ML20205D213

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Insp Repts 50-445/86-22 & 50-446/86-20 on 860701-0831. Violations & Deviations Noted:Stainless Steel & Carbon Steel Stored in Outside Areas W/Improper Protective End Coverings & Records of Heat Treatment Not Available for Disc Inserts
ML20205D213
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 03/16/1987
From: Barnes I, Ellershaw L, Hale C, Spessard R, Wagner P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205C998 List:
References
50-445-86-22, 50-446-86-20, NUDOCS 8703300350
Download: ML20205D213 (49)


See also: IR 05000445/1986022

Text

APPENDIX C

COMMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM ACTIVITIES INSPECTION REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/86-22 Permits: CPPR-126

50-446/86-20 CPPR-127. -

Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2

50-446

Licensee: Texas Utilities Electric Company Construction Permit:

Expiration Dates:

Unit 1: August 1, 1988

Unit 2: August 1, 1987

Applicant: Texas Utilities Electric Company

Skyway Tower

400 North Olive Street

Lock Box 81

Dallas, Texas 75201

Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),

Units 1 & 2

Inspection At: Glen Rose, Texas

Inspection Conducted, July 1 through August 31, 1986

[

Inspectors: C b

Lf E. Ellershaw, Reactor Inspector, Region IV

M

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Q(ite

CPSES Group

(paragraphs 2.n, 2.v-z, 3, 4.d-e, 4.1-j,,and

5.c-k)

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C. J. IQ1p, Reactor Inspector, Region IV

CPSES Group

das/v7

Date

(paragraphs 2.a, 2.m. 2.0, 4.b-c,-4.f-h,

6.a, 7, 8, and 9)

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$ $=__ "

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[ P. C. Wagner, Reactor. Inspector, Region IV Date

CPSES Group

'(paragraphs 2.b.-1, 2.p-u, 4.a. 5.a-b, and 6.b)

Consultants: 'EG8G - J. Dale (paragraphs 2.z, 3, 4.j, and 5.j)

A. Maughan-(paragraphs 2.b-1, 2.p-u, and 5.a)

- W. Richins (paragraphs 2.n, 2.v-y, 4.d, 5.e)

V. Wenczel (paragraphs 8 and 9)

Parameter - J. Birmingham (paragraphs 4.b-c, 4.f-h, and 7)

K. Graham (paragraphs 4.e, 5.c-d, 5.f 5.1 and 5.k) '

D. Jew (paragraphs 4.1, and 5.g-h)

Reviewed by: - .

.

4WM

Spessard~,/ Deputy Director, Division of

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Date

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R. L'.

Inspection Pr'ograms, Office of Inspection

and Enforcement

Approved: 8w UNM~/

I. Barnes, Chief, Region IV CPSES Group Date

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted: July 1 through August 31, 19E6 (Report 50-445/86-22;

30-446/86-20)

Areas Inspected: Nonroutine, unannounced inspection of applicant actions on 1

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previous inspection findings; employee protection posting; assessment of

d11egations; Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) issue-specific action

plans (ISAPs); CPRT central and working files; ERC overview inspection program;

and procurement, receiving, and storage.

Results: Within the seven areas inspected, four violations (stainless steel

and carbon steel were stored in outside areas with improper protective end

coverings, paragraph 6.a; records of heat treatment were not available for disc ,

inserts and spares for main steam safety valves, nor was it apparent that  ;

proper source and receipt ins

nonconformance reports (NCRs)pections were performed,

dealing with installed paragraph

valve bonnets were 4.g;

incorrectly dispositioned, paragraph 4.1; and a correct assessment was not

provided regarding adequacy of design with respect to square groove welds in

HVAC duct supports, paragraph 2.z) and six deviations (objectivity forms and

evaluations had not been completed for certain members of the CPRT staff,

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paragraph 2.a; and Evaluation Research Corporation (ERC) documentation package

review failed to identify four inspectors and two welders involved in the

package being reviewed, paragraph 4.h; ERC overview inspection failed to

identify deviating conditions and unsatisfactory decisions made by the initial

ERC inspector, paragraph 5.g; ERC identified eight deviations on a pump but

did not tag the pump, paragraph 5.c; diaphragm valves were purchased to an

earlier version of the ASME Code than that committed in the Final Safety

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Analysis Report (FSAR), paragraph 4.i; and ERC engineering did not identify all

safety significant attributes on the inspection checklist for mechanical

equipment installation, paragraph 5.c) were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

    • J. W. Audas, Senior Licensing Engineer, Texas Utilities

Generating Company, (TUGCo)

    • J. L. Barker, Engineering Assurance Manager, TUGCo

L. B. Barker, Executive Assistant, TUGCo

  • R. T. Bentley, Technical Assistant, CPRT
      • C. T. Brandt, Quality Engineering Supervisor, TUGCo
    • R. E. Camp, Project General Manager, Unit 1, TUGCo
  • W. G. Counsil, Executive Vice President, TUGCo

B. DuBois, Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, TERA

P. E. Halstead, Site Quality Control (QC) Manager, TUGCo

M. Keathley, Lead Electrical QC Inspector, ERC

    • J. Krechting, Director of Engineering, TUGCo
  • J. C. Kuykendall, Vice President, TUGCo
  • J. Mallanda, Electrical Review Team Leader, CPRT
      • J. T. Merritt, Jr. , Director of Construction, TUGCo

C. K. Moehlman, Project Mechanical Engineer, TUGCo

      • L. D. Nace, Vice President, TUGCo

0. Nevins, Training Coordinator, TERA

A. A. Patterson, Reinspection Engineering Supervisor, ERC

  • F. L. Powers, Assistant Unit 1 Project Manager, TUGCo

P. Pussalugo, Equipment Qualification Engineer, TUGCo

F. Schafer, Systems Engineering Manager, TERA

B. Shair, Lead Electrical Engineer, ERC

P. Stevens, Electrical Engineer, TUGCo

  • J. F. Streeter, Director of QA, TUGCo

T. G. Tyler, CPRT Program Director, TUGCo

R. F. Wright, Manager, Warehouse and Material Control, TUGCo

The NRC inspectors also interviewed other CPRT and applicant employees

during this inspection period.

  • Denotes personnel present at the August 7, 1986, exit interview.
    • Denotes personnel present at the September 5, 1986, exit

interview.

      • Denotes personnel present at both of the above exit interviews.

2. Applicant Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Closed) Deviation (445/8511-0-02): An issue coordinator that had

been previously involved with CPSES activities had not been

identified to the NRC, r.or had the CPRT provided justification .

regarding his objectivity as required by Section VII of the CPRT

Program Plan.

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Revision 3 to the CPRT Program Plan deleted the commitment from

Section VII to identify and provide justification to the NRC when

third party personnel were found to have had prior CPSES involvement.

By letter to the NRC dated April 1, 1986, (Counsil to Johnson), it

was further committed that all CPRT personnel would complete

objectivity questionnaires (Attachment 7 of the CPRT Program Plan).

When completed questionnaires identified prior CPSES involvement or

association of an individual, further evaluation was required by the

Senior Review Team (SRT) for Review Team Leaders (RTLs) and by the

RTL for their assigned personnel. In such cases, evaluation forms

were to be completed documenting the basis for the SRT or RTL

conclusions concerning the objectivity of such an individual. These

objectivity and evaluation forms were to be completed by the end of

April 1986.

The NRC inspector verified the implementation of these revised

commitments by: (1) a review of a sample of the ERC and TERA files

on objectivity of personnel (the TERA records were in Bethesda,

Maryland, and QA branch personnel from the Office of Inspection and

Enforcement conducted this review); (2) review of all the objectivity

records of the testing and electrical personnel; and (3) review of a

sample of the files of the SRT and their support staff. The

objectivity questionnaires and their evaluations by the appropriate

authority were found to be in compliance with the revised commitments

with the following exceptions.

The technical support staff (two individuals) of the CPRT Program

Director had not completed objectivity questionnaires nor had the

personnel on the records review committee. The CPRT Program Director

did not believe the revised commitment applied to these individuals;

however, the commitment states that these documents had been

completed for the SRT, RTL, and support staff. Further, a commitment

was made to document an evaluation of the objectivity forms for all

CPRT personnel by April 1986; however, such an evaluation was not

made for the CPRT Program Director and the TERA RTL evaluation was

not completed until July 17, 1986. These findings represent a

deviation from commitment (445/8622-D-01; 446/8620-0-01).

b. (Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-01): Incorrect electrical pull box

location. Further NRC review established that the ERC determination

of incorrect box location was based on a drawing which was for

guidance only and did not contain mandatory location requirements.

The NRC inspector verified that the box had been properly installed

and met all of the required quality procedure checklist items.

c. .(Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-09): Sharp cable trap edges and cable

. jacket damage. Further NRC review found that NRC Inspection Report

50-445/86-01;-50-446/86-01 had incorrectly associated NCR E85-100831

, with this open item. The correct NCR (i.e., E85-100844) was found to

have been dispositioned and closed. The disposition stated that

since the sharp edges were not inside the cable tray but were on the

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tray's lip, above the cable jacket, the conditions were acceptable.

The NRC inspector performed a reinspection of the cable tray and

-found that the NCR had been properly dispositioned.

d. (Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-11: Loose splice plate bolt.. Further

NRC review found NCR E85-100988 had been dispositioned and closed.

The disposition stated that the nut was jammed and could neither be

tightened or removed. The condition was determined to be acceptable

since Design Change Authorization (DCA) 3883, Revision 2, requires

only six bolts per plate and there are'eight bolts in this plate.

.The NRC inspector performed a reinspection of the splice plate for

this NCR and found that the NCR had been properly dispositioned.

e. (Closed)'Open Item (445/8511-0-21): Missing fire seals. The

findings that fire stop sealing material was not present in the

conduit stubs which entered a control room panel was evaluated during

a review of the ERC deviation report (DR). A review of the

applicable project requirements by the NRC inspector showed that the

seal material can be installed in either end of the conduit and an

inspection revealed that it was installed in the opposite end of

these conduits.

f. (Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-22): Improper electrical separation.

The condition of conduit C13016035 ending just under tray T130CCQ64

instead of ending 10" above the tray was identified during a

witnessed ERC. inspection. Further review by the NRC showed that

Drawing 2323-El-1702, Note Sc, allowed this type of installation

provided 2" of slack was maintained. Reinspection by the NRC of the

installation found it to be acceptable.

g. (Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-23): Group of cables bearing on

single cable, Further review by the NRC found NCR E85-101047X had

been dispositioned and closed. The disposition stated that the

indentation of the cable outer jacket was minor and would not affect

conductor performance. The NRC inspector performed a reinspection of

the cable and found that the NCR had been properly dispositioned.

h. '(0 pen) Open Item (445/8511-0-24): Lack of cable slack. This item

pertained to a lack of the required 2" of cable slack at the cable

tray (T130 SCC 65) to conduit (C13015570) transition for cable E0106091.

Further' review by the NRC inspector showed NCR E85-101211SX had been

written for this deficiency. This item remains open pending

disposition of the NCR.

i. (0 pen) Open Item (445/8511-0-31): Cable with cut outer jacket. This

item pertained to a two conductor cable with a cut outer jacket which

_w as located at the floor penetration for motor control center (MCC)

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IEB1-1. Further review by the NRC showed NCR E85-101048X had been

written for this finding. This item remains open pending disposition

of-the NCR.

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j. (0 pen) Open Item (445/8511-0-32): Incorrect tray to conduit

separation. This item pertained to less than the required 1" of

separation between a cable tray (T030 SCC 68) and a lighting conduit.

Further review by the NRC showed NCR E85-100180S had been written for

this finding. This item remains open pending disposition of the NCR.

k. (Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-38): This item pertained to the lack

of CPRT quality instructions governing ISAP I.a.5 activities.

Further review by the NRC of the required tasks, redispositioning of

NCRs and obtaining a vendor analysis report, showed that the

activities were already governed by acceptable existing site

procedures.

1. (Closed) Violation (445/8511-V-01): Inspector failed to write NCR.

