ML20206L706
| ML20206L706 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1987 |
| From: | Ronald Bellamy NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Mroczka E CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8704170211 | |
| Download: ML20206L706 (2) | |
Text
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APR 10 1937 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company ATTN: Mr. E. J. Mroczka Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Operations Group P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141 Gentlemen:
Enclosed for your review and consideration is a letter from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the NRC, and its enclosures, the Final Exercise Report for the April 25, 1986 exercise of the offsite radiological-emergency preparedness plans for the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant and the Remedial Exercise Report for the May 28, 1986 remedial exercise.
Two deficiencies, identified by FEMA concerning alert and notification, and EBS messages by the State E0C, were rectified at a remedial exercise on May 28, 1986.
Should you have any questions concerning the enclosed material, please feel free to contact me at 215-337-5200.
Sincerely, prigim:1g;g=,3g s, y
Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/encls:
D. B. Miller, Station Superintendent D. O. Nordquist, Manager of Quality Assurance R. M. Kacich, Manager, Generation Facilities Licensing W. D. Romberg, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Gerald Garfield, Esquire Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector State of Connecticut I
l 8704170211 87041o
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4 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power 2
Company bec w/encs-Region I bcket Room (with concurrences)
DRP Section Chief M. McBride, RI, Pilgrim T. Shedlosky, SRI. Millstone 1&2 T. Rebelowski, SRI. Millstone 3 J. Akstulewicz, LPM, NRR Robert J. Bores, DRSS J. Schumacher, DRSS i.
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i R: RSS RI: RSS RI:bRSS Schumacher Lazarus Bellamy 4/$/87 4/4/87 4/l6 /87 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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p f $91 Federal Emergency Management Agency Ik Washington, D.C. 20472 MAR - 385 MD10RANDUM EDR: Fdward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Of fice of Inspection and Enforcenent U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission PROM:
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Program
SUBJECT:
Exercise Report of the April 25, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Dnergency Response Plans for the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of the Haddam Ibck exercise report of the April 25, 1986, joint exercise of the of fsite radiological energency response plans (RERP) for t.he Haddam thck Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). This was a full participation exercise for the State of Connecticut and local jurisdictions. The returt dated February 19, 1987, was prepared by Region I of the Federal Dnergenc/
Management Agency (FDIA).
There were two deficiencies identified during the exercice. Areas requirinq corrective action (ARCA) were also identified. A remedial exercise was held on May 28, 1986, and a copy of the remedial exercise report is attached.
Based on the results of the remedial exercise ard the State's schedule of corrective actions submitted for the ARCAs, FEMA considers that offsite radio-logical emergency preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that apprcpriate measures can be taken of fsite to protect the health and safety of the public livirg in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on October 4,1934, for the Haddam Ibck NPP will remain in effect.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.
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FINAL EXERCISE ASSESSMENT l
JOINT STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE l
FOR THE CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT HADDAM, CONNECTICUT l
l APRIL 25,1986 i
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION I John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Boston, Massachusetts 02109 l
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4 HADDAM NECK NUCLEAR PLANT LICENSEE:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company LOCATION:
Haddam, Connecticut DATE OF REPORT:
February 19, 1987 DATE OF EXERCISE:
April 25,1986 PARTICIPANTS:
State of Connecticut Town of Chester, CT Town of Colchester, CT Town of Deep River, CT Town of Durham, CT Town of East Haddam, CT Town of East Hampton, CT Town of Essex, CT Town of Haddam, CT Town of Hebron, CT Town of Killingworth, CT Town of Lyme, CT Town of Madison, CT Town of Marlborough, CT Town of Middlefield, CT Town of Middletown, CT Town of Portland, CT Town of Salem, CT Town of Westbrook, CT American Red Cross NONPARTICIPANTS:
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CONTENTS LIST O F ABB R EVI ATIO N S................................................... vil
SUMMARY
ix 1 INT R O D U CTIO N........................................................
1 1.1 Exercise Background.................................................
1 1.2 Federal Observers...................................................
2 1.3 Exercise Obj ec tives.................................................
4 1.4 Exercise Scenario...................................................
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1.5 Evaluation Cri t eria..................................................
7 2 E X E R CISE EVA LU ATIONS...............................................
9 2.1 Connecticut State Operations.........................................
9 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center.................................
9 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility................................. 14 2.1.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams............................ 15 2.1.4 M e di a C e n t e r................................................ 17 2.1.5 American Red Cross / Sheltering................................ 19 2.2 Connecticut Local Emergency Operations Centers....................... 20 2.2.1 Chester.....................................................
20 2.2.2 C o lc hes t e r.................................................. 23 2.2.3 DeepRiver..................................................
25 2.2.4 Durham.....................................................
27 2.2.5 Eas t Hadda m................................................ 29 2.2.6 Eas t H a m p t on............................................... 32 4
2.2.7 Essex.......................................................
34 2.2.8 Haddam.....................................................
37 2.2.9 Hebron.....................................................
39 2.2.10 K illi ng w o r t h................................................. 41 2.2.11 Lyme.......................................................
43 2.2.12 M a d is o n..................................................... 45 2.2.13 Marlboro ug h................................................. 47 2.2.14 M i ddle f i e ld.................................................. 50 2.2.15 M iddl e to w n.................................................. 52 2.2.16 P o r tla n d.................................................... 55 2.2.17 Salem......................................................
57 2.2.18 W e s t b roo k................................................... 59 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING C O R R E CTIVE A CTIO NS................................................. 61 TABLES i
1 Chronology of Protective Action Decisions and Simulated Public Alerting and Notifica tion in the EP Z............................................... 12 y
TABLES (Cont'd) 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant.................................. 63 3 Deficiencies and Areas for Corrective Action, Haddam Neck Plant............. 79 4 Status of Core Objectives for Haddan Neck Plant........................... 117 4
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LIErr OF ABBREVIATIONS ARC American Red Cross CDOT Connecticut Department of Transportation CDH Connecticut Department of Health CP Civil Preparedness CPD Civil Preparedness Director DCP Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection LOE U.S. Department of Energy DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System I
EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency l
KI potassium lodide LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident NAWAS National Warning System NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654/
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency FEMA-REP-1, Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Rev.1 Plants" OCP Connecticut Office of Civil Preparedness PIO public information officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RADEF Radiological Defense l
RDO Radiological Defense Officer REP radiological emergency preparedness TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter USCG United States Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture l
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SUMMARY
The State of Connecticut, communities within the plume exposure emergency planning zone of the nuclear power plant in Haddam, Connecticut, the Northeast Utilities Service Company, and the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company participated in an exercise of the plans and preparedness for off-site radiological emergency response on April 25,1986. The exact date and time of the exercise was unannounced to participants from state and local response agencies prior to the initiating events. Following the exercise, preliminary observations were reported by the 23-member Federal observer team, and briefings for exercise participants and the general public were held on April 27, 1986 at the Connecticut State Emergency Operations Center in the National Guard Armory in Hartford. The final evaluation, including identification of deficiencies, areas requiring corrective actions, areas recommended for improvement, and recommen-dations, is included in this document.
Each deficiency or area requiring corrective action and a corresponding recom-mended corrective action is described by jurisdiction in Section 2 of this report. Areas recommended for improvement, which do not require corrective actions, are also similarly described.'
Section 3 provides a summary listing of (a) deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding, and (b) areas requiring corrective actions. It also provides a suggested format for the state to use in responding to these items.
frrATE OF CONNECTICUT OPERATIONS The State of Connecticut operations for this exercise included the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Media Center, and two radiological field monitoring teams. The State demonstrated an ability to mobilize for an unannounced exercise, to activate and effectively operate key response functions, and to recommend protective actions consistent with event status.
Although the communications capabilities at the state level remain exemplary, continuing problems with their utilization (noted in previous exercises) led to a failure to accomplish timely (simulated) activation of public alert and notification systems.
The State EOC is an outstanding facility ideally suited for extended emergency operations. The EOC was activated in response to'a declaration of Site Area Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Charlie-Two) by the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power c
Company and Northeast Utilities, Inc. Emergency operations management at the State EOC was very good. The Governor, assisted by the State Civil Preparedness Director and his Chief of Operations, provided excellent leadership and involved key staff members in decision making. The EOC staff was for the most part competent and well trained, although additional training is recommended for PIO assistants charged with critical public notification responsibilities. Communications at the state EOC were very good and capable of reaching all relevant remote locations with multiple backup systems.
Communication with the EOF by the accident assessment team was excellent. The state failed in its one attempt to coordinate public alerting, notification and instruction to the 1x n
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public at risk. Local EOCs were informed of changes in recommended protective actions in a timely manner, thus permitting them to execute their own public alert and notification procedures, but these timely. advisories did not arrive through the designated primary channel (the Area CP Offices).
Connecticut State Police, Department of Transportation, and Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) personnel exhibited exemplary coordination and knowledge in responding to simulated evacuation impediments, and DEP officials demonstrated appropriate technical knowledge in assessing the need for protective actions.
Demonstration of recovery and reentry operations was not an objective of the exercise.
i The DEP representative in the EOF again did an excellent job of facilitating communications between the EOF and the State EOC, with which he regularly exchanged information from the time of his arrival.
No problems were experienced with the dedicated line to the EOC or the two backup commercial lines for the DEP representative's use.
Both radiological field monitoring teams mobilized for this exercise had all appropriate equipment. Team technical operations were performed well, despite the unfavorable nighttime conditions. Equipment checklists were not available at time of deployment. Communications (by radio) between the field teams and the State EOC were adequate during this exercise, correcting an earlier weakness. However, the teams were not apprised by the EOC of critical accident prognoses or meteorological j
conditions, which should have been updated periodically by a dispatcher. Radiological
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exposure control equipment and procedures used by the field teams were not entirely adequate. An inappropriate.mid-range self-reading exposure meter was used. One team was not equipped with anti-contamination clothing. Neither team had respirators. In one instance, strict adherence to procedure led to unnecessary exposure. More flexibility in written procedures, additional training for exposure control, and assignment of a staff person for full-time direction and protection of field teams could eliminate these problems in the future.
Facilities in the Media Center were excellent, and well utilized by utility and State spokespersons. PIOS held regular briefings for real and simulated media who were present. Systems for internal and external communications are adequate to support extended operation.
The public information functions at the media center were surprisingly uneven. Apparently because of the multiple responsibilities. required of the State PIO during the exercise, there was inadequate time to prepare written copy, and, thus, no news releases were issued by the State. The geographical limits of protective action areas were initially not described during the briefings, and were not included in two of the EBS messages approved for transmission by the State PIO.
- However, coordination between State and utility PIOS was very good.
LOCAL OPERATIONS i
There were several occurrences of problems in EOCs for towns located downwind of the radioactive plume released by the plant that indicate an inability to protect the public, but for the most part the objectives of the exercise were met in the local EOCs.
All of the local EOCs demonstrated the ability to activate and fully staff the EOCs. All i
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2 local EOCs were able to demonstrate the ability to make decisions, but there were several instances of a breakdown in coordination by the State's Area Offices and one f instance where a risk community (Chester) did not inform the State of its expansion of the evacuation area. In addition, Salem did not record messages thoroughly.
All local EOCs demonstrated adequate facilities and displays to respond to a radiological emergency at the Haddam Neck plant, but the following improvements are suggested: (1) In Colchester, a procedure should be developed to improve control of entry at the EOC. (2) For Middlefield, a better floor plan should be devised so furniture can be moved quickly into efficient positions when the EOC is activated. (3) For Salem, a sign should be posted outside the Town Hall to indicate the location of the EOC, so persons delivering important information or equipment can find it easily.
The ability to communicate with all appropriate organizations was also demonstrated by all communities (Local Community Objective No. 4), although a number of them experienced difficulty obtaining information from the Area 3 office and/or getting through to the utility's recorded telephone message following radio pager activation requesting them to call. This was a recurrence of a problem noted in previous exercises.
The ability to alert the public via the emergency public notification system and
<!!sseminate an instructional message was not demonstrated by East Haddam at Stage I General Emergency (Connecticut posture code:
Bravo) although it was later demonstrated at Stage II General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Alpha). In Haddam, the ability - to coordinate public alerting with the dissemination of an instructional message to the public was not demonstrated (Local Objective No. 5). The local communities that were not affected by the plume simulated public notification and instruction, although not always as thoroughly as they might have.
Local Community Objective No. 6, which called for demonstration of evacuation by Haddam, was met.
Local Community Objective No. 7, demonstration of access control, was successfully met in all local EOCs except for East Hampton.
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demonstration of closing off a forest preserve area in the two mile EPZ was not conducted by East Hampton, although the decision not to do so was discussed in the EOC.
The demonstration of the ability to monitor and control emergency worker exposure (Local Community Objective No. 8) was a problem in nine of the towns. In two cases this was due to the fact that there was not a sufficient complement of personal dosimetry. In the other seven cases this was because either there was no simulation of the distribution of dosimetry or the distribution occurred after emergency field teams were dispatched from the EOC. Demonstration of a decision to issue K1 to emergency workers (Local Community Objective No. 9) was accomplished only in Haddam. No other towns demonstrated the decision-making process for KI. Local Community Objectives Nos.10 and 11 (evacuation and responding to impediments to evacuation in Haddam) were successfully met in Haddam.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and
- response, j
FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Planning include:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
I Determining whether the plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises conducted by emergency-
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response jurisdictions.
Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other 1
involved Federal agencies:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
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U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
American Red Cross (ARC)
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
l Formal submission of emergency plans to the RAC by the State and relevant l-local jurisdictions was followed closely in 1982 by exercising, critiquing, and evaluating l
the plan. A public meeting was held to acquaint the citizenry with contents of the plans, to answer questions about them, and to receive suggestions regarding them. Additional exercises were conducted on April 23, 1983, and May 12, 1984. The fourth radiological emergency exercise was conducted on April 25,1986, between the hours of 5:43 p.m. and r
f 11:00 p.m.
The exact date and time for this exercise was unannounced to participants prior to its initiating events, and it was scheduled outside of normal operating hours for l
the response organizations.
This report presents findings for the April 25, 1986, exercise. The purpose of these exercises is to reassess the capability of the State and i
local emergency preparedness organizations to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear power plant in Haddam, Connecticut.
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An observer team coniisting of FEMA Region I personnel, RAC, and supporting personnel from Federal and,8 tate agencies evaluated the April 25, 1986, exercise. A total of 29 observers trafhd in radiological emergency response were assigned to evaluate state, local, and field activities.
Following the exercise, a closed critique for the participating State officials was held at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 27, 1986, at the National Guard Armory, site of the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), in Hartford, Connecticut. This critique was followed at 2:00 p.m. with an open meeting for the public and local participants.
The findings presented in this report are the results of a review of the Federal observers' evaluations and were reviewed by the RAC chairman for FEMA Region I. The FEMA Region I director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support that any significant deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action observed during the exercise have been corrected, and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans as appropriate.
Therefore, FEMA suggests that the State complete the schedule for correction of the identified deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions included as Section 3 of this report.
1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Twenty-nine federal observers participated in evaluating this exercise. These individuals, their agencies, and their observation locations are given below.
Observer Agency Location Edward A. Thomas, RAC Chairman FEMAa General Observations Henry G. Vickers, Reg. Director FEMA General Observations b
Christopher Saricks, Team Leader ANL State EOC C
Paul Lutz DOT State EOC Frederick Oleson FEMA State EOC (Radiological Health) d Donald Connors ARC State EOC (Reception / Red Cross)
Kenneth Horak FEMA Media Center (at State EOC)
Byron Keene, Team Leader EPA' EOF I
Dorothy Nevitt USDA EOF Charles Gordon NRCE Field Monitoring Caroline Herzenberg ANL Field Monitoring
3 Observer Agency Location Donald Jankowski, Local EOC Team Leader A ANL Deep River EOC John Tatar, Local EOC Team Leader B ANL Durham EOC William Knoerzer, Local EOC Team Leader C ANL Hebron EOC Brendon Bailey FEMA Chester EOC Ross Hemphill ANL Colchester EOC Kevin Merli FEMA East Haddam EOC
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Jeanne Jendro ANL East Hampton EOC William Vinikour ANL Essex EOC Jack Dolan FEMA Haddam EOC David Poyer ANL Killingworth EOC Floyd Davis ANL Lyme EOC Arvind Teotia ANL Madison EOC Samuel Nelson ANL Marlborough EOC William Chambers ANL Middlefield EOC Elizabeth Dionne FEMA Middletown EOC Larry Robertson FEMA Portland EOC Conrad Tome ANL Salem EOC Lester Conley ANL Westbrook EOC aFEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency bANL: Argonne National Laboratory CDOT: U.S. Department of Transportation dARC: American Red Cross / FEMA
- EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency IUSDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture ENRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
4 1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES During the exercise, the objectives of the State and local communities were to demonstrate that their emergency response plans, operations, and capability for mobilizing and coordinating necessary resources are adequate to cope with an emergency at the Haddam Neck Atomic Power Plant (HNP).
The State objectives for the April 25,1986, exercise were as follows:
1.
Demonstrate ability to activate and fully staff the principal emergency response facilities (State EOC, Media Center, and the three affected Area Offices of Civil Preparedness).
2.
Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
3.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
5.
Demonstrate ability to use procedures, mobilize and deploy field teams, use appropriate radiological monitoring equipment for the determination of off-site environmental radiation levels.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to project radiological exposure to the public based on plant data and field team monitoring data and to determine appropriate protective actions and mensures, as detailed in guidance within the State of Connecticut Radiological Emergency Response Plans.
7.
Simulate the ability to alert the public via the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
8.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to perform access control and deal with impediments to evacuation, such as traffic obstructions; this portion of the scenario to involve the Department of Transportation in coordination with the State Police in planning alternative traffic routing.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 10. Demonstrate the ability to decide, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue potassium lodide (KI) to emergency
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workers (consideration also to be given to methods of deploying personnel to distribute KI for use by emergency workers).
11.
Demonstrate the ability of the State to work with the town of Haddam to effect an orderly evacuation of the Near Site Evacuation Center (Haddam Neck Fire House) through the town of East Hampton for on-site personnel.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner with provisions to perform rumor control.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure.
The local community objectives for the April 25,1986, exercise were as follows:
1.
Demonstrate the ability to activate and fully staff the emergency response facilities, which would consist of the local community Emergency Operations Centers.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
5.
Simulate the ability to alert the public via the emergency notification system within the town borders and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
6.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage the simulated evacuation of Haddam. Evacuees were to be a simulated group of schoolchildren evacuated to the town of Wethersfield prior to the exercise.
7.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to perform access control and deal with impediments to evacuation such as traffic obstructions; this activity to involve cocrdination between the State Department of Transportation and State Police in planning alternate traffic routing.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
9.
Demonstrate the ability for some communities to decide, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers
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and to consider deploying personnel for distribution of KI to workers.
- 10. Demonstrate the (Haddam - Haddam Neck) ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site personnel through the town of East Hampton.
- 11. One or two communities demonstrate by special scenarios the 2
ability to dest with a situation of injured workers in the field.
1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO The exercise began with the Haddam Neck Atomic Power Plant in Haddam, Connecticut operating normally at 100 percent power. Emergency diesel generator 2B was out of service for heat exchanger maintenance. A fast moving cold front, with a squali line 100 miles ahead of it, was moving from the northwest through Connecticut. A tornado watch was declared (drill message) by the National Weather Service and reported to the Operations Shift Supervisor (OSS).
At 5:10 p.m., all Connecticut Yankee generating stations were notified of a funnel cloud sighting over the town of Cromwell.
After this notification, the OSS declared an Unusual Event (Connecticut posture code:
Delta-One), based on notification by external agencies of meteorological conditions projected beyond usual levels.
The tornado touched down briefly in severallocations before reaching the plant's 345-kV switchyard. There, at 5:40 p.m., snapped trees and other debris:were hurled into the 345-kV power line, taking out one phase of the 345-kV power line on the plant side of the switchyard. At 5:41 p.m., a temporary office trailer was thrown into a 115-kV power line tower, causing a loss of off-site 115-kV power. The loss of the 345-kV line at 5:40 caused a turbine trip, but the reactor did not trip automatically as designed. Although the reactor did, finally, trip some thirty seconds later, the high pressure caused by the anticipated transient without scram (ATWOS) caused one of the core safety valves to open. This stuck in a fully open position, with a resultant loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The pressure relief tank's rupture disk failed and this tank overflowed to the containment sump. Following the loss of off-site power at 5:41, diesel generator 2A, high-pressure safety injection pump 2B, and low-pressure safety injection pump 2B activated automatically.
At about 5:43, the OSS declared a Site Area Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Charlie-Two), based on a LOCA greater than 160 gallons per minute. The station emergency response organization and the off-site state and local organizations were then notified by radio-pager. When tornado damage was assessed, it was determined that the diesel-driven pump for the fire control system had been disabled and the top section of the stack, apparently hit by a projectile, was hanging from a single support brace.
At 6:15 p.m., managers and support staff began arriving at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Within the same time frame, local Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) and the State EOC in Hartford were being staffed and activated. At 6:25 p.m., the main bearing oil pump for diesel generator 2A failed, resulting in a station n
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i blackout at the plant. The emergency core cooling system was disabled because of the loss of power. The Director of Station Emergency Operations (DSEO) declared a Stage I i
, General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Bravo), based on a potential core melt situation. State and local organizations were notified of the escalation of incident classification'by radio-pager by about 6:30 p.m.
At approximately 7:40 p.m., core was uncovered and consequent fuel damage began.
The cold front that was trailing the squallline moved into the plant area bringing strong gusty winds. The wind shifted from a southwest-to-northeast to a northwest-to-southeast direction; therefore, blowing from the plant down the Connecticut River.
State and local EOCs were notified of this wind shift by message from the Northeast Utilities Corporation EOC. This message confirmed earlier forecasts of such a wind 4
shift. At 7:45 p.m., a wind gust dislodged the hanging upper portion of the stack, which fell onto the purge bypass line and ruptured it on the containment side of the purge i
system isolation valve, thus creating a release path to the atmosphere. With substantial core damage apparent from the containment high-range radiation monitors and a known breach of containment, the DSEO escalated the incident classification to a Stage II General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Alpha), and notified state and local i
emergency response organizations of the escalation by radio-pager shortly before 8:00 p.m. At about the same time, the Governor of Connecticut issued a State of Emergency declaration in connection with the incident.
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Situation response at the plant continued with replacement of diesel generator i
2A's main bearing oil pump and the return of that unit to service. A controlled fill of the reactor vessel was performed and containment spray initiated from the fire main once i
the electric-driven fire pump had been started. In the period between 8 p.m. and 11 p.m., on-site and off-site Radiation Monitoring Teams, including a team dispatched by j
the State Department of Environmental Protection, tracked the plume while dose projections were updated at the EOF and the State EOC.
By 10:08 p.m., the effects of containment spray, containment air recirculation fans,' and the leak from containment were combined to equalize containment pressure with atmospheric pressure and the release was stopped although the release path was still open. At 10:53 p.m., state and local response organizations were released from the exercise, although efforts continued at the EOF to assess and mitigate the effects of the incident while developing a plan to restore containment integrity.
The exercise I
terminated for all off-site response activities by 11:00 p.m.
i 1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA i
The exercise evaluation, presented in Sec. 2, is based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sec.11 of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980). Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, l
defielencies, areas requiring corrective actions, and areas recommended for j
improvement are presented with accompanying recommendations.
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Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable l
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8 assurance that appropriate protective measures could be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, it is required that they be expeditiously corrected through appropriate actions which may include remedial exercises or drills. Seven deficiencies were noted in the April 25,1986, exercise. Recommended remedial actions are presented in Section 3.
Areas requiring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of state and local government performance, and although their correction is required to be proved by or during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to have an adverse impact on public health and safety.
Areas recommended for improvement also are listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or activity. These are problem areas observed during the exercise that are not considered to have an adverse impact on public health and safety.
While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
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Emergsney Optrations Canter 9
2 EXERCISE EVALUATIONS 2.1 CONNECTICUT STATE OPERATIONS 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Connecticut State EOC was located in the State Armory in Hartford. The layout of the work area was, well organized with ample space available for all operations. Work areas were separated to minimize noise levels, and the facility had the physical resources necessary to carry out the emergency response and support operations for an extended period. All pertinent maps and status information were available and clearly posted.
The " Radiological Emergency Status Board" was useful in both the operations area and the media center, and other message boards were kept current.
Considerable information on the emergency was available to all participants.
Communications between the State EOC and the local EOCs was by low-band VHF radio to the appropriate Office of Civil Preparedness (OCP) Area Office and then relayed by the OCP Area Offices to the local EOCs by high-band VHF. However, land-line telephones were used as the primary means of cemmunicating vital status information to the local selectmen, as either the Governor or the Civil Preparedness (CP)
Director made these direct contacts as appropriate. Back-up telephone contact from the State EOC Communications Center to each of the three Area Offices involved in this exercise was used to handle nonpriority message traffic.
Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) communication between the State EOC and the Red Cross, the Area CP Offices, and the plume EPZ towns was available.
