ML20205H887

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Byron Station,Units 1 and 2.Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455. (Commonwealth Edison Company)

ML20205H887
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	03/31/1987
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0876, NUREG-0876-S08, NUREG-876, NUREG-876-S8, NUDOCS 8704010167
Download: ML20205H887 (24)

Text

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NUREG-0876 Supplement No. 8 4

Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of

Byron Station,

Units 1 and 2 .

Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455 Commonwealth Edison Company 2

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! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory J Commission Offico of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 1987

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.y NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:

1. The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20555

2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post Of fice Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013 7082 1 3. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.

Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Docu-l ment Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers;and applicant and l licensee documents and correspondence.

l The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the GPO Sales Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings, and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission issuances.

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! mission, Washington, DC 20555.

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library, 7020 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and are available there for reference use by the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the originating organization or, if they are American National Standards, from the

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NUREG-0876 Supplement No. 8 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455 Commonwealth Edison Company

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i i ABSTRACT I >

! Supplement No. 8 to the Safety Evaluation Report related to Commonwealth Edison i Company's application for licenses to operate the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 located in Rockvale Township, Ogle County, Illinois, has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This supplement provides recent information regarding resolution of the license j conditions identified in the SER. Because of the favorable resolution of the l

! items discussed in this report, the staff concludes that the Byron Station, I Unit 2 can be operated by the licensee at power levels greater than 5% without

{ endangering the health and safety of the public.

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i TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT................................................................. iii 1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY.................... 1-1 1

1.1 Introduction................................................... 1-1

1.7 Summary of Outstanding Items................................... 1-1 1.8 Confirmatory Issues............................................ 1-2

1. 9 License Conditions............................................. 1-4 2 SITE CHf."ACTERISTICS................................................ 2-1 i 2.4 Hydrology...................................................... 2-1 i

i 6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES.......................................... 6-1 ,

i 6.5 Fission Product Removal and Control System..................... 6-1 I

9 AUXILIARY SYSTEM.................................................... 9-1

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a 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems........................................ 9-1 1

11 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT........................................ 11-1 1

j 11.5 Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling

Systems....................................................... 11-1 1

l 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS............................................... 13-1 1

4 13.3 Emergency Planning............................................ 13-1 l

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1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY 1.1 Introduction l' . 1 The Nuclear Regulatory Coemission's Safety Evaluation 'Raport .(5ER) (NUREG-0' 376) in the matter of Commonwealth Edison Company's application to' operate the By>on ,

Station Units 1 and 2 was issued in February 1982. The first' 3upplemen*, (SSEk) to that SER was issued in March 1982, the second was issued in Jen'uary 1983,,

the third was issued in Novembers1983, the fourth was issued in May 1984 (the t

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fif th was issued in October 1984; the sixth was issued 1n February 1985, a'id K

the seventh was issued November 1986. Cn Fioruary 14, 1965, a full power li-i

! cense was issued for Unit 1. On NovemberT,~ 1986, a , license. authoriz,'ng fuel loading and operation up to 5% of rated pob.? was issued for' Unit 2.

i j This eighth SER supplement provides the staff evaluation et those items that

required resolution before 5% of rated power could bh exceeded and to address s i changes to the SER that resulted from the receipt of additional informaticg.

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! Copies of this SER supplement are available for inspection at the NRC Public t I Document Room, 1717 H Street,~NW, Washington, D.C., and at the Rockford Public I

Library, Rockford, Illinoin. Single copies may be purchased from'the sources Y, V

indicated on the inside front cover. , ,

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! The NRC Project Manager assigned to the Operatirig License applicaPon for 0 i Byron Station is Leonard N. Olshan. Mr. Olshan may be contacted by calline.,

I (301) 492-4937 or writing: / \

l Leonard N. 01shan j Division of Licensing ,

Office of Nuclear React'or Regulation  !

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Washington, D.C. 20555 1

3 1.7 Summary of Outstanding Items , s y

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i j The current status of the outstanding items listed in thd original,SER '

and the

supplements follows

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(1) Additional inforr:ation to confirm pipeline foundation desiqn (Section 2.5) - '

t Closed in Supplement 5. ,

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j i \1 \ ) s q (2) Turbine missile evaluation (Section 3.5.1.3) - Closed Un SulpMment 5. j i /,

! (3) High- and moderate-energy pipe break analysis outsid{ coataihrnerci, y-(Section 3.6.1) - Closed in Supplement 2. ,

{f l (4) Pump and valve. operability assurance (Section 3.9.3.;O '-IClos' 7

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y_ (5) Dasep' late flexioility and anchor bolt loading (Section 3.9.3.4) - Closed s in Supplement;3.