During an NRC witnessed reinspection, a TUGCo QC inspector failed to

document nonconforming conditions and process an NCR in a prompt

manner relative to out-of-scope ERC inspection findings. The

inspector involved was retrained to Procedure CP-QP-16-0,

"Nonconformances," on September 16, 1985. For the nonconforming

conditions identified, TUGCo has issued NCR E85-100993X. In addition

to the above actions, ERC Procedure CPP-020, "Out-of-Scope

Observations," Revision 0, was issued on August 23, 1985, to provide

a procedure to third party inspectors to follow in documenting

out-of scope observations.

m. (Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-37): Prior to the development of_the

design adequacy procedures (DAPs), TERA personnel used informal work

instructions to control their activities.

The DAPs manual was issued in October 1985. This manual is fully

developed, presently containing 23 procedures. NRC inspectors from

the QA branch in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement have

inspected the adequacy and implementation of these procedures at

TERA's office in Bethesda, Maryland, and Berkeley, California. The

results of these inspections are documented in NRC Inspection Reports

50-445/86-17; 50-446/86-14 and 50-445/86-19; 50-446/86-16.

NRC personnel involved in these inspections observed that very little

work was performed by TERA prior to March 1986 that would have

required these procedures being in place. Therefore, the DAP manual

was issued before substantive TERA work was conducted,

n. (Closed) Deviation (446/8513-D-11): This deviation addressed field

reinspection of a containment liner package that included weld seams

between materials of unequal thickness. Change Notice 001 to QI-031,

Revision 2, provided guidelines for measuring reinforcement of welds

using a contour gauge for weld seams between materials of unequal

thickness. Approximately 38 containment liner packages were

reinspected. Two new DRs were issued, ten were superseded, and six

were invalidated. The NRC inspector inspected containment liner

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Verification Package I-S-LINR-061 using Change Notice 001 to QI-031,

Revision 2, and found the weld reinforcement to be acceptable. A

sample offthe results of the additional reinspections by ERC for weld

rein'forcement was reviewed by the NRC inspector. The committed

corrective actions were found by the NRC inspector to have been

., correctly implemented.

o. .(Closed) Open . Item (445/8513-0-01): TERA identified a potentially

-reportable condition on August 27, 1985. This open item was

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initiated in order to track its disposition.

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. t Discrepancy / Issue Resolution Report (DIR) D-0004 was initiated by

' TERA on August 27, 1985, concerning the evaluation of an air gap

deviation using methodology in apparent conflict with FSAR

commitments. "On July 26, 1985, a significant deficiency analysis

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report was,issu'ed (CP85-27) and the NRC was notified that the matter

< - was potentially' reportable under paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR

Part 50. On December 17, 1985, this item was determined to be

reportable and a report was submitted to the NRC. This matter is

included in the CPRT's assessment under ISAP II.c, which the NRC is

monitoring on a continuing basis. Accordingly, this item is closed.

p. (Closed) Open Item (445/8513-0-25): Conduit separation and loose

fittings. This item pertained to two loose conduit couplings and

separation between two conduits being less than the required 1".

These conditions were identified during a witnessed ERC inspection

and were additionally addressed in NRC Inspection Report

50-445/86-01; 50-446/86-01. NRC review during this report period

found that NCR E85-101496SX had been dispositioned and closed. The

disposition of the NCR required the couplings to be tightened and the

conduits reworked to meet the 1" requirement. The NRC performed an

inspection of the conduits and found the reworked condition

acceptable.

q. (Closed) Open Item (445/8513-0-28): Incorrect tray node

identification. This item pertained to a tray section identification

tag not located as shown on Drawing 2323-El-0500-16. Further NRC

review of Drawing 2323-El-0500-16 found that note 1 is used only to

identify the location of the tray segment, not its identification.

Review of TUGCo Instruction QI-QP-11.3-24, " Class IE Cable Tray

Raceway Inspections," by the NRC inspector found that the tray

identification tag was properly installed,

r. (0 pen) Open Item (445/8513-0-38): Misaligned torque indicators.

This item pertained to anti-torque indicators on flexible hose

connections which were misaligned. Further NRC review found that

DR-I-E-ININ-005-DR01 and NCR 185-101251SX had been written for this

condition. This item remains open pending disposition of the NCR.

s. (0 pen) Open Item (445/8513-0-39): Loose lighting switch box. This

item pertained to a lighting circuit switch box which was loose.

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Further NRC review found that NCR E86-101053X had been written for

this condition. This item remains open pending disposition of the

.NCR.

., t. :(0 pen) Open Item'(445/8514-0-03): Cable routing and conduit

. . identification. The conditions of incorrect routing for cable

EG113538 and two through-wall conduit sleeves with the same

identification number were noted during a witnessed ERC inspection.

-Review of ERC Verification Package I-E-CABL-078 by the NRC inspector

showed that DR I-E-CAB-078-DR01 and NCR E85-101382SX had been written

for these conditions. This item remains open pending disposition of

the NCR.

u. (Closed) Open Item (445/8514-0-11): Incomplete procedure. The

condition that an ERC procedure (QI-009) did not reference the

specific procedures for plant Class IE lighting conduits was resolved

by the initiation of a new population for lighting circuits. The new

population covered all aspects of the plant lighting circuits,

including the conduits, and resulted in the removal of lighting

circuits from the other populations; i.e., conduit, cables,

equipment. Therefore, the new population eliminated the need to

incorporate lighting conduit procedures in the conduit inspection

procedures.

v. (Closed) Deviation (445/8516-D-41): This deviatica

addressed: (1) an inconsistency regarding measurement of liner

contour between ERC QI-031, Revision 0, for containment liner

reinspection and Gibbs & Hill (G&H) Containment Liner

Specification 2323-S5-14, Revision 4; and (2) a failure to provide

comprehensive instructions for reinspection of containment liner

contour using a 10' straight edge.

The committed corrective action involved the revision of the

applicable paragraphs in QI-031. ERC conducted a review of each QI

for clarity and discussed changes to QI-031 with the ERC inspectors.

QI-031 was revised and Revision 1 was issued on January 15, 1986. A

review of inspection packages completed prior to this date was

conducted by the NRC inspector. The committed corrective actions

have been made to determine if any package was inappropriately marked

"N/A" for Attribute A.1.b. In addition, ERC determined that previous

inspections using the 10' straight edge (Attribute A.1.d) were

correctly performed.

The NRC inspector reviewed the changes made to QI-031 to assure

consistency with G&H Specification 2323-55-14 and that adequate

instructions were provided for the measurement of containment liner

contour. The NRC inspector also discussed with the ERC population

engineer and inspectors, the methods used for inspection of these

attributes prior to January 15, 1986. The NRC inspector reviewed an

additional ten containment liner reinspection packages and determined

that the original ERC reinspection conformed to Attributes A.1.b. and

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A.1.d of QI-031, Revision 1. The committed corrective actions were

verified to have been implemented,

w. (Closed) Deviation (445/8516-D-42): -This deviation addressed field

reinspections of containment liner packages by ERC that were not

performed in accordance with approved instructions. The ERC

inspector entered "N/A" for not applicable and " dome only" in the

remarks column for Attribute A.1.a on the checklists for three

containment liner packages. These verification packages involved the

cylindrical liner and Attribute A.1.a did, in fact, apply.

The committed corrective actions involved the revision of ERC QI-031

and a review of reinspection packages. In addition to the 3 noted

verification packages, 14 other packages initially reinspected by the

same ERC inspector were identified as having "N/A" and " dome only"

entered for Attribute A.1.a. These packages were reinspected for

Attribute A.1.a and two new DRs were issued regarding liner contour.

The NRC. inspector has reviewed the corrections made to QI-031, the

results of the ERC reinspection of Verification Packages I-S-LINR-08,

I-S-LINR-12, and I-S-LINR-61, and three of the additional packages

reinspected by ERC for Attribute A.1.a. The committed corrective

actions have been verified by the NRC to have been implemented.

x. (Closed) Deviation (445/8516-D-47): This deviation addressed the

completeness and accuracy of an ERC checklist for a concrete

placement reinspection. Attribute 3. A of the completed checklist for

Verification Package I-S-CONC-015 was neither accepted nor rejected;

i.e., not signed off, and actual reinspection for this attribute

could not be verified. The checklist was approved and signed by both

the lead inspector and the lead discipline engineer.

The committed corrective actions were the reinspection of this

verification package for Attribute 3.A. and ERC management meetings

'with all ERC inspectors and leads to emphasize the importance of

providing complete and accurate information. The overview inspection

program has also been implemented to reinspect a sample of each

inspector's work. The NRC inspector reviewed ERC's reinspection of

Verification Package I-S-CONC-015 and established from record review

that training meetings were held with ERC inspectors and' leads. A

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review of the overview inspection program is ongoing. The committed

corrective actions have been implemented.

y. (Closed) Deviation (445/8516-D-48): [ Note: This deviation was

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incorrectly identified as 445/8516-D-47 in the Notice of Deviation,  !

NRC Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13. Appendix 0 of that

report torrectly identified the deviation as 445/8516-D-48]. This

deviation ^ addressed field reinspection of a concrete placement

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package by ERC that was not performed in accordance with approved

instructions. The ERC inspector entered "N/A" for not applicable and

" coated" in the remarks column for Attribute 3.A on the checklist for

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Verification Package I-S-CONC-057. A subsequent NRC inspection,

however, identified that the surface was not coated.

The committed corrective actions involved discussions with the

inspector and a historical review of the inspector's activity by the

ERC overview inspection program. No additional errors were -

identified. The ERC inspector stated that reinspection was made on a

blockout immediately adjacent to the designated blockout. The NRC

inspector has reinspected Verification Package I-S-CONC-057, verified

ERC's reinspection of the correct blockout, and reviewed the results

of the ERC overview inspection program. The committed corrective

actions have been implemented.

z. (Closed) Unresolved Item (446/8602-U-12): It was not apparent that

inspection of square groove weld penetration conditions had been

considered in the Corporate Consulting & Development Company, Ltd.

(CCL) reanalysis of HVAC supports.

Further review of this item identified Memorandum No. BSC-2156, which

references Section 6.2 of Revision 8 to Bahnson Service Company (BSC)

Procedure DFP-TUSI-003 and states, "The following shall be considered

a part of the subject procedure: All groove welds on the seismic

duct hanger detail drawings shall be shown as square groove welds.

Unless otherwise stated the weld shall be considered partial

penetration. No size will be shown. Per the attached test results a

penetration of not less than 1/8" (0.125") is achieved. These tests

results with coupons are retained in DCC."

This 1/8" penetration has been used in CCL's reanalysis of HVAC

supports in Unit 2. However, the available documentation for the

original test program did not assure that the test results were fully

representative of minimum penetration conditions that could occur

during field welding; i.e., the position used to weld the samples was

not recorded and etching was performed on weld sample ends rather

than on sections cut from samples. Further, the tests coupons were

not retained in the Document Control Center (DCC) and could not be

located.

Additional welded samples were prepared and sections macroetched,

with the NRC inspector witnessing the activities. The samples were

welded with a 3/32" electrode in the vertical position using BSC

Welding Procedure Specification BSC-20. Macroetching of sections

revealed a maximum partial penetration of 0.047", which is 0.078"

less than the claimed penetration used for reanalysis.

The unresolved item is closed and replaced by a violation, as a

result of the original test program documentation and witnessed

macroetch activities failing to provide an appropriate test basis for

assumptions used in the design analysis (446/8620-V-02).

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Employee Protection Posting

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[ Paragraph (e) in 10 CFR Part 50.7, " Employee Protection," requires the

j applicant to post Form NRC-3 " Notice to Employees" on its premises.

Posting must be at locations sufficient to permit employees to observe a

copy on the way to or from their place of work.

As-a. result of recent relocations and modifications to entrances and

! exits, the NRC inspector performed an inspection to determine if TUGCo

was in compliance with the above requirements. The inspection revealed

that TUGCo was in. compliance in that Form NRC-3 had been conspicuously

posted at all entrances and exits to the job site, and at various

i. locations within Units 1 and 2.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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4. CPRT ISAPs (Excluding ISAP VII.c)

a. Butt Splice Qualification ISAP I.a.3

The NRC inspector participated, with representatives of NRR and the

applicant, in an inspection of selected Unit 1 panels known to

i contain the AMP splices that are the-subject of this ISAP. The

, panels-(i.e., control room relay panel CR-03, cable spreading room

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. termination cabinets TC 41 and TC 42, and auxiliary building MCC

CEB 4-1) were inspected to familiarize the NRR representative with

the type.of installations and configurations in which the splices ~are

4 installed.

