice Correspondence to QC Inspectors stating that they should take the following action in an' effort to avoid the cracks:
1.
Suggest to the production personnel that they use more heat, preferably 3000 or more.
2.
Check to assure that the temperature is maintained during the complete welding cycle.
3.
Recommend a welding sequence which will induce less stress.
4.
After weld is complete, let it cool completely before final visual inspection, then examine closely for tight cracks.
5.
Make sure that there are no visible cracks before calling for U.T.
inspection.
This IOC would tentatively identify reasons for the continued cracking problem, welds in restricted joints and welding sequences.
F.
Pullman would issue DR 83158 concerning cracking adjacent to beam to column flange welds.
PG&E Engineer Research sent a letter, 6-4-76, to PG&E management, of which Pullman received a copy, reporting the results of an investigation into the cracking.
The results were --
1.
The fracture is brittle in nature.
2.
The fracture results from flame cutting of the welding i
relief hole in the weld, 3.
There are high, up to yield stress level, residual stresses in the vicinity of the beam to column weld joints.
These stresses are a result of the beam to column weld... _
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4.
Higher residual stresses, and cracks, appear to be associated with wide, greater than 3/4" wide weld
/
passes.
The. letter stated that failures appear to be the result of~a number of minor materials property, fabrication E
details, construction sequence details that combined to cause these cracks.
The letter then gave recommendations for repair and modification of welding and manufacturing procedures to alleviate these problems.
These recommenda-tions were:
i 1.
Preheat before all thermal cutting operations according to.the welding preheat schedule for the thickness of materia) being cut-2.
Remove, by grinding or other mechanical means, a minimum of 1/15" from all flame cut or arc gouged surfaces not to bo 8.ncorporated in the weld.
3.
fthe Gelding procedure should be modified to limit the weld bead wiith to 5/8" maximum.
For 2 -inch and thiF<er material, in beam to column joints and other restrainted yointa, the minimum preheat temperatures should be dais'ed to -300 F, and a maximum interpass 0
temperature 'of 8000F should be imposed.
4.'WNce)poss[ibletheweldjointdetailshouldbemodified
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'tel edace the volum? of weld metal deposited.
This can b'e accomplished by uriing a narrower groove, a double-V
, weld preparation ~, ur both, instead of the 450 single-V
'J
- wcid 'p, reparation presently used.
G._'On '6-10-76, ESD 243 was revised to implement recommendations
's of-PG&E's investigations.,
d' H.
From 3-230M to 7-20-78, a total of twenty-four discrepancy reports were/ generated by Pullman which involved cracking J
i in' Pipe;Rupthre Restraints.
g-o I '.
The contihuing problem of weld cracking resulted in a iJ-9-76 IOC to a.11 rupturo restraint inspectors instructing
,them that Prcesss Sheet Stop 6 - Final Visual, was not to ba' signed until the,vold.had cooled to ambient temperatures and chin the " inspector was to check and see that the weld area wt.s clean et slag, scale and smoke, and that it was smooth for 0.T. exam.
This would help the inspector to more readily detect cracks in welds.
J.'
On 7-20-73, DR #3686 reported a lamellar tear which opened c
~
durir.g repair of a weld in the Unit 1 piperack.
Subsequent NDE an'd metallurgical. studies by PG&E revealed a generic nroblem'with highly restrained joints.
This would lead to severcl PG&E Nonconformance Reports resulting in NCR #DCl-
~
5-7-79, identifying rejectable linear indica-79-RM-010, s
j tions in field welds.,
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Region V has omitted vital information in answering Dr. Myers' question.
This information shows that Pullman's QA/QC Depart-ment was aware of the four basic causes of the cracking prob-
- lem, but not as a generic problem, and attempted to implement corrective action although this action would be ineffective.
As a result, Region V's response to Dr. Myers is a material false statement by omission.
III.
(Question ill) nn Dr. Myers raised concern about the Post Weld Heat Treatment.
He asked Region V, "What is the basis for the conclusion that post weld heat requirements were in compliance with Appendix B prior to issuance of ESD 218 in October 1977?"
l Region V's response was:
,1 The basis for the NRC staff's conclusion that post weld heat treetment requirements were in compliance with Appendix B prior to issuance of ESD 218 in October 1977 is as stated in the NRC Inspection report, ' Appropriate post weld heat treatment requirements were always prescribed by welding procedure specificiations.'
This is a material false statement based on the omission of pertinent information.
This statement is wrong about P.W.H'.T.
requirements being in compliance with Appendix B prior to issuance of ESD 218 in October 1977.
An April 1975 Pullman Corporate Audit identified that P.W.H.T.
~
was not on the operations list of Field Process Sheets, as required by the QA Manual for code welds, and that QA Inspectors were not documenting verification of position of thermocouples as required by the QA Manual.
Failure to implement QA Manual requirements is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, resulting in indeterminate quality prior to April 1975 concerning application and verification of Post Weld Heat Treatment.
Region V's response to Dr. Myers is a material false statement based on omission of pertinent information.
t IV.
(Questions ill, 23, 30 and 39)
Dr. Myers raised concerns about the adequacy of Pullman's Corporate and Internal Audit Programs in relation to the welding program.
He asked several questions about this issue:
A.
Question ill -
"Did the corporate audits encompassed include review of weld and welder quality, and QA programs applied to weld and welder quality?"
B.
Question #23 -
. how could the audit program, upon which Region V relies ' detect welding program weakness and provide prompt corrective action during early phases of site welding' if the audit program was not initiated until November 1974?"
_g_
Question #30 -
"What is the basis for assurance that, c.
prior to November 1973, welders understood their duties and responsibilities?"
I Question #39 -
"Why did NSC cad Region V reach such dis-D.
parate conclusions?"
NSC had concluded management audits were ineffectual, while the NRC concluded there was no basis to suggest these audits were ineffectual.
Region'V's responses were:
Answer #11 -- The inspector stated that the internal audit E.
program was of marginal quality but that "the audits con-ducted by the corporate people compensated for this and the program as a whole met Appendix B requirements."
F.
Answer #23:
"Even though the welder audits did not start I
until November 1973, the Pullman internal audits and corporate audits (previously discussed) routinely examined in process welding and were implemented from the beginning of work."
Answer #30 -
there was an active audit program in I
G.
existence prior to November 1973 which routinely examined l
in process welding."
Answer #39 -- The answer referenced NRC Inspection Report H.
83-79, paragraph 42, page 40 for the staff's-rationale.
No.
"There is a file of ten management audit reports, performed during the this time period, indicating that comprehensive inspections were conducted by the Pullman Corporate Office on approximately a semi-annual frequency."
These four responses are material false statements based on omission of pertinent information.
Region V Staff has not addressed the scope of Pullman Corporate Audits.
Prior to February 1978, Pullman's Corporate Audits did not specifically address Pipe Rupture Restraints.
PG&E Audit 180422, issued 6-13-78, identified that records do not indicate that manage-(corporate) audits have been performed on Pipe Support work.
ment Pullman's Corporate audits of weld and welder quality, and QA programs applied to weld and welder quality were for piping, With the exclu-not Pipe Supports and Pipe Rupture Restraints.
sion of Pipe Supports and Pipe Rupture Restraints from Corporate the NRC conclusions that " comprehensive inspections were
- Audits, conducted by the Pullman Corporate Office" and that there was "an active audit program in existence prior to November 1973 which routinely examined in process welding" are not valid.
the first Per Region V's response to Dr. Myers' Question 49, pipe support work began on 8-5-71 for non-safety-related work 5
and 8-16-71 for safety-related pipe supports.
Pipe Rupture Restraint work began in late 1972.
The comprehensive inspections conducted by Pullman's Corporate Office and the active audit program prior to 11-73 which routinely examined in process welding was for piping and did not address the Pipe Support and Pipe Rupture Restraint welding in progress.
.b 4
In the answer to #11 it is indicated that the NRC Inspector stated that "the internal audit program was of marginal PG&E's Audit #80422 generated Nonconformance Report quality."
No. DC-78-RM-004 which identifies that the scope of management and internal audits had not been established and there was no detailed schedule to show that all aspects of the QA program An unofficial, unapproval internal audit had been audited.
schedule existed, but it had not been followed consistently and few Engineering Specifications appeared on the schedule.
A March 1977. internal audit erroneously stated that QA Manual 9 and 14 were not to be audited because they sections KFP 3, 5, Internal audit schedules for do not apply to Diablo Canyon.
October, November and December 1977 and January 1978 were not met.
The Corporate audits did not address Pipe Supports and Pipe The internal audits were of marginal Rupture Restraints.There is no basis for the NRC Region V conclusion that the audit " program as a whole met Appendix B requirements."
quality.
The four responses by Region V to Dr. Myers' questions concern-ing the welding problem are material false statements.
V.
(Background Question #3)
Dr. Myers again raised concerns about the Pullman Corporate audit program by asking, "What was the basis for the 83-37 finding (stated on page 40) that Pullman had performed adequate Corporate audits?
Region V's response in part was, "And, as stated in Staffthe co Report 83-37, Audits provided adequate audit coverage to meet the requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
This is a material false statement based on omission of pertinent See item IV above for omitted information.
information.
VI.
(Question #22)
He asked Dr. Myers raised concerns of preheating requirements.
if preheating requirements presented by the weld procedure specifications and documented by signature on the welding block of the process sheet were in compliance with Appendix B.
1 Region V responded:
The inspector concludes that, while no separate and specific procedure for preheating of weld 1
1977, pre-joints existed prior to December 30, heating requirements were e.dequately prescribed by the welding procedure specifications and documented l
by signature on the welding block of the process sheet, which specified the applicable welding This was in compliance with Appendix B, procedure.
hence the finding in paragraph 29 of the NRC inspection report that "(n)o items of noncompliance - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
or deviations were identified."
This is a false statement by omission of pertinent informa-tion.
Welding performed on Pipe Rupture Restraints in 1974 did not meet the criteria established by Region V for compli-ance with Appendix B.
This is illustrative in representative welds of Rupture Restraint #2031-6RT, FW's #14 A to E,
- 15 A to F,
- 16 A to C,
- 17 A to I,
- 4 A to G,
- 9 A to E,
- 10 A to G, and #11 A to E.
The field process' sheets for these welds do not have specific preheat requirements.
Although there is reference to the Weld Procedure Specification, there is no documented signature on the welding block of the process In sheet, which specified the applicable welding procedure.
many cases these blocks are marked "NA".
In addition, the Rupture Restraint Engineer Specification, ESD 243, did not require QC Inspectors to verify preheat temperatures until 5-6-75.
Region V's statement that preheats g requirements were docu-mented by signature on the welding block of the. process sheet is a false statement in regards to Pipe Rupture Restraints and possibly Pipe Supports.
VII.
(Question #24)
Dr. Myers raised concerns about gas flow rates for shielding and purging during the welding process.
Included in Region V's response was the statement that " ( t) he inspector found in his analysis of the situation that flows were maintained and in most all cases were reasonably near 20 CFM."
This is a material false statement.
A M.W. Kellogg (Pullman)
Interoffice Correspondence, 2-8-74, noted that from a recent review of Welding Audits that the Argon control has not been properly adjusted to meet the specifications prescribed by the Welding Procedures.
From this review it was found that 49% of the time, either the argon flow rate at the flow meter or the line pressure of the argon manifold was not correct.
The IOC also states, "It might be noted that this may have some correlation with the rejection rate." (original emphasis).