Each State agency assigned responsibilities in the plan had access to one radio, and a total of 55 separate telephone lines were available for agency communications to locations outside the State EOC. Other communications systems, including radio-pagers, National Warning System (NAWAS), direct hard-copy transmission ("TWlX"), and a mobile communications van, were available to enhance communications with contiguous states, the utility corporate EOC, the utility's headquarters (Berlin), FEMA, and Emergency Medical Services. Most of these communication systems were demonstrated during the exercise. The equipment in place for activating EBS was a four-way backup system permitting:
(1) direct broadcast from a booth in the communications center, (2) transmission of a recorded message directly from the booth, (3) direct simultaneous radio and telephone contact with the EBS station newsroom via a dedicated line, or (4) dedicated telephone contact to the studio. State Police and representatives from the transportation and environmental protection departments had no difficulty contacting their field personnel by radio from the EOC.
Therefore, communications with emergency response organizations was demonstrated successfully.
The State EOC was activated following receipt at the OCP main office of a radio-pager message from the utility at approximately 5:43 p.m., notifying OCP of a Site Area Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Charlie-Two). Principal response personnel were then notified by the OCP director and began their own "callouts" using their telephone l'sts of contacts, with instructions to deploy to the EOC as quickly as
Em'argsney Oparations Canter 10 possible.
By 6:50 p.m., representatives of OCP, the State Police, National Guard, Governor's Office, Red Cross, Northeast Utilities, and the departments of transportation and environmental protection were present in the EOC and implementing assigned procedures. The health department representative was not notified of EOC activation until 6:50 p.m. and, therefore, did not commence telephoning his contacts until that time.
The health department representative arrived after 7 p.m.
The agriculture department did not send a representative to.he EOC, and it was not possible to determine whether that department was participating. All first-shift staff had positions with decision-making authority in their agencies, and were knowledgeable about the radiological emergency response plan. The Governor was present during the deliberations about protective action measures.
Twenty-four-hour staffing was demonstrated by double-staffing.
Emergency operations management at the State EOC was well coordinated. The Governor or his representative was in control throughout the exercise, consulting with appropriate staff to determine protective actions, and make other decisions. Emergency operations were managed well by the Director and Chief of Operations for OCP. The l
State EOC staff was briefed. frequently over.the public address system, announcing changes in the emergency classification level (ECL), protective actions, and disseminating other pertinent information. The State Police, and the departments of environmental protection and transportation were effective in coordinating their actions regarding access control (including closing the Connecticut River to waterborne traffic),
i removing impediments to evacuation traffic, and resolving traffic problems. They were well supplied with charts, check-off lists, plans, and reliable telephone and radio i
communication.
f Message handling at the State EOC was efficient. Message logs were maintained by staff members and copies of messages were distributed to key staff members. Only information transcribed on standard message forms and signed off by a recognized official was transmitted over the VHF low-band radio to OCP Area Offices. However, low-priority messages were transmitted by telephone. This permitted Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) personnel in the same locations as designated response personnel to be informed of event status changes by their coordinator in the State EOC prior to official notification of local emergency staffs. In a real emergency, this could have led to confusion regarding actual event status.
)
Message handling between the Area CP Offices and the local EOCs was not i
I effective. The East Haddam, East Hampton, and Haddam EOCs did not have priority-level questions answered in a timely fashion by their Area Offices. Messages by the Area Offices were at times unclear or incorrect. In one instance, " clarifying" information about wind direction provided on request by the Area 3 Office to Marlborough, Hebron, East Hampton and Portland was inaccurate. Coordination through the Area Offices also l
was ineffective. The one attempt to coordinate siren sounding and EBS through the Area Offices was only partially successful, and there was a long delay. Siren activation was confirmed by:the State EOC at only a few of the local EOCs. Because message traffic
^
between the local EOCs and the Area Offices is not monitored at the State EOC, it cannot be determined whether all messages, requests, and information were appropriately channelled.
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Emargsney Oparations Center 11 The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Independent Radiological Assessment Team (IRAT) provided excellent and prompt dose assessment and development of protective action recommendations. Because of an improvement in
~,
the source for octeorological data, field teams were positioned more effectively at fiel.1 monitoring locations, to obtain essential readings of dose rates and air samples.
Consideration for controlling team exposure to radiation was demonstrated. Information flow between the State EOC and EOF was accomplished quickly and thoroughly over a dedicated telephone line, with simplified, computerized procedures.
The IRAT (composed of faculty members and health physicists from Yale University, the University of Connecticut, and the Electric Boat Company among others) interpreted technical information for the Governor to use in making decisions. DEP displayed good ler.dership and the ability to make decisions quickly and to communicate them effectively to the Governor, other agency heads, and the media.
Public alerting, notification, and instruction were only partially de:nonstrated.
In the first Instance, 23 minutes elapsed after the Governor's decision at 7:50 p.m. to order an evacuation out to two miles for 360 degrees around the plant and to five miles in sectors F-G-H. A n9ssage containing the Governor's decision was sent from the State EOC to the affected local governments when the decision was reached. However, the State did not simulate the broadcast of an EBS message until 8:13 p.m.
This EBS activation was not coordinated with sounding of sirens in the affected towns.
An attempt was made to achieve coordination at about 8:32 p.m., but it was only partially successful because not all of the towns activated strens when the EBS message was repeated. Furthermore, this attempt to coordinate the sirens with the EBS took place more than 45 minutes after the protective action decision; the instructional message was not available to the public until 8 minutes after th( established time limit had passed.
In the second instance, the decision to extend first sheltering and then evacuation to 10 miles in the affected sectors was relayed to the public through the EBS station within the prescribed 15 minutes, but the content of these messages did not adequately describe the specific area affected by the protective action decisions. This message was "on the air" from the principal EBS carrier in Hartford (CP-1) at least five minutes before the public in the town of Essex was notified by their local EBS station i
(carrying its own message) that only a sheltering recommendation was in place for that i
town. However, the town of Essex was by then in the evacuation area. (Essex residents did receive evacuation notification seven minutes later--see Table 1). Prescripted EBS messages should have been used to supply information specific to recognizable i
geographic areas on sheltering and evacuatloa, including how to do it and where to go, l
for each escalation of the event.
i l
EOC personnel demonstrated knowledge of problems associated with evacuation, I
such as traffic control and control of access to the evacuated areas. Access control planning was coordinated by the State Police and Connecticut Department of Transportation (CDOT) officials. As the situation developed, access control points were l
shifted appropriately. The State Police staffed four points at 7:24 p.m., with CDOT providing barricade materials. Additional posts and barricades were simulated at 8:05 l
- p. m.
There were impediments on I-91 and State Route 9 that CDOT cleared effectively. State Police respended to a chemical truck spill, assisted by procedural I
i i
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TABLE I Chronology of Protective Aeti,n Deelslons and Simulated Public Alerting and Notification in the EPZ Dect.
No Evac.
Site Cen.
Gen.
State Prot.
Agrt.
2 Mt.
Evac.
Event:
Area Emerg.
Emerg.
of Actiong Access Mess-Radius Strens to '
Location Unusual Emerg.
(Bravo)
(Alpha)
Emerg.
Recom.
Control ages 5HM DW Actv'd Shelter 10-M State EOC 6:43 7:53 7:56 7':24,8:05 8:48 7:54 8:32 8:51,9:05 9:23 EOF 5:47 6: 30 7:57 Chester*
5:25 5:40 6:46 8:10 8:36 8:35 8:50 Colchester 5:20 5:40 6:40 Deep River
- 5:30 5:50 6:46 8:57 8:57 9:45 Durham 5:25 5:50 6:40 8:07 East Haddam 5:50 6:40 8:06 8:46 8:46 a
East Hampton 6:48 8:06 8:22 a
Esses 5:50 6:50 8:22 8:59 8:37 9:44
[]
a Haddam*
5:47 6:47 8:12 7:52 7:35 8:09 Hebron 5:20 5:40 6:40 8:06 8:40 8:43 1
Elllingworth 5:30 5:50 6:44 8:10 9:28 8:30 Lyme" 5:40 5:50 6:50 8:06 9:05 Madison 5:20 5:40 6:45 8:10 j
M Ma rlborough 5:15 5:59 6:45 8:16 8:37 8:40 7:10 et 00 Middlefield 5:30 5:45 6:44 8:10 m
D Middletown 5:50 6:40 8:06 9:08 d)
C)
Portland 5:~0 5:53 6:44 8:14 8:43 8:23 93m Pt Salem 5:17 5:50 6:48 8:41 9:05 m
E Westbrook 5:20 6:14 6:48 8:15 o
Dm Media Center 7:58 8:00 8:30 g)
D
- Commimi t tes af f ected by the plume.
E
- 1 Time of comf ir mat tan t hat na pas were needed, if av a i l.sh i...
- I n. fica s es e i me-of tirst notifIcatton of medta.
9
Emergsney Oparations Csnter 13 guidance in the CDOT Emergency Manual on chemical spills. Because the bridge at Haddam was undergoing repair, with only one lane 'open, the State Police posted checkpoints at each end of the bridge to control traffic, permitting only westbound traffic to enter. A tow truck was stationed at the west edge of the bridge to deal with breakdowns.
The entire response was well thought out.
Furthermore, EOC staff members considered the needs of institutionalized persons, ships, and boats in the area.
Estimation of total population exposure was not demonstrated during the course of the exercise. However, there was limited demonstration of contamination monitoring by local personnel in the field. Demonstration of recovery and reentry procedures was not an objective in this exercise.
Defielencies 1.
==
Description:==
The State did not demonstrate the capability to alert and notify the public within 15 minutes of the decision to implement protective actions (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.E.6).
Recommendation: The State should review and revise procedures as necessary to ensure activation of the public alert and notification system within 15 minutes of the decision to recommend protective actions to the publ!c.
Staff should be trained in the procedures for alert and notification of the public.
2.
==
Description:==
The second and third EBS messages prepared by the State did not provide the public with adequate information and may have caused some people to take unnecessary risks, thereby endangering public safety (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!.E.5).
Recommendation: The State should develop prescripted messages that include easily identifiable boundaries such as roads, rivers, etc., for each sector within the plume EPZ so that the public will l
understand the information being disseminated.
)
}
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 1.
==
Description:==
The Area CP Offices as a message conduit failed to i
expedite or otherwise enhance information flow between the State and towns not directly affected by the plume.
Local EOCs j
requesting event status updates through the Area Offices did not l
have important questions answered quickly, and the Area Offices provided the local EOCs with either unclear or incorrect information, at times (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.N.2.a, F.1.b).
Recommendation:
Procedures for communication to the local EOCs by radio from the State EOC through the OCP Area Offices
Emergsncy Oparaticns Canter 14 should be either upgraded, with monitoring of Area Office message traffic at the State EOC, or discarded from the state plan in favor of a direct radio or hard-copy channel (or both) as the primary means of communication.
2.
Descriptiom Because of an apparent oversight in operations control at the State EOC, notification of the Governor's emergency declaration was neve;' provided to the local EOCs in accordance with the prescribed procedures. The Communications Officer is instreeted to transmit only messages received in writing, and the position of the communications station prevents this individual from reading the main event status board (which had the declaration clearly posted).
Thus, the emergency declaration message was never transmitted to the Area Offices and its absence 4
was never questioned (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.F.1.b).
1 Recommendation:
Procedures for developing and transmitting official communications to local governments should be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officials are informed of significant developments in a timely manner.
6 4
Area Recommended for Improvement
?
==
Description:==
An inconsistency was noted between the initial 3
meteorological conditions and the utility's protective action i
recommendations.
- i s
4 Recommendation: The addition of a meteorologist, who could explain and interpret the significance of changing weather conditions, would enhance protective action decision-making capabilities.
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2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) i The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) sent a j
representative to the EOF in order to enhance communication between the utility and i
the State regarding reactor status, plume data, and protective action recommendations. The representative was notified and arrived promptly, had full access to needed information, and did a good job of facilitating communication between the EOF and the State EOC.
The DEP representative was notified of the emergency at home by telephone fan-out shortly before 6:00 p.m.
He arrived at the EOF at 7:03 p.m. and promptly contacted the State EOC to begin the exchange of information. From that point on, he i
was in contact with the EOC as the occasion demanded, providing the EOC with reports on plant status and utility actions, and providing the utility Emergency Director with information as to State protective action decisions. He also provided information to the i
l i--
Emergs;ncy Oparations Fccility 15 utility's Rumor Control office. To obtain information, the DEP representative had direct access to the EOF's maps, status boards, and weather and plume displays, and also to the utility Emergency Director and Field Monitoring Communications Manager.
Communication from the EOF to the State EOC was by dedicated telephone line. Two commercial telephone lines were also available as back-up or for calling other locations.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
2.1.3 State Radiological Monitoring Teams Two field monitoring teams were dispatched from the Montville State Police barracks. The radiological field monitoring personnel on both teams were from the General Dynamics Electric Boat Division.
One team had a driver from the DEP.
Mobilization procedures of one of the teams were evaluated and found adequate.
Notification of team members is performed using call lists and pagers. The team assembled promptly and was directed to check the operation of their radiation monitoring instruments and air samplers. Battery and source checks were performed.
Deployment was well organized, except that equipment checklists were not available. A checklist and inventory of the equipment and supplies should be provided.
Both teams were adequately equipped to perform the tasks demonstrated. Each team had low-and high-range survey instruments (Eberline RO-2A and E-140 with pancake probe), portable air samplers operable with vehicle-supplied power, silver-zeolite cartridges, digital scale to count air samples, TLDs, and bags and envelopes for sample media. The instruments had recently been calibrated. Both teams also had suitable vehicles and were equipped with radios and area maps.
Technical operations were performed well. Both teams appeared familiar with the area and were able to locate the monitoring locations promptly, despite darkness, rain, and missing road signs. Proper techniques and instrument use were demonstrated for beta and gamma survey and the collection and counting of air samples, although one of the teams should have modified their sampling procedure to reduce exposure. (See discussion of exposure control measures below.)
Field Tecms 16 4
Communications were adequate. Both teams communicated with the EOC by radio. One of the teams was deployed with a hand-held portable radio, and their vehicle was equipped with two backup radio systems, operable on different frequencies. Neither team experienced any serious technical problems with communication.
Procedural problems were observed, however. The teams were not apprised by the EOC of critical plant information (accident prognosis), protective action recommendations, or meteorological conditions.
The dispatcher should provide periodic updates on these factors, to assist teams during travel between monitoring locations.
Exposure control measures were not adequate. Both teams had low-range (0-200 i
mR or 0-500 mR) and mid-range (0-2 R) pocket dosimeters and TLDs. The pocket dosimeters were read periodically.
Because the maximum dose allowed without authorization is 3 R, a 0-5 R dosimeter would be more appropriate than the 0-2 R as the mid-range instrument.
One of the teams had KI and rain suits to use for anti-contamination clothing, but the other did not have either of these items. Neither team had respirators. A KI decision was not made.
The primary problem identified in field monitoring involved air samples taken by field teams. One team was instructed to count the initial air sample at a location that was in the downwind direction. Later, the team was directed to take a second sample at a location where the dose rate level was approximately 18 R/hr. Although they followed their written procedure, which provides for a 5-minute sampling period, a 1-minute sample would have been adequate. Though technically no overexposure resulted, an unnecessary dose was incurred. Three recommendations can be made in order to prevent this kind of problem. First, the State should consider assigning someone to direct the field teams, with the understinding that they should protect the safety of the teams and provide them with information on weather, plume location, and plant conditions as well as directing them to monitoring locations. Second, the written procedures should be altered to provide more flexibility on sampling times, including reminders about exposure c'ontrol. Finally, additional training should be provided to the teams to enable them to i
make on-site decisions to minimize their own exposure.
1 Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions l
1.
==
Description:==
The teams did not have checklists for equipment and l
supplies to enable them to quickly determine whether they have everything they need for monitoring and sampling (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.H.10, I.8).
i f
Recommendation: Checklists should be drawn up and kept with the monitoring team emergency kits.
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Field Tsems 17 2.
==
Description:==
One team did not have KI or protective clothing.
Neither team had respirators (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.J.10.e).
4 Recommendation: 'All radiological monitoring field teams should have protective clothing, respirators, and KI issued to them prior the initiation of field monitoring activities.
3.
==
Description:==
Radiological monitoring teams' mid-range self-reading dosimeters had a range of 0-2 R (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.K.3.a).
Recommendation:
Since the maximum dose allowed without authorization is 3 R, consideration should be given to issuing 0-5 R self-reading dosimeters to monitoring teams.
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
2.1.4 Media Center The Media Center was located adjacent to the State EOC in the Armory at Hartford. The facilities were very good, with a capacity of 50 to 75 people in the briefing room which was well-equipped with high-quality visual displays. Reporters were providEd with a bank of telephones and microphone connections to the public address system. Televisica monitors were available for videotape presentations, several of which were provided by the utility for making background information available to the media during the exercise. Facilities and equipment provided for use by the State and utility PIOS were very good, contributing to, overall, a sugierior environment for effective dissemination of public information.
The Media Center was activated and staffed in a timely fashion by spokespersons representing Northeast Utilities Company (NU) and the Governor of Connecticut. These spokespersons can be notified on a 24-hour basis. Although the NU representative was supported by a sufficient complement of staff, including clerical and rumor control personnel, the Governor's Press Secretary's staff was inadequate in number to deal with all responsibilities required of the position. The State PIO delegated responsibility for formulation of EBS messages to another, apparently less well trained person. This lack of available, well-trained support staff was also in part responsible for the State's failure to generate a single news release, relying completely on NU releases to inform the public through media channels.
The communications resources for the public information staff in place at the Media Center were excellent, including direct access to the full range of state telephone and radio communications capabilities.
Both dedicated and commercial telephones, together with a facsimile machine, were available and constantly used to maintain communications with the EOF and NU headquarters.
M dia Cantar 18 The public information functions at the Media Center were uncharacteristically uneven. Briefings were thorough and clear and had been carefully coordinated between j
the State and utility PIOS. Maps and displays were effectively utilized by spokespersons, and NU generated and distributed timely news releases. However, media kits provided by NU were, mistakenly, never distributed. A complete chronological set of all NU releases was not posted or available to media representatives who might have arrived late. As noted, the State did not generate any news releases during the course of the exercise.
Therefore, no protective action measures were available in documented form for use by the media, who, consequently, were never informed in writing about either the Governor's Declaration of Civil Emergency at 7:56 p.m. or the content of EBS messages. In the briefings themselves, evacuation areas were not described in terms of towns or recognizable geographic landmarks, but by sectors. Questions from reporters about which towns were involved could not be answered consistently by the State PIO, but were provided much later in briefings.
Rumor control was not actively exercised through either the Media Center or the State EOC.
NU handled most rumors from its Berlin headquarters, routing only information about rumor resolution to its contact positioned in the EOC. However, both the utility and State PIOS performed rumor control related functions during the exercise.
When rumors were reported to these spokespersons by the NU contact, they used the media briefings on at least three occasions to dispel the rumors.
Until the later stages of the scenario, the events caused enough sustained and meaningful activity to challenge the resources and personnel of the Media Center.
Special mention should be made of the role-playing reporters provided by the utility.
These " reporters" performed a necessary service in posing persistent and challenging questions to the PIOS. However, if role-players are used in future exercises, they should be coached to ask more questions pertaining to the protective actions recommended for the'public.
Deficiencies None.
l Areas Requiring Corrective Action 1.
==
Description:==
The Governor's PIO staff was not large or well trained enough to perform the multiple functions it had been assigned (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, ll.G.4.a).
Recommendation: Sufficient P!O staff should be available during an exercise to adequately demonstrate the capability to perform all its assigned responsibilities.
2.
==
Description:==
The State generated no hard copy news releases of its own during the exercise; therefore, no protective action messages
M:dia Csnter 19 were available in documented form for use by the media, who, consequently, were never informed in writing about either the Governor's Declaration of Civil Emergency at 7:56 p.m., or the content of EBS messages (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!.G.3.a).
Recommendation: The State should delegate to a member of the PIO's staff the specific responsibility of preparing news releases and updating media representatives on important developments.
f Area Recommended for Improvements
==
Description:==
Utility media kits were not distributed.
i Recommendation: Distribution of media kits should be assured in future exercises.
. 2.1.5 American Red Cross / Sheltering Although the objectives for this exercise did not require opening and operation of 4
a mass care center as would be called for in the State plan, the American Red Cross
]
(ARC) activated and staffed the State Red Cross Headquarters and dispatched a i
representative to the State EOC. Twenty staff members were actually mobilized, with 62 others on standby for sheltering and mass care duty. Mobile feeding service was
{
actually provided to the State EOC by ARC volunteers.
j As soon as the first notification was received by the ARC duty worker, he began the normal calling fan-out procedure. It appears that this notification was received after i
declaration of Stage I General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Bravo), which is too late according to procedures. Despite the late notification, the headquarters was fully operational by the time the simulated evacuees were en route to the Wethersfield j
reception center.
Once activated, all ARC systems worked well, including j
communications (although there was initially some delay in establishing a backup RACES link with the State EOC and in hearing from the ARC liaison at the State EOC that the EOC was operational). Simulated opening of shelters began at 8:55 p.m.
l The only potential problem related to public protection and services that was i
observed at ARC headquarters was some delay or confusion in designating which shelters -
were to be opened.
Although shelter managers were prepared for deployment and evacuation was already under way, the actual mass care building (s) in the host communities had not yet been " opened" or, in at least in one case, selected. This difficulty might have been alleviated by placement of an ARC liaison directly in the 4
Area CP Office (s) responsible for host communities.
i 1
I 4
-._- ~ _ -,
Ch2 ster 20 r
L 2.2 CONNECTICUT LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS w
2.2.1 Chester f
The Chester EOC was located in the Chester Fire Station. The EOC facilities were excellent. The EOC had ample space, lighting, telephones, and furniture. The facility could provide support for extended operations. Back-up power was available through an emergency generator on one of the fire emergency vehicles. The use of the i
emergency vehicle to provide back-up power could be a problem if there is concurrent l
need for that vehicle for emergency operations. Charts, maps, and status boards were posted and were clearly visible. Maps showing evacuation routes and relocation centers i
were available but not posted. Although this information was not posted, all EOC staff j
members who were interviewed were aware of the location of the relocation centers and j
the evacuation routes.
The local EOC notification system consisted of radio-pagers. Notification from the utility on alert levels came through the radio-pager. Calls back to the utility would then be made to verify that the messcge was received and to obtain any additional l
Information. Because of some difficulty in reaching the utility verification number, RACES was used for backup communication with the utility through the Area 2 Office.
The Chester EOC was activated following notification of an Unusual Event (Connecticut i.
posture code Delta-One) at 5:25 p.m. Because the Unusual Event was a tornado watch, full fire department activation resulted. The EOC was operational by 5:45 p.m.
i l
Three municipal offices were represented by eight individuals at the Chester i
EOC. Around-the-clock staffing of the EOC was demonstrated through discussions with the First Selectman. A roster of shifts was not presented. All EOC staff appeared knowledgeable about their responsibilities for emergency response.
The First Selectman demonstrated effective command of the emergency i
l operations at the EOC. The First Selectman and his staff used the emergency response plan and procedures during the exercise. Some checklists and notification lists were out i
of date or not available. This caused some problems; when procedures were not clear, l
the First Selectman had to seek out the appropriate individual to determine what emergency response actions were necessary.
Staff were kept well informed and l
participated in major deelslons.
l The communications capabilities at the EOC were very good. The primary communications system for notification was the radio-pager system from the utility, j
Verification was through.the commercial telephone system. Local radio systems were available for communications with the fire department, town constable, ambulance, and public works. The primary system for communication to the State EOC was through RACES to the Area 2 Office.
The Chester EOC simulated the initiation of public alerting at 6:07 p.m. through an EBS message about the tornado warning. The EOC simulated contacting three local i
area convalescent homes with the tornado warning message. The Chester EOC received a message from the Area 2 Office to prepare to evacuate the downwind sectors of i
)
Chaster 21 Chester at 8:26' p.m. A decision was made at the Chester EOC to expand the evacuation area to Route 9, but the change in the evacuation area was not received by the state EOC. Traffic and access control was coordinated through the State Police. An EBS message was developed by the EOC staff to evacuate the population east of Route 9 and the local EBS station was notified. The sounding of the sirens was simulated at 8:35 p.m. Calls would be made to local residents to confirm the operation of the sirens. The EOC had backup route alerting plans ready if any of the sirens did not operate.
Protective actions were demonstrated by calling the State Police to implement access control in the evacuation area and calling other nearby towns to implement traffic control on evacuation routes. The Chester EOC contacted the Area 2 Office at 8:45 p.m. to confirm whether the Yale Bowl had been opened as a reception center. The Chester EOC received no information about the opening of reception centers until 10:25 p.m.
Although no list of mobility-impaired individuals was presented, it was indicated to the observer that mobility-impaired individuals have been identified by the town nurse.
' Radiological exposure control equipment in Chester was inadequate. A total of 12 self-reading dosimeters were available at the Chester EOC (four of each in the low, mid, and high ranges were available). No TLDs or film badges were available at the EOC. This equipment did not provide enough dosimetry for staff and emergency workers at the EOC. The dosimeters were not issued during the exercise, nor were the team members that were sent out of the EOC to conduct ground monitoring issued dosimetry before they left the EOC. At 8:49 p.m., the Chester EOC told the Area 2 Office that additional radiological exposure control supplies were needed.
No response was received. Potassium lodide (KI) was not available at the EOC. The ability to make decisions regarding the use of KI was not demonstrated.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 1.