During this inspection, the NRC inspector noted wrappings of

electrical tape on a conductor in control room panel CP1-ECPRCR-03.

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- The green conductor of cable E0112530 was subsequently identified as

having had its insulation repaired and inspected by Maintenance

Action Request (MAR) 85-0757 as implemented by Operation Traveler

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EE85-11348-2203.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. QC Inspector Qualifications (ISAP I.d.1)

i During this report period, the activities identified by NRC Reference

No 01.d.01.04 were inspected as follows:

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Phase III Sample Selection and Reinspection (NRC Reference No.

01.d.01.04)

The NRC inspector reviewed four reinspection matrices approved by the

ERC Discipline Level III inspector. These matrices were used to

evaluate the performance of those inspectors placed into Phase III

due to documentation difficulties with their qualifications. The

reinspection matrices were for TUGCo Instructions QI-QP-11.2-1,

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.-. , - . . . . ,,,--m.-

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~ , , r.- ..-, ~. _ ___,,..-_,.,_-,_m. , , , . - - _ , . , , , - , , . .

-

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,

-13- -

Revision 16, " Installation of Drilled-in Hilti Bolts"; QI-QP-11.14-8,-

Revisions 1 and 2, " Verification of Installation of Richmond Insert

Bolts"; QI-QP-11.0-15. The NRC inspector verified that the

'

reinspection matrices identified the inspection procedures and

4

' . designated the' inspection attributes as recreatable/nonrecreatable

s and subjective / objective as defined in ERC QI-005, " Evaluation of

Inspector Performance."

~

The NRC inspector witnessed the ERC Phase III reinspection of TUGCo

" Inspection Reports (irs) 2-0010162 and 2-0020136. Subsequent NRC

review of,the completed ERC reinspection matrices for these two irs

found-them to be complete and to properly reflect the actual field

conditions.

No violations or deviations were noted during this inspection.

c. Craft Personnel Training (ISAP I.d.3)

During this report period, the ISAP activities identified by NRC

Reference Nos. 01.d.03.02, 01.d.03.03, 01.d.03.04, 01.d.03.05,

01.d.03.06, and 01.d.03.07 were inspected as follows:

Interview Personnel (NRC Reference No 01.d.03.02)

The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation from the interviews of

site personnel conducted by ERC. Thirty-seven interviews of

personnel were conducted, with the selection of personnel interviewed

ranging'from general superintendents to craft journeymen and helpers.

The NRC inspection was performed to determine if the attributes

listed in Section 4.1.2 of the ISAP were included.- Since no

established list of questions was utilized in the ERC interviews, the

NRC inspector reviewed the interviews to assure that each attribute

was included. It was found that the interviews in total did address

each attribute, although not every attribute was applicable or

addressed in each interview; e.g., attributes applicable to

management were only addressed in the management interviews.

From review of interviews, the NRC inspector determined that specific

areas of NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) concern, such as knowledge

of criteria used for lifting of heavy loads and installation of

electrical supports were addressed in interviews of the

representative craft personnel.

Separate NRC interviews of personnel are planned to be conducted

during a subsequent inspection.

No violations or deviations were noted.

-14-

'

. Observe Training and Field Activitics (NRC Reference No. 01.d.03.03) I

- 1

-

-  : The NRC inspector reviewed the records of ERC's observations of

>

training and field activities. These records showed that one class

  1. *

each of mock up training, classroom training, and procedural training )

'

were observed. The lesson plan for each class was reviewed by the

. . NRC inspector. The ERC observations were found by the NRC inspector j

,

to be in agreement with the lesson plans. The records of field 1

activities observed showed that 11 field activities were observed '

which included installation of Hilti bolts and pipe hanger rework in

-

the mechanical discipline, cable termination and pulling in the

electrical discipline and installation of a duct and a duct hanger

for HVAC. The field observations lists were noted by the NRC

inspectcr to contain attributes that would be found in the applicable

procedures, but did not give either a direct reference to the procedure

in most cases, or provide specific evidence of craft compliance with

these attributes. The ERC observers were determined by the NRC

. inspector from file review to have previously reviewed the craft

procedures to familiarize themselves with the craft activities to be

observed. The NRC inspector verified that the listed procedures were

applicable to the field activities observed. Additional assessment

of the adequacy of field activity observations will be made during a

subsequent NRC inspection.

No violations or deviations were identified during this inspection.

Recommendations for Improvement and Evaluation of Changes (NRC

Reference Nos. 01.d.03.04 and 01.d.03.05)

The NRC inspector verified performance of the following ERC

activities by inspection of documents in the working files for this

ISAP.

ERC addressed through implementation of this ISAP the specific TRT

concerns for conduit supports, lifting of heavy loads, and the

general concern of craft training. ERC found by interviews of

electrical personnel and observation of a conduit support

installation that craft were aware of necessary documents of

installation, but did not always recall the formal name of the

documents. ERC found by review of the training procedure, interviews

of rigging personnel, training records, and a field observation that

training related to lifting of heavy loads was adequate. ERC also

found as a result of interviews, procedure review, and field

observations that the training programs of Brown & Root (B&R) and BSC

craft personnel were adequate and therefore recommendations for

improvement or evaluation of changes were not applicable.

The NRC inspector inspected the current training procedure of B&R and

found that it met the requirements of ANSI N45.2, 1971, and the

guidelines on training given by Section D of the Gray Book, " Guidance

on Quality Assurance During Design and Procurement Phase of Nuclear

-15-

Power Plants." The NRC inspector verified a portion of the training

records listed in the ERC working files by reviewing the signed

attendance sheets in the TUGCo training files. The NRC inspector

inspected the lesson plans for the training classes that were

monitored by ERC and found that the lesson plans support the ERC

observations of mockup, classroom, and procedural training adequacy.

The ERC review of Corrective Action Requests (CARS) related to craft

training was inspected by the NRC inspector.

A sample of the CARS reviewed by ERC was inspected in detail. These

CARS were found by the NRC inspector to support ERC's determination

that most craft training related CARS pertained to documentatiei,

administrative, and clerical deficiencies rather than craft training

program or implementation deficiencies. NRC inspection of the BSC

training program will be reported in a subsequent inspection report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

Qualification of Personnel (NRC Reference No. 01.d.03.06)

The NRC inspector verified the qualification of personnel associated

with the evaluation of this ISAP. The resumes and objectivity

questionnaires from the personnel files were; reviewed and found to

meet the requirements of the CPRT Program Plan.

No violations or deviations were noted during this inspection. No

further NRC inspection is planned for this reference area.

Root Cause Determined from VII.c Results (NRC Reference

No. 01.d.03.07)

The results report for ISAP I.d.3 was approved by the SRT on

August 27, 1986. No program deviations or deficiencies were

identified by ERC; therefore, root cause and generic implication

analyses were determined by ERC to be not applicable. NRC evaluation

of this determination will be reported when inspection of I.d.3

activities is completed. Craft training may be determined to be the

root cause of construction deficiencies or adverse trends found

'

during implementation of other ISAPs, including VII.c. If this

'

occurs, the Collective Evaluation Group is responsible for evaluation

of' that determination. NRC inspection of the Collective Evaluation

Group. activities for this ISAP reference area (01.d.03.07) will be

,,

< reported when the collective evaluation is completed.

, , ,

t

Noitolationsordeviationswerenotedduringthisinspection .

.

4

2

%.

J

-16-

d. Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures (ISAP II.c)

The following activities for ISAP II.c were reviewed by the NRC

inspector during this report period:

Reinspect and Assess As-Built Condition (NRC Reference No. 02.c.01.00)

The NRC inspector reviewed Unit 1 and Unit 2 work in progress on

single wall, secondary wall, and basemat gap initial clean out and

inspection. These activities are complete for single wall gaps. The

initial clean out of foam to allow for. gap inspection has started for

secondary wall gaps with approximately 70% of the work complete. The

initial clean out of foam and inspection of the as-built condition

has also started for gaps associated with the basemat.

Initial clean out and inspection of double wall gaps is essentially

complete with the exception of several areas at or near the basemat

that are not accessible through existing access points. Two

blockouts, approximately 6' x 6', have been cut through the auxiliary

building walls to provide access to the gaps between the auxiliary

and safeguards buildings for both Units 1 and 2 at the 790' level.

Five additional blockouts are planned.

No violations or deviations were identified.

Removal of Debris or Rotofoam (NRC Reference No. 02.c.02.00)

The NRC inspector witnessed ongoing cleaning and repair activities of

air gaps between structures in Units 1 and 2 during this report

period. These activities included use of a high pressure water jet

system, concrete removal from single walled gaps, grinding of

concrete in secondary wall gaps to increase the gap dimensions, and

removal of debris through the blockouts discussed above.

NRC inspections were not performed on other activities during this

report period.

No violations or deviations were identified,

e. Plug Welds (ISAP V.d)

The following activities for ISAP V.d were reviewed by the NRC

inspector during this report period:

Determine Effects of Plug Welds on Quality of Supports (NRC Reference

No. 05.d.09.03)

A concern relative to the effect of plug welds on the quality of

supports is the influence on weld properties of the slag removal

method used during welding. To address this concern, a program was

established by the CPRT in which 3/4" diameter plug welds were made

-17-

in 3/8" thick predrilled plates. Three welders were randomly

selected from a list of all welders qualified to make plug welds.

Each welder was provided with eight test plates and instructed to

make plug welds and remove slag with a chipping hammer and wire brush

on the first four test plates, and a grinding tool on the remaining

four test plates. Each of the 24 test plates was radiographed per

AWS 01.1. Three test plates were selected from each slag removal

process used by each welder (i.e., 18 plates) and tensile test

coupons were prepared and tested per ASTM E8.

The two remaining coupons prepared by each of the the three welders

were sectioned, polished, and acid etched for macroscopic testing.

The NRC inspector will review all test results and associated

documentation during a subsequent report period.

No other activities in this ISAP were inspected during this report

period.

No violations or deviations were identified.

f. Periodic Review of the QA Program (ISAP VII.a.5)

During this report period, the ISAP activities identified by NRC

Reference Nos. 07.a.05.01 and 07.a.05.02 were inspected as follows:

Develop Criteria for Review of the QA Program (NRC Reference

No. 07.a.05.01)

ERC considered information obtainr>d from INP0 and guidance from the

USNRC Standard Review Plan in developing the review criteria to

assess the current management review of the QA program. The review

criteria specified that a policy statement of management objectives

for the QA program be published and that specific details be

developed to assure management's review of progress in meeting those

objectives. In addition, the review criteria required management

review of: current QA status reports, including any deficiencies

from all departments; trend analysis reports; audit reports; notices

and bulletins from external sources; construction progress reports;

and other typical sources. The ERC review criteria further specified

that the methods should be detailed by which management would:

respond to reported information; track deficiencies and assure that

followup and closecut is performed; and provide for an annual review

of management's actions in meeting the published objectives. The NRC

inspector verified that the applicable elements of the USNRC Standard

Review Plan were incorporated in the ERC review criteria. The NRC

inspector determined that the ERC review criteria would provide an

adequate basis to perform an evaluation of management review of the

QA program required in paragraph 4.1.2.4 of the ISAP.

!

-18-

ERC's development of review criteria is complete. No violations or

deviations were identified and no further NRC inspection is planned

for this reference area.

Evaluation of the Current QA Program Review Versus the Developed

Criteria (NRC Reference No. 07.a.05.02)

The NRC inspector reviewed the ERC issue coordinator's evaluation of

the current QA program review. The ERC evaluation reviewed Policy

Statement No.2, Revision 0, issued by the Executive Vice President

for Nuclear Engineering and Operations (NE0). This policy statement

details the QA program objectives and defines the responsibilities of

the Director of QA and the organizational vice presidents. The

policy specifies that the vice presidents shall meet periodically to

assess the status and adequacy of the QA program and at least

annually provide a written assessment of the QA program to the

Executive Vice President, NE0. The Executive Vice President, NE0, is

responsible to assure that an annual independent assessment of the

TUGCo QA program is performed. NE0 Procedure 2.20, Revision 1,

" Senior Management QA Overview Program," details the methods by which

the objectives of the policy statement are to be implemented. The

issue coordinator reviewed NE0 2.20, Revision 1, and attended the

first two meetings of the Senior Management Quality Assurance

Overview Committee. The notes and recommendations of the issue

coordinator and the minutes of the overview committee meetings were

reviewed by the NRC inspector. The results of this review showed

that the issue coordinator had evaluated the meetings against the

objectives of Policy Statement No. 2 and the ERC developed criteria.