Another Kellogg IOC, 4-11-74, noted a review of Welding Audits found that 30% of the time either the argon line pressure at the regulator or the flow rate at the flowmeter (or both at the same time) were not adjusted properly.
The Region V response that flows were maintained is a material false statement.. _ _ _ _
VIII.
(Question #38)
Dr. Myers raised concerns about the Pullman corrective action system.
He asked, "Are the samples cited by Region V sufficient to demonstrate that the Pullman did have an operative corrective action program?
Region V responded, "Yes, the staff feels that the examples cited in the NRC inspection report were suf ficient to show the breadth of the contractor and licensee's corre,ctive action system."
This is a material false statement.
Region V in Question #9 relates a brief history of the Pullman QA program applicable to pipe supports.
It identified a PG&E Audit #73-15, per-formed in late 1973 which found the.t Pullman did not have a QA program covering the installation of pipe supports and that the QA progran for the installation of pressure boundary piping was not fully applicable to pipe support work.
A stop work order was issued on pipe hanger / rupture restraint work until an approved QA program covering pipe support / rupture restraint work was implemented.
Region V stated:
As corrective action Pullman procedure KFPS-7 was issued on December 3, 197 3 establishing and implementing a pipe support QA program for process planning and control.
In addition, a Pullman Discrepancy Report (Nonconformance Report) was issued on February 11, 1974.
This Discrepancy Report recognized that pipe support work was per-formed prior to establishing process planning and control.
As corrective action all Class 1 pipe supports installed without process control were identified, reinspected and inspection findings resolved.
The Region V response is inaccurate and misleading, because there was no corrective action implemented for Pipe Rupture Restraints.
PG&E Audit #73-15 also ifentified numerous deficiencies with rupture restraints including:
A.
All inprocess inspections of workmanship and technique required by the AWS Code were not ieing performed.
B.
Some welders were welding materials of greater thickness than they were qualified.
C.
Welding was not in complete accordance with the assigned weld procedure.
D.
Provisions for the installation and inspection of high strength steel bolts were not in accordance with AISC code.
E.
The method of recording inspections and acceptance criteria were not set forth in an instruction and it I _. - - _
was difficult to determine the inspection status.
The Discrepancy Report issued on 2-11-74 did not address Pipe Rupture Restraints, only Pipe Supports.
The result was that Pipe Rupture Restraints went uncorrected at this time.
A Pullman Internal Audit of 5-13-74 found that "most field welds on the Unit 1 Rupture Restraints show poor workmanship."
The corrective action which was implemented as a result of this audit is unknown, but as illustrated by l'ater findings, the problem was not corrected.
A PG&E Audit #80422, issued 6-13-78, identified QA breakdowns including inadequate QA Program description for Pipe Supports and Pipe Rupture Restraints.
A July 1978 Pullman Corporate Management audit #7177-3-78 identified significant QA Program deficiencies.
The docu-mentation packages would not be used for an adequate audit.
Drawings existed that effected installation but were not referenced.
There was a problem getting documentation to match final erection.
Finally in 1978 and 1979 a series of PG&E Nonconformance Reports (DCI-78-RM-009, DCI-79-RM-002 and DCI-79-RM-003) were generated by PG&E identifying the same discrepancies that had first been found six years earlier in 1973:
A.
Documentation shows acceptable bolted connections.
How-there are cases of out of tolerance gaps existing
- ever, under base plates, nuts not bearing against splice plates properly and nuts not engaged per requirements.
B.
Documentation shows acceptable welded connections.
How-there are cases of materials and welds not conform-
- ever, ing to the specification.
C.
There are bolts that have " torque seal" which indicates tensioning and inspection.
However, inspection records do not exist.
The Region V example of a good corrective action system is just the opposite.
A full review of the record reveals that Pipe Rupture Restraints had inadequate corrective action to problems identified in 1973.
The Region V response is a false statement.
There is an additional Region V false statement by omission, IX.
with respect to the resolution of an allegation that Pipe Rupture Restraint Weld Procedure Specifications did not adequately illustrate all joint types which were welded.
Region V in SSER #22, page A.4-103.3, stated that the alleger is correct in stating that the WPS documents do not list all joint types which are welded.
Region V went on to state: _
7
~
WPS 7/8 is qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX requirements which indicate in y
QW 402.1 that a change in joint type is a non-essential variable.- Lack of description of all l
types of joints utilitzed is contrary to Section l
IX' rules and requires a revision to the WPS.
However, this is an administrative change only and does not require requalification of the WPS.
l This is a material false statement with regard to Pipe Rupture I
Restraints.
Region V did not review WP5 7/8 in light of the i
AWS Code, which considers joint type as an essential variable.
i The absence of joint configuration descriptions (details) in 4
the WPS meant that the Pipe Rupture Restraint work in the field' was uncontrolled.
This takes on special significance when it is realized that many of the joint configurations used were 8'
not specified in Engineering Specifications - ESD 243 prior to 1979.
Activities af fecting quality (joint configuration des-criptions) were not prescribed by documented instructions or procedures and there is no assurance these activities were properly accomplished.
This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, j
Appendix B - Instructions, Procedures and Drawings..The Region V response that joint type descriptions are a nonessential variable and that.the problem is administrative is a false i
statement with respect to Pipe Rupture Restraints.
i X.
There is an additional material false statement by Regional-Administrator J.
B. Martin concerning prompt referral of evidence or allegations of wrongdoing to the Office of Investigation.
Audit Action Request #7 identifies three allegers who made employee discrimination complaints to l
Region V., in December 1983 by one employee and in early January 1984, by the other two.
But it was not until March that the allegers were referred to the NRC Office of Investi-gation.
l A 9-20-84 NRC letter from J.
B. Martin, Regional Administra-tor, to W. J. Dircks, Executive Director of Operations, con-l cerning recommendations by the Government Accountability Project for the Allegation Management Program addressed this 4
issue.
Mr. Martin, in reference to prompt referral of evidence or allegations of wrongdoing to the Office of Investigation, stated, "This is our policy" and "In fact, it is our practice as well."
Mr. Martin's statement is not supported by the evidence presented and is a material false statement.
Suspected Causes:
First, there are two possible causes.
The NRC Region V l
Staf f did not perform a complete reconstitution of all Pullman i
construction activities at the site over the years.
As a result, certain aspects of Dr. Myers questions were not accurately answered.
Region V elected to approach inconsistencies between
.NSC findings and PG&E and Pullman responses by examining only a sample of what thef considered the most significant NSC findings and responses.
The Region V examination was limited to this sample.and did not constitute a comprehensive reconstruction of
the entire Pullman activity of Diablo Canyon.
Alternatively, Region V may have been aware of the omitted facts and deliberately withheld material information.
Recommended Corrective Action:
A comprehensive reconstruction of the entire Pullman construc-I.
tion program to be performed by NRC members who are not Region y staff members.
II. The findings of false statements be investigated by an independent investigative body.
Where these findings are confirmed and determined to be intentional, criminal charges be filed against the Region V individuals responsible.
Harold Hudson Audit performed by: i
a Audit Action Request #2 Audit Date 11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Allegation Management Program - Confirmation of Allegations Referenced Documents: NRC Region V Instruction No. 1303 para-graphs E.5, D.2.f, D.3.c, and E.1.e.4.
~
Findings: (Interview with Steve Lockert, Charles Stokes, Tim O'Neill and Alleger requesting Anonymity, 11-4-84)
None of the interviewed allegers received letters of acknow-ledgement from NRC Region V Staf f.
The purpose of these letters was to detail the allegation as understood by the NRC and to assure the alleger that his concern would be examined as ap-propriate, and that the examination would address all of the specific concerns expressed by he alleger.
(Mr. Stokes re-ceived an October 23, 19 84 letter to a6 knowledge a concern raised on behalf of any anonymous alleger.)
I.
The NRC Region V Division Directors did not prepare, sign and/or concur on letters stating an acknowledgement of the contact.
This is a noncompliance to Region V Instruction No. 1303 paragraphs E.5, D.2.f and E.1.e.4.
II.
The NRC Region V Office Allegation Coordinator did not pre-pare acknowlddgement letters nor verify that written com-munication had been sent to allegers as prescribed in Section E.5 of Instruction No. 1303.
This is a noncom-pliance to Region V Instruction No. 1303 paragraphs E.5, D.3.c, and E.1.e.4.
Suspected Cause:
Region V received a large volume of alleagtions concern-ing Diablo Canyon.
Due to the number of allegations received Region V did not wish to expend the manhours needed to com-municate with allegers as prescribed in Section E.5 of Instruc-tion No. 1303.
Recommended Corrective Action:
Institute compliance with the stated policy of Region Instruction No. 1303 - Allegation Management Program of written communications with the allegeres to confirm the allegations were properly understood.
Audit performed by: Harold O. Hudson Audit Action Request #3 Audit Date 11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Allegation Management Program - Confidentiality Referenced Documents: NRC Region V Instruction No. 1303 para-graphs E.1.e, E.7 and SSER #21 paragraph 1.3.
Findings:
(Interview with Tim O'Neil and alleger requesting anonymity, 11 8 4)
I.
Two of the allegers contacted indicated they had been granted confidentiality by Region V NRC.
But Region V Staf f was not consistent in informing allegers their rights under con-fidentiality.
A.
The alleger was not informed that the pledge of con-fidentiality was not absolute.
B.
Neither alleger was informed that their names would not normally appear in the publicly released reports.
C.
One alleger was not informed that his identity may be tevealed where required by law, when necessary to in-sure public health and safety or pursuant to congres-sional directive.
D.
Neither alleger was informed that a pledge of confiden-tiality could not be made or honored if the alleger provided information indicating he intended or had com-mitted or participated in criminal acts which may in-clude a willful violation of NRC requirements.
These findings are noncompliances to Region V Instruction No. 1303 paragaph E.7.b.
II.
The pledge of confidentiality was compromised for both al-legers when their identities were revealed by the NRC Staff to the contractor their worked for and PG&E, the licensee.
A.
The identity of one alleger was revealed when Supple-mental Safety Evaluation Report #22 stated that person making the allegation was the individual who wrote a referenced Deficient Condition Notice.
The DCN listed the alleger's company hat number.
B.
The identity of the second alleger may have been revealed by an NRC Region V Staff member directly to the alleger's company QA/QC Manager and to PG&E.
This possibility __ __
a of a breach was raised when the alleger had a conversa-tion with PG&E's Quality Hot Line.
The PG&E Quality Hot Line representative stated that "we know you are talking to the NRC."
Breaches of confidentiality are noncompliances to Region V Instruc. tion No.1303 paragraphs E.7 and SSER #21 paragraph 1.3.
C.
It is an item of concern that these breaches of con-fidentiality may have been the result of NRC disclosure where the specific approval of the cognizant Division Director was not stationed..If this is the case, 'these breaches would be noncompliances to Region V Instruction No. 1303 paragraph E.7.c.
Suspected Causes:
Region V Staf f membe rs were not sufficiently indoctrinated I.
to the requirements of granting pledges of confidentiality.
III.
Region V did not review and sanitaize SSER #22 prior to A.
publication, with respect to protecting confidentiality.
B.
Unknown.
indoctrinated to the re-Region V Staff members were not III.
quirements for of ficial disclosure of identity of indivi-duals granted confidentiality.
Corrective Action:
Region V Staf f members should be reindoctrinated to Instruction 1303 requirements for confidentiality.
Region V Staf f members should be reindoctrinated to the importance of honoring pledges of con-fidentiality and instructed to stop compromising the identity of confidential witnesses.