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! (6) Seismic and dynamic qualification of equipment (Section 3.10) - Closed in jt[,$ '

Supplement 5.

I i (7) Environinental qualification of electrical equipment (Section 3.11) -

Closed in Supplement 5.

I (8) Improved thermal design procedures (Section 4.4.1) - Closed in ,

! Supplement 5.

j (9) TMI action item II.F.2: Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation

/ (Section 4.4.7).- Closed in Supplement 5.

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{10) Steam generator flow-induced vibrations (Section 5.4.2).- Closed in

) Supplement 5. .

(11) Reactor pressure vessel forces and moments analysis (Section 6.2.1.2) -

Closed in Supplement 2.

(12) Equipment and floor drainage system for internal flood protection 1 y (Section 9.3.3) - Closed in Supplement 2.

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(13) Fire protection program (Section 9.5.1) - Closed in Supplement 5.

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, (14) Residual moisture in diesel air start piping (Section 9.5.6) - Closed in Supplement 1.

(15) Volume reduction system (Sections 11.1 and 11.4.2) - closed in Supplement 6.

i (16) Emergency preparedness plans and facilities (Section 13.3) - Closed in Supplement 4.

t (17) Contrul room human factors review (Section 18.0) - Closed in Supplement 4.

i (18)Conforfr'anceofESFfiltersystemtoRG1.52(Section6.5.1)-Closedin

! Suppler ant 5.

1. 8 Confirinatory Issues i

(1) Confirmatory analysis to verify river screenhouse seismic response

analysis (Section 2.5.4.3) - Closed in Supplement 6.

(2) Category 1 manhole protection from tornado missiles (Section 3.5.3) -

Closed in Supalement 1.

(3) Analysis of tangential shear on containment (Section 3.8.1) - Errata, deleted in Supplement 2.

t (4) Pipicg vibration test program (Section 3.9.2.1) - Closed in Supplement 6.

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(5) Snubber inspection and testing program details (Section 3.9.2.1) - Closed in Supplement 1.

(6) Seismic reevaluation of components and supperts (Section 3.9.2.2) - Closed in Supplement 1.

(7) Basis for steam generator tube plugging (Section 3.9.3.1) - Closed in Supplement 3.

(8) Inservice testing of pumps and valves (Section 3.9.6) - Closed in Supple-ment 5.

(9) Loose parts monitoring system (Section 4.4.6) - Closed in Supplement 2.

(10) Code cases for control valves (Section 5.2.1) - Closed in Supplement 1.

(11) Fracture toughness data for Byron Unit 2 (Section 5.3.1) - Closed in Supplement 2.

(12) Steam generator tube surveillance (Section 5.4.22) - Closed in Supple-ment 2.

(13) Boration to cold shutdown analysis (Section 5.4.3) - Closed in Supple-ment 2.

(14) Cooldown rate with RHR (Section 5.4.3.1) - Closed in Supplement 2.

(15) RCS vent procedures (Section 5.4.5) - Closed in Supplement 2.

(16) Charging pump deadheading (Section 6.3.2), (Section 7.3.2.13) - Closed in Supplement 7.

(17) Containment differential pressure analysis (Section 6.2.1) - Closed in Supplement 2.

(18) Containment sump instrumentation (Section 6.2.1.1) - Closed in Supple-ment 2.

(19) Minimum containment pressure analysis for performance capabilities of ECCS (Section 6.2.1.5) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(20) Containment leakage testing vent and drain provisions (Section 6.2.6) -

Closed in Supplement 5.

(21) Confirmatory test for sump design (Section 6.3.4.1) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(22) Upper head temperature verification (Section 6.3.5.1) - Closed in Supplement 2.

(23) IE Bulletin 80-06 (Section 7.3.2.2) - Closed in Supplement 6.

(24) Test jacks for P-4 interlock test (Section 7.3.2.9) - Closed in Supplement 2.