NRC's review of these notes and Revision 1 of NE0 2.20 showed that

recommendations of the issue coordinator had been incorporated.

No violations or deviations were identified and no further NRC

inspection is planned for this reference area.

g. Receipt and Storage of Purchased Material and Equipment (ISAP VII.a.9)

Receipt Inspection Report (RIR) 13686 was inspected by the NRC as a

sample of the implementation of ISAP VII.a.9. During this

inspection, a disc insert for main steam safety valve CP2-2MS-021 and

two spare disc inserts were found not to have required records of

heat treatment available in the documentation package. The NRC

inspector noted that implementation of ISAP VII.a.9, Revision 0,

would not have identified the deficiency. For this and other

reasons, ISAP VII.a.9 is undergoing revision. The failure to have

heat treatment records for the indicated disc inserts is a violation

(445/8622-V-02; 446/8620-V-03).

.

-19-

[ ,

, h. 'Onsite~ Fabrication (ISAP VII.b.1)

m

~'

During this report period, the ISAP activities identified by NRC

,

.

, Reference Nos. 07.b.01.01 and 07.b.01.03 were inspected as follows:

Review and Evaluate Procedures for Onsite Fabrication (NRC Reference

.

No. 07.b.01.01)

The NRC inspected the review performed by ERC of material storage,

fabrication, and inspection procedures applicable to both ASME and

non-ASME onsite fabrication. The ERC review listed the attributes

necessary for control of material traceability, fabrication

processes, and item inspection for acceptability. The ERC review

then identified where the attributes existed in the historical and

the current procedures. NRC inspection of the attributes found them

to reflect the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criteria VIII and XIII; ANSI N45.2; and the Comanche Peak FSAR. The

NRC inspector selected several of the attributes for inspection and

verified that the attributes were included in the procedures for the

times specified (historical and current) by the ERC review.

No violations or deviations were noted in this area and no further

NRC inspection is planned for the reference item.

Review Fabrication Packages (NRC Reference No. 07.b.01.03)

The ERC sample selection and review of ASME-related fabrication

packages were inspected by the NRC inspector. ERC reviews of

non-ASME packages are near completion and will be inspected and

reported when complete. The 73 ASME-related package reviews were

inspected for overall completeness and adherence to the guidelines of

the ISAP and the review checklists. The following nine ERC package

reviews were selected for inspection in detail:

CC-1-195-015-C42R SI-1-101-011-C41R

CH-1-206-703-E23R RH-1-063-010-S22R

SI-1-031-033-Y32K RH-2-006-408-C42R

PS-2-R8-011-003-2 SW-1-102-086-543R

CT-1-031-015-C82K

These package reviews were compared to the hanger packages and other

applicable documents to determine their completeness and accuracy.

NRC inspection showed that eight of the nine package reviews were

complete and accurate for all review criteria, such as welder or

inspector qualifications, all required inspections complete, required

documentation complete and legible, documentation consistent and in

proper sequence, and traceability requirements met. One package was

noted to have failed to record four inspectors and two welders. This

. deficiency was corrected at the time of discovery and all reviews

performed by the responsible document reviewer were repeated. NRC

-20-

inspection of the repeated reviews found them to be satisfactory.

This deficiency has been identified as a deviation (445/8622-D-03;

446/8620-D-04).

No other violations or deviations were noted.

i. Valve Disassembly (ISAP VII.b.2)

Review Construction and QC Procedures to Determine if They Provide

Adequate Controls of Materials During Disassembly / Reassembly (NRC

Reference No. 07.b.02.03)

NRC Inspection Report 50-445/86-07; 50-446/86-05, documented in

Deviation 445/8607-D-26 the failure of CPRT to identify that B&R did

not have an implementing procedure in existence for a portion of 1983

to control the disassembly / reassembly of valves. The CPRT

investigated to determine the reason (s) for not having a procedure in

effect for the five month time span and what effect it had on the

valve di'sassembly/ reassembly process. The CPRT's response is

documented in a memorandum dated May 23, 1986, from Counsil to

Noonan.

Based on review of the above memorandum, the NRC inspector concurs

with the CPRT finding that with the appropriate portions of QA

Procedure QI-QAP-11-1.26, Revisions 9 thru 12, still in effect, and

the use of an operation traveler similar in format and content to

those utilized prior to the procedural omission, adequate control of

valve disassembly / reassembly existed during this time frame. This

activity is complete.

No violations or deviations were identified.

Perform an Analysis to Determine the Safety Consequences of

Improperly Assembled Valves (NRC Reference No. 07.b.02.04)

An analysis was performed by CPRT to determine the safety

consequences and failure modes of improperly assembled generic

valves. Generic valves are those which required disassembly of all

valves of that type and included ITT Grinnell diaphragm valves and

Borg-Warner check valves.

All possible combinations of reassembling generic valve bodies and

bonnets of the same size and type were evaluated in this analysis.

CPRT concluded that improper reassembly could possibly result in a

loss of valve function for Borg-Warner check valves. For ITT

Grinnell diaphragm valves, it was determined that improper reassembly

would result in ASME Code violations, but not a loss of valve

function. The NRC inspector reviewed this analysis for validity and

completeness, factoring into the review ASME Code requirements and

information received from the valve vendors. However, a satisfactory

response is required with respect to a previously identified

-21-

unresolved item (445/8607-U-28) before a final evaluation of this

ISAP element can be made. This unresolved item deals with the lack

of consideration in the results report, after stating there was a

potential for switching ASME and non-ASME bonnets, of the

significance of differences in QA requirements for non-ASME and ASME .

Code bonnets.

No violations or deviations were identified.

Additional NRC Findings

As a result of DRs identifying the lack of traceability between the

installed bonnet and the vendor supplied NPV-1 form for Valve Tag

Nos. 1-7046 and XSF-179, NCRs were issued by B&R. NCRs M-23175N,

Revision 1, and M-23178N were initiated on February 25, 1986, and

were dispositioned and closed out by TUGCo on July 15, 1986. To

assess the applicant's review of these nonconformances, the NRC

inspector reviewed the NCR dispositions.

The dispositions stated that documentation, except for hydrostatic

testing, was received from the vendor indicating that the bonnet

material met all applicable requirements of ASME Section II and

Section III, ND-2000. The dispositions, however, stated that an

acceptable bonnet hydrostatic test was performed during the

system / subsystem hydrostatic test, as allowed by the ASME Code. In

order to reconcile the fact that the valve bonnet heat numbers did

not correspond with those specified on the vendor's Nuclear

Valves / Heat Code Identification, the dispositions stated that the

bonnets shall be considered as replacement parts and documented as

such on an NIS-2 form, which is an Owner's Report for Repair and

Replacement.

. As a result of this review, the NRC inspector identified the

following:

(1) The disposition was incorrect with respect to an acceptable

bonnet hydrostatic test being performed during the system /

subsystem hydrostatic test. When a diaphragm valve is

hydrostatic tested as a complete assembly, the diaphragm

isolates the bonnet from any hydrostatic pressures, Therefore,

there is still no evidence of the required hydrostatic test

having been properly performed. This incorrect disposition of

the NCRs is a violation (445/8622-V-04).

_

(2) The NRC questions the validity of utilizing an NIS-2 form to

document as-installed components. This matter is an unresolved

item pending the applicant providing the NRC with adequate bases

for using the NIS-2 forms (445/8622-U-05).

(3) Table 3.2-1 in Section 3 of Amendment 56 to the CPSES FSAR

requires that Class 2 and 3 valves shall meet the requirements

l

-

-22-

of the 1974 Edition of Section III of the ASME Code.

Westinghouse P0 546-CCA-191000-XN, which deals with Class 2 and

3 valves, specifies, however, the applicable Code requirement to

be Section III, 1971 Edition, Summer 1972 Addenda. Receipt of

valves in accordance with this criteria is evidenced by the

NPV-1 form for Valve Tag No. 1-7046 which states, "The material,

design, construction, and workmanship complies with ASME Code,

Section III, Class 3, 1971 Edition, Summer 1972 Addenda." The

failure to comply with FSAR commitments is a deviation

(445/8622-D-06).

J. Pipe Support Inspections (ISAP VII.b.3)

(1) Status of CPRT Activity

The reinspections being performed under ISAP VII.b.3 deal with

pipe supports located in Room 77N and the 42 pipe supports

previously inspected by the TRT. All other pipe support

populations and their samples are being reinspected under

ISAP VII.c.

~ Room 77N Pipe Supports

Reinspection of the 178 pipe supports identified as being

nonconforming by TRT has been completed. Of the 252 deviations

identified, 248 have been evaluated to date, with 99 determined

to be valid.

~

TRT Issues - 42 Pipe Supports

Of the 42 pipe supports identified by TRT as being nonconform-

ing, 40 have been reinspected. Of the 103 deviations

identified, 99 have been evaluated to date, with 67 determined

to be valid.

(2) Status of NRC Inspection Activity

Room 77N Pipe Supports

To date, a total of 9 ERC reinspections have been witnessed and

16 NRC inspections of ERC verification packages have been

performed. Eight of the 16 NRC inspections were performed in

conjunction with the NRC inspection of the ERC overview

inspection program.

As a result of a previously identified deviation (445/8607-D-13)

pertaining to improper acceptance of a spherical bearing gap

measurement by an ERC inspector, ERC determined that six

verification packages which had been previously inspected by

3

-23-

that ERC inspector would be reinspected. The six reinspected

packages are:

'

I-S-LBSN-048 I-S-LBSR-009 I-S-SBPS-033

I-S-PS7N-001 I-S-PS7N-135 I-S-PS7N-145

The reinspections of the spherical bearing gaps were witnessed

by the NRC inspector, and resulted in the identification of

out-of-scope observations pertaining to paint on the spherical

bearings for packages I-S-PS7N-001, I-S-PS7N-135, and

I-S-PS7N-145.

Disposition of these out-of-scope observations is an open item

(445/8622-0-07).

TRT Issues - 42 Pipe Supports

There were no NRC inspections performed in this area during this

report period.

No NRC inspections were performed in other ISAP VII.b.3

activities.

5. ISAP VII.c

a. Electrical Equipment

Status of CPRT Activity

ERC has completed 98 reinspections and 98 documentation review

packages of sampled electrical equipment as of August 31, 1986.

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

The status of NRC inspection activity remains unchanged for the ERC

population sample from the previous inspection report; i.e., the NRC

inspectors have witnessed 11 ERC reinspections, performed separate

reviews of 10 documentation packages, and performed 6 separate

inspections of sampled electrical equipment. The NRC inspectors

did, however, perform the following inspection during this report

period of electrical equipment which was not included in the ERC

population sample:

(1) The NRC inspectors performed an inspection of the four

safety-related refrigeration units to verify proper

installation. The inspections included observations that:

(a) components were properly installed and identified as

indicated on the latest design documents, (b) supports and

attachments were properly mounted and secured, (c) protective

coatings were as specified, (d) electrical separation and

, l

.__ . _ . .

,_ .

.

'

b -24-

-

-

< 4

L -

,

'

independence were maintained, and (e) provisions related to

,

'

,

. environmental qualification of the components were maintained.

-

The ;following refrigeration units cool the safety chilled water

'

>3

system l(SCW) which provides cooling water to various engineered

,

e

safety. features (ESF) components' room coolers:

~

. Equipment No. System Unit

. .

'

'

CP1-CHCICE-05 SCW 1

CP1-CHCICE-06 SCW 1

CP2-CHCICE-05 SCW 2

CP2-CHCICE-06 SCW 2

During the above inspections, the following conditions, which

appeared to deviate from CPSES electrical erection specification

requirements, were identified.