Harold Hudson Audit perform 2d by:
e 1 _,
i Audit Action Request 94 Audit Date 11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Allegation Management Program Handling of Allegations Referenced Documents: NRC Region V Institution No. 1303 para-graphs E.2.a.6, E.3.f.
SSER,#21 para-graphs 1.2.1. and 2.2.and SSER #26 para-graph 4.
Findings:
Allegers make allegations of wrongdoing to Region V Staff.
I.
These allegations of wrongdoing involved record falsifica-tion, willfulor deliberate violation of a regulatory re-and/or improper conduct.
But the regional staff quirement, provided no indications to the allegers that Region V would, or did, refer these allegations to the NRC Office of Investi-gations in a timely fashion for investigation, as prescribed by Region V Instruction No. 1303 E.2.a.6.
Through'the low-power licensee vote the allegers were not contacted by O.I.
concerning their allegations of wrongdoing and they re-viewed no evidence to suggest O.I. had investigated their allegations.
In some cases O.I. only became involved after the allgers raised the issues themselves to the Office of Investigations.
Examples of wrongdoing by Region V Staff include:
A.
(Affidavit of Timothy O'Neill, 11-2-84)
NRC Region V Inspector D. Kirsch became aware of a con-flict in Pullman Deficient Condition Notice and Dis-crepancy Reports reporting when during a routine inspec-tion it became apparent tha tthe definition of deficient conditions and nonconformances were virtually identical and that one document (the DCN) could be voided while the other (DR or NRC) could not.
Inspector Kirsch also discovered that Pullman was not keeping complete records of voided DCN documents.
Instead of reporting this action to 0.I. (or instituting staff enforcement action)
Mr. Kirsch merely gave the Pullman assistant QA/QC Manager a verbh1 warning.
B.
(Affidavit of Harold Hudson, 6-5-84)
An allegation was made that Pullman (M.
W. Kellogg)
QA/QC Manager deliberately falsified certification records in 1975 for NDE and Welding Inspectors, stating that they were certified to ANSI N45 2.6 Standard when in fact it was virtually impossible to comply totally to the standard because.of experience requirements and low salaries.
C.
(Affidavit of Jim McDermott, 2-5-84 and SSER #26, Attach-ment 5, p.13)
An allegation was made that Pullman's QA/QC Managar in.
l-1982/1983 covered up a serious Quality Assurance problem by a failure to properly respond to a Deficient Condi-tion Notice concerning the use of unmarked toofs on stainless steel.
This allegation was resolved by Region V without investigation by the NRC Office of Investiga-tion, although in a June 19 84 followup interview Mr.
J McDermott informed Region V that the licensee response j
tentatively accepted by Region V was a fals'e statement I
and of fered to recommend a corroborating witness.
I II. - NRC Region V Staff did not conduct systematic examination and analysis for each allegation it received.
In many cases where an allegation had multiple concerns, one or more concerns were not addressed.
In some cases the NRC examined an allegation only from a techhical point of view without consideration of Quality Assurance ramifications for other work that could be affected by the same program flaw.
In some. cases the NRC conducted only a cursory examination of the allegation.
Allegations with inadequate examinations and analysis include:
A.
(SSER. # 22, p. A.4-10 3.5)
An allegation that structural steel pipe supports were not fabricated and erected to the A.W.S. Code as speci-fled by PG&E Contract Specification 68711.
NRC Region V Staff examined welder, welding procedures and material qualifications and concluded that pipe support : work was properly done to the ASME Code which was permitted by the A.W.S. Code.
But the NRC Staff did not address the issues of workmanship, Technique and Design of Welded Connections which have special A.W.S. Code requirements; They did not review these areas against the ASUE Code -
to determine if a substitute could be made or if these areas were uncontrolled during construction.
The NRC did not examine the total scope of the' allegation.
The NRC resolved the allegation based on an examination of 3 out of 6 considerations.
I B.
(SSER 422, p. A,4-103.3)
An allegation that Pullman Weld Procedure Specifications did not adequately detail all joint configurations which were being welded with the W.P.S.
The NRC Staff ruled that W.P.S. Code 7/8 and otherso were qualified is accordance with ASSE Code Section IX which indicates in QW 402.1 that a change in joint type is a nonessential variable.
But the NRC Staf f did not review W.P.S. Code 7/8 and others with regard to the A.W.S. Code for Pipe Rupture Restraint work.
The A.W.S.
Code considers joint type as an essential varaible.
Yet the NRC Staff did not identify this in their exa-mination and analysis and did not take it into considera-tion in their resolution of the allegation.
In another aspect of this allegation the NRC decided that lacking a description of all joints utilized was contrary to.
Section IX rules and required a revision to the W.P.S.
But the NRC ruled this was administrative change dnly The and did not require requalification of the W.P.S.
NRC Staff did not analyse the allegation against.its Quality Assurance ramifications.
The absence of joint configura tion descriptions (details) in the W.P.S. meant that the Pipe Support and Pipe Rupture Restraint work in the field was uncontrolled.
This takes an special I
t significance when it is realized that many of the joint configurations used were not sepcified in Engineering Specifications (ESD243 and ESD223) prior to 1979 and in some cases later.
Activities af fecting quality (joint configuration descriptions) were not prescribed by docu-mented instructions in procedures, and there is no assurance these activities were properly accomplishdd.
This is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B V-Instructions, Procedures and Drawings.
Yet the NRC did not address this Quality Assurance issue.
Their concern was only l
with administrative changes and qualification of the l
procedure.
l (NRC Letter f rom Of fice of Congressional Affairs to C.
6-13-84, Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor to U.S.H.R.,
Background Question #1.)
Dr. Henry Myers questioned the Region V Staff on what
" generic deficiencies" had been identified by PG&E's General Construction Department that resulted in a re-quest by PG&E for an independent audit to be performed on the Pullman Power Products construction program.
The NRC Staf f responded that "the best that the Staff was able to reconstruct regarding the ' generic defi-ciencies' (refered.to in Audit 80422) related primarily
.to two specific problems and"amore generalized problem with rework" and that "the Staff had been informed of these problems."
The Staff provided information about the two specific problems (anchor 1mits and socket welds) and then informed Dr. Myers that in 1977, PG&E noted that the volume of rework by Pullman was increased over previous periods.
Then in one sentence the NRC Staff "This explained the " generic deficiencies" in rework:
included not only anchor bolts, and socket welds, but also rework related to radiographs."
The NRC Staff provided a one-word explanation - radiographs.- for a third area of generic deficiencies.
This is hardly a systematic analysis of the problem and is grossly misleading, considering the safety significance of the problem and the fact that the problem extended beyond radiographs.
Rework due to radiographs was initially identified by PG&E in March 1977 when a leak was detected in FW 212, where a 16" Feedwater Pipe ties into Nozzle 64 on Steam Generator 1-2, during Hot Functional Testing.
A crack in the weld was determined to be the cause of the leak.
Pullman DR #3366 and series of PG&E, Pullman and Westing- _
house reports analyzed the cracking problem.
Several causes were identified as possible contributing factors.
As a result of the FW212 crack, a review of the radio-graphs of the same welds on the remaining Steam Generators was performed.
The review revealed a questionable indi-cation on FW197 on the Feedwater lead to Steam Generator 4
1-1.'
Pullman DR. 03370 stated the indicadon was removed and a weld repair performed.
The DR required a full review of all radiographs accepted by the interpreter of FW197 and a random review of other accepted radio-graphs.
No rejectable radiographs were noted..But a subsequent review of addtional Unitall fibm identified a rejectable indication.
At that time PG&E requested a 100% film review of all design class 1 radiographs in Units I and II.
Pullman DR #3400 reviewed 1675 Unit #1 radiographic films which resulted in 77 weldment repairs.
DR #3409 review of Unit II film resulted in approximately 114 repairs.
This was the NRC's so-called " generalized problem with rework" related to radiographs.
But the problem went beyond poorly interpreted radiographs.
A Quality Assurance Report of Documentation and Radio-graphic Fih Review by the M.W. Kellogg (Pullman) Field QA/QC Manager, dated 4-22-77. stated the interpreter of FW19 7 had been hired on 1-2-74 but he had not been certified as a Level II Radiographer until 8-9-74, and that he had accepted radiographs prior to his certi-fication.
But the report does not indicate when the in-terpreter began performing his job or how many in-terpretations were done prior to his certification.
The QA/QC Manager did not report this nonconformance via the QA system but merely attr!buted the QA breakdown to an administrative error and dropped the issue.
When the subsequent 100% film review revealed approximately 191 film interpretations which required weld repairs there is no evidence to show that the cause of this genuine problem had been identified or corrected.
There is no record attached to the DR's or the QA Report of the identities of the individuals making these bad in-terpretations or how many were involved.
The QA Report merely states that "it revealed a discrepancy in the interpretation of. radiographs which has been corrected."
The Report indicated that steps to prevent recurrence were instituted by a requirement that two interpreters shall review each set of readiographs in the future.
The Report itself was premature in that DR 8 3400 did not have a Final Disposition until 11-4-77 and DR #3409 until 3-3-78.
Yet the QA Report makes its conclusions on 4-22-77, based 'on thelinitial investigation of film interpretation problems. -
Even this was not the extent of the problem.
A July 19, 1977 report by Westinghouse indicated possible generic problems with Steam Generator Nozzle welds including:
1.
The Feedwater Nozzles on the other three Steam Generators and all four steam takeoff nozzles were
. welded to the same W.P.S. and had the same history of thermal cycling during preheats.
2.
The ultrasonic and radiographic examinations of the nozzles were not sensitive enough to detect I.D.
(inside diameter) flaws on the pipe or nozzle ob-served adjacent to the weld which failed.
3.
The Report concluded that it could not be estab-lished that the failed weld was "different" than the other seven.
4.
The Report also concluded that a fracture mechanics analysis should be made.
A 4-15-77 letter from PG&E attorney Philip Crane to the NRC (Docket No. 50-275) stated that " ultrasonic examina-tions conforming to ASME Section XI were performed on i
the four main steam and other three feedwater to steam generator nozzle. welds.
These examinations revealed that there were no rejectable indications."
In light of the Westinghouse Report conclusions, the PG&E letter to the NRC is misleading and does not adequately iden-tify the extent of the problem.
i On August 26, 1977, PG&E issued Report #411-77.55, Failure Analysis of Cracked Field Weld No. 212.
This report did not indicate if the identified problem was an isolated case or apotential generic problem.
1 In August 1977,,PG&E directed Pullman to perform an internal inspection of FW244 in Steam Generator 1-4 Feedwater Nozzle.
Pullman DR #3453 identified indica-tions which had to be removed an d resulted in weld re-pair.
Per the DR this discrepangy was not reported to the NRC,.,
In early October 1977, FW229, Feedwater Pipe to Nozzle for Steam Generator 1-3, had its inside surface examined.
The findings and extent of rework is not known by this auditor.
In October 19 77, PG&E directed an internal inspection of FW197 on Steam Generator 1-1.
This was the same weld ordered to be repaired back in March.
Pullman DR #3484 identified linear indication, nonmetallic inclusions and numerous other problems which required removal of of the findings and weld repair.'
Per the DR these dis-crepancies were not reported to the NRC..
In late October 19 77, PG&E directed an internal inspection of FW212, the weld originally identified to be leaking during Hot Functional Testing in March.
Pullman DR 83487 identified a crack on the inside surface of the root bead.
The crack was removed and a weld repair made. It is not known by the auditor if this DR was reported to the NRC.