==
Description:==
The supply of dosimetry at the Chester EOC was insufficient (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.K.3.a).
Recommendation:
There should be a sufficient supply of self-reading dosimetry and TLDs or film badges for all emergency workers in Chester.
2.
==
Description:==
Some check!!sts and notification lists were out of date or not available. This caused some problems; when proce-dures were not clear, the First Selectman had to seek out the appropriate individual to determine what emergency response actions were necessary (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II. A.2.a).
Chsster 22 Recommendation: All checklists and call lists should be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that they are up to date and appropriate personnel trained.
3.
==
Description:==
Although the decision-making process to expand the
' evacuation area in Chester was very good, information regarding this expanded evacuation area should have been transmitted to the State (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.A.2.a).
Recommendation: Chester officials should inform the State of any significant actions that they have taken at the EOC.
4.
==
Description:==
Town officials did not demonstrate the decision-making process regarding the issuance of KI to emergency workers (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.J.10.f).
3 Recommendation:
Plans should be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officials' decision making will be timely with respect to protective actions for emergency workers.
- 1 Area Recommended for Improvement
==
Description:==
The use of an emergency vehicle for backup power at the EOC could cause problems if there is a concurrent need for emergency vehicles and backup power.
Recommendation: A facility should be located with backup power j
~ '
for EOC operations in Chester or as an alternate EOC.
i 4
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colchaster 23 2.2.2 Colchester The Colchester EOC was a fully equipped facility with an efficient design and layout. It was located in the Halls Hill School basement and normally serves as offices and meeting room for local government. The EOC was adequate in terms of furnishings, equipment, maps and displays. The status board was updated continuously. Facilities are available for 24-hour operations, including kitchen, rest rooms, and sleeping quarters, and back-up power is available.
The EOC was entered through a locked metal door; however, after activation of the operations, the door was kept ajar. It was understood that the door normally would stay locked and access could be gained by knocking. A buzzer is on order and will be installed soon. There was some confusion among EOC staff as to the rules regarding access to the EOC during a radiological emergency. A rule or procedure should be developed regarding entry to the EOC.
Communications equipment was located in a separate, adjacent room.
- Communications equipment was sufficient for the operation.
The town could communicate via radio with the State EOC, all local EOCs, thep)F, State Police, local l
police and fire departments, and ambulance services.
TeIQhone would be used to contact the schools and the EBS radio station. The communiftlons room was equipped with a clock, which rectified a problem noted in the previous eMrcise.
l Activation and staffing of the EOC was prompt and complete. The CP Director j
paged all staff at 5:25 p.m. after receiving notification of the Unusual Event (from the I
utility) at 5:20. The EOC was' opened by the CP Director and the First Selectman at 5:30 i
and was operational by 5:40. Staffing was complete by 6:20. The EOC staff also included representatives of State Police, local police and fire departments, ambulance
]
and medical services, and the local bus company.
The CP Director was effectively in charge and involved the staff in decision-I making through discussion.
Opportunity for coordination of activity was limited, however, since the town of Colchester was not at risk of exposure from the plume for j
this exercise. No protective actions were indicated for Colchester, and there was no play of public alerting, public instruction, traffic control, or sheltering. The staff did j
demonstrate a degree of readiness, however. Staffing of access control points was discussed, and information on the location of mobility-impaired residents was available.
i The staff also addressed a free-play problem inserted by the controller, involving a truck
{
accident with chemical spillage. A police ambulance unit was dispatched in response.
Personnel exposure control was demonstrated by issuing mid-range (0-5R) and high-range (0-200R) dosimeters to all staff members leaving the EOC. All staff members had received training in dosimetry.
Deficiencies l
None.
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Colchsstar l
l 24 Area Requiring Corrective Action l
==
Description:==
There was some, confusion among EOC staff as to the 1
rules regarding access to the EOC during a radiological emergency (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II.H.3).
Recommendation: Rules and procedures on controlled access to the EOC while emergency operations are in effect must be made i
clear to all emergency workers.
t-Area Recommended for Improvement None.
?
I i
a 4
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t.
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^
i Daep River 25 2.2.3 Deep River
)
The Deep River EOC was located in the basement of the town hall. The facility l
was well equipped and adequate for short-term emergency management operations, but there were no feeding or sleeping facilities to support extended operations. Back-up 4
power was available at the facility. Displays at the EOC were very good. Two status boards were kept current; one showed significant external communications, the other displayed information on internal EOC decisions (e.g., times for siren activation, calls for external assistance).
The primary communications system for local EOC alert notification consisted of l
radio-pagers. Notification from the utility on emergency classification levels came over the radio-pager.
The utility would then be called to verify that the' message was
~
received and to obtain any additional information.
j The Deep River EOC was activated following the notification cf a Site Area Emergency (Connecticut posture code:
Charlie-Two) at 5:30 p.m.
The EOC was operational by 6:20 p.m. The EOC xas staffed by the First Selectman, the CP Director, communications staff, the fire department liaison, the town constable, and the ambulance squad IIalson. The EOC staff demonstrated good training and knowledge in carrying out assignments. Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by double-staffing of positions and presentation of a roster.
The Deep River EOC staff demonstrated the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
The First Selectman was effectively in charge throughout the exercise and was very ably assisted by the CP Director. Staff members were involved in every phase of decision-making, such as coordination with other i
municipalities, tending to a simulated tanker accident, and tracking events and emergency management decisions.
Staff at the Deep River EOC demonstrated the ability to communicate with all relevant organizations including the Area 2 Office, other local EOCs, the plant, the EBS station, and local emergency response organizations. The communications systems used I
included high-frequency radio, ham radio, commercial telephone, and police radio.
The Deep River EOC staff demonstrated the ability to alert the public via the emergency notification system within the town borders and to disseminate an initial F
instructional message to the public. Public alerting was performed by the Deep River EOC after the "take shelter" and " evacuate" recommendations by the State were
[
received at 8:57 p.m. and 9:45 p.m., respectively. Following the State's protective action recommendations, the sounding of the strens was simulated and a prescripted message was telephoned into the EBS station. After the recommendation to evacuate, the Deep j
River EOC implemented route alerting. Because of a simulated tanker truck accident, no vehicles were available. Thus, vehicles equipped with public address systems were called in from Clinton to assist in route alerting.
l j
The Deep River EOC staff demonstrated the ability to implement protective actions in the community. During the evacuation a simulated impediment to evacuation l
caused by an overturned propane tanker was handled promptly. The EOC staff discussed
Dasp River 26 alternate evacuation routes. Access control functions for the community are handled by the State Police. Buses were mobilized to evacuate the two convalescent homes in the town. The list of mobility-impaired individuals outside of the two convalescent homes was not available in the EOC; however, the list is maintained at the 24-hour dispatch center. Locations of dairy farms are available at the EOC. Calling of farmers to place cattle on stored feed was simulated after the state recommendation was received.
The Deep River EOC had an adequate supply of self-reading dosimeters and TLDs for EOC staff and emergency workers in the field. The RDO was aware of the proper use of this equipment. When dosimetry was distributed at the EOC, the RDO did not provide instruction regarding its proper use. Potassium lodide was not available at the Deep River EOC.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions None.
Area Recommended for Improvement 1.
==
Description:==
Town officials did not demonstrate the decision-r,.
making process regarding the issuance of KI to emergency workers.
Recommendation:
Plans should be reviewed and revised if necessary to include the town policy on the distribution of KI to emergency workers.
2.
==
Description:==
Although emergency workers appeared to be well versed in their use of dosimetry, the dosimetry was issued at the Deep River EOC without instructions.
Recommendation: Emergency workers should be told, at minimum, to read the instructions included with the dosimetry.
S
-~
Durhtm 27 2.2.4 Durham The EOC facility at Durham was adequate to support emergency operations. The EOC had enough space, lighting, telephones, and furniture. This met a recommendation for improvement from the last exercise. The facility had a kitchen, but no showers or bunks. Back-up power was available at the EOC from a portable generator. The displays at the EOC were excellent and helpful in tracking the plume and protective action areas. All necessary-maps and displays were posted.
Activation and staffing at the Durham EOC were conducted promptly and effectively. The initial notification of the Unusual Event (Connecticut posture code:
Delta-One) was received at 5:25 p.m. by the First and Second Selectmen and the CP Director via the radio-pager system from the plant. When the observer entered the EOC at 5:55, the First Selectman and his secretary were making telephone calls to activate the EOC staff, using a current calllist. The EOC was activated at 5:45 and was declared operational by the First Selectman at 6:30. Most EOC staff were on duty by 6:15. A roster listing back-up personnel for each position was presented.
Emergency operations management in Durham was very good.
The First Selectman was in charge and received assistance from the CP Director regarding emergency response actions.
Briefings were held at appropriate intervals.
Written procedures were available for all response actions. These procedures were comprehen-sive and well written.
i The Durham EOC had the following communication systems: 3 radio-pagers for the receipt of communications from the licensee, 2 scanners, a 2-meter-band radio for communicating with other towns, a high-band radio (153.8 Mhz and 37.1 Mhz) for emergency communication within Durham, a CB radio, a fire and ambulance band radio, and 8 telephones. Communication with all relevant organizations was demonstrated.
Some participants at the Durham EOC complained that communications from the Area 2 Office were both infrequent and unclear. This did not prove to be critical in Durham, however, since no protective actions were required.
Public alerting and instruction was not demonstrated in Durham, since the town was not at risk of exposure from the plume. The CP Director described the public alerting procedure: following a recommendation for protective action from the state, the EOC staff would instruct the EBS station to broadcast a message on the air and then sound the sirens, followed by route alerting in any areas where the siren (s) failed to sound. Route maps for each area of siren coverage were already developed, along with prescripted instructional messages depending upon the protective action.
Although the scenario did not test the town for protective actions, the staff did demonstrate the ability to respond to a radiological emergency. At the time of the evacuation of Haddam, Durham officials discussed evacuation routes from Haddam that went through Durham and the traffic control needs on those routes.
State Police assistance was then requested for traffic control. All traffic and access control in Durham is the responsibility of the State Police. In the event of a traffic impediment, the CP Director had a list of garages with wreckers that could be called on to clear the roads. The CP Director also had a list of mobility-impaired individuals. This list is updated regularly with information provided by the Visiting Nurses' Association.
Durhtm 28 A map and a telephone listing of all dairy farmers in the town was available at the EOC for ingestion pathway protective action.
Fifty dosimeter kits were available at the Durham EOC to monitor emergency worker exposure. Each kit consists of a:
1.
0-200 R self-reading dosimeter; 2.
0-5 R self-reading dos! meter; 3.
TLD; and 4.
Record-keeping card.
The town does not have a supply of KI. The town's official policy is that it will not administer KI to emergency workers. The CP Director, who was also acting as RDO, was very knowledgable with respect to dosimetry. Population and emergency worker exposure limits were posted in the EOC. However, during the exercise the CP Director did not distribute or simulate the distribution of dosimetry at the EOC. This was partly because he had so many other duties, and also because the town's plan does not indicate when dosimetry should be issued.
Media relations and recovery and reentry were not part of Durham's objectives for this exercise.
Deficiencies None.
s Area Requiring Corrective Action
==
Description:==
Distribution of dosimetry to EOC staff was not demonstrated or simulated (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.K.3.a).
Recommendation:
Responsibility for distribution of dosimetry should be delegated to an EOC staff person when the regular RDO is not available. The town's plan and procedures should specify when dosimetry should be issued.
2 Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
E s
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East Heddtm 29 2.2.5 East Haddam The East Haddam EOC was located in the East Haddam Fire Station. The facility was excellent for supporting long-duration emergency operations for the town.
The room used for EOC operations was large and well lighted. The communications room was adjacent to the EOC operations room. A back-up generator was available and was tested during the exercise. Bunks, showers, and a kitchen were available at the EOC.
Displays included a status board with postings of emergency action levels and an EPZ map with weather conditions and emergency action levels posted.
The Alert notification for East Haddam was done over the radio-pager system.
The First Selectman was informed of the Site Area Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Charlie-Two) at the plant at 5:50 p.m. The First Selectman activated the EOC by calling the Colchester Fire Dispatcher and instructing him to call in all East Haddam fire department personnel to the EOC. Upon arrival of some EOC staff members, other municipal organizations were notified. The East Haddam EOC was operational by 6:15 p.m.
The First Selectman was in charge of the East Haddam EOC.
The First Selectman and the EOC staff appeared to be knowledgeable regarding their responsibilities during an emergency at the plant. The First Selectman held periodic briefings and involved staff in the decision-making process. Message handling within the EOC was very good. Four municipal offices were represented at the EOC: the Fire Department, Civil Preparedness, the Town Constable, and Public Works. Twenty-four hour staffing of the EOC was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.
Three individuals handled communications and message-logging functions at the EOC. This resolves a problem identified in the last exercise.
The communications systems available at the East Haddam EOC consisted of high-band radio, telephones, RACES radio, and the radio-pager system. Police and fire radios were also available in the EOC. The East Haddam EOC demonstrated the ability to establish communications to all relevant organizations. Although communications linkages were established with the Area 4 Office, many nessages from that office were either not detailed or not clear. East Haddam requested clarification on a number of l
messages, but either little clarification was made or there was a significant delay between the time of the request for clarification and when the clarification was received. This has been identified as an area requiring corrective action by the State (see Sec. 2.1.1 of this report).
Several difficulties were experienced with public alerting and instruction in East Haddam.
When Stage I General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Bravo) was reached, no alerting of the public was conducted in East Haddam. The town officials attempted to coordinate public alerting with the State but did not find out that the State would transmit the EBS message on the General Emergency until an hour after it was declared.
No simulation of the sounding of sirens was attempted during the Bravo posture.
At 8:06 p.m. East Haddam received a declaration of Stage II General Emergency (Connecticut posture code:
Alphs).
After being notified of the Alpha posture, EOC staff members discussed the actions that should be taken. The Area 4 Office was then called to notify the State that East Haddam was ready to sound its
East Heddam 30 sirens. After getting a message from the Area 4 Office to sound the sirens, activation of the strens was simulated in East Haddam at 8:46 p.m., 40 minutes after receiving the Stage II General Emergency (Alpha) notification. This has been identified as a deficiency requiring corrective action by the State (see Sec. 2.1.1 of this report). East Haddam did not prepare any messages for EBS based on its understanding that the Siete was handling this function, but monitoring of EBS stations was neither conducted or simulated. The EOC simulated sending the town constable and firefighters out to alert persons needing special assistance.
The ability to take protective actions was demonstrated in East Haddam through the availability of lists of individuals needing speelal assistance developed through the Visiting Nurses Association. Lists of school transportation needs were also available.
The State Police are responsible for staffing traffic and access control points.
Only ten sets of dosimetry were available at the East Haddam EOC. The dosimetry included 0-5 R and 0-200 R self-reading dosimeters, TLDs, chargers, and record-keeping cards. All dosimetry issued was properly recorded and distributed. The East Haddam EOC requested additional dosimetry via the Area 4 Office. No response was received from the Area 4 Office. The decision process for issuing potassium iodide (KI) was not observed. No KI was issued at the East Haddam EOC.
Deficiencies None.
I Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 1.
==
Description:==
At the General Emergency (Connecticut posture code:
Bravo), which calls for sheltering in the two-mile: EPZ, neither public alerting and instruction nor protective actions were implemented in East Haddam (FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, II.E.6., II.J.9).
Recommendation: EOC officials should be trained to implement appropriate protective actions and public alerting.
2.
==
Description:==
Dosimetry kits at the East Haddam EOC were insufficient in number (FEMA REP-1, Rev 1, II.K.3.a).
Recommendation: The supply of self-reading dosimetry and TLDs or film badges should be sufficient for all emergency workers in East Haddam.
3.
==
Description:==
Town officials did not demonstrate the decision-making process regarding the issuance of KI to emergency workers (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II.J.10.f).
East Hiddem 31 Recommendation:
Plans should be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officials' decision making will be timely with respect to protective actions for emergency workers.
4.
==
Description:==
The East Haddam EOC did not monitor the EBS station (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II.E.7).
Recommendation:
East Haddam EOC personnel should monitor EBS to ensure that EBS messages include East Haddam, particularly when protective actions may be appropriate.
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
me
~
East Htmpton 32 2.2.6 East Hampton The East Hampton EOC was located in the communications room of the police station. The facility was well equipped to support twenty-four hour operations. The nearby fire station would be able to supplement an ongoing emergency response. The fire station also serves as a radiological monitoring station. The EOC layout made good use of the limited space available, but this lack of space could hamper the ability of East Hampton to deal with an emergency at the Haddam Neck plant. This is a problem area that was also identified in the previous exercise. Copies of plans and call lists were readily available in the EOC.
Maps and displays effectively presented the EPZ, emergency classification levels, and current and projected meteorological data. Maps showing population by evacuation area, evacuation routes, and relocation centers also were displayed. Back-up power is available at the facility.
East Hampton received the Site Area Emergency notification by the radio-pager system. Initial activation of the East Hampton EOC was not observed. Full activation and staffing was accomplished by 6:50 p.m.
Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by posting a roster. Staffing at the EOC included representation by the Board of Selectmen, the town constable, the fire department, and civil preparedness.
The EOC operations were effectively managed by the CP Director. The staff demonstrated adequate training in emergency procedures, and the coordination among staff members was very good.
Emergency telephone messages were received, transcribed, and passed on to the Director in a timely manner. Messages were posted on the status board and incident reports were promptly completed upon receipt of the message.
The Director conducted periodic briefings to inform the staff of the emergency status or status of responses.
Communications systems in the East Hampton EOC consisted of high-band radios to the Area 3 Office and other local EOCs, commercial telephone, and local police and fire department radios.
East Hampton had some difficulties in getting responses to requests for information from the Area 3 Office. A request for confirmation of an evacuation order was sent to the Area 3 Office at 7:15 p.m. At 8:23 p.m. the Director placed his third call to confirm the evacuation order, but no confirmation was received.
1 This has been identified as an ares requiring corrective action by the State (see Sec.
2.1.1 of this report).
EBS in East Hampton was initiated at 6:28 p.m. at General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Bravo) due to the tornado warning. At 8:06 p.m. the General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Alpha) notification was received at the East Hampton EOC.
The ability to monitor and control emergency worker exposure was not demonstrated. An adequate supply of dosimetry was available in East Hampton, but none of the packages was distributed to emergency workers nor was there any simulation of the distribution of dosimetry at any time during the exercise. The ability to make a decision on the issuance of potassium lodide to emergency workers was not demonstrated.
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Ecst Hcmpton 33 Deficiencies P
None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 1.
==
Description:==
There was no demonstration of the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.K.3.a).
Recommendation:
Distribution (or simulated distribution) of dosimetry should be implemented by all communities within the plume EPZ at General Emergency.
2.
==
Description:==
Town officials did not demonstrate the decision-making process regarding the issuance of KI to emergency workers (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.J.10.f).
Recommendation:
Plans should be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officials' decision making will be timely with respect to protective actions for emergency workers.
Area Recommended for Improvement
==
Description:==
The East Hampton EOC did not have sufficient space for emergency operations management.
Recommendation:
Additional space for emergency operations should be provided in the East Hampton police station or another
- facility, i
Essex 34 2.2.7 Essex The Essex EOC facility was adequate to support emergency operations, except for the lack of emergency back-up power. If a power failure occurred, the Essex EOC would have to relocate to the ambulance barn in Essex. All necessary status boards and maps were posted. This included an exceptionally good radiological emergency status board that was continually updated. The EOC was somewhat noisy. Operations during an actual emergency could be affected if emegency personnel and activities in the EOC were increased. A partition is planned to better isolate radio communications from the rest of the EOC. This should alleviate most of the noise problem.
The Essex EOC was activated at 5:55 p.m.
Activation and staffing of the EOC were prompt. A call list was used to activate staff, but was not current. Shift change capabilities were demonstrated during the exercise via double-staffing and a shift change. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated for all positions except the CP Director. Since this is an important position at the EOC, a second-shift CP Officer should be trained.
Staffing of the EOC included the Board of Selectmen, the CP Director, and communications staff.
Emergency operations were effectively managed by the CP Director. EOC staff members were involved in decision-making as needed and handled their responsibilities capably during the exercise. EOC staff and emergency workers at other locations were kept up-to-date on emergency conditions and the town's response.
Communications were very good at the Essex EOC. Radio communications were the primary means of communications in most instances. The radio operators were well trained and performed their duties well. In one instance, a radio operator caught an omission in a state protective action message calling for sheltering that did not incl'ide i
Essex although Essex was in the affected area. After consultation with the CP Director a call was made to the State EOC to get the message corrected. The only problem experienced in communications was the inability to reach the plant's verification number in a timely manner after radio-pager notification.
1 The limited involvement of the Essex EOC in public alerting and instruction was handled well. The sounding of the sirens was simulated within five minutes of the receipt of a protective action order from the State. Route alerting also was simulated following i
the sounding of the sirens. EBS messages were drafted at the Essex EOC based on prescripted messages contained in the plan. The calling of an EBS station was simulated in a timely manner.
The EOC promptly activated traffic control points on evacuation routes when the State first ordered an evacuation. Adequate resources and personnel were available for staffing the traffic control points and keeping roads cleared in Essex. Adequate lists of mobility-and hearing-impaired individuals were not available at the EOC.
A questionnaire seeking this information was to be sent out shortly.
The issuance of dosimetry was simulated at the Essex EOC. This simulation, though, only occurred after teams had been sent out to conduct route alerting.
Dosimetry available at the EOC included: 0-5 R and 0-200 R self-reading dosimeters, l
1
Essex 35 TLDs, and record-keeping cards. The supply of dosimetry was adequate for operations at the Essex EOC. The CP Director was knowledgeable regarding the use of dosimetry and the location of deccntamination facilities. The ability to make a decision on the issuance of potassium Iodide to emergency workers was not demonstrated.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 1.
==
Description:==
The call list for EOC staff was out of date and had to be updated using a telephone directory during the call down (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.E.2).
Recommendation: The EOC calllist should be updated.
2.
==
Description:==
Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated for all positions except the CP Director (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.A.4).
Recommendation: A second-shift CP Director needs to be trained.
3.
==
Description:==
Adequate lists of mobility-and hearing-impaired individuals were not available at the EOC (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.J.10.d).
Recommendation: The planned questionnaire seeking information on mobility-and hearing-impaired individuals should be sent out as soon as possible and the results from the questionnaire should be collated into a listing of mobility-and hearing-impaired.
4.
==
Description:==
Distribution of dosimetry occurred after route alerting teams were dispatched (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.K.3.a).
Recommendation:
Procedures for the issuance of dosimetry to emergency workers should be reviewed and revised if necessary to assure that emergency workers are issued dosimetry prior to being sent into the' field.
Area Recommended for Improvement 1.
==
Description:==
Town officials did not demonstrate the decision-making process regarding the issuance of KI to emergency workers.
Esssx 36 Recommendation:
Plans should be reviewed and revised if
. necessary to include the town policy on the distribution of K1 to emergency workers.
2.
==
Description:==
The noise level in the EOC could affect EOC operations.
Recommendation: The planned partition for the communications area should reduce the EOC noise level.
g.s f
a d
4 4
l
Haddtm 37 2.2.8 Haddam Th= Haddam EOC was located in the Higganum Fire station in Haddam. The EOC consisted of a radio room, an operations room, and a radiological monitoring and decontamination station. A status board and appropriate maps were available and kept up-to-date. Back-up power was available at the EOC. The EOC could support extended operations.
Protective action decisions reached in Haddan included the establishment of access control points, sheltering, placing animals on stored feed and evr.cuation.
Emergency workers were well versed on actions required to implement sheltering ar:d evacuation.
The communications systems in the Haddam EOC consisted of high-band radios to the Area 2 Office and other local EOCs, commercial telephone, and local police and fire department radios. Use of primary and backup communications to all relevant organizations was demonstrated. During the exercise, though, the Haddam EOC had some difficulties in getting responses to requests for information and clarification from the Area 2 Office. This has been identified as an area requiring correction by the State (see Sec. 2.1.1 of this report).
The EOC was activated after notification of the Unusual Event from the plant.
Activation of the EOC was begun because the event was a tornado warning. After verification of this notification, activation of the entire EOC staff was begun. The EOC was fully activated by 5:28 p.m.
The town's civil preparedness, fire and public health departments, as well as the State Police, ambulance service, Board of Selectmen, Red Cross, and school bus operations were represented at the EOC.
Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated through the presentation of a roster.
The First Selectman effectively managed emergency operations in Haddam with the assistance of the CP Director. EOC operations were well coordinated. Periodic briefings were held to inform staff of the plant status and responses by Haddam to the emergency.
The Haddam EOC received notification of the General Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Bravo) at 6:47 p.m. Several telephone calls were then made to the Area 2 Office as to when the sirens should be activated. After some discussion by the staff and the First Selectman, a decision was made to begin public alerting. The first siren activation was simulated at 7:35 p.m. A second sounding of the strens was simulated at 8:09 p.m.
Both times the sirens were sounded were local decisions made in Haddam.
There is no indication that the Haddam EOC coordinated the sounding of the sirens with the broadcast of any EBS message.