'

CP1-05

'

(a) Bolts on the compressor discharge flange were not installed

as shown on Drawing 376-09121E;

j (b) . Paint on the underside of the compressor was peeling;

(c) Some of the devices inside the control panel had wires

terminated using slide-on, tab type connectors;

(d) A number of wires inside the control panel had a short bend

radius;

(e) A number of connectors had two conductors crimped inside

one connector's barrel;

,

(f) Fitting No. OPG, inside the control panel, was leaking oil

, onto relay SG and its associated wiring, which had resulted

in damage to the insulation of one of the wires;

(g) The flexible conduit for switch PRV had the outer jacket

split and falling off; and

(h) Cap type, inline splice connectors were used to terminate

instruments and limit switches.

l CP1-06

This unit had the same conditions as identified in (a), (c),

'

(d), (e), (f), and (h) above for CP1-05, and:

(a) Some splices used to terminate instruments and limit

switches were made using Thomas and Betts (T&B) RC-6

L

!

1

I.

_ .- _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ - . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-

-25-

connectors, which are usually only used for lighting

circuits; and >

(b) A cap type, inline splice was installed on a wire in the

control panel.

CP2-05

This' unit had the same conditions as identified in (a), (c),

(d), (e), (f), and (h) for CP1-05.

CP2-06

This unit had the same conditions as identified in (a), (c),

(d), (e), (f), and (h) for CP1-05 and one of the auxiliary oil'

pump motor leads was also terminated using a wire nut.

The above findings are an unresolved item pending the completion

of an NRC review of the applicable requirements for these pieces

of equipment (445/8622-U-08; 446/8620-U-05).

(2) In addition to the above inspection efforts, the NRC inspector

noted, during a tour of the Unit 1 cable spreading room, feeder

cable splices and a cable jacket repair inside distribution

panel CPX-ECDPEC-02. The cover had been removed from this

panel, as well as another N nel, to facilitate some plant

modifications; the. cable il question (EG205704) was, however,-

unaffected by those modifications.

The NRC inspector noted that the outer jacket of one of the two

conductors of cable EG205704 had been repaired by wrappings of

electrical tape and that both conductors had been reduced in

size from AWG 4/0 to AWG #2 through the use of reduction 4

splices. A review of the applicable records showed:

(a) The damage to the cable jacket.had been reported in NCR

E84-01095, was repaired and the results recorded in

>,.

IR E-1-0036473.

..

.

,

~

(b) The reduction splices were installed in accordance with

. 4

. construction operation traveler EE83-3520-2-02CT. The

,

reduction consisted of installing a terminal lug of the

i , 'properisize on each of the conductors and then bolting the

"

..l'ugs,of one of the 4/0 and one of the #2 together. These

. ,

connections were then covered with heat shrinkable tubing

,  ; insulation.

_

-

e,

i

. 'The conductor size reduction was necessary for connection

,

'.,- to.the c_ircuit breaker in the panel. Since the circuit

= breaker was rated for 100 amperes, and a review of the

applicable plant drawing (2323-El-1701) showed the smaller

-26-

(#2 AWG) conductor was rated for 116 amperes, sufficient

current carrying capability was maintained by the

reduction.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Documentation Review of NIS Cable Terminations

Status of CPRT Activity

ERC completed the review of the 60 sampled nuclear instrumentation

system (NIS) cable termination verification packages prior to

August 31, 1986.

~

Because the attributes affecting these connectors

are not inspectable without completely reworking the connectors, no

physical inspections were required. ERC is continuing the evaluation

of the deviations which were noted during the documentation reviews.

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

(1) Procedures Review

The NRC inspector initiated the review of this population during

this report period. A review of the procedure which was

utilized by ERC (QI-074, Revision 0, dated March 10, 1986,

" Documentation Review of NIS Cable Terminations /R-E-NIST")

showed that it required checking five attributes. The ERC

reviewer was required to verify that: (a) all attributes on the

IR for the connector were indicated to be satisfactory, (b) all

IR attributes for insulation and resistance measuring were

satisfactory, (c) all IR attributes for the coupling of the

connector were satisfactory, (d) all IR attributes for soldered

connections were satisfactory, and (e) the QC inspector who

verified the above four connection attributes was certified to

the applicable procedure. The NRC inspector also reviewed the

latest revision of the QC installation inspection procedure for

NIS connectors, QI-QP-11.3-43, Revision 20, dated February 18,

1986, " Verify Testing and Installation of NIS Triaxial Cable

-Connectors."

(2) CPRT Records Review

'

Ten of the completed ERC verification packages were selected at

random and reviewed by the NRC inspector. A total of 9 DRs were

'

noted to have been written by the ERC inspectors for findings

made during their documentation reviews of these 10 packages.

Each package consisted of one NIS connector. Of the nine DRs,

four were written because the heat shrink tubing (HST) had not

been installed over the completed connection. A subsequent

review of the applicable requirements by ERC showed that HST

need only be applied to those NIS connectors at the containment

penetrations and at the detector wells. Since all of the

.

-27-

connectors in question were equipment connections, HST was not

required. One DR was written because the test date was not

included in the package; however, the data sheet was-

subsequently located. Another DR was written because the "0"

ring seal-between connector halves had not been installed;

however, the connector in question was, a spare connector which

'

was covered with HST and not mated with another connector half.  ;

A seventh DR was written because a procedure step for insulation

and resistance measurements had been marked "N/A"; however,

since the connector was not a penetration connection, these

4

measurements were not required. The remaining two DRs were

written because.other steps in the procedure had been marked

"NA." Further review determined that the steps marked "NA" were

not required for the particular application. ERC, therefore,

determined that all of the nine DRs were invalid.

. The NRC inspector questioned the appropriateness of some of the

above determinations with CPRT personnel and the applicant

personnel responsible for the preparation and implementation of

the QC' procedure. The inspector was informed that all

connectors located inside the containment were covered with HST;

the invalidated DRs on this subject were for connectors located

outside the containment. In addition, the entire length of the

cable run, excluding active devices, was subjected to an

, insulation and resistance measurement test after final

installation. The NRC inspector found no reason to disagree

with the above determinations.

(3) TUGCo Documentation Review

The NRC inspector performed reviews of TUGCo documentation for

the following four verification packages for Unit 1 NIS cables:

' Verification Cable No.

Package No.

1

R-E-NIST-002 EW-140610

R-E-NIST-003 EY-140308

-

R-E-NIST-004 ER-140490Z

R-E-NIST-008 EW-140601

The results of the NRC inspector's review, which included

verification of the QC inspector's certification, were

compared to the ERC review findings with no differences

being identified.

-

No violations or deviations were identified.

.

4

.,. . . . - _ - , - , - . - - - . - - - ....---..._-,v

-

.----_-....,.-,-.v---__ . _ , _ , ~ . - - - - . , . . , , . - , , . - - .

. - _ _ _ _.

Y

4

-28-

,t

, c.' Mechanical Equipment Installation

, -

- Status of CPRT' Activity

,'EkCIbascomhleted168reinspectionsofmechanicalequipment

4

,

'

, installation items from a total _ random and engineered sample size of

' '

'

s 171.~ Two!hundred~and fifteen valid DRs were issued as a result of

.the above reinspections.

<'

v ERC has comos'eted all documentation reviews of the total sample of 84

~

documentation review packages. Two valid DRs have been issued.

.

Status ,of NRC Inspection' Activity

4

To date, the NRC inspector has performed nine inspections of sample

items previously inspected by ERC, of which the following three

inspections occurrgd during this report period:

Verification Equipment Tag No. System * Unit

Package No.

I-M-MEIN-107 TBX-CSAPPD-01 CS Common (1)

I-M-MEIN-019 CP1-CCAHHX-02 CC 1

I-M-MEIN-263 CP1-VAAUSE-11 VA 1

i CS - Chemical and Volume Control;

CC - Component Cooling Water;

VA - Containment Ventilation

The NRC inspector identified that ERC engineering, during their

review of historical data pertaining to Verification Package

I-M-MEIN-017, failed to provide ERC inspectors with accept / reject

criteria for the following work activities described by construction

operation travelers (C0Ts)

(1) COT ME78-101-4901 identified the use of Richmond inserts for

equipment anchoring. No inspection instruction were provided to

verify adequacy of stud bolt thread engagement.

(2) COT ME83-1532-4900 identified torquing requirements for Cylinder

Head Cover No.9. No inspection instructions were provided to

verify satisfactory performance of the torquing operation.

, (3) COT ME78-101-4901 identified a requirement to install the oil

cooler and its associated piping. No inspection instructions 1

were provided to verify satisfactory performance of the work

activities required for installation.

Subsequent to the NRC inspection, ERC engineering issued inspection

instructions to resolve (2) and (3) above. The failure to include

1

m, . - - - _ * , - , _ , . ,. c- , -r .- . - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - , - -

-29-

the preceding work activities in the scope of the reinspection effort

is a deviation (445/3622-D-09).

As a result of the additional inspection activities performed by ERC

inspection personnel with respect to (2) and (3) above, eight

deviations pertaining to nonconforming torque and coupling / alignment

specifications were identified. However, NRC subsequent inspection

revealed that the equipment was not tagged to identify the

nonconforming conditions as required by ERC Procedure CPP-010. This

failure to tag the nonconforming equipment is a deviation

(445/8622-D-10).

d. Pipe Welds / Materials

Status of CPRT Activity

The Pipe Welds / Material (PIWM) population was created by combining

two previous populations referred to as Large Bore Pipe

Welds / Material and Small Bore Piping and Instrument Tubing / Piping

Welds / Material. In addition, tubing welds were excitded and placed

in their own population, and mechanical equipment pressure boundary

welds were added as PIWM welds. The PIWM population was then

categorized into two subsets: Large Bore Pipe Welds / Material (LBWM)

subset and Small Bore Pipe Welds / Material (SEWM) subset. This

categorization has been done for the purpose of utilizing the

existing inspection QIs and corresponding verification packages.

ERC has completed all of the planned random and engineered sample of

180 reinspection packages and the 182 documentation review packages.

Of the five valid DRs which were issued, four have been evaluated, to

date, and determined to be nonsafety significant.

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

(1) To date, the NRC inspector has witnessed 15 ERC reinspections

and performed 6 separate inspections of ERC verification

packages, of which the following three separate inspections were

performed during this report period:

Verification Drawing No. Weld No. System * Unit

Package No.

I-M-SBWM-029 BRP-MS-2-RB-044 WE-15 MS 2

I-M-LBWM-054 BRP-BR-2-SB-014 WE-7 BR 2

I-M-LBWM-038 BRP-MS-2-SB-056 FW-3A MS 2

MS - Main Steam; BR - Boron Recycling

No violations or deviations were identified.

-30-

(2) The NRC inspector performed a documentation review of the

following four ERC population samples:

Verification Drawing No. Weld System * Unit

Package No. No.

R-M-PIWM-174 BRP-BR-2-SB-014 WE-7 BR 2

R-M-PIWM-046 BRP-MS-2-RB-044 WE-15 MS 2

R-M-PIWM-110 BRP-MS-2-SB-056 FW-3A MS 2

R-M-PIWM-2004 TNE-12-2107-04-8-01-1Q2 FW-14 CS 2

BR - Borco lecycling; MS - Main Steam; CS - Chemical and

Volume Control

No violations or deviations were identified.

e. Equipment Supports

Status of CPRT Activity

ERC reinspection of equipment supports is complete with 70 support

packages reinspected and 128 DRs issued. Eighty-nine DRs have been

determined to be valid. Documentation review is also complete with

225 DRs issued. No safety significant deviations have been

'

identi fied.-

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

(1) Two ERC equipment support inspections were witnessed by the NRC

inspector during March 1986. The discussion of the following

witnessed inspections was inadvertently left out of NRC

Inspection Report 50-445/86-03; 50-446/86-02:

Verification Equipment No. Building * Unit

Package No.

.

I-S-EQSP-002 CP2-EPBCED-03 AB Common

I-S-EQSP-_010 CP2-ECDPED-01 CR Common

  • '

AB - Auxiliary Building, CR - Control Room

~

'

During the above reinspections, ERC identified the following

,

'

e conditions to the NRC inspector as subject to evaluatio,n' as ,

'

potential' deviations:

, 'I-S-EQSP-002: A channel was incorrectly located by 1/4" and a

'

weld length was undersized for 1 3/4".

  • . _ .

~

I-S-EQSP-010: The support location was not in accordance with

the installation drawing. The gap between the panel and the -

r

,

-31-

concrete wall exceeded the allowable of 1/2". In addition, a

Hilti bolt spacing violation was identified.

Dispositions of the above findings are open items (445/8622-0-11 I

and 445/8622-0-12).