In addition to Unit #1, PG&E ordered examina'tions per-formed on the Nozzle to Pipe welds in Unit II Steam Generators and Mainstream inside surface. Rework was re-quired on Steam Generators 2-1, 2-2 and 2-4.
The extent of work is unknown by this auditor.
The findings in the Main Steam wells are unknown as well. :It is not known if PG&E reported these findings to the NRC.
On November 15 and 16, 1977, a meeting was held to discuss and provide recommendations to resolve the specific weld-ment indication problems of FW212.
Westinghouse issued a summary report # PG&E-3823, dated 1-5-78.
The report concluded that "it is believed that neither of these incidents (repeated FW212 cracking) can be considered generic problems since the causes :are apparently due to a unique combination of factors related to welding practices used at Diablo Canyon for these specific weldments."
The report also concluded that " cracking would not be expected to occur in other similar weldments unless the same combi-nation of factors were duplicated."
The report did not address similar wediments which were made using the same W.P.S.
The report indicated PG&E had examined these welds, removed indications and repaired areas where necessary.
The report then stated, "Apparently, based on these I.D.
examinations and non-destructive testing performed on these welds, PG&E does not intend to submit a Fracture Mechanics Analysis to the NRC, since it is assumed crack-ing similar to that found in FW212 does not exist."
A Fracture Mechanics Analysis, which had been agreed to back in July 1977, was not going to be performed or submitted to the NRC based on an assum? tion that cracking similar to FW212 did not exist in ot.1er welds.
To complicate the Steam Generator Feedwater Nozzle issue is the existence of a 12-18-74 letter from the Senior Safety Engineer of the State of California, Depar tment of Industrial Tbla.tions to the M.W. Kellogg (Pullman)
QA Manager.
The letter indicated that repair work had been performed to the Steam Generator 1-1 feedwater nozzle becau se "a crack extending circumferentially 360had been caused by your welders when they welded without the use of preheat.
The welders had been assigned to the job by their supervisor before you. vere in possession of qualified welding procedures for P1 to P12-B materials." -. - _ _
There is an issue of material specification which also complicates the Steam Generator Feedwater Nozzle problem.
M.W. Kellogg (Pullman) used W.P.S.
W.P.S. #200 states it is for welds between P1 and P12-B materials.
The nozzle material is ASME SA-508 class 2, which is classified as a P3 material, under ASME Code Section IX.
The weld procedure for the nozzle welds should be for P1 top 3 materials,.
PGEE Re-port #411-77.55 and Attachment 1 to Westinghouse Report
- PG&E-3023 make recommendations for modifying the weld procedure for steam generator-to-piping welds, P3 to P1 materials.
But the actual W.P.S. used (W.P.S. #200) is a P1 to P12-B material specification.
Region V Staff did not conduct a systematic examination and analysis and report their findings to Dr. Myers.
Instead, the NRC used a one word description (radiograph) to identify a g2neralized problem with rework which did not begin to disclose the extent of the generic problems and existence of another possible generic problem.
D.
(NRC/ Myers Letter, 6-13-84, Background Question 3)
Dr. Myers would question Region V Staff on what was the basis for the NRC Report #83-37 findings that Pullman had perforned adequate corporate audits and that Pullman's Internal and Corporate Audits had indicated that no fun-damental QA breakdown had occurred, with regard to 1978-1979 PG&E Nonconfermance Reports for Pipe Rupture Re-straints.
The NRC Region V response was that "the findings from the licensee and Pullman audits were not of the signi-ficance that would indicate a fundamental Quality Assu-rance Program breakdown.
And,as stated in Staff Report 83-37, the combination of Pullman Corporate and Internal Audits provided adequate coverage to meet the require-ments of 10 CFR 50, Apperdix B."
The NRC Region V Staff has not presented an accurate assessment of the Pullman Audit Program, which a systematic examination and analysis would have revealed.
Pullman did not perform any Corporate Audits specifically on Pipe Supports and Pipe Rupture Restraints prior to 1978.
PG&E Audit #80422, dated 6-13-78, also found that the unofficial, unapproved Internal Audit schedule had not been followed consistently and that few Engineer Specifications appeared on the schedule.
With the ab-sence of Corporate Audits Pipe Supports and Pipe Rupture Restraints and the inconsistent implementation of In-ternal Audits, it is difficult to understand the Region V conclusion that Pullman's Audit Program provided ade-quate coverage to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B...-
The NRC response that "the findings from the Licensee and Pullman Audits were not of the significance that would indicate a fundamental Quality Assurance Program break-down," cannot be supported by a systematic examination of Audit Reports.
1.
The first documented Pullman internal audit per-formed on Pipe Rupture Restraints was 10-24-73, a
~ full year after the construction program began..This audit revealed that there was no Quality Assurance Manual available for the control of rupture restraints.
The Piping QA Manual available did not specially ad-dress restraints.
2.
A PG&E Audit #73-15, dated 11-29 and 12-19, 1973, also identified that the Pullman QA Manual was not applicable to Pipe Supports and Pipe Rupture Restraints.
The PG&E audit would identify other significant QA breakdowns for Rupture Restraints including The Resident's instruction for receiving inspec-a.
tion of restraints did not require identification and segregation of nonconforming items.
b.
Pullman had not determined or received a written material release from PG&E stating that the pro-curement requirement had been met.
The method of recording inspections and ac-c.
ceptance criteria were not set forth in an instruction and it was difficult to determine the inspection status.
d.
All in process inspections of workmanship and technique required by the A.W.S. Code were not being performed.
Some welders were welding materials of greater e.
thickness than they were qualified.
f.
Welding was not in complete accordance with the assigned weld procedure.-
g.
Provisions for the installation and inspection of high strength steel bolts were not in ac-cordance with the AISC code.
3.
A Pullman Internal Audit of 5-13-74 found that "most field welds in the Unit 1 Rupture Restraints show poor workmanship" and recommended that " Field welds on the Unit 1 Rupture Restraints in Aux. Building should be reinspected, and a modified Process Sheet should be made up to show 100% or final inspection of these welds."
4.
A PGEE Audit #80422, issued 6-13-78, would identify several significant QA. breakdowns including inadequate Quality Assurance Program Discriptions for Pipe Sup-ports and Pipe Rupture Restraints and inadequate Corporate and Internal Audit Programs.
The scope of both types of audits had-not been established, and there 4
was not detailed schedule developed to show that all aspects-of the-program had been audited.
Audit records s
indicated that all aspects of the program had not been audited.
Pullman Corporate management had not audited i
the Pipe Support and Pipe Rupture Restraint construc-tion Programs and the Internal Audit programs had not 4
'been consistently implemented.
5.
In July 1978, Pullman Corporate Management would per-form an audit.on Pipe Rupture Restraints and a sig-nificant QA Program deficiency would be identified.
Twenty of the forty three Action Request generated l
by Audit #7177-3-78 would be written against the Rupture Restraint Program.
The Corporate Audit con-cluded:
The rupture restraint documentation pack-age cannot be used for an adequate audit.
It was pointed out that additional draw-j ings are available.
The only way some of these restraints could have been installed i
is by the referenced design drawings, how-ever we were informed by site personnel v
that other drawings exist that could ef-fect the final installation.
These addi-tional drawings are not referenced with-I in the RR package.
...there is a defi-L nite problem in regard to drawing re-ferencing.
QA site personnel also have problems getting documentation to proper-j ly match final erection due 'to lack of
'as built drawings.'
It was pointed out 4
that there is a lack of proper interface between PG&E and site P.P.P. QA.
1 Contrary to the NRC conclusion, PG&E and Pullman audits j
did find significant, fundamental QA Program break-downs including failure to implement A.W.S. and A.I.S.C.
)
Code requirements and inadequate documentation.
i But more significant than the audit findings them-i selves was the failure by PG&E and Pullman to imple-i ment effective corrective action.
The numerous Non-conformance Reports generated by PGEE in 1978 and 1979 L
against Pullman's Rupture Restraint Construction Program l
were basically the same findings identified in 1973 and 1974 by PG&E and Pullman audits.
There was no I
effective corrective action for the identified failures i
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to follow A.I.S.C. and A.W.S. Code requirements for workmanship and inspection and QA documentation re-i j.
quirements for the erection of bolted and welded rupture restraint connections.
The failure of the Rupture Restraint Corrective Action Program is a breach of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirements.
The NRC Region V Staff has not conducted a systematic examination and analysis of the PG&E and Pullman audit program.
E.
(NRC/ Myers Letter, 6-13-84, Question 9)
Dr. Myers questioned Region V Staff on "what is basis for assurance that KFP-8 and KFPS-7 (QA requirements) were adequately implemented prior to September 1978."
The Region V Staff response was to give a brief history of the Pullman QA program applicable to pipe supports.
It used PG&E Audit 73-15, dated 11-29 and 12-29, 1973 as an illustration for the basis of its assurance.
The audit " identified that Pullman did not have a QA Program covering the installation of pipe supports and that the QA Program for the installation of pressure boundary piping was not fuly applicable to pipe support work.
A stop work order was issued on pipe hanger / rupture restraint work until an approved QA Program covering pipe suport/ rupture restraint work was implemented."
Region V asserted that A corrective action Pullman procedure KFPS-7 was issued on December 3, 1973 es-tablishing and implementing a pipe support QA program for process planning and control.
In addition, a Pullman Discrepancy Report (Nonconformance Report) was issued on February 11, 1974.
This Discrepancy Re-port recognized that pipe support work was performed prior to establishing process planning and control.
As corrective action all class 1 pipe supports installed without process control were identified, reinspected and inspection findings resolved.
The NRC then concludes that "..., procedures KFP-8 and KFPS-7 were entirely satisfactory and met NRC requirements."
The NRC examination and analysis of the corrective action to the PG&E audit findings failed to identify that cor-rective action was not completely implemented.
The Pullman Discrepancy Report did not address Pipe Rupture Restraints.
It only addressed Pipe Supports.
There was no reinspection or corrective action rework performed on rupture restraint hardware.
The same hardware discrepancies identified by PG&E in 1973 would be reidentified in 1978 and 1979 in PG&E Nonconformance Reports..
The NRC Region V Staff has not performed a systematic examination and analysis of Pullman's corrective action to PG&E Audit #73-15.
F.
(NRC/Myers Letter, 6-13-84, Question 11)
Dr. Myers questioned the Region V Staff concerning "what is the basis for the conclusion that post weldheat treat-ment requirements were in compliance with Appendix B prior to issuance of ESD-218 in October 1977?"
The Region V response was " Appropriate post weld heat treatment requirements were always prescribed by welding procedure specifications."
The NRC analysis did not identify that the Pullman QA Manual required that Post Weld Heat Treatment be listed as an operation on the Field Process sheet and that Field QA Inspectors were required to verify position of thermo-couples.
The NRC analysis did not identify that a Pullman Corporate Audit in April 1975 found that Post Weld Heat Treatment was not listed on Field Process Sheets for Code welds and that QA Inspectors were not verifying position of thermocouples.
The corrective action did not address work already performed but did implement action for future work.
The NRC assurances about Post Weld Heat Treatment being prescribed by W.P.S.'s are not so reassuring in light of failures to implement QA Manual requirements prior to April 1975.
G.
(NRC/Myers Letter, 6-13-84, Question 22)
Dr. Myers questioned the Region V Staf f about preheating requirements that were prescribed by the welding procedure specifications and documented by signature on the welding block of the process sheet, which specified the applicable welding welding procedure, being in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Region V Staff responded that this system was in compliance with Appendix B and that "No items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identified."