Radiological monitoring of emergency workers and decontamination activities were demonstrated at the EOC. Dosimetry available at the EOC included 0-5 R and 0-200 R self reading dosimeters, TLDs, record-keeping cards, and respirators. The supply of dosimetry was adequate for operations at the Haddam EOC. Emergency workers were trained in the use of radiological exposure control equipment and maintenance of individual exposure control records. Local field monitoring teams were dispatched to I
i
Hzddtm 38 assist decision-making regarding emergency worker exposure control. Decision-making regarding the issuance of potassium iodide to emergency workers was demonstrated in Haddam. The First Selectman ordered that KI be issued to emergency workers before they were deployed in the field. This decision was made during the Site Area Emergency.
Deficiencies None.
Area Requiring Corrective Action
==
Description:==
The decision to sound the sirens in Haddam was not coordinated with the broadcast of an instructional message to the public (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.E.6).
Recommendation: If a municipality is to sound the, sirens to alert the public, there must be some transmission of an instructional message so that the public can take appropriate actions.
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
l' 9
d
+
Habron 39 2.2.9 Hebron The Hebron EOC was located in the basement of the town hall, and was adequate to support operations for this exercise. The EOC operations room was shared with daily town hall operations, but this situation was to change by setting aside a separate room for EOC activities in the future. All communications equipment was located in the EOC operations room. In the new facility, these functions are to be separated, which would reduce the noise level of the EOC operations room. Maps and displays were adequate to support operations.
Activation of the Hebron EOC was fairly prompt. The First Selectman and the CP Director have pagers and went directly to the EOC when they were activated. The other EOC staff were contacted promptly by telephone, using a call list. EOC staff included representatives of the Board of Selectmen, police, fire, and civil preparedness departments. A roster was presented to show second-shift capability. The CP Director, with concurrence of the First Selectman, effectively managed the EOC staff.
He conducted periodic briefings, involved appropriate staff in decision-making, and maintained control of the EOC. Plans and checklists were available to the EOC staff.
Message handling was satisfactory.
Hebron had an excellent communications setup, reflecting the competent efforts of the communications operator.
Two radios covering CP Areas 3 and 4 plus the l
operator's own mobile amateur unit and scanner afforded the EOC ample communications l
capability. There were also two separate telephone systems available to the EOC staff.
l One is the regular system that is for daily town hall act.vities, and the other system is a set of five separate telephone lines that are used only for EOC emergency operations.
Public notification procedures and protective actions were discussed by the EOC staff, although the small part of the town that is within the plume exposure EPZ was not l
affected by the plume in this exercise. The siren that covers this area is controlled by l
Colchester. A list of "special needs" persons requiring special notification or assistance with evacuation is maintained at the EOC, with addresses, phone numbers, and special requirements.
Exposure control equipment and procedures were adequately demonstrated. The RDO used a survey meter to survey the EOC and distributed dosimetry kits consisting of mid-range (0-5 R) and high-range (0-200 R) dosimeters and a TLD. Periodic dosimeter readings were required of the EOC staff.
Media relations were not tested at Hebron.
(
Deficiencies None.
Habron 40 e
Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
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Killingworth 2.2.10 Killingworth The EOC facility at Killingworth was located on the second floor of the fire station. The radio dispatcher was located on the first floor of the station, with a public address system link to the EOC upstales. The EOC was adequate in terms of facilities and equipment. A plume EPZ map was posted, and a status board was updated with key emergency information. Maps of evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, and population were available but not posted.
Activation and staffing of the EOC went very well.
The First Selectman received the initiating call by radio-pager at 5:30 p.m. and used a telephone call list to activate the staff. The EOC was gerational by 5:45. Staffing included representatives of the Board of Selectmen and the police, fire, health, highway, and civil preparedness departments. A roster was presented to show a second-shift capability; however, it did not specify which personnel were responsible for which positions. The roster available for use at the EOC should specify which personnel have been trained to fill the various emergency response functions.
Operations at the EOC were effectively managed by the CP Director. The Director gave periodic briefings and generally made a concerted effort to update the staff on the status of the emergency. Message logs were maintained. The EBS station was monitored throughout the exercise, which corrects a problem noted at the previous exercise.
Communications at the Killingworth EOC were, in general, good. Exchange of information was demonstrated between Killingworth and the licensee, the State, and other local EOCs. The EOC staff expressed concern, however, about the verification call-back system with the licensee.
Delays were often experienced in reaching the licensee.
Killingworth demonstrated only a partial capability for notification and instruction.
In response to a call from the State EOC, the sounding of sirens was simulated at 8:30 p.m. A monitoring team was dispatched to monitor ambient radiation levels in the town, and the Westbrook reception center was put on alert. At 9:28, the Killingworth EOC received a request from the town of Chester to assess road conditions and traffic along a designated evacuation route that runs from Chester through Killingworth. A team was dispatched to perform this task.
Radiological exposure control was adequate but could be improved. Dosimetry equipment was distributed to EOC staff; however, the supply was inadequate. There was some confusion as to how additional dosimetry equipment would be obtained in a real emergency. Two Boy Scouts played the role of contaminated individuals and EOC staff demonstrated proper techniques for monitoring and decontamination.
Media relations and recovery and reentry procedures were not tested at this exercise.
Killingworth 42 Deficiencies None.
Area Requiring Corrective Action
==
Description:==
The supply of dosimeters was inadequate and there was some confusion as to how to obtain more of these instruments (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.K.3.a).
Recommendation: A sufficient number of dosimeters should be 7
secured for the town's anticipated needs, and plans should be reviewed regarding available assistance from other organizations when the local supply of dosimeters has been exhausted.
Area Recommended for Improvement
==
Description:==
A roster was presented to show a second-shift capability; however, it did not specify which personnel were responsible for which positions.
e.
Recommendation: The roster available for use at the EOC should specify which personnel have b<en trained to fill the various emergency response functions.
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Lyma 43 2.2.11 Lyme The Lyme EOC was located in the Lyme Volunteer Fire Department station. The facility was an excellent new complex which had automatic back-up power.
This corrected a deficiency from the previous exercise. The EOC had all the necessary facilities to support extended emergency operations. The operating space at the EOC l
was generous and well lighted. At least 14 telephones were available. All necessary displays and maps were posted, highly readable, and updated promptly. Noise from radios was sometimes a problem in the EOC operations area.
Initial notification of the incident was received by the First Selectman and the CP Director at 5:40 p.m. The EOC was activated at 6:00 p.m. and fully staffed by 6:45 p.m.
An up-to-date call list was used to notify the EOC staff by telephone. All staff members at the EOC demonstrated good training. Continuous staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster and double-staffing in several positions. The i
groups represented at the EOC included the Board of Selectmen, the fire and civil l
preparedness departments, RACES, and a communications officer.
l The First Selectman was in command of emergency management for Lyme. The CP Director was in charge of operations and coordinated all staff activities. Key staff members were fully involved with decision-making in the EOC. The Director held frequent and informative briefings. Plans and checklists were used effectively during the exercise.
l High-band radio was the primary means of communications with the State.
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Commercial telephones were used as backup. Radio was used for communication with all field personnel.
Communications with the Area 4 Office were maintained through l-RACES. Commercial telephone was used for most other communications, with fire department frequencies as a backup.
Public alerting and instruction at the Lyme EOC was limited to the preparation of EBS messages, which were transmitted to the State EOC for approval before simulated broadcast of the message.
The implementation of protective actions in Lyme was conducted very well.
Traffic control points were promptly assigned and traffic volumes on evacuation routes were discussed at the Lyme EOC. Upon the initiation of an evacuation from Lyme, New Haven (the reception center host community) was notified of the evacuation. The First Selectman maintains a list of mobility-impaired individuals in the community. Steps were taken to tell farmers to place livestock in shelter and on stored feed.
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Emergency worker exposure control was outstanding. The RDO was especially well trained and diligent in preparing dosimeters and survey meters. Emergency workers were throughly instructed in dosimetry. The RDO and the First Selectman were both aware of the maximum allowable dose for emergency workers and knowledgeable about the use of KI. Decontamination procedures appeared to be well understood. No KI was issued during the exercise.
Lyme 44 Deficiencies None.
g Area Requiring Corrective Action
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Description:==
Town officials did not demonstrate the decision-making process regarding the issuance of KI to emergency workers (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.J.10.f).
Recommendation:
Plans should be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officials' decision making will be timely with respect to protective actions for emergency workers.
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
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Madison 45 2.2.12 Madison The Madison EOC was located in an auditorium on the second floor of the town hall. The facility was adequate in terms of furniture, space, lighting, and telephones.
Back-up power was available according to the EOC staff, but was not tested for this exercise.
Maps and displays were adequate to support operations.
Posted displays included a chart describing the classification of radiological incidents and posture codes,
. a status board, and several maps, including a plume EPZ map with sectors labeled. Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points, and population by evacuation area were available but not posted.
The EOC was promptly activated and fully staffed.
The First Selectman received radio-pager announcement of an Unusual Event (Connecticut posture code:
Delta-One) classification at approximately 5:20 p.m., and notification of Site Area Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Charlie-Two) at 5:40, which initiated activation of the EOC. The EOC was activated at about 6:00 p.m. and was fully operational when the Federal observer arrived at 6:30. Staffing included Selectmen and representatives of the police, fire, community services, public works, health, ambulance, and civil preparedner.s departments, the school district, and communications staff. The First Selectman led decision-making and managed operations effectively. A copy of the town plan was used for reference.
Communications at the Madison EOC experienced several problems. The primary communication link with the utility was by radio-pager, with a telephone call-back for j
additional information. However, some delays were experienced in getting through on the telephone. Primary contact with the State and other local EOCs was over the high-band radio, with amateur radio and telephone as back-up. Reception was at times weak or broken up by interference. At one time the Madison EOC lost contact with the State EOC on the high-bend radio. Given the limited role of Madison in this exercise, this did not prove to be a problem. However, radio communications on the high-band system needs to be improved.
Dosimeters were distributed to field workers by knowledgeable personnel and were available in sufficient quantity. Madison assisted another local EOC by providing dosimeters to them.
Madison demonstrated public notification and instruction by contacting the local EBS radio station after each change in emergency status or protective action recommendations.
Activities related to protective action and media relations were not demonstrated at Madison.
Deficiencies None.
Madison 46 Area Requiring Corrective Action
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Description:==
Radio reception on the high-band radio was at times weak or broken up by interference. At one time the Madison EOC lost contact with the State EOC on the high-band radio (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.F.1.b, F.3).
Recommendation:
The cause of the communications problems experienced by Madison during the exercise should be determined and corrected.
Area Recommended for Improvement
==
Description:==
The Town of Madison did not have a sufficient supply of KI for emergency workers.
Recommendation:
- Plans should be reviewed 'and revised if necessary to include the town policy on the distribution of K! to emergency workers. If the policy is to provide KI to emergency workers, a sufficient supply should be available.
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Marlborough 47 2.2.13 Marlborough The Marlborough EOC was located on the first floor of the new town hall. The fire station served as an annex for emergency workers. The EOC had adequate space, lighting, furniture, and telephones. Because of the layout - RACES in one room, status boards in an adjoining room - noise control was excellent. Also, a separate room was available for press briefings, although no media personnel appeared during the exercise.
I An emergency generator was brought over from the town garage on several minutes notice and turned on briefly to ensure that it was operational. Additional portable generators were located at the fire station. There were adequate kitchen and toilet facilities. There was sufficient space to set up cots in conference rooms and at the firehouse. (Because volunteers live nearby, extensive overnight facilities would not be major consideration.)
Shortly after receiving radio-pager notification of Unusual Event (Connecticut posture code: Delta-One) at about 5:35 p.m., the PIO reported to the EOC. The CP Director arrived about 15 minutes later. As soon as the EOC received notice of a Site Area Emergency-(Connecticut posture code: Charlie-Two) at 5:59 p.m., the PIO made telephone calls to key personnel listed on a printed " call tree" while the CP Director set up for operation. At 6:15 p.m., the Fire Chief and RACES were logged in and the EOC was operational. The Second Selectman arrived at 6:20 p.m. and took charge. Also at
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6:20 p.m., the volunteer firemen and police and emergency workers were called in. The First Selectman, who had been enroute to Enfield when the incident began, arrived at F
6:25 p.m. Just as he took charge, h beame sick (scenario script) and went home. The Second Selectman again took over by 6:35 p.m.
The EOC was fully staffed several minutes earlier with the RDO, town eleck (who was in charge of EOC access control), and several fire fighters arriving.
The EOC and fire station remained fully staffed throughout the entire exercise. Staff members at the Marlborough EOC demonstrated knowledge of procedures in an emergency by their prompt and appropriate actions. With the exception of the assistant PIO, the appropriate EOC staff members for a shift change were in attendance for all or a substantial part of the exercise.
The absence of the First Selectman, as required by the scenario, did not materially affect the management of the EOC. Upon arriving just before the Site Area Emergency, the CP Director took charge. He relinquished command to the Second Selectman upon his arrival. The First Selectman was not present long enough to take command of the EOC. The Second Selectman resumed command when, in accordance with the scenario, the First Selectman simulated becoming ill. The Second Selectman then managed operations with the advice of the CP Director. The PIO wrote and recorded all messages, the CP Director logged messages on the status board, and the Fire Chief maintained the EPZ maps.
Message handling was efficient.
Messages were checked, logged, distributed to key EOC personnel, and posted on the status board.
Access to the EOC was controlled by a guard, with assistance from a radiological health person. Each person was logged in (and out) and issued a badge acknowledging permission to enter the EOC.
The emergency classification level was posted at all times. It was incorrectly left posted at Unusual Event until about 6:25 p.m., when someone realized this and changed it to the correct classification. As all personnel were aware of the correct
Kariborough 48 status, this was not a problem.
An EPZ map with plume sector, emergency classification, and wind direction as well as a status board and siren alert map were posted in the main conference room. ~ Evacuation routes, relocation centers, access points, and radiological monitoring points were available but not posted.
Communications were handled efficiently. When the EOC staff members were unable to report to Area 3 Office (which did not become operational until 7:00 p.m.),
they immediately contacted the State EOC by telephone. Messages were received over radio-pagers, telephone, and amateur and citizens band radios. The EOC was able to communicate with field personnel, other local EOCs, and both the Area 3 and 4 Offices.
Almost all of the staff had citizens band radios in their vehicles. Two RACES operators were present. In addition, the CP Director and First Selectman are RACES members.
Communication to the auxiliary staff at the fire station was by radio. All nuclear incident reports were typed for distribution, eliminating any potential problems caused by poor handwriting.
Public alerting was accomplished by simulating the sounding of sirens. An electronic map indicates whether an activation signal was received by a siren. The sirens did not activate immediately; the PA speakers at the sirens were successfully used instead. Activation was at 7:10 p.m.
The EOC then acted in accordance with the discretionary authority provided by Connecticut under its Bravo posture code (Stage I General Emergency). EOC staff felt that the combination of a General Emergency and tornado warnings justified alerting the public. A back-up route alerting system (should the sirens fail completely) was in place. The EOC staff had a complete listing of mobility-impaired and hearing-tmpaired individuals listing names, addresses, and impairment.
The local constabulary was available to assist the State Police with traffic control, had this been necessary. The town has sufficient equipment to clear roads in bad weather and to remove stalled vehicles. There is one dairy farmer in the town. There is no other farming except personal gardens.
An adequate supply of dosimetry equipment was available at the EOC. The distribution (or simulation of distribution) dosimetry was not demonstrated at the EOC.
Many of the volunteer firefighters have been trained in the use of dosimetry equipment and, consequently, the RDO felt there was no need to explain how the equipment works.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.
Marlborough e
49 Area Recommended for Improvement
==
Description:==
Distribution of dosimetry to EOC staff was not demonstrated or simulated.
Recommendation: Dorimetry should be distributed to EOC and field staff at an appropriate time (e.g., when releases are occurring from the plant). The town's plan and procedures should specify when dosimetry should be issued.
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Middlefield 50 2.2.14 Middlefield The Middlefield EOC was spacious, with adequate communications l(fire emergency telephone, commercial telephone, two EOC " dedicated line" plug-in telephones, radio, and beeper-radios). Exhibits and displays were good, but their location was such that visibility would be rather restricted if more staff members were present.
Back-up power generation was available at the EOC. The EOC contained the necessary facilities for extended operations.
Although somewhat in disarray because of i
construction, the EOC space that was cleared and used was sufficient to carry out EOC operations. However, this wo-king space was not well organized.
Activation and staffing were effectively demonstrated. Although unexpected recent events thinned the ranks of experienced staff, the EOC was adequately staffed by the First Selectman, CP Director, Fire Chief, Resident Trooper, and, later, by Fire Department call-ins. The CP Director arrived at approximately 5:40 p.m. and the First Selectman at 5:45 p.m.
Within minutes, the EOC was activated, exhibits and furniture arranged, and telephone calls to notify staff calls were being made. The EOC was staffed by 6:10 p.m.
Second-shift staffing was demonstrated by roster. Most of the second shift would consist of Fire Department volunteers.
1 This EOC evidenced good management, with prompt decisions and coordination of response efforts. The First Selectman was in charge of the EOC and was an effective decision-maker. The First Selectman was able to assist the CP Director through some of the emergency response procedures and also by effectively rendering decisions. The new CP Director, who has been in this position less than one month, lacked some experience but was well quallfled. The EOC staff appeared very capable.
4 The Middlefield EOC demonstrated the ability to communicate with all i
appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. All key EOC staff had radio-pagers. Call-back confirmations were made to the utility. But EOC staff had difficulty getting through to the utility via the telephone during the exercise.
Radio communications to the Area 2 Office and other local EOCs were clear and reliable.
Concern expressed at a prior exercise regarding the lack of telephone lines was resolved through the addition of more telephone lines in the EOC.
4 No public alerting or instruction was required in Middlefield. The EOC staff i
discussed procedures for public notification, use of sirens, EBS, and route. alerting.
Notification procedures for school alerting were discussed as evidence of the Middlefield EOC's capability to fully carry out a thorough notification.
No protective actions were implemented in Middlefield, but discussions by EOC staff members demonstrated their knowledge of procedures. Evacuation and access
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control would be handled by constables and the fire department, with any other necessary personnel from Troop F of the State Police. The town had lists of those individuals in town requiring assistance, including the mobility-impaired, hearing-impaired, and others requiring special assistance. The school buses would be available and staffed by local drivers. There are eight farms in the town and notification by telephone for ingestion pathway protective actions could be done from the EOC. According to the EOC staff, j
the fire department workers have received training regarding radiological emergency j
measures.
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Middlefield 51 The Middlefield EOC simulated the implementation of exposure control measures. Dosimetry available at the EOC included nine kits containing high-and low-range self-reading dosimeters, a TLD, record forms, and instructions. This number was sufficient to protect emergency workers at the EOC. The CP Director checked and calibrated the dosimeters. Emergency workers were informed as to the frequency with which they should read their dosimetry. It was reported that the constables and fire department groups nave been trained in exposure control for emergency workers.
Deficiencies None.
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Areas Requiring Corrective Actions None.
Area Recommended for Improvement
==
Description:==
The layout of the area used for the Middlefield operations center was not well organized.
Recommendation:
A floor plan should be devised so furniture could be moved directly into efficient positions when the Middlefield EOC is activated.
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Mi,ddletown 52 f
2.2.15 Middletown The Middletown EOC demonstrated adequate facilities and displays to suppo-t emergency operations.
The Middletown EOC was located in the basement of the secondary fire station. This EOC had been completely renovated and was much improved since the last exercise.
The noise level has been reduced by soundproofing and installation of carpeting. The EOC had sufficient furniture, space, lighting, kitchen facilities, a dormitory with bunks, showers, and a back-up power generator. The displays posted in the EOC included a status board (constantly updated), an emergency classification chart, a radiological emergency status board, and a steen activation board.
Access control points, relocation center, and evacuation route maps were available but not posted.
Activation of the EOC was initiated by the Mayor after receiving notification of Site Area Emergency (Connecticut posture code: Charlie-Two) at approximately 5:50 p.m.
Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated. A 24-hour call list that was posted identified all the emergency response personnel.
All key organizations were represented, and over 32 persons arrived at the EOC 'in response to the exercise.
Additional personnel were on standby.
The EOC was ; fully staffed by 6:40 p.m.
Represented were the civil preparedness, fire, police, ' health, water and sewer, transportation and public works departments, the SWAT team, and the RDO. The EOC was secured by the SWAT. team stationed outside the rear door of -the EOC and decontamination area.
The Middletown EOC was managed by the Mayor. The Mayor demonstrated a thorough knowledge of all aspects of the town's radiological emergency plan. He gave periodic briefings to the staff. The status board was kept current (correcting a problem noted at the last exercise). Messages from Northeast Utilities and the Area 2 Office were logged in and read aloud by the Mayor. The staff followed written procedures and lists for reference. A copy of the town plan also was used. The RDO showed great initiative when responding to a simulated auto accident involving an injured and contaminated camper. Police, ambulance, and fire personnel, responded immediately.
The police and public works departments simulated the removal of a fallen tree blown down during the tornado by redirecting traffic to allow removal of the tree. The Healtn Officer also demonstrated initiative when the plant lost power by opening school shelters and placing all health department emergency personnel on standby. All staff members were involved in the decision-making process.
The Middletown EOC demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
There were several radio systems in the EOC.
Fire, emergenc5 preparedness, and police personnel were all equipped with two-way radios. In addition, the ambulance based at the fire station had a radio that could communicate with the county hospital. There were also 10 conferencing telephones in the EOC. The Mayor, Fire Deputy, Fire Chief, Police Chief, and CP Director were also equipped with car radios. All key personnel, firefighters, and police officers were equipped with pagers. Messages received over the radio from the Area 2 Office were clear and free of static. The initial notification of each classification level was received by the fire dispatcher, who promptly notified the Mayor.
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Middletown 53 4
The Middletown EOC can initiate alerting and notification, but no protective actions were taken as Middletown was not in the plume pathway. However, the Mayor did initiate at 9:08 p.m. a prescripted EBS message to shelter when the utility stated there was a potential off-site radiological release. The Mayor and staff thoroughly discussed what protective actions would be taken at the appropriate time. There was no simulated sounding of the sirens.
Since the last exercise, the school system had developed emergency plans to evacuate the schools, including a plan for busing students to their assigned destination, where parents would pick them up. This corrected a problem noted at the last exercise.
The protective actions of access control, sheltering, and activation of relocation centers were performed in a timely feshion but a problem was experienced in EBS and stren coordination. The town was not in the plume. But when the wind changed and it appeared that the town would be in the plume pathway imminently, the Mayor made the decision to shelter. An EBS message was formulated and EBS was activated but there was no sounding of sirens. The health department had a list of mobility-impaired, institutionalized, and transport-dependent townspeople who need transportation. This information was card-Indexed and special needs individuals are categorized by the nature of their needs and illnesses. The list was very thorough, comprehensive, and is updated monthly with the coordination of the Visiting Nurses Association. The health department also had a listing of two dairy farms and a food processing plant. The police department controlled access and used barricades promptly and effectively.
The Middletown EOC had a sufficient supply of dosimetry equipment for emergency workers consisting'of low, mid, and high-t k i dosimeters, record-keeping cards, TLDs, and chargers for the dosimeters. Since K1is supplied by the State EOC, the Middletown EOC does not stock it.
The RDO demonstrated knowledge of decontamination procedures after responding to a simulated auto accident of a contaminated individual. The ambulance medical service, emergency workers, and police personnel were also carefully checked for contamination.
The injured person had contaminated material concealed in a pocket, which was detected by the RDO. The EOC had an isolated decontamination area with a showte and clothing to replace contaminated clothing. There is a separate container for discarded contaminated clothing. The stairs of this area were covered with paper that can be destroyed if contaminated and that protects the stairway. The RADEF team is experienced and well trained.
i Deficiencies None.
Area Requiring Corrective Action
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Description:==
Although Middletown was not in the plume, the EOC issued an EBS message for the public to take shelter, but did not simulate the activation of sirens or any public alerting functions (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!.E.6).
Middistown 54 Recommendation:
Public alerting must be coordinated with public instruction to assure that the populace is informed of the protective actions that should be taken.
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
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Portland.
55 2.2.16 Portland The Portland EOC was located in the town hall. The EOC had sufficient space, lighting, maps, and furniture to conduct emergency operations. The communications equipment was located in a separate room so that noise could be controlled. The EOC had back-up power. The emergency classification level was posted and the status board was kept current.
Activation and staffing of the Portland EOC were prompt.
The Portland Communications Center is staffed continuously and is used to dispatch police, firefighters, and ambulances within the town.
This center received the initial notification and changes in emergency classification levels from the utility.
The Communications Center then called appropriate staff either using radio-pagers or the telephone.
EOC staff members arrived promptly.
The staff included the First Selectman, the CP Director, and members of the Portland communications staff. The Portland Police and Fire Departments were also alerted. The EOC was fully activated by 5:40 p.m.
Emergency operations were managed by the First Selectman, who was assisted by the CP Director. All participants were kept informed of the situation. Entry to the EOC was controlled, and people were asked to sign in and out. Messages were logged as they came into the communications room and then passed to the operations staff. The Elmcrest Hospital was kept informed of the situation throughout the exercise. The EOC staff demonstrated training and knowledge of duties and dealt capably with the situation.