(2) The following seven equipment supports were separately

reinspected during this report period:

Verification Equipmert No. Building * Unit

Package No.

I-S-EQSP-008 CP1-VAFNAV-32 DG 1

I-S-EQSP-023 CP2-ELDPEC-04 DG 2

I-5-EQSP-027 CP2-VAFNAV-27 DG 2

I-S-EQSP-038 ILCS5691A DG 1

I-S-EQSP-045 ILCS5803 AB 1

I-S-EQSP-049 CPX-EPTRET-04 CR Common

I-S-EQSP-052 CP2-ELDPEC-14 CR Common

DG - Diesel Generator, AB - Auxiliary Building,

CR - Control Room

The above seven equipment supports had been previously inspected

by the ERC 01. The initial ERC reinspection of Verification

Package I-S-EQSP-023 was evaluated as unacceptable by the

ERC OI. The initial ERC inspector rejected Attribute 6F(i)

because nuts and washers were not installed on two Hilti bolts.

Note 10 of DCA 3273 states, "If Hilti violations occur between

existing Hilti Kwik bolts and new added Hiltis, remove nut

- permanently from existing Hilti Kwik bolts." Note 5 of DCA

~20659 states that the Hilti bolts inside the panel are not

necessary. The OI determined that a DR should not have been

issued. Upon evaluation of this finding by the overview

supervisor, a decision was made to accept the initial ERC

inspector's DR, since the identity of the new versus existing

.

.Hilti bolts could not be determined. Thus, Note 5 of DCA 20659

- ~ was.not applied.

..

The initial ERC reinspection of Verification

-

.

,- Package I-S-EQSP-052 was evaluated as unacceptable by the

4 '# #.

. *

  • -

'ERC oil Two additional DRs were issued. Attribute 3,

% ,

. configuration, was rejected by the ERC OI. The bottom of the

,

"~ '

-, panel was 5/8" from the wall whereas DCA 14811 allowed 1/2"

4, *

-

maximum. Attribute 6F(ii), anchor bolt nut engagement and

bearing, was also rejected by the ERC 01. One Hilti bolt was

' '

' installed without a required washer.

.

J

J

_ _ _

. ._ . . . .

" '

,

e

-32-

Y

t' is

ERC Overview inspection results agreed with the initial ERC

reinspections for the remaining five packages listed above.

No violations or deviations were identified.

,

f. Fuel Pool Liner '

Status of CPRT Activity

.ERC has completed 62 reinspeitians of the fuel pool liner from a.

population sample size of 627 Ten valid DRs were issued as a result.

of the above reinspections. '

ERC has completed 100 documentation reviews from a total sample size

of 100. -Forty-four valid DRs have been issued as a result of the ,

above documentation reviews. i'

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

(1) The NRC inspector witnessed the following ERC inspection during

December 1985, the discussion of which was inadvertently omitted

from NRC Inspection Re' port 50-445/85-18; 50-446/85-15:

"N.

'

Verification' Weld Unit

I.D. No.

'

Package No.

. I-S-FPLR-163 -1161 1

No deviating conditions were identified during this inspection.'

.

'...

' (2) To date,'the NRC~ inspector has performed the following

'

f inspections of ERCsinspected packages:

\

"4 '

'-

'

Verification Weld Unit

.. Package No. I.D. No.

I-S-FPLR-004 969 2

I-S-FPLR-111 1748 1

I-S-FPLR-029 1052 Common (1)

I-S-FPLR-072 1049 2

4

I-S-FPLR-058 1015 Common (1) x

-(

i No violations or deviations were identified. '

,

g. Small Bore Piping Configuration

,

'

,

Status of CPRT Activity ,

, ERC has completed all reinspections of small bore piping

'

s . configurations from the planned random and engineered sample of 99.

Seventy-nine valid DRs have been identified and issued.

1

%

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,

-33-

.

- ~

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

-

3 .-

< (1) To date, the'NRC inspector has witnessed seven ERC reinspections

and performed seven separate inspection of ERC inspected

-e , ,

,

  1. '

packages, of which the following three separate inspections

T

..

-

occurred-during this report period:

'

~ Verification Drawing No. Unit

'

,

, , System *~

  • -

Package No.

-

.,

'I-M-SBC0-023 BRP-GH-X-AB-068 GH Common

c I-M-SBC0-097 BRP-RC-1-RB-039 RC 1

s <" < I-M-SBC0-121 BRP-RH-1-SB-011 RH 1

Y. .

GH - Gaseous Waste Processing System;

RC - Reactor Coolant System; RH - Residual

Heat Removal System

(2) With respect to Verification Package I-M-SBCO-121, the OI

identified that in the northwest corner of Room No. 67, the

inspected line and the floor grating angle iron did not meet the

separation criteria of Section 5.2 of QI-026. The deviation was

not identified by the original ERC inspector. Disposition of

the above item is an open item (445/8622-0-13).

(3) During the inspection of Verification Package I-M-SBCO-121, the.

NRC inspector identified two instances where the separation

criteria of paragraph 5.2.6.2 in QI-026 was violated. QI-026

requires that for pipes operating at 200 degrees Fahrenheit or

greater, a minimum of 1", including insulation, shall be

maintained between the pipe and hangers. Attribute 1.f

(separation) of the ERC reinspection checklist for this

verification package was accepted by the ERC inspector. The

subsequent overview inspection failed to identify the deviating

conditions; thus resulting in a failure to identify

unsatisfactory decisions made by the ERC inspector. These

failures constitute a deviation (445/8622-D-14).

These conditions existed between a vertical run of pipe (5' 7

1/2" west of wall D-S and 3' 4" south of wall 5-S at elevation

789'6") and structural tubing of pipe support RH-1-025-004-522R,

and at elevation 791' 2" with the snubber rear bracket of Pipe

Support No. RH-2-013-008-S32K.

h. Large Bore Piping Configuration

Status of CPRT Activity

ERC has completed all reinspections of large bore piping

configurations from the planned random and engineered sample of 98.

Sixty-three valid DRs have been identified and issued.

- - . _ . --. -. -

. - _ , . _- . - _ , _ _ - - , -

~

, .

,

'

, -

'

. -34-

'

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~ ,

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. - g= m

, ,

7

-

, , Status of NRC Inspection Activity

-- 1  ! <

'

.

, ,

To date, the NRC' inspector has witnessed seven ERC reinspections and

-

performed seven separate inspections of ERC inspected packages, of

L , , 3, . - x .which the following separate inspections occurred during this report

_

period:

'

'

. .

'

,

.,

Verification Drawing No. System * Unit

_

Package No. -

I-M-LBCO-087 BRP-CT-1-RB-020.

~

CT 1.

I-M-LBCO-025 CRP-CC-1-RB-057 CC 1

.

CT - Containment Spray; CC - Component Cooling Water

N'o violations or deviations were identified,

i. Reinspection of Tubing Welds / Materials

Status of CPRT Activity

ERC has completed all reinspections of tubing welds / materials from

the total random and engineered sample of 99. Seventeen valid DRs

were issued as a result of the above reinspections.

ERC has also completed all documentation reviews from the sample of

'

98 packages. Fourteen valid DRs have been generated as a result of

the above documentation review.

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

Review of this population identified that documentation of NRC

inspection activity had been deferred pending attempted resolution of

questions concerning the adequacy of instruction to. inspectors in

QI-070, Revision 1. The questions, which are somewhat judgmental in

nature, are described in paragraph (3) below.

(1) The NRC inspector has, to date, witnessed tae following three

inspections:

'

Verification Drawing No. System * Unit

Package No.

I-M-TUWM-024 FSI-00043-17 NI 1

!

I-M-TUWM-034 FSI-00043-56 NI 1

I-M-TUWM-036 FSI-00043-54 NI 1

i

NI - Nuclear Instrumentation

!

-35-

During these inspections, no deviating conditions were

identified by the ERC inspector. No violations or deviations

were identified by the NRC inspector.

(2) The NRC inspector has, to date, performed the following four

separate inspections of ERC inspected packages:

Verification Drawing No. System * Unit

Package No.

.I-M-TUWM-002 FSI-1-500 MS 1

I-M-TUWM-008 FSI-1-601-01 RC 1

I-M-TUWM-016 FSI-1-601-01 RC 1

I-M-TUWM-025 FSI-1-528 RC 1

MS - Main Stream; RC - Reactor Coolant

No violations or deviations were identified.

(3) The NRC inspector questioned ERC engineering concerning the

adequacy of QI-070, Revision 1, relative to instructions not

being provided for weld size inspection when the edge of tubing

fittings had either been consumed by welding or subjected to

grinding. An additional related question was asked concerning

the QI not requiring verification of socket weld fitting sizes.

In the NRC inspector's judgement, fitting size verification

would have permitted more accurate assessment of weld size when

the edge of the fitting was not identifiable. In attempting a

suitably resolve these questions, TUGCo Quality Engineering was

contacted relative to original inspection criteria used for weld

acceptance. TUGCo Quality Engineering-issued NCRs M-86-103363

(for Unit 1) and M-86-201978 (for Unit 2) to obtain suitable

resolution of these questions. This subject is considered

unresolved pending disposition of the NCRs and NRC review

(445/8622-U-15; 446/8620-U-06).

j. Category I Conduit Supports *

Status ~of CPRT Activity

Reinspection of Category I Conduit supports is complete with 161

support packages reinspected. A total of 80 valid deviations were

' identified. Documentation review is also complete with 160 packages

, reviewed. . A total of 186 valid deviations were identified.

~

-36-

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

i

The NRC inspector has, to date, performed the following eight i

separate inspections of ERC inspected packages, all of which occurred  !

during this report period: ' 1

Verification Support No. Unit

Package No.

I-S-COSP-071 C14W-13102-05 1

I-S-COSP 073 C140-06419-01 1

I-S-COSP7046 C03G09956-04 1

I-S-COSP-003 EAB9-5 1

I-S-COSP-017 ESB2-21 1

I-S-COSP-024 ESB8-6 1

I-S-COSP-042 C12G-16958-08 1

I-S-COSP-009 C146-20047-01 1

No violations or deviations were identified,

k. Inspection of Nonpressure Boundary Welds for a Supplementary

Evaluation of Visual Welding Inspection Techniques

Status of CPRT Activity

All inspection activity is complete.

Status of NRC Inspection Activity

.

(1) All inspection activity is complete.

(2) The NRC inspector witnessed the following inspection during

March 1986 which was documented in NRC Inspection

Report 50-445/86-03; 50-446/86-02:

Verification Equipment System * Unit

Package No. Tag No.

I-S-NPBW-004 FW-1-017-908-C77W FW 1

An open item was identified during the inspection; however, its

discussion was inadvertently left out of the NRC inspection

report. The following is a discussion of that open item.

During the second phase inspection (after removal of coating),

the NRC inspector identified what appeared to be an unacceptable

weld surface condition; i.e., not suitable for nondestructive

examination (NDE). This open item was resolved by the

performance of a magnetic particle examination (MT) of the weld

- - _ . - .

-37-

by a Brown & Root (B&R) Level III NDE examiner on June 30, 1986,-

using NDE Procedure QI-QAP 10.2-2, Revision 4. The result of

the MT was documented on MT Report.No, 22583, and showed that

the weld surface. condition was suitable for NDE. No rejectable

indications were observed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Assessment of Allegations

a. AQ-148 (4-85-A-15), AQ-155, and AQ-157 (4-85-A-30): It was alleged

that the construction start-up/ turnover surveillance (CSTS) group

performed a QA surveillance of the warehouse and bulk material

storage (laydown) areas and found deficiencies. The QC group had

performed a similar surveillance in the same areas, yet the QC

surveillance did not detect or record any deficiencies (AQ-148 and

AQ-157). Although the QC group had reported the iron fabrication

shop (fab shop) had satisfactorily implemented corrective action for

previously identified deficiencies, CSTS surveillances found that the

same type deficiencies continued. Also, the QC surveillances of the

fab shop did not detect or record the continuing deficiencies

.(AQ-155).

These three allegations were assessed in common since they concern

departures from procedural requirements pertaining to surveillances

of the segregation, protection, and storage of bulk materials.

The NRC inspector reviewed the CSTS QA Surveillance Report 85-002

dated January 14, 1985, for the fab shop and found that the report

identified several deficiencies regarding material storage and one

deficiency that QC surveillances required by procedures were not

documented. The CSTS record package contained documentation of

satisfactory corrective action that was implemented by CAR 039 dated

January 16, 1985, which addressed surveillances not being documented.