The NRC analysis did not identify that Pipe Rupture Restraint welding process sheets for 1974 and earlier (ref. RR #2031-6RT, FWS #14 A-E and 16 A-G) did not have documented signatures on the weld block of the process sheet or any other references to preheating.
This por the NRC conclusion is a noncompliance / deviation to Appendix B but the NRC examination did not identify the problem.
H.
(NRC/Myers Letter, 6-13-84, Question 24)
Dr. Myers raised questions about the NSC Audit finding con-corning welding gas flow for shielding and purging and the related problems of low flow rates on welds..
The NRC Staff responded that it "did not consider the specific deficiencies found in the purging and shielding area by the M.W. Kellogg (Pullman) welder audits to be of much technical significance."
The NRC then indicated why.
The NRC response then stated that the NRC " inspectors found in his analysis of the situation that flows were maintained and in most all cases were reasonably near 20 CFM."
The NRC did not do a complete examination.
An M.W. Kellogg (Pullman) Interoffice Correspondence, dated 2-8-74, from the QA Department notes that "from a recent review of weld-ing audits that the argon control has not been properly adjusted to meet the specification prescribed by the weld-ing procedures.
From this review it was found that 49%
of the time, either the argon flow rate at the flow meter or the line pressure of the argon manifold was not correct."
The IOC concludes that "It might be noted that this may have some correlation with the rejection rate" (original emphasis).
A second M.W. Kellogg IOC, dated 4-11-74, notes, "From a re-cent review of the welding audits, it has been noted that 30% of the time either the argon line pressure at the re-gulator or the flow rate at the flowmeter (or both at the same time) were not adjusted properly."
The NRC Inspecor's analysis does not correspond to 1974 re-views of welding audits by the QA Department.
I.
(Affidavit of James McDermott, 11-2-84) 3 The allegation was previously made that Pullman removed from the training manual the basis decision in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B that safety concerns take priority over cost i
and schedule concerns.
The NRC Staff sanitized the al-legation until the meaning of the allegation was lost.
SSER #26, p. 43, listed the concern as: "0860 in PPP Self-l Study Book #2 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria was incor-
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rectly paraphrased."
The term " incorrectly" does not j
communicate that the legal requirement for safety over 1
profits was censored.
The NRC cannot perform systematic examinations and analysis if they sanitizo an allegation
{
so that it intent is lost.
suspected Causes I
l 1 And 2.
The NRC' Region V perferred to resolve allegations expeditiously in order to lay them to rest, instead of taking the time and effort necessary to properly intvestigate significant issues.
Recommended Corrective Action:
All allegations of wrongdoing be submitted to the office of Investigation per Instruction No. 1303 and all other allegations be reexamined per Instruction No. 1303 and SSER 921 by inspectors i
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independent of Region V to ensure a systematic examination and analysis has been performed and that the full scope of all al-l 1egations have been addressed.
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Audit performed by - Harold Hudson d
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Audit Action Request #5 Audit Date 11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Allegation Managel:.ent Program - Handling of Allegations Referenced Documents:
SSER #21 paragraph 1.2.1.
Findings:
I.
NRC hegion V Staff has not provided responses, or apparently conducted any systematic examination and analysis for nu-merous expressions of concern by Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor to the U.S. House of Representatives, and allegations by whistleblowers.
This is a noncompliance to SSER #21 paragraph 1.2.1.
Identified expressions of concern and allegations not responded to by Region V Staff include:
A.
(NRC Letter, 6-13-84, Office of Congressional Affairs -
Kammerer to Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor, U.S.H.R.)
1.
In Question #8, Dr. Myers asked, "What was the program prior to the improvements?" and "what was it after the improvements were instituted?"
Dr.
Myers was referring to the Pullman management re-views of nonconformance reports, personnal qualifi-cations, and corrective actions.
The NRC Region V Staff did not provide answers to the expressions of concern.
Instead, Region V stated that the NRC Inspection did not include a diagnostic evaluation of the entiro Pullman QA history and "did not compile a description of the Pullman program for each point of time in its evaluation.
2.
In Question #6, Dr, Myers asked, "On what date were these welds produced?"
Dr. Myers was referring to 25 stainless steel welds sampled for delta ferrite and 100 radiographs reviewed to verify field weld and inspection review by Region V Inspectors.
The NRC Regior. V Staff did not provide an answer to this concern.
3.
In Question #10, Dr. Myers asked, "What is the date of ESD253?"
Dr. Myers was referring to a hanger package review not being described in procedures.
ESD254 was a procedure that provided detailed in-formation concerning hanger drawing controls.
NRC Region V Staff did not provide an answer to this concern.
4.
In Question #11, Dr. Myers asked, "Did the corporate audits ecompassed involve review of weld and welder quality, and the QA programs applied to weld and welder quality?" and "On what dates were the corporate audits conducted and what were their findings?"
Region V Staf f did not answer either concern but gave an explanation for not answering the second question.
Region V Staff stated, "Since the inspector concluded that the Pullman audit program as a whole met all requirements, a detailed catalog of all findings, dates, and resolutions was not made."
5.
In Question #24, Dr. Myers asked, "How many welds were not radiographically examined?" and "How many were examined?" and "Of those that were examined, what percentage exhibited excessive porosity?"
Dr. Myers was referring to unacceptable defects resulting from inadequate shielding and purging and subsequent nondestructive examination of these welds.. Region V did not provide answers to these concerns.
Region V Staff stated, "No effort was made to reconstruct the nondestructive examination history of the weld in question nor was it considered worthwhile to do so."
6.
In Question #26, Dr. Myers asked, "What about improper amperages that might have been used prior to November 19737" Dr. Myers was referring to an NSC audit finding concerning welding amperages not within the welding procedure specification limit.
Region V did not answer this concern and instead stated, "In the judgemer.t of the inspector, it did not appear to be necessary or particular fruitful exercise to attempt to assemble amperage data for the period prior to November, 1973."
7.
In Question #34, Dr. Myers asked, "How many active welders are shown in the initial 90 day qualified welders log?" and "Is this log consistent with Region V's findings regarding the 20 welders?"
Dr. Myers is referring to an NSC audit finding concerning inadequate welder qualification records, prior to 1972 and Region V's belief that welder qualification records for this period are complete.
Region V did not provide an answer to these concerns.
8.
In Question #35, Dr. Myers asked, "Is it Region V's position that for the entire period covered by the NSC audit, Pullman was in compliance with the applicable NSC requirements pertaining to handling procedures?"
Dr. Myers was referring to an NSC audit finding concerning inadequate handling procedures.
Region V responded to the concern by stating, "The NRC Inspector did not attempt to reconstruct a history regarding compliance with handling procedures..." -
SSER 121, paragraph 1.3 and 1.2.1 states that the Diab'.o Canyon Allegation Management Program encompasses concekns raised and provided by members of Congress and that systematic examination and analysis of these ex-pressions of concern will be conducted.
Region V is in noncompliance to SSER #21.1.3 and 1.2.1 with regard to concerns raised by Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor to the U.S. House of Representatives.
B.
(Interview with Stove Lockert, 11-4-84 and SSER #22, p.
A.4-123.1)
An allegation was made that Pullman wolder qualification examinations did not have adequate Quality Control Welding supervision and records to assure that nocessary hold points had bocn verified.
The QC Wolding Supervisor was alleged to be " rubber stamping" welder qualifications.
He also alleged that an attempted investigation of this issue by him resulted in being fired from Pullman.
Mr. Lockort asserts that Region V Staff never specifically addressed this allegation, which is material for any conclusions about the quality of welding and, therefore, any licensing decisions.
This is a noncomplianco to SSER #21.1.2.1.
(Interview with Alleger who requested anonymity, 11-4-84).
C.
A verbal allegation concerning welding and bolting problems in Pullman's construction program was made to NRC Region V Staff member Mendonca.
Mendonca claimed he wasn't knowledgeable and would got another Staf f member to talk to the alleger.
No NRC Staff member over reestablishod contact with the alleger concerning his allegations.
This is a noncompliance to SSER #21.1.2.1.
Suspected Causes e
1.A.
The NRC Region V Staff did not perform a completo reconstruction of all Pullman Power construction activitios at the site over the years.
As a result, certain aspects of Dr. Myers' questions and concerns related to the NSC Audit could not be answered.
The Region V Administrator elected to approach inconsistence betwoon NSC findings and PG&E and Pullman rosponses by examining only a samplo of what ho asserted woro the most significant NSC findings and responses.
The Region V oxamination was limited to this samplo and did not constituto a representativo, comprehensivo reconstruction of all Pullman activition at Diablo Canyon that could significantly offect quality.
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Recommended Reco'rrective Acticn:
r All alleejations be systamatically examined and analyzed per SSER # 21 req'tirements.
s Auditing psrformed by Harold Hudson 1
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Audit Action Request 46 Audit Date 11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Allegation Management Program
-- Handling of Allegations.
Referenced Documents:
SSER 421 paragraph 2.2 and SSER 626 paragraph 4.
Findings:
(interview witn Cnarles Stokes, Steve Inckert, Th 0%il, eud alleger request-ing anonymity, 11-4-84.)
1.
SSER #21 paragraph 2.2.5 stated that when significant technical meetings were held concerning allegations that these meetings were announced and open to the public.
Mr. Stokes indicated that he was informed of a technical meeting in San Francisco in January 1984 by the Government Accountability Project.
The meeting was not open to the public.
It was a controlled
=eeting on PG&E property, and there was a list of people to be admitted and some people who wanted to attend were not allowed.
The alleger gained access only through the efforts of a Mothers for Peace lawyer.
This is a noncompliance to SSER 421 paragraph 2.2.5.
l 2.
Three allegers indicated that there was no attempt on SRC Region V Staff's part to discuss the approach and findings of the Staff's evaluation related to their allegations and there was no attempt by the Staff to assure the alleger they thoroughly understood the concern and demonstrated how the Staff had dealt j
with the concerns.
One alleger indicated that Region V Staff had limited feedback with him.
He was informed that a problem was technically resolved but was not provided an explanation for the resolution or given an opportunity to review the resolution.
A review of a letter from Thomas Devine, Legal Director of thel Government Accountability Project, to the NRC Commissioners, dated 10-5-84, indicated that for a 10-month period NRC Region V Staf f only conducted 14 followup interviews for 1000 allegations of construction QA violations presented by GAP.
The failure of NRC Region V Staff to conduct followup interviews is a noncompli-ance to SSER #21 paragraph 2.2.6.
3.
All the allegers interviewed stated that their allegations were turned over to PG&E by Region V for evaluation and the evaluations returned to Region V.
The subsequent NRC Staff evaluation considered the licensee's response and action.
SSER #26 states that Attachment 6 provides a listing of 177 allegations for which the licensee was requested to respond.
SSER #26 Attachment 6 does not list all allegations turned over to PG&E for response.
A representative sample of allegations turned over to PG&E but not listed on Attachment 6 include allegations #103 to #122.
It is an item of concern that NRC Region V Staff is misleading the Commission and other interested l
parties about the methods used to resolve these allegations.
The NRC Staff is not being candid and honest about how it has resolved allegations. _
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'A, Suspected Causes:
1.
NRC Region V Staff did not want interested parties to participate in significant technical meetings for fear of public knowledge about serious problems at Diablo Canyon.
2.
NRC Region V Staff was so overwhelmed with allegations that it did not want to expend the manhours and money necessary to implement the Allegation Management Program.