Byron SSER 8 1-3

(25) Remote shutdown capability (Section 7.4.2.2) - Closed in Supplement 7 for Unit 1.

(26) Steam generator pressure control (Section 7.4.2.3) - Closed in Supple-ment 2.

(27) Switchover from injection to recirculation (Section 7.6.2.3) - Closed in Supplement 3.

(28) TMI Item II.K.3.1 (Section 7.6.2.7); III.D.1.1 (Section 9.3.5); II.K.2.17 (Section 15.5); II.D.I (3.9.3.3); II.K.2.17 - Closed in Supplement 2, others closed in Supplement 5.

(29) Viewing the installation and arrangement of electrical equipment (Sec-tion 8.1) - Closed in Supplement 3.

(30) Independence of redundant electrical safety equipment (Section 8.4.4) -

Closed in Supplement 2.

(31) Electrical distribution system voltage verification (Section 8.2.4) -

Closed in Supplement 6.

(32) Combined health physics and chemistry organization (Section 12.5.1) -

Closed in Supplement 3.

(33) Revision to Physical Security Plan (Section 13.6) - Closed in Supplement 4.

(34) RCP rotor seizure and shaft break (Section 15.3.6) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(35) Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) (Section 15.6) - Closed in Supplement 4.

(36) Applicant compliance with the Commission's regulations (Section 1.1) -

Closed in Supplement 4.

(37) SWS process control program (Section 11.4.2) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(38) Noble gas monitor (Section 11.5.2) - Closed in Supplement 5.

1.9 License Conditions Following is the current status of the license conditions:

(1) Groundwater monitoring program (Section 2.4.6) - Closed in Supplement 5.

i (2) Masonry walls (Section 3.8.3) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(3) Preservice and Inservice inspection program (Sections 5.2.4 and 6.6) -

Closed in Supplement 5 for Unit 1, closed in Supplement 7 for Unit 2.

(4) Response time testing (Section 7.2.2.5) - Closed in Supplement 4.

(5) Post accident monitoring (Section 7.5.2.2) - Closed in Supplement 2.

Byron SSER 8 1-4

(6) Modifications to permit isolation of non-IE loads from Class 1E power sources (Section 8.3.2) - Errata, deleted in Supplement 1.

(7) Compliance with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50, Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1).

(8) Steam valve inservice inspection (Sections 3.5.1.3, 10.2) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(9) Implementation of secondary water chemistry monitoring and control program as proposed by the Byron /Braidwood FSAR (Section 10.3.2) - Closed in Supplement 4.

1 (10) Personnel on shift with previous commercial PWR experience during startup phase (Section 13.2.1) - Closed in Supplement 4.

(11) TMI Item II.B.3 Postaccident Sampling (Section 9.3.2) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(12) Natural circulation testing (Section 5.4.3) - Closed in Supplement 5.

(13) Control of heavy loads (Section 9.1.5) - Closed in Supplement 6.

(14) Upgrade emergency operating procedures (Section 13.5.2) - Closed in Supplement 7.

(15) Relocate control room controls (Section 18.2) - Closed in Supplement 7.

(16) Emergency planning (Section 13.3) - Closed in Supplement 6.

(17) Seismic and dynamic qualification (Section 3.10) - Closed in Supplement 7 for Unit 2.

(18) Equipment qualification (Section 3.11) - Closed on November 30, 1985.

(19) Iodine particulate sampling (Section 11.5.2) - Closed in this supplement.

l (20) Reliability of diesel generators (Section 9.5.4.1) - Closed in this supplement.

(21) Feedwater flow measurement accuracy monitoring (Section 4.4.1) - Closed in Supplement 6.

(22) Protection against postulated breaks or cracks in high- and moderate-energy lines (Section 3.6.2) - Closed in Supplement 6.

(23) Volume reduction system (from Outstanding Issue 15) - Closed in Supplement 6.

(24) Shift advisors (Section 13.1.2) - Closed in Supplement 7.

(25) Turbine maintenance program (Section 3.5.1) - Closed in Supplement 7.

(26) Control room ventilation system (Section 6.5.1) - Closed on July 1, 1985 for Unit 1.

