ML20206D293
| ML20206D293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206D284 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8811170037 | |
| Download: ML20206D293 (5) | |
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0, UNITED STATES i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
'S, SAFETY EVALUATION 9Y THE OFFICE OF NilCLEAR DEACTOR REGillATION RELATED TO AMENOMENT NO. 118 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-54 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZpATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 INTR 00llCTION By letters dated May ?7 and August 10, 1988, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) requested changes to Facility Operating License No.
OPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The change would revise Table 3.7-1, "Process Pipeline Penetrating Primary Containment." of the Technical Specifications (TS) to reflect six plant modifications which will be completed during the 1988 refueling outage currently underway.
DESCRIPTION The modifications involve the Primary Containment Radioactivity Monitoring System, service and breathino air supplies to the drywell. Reactor Water Sample containment isolation valves, Residual Heat Removal (RPP) system containment isolation valves, and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System containment isolation valves. Specifically the licensee reouested the following chances to the TS:
1.
Add two containment penetrations IX-31Ad and X-55bl and four containment isolation valves for the redundant primary containment radioactivity monitor.
P.
Eliminate service and breathing air supplies to drywell.
3.
Peplace RHR motor-operated gate valves (1090V-31A and 10MOV-31R1 with motor-operated globe valves.
4 Replace Reactor Water Sample air-operated globe valves /07-PA0V-39 and 02-2A0V-40) with solenoid-operated valves.
5.
Add containment isolation signal F (high drywell pressure) to three existing PWCU system containment isolation valves (12MOV-15, I?POV-18 and 12POV-80).
6.
Add an isolation valve (1?MOV-0691 outside containment in the RWCU system.
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.p-l EVALUATION 1.
Primary Containment Radioactivity Monitoring System (pCRMS)
(Gaseous and Particulate) f The FitzPatrick plant has redundant primary containment radioactivity monitors. PCRMS instruments monitor both gaseous and particulate radioactivity levels during normal plant operation. A single pair of supply and return lines services both monitors (i.e., both monitors draw primary containment (drywelll atrosphere through a single supply line and exhaust through a single return line). The licensee proposes to install a second pair or PCRMS sample lines to improve system reliability.
Each PCRPS monitor will have its own supply and return lines.
This modification will eliminate the possibility that both monitors could be inoperable as a result of a single line failure.
When the modification is complete, the following arrangement will exist:
Penetration Function Valves X-31Ad Existing Supply 2750V-135A and ?750V-135C X-55b Existing Return 2750V-125B and 2'50V-1250 X-319d New Supply 2750V-1350 and 2750V-135R X-52a New Return
?750V-125C and 2750V-125A Further, the licensee is required to reviso the FSAR to reflect the new valve arra ngement. The staff finds the new arrangement acceptable.
2.
Service and Breathing Air Sucplies to Dryvell The licensee proposes to cut and cap pipe lines associated with centainment penetration X 21 and X-61 for breathing air and service air, respectively.
These penetrations were designed and installed to supply breathing and service air for personnel and equipment in the drywell during maintenance. Currently, the licensee is using a portable air supply. The licensee stated that the cutting and capping of these air lines will eliminate a potential source of air leaks into HtzPatrick's inerted drywell. The work will be performed in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code. On the basis of its review the staff concludes that this modification will reduce the potential for containment leakage following a postulated accident. Therefore, the staff finds this modification acceptable.
3.
RHR System Containment isolation Valve Chance The licensee proposes to replete two RHR systen containment spray motor-operated gate valves (10F0V-31A and 10MOV-318) with motor-operated globe valves. This change will improve the operators' ability to throttle containment spray flow during certain accident conditions. The flow characteristics of globe valves make then suitable for flow throttling.
Even though maximum containment spray ' low will be reduced from approximately 10950 gpm to 6700 gpm, the licensee has determined that this reduction in maximum flow represents no significant reduction in the margin of safety because the containment spray systen will still be able to perfonn its intended functicn. Containment spray has three primary functions:
(1) Assure primary containment integrity, (?) Assure that drywell/ torus temperatures and
1
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pressures remain within equipment qualification limits, and (3) Reduce or eliminate chugging. The closure time of the new globe valves is the same as that of existing valves, therefore flow dynamics are not changed. The isolation signals used to actuate these containment isolation valves remain
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unchanged.
Environmental qualification analyses are unaffected. Therefore, the staff concludes that containment spray flow resulting from replacing gate valves with globe valves is acceptable.