Additionally, interface with the allegers would possibly l
have identified further concerns or instances where original allegations had not been properly addressed, resulting in additional delays in the licensing process.
4.
NRC Region V Staff has in many cases accepted at face value responses from PG&E on allegations, without performing I
its own systematic examination and analysis.
Allegations not listed on Attachment 6 but responded to by PG&E could represent such cases that the NRC does not want identified.
Recommended Corrective Action:
1.
Technical meetings concerning allegations should be I
open to the public and interested parties, particularly allegers
)
involved.
Notice should be in a timely manner.
I 2.
Region V Staff should implement the SSER #21 paragraph 2.2.6 policy of followup interviews with the alleger on the Staff's tentative evaluation of allegations.
3.
All allegations turned over to PG&E for a response should be identified and those not appearing on Attachment 6 should be independently analyzed to determine if the NRC Staff performed systematic examinations or accepted at face value the PG&E responses.
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i Audit Action Raquent $7 Audit Data 11-4-84 Activity Audited:
NRC Region V Allegation Management Program --
Employees Discrimination Complaints.
Referenced Documents:
Region V Instruction No. 1303.3.1.e.3, E.6.b, E.6.c.
Findings:
(Interview with Charles Stokes, Tim O'Neil and Steve Lockert, 11-4-84.)
All allegers interviewed stated that they were the object of employee discrimination as a result of making allegations or pursuing Quality Assurance excellance.
Two of the allegers were fired from their jobs for engaging in federally protected activities.
On resigned due to onsite harassment by management and others for engaging in federally protected activities.
In each case an employee discrimination complaint was made to the NRC staff, in December by one employee and in early January by the other two.
Region V staff did not implement Region V Instructions with respect to Employee Discrimination Complaints in a timely manner.
Not until March were allegers referred to an NRC Enforcement Officer or to an investigator in the NRC Office of Investigation.
None were informed that a complaint must be filed with the Department of Labor within 30 days of the acts complained of in order to obtain the Department's assistance.
The lack of timely referrals to OI contradicts a 9-20-84 NRC letterfrom J.B. Martin, Regional Administrator, to W.J. Dircks, Executive' Director of Operations, concerning prompt referral of evidence or allegations of wrongdoing to OI.
Mr.
Martin states, "This is our policy," and "In fact, it is our practice as well."
Mr. Martin's statement is not supported by the evidence presented and is a material false statement.
The lack of timely referrals to OI is a noncompliance to Region V Instruction No. 1303.E.1.e.3, E.6.b and E.6.c.
Suspected Cause:
Inadequate indoctrination of Region V staff to Region V Instruction No. 1303 concerning Employee Discrimination Complaits.
Recommended Corrective Action:
Region V staff should be reindoctrinated to Instruction No.
1303 requirements.
A review should be performed to determine if the discrimination complaints were properly investigated by the NRC and that no employees who may have had potential DOL cases were denied as a result of NRC Region V neglect.
Audit performed by:
Harold Hudson i Y,,
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Checklist Questions for Interviews with Allegers I.
Confirmation of Allegations A.
Did the NRC Region V Staff acknowledge any of your allegations by sending you a letter which documented the NRC's understanding of the allegation to assure the NRC had correct information?
4 B.
If you received a letter from Region V NRC,, did the letter include a " Statement of Concerns"?
The statement will detail the allegation as understood by the individuals who received the allegation.
C.
Did you receive any of five types of letters from the Office Allegation Coordinator (NRC) ?
D.
Was any other type of contact made with you by Region V to confirm their understanding of the matter?
What type of contact was made?
t II.
Confidentiality Did you refuse to give your name to the NRC when you made A.
1 your allegations?
If so, did the NRC inform you that if requested, the NRC would treat your identity as confidential?
B.. If you were granted confidentiality, did the NRC inform you that:
1.
the pledge is not absolute but NRC policy is to not divulge the identification of people granted confidentiality?
2.
the individual's name will not normally appear in the publicly released reports?
3.
individual's identification may be revealed where required by law, when necessary to insure public health and safety, pursuant to congressional directives?
4.
a pledge of confidentiality shall not be made or will not be honored if you provide information indicating that you intent or have committed or participated in criminal acts which may include a willful violation of NRC requirements?
C.
Was your confidentiality compromised?
Was you identifica-tion made known to the licensee employee?
D.
How was your confidentiality compromised?
2 _, _ _
E.
If the compromise of your confidentiality was the result of NRC disclosure, do you know if the specific approval of the cognizant Division Director was obtained for that action?
F.
If the licensee guessed your ID, do you know how the NRC-responded, i.e., did the NRC neither confirm nor deny the validity of the guess and refuse to discuss the matter?
III.
Handling of Allegations A.
Did you make allegations to NRC Region V Staff involving wrongdoing such as record falsification, willful or deliberate violation of a regulatory requirement, material false statements or improper conduct which affects licensed activities?
If so, to your knowledge did Region V Staff refer these matters to the NRC Office of Investigation?
Or did Region V resolve the issues themselves without OI participation?
B.
To the best of your knowledge, did the NRC conduct a systematic examination and analysis of your allegations?
If not, what did they overlook or not deal with?
C.
Did you have any allegations not addressed by Region V NRC in their DCAMP?
D.
To your knowledge, were there any announced meetings open to the public which addressed significant technical issues?
If so, when and where?
E.
When significant technical meetings were held, were verbatim transcripts taken to maintain an appropriate record?
F.
Did the NRC Staff have any feedback with you, i.e.,
discuss the approach and findings of the Staff's evaluation or assure you the Staff thoroughly understood the concern and demonstrated how the Staff dealt with the public G.
Did the NRC Staff submit any of your allegations to the licensee for evaluation?
If so, which are allegation numbers?
If so, do you know if they were listed on Attachment #6 to SSER #26?
IV. Documentation A.
All NRC reports are supposed to be factual and written in a style that does not discourage persons from bringing matters to its attention.
Did you observe any NRC reports that were not factual or discouraged you from bringby matters to the NRC?
B.
Did you observe any NRC reports that attacked or dis-paraged the alleger?
If so, what was the response? -
V.
Employee Discrimination Complaints A.
As a result of making allegations or other NRC protected activity, were you subjected to discrimination in any form?
What was the form?
B.
Did you report this discrimination to a Region V Staff member?
C.
Did the Region V Staff member refer you to:
1.
Enforement Office NRC?
2.
Office of Investigation?
D.
If the above referrals were not made, were you informed by Region V that a complaint must be filed with the Dept. of Labor within 30 days of the acts complained of in order to obtain the Dept. of Labor's assistance?.. -
Charles Stokes -- Interview 11-4-84 I.
1.
No letters received.
4.
Yes.
Interviewed several times -- two occasions at his request.
II. No confidentiality requests.
III. 1.
Yes..OI was involved.
2.
50-50 systematic examination.
But has not reviewed all work performed by NRC.
Analysis done -- nothing cause of it.
Not satisfied.
3.
One out of original 17 allegations made not addressed --
shear stress.
NRC claims never raised point.
4.
Yes.
One in January 1984 at PG&E offices in San Francisco.
There was a list of people to be admitted -- some people couldn't get in.
Actually a controlled meeting because on PG&E grounds.
Meeting announced in Washington,- D.C., or in NRC publication in document room.
i S.
Yes -- transcripted and on tape but FOIA.
6.
Basically none.
NRC does not have to satisfy alleger, just themselves.
7.
All submitted to PG&E.
IV.
1.
Yes. Responses are not factual enough.
To abbreviated.
NRC never stated what they looked at.
Very small sample size.
NRC agreed to talk with witnesses but never did it.
NRC decided not necessary.
V.
1.
Made commitment but broke it.
2.
No written reports.
But verbally accosted.
Pissed off at me -- ignored what it said.
Did not handle themselves very professionally.
NRC resented my probbing into their affairs or follow up on NRC responses to allegations.
VI. 1.
Yes.
I was fired.
2.
Yes.
Reported to Region V and Dept. of Labor jointly.
3.
a.
No.
b.
No.
4.
No.
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Steve Lockert -- Interview 11-4-84 I.
1.
No.
2.
One confirmation meeting on first affidavit with Region V and OI.
II. Did not ask for confidentiality.
III. 1.
Yes.. Unable to determine if OI involved.
OI would get involved at later time because of GAP.
2.
Allegations were turned over to PG&E and PG&E answers adopted by Region V without much examination.
3.
Yes.
Made allegation concerning welder qualifications with QC Inspector rubber stamping approval which resulted in alleger being fired.
4.
No.
5.
Yes.
6.
Partial effort to act as a sounding board at first but later no feedback at all.
No feedback at all on approach and findings.
7.
Yes.
IV.
1.
SSER #26 had factual misstatements and purposefully dodging issues.
Minimum imput by NRC.
2.
No.
V.
1.
Yes. Was fired from job.
2.
Yes.
3.
a.
No.
b.
No.
4.
No. -.
Diablo Canyon Alleger -- Wishes to 11-4-84 remain anonymous I.
1.
No letters received from Region V.
4.
Phone calls, personal contacts -- no followup by NRC.
II.
1.
Granted confidentiality by NRC Region V and OI.
OI had written form to be signed.
Region V verbal offer of confidentiality.
2.
a.
No.
b.
No.
c.
No.
d.
No.
3.
Yes, yes.
4.
NRC Region V Mendoza gave name to Pullman QA Manager and to PG&E.
During a conversation with PG&E Hot Line, Ron Hobgood PG&E QC Manager stated we know you are talking to NRC.
5.
No approval to his knowledge.
III.
1.
Verbal allegations to NRC Mendoza.
No written allegations.
OI was not involved to his knowledge by Region V but subsequently he talked to OI on his own.
2.
Absolutely not.
NRC Mendoza went direct to Pullman QA/QC Manager and gave him opportunity to cover tracks (Steps To Prevent Recurrent Program Issue).
Alleger was informed by NRC he had gone to QA/QC Manager.
3.
Yes.
Made allegations concerning welding and bolting to NRC Mendoza.
He claimed he wasn't knowledgeable and would get another NRC Staff member to talk to him.
But nobody ever got back with him to discuss issue.
Another occasion alleger threatened by pipefitbers NRC Region V never address threats.
Address posting requirements concerning protected activities.
4.
No.
5.
Not with Region V.
Only with OI.
When making verbal allega-tions of technical significance NRC Region V did not even take decent notes.
6.
Only on Quick Bolt issue but even then how problem technically resolved was not explained or offered to be reviewed.
NRC just said problem resolved.
Did not show criteria used.
7.
Yes.
IV. 1.
Yes.
NRC reports appeared to be written by PGEE.
SSER #26 was mostly PG&E answers.
SSER changes the intent of the allegations and basically missed point of allegations.
2.
No.
V.
1.
Yes.
Quit job because feared being set up by Pullman.
2.
Yes.
3.
a.
No.
b.
No.
4.
No.
i-4.-.-
Tim O'Neil -- Interview 11-4-84 I.
1.
No letters received from NRC.
No confirmation of understanding of allegations.
4.
Did have a couple of meetings with Region V Staff.
II.
1.
NRC Region V agreed to grant Confidentiality.
Dennis Kirsch sagreed to confidentiality during meeting.
He, stated, " keep identify confidential unless you are put on the witness stand."
2.
a.
Yes.
b.
No.
c.
Yes.
d.
No.
3.
Yes.
4.
Two occasions.