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At one point, the First Selectman and the CP Director were discussing possible protective actions for areas in the town near the Connecticut River because they thought the wind was blowing toward Middletown. The status board had the correct wind written t
in, but the wind arrow was pointing in the opposite direction. However, they checked with Area 3 before deciding to implement any protective action and were told that they did not have to do anything because they were not in the affected sectors.
The Portland EOC demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
In addition to official radios and telephones, a NARS radio was set up in the communications room.
The Portland EOC demonstrated the ability to alert the public via the emergency 7
notification system. At 8:05 p.m. Portland received a message from the Area 3 Office to inform them when they were ready to sound their strens. The Portland EOC received a message at 8:23 to sound the sirens. The EOC confirmed shortly thereafter that the l
sirens had been sounded. EBS was also coordinated by the State. A message from the Area 3 office at 8:43 p.m. Informed the EOC that no protective actions were necessary l
In Portland.
l According to the EOC staff, sufficient resources exist to keep evacuation routes i
clear during bad weather and in the event of stalled or wrecked cars. Portland also had I
detailed lists of residents who would need special transportation assistance. The town also has an agreement with the Town of Glastonbury to supply buses if the need arises.
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Portland 56 The Portland EOC partially demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
The town did not distribute dosimeters to its emergency workers, but the CP Director indicated that he had been trained and was knowledgeable of the procedures for issuing dosimetry. The town also has an agreement with the town of Glastonbury to provide an RDO to assist in emergency worker exposure control.
Deficiencies None.
g Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.
Area Recommended for Improvement
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Description:==
Portland did not demonstrate the distribution of s
dosimeters to emergency workers.
Recommendation: Guidance should be provided on when and how the decision to issue dosimeters to emergency workers should be made and the process should be demonstrated at the next exercise.
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Salem 57
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4 2.2.17 Salem The Salem EOC -was located in the town hall.
The EOC had sufficient furnishings, lighting, space, and equipment. The EOC was well organized and adequate to handle emergency operations. A communications room was separate from the operations room. It contained 2 two-way radios, a telephone, a tape recorder, a radio-pager, and necessary message pads. All equipment was in good working order. Background noise was controlled. The operations room had a large, easily read status board, evacuation maps, pathway charts, and a large work table for handling all information. Back-up power was not available at this time, but a new 10-kW generator is on order. All maps, population data, and information necessary to the operation are updated periodically.
The local school adjacent to the town hall would serve as a decontamination center for people and vehicles if needed.
I Activation of the EOC was initiated quickly; the staff was mobilized according to written procedures. Almost all staff members arrived in less than one-half hour. The EOC was fully staffed by 7:23 p.m. The staff members displayed adequate knowledge of their equipment and their responsibilities in the town's emergency operations. Incoming f
staff members were given briefings. The EOC was locked during the exercise while the security officer screened and logged people entering.
A complete shift change was demonstrated, with the second shift exhibiting adequate training and knowledge.
Emergency operations management at the Salem EOC was good overall. The First Selectman and the Second Selectman oversaw the total operation, while the CP Director provided effective control and management of incoming communications. All j
staff members participated in the discussion of information, and decisions were made in a timely manner. Written messages were processed quickly. They were short and to the point, but lacked such basic information as time received and, in some cases, place of l
origin. This could cause confusion to second-shift personnel when a quick update is l
necessary. The large status board was clear and kept up-to-date, but the origin of some information was unclear because of the problem with the message-logging procedure.
l The Salem EOC demonstrated the ability to communicate with all acorooriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
Minor problems were resolved quickly.
Equipment worked well, and the communications operator appeared to be knowledgeable and aware of his responsibilities. The communications staff was activated in a timely manner. Most EOC staff members can be contacted 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day by the radio-pager system.
j Dose assessment normally is not done by the local EOC. However, the Salem CP Director did dispatch several staff to monitor radiation levels at eight predetermined i
sites. The readings were called back during the exercise and posted on the status board.
Discussion with staff followed on options available if the situation should worsen.
l Public alerting and instruction were not conducted in Salem; however, a j
discussion on public alerting and instruction procedures was conducted. The staff was ready to implement public alerting if protective actions were necessary.
l
(
Salem 58 a
Although the scenario did not include conditions requiring the demonstration of access control and the ability to deal with Impediments to evacuation, discussions with the EOC staff indicated that sufficient resources are available to keep evacuation routes clear during bad weather and in the event of obstructions. Also, a list of the mobility-impaired was in the EOC, and according to the staff this list is updated annually.
Emergency worker exposure control was not implemented in Salem. The supply of survey meters, dosimeters, and record-keeping forms appeared adequate. Personnel were knowledgeable in the use and care of the equipment and the maximum dose allowable without authorization. No distribution of dosimetry was simulated during the exercise.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action 1.
==
Description:==
Messages received by the communications room did I
not indicate the time they were received and place of origin, giving rise to possible confusion (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.A.2.a; F).
Recommendation: Staff at the Salem EOC should be trained to include the time received and the place of origin on message forms.
2.
==
Description:==
Salem did not demonstrate the distribution of dosimeters to emergency workers, although emergency workers were dispatched to conduct monitoring at eight locations (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II.K.3.a).
4 Recommendation: Guidance should be provided on when and how the decision to issue dosimeters to emergency workers should be made and the process should be demonstrated at the next c
exercise. All monitoring teams should be issued dosimetry prior to being dispatched to conduct field activities.
e e
Areas Recommended for Improvement None.
l
Westbrook 59 4
4 2.2.18 Westbrook The Westbrook EOC demonstrated adequate facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
The space allocated for Westbrook EOC operations could acconimodate only a small staff of emergency workers. This was a problem noted in a prior exercise. In response, the layout has been changed; the fire, police, and health staff are not located at the EOC, but are at their offices, which are very close to the i
i FOC. Although this reduced coordination among the staff, the observer felt that it was superior to the previous layout and that it corrects a problem noted earlier.
The Westbrook EOC was promptly activated and staffed. At 5:20 p.m. the radio-pager system activated by the Haddam Neck Plant alerted the Westbrook CP Director, who then promptly opened the EOC. The CP Director advised the First Selectman by j
telephone of the Unusual Event (Connecticut posture code: Delta-One) notice from the i
plant.
The First Selectman arrived at the EOC at 6:10 p.m., completing the EOC staffing.
The First Selectman effectively managed EOC operations.
Radio I
communications tasks were staffed by the CP Director while message logging and i
telephone answering tasks were shared. Fire, police, and health officers were telephoned by the First Selectman and advised to remain on standby during exercise.
These emergency officers remained in their respective quarters, housed adjacent to the EOC.
i Two-way radio communications capabilities were maintained as directed by the First Selectman. Round-the-clock staffing of the EOC was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster.
The Westbrook EOC-demonstrated the ability to communicate with all i
appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. Message logs were kept on the Nuclear Incident Report forms showing incident class, description, and times.
4 Notifications of changes in plant status were issued from the plant directly to the EOC via radio-pager. Telephone calls were made to the plant for further information and to verify that Westbrook had heard the message. The pagers worked well, remedying the deficiency noted at a previous exercise. The EOC staff demonstrated the ability to maintain radio and phone communication with the Area 2 Office and other local EOCs.
The staff ind!cated that they usc the commercial tc!cphonc system as the primary communication link to schools and hospitals.
i Although access and traffic control was not required by the scenario in Westbrook, the EOC staff indicated that they have adequate resources to cover all traffic and access control points during an evacuation, as well as keeping evacuation routes clear during bad weather or in case of obstructions.
Identitles of rnobility-impaired individuals and a list of these special needs were maintained at the EOC for use i
if an evacuation was orde' red.
l Exposure control was not demonstrated at the Westbrook EOC. The dosimetry equipment was examined by the observer. Six dosimetry kits were present in the EOC, including mid-and high-range dosimeters and TLDs. Additional dosimetry was said by the EOC staff to be available in the fire department. Together, this appears to be sufficient for this community.
The CP Director appeared well trained to instruct emergency workers in the proper use of dosimetry. No distribution of dosimetry was simulated during the exercise.
i
W2Stbrook 60 Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.
A Area Recommended for Improvement
==
Description:==
Westbrook did not demonstrate the distribution of dosimeters to emergency workers.
Recommendation: Guidance should be provided on when and how the decision to issue dosimeters to emergency workers should be made and the process should be demonstrated at the next exercises 4
f
.+
1
~.
61 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
.Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions with recommendations ' noted by the Federal evaluators of this exercise.
These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sec.11 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1: Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (November 1980), exercise objectives, and the evaluation criteria provided in Sec.1.5 of this report.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying 'to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
FEMA requests that the state and local jurisdictions submit the measures they have taken or intend to take to correct deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including projected and actual dates of completion for implementing corrective actions, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately.
The definitions of exercise inadequacies are as follows:
s Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the i
vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency.
Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected througn appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, I
drills, or other actions.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise,.
they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
Seven deficiencies were identified in this exercise. The deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions identified in th!s exercise are summarized in Table 2. Areas recommended for improvement are not included in Table 2.
Table 3 is a compilation of the current status of deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions identified in the exercises of February 6,1982; April 23,1983; May 12, 1984; and April 25, 1986.
Table 4 lists the status of each of the 35 FEMA Core Objectives for each state and local jurisdiction by exercise year.
l
I.t
)
TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Meck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 1 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recommendation Bew. 1, State (S) and Imcal (L)
Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date State 3DC 1.
Desc ript ion: The State did not demon-E.6, Procedures were revised to Corrected as demon-5-28-86 strate the capacity to alert and AppeMis improve activation time strated during 5-28-86 notify the public within 15 minutes of 3-l. 2.a for the sirens.
remedial drill.
the decision to implement protective actions. DEFICIENCY Recommendation:
The State should review and revise procedures as neces-sary to ensure activation of the public alert and notification system within 15 minutes of the decision to recoasmend protective actions to the f
public.
Staff should be trained in the procedures for alert and notifi-cation of the public.
2.
Descriptions The second and third EDS E.5 An RERP EBS Procedures Corrected as demon-5-28-86 messages prepared by the State did not workbook was developed to strated during 5-28-86 provide the public with adequate provide a better format to remedial drill.
information and any have caused some develop ESS announcements people to take unnecessary risks, which include geographical thereby endangering public safety.
boundaries for areas.
DEFICIBBCY accommendation:
The State should develop prescripted messages that include easily identifiable boundaries such as roads, rivers, etc., for each sector within the plume EPZ so that the public will understand the infor-mation being disseminated.
TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant
( April 25,1986)
Page 2 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC RaCommendation Rev. I, State II) and 14CaI iL)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Eles eent Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date 3.
==
Description:==
The use of the Area CP N.2.a.
" Area offices are not...
Adequate.
Offices as a message conduit failed to F.I.b the primary notification expedite or otherwise enhance infor-channel for local com-nation flow be'veen the State and munities receiving updates l
towns not directly affected by the on plant situation status.
l plume.
Local E0Cs requesting event The radiopagers are the j
status updates through the Area direct line of consuni-i Offices did not have important cation between the plant questions answered quickly, and the and the local and state Area Offices provided the local EOCs emergency workers.
l either unclear or incorrect informa-l tion at times.
"... The Area Coordinators were given special train-Rec - Jatioet Procedures for com-ing to improve the flow munication to the local EOCs by radio and quality of information from the State EOC through the OCP passed to town levels in-Area Offices should be either ur mediately following this graded, with monitoring of message esercise. Training at the traffic at the State EOC, or discarded local level will be up-from the state plan in favor of a graded to ensure this direct radio or hard-copy channel (or situation will not be a both) as the primary means of commn-problem in the future.
ication.
"... The State De pa rt ment of Environmental Protec-tion is currently obtain-ing contracts to upg rade coassunications to the Area Offices and to the emer-gency planning zone com-munities."
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers l
6:
c TAat.E 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 3 of 16 Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-RE*-1, Proposed Completion-Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (5) and Local (L)
Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of for Corrective Action Elemen-.
Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local kesponse Date 4.
Descripcios Due to an apparent F.1.1 "The situation occurred Adequate.
oversight in operations control at the contrary to established State
- EOC, notification of the procedures.
The State Covernor's emergenc y declaration was will conduct a review of never provided to the local EOCs in communications and message accordance with the prescribed pro-handling procedures."
cedures.
The Consunications Officer is inst ruct ed to transmit only ass-
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
sage s received in writing, and the Mancuso, Connecticut State position of the communications station Director of Civil Pre-prevents this individual f rom reading paredness, to H.C. Vickers the main event status board (which had the declaration clearly post ed ).
Thus, the emergency declaration ass-sage was never transmitted to the Area Offices and its absence was nev er i
questioned.
Receamsedations Procedures for developing and transmitting communi-cations to local governments should be reviewed and revised if necessary to e
I ensure local officials are informed of significant developments in a tiesty manner.
i 5
o I
1 I
i i
TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 4 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-RI:P-1, Proposed Actual State (S) and local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. i, for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Seaponse' Date Field Monitoring 1.
Descripticet The teams did not have H.13
" Checklists for equipment Adequate.
checklists for equipment and supplies
!.S and supplies will be kept to enable them to quickly determine with the monitoring team whether they have everything they need emergency kits in the for monitoring and sampling.
f u t u re.**
Recommendatioet checklists should be
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
drawn up and kept with the monitoring Mancuso, Connecticut State team emergency kits.
Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers 2.
De sc ri ption: One team did not have El J.lO,e,
" Recommendation accepted.
Adequate.
protective clothing. Neither team I.5 This situation occurred or had respirators.
contrary to e st ablished procedures."
Recommendatient All radiological monitoring field teams should have
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
protective clothing, respirators, and Mancuso, Connecticut State KI issued to them prior to the initia-Director of Civil Pre-tion of field monitoring activities, paredness, to H.C. Vickers O
e g-TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 5 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. l',
State (S) and Local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date 3.
==
Description:==
Radiological monitoring K.3.a "secommendation accepted."
- Adequate, i
z r.;'
mid-range self-reading dosi-meters had a range of 0-2 R.
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Recasmandations Since the maximum Director of Civil Pre-dose allowed without authorisation is paredness, to H.C. Vickers 3 R, cuneideration should be given to issuing 0-5 a self-reading dominsters to monitoring teams.
i Media Center 1.
Desc ri pt ion: The Covernor's PIO staff C.4.a
" Additional training will Adequate.
was not large or well trained enough be accomplished."
to perform the multiple functions it had been assigned.
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Mancuso, Connecticut State j
Becommandation: Sufficient PIO staff Director of Civil Pre-should be available during an esercise paredness, to H.C. Vickers i
to adequately demonstrate the capabil-
)
ity to perform all its assigned res-ponsibilities.
i i
i 4
i
w TABl.E 2 Remedial Actions for Maddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 6 et 16-i Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective
- FDIA-SEP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC secommendation Rev. I, State (S) and Local (L)
Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date generating Adequates The state 2.
Bescriptient The State generated no C.3.s
" Emphasis on hard copy news releases of its own more hard copy news re-has developed an Emer '
during the esercieel ttferefore, no
- leases, for the media, gency Broadcast System protective action messages were avail-will be made in the workhoek, designed to able in documented form for use by the future."
accelerate development of protective action media, who, c on sequently, were never informed in writing about either the
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
messages and highlight Covernor's Declaration of Civil Emer-Mancuso, Connecticut State details of the sency at 7 56 p.m., or the content of Director of Civil Pre-affected areas, which was used during the paredness, to W.C. Vickers EBS messages, S/28/86 esercise. The ESS workbook will. pro-Secommendaties:
The State should wide valuable informa-delegate to a member of the PIO's staff the specific responsibility of tion for inclusion in hard copy press re-preparing news releases and updating leases.
Howe ve r,. i t on important media representatives should not be the only developments.
information
.provided to the media.
Chester EDC 1.
Desc ription: The supply of dosimetry K.3.a "The Town of Chester has 2-1-88 Adequate.
at the Chester EOC was insuf ficient, responded that they will invent ory their supply of Secommendatient There should be a Josimeters and will re-sufficient suppl y of self-reading quest ' sufficient amounts dosimetry and TLDs or film badges for
-for future esercises.
all emergency workers in Chester.
This will be accomplished by February 1, 1988.'"
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Mancuso. Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to N.C. Vickers O
n s
e TJALE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 7 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1 Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date 2.
Desc ri pt ient Some checklists and A.2.a "The Toun of Che st er Adequate.
notification lists were out of date or responded that they will not available.
This caused some conduc t an inused ia t e problemel when procedures were not review and will update clear, the First Selectman had to seek their alert list."
out the appropriate individual to determine what emergency response
--.12/23/86 letter from F.
actions were necessary.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-Reco h tions All checklists and paredness, to H.C. Vickers call lists should be reviemd and revised as necessary to ensure that they are up to date and that appro-priate personnel are trained.
3.
Desc riptiont Although the decision-A. 2..a "Chester First Selectman Adequate.
making process to espond the evacu-Robert Blair responded stion area in Chester was very good, that they will make this information regarding this espanded recommenda t ion a priority ares should have been transmitted to for future esercises."
the State.
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Recommendations Chester officials Mancuso, Connecticut State should inform the State of any sig-Director of Civil Pre-nificant actions they have taken at paredness, to H.C. Vickers the EOC.
1 A81.E 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 8 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-tEP-8, Proposed Actual Actions ac t RAC Recosusendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L)
Completi)n FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date i
l 4.
Desc ription:
Town officials did not J.13.f "This office will request Adequate.
l demonstrate the decision-making pro-all emergency planning I
cess regarding the issuance of El to zone chief esecutives to l
emergency workers.
incorporate a definitive l
position on the use of Rec - dation:
Plans should be potassium iodide for emer-reviewed and revised as necessary to genc y workers into their ensure local officials' decision local plans, before the making will be timely with respect to end of 1987.
protective actions for emergency workers.
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-I paredness, to H.C. Vickers Colchester 50C De sc ri pt ion: There was some confusion H.3 "The Town of Colchester Adequate.
among EOC staff as to the rules re-will revise its standard garding access to the EOC during a operating procedures to radiological emergency, include access control to the EOC."
Bec - dations Rules and procedures on controlled access to the EOC while
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
emergency operations are in effect Mancuso, Connecticut State must be made clear to all emergency Director of Civil Pre-workers.
paredness, to H.C. Vickers 0
8
e
=
TAM.E 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 9 of 16 Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (5) and local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for corrective Action Elemen t Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date Durham EOC Descriptions Distribution of K.3.a "The Town of Durham First Adequate.
Selectman reports that it dosimetry to EOC staff was not will ' revise its standard demonstrated or simulated operating procedure to Recenseadatient Responsibility for include the timely dis-distribution of dosimetry should be persement of dosimeters'."
delegated to an EOC staf f person uhen the regular RDO is not available. The
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
town's plan and procedures should Mancuso, Connecticut State specify when dosimetry should be Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers issued.
i East Naddam MM:
1.
Descriptions At the Ceneral Emergency E.6,
" Additional training will Adequate.
i (Connecticut po st ure code Bravo),
J.9 be conducted to alleviate which calls for sheltering in the two-this deficiency."
mile EPZ, neither public alerting nor
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
protective actions were taken in East Mancuso, Connecticut State Haddam.
Director of Civil Pre-Rec - datient EOC officials should paredness, to H.C. Vickers be trained to implement appropriate protective actions and public slerting.
TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Psse 10 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Carrective FDIA-IEP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Reconsendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L)
Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Actio-Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date 2.
Descri pt ion Dosimetry hits at the E.3.a "The Town of East Haddam Adequate.
East Haddam EDC were insufficient in will inventory their number.
supply of dosimeters and will receive sufficient Beca m tion The supply of self-amounts for all emergency reading dosimetry and TLDs or film workers."
badges should be sufficient for all
- 12/23/06 letter from F.
emergency workers in East Haddam.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers 3.
De sc ri pt ion:
Town of ficials did not J.10.f cf.
response to this Adequate.
issue under.Chester EOC demonstrate the decision-making pro, ess regarding the issuance of KI to
(#4) emergency workers.
Becammendatism Pl ans should be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officials' decision making will be timely with respect to protective actions for emergency workers.
4.
Desc ript ion: The East Haddam EOC did E.S.
"During the June 1986 Adequate.
not munitor the EBS station.
E.?
Public Officials Con-ference this of fice recom-Recommendation:
East Haddam EOC mended that all EPZ com-personnel should monitor EBS to ensure munities purchase E85 that EBS messages include East Haddam, monitors for their opera-pa rt icul arl y when protective actions tions centers."
may be appropriate.
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers 9
s e
TA8LE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 11 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas aequiring corrective FEMA-RI'P-1, Preposed Actual Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date East Hampton 50C 1.
Descriptiset There was no demon-K.3.a.
" Demonstration of the Adequate.
stration of the ability to continu-K.3.b ability to continuously ously monitor and control emergency monitor and control emer-worker esposure.
gency worker esposure will be demonstrated in sub-Recommsedation:
Distribution (or sequent esercises."
simulated distribution) of dosimetry should be implemented by all commun-
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
ities within the plume EPZ at Stage II Mancuso, Connecticut State Ceneral Emergency (Connecticut posture Director of Civil Pre-codel Alpha).
paredness, to N.C. Vickers 2.
Descri pt ioot Town officials did not J.10.f cf. response to this issue Adequate.
demonstrate the decision-making pro-under Chester EOC (f4).
cess regarding the issuance of K1 to emergency workers.
Recommendatioet Pl ans should be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officiale*
decision asking will be timely with respect to protective actions for emergency workers.
Essea RDC 1.
Desc ri pt ion:
The call list for EOC E.2 "The Town of Esses reports Procedures should be staff was out of date sad had to be that they are currently developed to update updated using a telephone directory developing an up-to-date
. call lists at least during the call down.
call list."
quarterly.
Recommendation:
The EOC call list
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
should be updated.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers t
i 1
TARI.E 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986) l Page 12 of 16 1
Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-8 Proposed Actual
. Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1 State (S) and Local (L)
Completion PEMA Evaluation of Completion 4
for Corrective Action Element
. Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and 1.ocal Response Date 2.
Descriptioet Tuenty-four hour staf f-A.4 "The Town of Esses reports Adequate.
ing was demonstrated for a!! positions that the position of except the CP Director.
assistant to the CP Direc-
+
tor is currently open and Reco m tioet A second-shift CP that they are attempting Director needs to be trained.
to fill it."
12/23/06 letter from F.
Mancuso Connecticut State Director of' Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers i
3.
Descripties:
Adequate lists of J.10.d "The First Selectman of Procedures shall be mobility-and hearing-impaired india Esses is currently working developed to assure viduals were not available at the EOC.
with Valley Shore Emer-the information is atac y Communications to kept current.
Recessaandatiaa t The planned ques-develop an up-to-date I
tiennaire seeking information on mobility and hearing-j mobility-and hearing-impaired indi-impaired list for Esses."
viduals should be sent out as soon as possible and the results from the
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
questionnaire should be collated into Mancuso. Connecticut State a listing of mobility-and hearing-Director of Civil Pre-impaired.
paredness, to H.C. Vickers 4.
Desc ri pt ioat Distribution of K.3.a
" Esses reported that dis-Adequates additional dosimetry occurred after route tribution of dosimeters training of personnel alerting teams were dispatched.
after the onset of route on these procedures j
alerting was done contrary should be conducted.
Rec - dations Procedures for the to their established pro-issuance of dosimetry to emergency cedures."
i workers should be reviewed and revised if necessary to assure that these
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
i worker s are issued dosimetry prior to Mancuso, Connecticut State being sent into the field.
Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers I
i i
-we e
t l
TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
{
Page 13 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (5) and Local (L)
Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date Msadas EOC Desc ri pt ioet The decision to sound E.6 "In the
- future, the Adequate.
the sirens in Haddam uns not coordi-sounding of public alert-nated with the broadcast of an in-ing sirens will be coordi-structional message to the public.
nated wit h an instruc-DgFICIERICT tional broadcast (e.g.,
EBS) to the public."
Recommendatioe t If a municipality is to sound the sirens to alert the
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
public, there must be some transmis-Mancuso, Connecticut State sien of an inst ruct ional message so Director of Civil Pre-that the public can take appropriate paredness, to H.C. Vickers actions.
Killingworth EOC Descriptioet The supply of dosimeters K.3.a
- Killingwort h will inven-Adequate.
was inadequate and there was confusion tory their supply of as to how to obt ain more of these dosimeters and will re-instruments.
ceive sufficient amounts for all emergency workers.
Bec - datient A sufficient number Additional training and of dosimeters should be secured for inatruction will be given the coun's anticipated needs, and to Killingworth in tt e plans should be reviewed regarding procurement of additional 1
available assistance form other do s imm t e r s.
organizations when the local supply of dosimeters has been enhausted.
- 12/23/86 let ter f rom F.
Mancuso, Connecticut State Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers
TABLE 2 Benedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 14 of 16 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Beerwse Date Lyme ROC i
mescriptioet Town officials did not J.10.f cf. response to this issue Adequate.
I demonstrate the decision-making pro-under Chester EOC (f4).
cess regarding the issuance of K1 to emergency workers.
Recommendetian:
P1ana shoutd be reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure local officials' decision making will be timely with respect to protective actions for emergency workers.
l Madison M C Desc ri pt ies:
Radio recept ion on the-F.1.b.
"The Town of Madison is Adequate.
high-band radio was at tiers weak or F.3 currently looking into broken up by interference.
