ML20207E834

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 178 to License DPR-72

ML20207E834
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	05/21/1999
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207E830	List: ML20207E826 ML20207E834
References
NUDOCS 9906070171
Download: ML20207E834 (4)

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- SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.178 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM'AND ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM l

ACTUATION SYSTEM SETPOINTS AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-302

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letters dated November 23,1998, and supplemented January 29 and May 7,1999, Florida Power Corporation (FPC or the licensee) requested the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j

. (NRC) approval for changes to the technical specifications (TSs) for the reactor protection system (RPS) and engineered safeguards actuation system (ESAS) setpoints and allowable values. The licensee has also proposed a change to a surveillance requirement to verify valve position for valves in the high pressure injection (HPI) system. The licensee's Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) analysis for Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) currently takes credit for several operator actions in order to achieve a successful mitigation, in 1997, FPC committed to enhance the HPl system before Cycle 12 in order to reduce the number of operator actions required to mitigate SBLOCA. The proposed modifications are intended to provide a significant reduction in operator burden and enhance the operator's capabilities for accident management for design basis accidents, specifically a SBLOCA concurrent with a loss of offsite power and a single failure, such as a loss of "A" train DC electrical system or battery.-

The licensee has also included, as supporting information, a description of a number of changes to the HPl system which are intended to be implemented under authority of 10 CFR 50.59. The staff confirmed with the licensee that modifications to the HPI system were not part of the license' amendment request and NRC review and approval for these modifications were i

L not requested. Therefore, the modifications to the HPI system were not reviewed for j

acceptability.

The January 29,1999 and May 7,1999, supplements did not affect the original proposed no significant hazards determination, or expand the scope of the request as noticed in the Federal

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1. ' 2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Setooint Calculation Methodoloav

. Revised Allowable Values were determined using the licensee's in-house setpoint calculation methodology. This methodology was reviewed and accepted by the staff via NRC inspection of CR-3 and was documented in Inspection Report 50-302 / 95-06 dated March 1,1995. Use of

- this methodology to determine the RPS and ESAS setpoint allowable values is acceptable.

2.2 IS Table 3.3.1-1. Items 4 and 11 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation The licensee is raising the allowable value for the RPS reactor trip setpoint for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) low pressure from 1800 to 1900 psig. The allowable value for the RPS setpoint for Shutdown Bypass RCS High Pressure is also being raised from 1720 to 1820 psig. These changes are being made to maintain the existing relationship between the reactor trip, the reactor trip bypass, the ESAS signal and ESAS applicability on low RCS pressure. Because the ESAS setpoint is being raised, it is desirable to also raise the reactor low pressure and

- shutdown bypass high. pressure trips.

' Although increasing the low-pressure reactor trip setpoint may increase the frequency of reactor trips, the licensee has reviewed data on reactor trips at Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)

I plants since 1980 and concluded that the increase is not significant (approximately one l

- percent).- The staff finds this conclusion reasonable and finds the proposed change

. acceptable.' The revised setpoints will ensure earlier actuation of the RPS and ESAS on a low RCS pressure condition and no reduction in the margin of safety associated with these systems

. is effected by the proposed change. The Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure High trip is a backup for mitigating shutdown transients and is not credited in the transient analysis. As a

' result, raising this allowable value is also acceptable.

2.3 TS 3.3.5 and Table 3.3.5-1 Enaineered Safeauards Actuation System Instrumentation

. The licensee is raising the allowable value for the ESAS RCS Pressure - Low from 1500 to 1625 psig. The signal actuates the HPl system on decreasing RCS pressure and the proposed change, raising the setpoint, will result in earlier actuation of HPl on decreasing RCS pressure.

- For a small-break LOCA, where the event progresses slowly this change will result in HPl being

- actuated significantly earlier with more water delivered to the core. The change enhances the plant response for some slow-progressing events by increasing the integrated flow of water to 1

- the core. As a result, tho' staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

Additionally, to permit'this change the applicability foi ESAS in TS table 3.3.5-1 is also being adjusted from 1700 to 1800 psig. This permits the ESAS to be bypassed below 1800 psig when depressurizing well before the setpoint is reached. Bypassing the ESAS well before the setpoint reduces the likelihood _ of an inadvertent ESAS actuation while shutting down and depressurizing.3The same change is also being made to Action C.2 in TS 3.3.5 which requires

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RCS pressure to be reduced to 1800 psig rather than 1700 psig. Because inadvertent ESAS i

actuations can be detrimental, the staff finds the change acceptable, r

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=3-l 2.4 TS 3.5.2.5 Surveillance Reauirement -

-TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.2.5 is the SR used to verify valve position for valves in the HPl flow path, and is being revised to include the additional throttle valves to be installed in the system that need to be verified in the correct position on a 24 month interval. The

- installation of these valves is part of the planned system modification to the system. Because

'there are currently valves in the system that have an SR to verify their position, the licensee is proposing to include these throttle valves under the current surveillance. The proposed SR 3.5.2.5 has been modified to specifically call out ths seven valves that would be verified in the correct position, MUVs 2,6,10, 590,591,592 and 593. The revision to the surveillance is consistent with the intent of the B&W Owners Group Standard Technical Specifications and

. provides additional assurance that the valves will be in the correct position when the system is needed. As a result, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon a letter dated March 8,1991, from Mary E. Clark of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to Deborah A. Miller, Licensing Assistant, U.S. NRC, the

- State of Florida does not desire notification of issuance of license amendments.

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.4.0. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS The amendment changes requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance _

requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant i

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-increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be

' released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 71966). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

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5.0 CONCLUSION

i The staff has reviewed the TS amendment request, the technical justification, and the applicable TS bases submitted by the licensee The staff finds the requested changes to the RPS and l

ESAS Allowable Values and the change to SR 3.5.2.5 are acceptable. The staff concludes that

~ (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: S.V. Athavale, EElB C. Jackson, SRXB Date:

May 21, 1999 l

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O Mr. John Paul Cowan CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 Florida Power Corporation 1

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Mr. R. Alexander Glenn Chairman Corporate Counsel (MAC-BT15A)

Board of County Commissioners Florida Power Corporation Citrus County P.O. Box 14042 110 North Apopka Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33733-4042 inverness, Florida 34450-4245 Mr. Charles G. Pardee, Director Ms. Sherry L. Bernhoft, Director Nuclear Plant Operations (PA4A)

Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (NA2H)

Florida Power Corporation Florida Power Corporation Crystal River Energy Complex Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 W. Power Line Street 15760 W. Power Line Street Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 Mr. Michael A. Schoppman Senior Resident inspector Framatome Technologies Inc.

Crystal River Unit 3 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rockville, Maryland 20852 6745 N. Tallahassee Road Crystal River, Florida 34428 Mr. William A. Passetti, Chief Department of Health Mr. Gregory H. Halnon Bureau of Radiation Control Director, Quality Programs (SA2C) 2020 Capital Circle, SE, Bin #C21 Florida Power Corporation Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1741 Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 W. Powor Line Street Attorney General Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs y

2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 l

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