Byron SSER 8 1-5

2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2.4 Hydrology 2.4.8 Safety-Related Water Supply In a letter dated November 3, 1986 from K. A. Ainger to Harold Denton, the licensee indicated all the tests necessary to demonstrate the capability of the tower under full design basis conditions could not be completed. In Attach-ment B of the letter, the licensee indicated that the modifications to the towers for missile protection had apparently reduced the capability of each {

tower to 50% of the manufacturer's original rating. Recognizing the shortcomings in the performance of the towers, the licensee constructed a set of curves indi-cating the tower capacity against the wgt bulb temperatures. In constructing these capacity curves, the licensee used the available test data and extrapolated /

the results to higher wet bulb temperatures. .

Considering the uncertainty in the tower performance and the limited data base, p the staff recommended more restrictive limiting conditions for operation than I those in Section 3.7.5 of the Byron Technical Specifications. The recommended limiting conditions are slightly more restrictive than those proposed by the l licensee to account for the uncertainty in tower performance. By letter dated January 14, 1987, the licensee committed to operate with these more restrictive conditions. Thus, one unit will be placed in cold shutdown if the wet bulb temperature exceeds 75 F (no tornado warning) or if the wet bulb temperature exceeds 65 F with a tornado warning in effect. The limiting conditions are to be observed with the applicable actions as provided in Section 3.7.5 of the Technical Specification.

In order to assure that the limiting conditions do not prevent the licensee from obtaining valid data points during higher wet bulb terperatures, the mete-orological data for the Chicago area were obtained and evaluated. The evaluation indicates that the prevalent wet bulb temperature in late April should be around 60 F and that in June-July should be around 70 F. The limiting condition of 75 F (no tornado watch) should provide enough margin over the prevalent wet bulb temperatures so that the licensee can obtain tower performance data in hot weather.

The staff concludes that operation with the new limiting conditions for opera-tion is acceptable in the interim until the additional tower performance data are available and evaluated by the staff.

Il Byron SSER 8 2-1 e - _ ______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.5 Fission Product Removal and Control System 6.5.1 Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) Atmospheric Cleanup System SER Supplement No. 7 provided the basis for allowing interim operation of Unit 2 until July 1, 1987 with the auxiliary building ventilation (VA) system incapable of maintaining at least a 1/4 inch water gage negative pressure in each individual compartment of the VA system. By letter dated January 13, 1987,

, the licensee stated that additional time would be needed to complete testing of l

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the VA system and requested that the interim operation be allowed until October 1, 1987. Unanticipated problems and the upcoming refueling outage of Unit 1 neces-sitate the extension to October 1, 1987.

To provide additional assurance that ECCS leakage is less than values specified in the licensee's October 24, 1986 letter, the staff is requiring two additional leak rate determinations. The Unit 2 license contains a condition that two leak rate determinations be performed, one in April 1987 and one in July 1987, in addition to the one prior to 30% power that was proposed by the licensee.

The staff has reviewed the independent analysis it previously performed (see Supplement No. 7) and has verified that the extension until October 1,1987 for the interim plan for operation of the VA system is acceptable because the ECCS leakage rate will continue to be verified to be less than 1.0 gpm for the ex-tended operating period.

Byron SSER 8 6-1

9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS j-9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems 9.5.1 Fire Protection Program In SER Supplement No. 7, the staff identified two unresolved issues regarding the incomplete high/ low pressure interface analysis of the reactor head vent and excess letdown lines and the six National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code deviations for BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Following is the resolution of these two issues: (

9.5.1.4 General Plant Guidelines Safe Shutdown Capability By letters dated September 23, October 23, November 3, December 12 and 15, 1986 "

and January 21, 1987 the licensee submitted the additional information regarding the high/ low pressure interface analysis of the reactor head vent valves and excess letdown lines. In the November 3, 1986 submittal, the licensee has pro-posed to remove power from the reactor head vent valves in the event of a fire i

as stated in the PRI Rev. 54 procedures. The staff finds the licensee action acceptable.

By letter dated October 23, 1986, the licensee provided the results of an analy-sis concerning the spurious operation of the valves that form the high/ low pres-sure interface on the excess letdown lines. The licensee has stated that the valves are arranged in such a way for the excess letdown lines that at least four spurious valve failures would have to occur simultaneously in order to create an uncontrolled coolant loss to the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT).

Due to the number of valves involved in this scenario, the spurious operation of these valves due to fire is incredible. On this basis, the staff finds the licensee analysis for the excess letdown lines acceptable. Therefore, this item is considered closed.