The NRC inspector reviewed CSTS QA surveillance reports through

April 1985. These reports identified deficiencies in the warehouse

areas that related to maintenance records for stored in place items;

however, no deficiencies similar to those previously identified in

the fab snop were noted. The CSTS record packages contained

documentation'of the satisfactory implementation of corrective action

of the maintenance record deficiencies noted. A walkdown inspection

by the NRC inspector did not identify any continuing deficiencies or

deficiencies similar to previous findings in the fab shop.

The allegers referred to a QC surveillance of the warehouse area

which did not identify any deficiencies; however, a CSTS QA

surveillance of the same area conducted one day later found uncapped

pipe and deteriorated tape on pipe ends. The NRC inspector found

that a QC surveillance report of bulk material storage outside

Warehouse C was performed on April 30, 1985. On the following day,

May 1, 1985, the CSTS QA surveillance group performed a random

-

)

-

-38-

~

(unscheduled, not utilizing a prepared QA checklist) surveillance of

the same area. The random surveillance resulted in the issuance of

surveillance deficiency reports concerning pipe end caps missing or

damaged. The deficient items were corrected and the deficiency

' reports closed.

The NRC inspector considered further the differences in the results

of the April 30 survey, which was satisfactory, and the May 1 survey

which identified the deficiencies. Based on interviews with

personnel involved and review of documentation, it was determined

that the April 30 survey was a visual only inspection of the stored

condition of the items in the laydown yard. The May 1 survey was a

hands on inspection of protective coverings which identified

deficiencies that would not necessarily be identified during a visual

only inspection. This difference in inspection technique could

account for the different survey results.

In discussions with the manager, Warehouse and Material Control, the

NRC inspector found that warehouse and receiving QC personnel conduct

weekly and monthly surveillances of all storage areas. While the

requirement for these surveillances are not clearly documented in

procedures, the surveillance results are documented for each area

inspected, a result of implementation of CAR-039. In addition,

periodic surveys and audits are conducted by personnel from the CSTS

group and the Dallas-based QA audit group. The NRC inspector

reviewed the results of the following surveillances and audits of the

pipe laydown area outside Warehouse C.

(1) Weekly surveillances are conducted in 28 areas by warehouse

personnel. Three of the weekly surveillances conducted in

June 1986 were reviewed and no unsatisfactory conditions were

noted in the areas outside Warehouse C.

(2) Monthly surveillances are conducted in 14 areas by receiving QC

personnel. The January through June surveillance reports were

reviewed. The February report identified seven items not stored

properly in areas outside Warehouse C, which were subsequently

corrected. All other reports found conditions satisfactory in

this same area.

(3) CSTS Report No.86-170, conducted the end of March 1986, was

reviewed. This survey of warehousing included the pipe laydown

areas outside Warehouse C. Checklist item #4, based on

CP-CPM-8.1, Revision 3, was to verify piping and components were

capped and protected. This item was documented as satisfactory.

(4) The Dallas QA group conducted an audit (TCP-86-08) of the

warehousing at the site, including the laydown areas outside

Warehouse C, during the weeks of March 3-17, 1986. No

unsatisfactory conditions were noted in the audit report

concerning outside pipe storage.

Y

-39-

.

.f

-

4

The NRC; inspector discussed the above findings with both the

, CSTS surveillance inspector and the Dallas QA auditor. Each

confirmed that the outside pipe storage areas were in compliance

.

'

with requirements during their inspections. This is potentially

accurate since the monthly surveillance conducted February 28,

1986, had identified seven nonconforming items which had been

corrected. Further, no audits or surveillances since the end of

. February had identified nonconforming conditions in the outside

pipe storage areas.

'

On July 10, 1986, accompanied by the manager, Warehouse and v

Material Control, the NRC inspector conducted an inspection of

outside storage at Warehouse C, including pipe storage. Four

pieces of stainless steel pipe were found with damaged or

deteriorated end covers, which is a violation of Procedure

MCP-10, Revision 9, " Storage and Storage Maintenance of

Mechanical and Electrical Equipment." The manager, Warehouse

and Material Control, initiated immediate corrective action.

The NRC inspector found several pieces of carbon steel pipe with

end caps in place. When asked why, the manager, Warehouse and

Material Control, stated that when carbon steel pipe is received

with end caps in place they were not required to remove them.

This also is contrary to MCP-10 which states, in part, " Carbon

steel piping material or structural tubing shall not be capped."

These conditions are considered a violation (445/8622-V-16;

446/8620-V-07).

Based on the assessment of these allegations, the NRC inspector

substantiated that the weekly and perhaps the monthly

surveillances were not completely effective in identifying

storage deficiencies nor in preventing identified deficiencies

from recurring. The NRC findings above and those identified in

paragraph 7.c of this report are indicative that the alleged

ineffectiveness of the surveillances continues to exist. The

NRC findings concerning material stored outside was the only

example of receiving deficiencies that was identified that is

indicative of ineffective preventive measures, while several

examples of effective preventive measures, such as CAR-039, were

noted.

b. 4-86-A-026: Improper Drilling on Cable Trays

An allegation was made to the NRC inspectors that craft personnel bad

drilled holes through solid bottom cable trays while electrical

cables were installed. The holes were drilled so that cable ties

could be installed in the bottom of the tray to hold the electrical

cables in proper separation positions, The concern was that the

drilling through the tray could cause damage to the electrical

cable (s).

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An NRC inspector identified a similar concern in NRC Inspection

Report 50-445/86-14; 50-446/86-11, in that holes were being drilled

through cable trays (paragraph 10.d). The failure of the applicant

to control the drilling of holes through cable trays containing

electrical cables was determined to be a violation of Criterion V of

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 (445/8614-V-03; 446/8611-V-10).

Therefore, this allegation has been substantiated and the NRC will

follow the corrective actions proposed by the applicant in response

to the above violation.

7. Procurement, Receiving, and Storage

During this report period, an inspection of TUGCo procurement, receiving,

and onsite storage activities was made by the NRC inspector. The

activities of subcontractors that perform safety-related procurement were

also inspected. Review of safety-related contracts revealed that BSC is

the only subcontractor currently performing onsite safety-related

procurement.

a. TUGCo Onsite Procurement

Onsite procurement is the responsibility of TUGCo as committed in the

FSAR and the TUGCo/TUSI QA Manual. Details of organization are in

TUGCo Procedure CP-SP-1, Revision 0. A review of the site

procurement procedures found that they include the requirements of

ANSI N45.2.13 (1986).

To verify TUGCo implementation of onsite procurement requirements,

the NRC inspector selected 10 safety related P0s issued in the last

6 months for inspection. The P0sselected were: (1) CPF-12901-S,

(2) CPF-12913-S, (3) CPF-12971-S, (4) CPF-13022-S, (5) CPF-13114-S,

(6) CPF-13141-S, (7) CPF-13172-S, (8( CPF-13210-5, (9) CPF-13257-5,

(10) CPF-13313-S. For all of the P0s, the purchasing documents

specified and imposed the applicable technical requirements; i.e.,

codes and standards.

The NRC inspector' verified that the P0s were placed with suppliers

from the approved suppliers list or that the items were purchased

'

commercial grade and the required engineering evaluations performed.

The adequacy of the vendor surveillance program was previously

inspected and reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/86-03;

50-446/86-02. As a further review, 10 vendors were selected and a

verification made that a current audit or evaluation had been

perfdrmed. Two of these audits were reviewed in depth.

Audit TBBC-3/T of BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., was performed by Gilbert

Commonwealth for TUGCo, an approved supplier for conducting these

audits. The Gilbert Commonwealth auditor utilized the Nuclear

Supplier Quality Assurance System Evaluation Checklist developed by

the Coordinating Agency for Supplier Evaluation. Audit TWH-34 of

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Westinghouse Nuclear Components Division was performed by the TUGCo

Dall,3 audit group utilizing their own prepared checklist. Both

vendors QA programs were evaluated as acceptable.

No violations or deviations were found in this area of the

inspection.

b. TUGCo Receipt Inspection

The system for conducting receipt inspection was examined for

procedural compliance. Procedures utilized were:

. CP-QP-8-0, Revision 5, " Receiving Inspection"

. CP-QP-8-0-2, Revision 1, " Receiving Inspection Instruction"

. CP-QP-2-1, Revision 21, " Training of Inspection Personnel"

. QI-QAP-2.1-5, Revision 9, " Training and Certification of

Mechanical Inspection Personnel."

The qualifications of six receipt inspectors were inspected and found

to be proper with appropriate supporting documentation in the

qualification file.

The area used for receipt inspection provided controlled access, a

clean and protected inspection area, a hold area for nonconforming

material, calibrated measuring equipment in current calibration, and

an area with controlled temperature and humidity available for

receipt inspection of environmentally sensitive material.

Eleven RIRs and supplemental data were inspected to determine if the

requirements of the receiving procedures and purchasing

specification were met. The RIRs selected were #27448, #26274,

  1. 27699, #27737, #27738, #27698, #27650. #27672, #27857, #27735, and
  1. 27734. The receiving requirements were met for all of these RIRs

and no violations or deviations were identified.

c. TUGCo Storage

The site storage and laydown areas were inspected for compliance to

.

B&R Procedure MCP-10, Revision 9, " Storage and Storage Maintenance of

Mechanical and Electrical Equipment." Areas inspected were

Warehouse's A and B, Welders Qualification Training Center (WQTC),

the Pipe Fabrication Shop, Millwrights Shop, and the pipe, steel, and

electrical laydown areas. Also, items " stored inplace" inside Unit 2

reactor building were inspected. The following areas of

noncompliance were noted: two level transmitters " stored inplace"

were not protected from overhead grinding activity; electrical cable

in cable trays in Unit 2 were not properly protected from nearby

welding activity; stainless steel tubing with the ends not capped or

capped with tape in degraded condition was found outside in the area

behind the WQTC and the layout area north of Warehouse C. Violations

for the unprotected level transmitters and electrical cable was

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reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/86-15; 50-446/86-12. The

improperly capped tubing was identified as a violation

(445/8622-V-16; 446/8620-V-07) in paragraph 6.a of this report during

the assessment of an allegation.

The NRC inspector reviewed Procedures CP-QAP-14-1, Revision 6,

" Inspection of Storage and Maintenance of Permanent Plant Equipment";

CP-QP-19.0, Revision 4, " Construction, Start-up/ Turnover (CST)

Surveillances"; and MCP-10. These procedures describe storage levels

and inspection requirements for storage and maintenance. The

procedures meet the requirement of ANSI-N45.2.2, Sections 2.7 and

6.1.2 for storage levels, and Section 6.4.1, for inspection

requirements.

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No other violations or ceviations were noted in this area of

inspection.

d. Subcontractor Onsite Safety-Related Procurement Activity

To determine the procurement, receipt, and storage requirements for

BSC, the NRC inspector reviewed the terms of the BSC contract with

TUGCo. The contract imposed the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix B; ANSI N45.2, 1971; and ASME,Section III, 1977. The

following BSC procedures for procurement, receipt, and storage of

.- , safety-related materials were reviewed to determine if they

incorporated these requirements:

'

Procedure Title

QFP-4.003-CP1 Procurement of Material and Service from

General Contractor /0wner

QFP-4.002-CP1 Procurement of Welding and Brazing Material

QFP-4.001-CP1 Procurement Document Control for Nuclear

Projects

QFP-7.002-CP1 Receiving and Storage

QFP-8.001-CP1 Identification and Control of Materials,

Parts, and Components

QCI-CPSES-004 Receiving Inspection and Identification

Procedure

These procedures were found to adequately incorporate the above

standards and requirements for procurement, receipt, and storage

activities.

BSC P0s 1769, 1776, and 1864 and BSC RIRs 511 and 517 were compared

with the criteria of the procurement and receipt inspection

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procedures. -They were found to have been developed and processed in

accordance with these procedures.

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The NRC inspected the inside and outside storage areas as well as the

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weld rod room and oven area. These areas were found to be in

. compliance with the storage procedures and suitable for the type of

material stored. Inspection of recent surveillance reports for these

areas found that surveillances were being performed to the specified

frequency'and that the area surveillance forms were completed

including notation of deficiencies.