At one different areas to relo-time the Madison EOC lost contact with cate their antenna, in the State EOC on the high-band radio, order to improve recep-tion."
Rec - '-tion:
The cause of the communications problems esperienced by
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Hadison during the esercise should be Mancuso, Connecticut State determined and corrected.
Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers O
e
e TAllE 2 Remedial Actions for Haddam Neck Plant (April 25, 1986)
Page 15 of 16 i
Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-Rf P-1, Proposed Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. I, State (S) and local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Elemeet Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date Middleteess 50C
==
Description:==
Although Middletown was E.6 "The Mayor of Middletown Adequate.
not in the plume, the EOC issued an reports that this area ERS message for the public to take requiring Corrective shelter, but did not simulate the Action will be corrected activation of sirens or any public in the future and it will be incorporated into their alerting.
plan."
Becommendation: Public alertirs mast be coordinated with public instruction
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
to assure that the populace is in-Mancuso. Connecticut State formed of the protective actions that Director of Civil Pre-paredness, to H.C. Vickers I
should be taken.
Salem WC 1.
Descripties: Messages received by the A.2.s,
" Additional training and Adequate.
communications room did not indicate F
instruction will be given the time they were received and place to alleviate this of origin, giving rise to possible problem."
confusion.
- 12/23/86 letter from F.
Recommendaties:
Staff at the Salem Mancuso, Connecticut State EOC should be trained to include the Director of Civil Pre-time received and the place of origin paredness, to H.C. Vickers on message forms.
1
__ _ - -. =.
l l
TAat.E 2 Remedial Actions for Haddas Neck Plant
( April 25,1986)
Page 16 of 16; Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-RE P-1 Proposed Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (5) and Local (L)
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action El es ent Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date 2.
rescription:
Sales did not demon-K.3.a
" Salem will be instructed Adequate.
strate the distribution of dosimeters to revise their st andard f
to emergency workers, although emer-operating procedures to j
include the timely dis-gency workers were dispatched to con-duct monitoring at eight locations.
tribution of dosimeters to emergency workers."
l Recausendation Guidance should be l
-- 12/23/86 letter f rom F.
I provided on when and how the decision Mancuso, Connecticut State to issue dosimeters to emergency workers should be made and the process Director of Civil Pre-l should be demonstrated at the nest paredness, to H.C. Vickers esercise. All monitoring teams shoulJ be issued dosimetry prior to bein.g dispatched to conduc t field activi-
- ties, i
O O
O
e e
TAtl.E 3 Olp3FMT AND CnseECTEn steh F.Itaf"t%E REFICithCIE5 AND AREAS FtMt OWeECTIVE ACTime NADDAM NECE Ft. ANT (OMINECTIQIT TANrEF)
Page B of 32 objective Subee-quently Correetive prevtomely Teeted Act ten Eseretee Identitled FEM Esercise sataEC-d454 (Esercise Vertiled Current leeue Deecetpalee Sete leeue objecttie objective Reference Juriedtetten Action Taken Sete)
($.e.
Seoutt e)
St atue 82-l.
Troteing and researces 2/6/92 N/A F.I.b commecticut r - atcattene have been to-Tee re tcasten to ottig g
are needed at the eres preved byt
- a. Installettee of (4/23/83) a problem bet wen the Cp effices to leprove high-band redte in the area (5/t2/04)
State and local toCo communicotten between offices and EPE teuse.
b.
(4/25/96)
(PEA 1983).
teresages the state and the local Presteten of
- radio-pager*
to local governmente EOCs. (3.B.9) espebility at eres offices, were met received in a
- c. Use of dedicated telephone sleely meaner (EA Se, communication pereennel la the pp. 3).
Requeste by State emergency operating local EOCs for infor-center.
(letter from State metten en event status 8/9/82) not sattefied (EAS4) j
$2-4.
The state posttten en 2/6/02 II/A J.10.e Connecticut The Connecticut Separtment of Tee The recommendattee for I
the administrattee of El Healt h Services to currently (4/23/03) use of Et use not made to emergency workere developing a El policy In com-(4/25/06) due to pleet rolesse neede clartitrattee in sultet tee with the Comeecticut dets (PEA 3963, pp.
order to ettelmate the State Medical Sectety.
It le 20-21),
poettive El confesten regarding Ste espected that thte policy will doctelee not desen-ese uhtch wee evidenced be published prior to the mest strated (EA 36).
I during the eserclee.
scheduled esercles.
(letter (3.8.4) free State S/9/82) 82-2.
Some improvemente la 2/6/32 N/A F.I.h Connecticut No act ten tabee.
Tee leprovement to comun-I ceamentrattene between (4/23/03) tretten syst ems are the state EUC and the (5/12/84) still needed.
Five eres Cp offices are (4/25/86) problems wre etted exagested. (4.I.3)
(PEA 1943.
p.
26).
Ceemunications wee still a probles during the 5/12/04 eneresse (EA S4 pp.
2-9).
Equipment le aJequate, but informattee trame-for remains a probles (EA 86).
92-4.
Benat e reementcattene 2/6/82 N/A F.I Connecticut leew FIO f acility to under con =
Tee Effect of new facility C
between the EOC opera-structica.
(4/23/03) unknown as temporary tiene reen and the media (5/12/04) apace was ut tllsed for center shoute be com-(4/25/86) esercise (PEA 1983, p.
eldered to enheere 19).
Internal commue-
]
tafermetten flew to the teattens were adequate Public Informatten (EA 94, pp.
4-5).
Officer.
(4.3.4)
Commuascatden channels worked well (EA 46).
s D
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et t
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t t ggyc4 t me ai r c
I i. e s
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n a anri(
amt t
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msit g mog oh e
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t ee s
h o
t t e ocet c os e
nt eaer) ed t. 6 t
nit.
t el e,st n e
o nd mr e5 t r t
ebep s upsi s
e ceirCt h u e1 t
mes m it repeee e
s e meo r8 e
s mnf d a igdC s
d e a pd e d ed osatdr eof s4 d rn ser d re ri ecee oeaeu4 TcE oa(
A aeerS A ar gdt emp l
Acct mq(
0 I
2 9
1 I
1 2
2 2
2 8
8 8
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l illlllI
e TASI.E 1 08estm7 Ann oweECTEm 19m6 ExterssE f*FICitlectFS AeD ASEAS Fna OmurCTlvE ACTlose NApoArt Ist.Q pt.AmT (OnesECTICaff TAesitEE) pese 1 el 32 ebjective
% shoe-quently Corrective Tested Acatee presteuely Eseretse Identified FEMA Fseresse suumEC-0654 (Emere s se vertiled Current lesse Desertptlen Sete leone ebjective objective Seference Juttadicates Actles Tehee ente)
(i.e., Seoutta)
States l
l l
82-16. Minor 4efteleactee in 2/6/82 m/A E.1 Comeccatest ne artiea taben.
Tee perseeeel meetamed to C
(4/23/01) prepare EDS messages public starttas and (S/82/04) were enfestater wit h l
eettitcotten included (4/25/96) procedeces and comeed delays in compostas ESS (S/20/96) delays (ptA 8983, p.
onesencements.
Addt-S 19). Dettelemetes were tional tratolas le foemd conceretag EDS esagested. (4.I.82) dettag S/82/04 eser-clee (EA 94, pp. 5).
Imedequate trateles of stalf emetpaed to prepere EDS meseeSee (EA M, see. 2.l.4) 32-12. Oleseetnetten of in-2/6/82 N/A C.3.e.
Connectices Tee Bord coptee of prese I
formatten free the C.4.s.b (4/23/83) rolesees were promptly (S/82/04) ovellable (EA S4, pp.
State EUC to the media (4/2S/96) 4). State did met pre-could be leproved with pere Ste som prese written prese releases releases (EA 36, See.
distributed at the 2.l.4)
State feedte Center.
(4.9.81) 82-19.
Improvement of redte 2/6/82 N/A F.I.d.
Commeeticut les actlee tekee.
Tee The St ate Sadlettee C
(4/23/03)
Centret matt ottil communicottene between I.0 (S/82/84) teche the oblit t y to the utility, etete and (4/25/06) comment e st e directly Iscal field-mentterlag by redte with its off-te ee by adding coe-ette emetterlag tesse.
eueleettaa links.
leprovemente are belas (4.l.15(l)).
- p. 1).
He problems with come-unicottene to Eoc (EA Se, Sec. 2.5.1) 82-20.
Improveerat of comauet-2/6/02 r/4 F.B.d Comeeettret Its I
cettene between the field tesse and mobile vene. (4.1.8 S( 2))
82-21. Tratulag to Improve the 2/6/82 N/A E.1, Commerticut Tee C
(4/23/01) intelligtbtlity of in-E.4 (S/82/84) formation on plant con-(4/25/06)
(8ttens transeltted te t he st at e roc.
(4. l. 8 5( 1))
I l
TASLEE 1 09eerNT Afsp CIMreFCTts 19e6 FIteCIV DEFICIT esCIFS Ae9 AeEAS Fs4t Ouserff tvE ACTinse NApDAM NEG pLAffT (OeNIFETROIT TAmeEE)
Fase 4 of 32 mject ive Setee-geently Corrective Prevleesty Tested Acelee Eseresse Identitled FEMA Faercise letteEG-0654 (Emeret oe Vestfled Cetreet lesse pesertptten Date lesse objective ohjeettve Beierence Jettedtetlee Acates fates Det e)
(i.e.. Rosette)
St at es 32-21. Imeel field-eentterlag 2/6/82 N/A F.B.d.
Conneenteet No actsee tenen.
Tee Ceemesseettene a**d I
data should he cameent-E.4 (4/21/81)
(EA 86 Sec.
2.l.3)
(
cated to the State end 5.8 (S/12/04) bet local date met attitty and used te (4/25/06) seed to 4/25/86 auseent date free their eseretee.
emettering teses.
(4.I.82) 82-2%. Ihsstas the lattlet 2/6/82 N/A F.8 Ceaneetteet N/O Tee toternettee one I
phase of thle detti.
(4/23/03) taproved.
het setti j
the med Crees staf f et
(%/82/94) delayed setti evee-the St at e EOC felt (4/21/06) eettee one underesy that they should have (EA 86. Sec. 2.1) received more taferee-i stem se the sceldent ettoetles.
Only after the order to evecost e end seek shelter ses gIves, were they kept folly emere of the etteetten.
It to seg-gested that the coor-dimetten of infermetten beaseen ahe St at e F.EM:
and the see Crees be reviewed. (4.l.19) 82-22.
Estettag e.
-teetleno 2/6/83 N/A F.I.b Durham Tee Its egespeemt prettees C
espebilit ies could be (4/23/01) reported to 1906 taproved by obtelatna (5/82/04) esercise (EA te. See.
additional telephones (4125/06) 2.2.4) and redte pegere.
(4.2.28) 02-24.
Eulettag comanna t eat t ene 2/6/02 N/A F.I.h Oester Tea The high-band ehest-C capabllttles emeld be (4/23/03) eave vedte and the leproved by obt e t alag
(%/ 82/04) telepheme call-bach additlenal telephones (4/2%/06) systee eerhed peerly and redte pegere.
(PEA 33).
Rodte (4.2.21) pegere are utilised (EA $4 p.
IS).
Itoo have adequate redte pegere and phemeo (E4 86 See. 2.I.1).
~
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TABLE 3 Ct3RRLNT AND CosaECTtD 1946 FIDWCBSE DEFIClFMCIES AND AREAS Flut COGDFCTIVE ACTRIMI NAlW1AN IsECE PLANT (Q4 Nit'CTitiff TAMEFE) rese 6 of 3F Objectlee Sebee-goemely Correctlee Preetemely Tested Actlee Esercise Identified FFNA Esercise NUREC-0654 (Esercise Vertised Current issue Description Date Issee Objective objectlee Seference Jurisdictles Acaten Taken Dete)
(i.e., Seemit e)
St at es 82-40.
Esteting comeuelcatione 2/6/82 N/A F.I.h Middletown Yes Communicatten egelp-C espabilities coeld be (4/23/81) seat funcatened well tepreeed by obtaining (S/12/04) wtab the esception of addittomat telepheaes (4/25/96) the redte pegere (EA 84 pp.
48).
No and radle regere.
problems report ed (EA (4.2.25)
- 36. Sec. 2.2.l5).
82-42.
Enteting communications 2/6/82 N/A F.I.b Westbrook No actten taken te liestbreak Yee Ifestbreak bed difft-C espabitteles could be (FEA S3).
(4/23/83) eettlee to receleing
($/32/04) follow-op messeses tapteeed by obtalogna addtttenal telephones (4/25/86)
(PE A S 3).
r - Sce-tiene were inadequatet and redte pegere.
redte pagere fetted (4.2.21)
Its problems reported (EA
- 36. See. 2.2.88).
82-53. Efforts to reduce con-2/6/82 N/A N.)
East Naepten peo apparent acties to reduce Yes Esat Weapten BOC to I
geesten in the Esos congeotten la the Esat Itseptoe (4/23/83) odegoate but emell Neopton Enc are being EOC was observed (PEA S3).
(S/82/84)
(PEA 8983, pS. 663 EA (4/25/06)
- 84. pp. 25).
Adequet e leptemented. (4.2.24) for IIetted operatione (EA $6. See. 2 2.6).
82-57.
Emergency operettene 2/6/82 II/A N.
trcal EcCe Tee Emergency operettene C
emessement at anoe 0.B.h (4/23/03) esmatement wee ode-local Eoce could be (S/82/84) goete et all tecel (4/25/06)
EOCa (EA $6 Sec. 2.2) tapreeed through fetest and on-t he-j ob trata-tag. (4.2.28) 82-58.
At the East Nadden EOCs 2/6/82 N/A D.4 East Nadden Tee I
(4/23/83) precedures for emer-gency actions la t he (3/32/84) 50-elle planalog some were taconsistent between the et st e and the local Sore.
The inennetstency should be reseleed. (4.2.29) i 1
e 7
t e 3
nu et f
r a C
C
?
f I
C o
r t uS e
2 C
eg l A
- t r.
- - n n6 Ae a
l E nne4 etide8 Em n6 tf e m
ee 9
P P
a(
aetS t u s t
(
s rd s ao l
t e
)
lo s
so a
i8 ehA n
t I rI e 6
t 9
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(
t u a e
e t
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el aE n
9 v
d u t
nea e
n e
.i s
1 i el e nn) ie l
i 2
n t.
nt d )3 h )4 n t
e oi.
cll B od a) ot n3 C
h eei i
n nu1 i
r c r pe2 i
a a
9 a eq t
e.
e rA e C
t eU.
a t e2 usgd A E
oAv ve o
V e.
Ec r
td bi nn is E
C
- i a
e t
aa2 i i t
t a (P t i t
t
(
(
ulS itl redl cc e
qa t nu tt nt er e
sje c)j o 'e b ec.
t epec sear s
/3b d o6 ot one ii t Al 8 NspuS Dt sPd oe N8o e
e
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w y
s 34 6 146 34 3e 6
34 t - l di) 888 080 88 8s s
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cest rt e325 e325 e32 e32N5 eb esee T212 T212 T2t T 2s 2 l 12 e
21 l uuenD
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h S qT E 454 454 45 45 4
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Tfilf 8 EFriE3*T AND 81WZtrit h 19fA DIERS:15E lH ICitNCIES AND AREAS Fue O*KECTivE ACTiene MADDAM NECE PLANT (CIWegetCTICITT VANEDT) pace 9 of 37 i
objective s.. bee-g'aently Corrective previously Tested Action Eseretse Identified FEMA Esercise NilREC-0654 (Esercise Verified Corrent leeue Description Date loose Objective objective Reference Juriedtetten Action Totes Date)
(i.e., Resulte)
St at ue 32-84. Ilealt h,
- medical, and 2/6/82 N/A E.3.b.
Colchester Yes permanent record doet-1 esposure control mea-E.4 K.S.e (4 f 23/83) meters are needed (PEA sures generally need to (5ft2/84) 8 3).
More doelmetere be leproved at the (4f25/06) are needed (EA 84, pp.
local level.
At some 18).
Insuffstient do-local EOCs, the 24-hour almetery for workers capability to determine (EA 86).
does measurements wee weak. Deficienctee were slee noted in the num-ber of doelmetere for emergency workere. the maintenance of dosage records, the dectaten chain to authortae en-posure control, and the capability to determine i
that oppropriate sc-tiene have been spec-lited for decontamina-tien.
Additional trained personnel and equipment are needed to correct these minor defletencies. (4.2.41) 82-85.
- Health, medicot, and 2/6/82 N/A E.3.b.
Deep River Yes permanent record doet-C exposure control mes-E.4 K.5.a (4/23/83) metere are needed (PEA meres generally need to (5/12/04) 83).
permanent record be improved at the f4/25/06) doelmeters are needed local level.
At some (EA $4, pp. 20).
Suf-local Ence, the 24-hour ficleat doelmetry cepentlity to determine kite, records, and ad-dose measuremente was equate knowledge of week. Defletencies were doelmetry were die-also noted in t he num-played (EA
$6, Sec.
ber of doelmeters for 2.2.3).
emergency workere, the maintenance of dosage records, the dectaton chain to authorise en-posure enntrol, and the capability to determine that appropriate ac-tiene have been spec-tiled for decantamina-tion.
Additional trained personnel and equi ment are needed to t
correct these agnor delEclencien.
(4.5.41)
TRIE I ED%tKT ANtt 4)*Itt'Ttte 19R0. D.UTei1%E s*t es:lFNCIEN Ants AREAS tem 83mptrTIVE At'TleHe i
NADtBAM NECK pt.A887 (OWINEt* fit 3f7 TAMEEE) page In of 17 l
1 l
Objective Sube e-guerst l y Corrective Test ed Action prevleuely l
Eseretse Identtfled FEMA Esercise 18UREC-0654 (Emere s se vertiled Current i
I feeve Description Date lease Objective objective Reference Jertsdictton Action Takee Dete)
(i.e., peselt e) states 82-86.
- Nealth, medical, and 2/6/02 N/A E.3.b.
Durham Tee permaneet record doet-C E.4, E.5.a (4/23/83) metere are needed (PEA esposure control mes-(5/12/84) 81).
All required suree generally need to (4/21/86) doeteetere are swall-be improved at the able (EA S4, pp. 213 local level.
At some EA 06, Sec. 2.2.4).
local E0ca, the 24-hour capability to determine does seasurements was week.
Deftclencies were also noted in the number of doelmeters for emergency workers, the metatenance of dosage
- records, the docteten chain to auth-ortse esposure control, and the capability to determine that oppro-priate actions have been spectiled f or de-cont eelna tion.
Addt-f tienet trained per-sonnel and equipment are needed to correct these einer deft-l elencies. (4.2.41) i 82-87.
- Nealth, medical, and 2/6/02 N/A K.1.b.
East Naddae Tee perennent record doet-1 K.4, K.S.e (4/23/al) metere are needed (ptA exposure control een-(5/12/84) 03).
Additional pere-sures generally need to (4/25/86) onent record dost-be toproved at the meters are needed (EA local level.
At eene
$4, pp. 24).
Inade=
local EUCo. the 24-hour quote supplies avall-capabilit y to dete.eine able-only 10 complete dose measurements was kite;
- however, ode-week.
Defteteneses quote knowledge regar-were slee noted in the ding doelmetry mee wee number of doelmet ere displayed (EA S6, Se e,
for emergency workere, 2.2.5).
the maintenance of dosage
- recorde, the dectolon chain to auth-ortse espesure control, and the capablitty to determine that appro-priate actions have been specified far de-contaelnetinn.
AJJt-tional tralmed per-eennel and equienent are needeel to corsett these minor dell-
=
r B rne-l e i.
t4.'.41%
e e
e e
TAtl.F. I Oct2T ANIS uHtWLTLtB ITnh $ R PJf'lSE l*FIClt NCIES AND AprAS HHt upliNt.s~flVE ACTitwe liA'HpAPI FLECK pl. ANT (CENINFCTIO'T YANetty.)
page Il of 37 Chjeettve Sebee-quently Corrective prevlonely Tested Acatee Eserclee Identified Ft3tA Emeretse IIUREC-0654 (Emercise Verlfled Current Issue Desertption rete 2e.ee objective Objective Reference Jer t edle tion Action Taben Dete)
(i.e., peoulto)
St at ue 32-88.
Stealt h,
- medical, and 2/6/02 N/A E.3.b, East Tee permanent record and I
esposere control mes-E.4 E.5.a h apten (4/23/03) direct reading doel-(5/12/84) meters are needed (PEA seres generally need to be lepreved at the (4/25/06) 83).
Adequate emp-yttee of doeteetry local level.
At eene local EOCo, the 24-hour eqelpment wee not avellable (EA 84, pp.
capability to determine 26).
Doelmet ry avail-dose seeeerements was weak.
Deftelenetes able, het no desen-were sloo noted in the stretton of knowledge la Sto ese (EA 86, number of dealmetere for emergency workers, Sec. 2.2.6).
the maintenance of dosage
- recorde, the decteten cheln to auth-ertse esposure control, and the capability to determine that appre-prtete actione have been spectiled for de-centaelmetien.
Add 3-tional tralmed per-sonnel and equipment are needed to correct these einer deft-ciencies. (4.2.48) 82-R9.
Itee n t h, medical, and 2/6/02 lI/A E.3.b.
Essee Yes permanent record dest-I e s posure control mes-E.4, K.5.a (4/23/03) meters are needed (ptA seres generally need te (5/12/04) 83).
Doelmet ry avatt-be improved at the (4/25/96) able, but little deo-emetration of haew-local level.
At some local EOCs, the 24-hour ledge in Sto use (EA capability to determine 86, Sec. 2.2.2).
dose menestements was week.
Defletenetes were atee noted in the number of doelmeters for emergency workers, the maintenance of dosage
- records, the doctelon chain to meth-ortse esposure control, and the capabtiiey to determine that appro-pelate actions have been spectiled for de-cont aelmat ion.
Addt-tional trained per-eennel and equipment are needeel to correct thene ei nee r 6ctl-
.- 6 nc 6 e 4
( b '
'e l l
1 Ati t t eve: TNT AND O mIBCTise I M. til% RISE tw fit'l LN8:3)!t AND AeFAS tt3 DCtrTIVE s.4:TlHN HAIWAN IIFG pl. ANT (OnsetECTICtli YANKt.t) page if of 3F Objective Subee-quently Corrective Tested Actlos presteuely Esercise Identitled ptJth Eseretse sepaEC-0654 (Emercise Vertiled Current lease Description Date lease Objective tihj ect ive Reference Jestediction Action Taken pot e)
(i.e., Resulte) st etse 82-90. Health,
- medical, and 2/6/32 II/A K.3.b.
leeddae Tee permanent record deet-C E.4. K.S.e (4/23/03) metere are needed (ptA esposure control mes-(5/12/84) 83).
Required doetme-sures generally need te (4/25/86) try wee ovattable la be leproved at the edeguat e supply (EA local level.
At eene 84, pp. 29).
Adequate local toCe, the 24-hour knowledge of the wee capability to determine of destestry aloe dio-dose measurements was played (EA S6, Sec.
week.
Deftetencies 2.2.3).
were slee noted in the nienber of doelmetere for emergency worbers, the malatemance of dosage
- records, the doctelos chate to auth-estre esposure control, and the capability to determine that appro-priate actione have been speelfted for de-coat est ne tion.
Add 1-tlanal trained per-sonnel and egulpment are needed to correct these minor deft-ciencies. (4.2.41) 82-91. Stee n t h,
- medical, and 2/6/82 N/A E.3.b.
Itebron Tee permanent record and C
espesure contret mes-E.4, K.S.a (4/23/01) direct reading doet-(5/82/e4) metere are needed (PEA eures generally need to (4/25/06) 8 3). Required doetee-be improved at the try equipment to local level.
At ease avellebte (EA $4, pp.
local Etica, the 24-hour 11).
Supplies new capability to determine edeguate (EA $6, Sec.
does esasurements was 2.2.9).
week.
De f iciencie s were else noted in the nuber of doelmetere for emergency workers, the malatenance of das sge recorde.
the doctelea chain to auth-ertse esposure control, and the capatetity to determine that oppra-priate actions have been speelfted for de-coatamtmetion.
Addt-tional tralned per-sonnet and equipment are needed to correct these minor delt-clenetce. 14.?.41)
I
e s
TAT 8E l eM3ELNT ann OsalFCTth 19N6 61L2085L litFICEFNCIES AND AeEAS FIM UtsktCTIVE LCTIfDN HAlltlAM NECK Pt. ANT (DisNetCTlaff V ANrEE)
Page 13 of 3F Objective Sebee-quently Corrective Tested Action Previevely Eseretse Identified FEMA Eseresse NifkEC-0654 (Emercise Verilled Corrent lesse Description Date lease objective objective Reference Jettediction Action Taken Dat e)
(i.e., Reewit e)
St at ue E.3.b.
Ellitmaavorth Tea Permanent record and I
82-92. nealth, medical, and 2/6/02 N/A K.4, (4/23/03) direct reading doet-esposure control oea-(5/12/84) meters are needed (PEA E.5.e seres senerally need to (4/25/06) 8 3).
Mequate sep-be improved at the plies of doeteetry local level.
At some equipment are avell-local EOCs, the 24-hour capability to determine dose messerements was week.