Had a meeting on 1-13-84 with NRC Region V Staff member concerning draft review of a Discrepancy Report.
NRC agreed to be discreet but 2 days later asked for the DR before it had been processed through normal channels.
Second occasion -- identify reveals in SSER 622.
NRC Report stated person making allegation was the individual who wrote Deficient Condition Notice.
DCN listed individual hat number.
5.
No knowledge of specific approval.
NRC failed to censor its own report.
III.
1.
Yes.
Identified falsified records.
a.
OI not involved.
b.
Region V resolved issue by going after meaningless details.
2.
No.
NRC never discussed any exams or analysis that they performed.
3.
Quite a few allegations never addressed.
4.
No.
5.
NRC Region V taped some meetings but no transcripts or if they did transcript meeting no copy was ever received.
6.
No feedback at all.
Region V never initiated any feedback.
7.
Yes.
Weld issues turned over to PG&E.
NRC did look at A325 bolt issue -- PG&E welded studs; NRC reviewed and accepted. -
s IV. 1.
Yes.
SSER #22 disclosed identify by listing hat number.
2.
Yes.
Gist of reports were not substantiated when said allegers were misinformed, etc.
- v. 1.
Yes.
In July 1984 informed NRC Region V being harassed by management.
Ordered to cover whole building to do all inprocess inspection and write DCN's.
Too much coverage.
Also, I made allegations of wrongdoing in January 1984.
2.
Yes.
First to PG&E Quality Hot Line and then 'to Region V.
3.
a.
No.
Onsite NRC Staff member talked to individual, b.
No.
4.
No.
Program Requirements I.
Scope of Program.
A.
Region V Instruction No. 1303 -- Management of Allegations.
1.
1303.C.1 -- Allegation is an assertion by an indi-vidual in the form of a statement, complaint, or concern that indicates a possible problem in connec-tion with NRC licensed activities, or' activities within the jurisdiction of the NRC.
B.
Supplement Safety Evaluation Report No. 21, December 1983.
1.
1.3, Scope -- The Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program (DCAMP) encompasses all allegations or ex-pressions of concern which may be construed as allegations which pertain to design, construction, operation, and management of safety-related structures, systems and components at Diablo Canyon.
In this regard the DCAMP has also addressed certain concerns raised by the public, media, and provided by members of Congress.
2.
2.27, Allegation Management Instruction -- Region V's draft instruction or allegation management was used as guidance for this process.
3.
3.5, Conclusion and Recommendations --
The allegation management program in place for current and future allegations related to Diablo Canyon has and should continue to provide a procedure for orderly and thorough yet timely examination of each concern raised.
C.
Supplement Safety Evaluation Report No. 22, March 1984.
1.
1.0 -- The staff is performing its investigations, inspection and evaluation of the allegations in accordance with the DCAMP.
II.
Confirmation of Allegation.
A.
Region V Instruction No. 1303 -- Management of Allegations.
1.
1303, Division Directors.
a.
D.2.f. -- Prepare, sign and/or concur in all written communications between Region V and the
- alleger, b.
D.3.c. -- Verify that written communications have been sent to alleger as prescribed in Section E.5 of this instruction.
Sign and/or concur in the letters sent to an alleger at the discretion of the cognizant Division Director.....
t E.1.e.4. -- NRC Region V policy is to send a c.
4 letter to the alleger which documents the NRC's understanding of the allegation to assure that the NRC has correct information.
(Note:
E.1.e. deals with persons who wish to remain anonymous.)
l d.
E.4.o. -- All documents including letters to and from an alleger relating to an allegation shall be filed in an appropriate facili,ty docket file.
Confidential and/or sensitive material should be marked as " official use only."
e.
E.5., Letter to Allegers Acknowledging Receipt of Allegations -- All allegations received from concerned citizens will be acknowledged by a letter to the individual who presented the allegations.
This letter, in addition to stating an acknowledge-ment of the contact, will also contain a " Statement of Concerns" as an enclosure to the letter.
The statement will detail the allegation as understood by the individual who received the allegation.
The purpose of the letter is to assure the alleger that his concern will be examined as appropriate, and that the examination will address all of the specific concerns expressed by the alleger.
The office Allegation Coordinator (OAC) is responsible for preparing acknowledgement letters-to allegers.
. Generally, there are six types of letters which could be sent to allegers.
These are as follows:
(1)
Normal first letter.
(2)
Restatement of Concern.
(3)
Request for Additional Information.
(4)
Close-out for Lack of Response.
(5)
Close-out for Action Completed.
B.
Supplement Safety Evaluation Report No. 21.
j 1.
2.2, Methodology.
2.
2.2.1, Confirmation of Allegation -- As each allegation was received, every ef fort was made to contact the alleger to confirm our understanding of the matter.
. for some cases, meetings were held with the alleger to confirm our understanding of the allegation.
III.
Anonymity / Confidentiality.
A.
Region V Instruction No. 1303 -- Management of Allegations.
1.
1303.
E.1.e. -- Many persons reporting on a particular a.
matter to NRC wish to remain anonymous.
If the alleger refuses to give a name inform the person that:
(1)
NRC will, if the alleger so requests, treat.
the individual's identify as confidential.
(See paragraph 7 of this section for additional detail.)
(2)
All matters involving public safety will be examined and evaluated.
The individual's identity may, however, be revealed where required by law, when necessary to insure public health and safety, pursuant to Congres-sional directives, where he himself makes the matter public or where the nature of the allegations or the limited number of people with access to the reported information may provide a basis for guessing their identity.
This might be avoided if the NRC were aware of whose identify should be withheld.
(3)
If the individual alleging discrimination, (4)
NRC Region V policy is to send a letter to the alleger which documents the NRC's understand-ing of the allegation to assure that NRC has correct information.
(See paragraph 5 of this section for additional detail.)
(5)
If the allegers insists on remaining anonymous, obtain as much information.
b.
E.3. -- All notifications decisions shall be made with due regard for the need to maintain the nature of the allegation and its confidentiality.
c.
E.7.,
Confidentiality.
d.
E.7.a.,
Background -- The ability of the NRC to obtain information, particularly adverse informa-tion from sources who wish to remain confidential, depends on the subsequent handling of such informa-tion by the NRC and its ability to protect the identify of individuals providing the information.
Confidentiality is a means by which the NRC protects and withholds the identity of an individual who provides incriminating and/or adverse information 1 _ _. _ _ _ _ _.
0 to the NRC.
It is NRC policy not to divulge to others the identity of individuals granted confidentiality,.either during or subsequent to an inquiry based on the information provided to NRC.
E.7.b.,
Use of Confidentiality --
Confidentiality e.
should not be routinely offered to individuals making allegations.
. However, if a Region V staff member is of the opinion that he would not receive the information, or if the indivi'aual providing the information request anonymity, then a grant of confidentiality will be proffered.
Before con-fidentiality has been granted, the individual shonid be informed that, although the pledge is not absolute, it is NRC policy not to divulge the identity of people granted confidentiality.
- Also, the individual should be told that their name will not normally appear in the publicly released reports.
The individual's identity may, however, be revealed where required by law, when necessary to insure public health and safety, pursuant to Congressional directives, where he himself makes the matter public or where*the nature of the allegations or the limited number of people with access to the reported information may provide a basis for guessing their identify.
In these cases, NRC will neither confirm or deny requests to verify the identity of a source of information.
One point regarding promises of confidentiality should be clearly understood by all Region V staff members and explained to the indi-vidual providing information.
A pledge of confi-dentiality shall not be made (or will not be honored if previously granted) if the individual provides information indicating that he intends to or has personally committed, or participated in criminal acts which may include a willful violation of NRC requirements.
f.
E.7.c.
-- In no case will the identity of such an individual (individual making allegations, express-ing concerns, or registering complaints) be made known to a licensee employee without the specific approval of the congnizant Division Director.
If the licensee correctly guesses the identity of the individual, the Region V staff members will respond that the NRC position is to neither confirm nor deny the validity of such guesses and refuse to discuss the matter further.
B.
Supplement Safety Evaluation Report No. 21.
1.
1.3,. Scope - - The DCAMP maintains as one of its tenets that allegers' desire for confidentiality or anonymity will be protected by all means available.
J -
- e IV.
Handling of Allegation.
A.
Region V Instruction No. -1303 -- Management of Allegations.
1.
1303.
a.
E.2.a.6. -- Determine how allegation should be
- handled, i.e.,
inquiry, routine inspection, special inspection or investigation.
Allegations concern-ing technical matter, such as inadequacies in procedures, qualifications or training; inadequate implementation of procedures; inadequate corrective actions; radiation overexposure; etc., shall be handled via the inspector program.
Allegations involving wrongdoing such as record falsification; i
willful or deliberate violation of a regulatory requirement; material false statements, or improper conduct which affects licensed activities should be referred to OI for investigation.
I b.
E.3.f., Notification -- Cognizant Division Director shall assign individual to:
Notify Director OI i
Region V of any potential wrongdoing by individuals that may require referral to the Department of Justice.
I B.
Supplement Safety Evaluation Report No. 21.
1.
1.2., Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program (DCAMP).
2.
1.2.1. -- Conduct a systematic examination and analysis of allegations and expressions of concern pertaining to design, construction, operation and management of safety-related structures, systems, and components at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
3.
2.2, Methodology.
t 4.
2.2.2.,
Site Inspection -- Many of the allegations required onsite inspections to verify construction practices, records, procedures and personnel qualifica-tions.
. Independent measurements and evaluations were performed where appropriate.
j 5.
2.2.3., Technical Reviews -- The technical reviews were accomplished by detailed evaluations using licensing documents, regulations, standards, additional information provided by the licensee and independent analysis as necessary.
6.
2.2.5., Public Meetings -- Where significant technical meetings were held, verbatim transcripts were taken to maintain an appropriate record.
These meetings were j
announced and open to the public.
(Note:
This last sentence was deleted in SSER #22.)
i 4
7.
2.2.6.,
Feedback to Allegers -- Where practical, the staff attempted to discuss with the alleger the approach and findings of the staff's evaluation related to their allegation.
The purpose here was to. assure the staff thoroughly understood the concern and to demonstrate how the staff dealt with the concerns.
C.
Supplement Safety Evaluation Report No. 26, July 1984.
1.
4.,
Status and Summary of Staff Evaluation of Allegation the allegations are-being resolved by methods appropriate for the individual allegation.
Following appropriate screening by the staff a number of allegations have been submitted to the licensee for evaluation.
The licensee has been required to provide the results of their evaluations and identify any necessary corrective actions to the staff in writing.
The subsequent staff evaluation of an allegation then also considered the licensee's response and action. provides a listing of certain allegations for which the licensee was requested to respond.
V.
Documentation.
A.
Region V Instruction No. 1303 -- Management of Allegations.
1.
E.4.f. -- The purpose of all reports and other docu-ments is to set forth sufficient facts and information in a manner such that a reasonable person will read and understand the allegation and the facts and circum-stances that were found to exist or had existed concern-ing the matter.
All reporting shall be factual and written in a style such that the NRC does not discourage persons from bringing matters to its attention.
Under no circumstances is the report to be written such that it attacks or disparages the alleger.
Perjorative language is to be avoided.
VI.
Employee Discrimination Complaints.
A.
Region V Instruction No. 1303 -- Management of Allegations.
1.
E.1.e.3. -- If the individual is alleging discrimination, refer the person to the Enforcement Officer or to an investigator in the Office of Investigations Region V.