4 Reactor Water Sample Containment Isolation Valves Change The licensee proposes to replace two Reactor Water Sample containment J
isolation air-operated globe valves (01-2A0V-39 and 02-2A0V-40) with solenoid-operated valves (02-250V-39 and 02-250V-40). The existing globe valves open by means of pneumatic air pressure and electrical AC power. The new solenoid J
valves will use AC power only and will provide positive valve position indication.
The globe valves are being replaced to comply with both the licensee's comitment 1
regarding post-accident instrumentation and with Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2.
i Regulatory Guide 1.97 states the purpose of primary containment isolation valve position indication as "accomplishment of isolation." Primary containment isolation valve position provides information to indicate that plant safety functions are being achieved.
The modification satisfies this criterion. Reactor Water Sample 1
containment isolation valves are used to draw a small sample of reactor water for j
analysis. The valves are nomally open to provide flow to the crack arrest verification subsystem of the hydrogen water chemistry system and fail to the j
close position.
The isolation signals used to actuate these valves are not changed by this modification. Also, the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, criteria i
for testing of new valves will not change.
Therefore, the staff concludes that j
this modification is acceptable.
j 5.
Reactor Water Cleanup Containment isolation Valves i
The licensee proposed two modifications associated with the Reactor Water f
Cleanup (RWCU) System containment isolation valves in response to NUREG 0737, Item II.E.4.2 "Containment Isolation Derendability." The first of the two j
modifications involves adding an isolation signal F (high drywell pressurel to the three existing containment isolation valves (1?MOV-15, 12MOV-18, 190V-80). These three valves currently actuate on Primary Containment and 4
Reactor Yessel Isolation Control System (PCRVICS) signals that indicate reactor vessel low water level and RWCll line break. The containment isolation i
signal A (reactor vessel low water level) is indicative of either a loss of l
feedwater or a loss of coolant.
Isolation signal F (high drywell pressure) indicates a breach in the RCS inside the drywell.
Isolation signal J (RWCU l
system equipment room high terperature) detects a RWCU system line break. The two isolation signals A and J are not diverse because high RCWCU space I
l temperature will not detect a reactor coolant system break within the drpell.
When this modification (addition of isolation signal F to RVCU containment isolation valve) is complete, these valves will be actuated using diverse isolation signal as recomended in Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800).
The staff considers this modification to be acceptable.
. The second modification involves the addition of an isolation valve (12MOV-069) outside containment in the RWCU system.
This motor-operated valve will be installed in the RWCll return line to the feedwater system and will replace the TS isolation function of the check valve.
The valve will be located in the Reactor Building between the Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling (RCIC) discharge thermal sleeve and an existing ranual valve (12RWC-63).
The valve position indication will be provided in the main control room and on the emergency plant and information corputer (EPIC) system. A remote-manual switch will be installed in the main control room. The valve will fail in the "as-is" position upon loss of actuation power.
Electric power will be supplied from a safety-related motor control center.
This new valve will actuate on diverse isolation signals of either reactor vessel low water level or high drywell pressure as discussed above.
The valve and its associated control circuitry are classified as safety-related. Seismic Class I. 0A Category I and electrical Class IE and is subject to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix J. testing criteria.
Current 1v. the RWCU return line is isolated by the single check valve (12RWC-62).
The addition of the new motor-operated containment isolation valve on the RWCU return line in addition to a check valve will improve the leak tight integrity of the system in the event of an accident. A motor-operated valve also provides valve position indication not available with a check valve. Thus this modification of the RWCU system will comply with General Design Criterion 55 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 - Reactor Coolant Pressure Roundary Penetrating Containment.
Therefore, the staff considars this modification acceptable.
In addition to the modifications listed above, the licensee revised TS Table 3.7-1 to update and correct RWCU entries.
The maximum allowsble closure time for containment isolation valves (12MOV-15 and I?MOV-18) associated with the RWCll system supply lines changed from 30 seconds to 20 seconds. The licensee stated that this change was required to riflict assumptions made in the FitzPatrick environm ntal qualification analyses.
Faster valve closing tinie reduces the quantity of reactor coolant lost through the break. Consequently, the maximum temperature, humidity and radiation levels around the break are also reduced.
The staff considers this change acceptable. Also, the licensee added an isolation signal Y (Standby Liquid Control System Actuated) for valve I MOV-18 which was inadvertently omitted from TS Table 3.7-1.
The signal Y was installed on RWCtl valve (12MOV-18) as part of the original FitzPatrick design.
The staff considers this feature acceptable.
On the basis of the licensee's proposed modifications, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to Table 3.7-1 of the plant Technical Specifications are acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This arendment involves a chance in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the arounts and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in
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. individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public coment on such finding.
Accordingly, this amendment meets the eli for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(gibility criteria c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.?2(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: November 10, 1988 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:
R. Anand