Def f etencies 1966 esereteeg staff were also noted in the number of doeleeters to request additional for emergency workers, empplies (EA 86 Sec.
the maintenance of dosage
- records, the dectaton chain to meth-ortse esposure control, and the espability to determine that appro-priate actions have been speelf ted f or de-cont eelnat ion.
Met-tional trained per-sonnel sad equipment are needed to correct these minor deft-ciencies. (4.2.45)
Tee Permanent record and C
82-93. Mesteh, medical, and 2/6/02 N/A K.3.b.
Lyme (4/23/03) direct reading dost-K.4, R.5.a esposure control mes-(5/12/04) metesa are needed (PEA seres generally need to (4/25/06) 8 3).
Sufficient dest-be improved et the metry evettable.
Me-local level.
At some quote knowledge of its local Enre, the 24-hour capability to determine dose messerements was week.
Deficiencies were also noted in the number of desta= tere for emergency workers, the maintenance of dosage
- records, the decleton chate to meth-ortse esposure cont rol, and the capability to determine that appro-prtete actions have been spectfled for de-conteelnation.
Mdt-tional trained per-sonnel and equipment are needed to entreet these mi ssent def4-e 0. eo. l e f '. *
'e l 1
T104J. I GCttJT AND U6ICJCTD.3B 1"48: D R t.Kt:t %E lit. fit:ID NCRES AND AetA$ FIHt CI$NF.CTIvet ACTitN6 HAIMnAM NF.CE pt. ANT (CHesNECTICiff T ANtt E) page le of 37 ebjeettve Subae-quently Corrective prevleuely Tested Action Exercise Identified IEMA Eserclee NUREG-0654 (Escretse Vertised current n te leeue objective objective Reference Jurtedletion Action Token Dat e)
(i.e., peoutta) st at ue.
leeue Desertption o
82-94.
leeal t h,
- medical, and 2/6/82 N/A E.3.b.
Marlborough Tee Additional direct C
esposure control mee-E.4, (4/23/83) reading deelmetere are aures generally need to E.5.e (5/12/04) meeded (PEA
$3).
be improved at the (4/25/86)
MdSttonal direct local level.
At some needtog doelmeters are local EOCo, the 24-hour evitable from Colchee-capabil:.y to determine ter in a very short does measurements was time (EA 84, pp.
week.
Defielencies 38).
Iso problems were also noted in the reported (EA 86, Sec.
number of doelmeters 2.2.83).
for emergency workers, the maintenance of desage
- recorde, the decision chain to auth-ortse esposure control, and the capability to determine that appro-priate actione have been spectfled for de-centestmetion.
Me t-tional tralmed per-sonnel and equipment are needed to correct these minor delB-ciencies. (4.2.48) 82-95.
- Health, medical, and 2/6/02 II/A E.3.b, Middlefield Tee permanent record doet-C esposure control mes-E.4, (4/23/83) meters are needed (ptA sures generally need to E.5.e (5/12/04) 8 3).
Mequat e sup-be improved at the (4/25/86) plies of direct rese-local level.
At some in$
doelmeters are tecel Enca, the 24-hour evettable (EA 84, pp.
capability to determine 40).
Me problema dose measurements wee reported (EA *%.
Sec.
week.
DefIctencies 2.2.14).
were else noted In the number of doetmeters for emergency workers.
the maintenance of dosage
- records, the decteten chain to auth-orise esposure control, and the capabtiity ae determine that appro-priate actions have been specified for de-contamination.
Md t -
tional t r alned per-sonnet and equipment are needed to correct these etnot
.Ic I l -
c 8 ar 4 m.
64.'.'Il
=
e n
e a
e-1 Ais E 6 eUMt2T AND OCREs:vp as ITMn l atm t hE IWPII:l>NClES Llgll AREAS Fim OHt3 CTIVE LCittM HASHIAM Nt.CK PIJNT (CININECTitt3T YANrEE) page R$ of 32 objective subee-quently Corrective prestously Tested Action Eseretse Identified FEMA Euerclee NUREC-0654 (Emeretse Wertfled Ostrent leeue Description Date laoue objective objective Reference Juttadiction Action Taken gete)
(i.e., hesult a)
States 82-96. Healt h,
- medical, and 2/6/82 N/A K.).b, Middletown Tee permanent record doet-C esposure control mee-K.4, (4/21/03) meters are needed (pt A aures generally need to K.5.s (5/12/84) 81).
Ten TLDe were et be taproved at the (4/25/86) the EOC.
adottional Tl.De are evallable local level.
At some doelmetere are needed local EOCo, the 24-horc espability to deteur4tas (EA A4, pp. 42).
lhe problems report ed (EA i
dose measurements was week.
Defletencies
$6, Sec. 2.2.85).
were else noted in the number of doetmeters far emergency workers, the maintenance of dosage
- records, the decletos chain to auth-ortse esposure control, and the capability to determine that appro-priate actions have been spectiled for de-contamination.
Add t-tional trained per-sonnel and egulpment are needed to correct these minor deft-ciencies. (4.2.48) 82-97.
- Health, medteal, and 2/6/82 N/A K.).b.
portland Tee permanent record dost-
,I espesure control mea-K.4, K.S.a (4/23/83) meters are needed (ptA seres generally need to (1812/84) 8 3).
Sufficient sup-be leproved at the (4/25/86) ply of equipment wee available (EA S4, pp.
local level.
At ease local toca. the 24-hour 44).
Doelmeters were not distributed to capability to determine dose measurements was emergency workers and week.
Defletencies therefore were not y
were also noted in the observed (EA 86, Sec.
number of doetmeters 2.2.16).
for emergency workers, the malatenance of dosage
- records, the decleton chain to auth-ortse esposure control, and the capability to determine that appro-priate arttone have been specified fcr de-centsetnatIon.
AddI-tional trained per-sonnel and equipment are needed to correct these minor deft-ricacies.
(4.7.49) l
Tut.t. 6 (MND.NT i.leID t'teNIO.I'it te 1*BTJe F.R F Et t %P.
le t'It:14 NCip % ANa8 ANLAN rein ClinWP.CTIVD. ACittHI HAlmAM NF.t:K pt. ANT (CletN).CTiuf f V ANED.F.)
page Ib ef 37 Chjective Subse-quently Carreceive previously Tested Action Esercise Identifled PEMA Eserclee IfUREC-0654 (Emercise Verliled Current laeve Description Date leemu objective objective Beierence Jutiseletion Action Taken Dete)
(i.e.. Geoulte)
St at us 82-98.
- Nealth, medical, and 2/6/02 N/A K.3.b.
salen Tee permement record and C
esposure control oes-K.4. K.See (4/23/83) direct reading doel-outes generally need te (5/32/04) metere are needed (ptA be Improved at the (4/25/86) 8 3).
Seguised doetee-local level.
At some try equipment wee local EOCa. the 24-hour avellable needed (EA capability to determine 84, pp. 46).
les prob-less reported (Ek 86, some measurements was week.
Defielenclee Sec. 2.2.17) were also noted in the number of doelmeters for emergency workers, the maintenance of dosage
- recorde, the decleton chain to auth-ortse esposure control, and the capability to determine that appro-priate actions have beest speelfted for de-conteelmation.
Adds-tional trained per-sonnel and equipment are needed to correct these einer deft-ciencies. (4.2.41) 82-99.
- Health, medical, and 2/6/02 N/A K.3.b.
Westbrook Yes permanent record deat-C esposure control mes-K.4. K.S.e (4/23/83) meters are needed (pta sures generally need to (5/82/84) 83).
Sequired doetme-be leproved at the (4/25/86) try e utpoems wee local level.
At some available IEA 94, pp.
local Etsca, the 24-hour 88).
No Problems capability to determing re ported ( F. A 86 Sec.
dose measurements was 2.2.88).
weak.
Deficiencies were also noted In the number of doelmeters for emergency workere, the metatenance of dosage
- records, the decleton chain to auth-ortse esposure control, and the capability to determine that appro-priate actions have been specified for de-cont ant est ton.
Addt-tional trained per-sonnel and equipment are needed to curree t thcee minor dell.
cien.4en.
14.'.41) e e
e e
s A
TABLL I CURL %T AND Ct%"LCILD 19M lit t'Cibt htFICOLnCILS AML: AstAS tus CometCTIVE ACTION MADUAft NLCK pl. ANT (CUGHILCTICt1T YANtLL)
Page IF of 37 Objective Subee-quently Carrective Previously Tested Action Esercise Identified FEMA Esercise NUREC-0654 (Esereise verified Current leave Description Date leone ob ject ive Ob}ective Beference Jurisdiction Action Taken Dete)
(i.e.. Resulta)
Statue 32-800. The esercise scenario 2/6/02 N/A J.2 l.oc al Yes pomplene E0Ce were C
should be changed to J.10.k.
Ecce (4/25/66) kept informed of event allow testing of N.I.e.
status throughout es-response capabilities N.I,b ercise play in 1946.
for those communities located outside the plume path.
As the esercises are pre-eently administered, those local EOCs not in the plume path are only tested to certain point in the euereise scenario. (4.2.42) 83-2.
The State Badletion 4/23/83 4.5.15(1)
F.I.d Connecticut State funde have been bedgeted Yes Cossessic at ione are new C
Control Unit still (2/6/s2) for imetallation of sierswave (5/12/84) odequate (EA 86 Sec.
lacks the ability to relays which will permit di-(4/25/84) 2.1.3) communicate directly by rect commeicetione with field radio with its off-site teses in the plume some. par-esaltoring teses.
tial fundles has been used te (2.l.l.3) complete the design and east-seering portion.
The beleece of the funde to be comeltsed by Dec. 1984. It is requested that fire schedulleg of the corrective action be deferred.
(letter free State) 03-3.
Serious time delays oc-4/23/83 3.1.4 E.l.
Connecticut in some connunities more than Tee This probles continuee I
curred in the comeust-4.1.3 p.t.d one person was calling la for (5/12/04) to
- occur, as was cation a ye t eos between (2/6/02) informattee end the cellback (4/25/86) reported from severet the utility and area CP recorders were overt a me d.
of the loc al EOCs le offices and also be-Training provided to local the 1906 esercise.
tween the utility and officielo address this issue
- Bewever, fewer total local Eoce.
These and the communities are re-problems were encous-enoued by as much as 30 quested to designate one per-tered (E4 86. Sec 2.2) einstes the acquisition son to eeke celle for addi-of odditional informa-tional laternetton. Northeast tion from the utility utilities le going to esamine by these locations the possibility of modifylag efter they received the system to accommodate more radie pager motifice-callere. (letter from State) tion of an event or event upgrade at the plant.
Telephone con-firmation of messages received f on the util-ity was difficult be-cause of busy telephone I
lines.
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T AMif. 4 OI2MNT LNin O*IltRD 19 Ree D Rt28:l%E le plClLNCIES AND AltEAS Fim OSIFI'TIVE ACTitne llAptW1 NFOL pl. ANT (OtNNECitCalf YANrFL) rage de er ss Objective Sebee-quently Corrective previously Tested Actlen Esercise Identitled FENA Esercise OfUREG-0654 (Emercise Wertiled Current leave Description Date loose Objective Objective Beference Jurlediction Action Taken Dete)
(i.e.. Seoulte)
Statue 83-17. permanent-record dost-4/23/03 4.2.41 E.3.a East Hodden The procurement of TLD systee Teo Fif teen permanes.t ree-C meters were not avell-(2/6/82) to being acceeplished by OCpl (5/12/04) ord doeteeters were able.
(2.2.7.I) avallable in pT 84.
(letter (4/25/06) available at the toc f ree State)
(EA 84 p.
24).
Ten sets were available for t986 eseretse (E4
- 86. Sec. 2.2.5).
83-19. permanent-record doet-4/23/83 4.2.41 E.3..
Essen The procurement of TLD system Tee Adequate supplies of C
netece were not avail-(2/6/82) is being acceeptished by OCpg (5/12/04) permanent record doet-able.
(2.2.9.8) available in FY 84.
(letter (4/25/86) esters were available f rom State)
(EA 86. Sec. 2.2.7).
83-20. There were frequent 4/21/83 4.2.28 F.l.d Essee 10ertheast utilities hoe coe-Tee The redte peger systee C
communication difft-(2/6/82) ettted to providing trotning (5/82/84) became inoperative culttee encountered in for those who record the mee-(4/25/86) dortag the
- eserete, communicating with the seges which offette authert-(EA 94, p.
28).
Iso utilit y. (2.2.9.2) ties hear efter ceiling for problems reported (EA additional taformatten. (let-
- 86. Sec. 2.2.7).
ter free State) 83-21. Dere were somettees 4/23/83 4.2.2B F.I.d Esses A new procedure to being de-Tee The radio peSer system C
delays of 20 etantes or (2/6/82) veloped for the purpose of en-(5/B2/84) beceae enererative more between the stee suring the nottftcetion of (4/25/86) during the eseretee when en event at the local offletals within 15 (EA 84 p.
20).
IIe utility wee declared eine. of the eleselficetton of problems reported (EA and the slee when the en incident.
(letter free
- 86. Sec. 2.2.7).
message wee received by State) the local EOC.
(2.2.9.1) 83-25. The EOC felt it should 4/23/03 4.2.28 F.I 18estbrook Additional trotning and le-Tee Some significant ses-C have received the (2/6/02) proved instructions to monitor (5/l2/84) eases were not re-follow up messages from the redloposer and make cell- (4/25/86) cetved during the en-the ottitty more back to the facility to elle-ercise (EA 84. p. 47)*
quickly than it did.
teate repeat phone calle. le les problems reported The EOC frequently had being done.
(letter from (EA 86. Sec. 2.2.18).
to make several calle State) before getting it through to the ut titt y.
(2.2.12.1) 83-29.
The supply of direct
- 4/73/83 4.2.4B E.3.e Colchester The procurement of TLD systen y'8 Additional doetmeters reading desteeters was (2/6/82) le being accespitehed by OCp; (g/g2/84)
,,ggg
,,,4,4 ggg C
Inadequate. and perea-available in FY 84.
(letter (4/25/86) 84, p.
10).
Supply nent-record doelect e r m f rom State) were not evallable.
,4,q,g, g, 3906 eser-(2.2.83.1) clee (E4 86 Sec.
2.2.2).
0 9
0
e I
e TAII.E 1 OfMENT ANee DHeitt'TDit 19n6 FXtuCISE iMICIFNCIES AND AREAS Fint OMINF.CTiVE ACTines HADDAM NECK Ft. ANT (OnnetCTIOIT VANKFE)
Page 21 of 17 Ubjective subse-quently Corrective Previomely Teoted Actten Esercise Identified FEMA Eneretse IlullEC-0654 (Eseretse Vertised Current leave Description Date lesse objective objective Beference Jertsdiction Action Taken Det e)
(i.e., peoulte)
St at ue 83-30 There van difficulty 4/23/83 4.2.28 F.I Colchester Add i t ional training and to-Tee see problems reported C
with the call-back (2/6/82) proved instructions, to most-(5/12/84) et thte Eoc in 1984 system from she EUC to tor the redlopaSer and make (4/23/86) esercise (EA St.
See the utility because of call-back to the factitty to 2.2.2).
busy telephone lines.
eliminate repeat phone celle, Addittomat information to being done.
(letter from wee often hard to get State)
I after a radio peger nottiteetten. Fur t he r-more, messages from the uttltty were hard to understand. (2.2.83.4) 83-18. Messages from the Area 4/23/03 4.2.21 F.I Colchester Conducted training on message Yee Radte toterference wee C
4 CP of fice were of ten (2/6/82) trasemitting/ handitnel proco- (5/I2/84) encountered on the garbled and were read deres. (letter from Srete)
(4/25/86) high-band redte be-too feet to be tron-tween the Area 4 CP ocribed by tlva EOC and the EOC (EA 94, p.
etaff. (2.2.83.5) 16).
Iso problems re-ported at thte ROC in 1986 eneretse (EA 86 Sec 2.2.2).
81-32. The ability to receive 4/23/83 4.2.28 E.1 nebron Additional tratelag and to-Tee Probleme were observed C
the recorded mesesses (2/6/82) proved lastructions, to (5/82/04) conceratag the receipt from the ut ilit y wee monitor the radiopager and (4/25/06) of messages from the often hindered by the make call-back to the f acility utility (E4 84, p.
lack of sufficient to altalnate repeat phone 10).
Its problems re-telephone Ilmes to the calle, to being done. (letter ported at thte EOC in ut ilit y.
(2.2.84.1) from State) 1986 eneretse (EA 86, Sec. 2.2.9) 01-13. The supply of direct-4/23/81 4.2.48 K.3.a leebron Procurement of a Yl.D system Tee Doelmetere were evell-C reading doelmeters was (2/6/82) util be accompItehed in FT (5/12/84) able et the EOC (EA not adequate for the 84.
Approntmately 500 direct- (4/25/86) 84 p.
31).
Supply EUC
- staff, the reading doelmeters are avell-adequate (EA 86, Sec.
permanent-record dost-able upon request from St at e 2.2.9) meters were not avell-Felice or OCP.
In additten able.
the OCP mobile von travels to af fected towns to supply dost-4 meters and asenet in doelme-try.
(letter from State)
)
i I
T AII E 1 EU2It3T AND Usui,tritu Iqts. 91 tit:t M tmt it:lt ascitM Asso AntAS Hut OtuttCilyt'. ACTpwe elAINiAM NECK FLANT (OMeest.CTiuff YANKt E)
Page 22 of 37 Objeettve Subee-quently Corrective Previously Tested Action Eseretse Identified FEMA Eserclee getlSEC-o654 (Emeretse Vertfled Current lesse Descriptton Date loose Objective objective Seferer.c6 Jurisdiction Action Taken Det e)
(i.e.
Seoulte)
St at es 83-34.
Permanent-record doet-4/23/83 4.2.41 E.3.s Marlborough The procurement of TLD syetes Tee An adequat e supply of C
metere esere not avall-(2/6/02) is betog accomplished by O(Fg (5/82/04) yereenent-record doet-available in FY S4.
(letter (4/25/86) meters was not evett-eble. (2.2 85.1) f rom State) able (EA S4, p. 26).
18e problems-reported (EA 86. Sec. 2.2.11).
83-35. According to the SDO.
4/23/83 4.2.41 E.3.s Mortborough Procureneet of a TLD system Tee A limited number of C
the supply of direct-(2/6/82) will be accomplished in FY (5/12/04) direct reading dest-84.
Approutmately 500 direct- (4/25/86) meters wee avatlebte reading doeteeters was not adequate, reading deateetere are ovat!-
(EA S4, p.
30).
gee able upon request free State problems reported (EA
( 2.2.15.2 )
Police or DCP.
In addition 86, Sec. 2.2.13).
the Ocr mobile van travele to affected towns to supply doel-metere and aestet in doelee-try. (letter free State) 03-36 the ability to receive 4/23/03 4.2.28 E.1 East Itempton Additional training and Tee Call back to the util-C the recouded messages (2/6/02) leproved toetructione, to (5/12/04) ity for recorded mes-montter the redtopeser and (4/25/86) eases le still a prob-from the utility were eften hindered by the make call-back to the f actitty lee (EA S4 p.
25).
lack of suffielent to elleinste repeat psione Adegeiste telephone telephone lines to the calle. Se belas done. (letter lines were avallable utility. (2.2.86.1) free State)
(EA $6, Sec. 2.2.6).
83-37. Permanent-record deet-4/23/83 4.2.45 East Ilsepton The procurement of TLD system Tee An adequate supply of C
meters were not evall-(2/4/82) to being accomplished by OCF3 (5/82/84) pereenent record doet-able.
(2.2.84.2) avellable in fY 84.
(letter (4/25/96) meters was not avait-from State) oble (EA S4. p. 26).
Supply adequate in 1986 esercise (EA St.
Sec. 2.2.6).
83-1g. The supply of direct-4/23/83 4.2.41 E.3.a East lleepton Frecurement of a TLD syetas Tee Direct reading doet-C reading dosteeters was (2/6/82) will be acceepitched in FT (5/82/04) meters were not avall-not adequate for the 84.
Approsteately 500 direct- (4/25/86) able in omffIctent EOC staff.
(2.2.86.3) reading dealeeters are ovell-quanttttee (EA $4, p.
aPle upon request from State 26).
Supplies ade-Police or OCP.
In addition quote in 1986 eseressa the OCF mobile van travels te (EA 86. Sec. 2.2.6).
af f ected towns to supply doel-meters and esetet in doetee-try.
(letter from State)
O r
t
e s
TAllE l OrIIt NT Ara untItCTies 89%h EXLECle.F.
Be.FICll NCIE!$ AeIn AIL $,5 Fi%t OHtIECitVE ACTesne HAlmAM NFCK FLANT (OIIENFCTtGIT YANtkF.)
e Page 23 et 37 siblective subee-quently Corrective Tested Action Previously Esercise Idene** fed FEMA Exercise HumEG-0654 (Emercise Vertised Current Isame Description Date lemme objective objective Reference Jurlediction Action Taken Det e)
(i.e., peoult e)
Stetse 83-42. The EOC had insuf-4/23/s) 4.2.48 E.3.a Lyme procurement of a TI D system 1as Adequate supply of C
will be accomplished to FT (5/82/04) dealmetry was swall-ficient low-and mid-(2/6/82) 84.
Apprestostely San direct- (4/25/96) able le 1984 (EA $6, reage doetmeters, and reading doeteetere are swell-Sec. 2.2.11).
ne high-range or able upon request from St at e permement-record dost-Police er OCP.
le addittee metere. (2.2.88.3) the OCF mobile van travele to af fected towns to supply dest-metere and seatet in doelma-try. (letter from State) 03-43. The commundentions 4/23/s) 4.2.23 E.1 Lyme Lyme to beginning to work on Tea Communicotton equip.
C capability between the (2/6/g2) butiding a new public works (5/12/84) meet fonettom
- well, local FAC and Area 4 Cp garage (future locettom of (4/25/96) though it's operettom town EOC) and will include wee chaotte (EA se, p.
office was Itatted by additional telephone Itnee.
33).
r - -Ications the presence of only Radio communicottene proce-with the Area 4 of fice one phone in the Lyee dures will be esamined and were adequate (EA 86, EoC.
- Atee, other rectified.
(letter from sec. 2.2.11).
problems were ested State) with communications over the government-band radte with the Area 4 CP offtee, and these problems impatred effective transfer of informatten.
(2.2.88.3)
C4el.
The message to evacuate 5/12/94 3.1.3 E.S.
Connecticut pecommendation "s*
for direct Tea This problem peratete I
the 2 mile redlue was (2/4/42)
J.9 and timely communicotton cap-(4/25/s6) with respect to time-not trenomitted to East ability has been accomplished 18mese of message flow by means of a high band (153 through Aree OCP fladden which has a emell portion of the Metz) radte installation in offices (EA 86, Sec.
town within 2 miles of each ErZ town.
This communt-2.1 1) the plant.
Realdente estion now allowe East staddam had previously been to monitor tronomientone which alerted to listen to cover two-mile EFE protective ESS and would have actions.
Recommendetton "c '
heard the Ems warning for timely trementeston of to evacuate.
(2.l.l.8) operational messages has been adopted by corrective trelatng and restoing procedures.
T ATI.E l us2xs NT i.Np Outp4 CTEp SHle. LM.MCl%E t*rtCa reKits Ann ase.f.5 Fue OREt"flTF. A.CTf pft HApHAM $0ECK Ft. ANT (Openet'CTIDIT Y AINtEF)
Page 24 of 37 objective Subse-quently Corrective Tested Actlen Presteuely Eserefoe identified FEMA Esercise pusEC-0654 (tseresse Vertfled Current leeue Description Date loses Objective objective Deference Juttedtesten Actlen Taken pote)
(i.e., genulto)
St atee 84-2.
EDS messages were not
$/12/04 4.f.12 E.5 Coawe t icut An F.tS/feedle Cent er tratetas Tee EDS messages were I
estiletently coordt-(2/6/s2)
E.6 Seminar subsequently
- f. n-(4/25/86) termulated in a timely structed key easte agency feeblem et the St at e meted in thats docteten makers in proper toc. but trementesten
( 2. l. 8.2 )
methode of nettfiestion of (olmesated) wee tardy local offsetels in eenjunetten and message centent
- e. Protective actione with the rolesse of EDS mee-Inadequate (EA
$6, were recommended prior to local sages.
There wee emphaele en Sec. 2.1 5).
mesesse centent and local offtctate being effletale received special informed of the instructione en this subject
- deelston, ed on proper precedures for h-1 access.
- b. Message content con-flicted with state-j mente made later,
- c. Confesten estato en who has access to EDS and how local governmeate input inte message formulatten.
84-3.
The Ceneral Emergency 5/12/04 D.4 Connecticut St at-metatained that Table Tee Deepense to Code trave C
i 103-I and the *Claestitcatten (4/25/06) wee left to the dio-l Peetere Code trove and of
- tad t elegical incidente and cretten of local efft-(
Alpha protective actlen Poe'ure Codee" to the Con-clate and therefore secommendestene de not necstrut Radtelegical amer-uncoordinated, but provide local effletale gency Readinese Plan (RERP),
otherwtee efforded with enough guldence to together with the local cae=
edequate protection mehe appropriate dect-munity ItERP 401 Precedures, encept in East Isaddee.
stone in Ilght of the efter suffletent guldence for Deepense to Code Alphe radiological release local effletal docteten wee driven by Cover-date and deaa pro-making.
nor's Emergency Decla-jectione. Nor de they retten (EA $6 See provide for the esordt-2.2) matten of action with other lacel one state effletale.