If this cannot be done, obtain as much information as as possible about the problem and then inform the person that a complaint must be filed with the Department of Labor within 30 days of the acts complained of in order to obtain the Department's assistance.
(See paragraph 6 of this section for additional detail.)
2.
E.6., Employee Discrimination Complaints..
3.
E.6.a.,
Background -- A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the NRC and the Department of Labor (DOL) facilitates coordination and cooperation between the agencies in the processing of violations of the employee protection provisions of Section 201(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act.
4.
E.6.b., Working Arrangements -- The working arrangements between NRC and DOL establish certain commitments that must be carried out by the regional contacts for the NRC.
The working arrangements provide that NRC will refer complaints to DOL, advise DOL of complaints received concerning employee discrimination, inform DOL of investigations that NRC is conducting into these matters, 5.
E.6.c.,
Processing of Complaints -- If a complaint is received concerning a possible violation of Section 210(a), the OAC will refer the complainant to the Enforcement Coordinator, the Region V point of contact responsible for regional implementation of the NRC-DOL MOU.
j b dcyok
~
CD gc:qw ee.
C UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM3IA JAMES L.
McDEP.MOTT, IIj TIMOTHY J.
O'NEILL, Plaintiffs, v.
Civil Action No. 85-1082 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, et al.,
FI L E D Defenc. ants.
~
A?R 2 6 Td5 MEMORANDUM ORDER
,ig,.,,gg p, g, On April 4,
1985, Timothy J.
O'Neill and James L.
McDermott, II, two private citizens currently or previously employed at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, filed suit against the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
.I its Chairman, and Executive D:. rector for Operations.
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus relating to certain aspects of the Commission's license-related activities at Diablo Canyon.
Specifically, plaintiffs seek to have the Court order defendants:
(1) to
" comply strictly with all rules, regulations, procedures and instructions contained in the Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program" work plan, with respect to al'1 future, pending, and closed allegations; (2) to " create and maintain for each allegation a separate file available for public
\\'
l 1
)
(
~.
i
~
i review"; and (3) to " provide all necessary resources for the j
NRC's Office of Investigations to resolve allegations under its jurisdiction."
The case is presently before the Court on the plaintiffs' motion fer preliminary injunction.
The four f actors to be considered in determining whether party is entitled to the extraordinary relief of a prelimi-a nary injunction are set forth by the United States Court of Appeals in Vircinia Pet roleum Jebbers Ass ' n. v.
FPC, 259 F.2d J~
921 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Washincton Metrocolitan Area Transit Ccmmission v.
Holidav Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
Under this test, in order to grant the extraordinary relief of injunction, the Court, only af ter careful delibera-tion, must be persuaded that the moving party has clearly demonstrated (1) that there is a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits; (2) that he is in danger of suffering irreparable harm during the pendency of the action; i
(3) that more harm will result to him from the denial of the injunction than will result to the defendant from its grant; and (4) that the public interest will not be disserved by the issuance of the requested relief.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this suit reveal that in response to a large number cf allegations of safety-related and quality assurance problems at the Diablo Canyo'n Nuclear Plant, the Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program (DCAMP) was established in late 1983 by NRC to provide for a l
comprehensive and coordinated evaluation and resolution of
.... - -. ~...
these allega tions.-
Plaintiffs O'Neill and McDermott,are r.mong those who have made allegations of deficiencies at Diablo Canyon and whose allegations are under evaluation in DCAMP.
Plaintiffs' allegations are also part of a petition for i
enforcement action filed pursuant to 2.206 of the NRC's rules.
Under the regulatory scheme established by the NRC, members of 1
the public are allowed to request that the NRC take license-l related enforcement action.
Under the NRC's rules, within a reasonable time after receiving a 2.206 request, the NRC is required either to institute the requested proceeding or to provide a written explanation of its decision to deny the request.
Section 2.206(b)., Af ter final action by N P.C on the petition, judicial review may be sought in the Court of Appeals.
Plaintif f s contend that the NRC has f ailed to follow the procedures set down by the DCAMP f or processing allegations of safety deficiencies and that it has failed to comply with'its duty to act i n a timely manner.
Plaintiffs contend that by 4
establishing DCAMP the NRC has assured the Congress and th'e public that i t will follow the policy set forth by DCAMP to investigate allegations of safety hazards and for these reasons the agency is not free to violate that policy.
Plaintif f s seek relief in the nature of me.ndamus to e =pel the N?.C to comply with the provisions of DCAMP until the policy of the agency is officially changed.
4 S
It is well established that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and that it is to be utilized only under exceptional ci reuts tan ces.
Haneke v.
Secretarv of Health, Education and Welfare, 535 F.2d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
In order to be entitled to the extraordina ry remedy cf mandamus, plaintif f s must prove that there is a " clear right to the relief sought, a plainly defined and non-discretionary duty on the part of the defendant to honor that right, and no other adequate
~
remedy, e i t'h e r judicial or administrative is available."
Gane v.
Heckler, 746 F.2d 844, 852 (D. C. Cir. 19 8 4 ).
Mandamus issues to compel an officer to perf orm a purely ministerial duty.
It cannot be used,to compel or control a duty in the discharge of which by law he is given discretion.
Ganem, supra at E53 citing Werk v.
United States ex rel Rives, 257 U.S.
175 (1925).
In the instant case, plaintiffs seek to
~
enforce the provisions of a staf f workplan which was adopted by the NRC as a tool to provide the staff with guidance in processing and resolving allegations of safety violations.
Def endants contend that when the agency established DCAMP, it was not meant to bc the only managerial plan or that the agency was f orever bound to f ollow it, or that it could not be 1.. formally mod:fied if the need arose.
Bundreds of a* legations have been submitted to NRC since the inception of DCAMP.
Many of the allegations are repetitive in nature.
Be cause of the large volume of allegations, the agency has determined that it can make more efficient use of its
resources if the staff groups the allegations.
Over time, as the volume of allegations grew, the agency's practice of implementing DCAMP has been informally modified in order to allow for the more efficient use of agency resources while still complying with the spirit of DCAMP.
It is defendants' contention that DCAMP embodies the discretion of the NRC and that, therefore, mandamus cannot be used to compel strict compliance with its provisions.
Mor e ov e r, defendants contend that plaintif f s have an alternative source of relief in their 2.206 petition.
The Court de,termines that plaintif f s have no clear right to the relief sought.
As an internal. operating procedure or managerial tool designed to aid the exercise of the NRC's independent discretion, DCAMP is net enforceable in a private civil suit.
In Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v.
Grant, 537 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1976), the court held that because the Soil Conserva tion Service 's project evaluation manuals were merely internal operating procedures rather than officially promulgated regulations, they did not prescribe any rule of law binding on the agency.
In addition, in Indecend-ent Meat Packers Ass'n v.
Butz, 526 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1975),
the court held that an executive order requiring consideration of specified factors was intended primarily as a' managerial tool for implementing the President's persona.1 economic policies and not as a legal f ramework enforceable by private civil action.
Moreover, it a ppea r s that on March 14, 1985,
. ~ - -
1 p.aintiffs filed a 2.206 petition f or enf orcement.
There is presently an audit being conducted of DCAF.P allegatio'ns which 1
will provide plaintiffs with a f ull opportunity to express their concerns as to whether DCAMP is reasonably addressing the matters it is designed to address.
For these reasons, the Ccurt determines that plaintiffs are not entitled to the b
extraordinary relief of mandamus to compel the NRC to comply strictly with the provisions of DCAMP.
With respect to plaintiffs' allegations under 2.206, def endants also urge the Court to deny plaintiff s' request for
- ...junctive relief on the basis that plaintif f s have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.
In support of.this position, defendants allege that plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim because this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Defendants rely upon Florida Pcwer & Licht Comeanv v. Lorion, Nos. 8 3-7 0 3 and 8 3-1031 (U.S.
Sup.
Ct.,
Mar. 29, 1985).
In that case, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review denials of 2. 206 petitions 5
dees not lie in the District Court and that reviewability is to be initially in the Court of Appeals.
Further, the District of Columbia Ci r cuit has held that in cases where judicial review of final agency action is of$ Appeals, I
within the sole jurisdiction of the Court interlocutory judicial review of such agency action, if appropriate at all, is also within the e::clu s iv e jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals.
Tel e commu ni ca ti ons Research and i
-..,_____.___,_.._.,__,.-~,,,..--y--
.-._-.,__.,,-_,_.--___,._-,y.,
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E J
l Action Center v.
Federal Communications Co rission, 750 F.2d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (TRAC) and Air Line Pilots Association, International v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 750 F.2d 81 (D.C.
Cir. 19 8 4 )( ALPA).
In TRAC, the Court held:
l
[W)here a statute commits a review of i-agency action to. the Court of Appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the j
Circuit Court's future jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of
.t h e Court of Appeals.
1 It appears to the Court, therefore, that plaintiffs are i
~
1 net likely to succeed on the merits.
Plaintiffs also contend that they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
'n o t issued.
It is ' plaintiffs' pcsition that they will be subjected to risks f rom the Diablo Cianyon Nuclear Plant and that such risks carry potentially dangerous consequences.
They allege that the risks are so massive that the mere threat l
alone of a nuclear accident is sufficient to constitute i
irreparable harm and that this continuing risk is clearly avoidable by injunction.
The Court determines that plaintiffs have failed to make a showing of irreparable harm.
There are 4
presently 50 NRC staf f members working on DCAMP allegations.
Cf apprcximately 1750 allegations received, the great majority have been resolved and all have been initially evaluated to determine whether they require priority resolution.., Although NRC has admittedly not complie'd strictly with'DCAMP as
^
f originally established, it has complied with the spirit of the management program and has assured the Court that the agency 5
n ~. -
.,,,_,,-__.,.-.--__c.
rr, v
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N---' - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - * - + - * - -
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4 is doing the job which Congress expected it to do and that there are no significant saf ety considerations involved in the allegations which have yet to be resolved.
Defendants contend that even if these unresolved allegations were accepted as
- true, they would not have a significant impact on the operation of the Diablo Canyon Plant.
Plaintiffs also contend that they will suffer an irreparable harm by being continually deprived of their due process right to participate in the n u clea r regulatory program.
The Court also finds this argument without merit.
Plaintiffs have every right to participate and indeed have participated in the nuclear l
regulatory program by filing their 2.206 petition.
For these reasons, the Court determines that plaintiffs have failed to cake a showing of irreparable injury, f
And finally, plaintiffs contend that the balance of I
harms and the public interest favor the granting of the injunction.
The Court is not persuaded.
The NRC, in the exercise of its di scretiona ry powers, has established this system of managing the large volume of allegations it has received.
The Commission has, over time, modified its workplan to permit a more efficient use of its resources.
Plaintiffs seek to have this Court compel NRC to handle these allegations in a manner which the Commission, through past
- practice, has f ou nd to be inefficient.
Th e' NRC wa s established to regulate the nuclear energy industry for the safety of the country.
The Court determines that the l
1
. ~ -
Congressional intent in establishing the NRC is in line with the public interest and the Court will not interfere in the discretionary matter,s of the Commission.
For the feregoing reasons, the p1hintiffs' motic.n f or a preliminary injunction must be denied.
\\
Therefore, it is this rJ6 'A' dt.y of April, 1985, ORDERED that p l a' i n t i f f s ' motion for preliminary injunction be,'and hereby is, denied.
-1 +nd !. b..hc 'Cy
.bu.u m*
- i L NORMA HOLLOWAY/
UNITED, STATES DI./ HNSON
.RICT JUDGE 1
e e
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- - - - - - - -.