The approved vendors list was reviewed to determine if a current

audit or-evaluation had been performed for each vendor. This review ,

found all vendors listed to be in compliance or to have been removed

from the approved vendors list.

The qualifications and certification files of all receipt inspectors

were reviewed. These were found to be in accordance with the

requirements of ANSI-N45.2 and the BSC procedure for inspector

qualification.

No violations or deviations were identified during this area of

inspection.

8. CPRT-Central and Working Files

The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the CPRT central and

working files have been established, maintained, and controlled in

accordance with the requirements of Policy and Guideline (PAG) PAG-02,

Revisions 0 and 1, " Policy on Assembly of CPRT Program Central and Working

Files,: and PAG-11, Revision 0, " Policy for Controlling Access to the CPRT

File and Closed Working Files."

PAG-02 describes: (a) documents to be included in the CPRT central files;

(b) accountability mechanisms; (c) specific requirements for content

organization, and format of ISAP working files; and (d) the criteria used

by the'results report and working file review committee (RRRC) in their

review of completed working files and results reports for compliance to

ISAP requirements. PAG-11 describes the measures used to control access

to CPRT files. PAG-02 and PAG-11 are implementing documents for CPRT

Program Plan,Section III.J, "CPRT Program Records," and Appendix G,

Attachment 4, " Verification of Issue-Specific Action Plan Working Files."

It should be noted that PAG-02, Revision 0, and PAG-11, Revision 0, were

not issued until May 22, 1986, and July 30, 1986, respectively. Work

accomplished prior to issuance of PAG-02 and PAG-11 was inspected for

compliance using the requirements in the CPRT Program Plan,Section III.J,

and Appendix G, Attachment 4.

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a.' Organization of Central Files

The description of the central file contents and file index is

provided in PAG-02, paragraph 2 and Attachment 6.6. To verify

implementation of the PAG-02 requirements, the file index and file

contents log of each file was examined for compliance with

requirements. In cases where files were too large for 100%

inspection, sampling was used to verify file content. For example,

of the ten closed ISAP working files, seven were 100% inspected and

three were sampled.

The results of this inspection verified that file indexes, content

logs, and file contents were consistent with requirements. The only

exception was the CPRT Program Director's personnel file which did

not contain the required objectivity questionnaire / evaluation

documentation. This matter has been identified as a deviation in

paragraph 2.a of this appendix.

b. Control of Documentation / Files

Accountability of a file is accomplished by matching documentation

listed on the content file log against those documents in the file.

Procedurally, documents or document packages contained in the file

are required to be identified with the file number and the content

log sequential number. PAG-02, Revision 1, requires working file

documents or the contents of documentation packages to be

sequentially page-numbered. This allows for accountability and/or

recompiling should pages be mixed after or during reproduction, file

transmittal, or other use. The central file is in the process of

numbering pages of working files processed prior to PAG-02,

Revision 1. With the exception of working files, the pages of

documents, such as action plans, results reports, CPRT program plan,

etc., were always numbered.

PAG-11 requires controlled access to the file cabinets containing the

files. Files are locked when not in use. With the exception of the

working files, files may be removed from the central file room by

using check out cards to account for the documents.

The NRC inspected checkout cards, access methods to file cabinets,

the practice used to review working files in the central file room,

and documentation accountability. The practices used were found to

conform to PAG-02 and PAG-11 requirements.

c. Verification of ISAP Working Files

Appendix G, Attachment 4 of the CFRT Program Plan describes the

requirements, responsibility, and criteria for the review and

verification of working file by the RRRC. This review occurs after

the ISAP has been completed and prior to the results report (RR)

being submitted to the SRT for review and approval. The purpose of

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this review / verification is to determine: (1) the contents of the

working file is complete and organized to be consistent with the

requirements of the CPRT Program Plan, and (2) the work reported and

conclusions reached in the RR are supported by information contained

in the working files.

Prior to May 22, 1986, the RRRC performed review activities using

checklists individually developed from Appendix G, Attachment 4. The

checklists -listed criteria to be used in verifying consittency

between the ISAP, working files, and RR. Results of th's

review / verification were documented on the checklist w{th actions

required. After actions required were completed by the responsible

issue coordinator, the RRRC conclusions resulting from the review and

verification were documented in a working file verification report.

The verification report was then submitted with the RR to the SRT for

their review. Of the seven working files reviewed using Appendix G

checklist, six were found in the backup file, but there was no

commitment to retain the checklist. In each case, the working file

verification report was in the file to document the performance of

the RRRC review and the conclusions reached. Retention of the

working file verification report is a requirement.

The three working files processed by the RRRC using PAG-02,

Revision 0, were found to comply to stated requirements of PAG-02 and

l Appendix G. Found in the backup files were detailed checklists

listing criteria to perform reviews, actions required, closure of

actions required, and the completed RRRC report submitted to the SRT.

The NRC inspector witnessed a portion of in process review of I.d.3

by the RRRC and found it to comply with PAG-02, Revision 1,

requirements. A checklist was used to document review results and

actions required.

In summary, the NRC inspector determined that the CPRT had established

measures to develop and maintain the CPRT central files. Procedures

governing the central file activities have been suitably implemented with

one observed exception concerning the objectivity questionnaire missing

from the CPRT Program Director's personnel file noted above. Other files

appear to contain the required documentation. Accour,tability and access

to files were controlled per procedural requirement.

I

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With respect to the results report and working files review performed by

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the RRRC, their reviews were found to conform to the applicable

requirements and guidelines. The inspected documentation confirmed the

performance of reviews and that conclusions reached were reported to the

SRT as required.

Based upon a review of central files and supporting documentation, for

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RRRC activities, it appears that PAG-02, Revision 0 and 1, and PAG-11,

Revision 0, have been adequately implemented.

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9. ERC Overview Inspection Program

The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the ERC overview

inspection program, as delineated in ERC-QA-28, Revision 3, " Performance

of Overview Inspections," was being implemented in accordance with

requirements. According to ERC personnel, the objectives of the overview

inspection program are: (a) to measure the effectiveness of ERC

inspectors performing third party reinspection / documentation review

activities, and (b) to determine the adequacy of QIs in directing

inspection activities. To achieve these objectives, the OIs duplicate the

initial reinspection or documentation review, then by comparing these

results with the initial reinspection / documentation review identify any

inconsistencies. Inconsistencies are then evaluated for validity and

resolution including required actions to prevent recurrence.

The NRC inspector developed a checklist detailing requirements identified

in ERC-QA-28, Revision 3, and compared a sample of overview inspection

verification packages (VPs) against the checklist to determine if the VPs

were developed and processed in accordance with ERC-QA-28 requirements.

Of the ten certified Ols, seven had performed the majority of the overview

inspections. The sample of overview VPs was selected to contain at least

one or more packages from each of the seven most active OIs. It was noted

that, in some cases, more than one OI participated in a single overview

inspection. This inspection was structured to evaluate the following

topics: sample selection, determination of accessibility, preparation of

overview VPs, completion of overview checklists, comparison of results

with the initial reinspection, completion of overview inspection report

and verification and followup of actions required,

a. Sample Selection

VPs documenting the results of initial reinspection / documentation

reviews were randomly selected for overview inspection. Based on the

type of reinspection activity, the sampling technique is described in

ERC-QA-28 for the selection of VPs for overview inspection. The NRC

sample selected for inspection was 16 out of a total of 51 ERC

inspectors. The number of inspectors sampled were by discipline:

six piping; five-mechanical, three-electrical, and two-civil. The

NRC review of this sample included: the overview inspection program

selection methods and use of random tables, calculations, and

selection results. Based on documentation reviewed, the sample

selection used in the overview inspection program conformed to

procedural requirements,

b. Determination of Accessibility  !

The O! was required to confirm that any necessary equipment / services

to perform overview inspections are in place and that the sample is ,

accessible. This practice was found to be documented. If the

equipment / services was not available or the sample inaccessible, such

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was documented in the sample selection log and another accessible

-sample chosen in accordance with procedures.

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, c. Preparation of Overview VPs

l

l The overview VP is prepared by ERC and duplicates the initial VP used

! by the ERC inspector. Upon receipt, the 01 supervisor is responsible

to verify that the overview VP is complete and accurate prior to

assignment to an 01. Based on the NRC inspector's review of 17

overview VPs, it was determined that the OI supervisor had verified

the completeness and accuracy of VPs. The contents of the packages

l were found to agree with the contents form which lists all the

documents that comprise the overview VP; e.g., inspection drawings,

, supplemental inspection instructions, and inspection checklist.

d. Completion of Checklists and VP Contents Form

i In the review of overview inspection checklists, it was found that

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some checklists were not processed in accordance with ERC-QA-28

, requir'ements. Noted errors were: corrections not initialed and

dated; absence of required entries; no justification or explanation

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for "N/A" (not applicable) entries; supplemental checklist not signed

. by OI; and added documents to the VP were not entered on the VP

contents form. These type errors were also identified by ERC during

>

' audit ERC-86-03, June 16-20, 1986. Corrective action responding to

these findings was to conduct an independent review of historical

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VPs. A detailed checklist was developed to identify errors in

checklists and content forms. ERC was in the process of conducting

.this historical review of VPs during the NRC inspection. The NRC

- , insp'ector' examined 12 historical review results. VP checklist and

content form' errors that were identified were being corrected. VPs

processed after' completion of this corrective action would be subject

to independent reviews to assure completion errors are being

identified'and corrected,

e. Comparison of Overview Inspection Results vs Initial Reinspection

Results

,

Procedurally, a comparison is required to be made between the

overview inspection packages and the initial reinspection / document

review package to identify inconsistencies. Those inconsistencies

confirmed as being valid are reported in the overview inspection

i report for required action. During the NRC's comparison of the

l packages, it was found that not all inconsistencies were identified

l by the 01. Examples of inconsistencies were: inspection checklists 7

'

reflect disagreement between ERC inspectors and Ols, but the overview

i inspection report did not identify the disagreement; the ERC

l

inspector or 01 accepted an attribute and the other inspector would

enter N/A; and items not inspected by overview were inspected by the

initial ERC inspectors. These types of inconsistencies were also

identified in audit ERC-86-03. Corrective action taken was to also

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address these type errors in the historical review of overview VPs.

. During the NRC's' inspection of the 12 historical reviews, it was

_

. found that the inconsistency errors were being addressed and when

indicated, inspector retraining was conducted.

f. Overview Inspection Reports

Seventeen overview inspection reports were examined. The results

from overview inspections were found to be documented on the reports

per procedural requirements. Information in overview inspection

reports included: accept / reject criteria; the observed deviating

condition; and action required with a completion schedule. Typical

corrective action included: inspector retraining, reinspection of

identified inconsistency, revising OIs or the combination thereof.

The overview inspection reports were reviewed and approved by the OI

supervisor and transmitted by memo to the responsible ERC personnel

for action.

g. Followup and Verification of Actions Required

ERC-QA-28 delineates steps for the verification of actions required.

Of the 17 VPs reviewed, 11 contained overview inspection reports

requiring actions to correct identified inconsistencies. One

overview inspection report contained an error in that the required

corrective action had not been verified. This type error was to be

addressed in the historical review being performed by overview

personnel as a result of a finding in audit ERC-86-03. To assure the

historical review was effective and would identify this type of

error, the NRC witnessed the historical review of the overview

inspection report. The error was identified during the historical

review.

To date, 104 overview inspection reports required corrective action.

Seventy-nine related to findings against reinspection inspectors

(inspector effectiveness), and 25 related to ERC engineering

(inadequacy of QIs). Inspector deficiencies identified in overview

inspection reports are trended for corrective action to prevent

recurrence. When engineering deficiencies are identified, the

appropriate QI is revised as necessary, and previously completed work

per the affected QI is assessed for impact.

As of July 28, 1986, 46 open overview inspection reports requiring

corrective action were from 8 to 175 days past the scheduled closure

date. Audit ERC-86-03 identified the overdue reports as untimely

corrective action. In response to this audit finding, ERC

established a tracking system to monitor the status of overview

inspection reports and their progress.

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. 10.~ Exit Interview

Exit interviews were conducted on August 7,1986, and September 5,1986,

with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this

appendix. During-these interviews, the NRC inspectors summarized the

scope and findings of the inspection. The applicant acknowledged the

findings.