(2.l.I.3) e I
r
(
e
.o Tart.t; e OtGtPFtlT ANin OestILI:Tt h 19No t il lH:IW IAFICIt NCits 400ll ANCAS FES OSX6 4TIVF. At'TIEWI MAINIAM Ists* Fl. ANT (DueletCTIOff V ANIIFF)
Page 25 of 32 nhjective Subee-quently Corrective i
Prevleuely Tested Action Esercise Identified FEfth Esercise IIUREC-0654 (Emercise vertiled.
Current Issue Desertption Date lease objective objective Seference Jurisdiction Action Taken Sete)
(i.e.
Seoulto)
St at ue 84-4.
The enemmicettene link 5/12/84 3.I.I F.I.h Connecticut See response for 8 tee 84-l.
Yee Selays were again 1
between the St ate and (2/6/02)
Mrsesse handling procedures (4/25/06) observed in coordin-Emot IInddam via Aree IV 2.l.3.2 have eleo been updated.
ating pubite alerting use not accurate er (2/6/82) and nettitcottee settene utth East
{
timely.
Some bey mes-lieddam.
As a result, l
eages were not trane-stren activetten et ettted free Area 4 to Code Alphe use not the local EUC. and some were elentiteestly timely (E4 86 Sece.
changed in content when 2.1.3. 2.2.5) treneettted by Area 4.
( 2. l.2.3.4 )
i 84-5.
Some troopers were un-5/12/84 E.3.e.
Connecticut Training of access control lio I
fastilar
-:eh doele-E.3.b personnel use scheduled.
etere ont n.et'T mee.
(2.l.2.4.5) t 84-6.
The Youns of Oiester.
5/12/84 F.I.h Cannecticut Training and new precedures Tee Killinguorth and I
}
East
- Hampton, and were provided to local offt- (4/25/06) tends een reported stedleen encountered clate requesting that asett slettet problem in difficulty colling back town destenete only one perees 1986 eseretse (EA 86, the utility to receive to make the call back.
Sece. 2 2.10, 2 2.12).
additional information on plant states.
(2.1.6.8.6) 84-2.
Permanent record doet-5/12/84 4.2.41 E.3.s Chester Procurement and distributten Tee only four (4) per-t metere were not evall-(2/6/82) of permanent record deelmeters (4/25/86) mesent record dost-able in suffletent use espected to be complete by meters were evollable quantity. (2.2.2) early 1986.
In 1986 esercise (EA
- 86. Sec. 2.2.3).
84-8.
perennent record dost-5/12/84 4.2.41 E.3.a Colchester Procurement and distributten Tee Supply adequate in C
i metere were not evell-(2/6/02) of pereenent record doelmetere (4/25/86) 8986 esercise (EA $6 able In sufficient 2.2.13.3 use espected to be remplete by Sec 2.2.2) quantity. (2.2.2)
(4/23/83) early 1986.
I S4-9.
Town officiale were not 5/12/84 E.6 Colchester To ensure that all tremetente herent system (1986)
I sure if the estating and people in remote areas are employs mobile public public alerting system eierted.
e
- Peul Severe" address routes; not could eiert fishermen system has been implemented by t est ed in 1996 and other tranatente.
the Colchester Fire Depart-
,,,,,g,,
(2 2.2.8) ment.
This le supplemented by State nottitcation that parte and foreste are closed in an energency.
t 1
4 i
TALIX. ) QiltS ts7 ANN Oper!tETun liete lItxtil V.
17.FtC$ t Nd:lEN AMit fLFA5 Fs* Out:9.CilVF. Af"TinN HAIMBAM Nt CE pt. ANT (ONeNFCTlulf TANitEt) rage 26 et 17 objective Subee-quently Corrective Tested Actten previously Escretse Identified FEMA Eserclee NilREC-f454 (Emerclee Ver$ fled Cargent leone Description Date leaue objective objective Reference Juriedtetten Action Taken Date)
(i.e.. Resulte)
Statua E.6 Colchester probles due to inespertenced loot tested in 19e6 I
84-10.
The strene in Ce!-
5/82/04 operator. Subsequent treintas eseretee.
chester did not sound was conducted.
en the (tret try and not all sounded on the second.
(2.2.2.9) 84-11.
permanent record dest-5/.12/84 4.2.41 E.3.s Durban See response for Stee 84-7.
Tee 50 site now evallables C
(4/25/86) empply adequate (EA neters were not avell-(2/6/s2) 86, Sec. 2.2.4).
ebte in suffletent 2.2.5.8 quantity. (2.2.7)
(4/23/83) 84.12. permanent record doet-5/12/84 4.2.41 E.3.a East lladdae See response for 84-7.
Yes Only ten (10) perma-I (4/25/96) neat record doelmeters meters were not evall-(2/6/02) avallebte in 1986 able in suffletent 2.2.7.1 eseretoe (EA 86 Sec.
quantity. (2.2.7)
(4/23/03) 2.2.5).
84-83. Direct reading doete-5/12/g4 4.2.48 E.3.a East fleeptos East llaapton was eselsted in Tee Adequate doelmetry C
developins proemdures to (4/25/86) avellebte (EA 86, Sec.
etere were not en hand (2/6/82) obtain additional doeteeters 2.t.6).
In sufficient quan-2.2.86.3 from the reserve stock.
tittee. (2.2.6.10)
(4/23/03) 04-14.
permanent record dest-5/12/84 4.2.48 E.3.s East sleeptes see response for item 84-7.
Yee Adequate desteetry C
(4/25/06) available (EA 86, Sec.
meters were not avall-(2/6/s2) 2.2.4) able in sufficient 2.2 86.2 quantity. (2.2.7)
(4/23/03)
Tee ils problems reported C
84-16.
De radio paser systen 5/12/04 4.2.21 F.l.a Esses (4/25/86) in 1986 esercise (EA became inoperative (2/6/02) 86, Sec. 2.2.7).
during the esercise.
2.2.9.2 Nessages la the down-2.2.9.5 stade to the Alert and (4/23/s))
termination of Exercise were not received.
(2.2.7.18) 84-16.
permement record dcot-5/12/84 E.3.s Essem See response for Stee $4-2.
Tee Adequate quantity of C
(4/25/06) permanent record doet-meters were not avait.
meters now evettable able in sufficient (EA 86, Sec. 2.2.7).
quantity. (2.2.7)
Yes Facilltles now ede-C E4-17. De Eoc was not ade-5/12/84 F.I.a Lyme (4/25/86) quote (EA
$6, Sec.
quote to support 2.2.11).
operattone.
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e Tait.E l - (JrxrNT Amen Ce@u.Citle lina ExtetClw IWFICitNClkN AN05 AREAS Futet OutpCTIvt ACTleWe NAIMBAM NLCK F1, ANT (CanessFCflCifT YANKtt)
Peste 29 of 37 objective Suboe-quently Corrective prevlemely Tested Actlen Esercise Identified FEMA F.neretse NUeEC-0654 (Esercise Vertfled Currest leone tarscription Date leave objective Object 8ve Ileference Jurisdict ten Actlen Taken Det e)
(i.e.. Seemlt o)
St at ue 86-3.
The use of the Aree G 4/25/86 II. 2.e.
Connecticut "Aree offices are met...
the Offices as e message F.1.b primary settiteettee channel conduit felled to espe-for local coseenittee recote-dite er otherutee tag updates se pleet ettuetten enhance informatten otetus.
The rediepegere are flow between the State the direct line of communt-cetten between the pleet and and towns not directly ef fected by the plume.
the lacet and state emergency Local RoCe requesting workers.
event status updates through the Aree
"... The Area Coordinatore Offices did not have were given special tratolag to leportant queettene leprove the flow and qua t t t y.
enevered quickly, and of Reformatten poseed to town the Ares Offices pre-levels immedlately felleutng vided the local EOCe thle esercise.
Tretning at either unclear er in-the lacet level util be up-correct leformetlen et preded to ensure able ettus-tiere.
tien util not be a problee in the future.
"... The State Deporteemt of Environmental Protection le currently obtetning contracts to upgrade communteettees to the Aree Offices and to the emergency plannlag sene ese-eunttles."
- 12/23/86 letter free F.
Itencues.
Connecticut St at e Director of Civil Prepared-nees, to II.C. Vickere.
t e
4 T ALif. t Ocit2T Asso ontIECTth 99868. DJtEE:l%E 5
titFICIENCIES Alett AREAS FieR OeMutCTivE At: Tithe HAtHtAM teECK Ft. ANT (OpfeNECTIGT V ANUEE)
I Foge lo of 37 I
I objeccive i
Suboe-quencly Corrective Testad Action Previously Eseretse Identtiled FEMA Esercise IfDREC-0654 (Emercise vertised Current Isene Description Dat e leaue objective sibject ive Reference Jurisdiction Action fanen Det e)
(i.e.. peoulte)
St atue F.l.b Connecticut "The attuation occurred com-86-4.
Dee to are apparent 4/25/86 trary to established pro-oversight in operettene cedures. The State will con-control at the St at e duc t a review of communt-
- EOC, notification of catione and message banditag l
the Covernor's eser-procedures."
i gency declaretton wee never provided to the Iocal EOCs in accord-
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
- plancuso, Connecticut State l
ance with the pre-Director of Civil Prepered-scribed procedures.
nese, to N.C. Wickers.
The Cosement e nt ione officer to instructed to transett only mes-l eages received in
. }
writing, and the post-tien of the communt-catione station pre-vente thte individual free resetng the main event statue board (which had the declare-tion clearly yested).
- Thus, the emergency declaration message was never transettted to 5
the Aree Offices and its absence was never questioned.
86-5.
The teema did not have 4/25/86 H.lo, Connecticut
" Check 1 tete for equipment sad 1.8 empplies will be kept with the checkliste for equip-monitoring tese emergency hite ment and supplies to in the f uture."
enable them to quickly determine whether they
-- 12/21/86 letter from F.
have everything they
- tieneuse, Connecticut State need for monitoring and Director of Civil Prepared-sempting.
eens, to M.C. Wickers.
86-6.
One team did not have 4/25/86 J.lO.e.
Connecticut "secommendetton accepted.
1.8 This attuation occurred con-El or protective trary to established clothing. Neither team procedures."
had reeptrators.
- 12/21/86 letter from F.
t4encuso.
rennecticut St at e Direcsvr
- f Civil prepared-nese, ta 4.C. etchere.
I l
L
t
- n. o 1
TAhli I OfBRENT AND 04teECTL1B 89Rh IRENE:l%et tw.F RCIENCIF.S AND ARFJ.5 FI'2 OMtBF.CT'."4E ACTled$
4
(
HADDAM IIECK pl. ANT (DINieFCTtCUT T AsetDt
' Page 38 et 37 e.
objective Sebee-i
}
geently Corrective 1
Tested Actieen l
I PrevIonely Eseretoe Identified FEMA F.sercise IsufEC-0654 (Eseretse verf il ed Current I
losee Description Date leone objectlee objective Reference Jurtuotetten Action Taken Bete)
(t.e., neemite) saates l
86-7.
Radiolestral monitoring 4/25/86 E.3.e Connectient
- Recommendettee accepted, l
teams' old-range self-12/23/06 letter from F.
i reading doelmeters had
- Mancuee, Comeettient St at e l
e reage of 0-2 g.
Director of Civil Prepared-l nese, to N.C. Tickere.
86-8.
The Governor's PRO 4/25/86 C.4.s Connecticut
- Addittenal trotetag will be l
accomplished.*
j staff wee not large or j
well trained enough to
- 12/23/06 letter. free F.
perfers the multiple
- plancese, Comaect iet e State functimes it had been Director of Civil Prepared-seafsned.
nese, to N.C. Vickere.
36-9.
The State generated no 4/25/86 C.).e Connecticut "Emphaele on generettes more hard copy news rolesees, for hard copy news releasee the e9dte, will be mode le the of its own during the fatore."
esercleeg therefore, ao protective action mee-
- 81/23/86 letter free F.
essee were evellable in Mascues.
Ceemect '. cat State documented form for mee Director of
'J il Propered-by the media, who, con-nees, to N.C. % store, eequently, were never j
latermed in wetting about either the Covernor'e Decleretten
'f of Civil Emergency at 7:56 p.m., or the con-tent of Ets messages.
4 86-10.
The supply of doelmetry 4/25/86 E.3.e Chester The Town of Chester hee responded that they will et the Chester EOC wee Inventory their empply of insufficient.
doeteetere and will request "suffielent assunte for future eseretees.
Ihle will be accomplished by pobruary 1 i,...-
j
-- 12/23/86 letter free F.
t Itsncues.
Connecticut St at e l
Director of Civil Propered-i nees, to M.C. Vichere.
I i
t i.
i Ate e-t avmET AN11 GolfIPr Tite 8914 FIFZCl%E REFIC16 NCit$ i.NtB ARtl.S Pea 83Eits"flVE #A."TRIHf H4f*AM NEtX Pl. ANT (DiNNECTIQff TANEFF.)
Face 12 ef 11 ObjectIvo Suboe-quentty Cortertive Freviously Tested Act ton Esercise identtfled FEMA Emercise NtinEC-06%4 (Emercise vertfled corrent leeue Descript ion Date leeue objective objective Deference Jertedletten Action Taken Det e)
(i.e., peoulae)
Stat e 86-11. Some chechtlete and 4/25/86 A.2.a Oester "The Town of Oester reopended nottffcation lists were that they will conduct en out of d at e or not immediate review and will evallable. This caused update their etert list.*
some problems; when procedures were not
-- 12/23/06 letter from F.
- clear, the First
- Mancuso, Connecticut St at e Selectman had to seek Director of Civil Prepared-out the appropriate mese, to N.C. Vickere.
I todividual to determine l
what emergency response j
ectlene were necessary.
l 86-82.
Although the decielt,n-4/25/86 A.2.s Oester "Chester First Selectman maktwa process to Robert Slair responded that expend the evacuation they will make thte recoe-area in Chester was mendetton a
priority for very good. inforsetton future eseretees."
regarding thle espanded eres should have been
- 82/23/86 letter frena F.
treneeltted to the
- Mancuso, Connecticut State State.
Di rector of Civil Prepared-nees, to N.C. Vickere.
86-11.
Town offsetale did not 4/25/86 J.10.f Chester "This of fice will request all demonstrate the emergency planning sees chief deciaten-making procese esecutives to incorporate a regarding the tenuance definitive poettien on the use l
et gl to emergency of poteestus todide for emer-j workers.
gency workers into their local i
plans, before the end of 1987.
1
-- 12/23/86 letter from F.
I Maneuse.
Connecticut St at e Director of Cielt Prepared-nees, to N.C. Vickere.
86-14.
There was some con-4/25/86 N.3 Colchester "The Town of Colchester will fusion among EOC staff revloe 8te standard operettog as to the rules regard-procedures to include access tog access to the EDC control to the EOC."
during a radiological emergency.
-- 12/l)/86 letter free F.
- Mancues, Connecticut St at e Director of Civil Prepared-nees, to N.C. Vickere.
e e
8 k
7
+.
E e
TA00E 1 (3CICT AN1) O M".9 CTElf 89Mh 9.NEKCISE DEFit:lt Nt:lES ann ANF.AS FtMr DMtND.CTIVE ACTtHN 5
HADDAM Nt.CK PLANT (OnlNsECTit3tT YANEFE)
Paae 33 of 37 Dbjective suboe-quently Corrective Prestemely Tested Ac t ion Esercise Identitled FEMA F.se r e t ee MUREC-0654 (Emeretse Vertiled Current leave Description Date lease objective ubjective Seference Juriedletion Action Taken Det e)
(i.e., neemit s)
St at ue 86-15. Distributton of 4/25/86 K.3.s caschem "The Tow.
of Durham First doelmetry to EOC staff Selecteaa reports that it will wee not demonstrated or
'revloe its atendard operating staulated.
procedure to snelude the steely disperoement of doelmeters'.*
- 12/23/86 letter free F.
- leoncuso, Connecticut St at e Director of Civ11 Prepared-nees, to N.C. Vickers.
86-16. At the Stage I Ceneral 4/25/86 E.6 East leeddee
" Additional tratalag will be Emergency (Connecticut J.9 conducted to alleviate this poetuse codes trevo),
deitetency."
which calle for shel-tering in the two-elle
- 12/23/86 letter free F.
- EF2, neither public Mancuso.
Connecticut State alerting noe protective Director of Civil Prepared-actions were taken in nese, to N.C. Vickers.
East liedden.
06-17. Doeteetry kite et the 4/25/86 E.3.s East leeddes
- The Town of East Iteddam will East Reddeo EOC were leventory their supply of taeuffletent in number.
desteeters and will recette suffletent amounts for all emergency workers."
- 82/23/86 letter free F.
- Meneuse, Connecticut St at e Director of Civil Prepared-nees, to M.C. Vickers.
86-18.
Town offtetale did not 4/25/86 J.lo.f East Neddee ef.
See seaponse to thle demonstrate the teaue under Chester EOC (#4).
doctelon-meklag process regarding the loavance of El to emergency workere.
T AII.E l. OCIE:CT AIIIs eqtus3tte igNas ENf NCt%
$7FICIE81CIES A800 ARFJ.S FGt OLDECTIVE ACTinse NADDAM leECR Plasti (OsseesECTICtf7 T AMEEE)
Page 14 of 37 objective Subee-quently Correcstve Tested Action Previemely Eseretse Identified FEMA Eseretse IsupEC-0654 (Eneretoe Wertfled Current leeue Description Date lesse objective objective Reference Justedactten Acaten Taken Dete)
(i.e.
peoult o)
St at ue 86-19. The East staddae EOC did 4/25/06 E.5 East needdem "During the June 1986 Public 3.7 offletale Conference thte aet montter the ESS office recommended that all etetten.
EPZ commentales purchase ESS sonitore for their operettene centers."
-- 12/23/86 letter free F.
Mancese.
Connecticut state Director of Civil Prepared-nese, to N.C. Tschere.
P 6 -20.
There use no desen-4/25/06 E.1.e.
East usepten "tweenstretten of the ability K.3.b to continueuely mentter end stretten of the oblitty centrol emergency worker to continueuely mentter espesure will be demanetrated and control emergency In subsequent eueretees."
i merker espesure.
t
-- 82/23/86 letter free F.
Mancues.
Connecticut State Director of Civil Prepared-neos, to N.C. Vickers.
86-28. T un officiale did not 4/25/86 J.lo.f test usepton cf.
reopense to this leone under Oiester EOC (#4).
demonstrate the docteten-making procese regarding tee teemance of El to emergency workers.
86-22. The cell Blet for Eoc 4/25/86 E.2 Esses.
- The town of Esses reporte that they are currently staff wee out of date developing en up-to-date call and had to be updated list."'
I using a
telephone directory during the
- 12/23/06 letter free F.
l Mencuse.
Connecticut St ate l
cell down.
Director of Civil Prepared-nees, to II.G. Vickere.
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F 2
b REPORT ON THE REMEDIAL ~EXERClSE FOR THE HADDAM NECK PLANT MAY 28, 1986 O
O FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEME!!T AGENCY REGION 1 JOHN W. MCCORMACK POST OFFICE AND COURTHOUSE BOSTON, MASSACHUESTTS 02109-14595 N
3 7ep
i o
TABLE OF CONTENTS
=o k.
3 Page Summary............................
1 Introduction..-........................
2 Deficiencies of the April 26, 1986 Exercise Objectives for the Remedial Exercise Exe rci se Eval uat ion.....................
3, 4 State E0C & Area OCP Offices C oncl u s i o n s..........................
5 h
4 e
i
. - - - -. - -. -..... - -. -.,.. - _ _.... _. -,... - - -. -,. =., -,, _. - _ _ - - -,.. -
- - -., - ~,, -...., - -,, - - _ _,., -. - _.. -, - -. - -
o Haddam Neck Remedial Page 1
SUMMARY
On May 28, 1986, a remedial exercise was held to correct the two deficiencies identified in the Summary Deficiency Report of May 14, 1986, for the April 25, 1986, Haddam Neck Exercise.
A two hour drill i
L was held involving the State E0C, three Civil Preparedness Area Offices and communicaticns with the local communities within the Haddam Neck plume exposure emergency planning zone. The remedial exercise tested the capability of the State to alert and notify the public within 15 minutes, and to provide an informational or instructional message to the public over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).
The remedial exercise corrected the two deficiencies identified during the April. 25, 1986, exercise.
l
(..
o..
Haddam Neck Remedial Page 2 I.
INTRODUCTION A.
Deficiences of the April 26, 1986 Exercise The two deficiencies observed during the April 25, 1986 exercise were:
1.
Descript ion The State did not demonstrate the capability to alert and notify the public within 15 minutes of the decision to implement protective actions. (FEMA-REP-1,II.E.6)
Recommendation Review and revise procedures as necessary to ensure the capability exists to activate the public alert and notification system within 15 minutes of the decision to recommend protective actions to the public.
Train the appropriate staff regarding procedures for alert and notification of the public.
2.
Description The second and third EBS messages prepared by the State did not provide the public with an adequate amount of information and may have caused some people to take unnecessary risks, and, thereby, endangered public safety. (FEMA-REP-1,II.E.5)
Recommendation Develop prescripted messages that include easily identifiable bound-aries such as roads, rivers, etc. for each sector within the plume exposure EPZ so that appropriate information can be quickly included in EBS messages as well as other official releases.
B.
Objectives of the Remedial Exercise The objectives for the May 28, 1986 remedial exercise were:
Demonstrate the ability to alert the public within the plume expo-sure EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes (FEMA Objective 13).
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to public, in a timely fashion (FEMA Objective 14).
C.
Scenario for the Remedial Exercise See Appendix 1.
r
',f Haddam Neck Remedial Page 3 II. EXERCISE EVALUATION The remedial exercise was conducted on May 28, 1986, to demonstrate correction of the two deficiencies identified during the April 25, 1986, full-scale exercise for the Haddam Neck Plant.
FEMA stationed observers at the State E0C and the Area II Office of Civil Preparedness.
State E0C and Area OCP Offices After the April 25, 1986, exercise the State of Connecticut began a review of its procedures for the activation of the public alert and notification system and the formulation of EBS messages.
The result of this review was a revision to the procedures for siren activation and issuance of EBS messages. To enhance the capability to prepare appropri-ate EBS messages rapidly the State developed new RERP EBS procedures.
These procedures include prescripted EBS messages for different a reas.
The plume exposure EPZ was divided into 16 sectors and messages were
. developed for each group of 3 sectors.
These messages related the bound-aries of the sectors to easily identifiable landmarks.
The procedures have improved the capability of the state to develop appropriate EBS messages.
The exercise began at 9:30 a.m. with a briefing of the players on the scenario situation.' For the purposes of the drill all updates on the incident classification came over the telephone instead of the radio-pagers. At 9:40 a.m.
the State received an upgrade of the event class-ification to a Site Area Emergency. At 9:47 the governor's representative
e o ",
Haddam Neck Remedial Page 4 held a staff meeting to dicuss the situation.
The Radiological Control Program Director briefed the Governor and recommended that milk animals be placed on stored feed within a 2-mile radius of the plant and 5 miles I
downwind in sectors P, Q, and R.
This activity was to be carried out by the Department of Agriculture.
A message advising residents within the plume exposure EPZ to stay tuned for additional emergency,information was drafted and approved by the Governor's representative and Governor's press secretary at 9:52 and broadcast at 9:58.
The area offices were j
i i
told to have the affected towns of Haddam and East Haddam activate their sirens at 9:55.
The area offices confirmed activation a few minutes later. The EBS message was to be repeated every 15 minutes until addi-tional information or instructions were available.
At 10:10 a.m. a General Emergency (Connecticut Posture Code: Bravo) was declared by the utility.
A briefing was underway in the Governor's of-fice. Representatives from the utility and the Radiation Control Program l
Director had been discussing the situation at the plant, the probable upgrading of the classification to the General Emergency (Connecticut Posture Code: Bravo), and possible protective action recommendations.
The Radiation Cont rol Program Director had recommended that the areas within a 2-mile radius of the plant be evacuated, that the areas from 2 miles to 5 miles downwind in sectors P, Q, and R be sheltered, and that access control be implemented for the 2-mile radius and 10 miles downwind.
The Governor agreed to these recommendations at approximately 10:15 a.m.
An EBS message was drafted and approved by 10:18 a.m. and transmitted by 10:23 a.m.
. t
.,... ' s Haddam Neck Remedial Page 5 At 11:00 a.m.
the plant upgraded the emergency condition to General Emergency (Connecticut Posture Code: Alpha) because of a radioactive release. The decision was made to recommend extending the evacuation area out to 5 miles downwind and to extend the shelter area to 10 miles downwind (Sectors P, Q, & R). The message was developed and approved by 11:12 a.m.
and broadcast at 11:21 a.m.
Sirens were activated in the affected communities according to procedures.
The exercise was terminated at 11:24 a.m.
III. CONCLUSIONS The two deficiencies observed during the April 25, 1986, exercise of the plans and preparedness for the Haddam Neck Plant have been addressed and corrected.
i
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