In the January 21, 1987 letter, the licensee identified five deviations from the following National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes:

NFPA 12A Halon Check Valves NFPA 15 Water Supply Systems The NFPA 12A Section 2-7.4 states that only listed or approved equipment and devices shall be used in the system. The halon check valves at Byron 2 are not specifically approved by NFPA but the components of the halon system have been designed, installed and tested in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA codes. Further, the licensee has stated that the preoperational test of these systems will verify the operability of these valves. Therefore, the Byron SSER 8 9-1

staff concludes that the NFPA 12A deviation is acceptable. The NFPA 15 Sec-tion 2-1.2 states that all automatic water systems should be equipped with a U.L. Listed solenoid switch. The licensee proposed to have testing procedures which will confirm the operability of the components. The staff finds this deviation acceptable. ,

Section 4-11.3 of NFPA 15 codes recommends that the individual strainers should be provided at each nozzle where water passage ways are smaller than the one-eighth of an inch.

The licensee has proposed to provide the strainers upstream of the fire pumps instead of at each nozzle.

NFPA 15 Section 2-13 states that a suitable flushing connection should be in-corporated into the water spray systems to facilitate routine flushing. The licensee tem has stated that all the water spray systems are flushed up to the sys-piping. The staff finds this deviation acceptable. Section 4-9.25 of the NFPA 15 codes requires that a gage connection be provided at or near the nozzle for all the automatic water spray systems to determine the lowest pressure under normal flow conditions. The licensee stated that to verify the adequate water supply, limiting hydraulic analyses were performed for the individual water spray system.

tems. The staff Therefore, the individual gage is not necessary for these sys-finds this deviation acceptable.

On the basis of its review, the staff concludes that the above deviations are acceptable and meet the guidelines of BTP-CMEB 9.5-1.

9.5.4 Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 9.5.4.1 Emergency Diesel Engine Auxiliary Support System (General)

The licenses for Units 1 and 2 contained a condition that required satisfactory completion of dynamic qualification of the instrumentation and controls on the diesel generator control panel. The concern was discussed in SER Supplement No. 5.

By letter dated November 18, 1986, the license provided additional information in response to the staff's August 23, 1985 letter.

The basic dynamic qualification of the control panels for Byron 1 and 2 was established on the basis of similarity with the panel including its instrumen-tation and other devices at the LaSalle plant. The LaSalle control panel was qualified by actual testing. The staff performed a review of the additional information provided in the November 18, 1986 letter and concludes:

(a) during vibration testing of the panel, acceleration responses were recorded at seven locations where safety related devices are mounted on the panel; this is satisfactory since a direct response measurement at the the device panel only;location was obtained vs. the excitation at the base of (b) based on the acceleration plots on the LaSalle panel it is evident that driving frequencies during generator operation are in the 10 to 1000 Hz range which is significantly beyond seismic input range; Byron SSER 8 9-2

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therefore, the margin available at the zero period acceleration for the safe shutdown earthquake is adequate to account for the combined effects of the earthquake and operational vibration; (c) similarity between the LaSalle components and Byron 1 and 2 components was indicated in a component by component listing; that is satisfac-tory; and (d) by providing the details of methods and results of calculations per-formed, the licensee has established fatigue endurance of the Byron 1 and 2 control panels; the fatigue damage potential for the Byron 1 and 2 ganels subjected to a synthetic time history was evaluated by comparing them to the fatigue damage induced by measured time histories for the LaSalle panels (qualified by fatigue testing).

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the investigation conducted by the licensee on the dynamic qualifications of its diesel generator control panels, including the *nstrumentation and control devices, is satisfactory, and there is reasonable assurance that the subject equipment should perform its safety func-tion adequately. Therefore, the applicable license conditions have been satisfied.

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11 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 11.5 Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling Systems

• The Unit 1 license contained a condition that the license demonstrate that the iodine / particulate sampling system will perform its intended function. The concern was discussed in SER Supplement No. 5.

In a letter dated November 5, 1986 the licensee submitted a description of the modifications that will be made to demonstrate the capability to sample for gaseous radioiodine in conformance with TMI Action Plan Item II.F.1. This in-formation was submitted to provided the NRC staff sufficient detail to evaluate whether the concerns identified in SER Supplement No. 5 had been alleviated.

The licensee will replace its 1/4" diameter high range sample line with 3/4" diameter heat-traced line which will sample under both low and mid/high range operating conditions. An auxiliary pump skid will be added with automatic isokinetic flow control through the use of a flow splitter manifold. This auxiliary pump will be automatically started by the radiation monitor's copro-cessor and stopped by the high flow sample pump. The flow splitter manifold will direct the entire sample to the high flow path during low range radioacti-vity operation when the high flow sample pump is operating and to the low flow sample path during mid/high range operation when the low flow path sample pump and the auxiliary pump are running.

The staff believes that the utilization of this high flow sample line (3/4")

eliminates the concern expressed in the Region III inspection report. However, the NRC has contracted Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) to study the problems associated with obtaining representative samples from these sampling lines.

While the staff finds the present modifications to the Byron facility accept-able, additional modifications may be required based upon the recommendations of the PNL study. For the present, the licensee's modifications are deemed accept-able and the license condition will be satisfied when these modifications are completed during the first refueling outage of Unit 1. These modifications are common to both units and thus, will also resolve the concern on Unit 2.

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• By letter dated January 8, 1987, the staff transmitted this section to the licensee. l Byron SSER 8 11-1

l 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.3 Emergency Planning 13.3.1 Offsite Emergency Planning Medical Services In a decision, GUARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated the Commission's interpretation of 19 CFR 550.47(b)(12) to the extent that a list of facilities was found to constitute adequate arrange-ments for medical services for members of the public offsite exposed to danger-ous levels of radiation. Subsequently, the Commission issued interim guidance on May 21, 1985 requiring applicants for nuclear power reactor operating licenses to provide confirmation that the emergency plans contain a list of local or reg-ional medical treatment facilities and to commit to comply with any additional requirements imposed by the Commission in response to the GUARD remand. On September 17, 1986 the Commission issued its final policy and interim guidance to be followed in determining compliance with this regulation. The Commission directed that Licensing Boards [and in uncontested cases, the staff] should rely on the interim guidance of the May 21, 1985 Statement of Policy until the

[ NRC staff develops, in consultation with FEMA, and issues appropriate detailed guidance and until the licensees, applicants and state and local governments have had the time necessary to implement the detailed guidance. Specifically, the licensee shall satisfy the requirements of planning standard (b)(12) under 10 CFR 50.47 (c)(1) as interpreted by the Commission prior to the GUARD decision and shall commit itself to full compliance with any additional requirements im-posed by the Commission in response to the GUARD remand.

Consistent with the foregoing Statement of Policy, the licensee submitted a May 20, 1986 letter committing to full compliance with the Commission's response to the GUARD remand. Subsequently, the licensee submitted a September 16, 1986 letter confirming that the Offsite Emergency Plans for Byron includes a list of local or regional hospitals which have the capabilities to provide treatment for patients who are contaminated and injured as well as those who have suffered radiation exposure.

Accordingly, on the basis of the factors identified by the Commission in its Statement of Policy, the staff has determined that the requirements of 10 CFR g50.47(c)(1) have been satisfied so as to warrant issuance of the operating license for power levels greater than 5%.

Bryon SSER 8 13-1

APPENDIX A Continuation of the chronology of the NRC staff's radiological safety review for the period October 2, 1986, to January 14, 1987, for the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2.

October 2, 1986 Letter from applicant trans atting additional information on Environmental Effects on Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment - Information Notice 84-90.

October 3, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Submittal of Revised Heatup and Cooldown Curves.

October 7, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Section 6.0 Technical Specifications.

October 9, 1986 Letter from applicant requesting an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Cri-teria (GDC) 13 and 17.

October 14, 1986 Environmental Assessment noticed in FR (51FR37096) 10/17/86 for exemption from Appendix A and J to 10 CFR Part 50.

October 15, 1986 Letter from applicant transmitting an application for Amend-ment to Facility Operating License NPF-37, Appendix A, Technical Specifications.

October 16, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Preservice Inspection Byron Station, Unit 2.

October 23, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Integrated Leakage Rate Test Results.

October 23, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Review of High-Low Pres-sure Interface Valves on Excess Letdown Lines.

October 24, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Interim Operation of HVAC Systems, Byron Unit 2.

October 24, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Seismic Qualification, Byron Station, Unit 2.

October 27, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Interim Technical Specifi-cation, Byron Station, Unit 2.

October 27, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Fire Protection Technical Specification Changes.

Byron SSER 8 1 Appendix A

October 29, 1986 Letter to applicant transmitting Amendment No. 4 for Byron Units 1 and 2 Revised Technical Specifications.

October 29, 1986 Letter from applicant supplementing CEC 0 letter, dated August 15, 1986, concerning the essential service water l system application for amendment to NPF-37, Appendix A, Technical Specifications.

October 29, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Preservice Inspection Steam Generators and Pressurizer, Byron Unit 2.

October 29, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Environmental Qualifica-tion in Compliance With 10 CFR 50.49.

October 29, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning FSAR Revisions - Advance Information.

October 29, 1986 Letter to applicant concerning Approval of Byron Unit 2 Preservice Inspection Program.

October 30, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Interim Operation of HVAC System, Byron Unit 2.

October 30, 1986 Letter from applicant transmitting FSAR Update concerning Preoperational Testing Program.

November 3, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Deferral of Limited Aspects of the Initial Test Program, Byron Unit 2.

November 3, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Review of the Reactor Head Vent Valves for Spurious Operation, Byron Unit 2.

November 5, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Satisfaction of Licensing Requirements and Certification of Trchnical a Specifications, Byron Station, Unit 2.

November 5, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Plant Effluent Sampling.

November 6, 1986 Issuance of Facility Operating License NPF-60, Byron Sta-tion, Unit 2 for 5% of power. Letter to applicant includes Facility Operating License NPF-60, Federal Register Notice, Amendment No. 5 to the Indemnity Agreement B-97 and Supple-ment No. 7 to the SER.

November 7, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Preservice Inspection, Byron Units 1 and 2.

November 19, 1986 Letter to applicant transmitting Supplement No. 7 to the SER, NUREG-0876.

November 24, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Emergency Core Cooling System Technical Specification.

November 26, 1986 Letter to applicant concerning Pressurized Thermal Shock.

Byron SSER 8 2 Appendix A

November 26, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Human Factors Review.

December 5, 1986 Letter to applicant concerning Performance of Essential Service Water Cooling Towers.

December 12, 1986 Letter to applicant transmitting Amendment No. 5 for Byron Units 1 and 2 concerning DC Crossties and Cooling Towers.

December 19, 1986 Letter to applicant transmitting replacement pages for Amendment No. 5 issued 12/12/86.

December 23, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Modification to Narrow Range Resistance Temperature Detectors.

December 24, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning TMI Action Item II.K.3.31.

December 24, 1986 Letter from applicant concerning Essential Service Water System Cooling Towers.

January 6, 1987 Letter from applicant concerning application for amendment to Technical Specifications - Reconstitution of Fuel Assembly.

January 8, 1987 Letter to applicant concerning TMI Item II.F.1, Iodine /

Particulate Sampling.

January 14, 1987 Letter to applicant concerning Generic Letter 83-28:

Item 2.1.

Byron SSER 8 3 Appendix A

APPENDIX F NRC STAFF CONTRIBUTIONS This Supplement No. 8 to the SER is a product of the NRC staff and its consultants. The NRC staff members listed below were principal contribttors to this report.

Name Title Review Branch H. Ashar Civil Engineer Engineering (PWR-A)

G. Staley Hydraulic Engineer Engineering (PWR-B)

J. Hayes Nuclear Engineer Plant Systems (PWR-A)

G. Bagchi Section Leader Engineering (PWR-A)

A. Singh Mechanical Engineer Plant Systems (PWR-A)

R. Meck Emergency Preparedness Emergency Preparedness Specialist (IE)

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Supplement No. 8 to the Safety - aluation Report related to Commonwealth Edison Company's application f licenses Units 1 and 2, located in Roc ' ale Townshi o operate the Byron Station, been prepared by the Office , Igle County, Illinois, has Nuclear Rea or Regulation of the U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commissic .

This supple ent provides recent informa-tion regarding resolution o the license co itions identified i n the SER. Because of the favor le resolution of the i tems discussed in this report, the staff conclud that the Byron S tion, Unit 2 can be operated by the licensee t power levels grea er than 5% without endangering the health ar safety of the publi .

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