ML20204G409
| ML20204G409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1987 |
| From: | Russell Gibbs, Martin M, Russell J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204G202 | List: |
| References | |
| 305.01-SQN, 305.01-SQN-R04, 305.01-SQN-R4, NUDOCS 8703260391 | |
| Download: ML20204G409 (15) | |
Text
., , TVA IMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 305.01-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element EEVISION NUMBER: 4 TITLE: Accessibility Problems REASON FOR REVISION:
Incorporation of TAS and SRP review comments and documentation Revision 1 of new concern addition.
Additional evaluation for concern RII-86-A-0116 per SRP/ ORC Revision 2 comments Incorporation of SRP review comments and SQN corrective Revision 3 action response.
Revised for clarity and readability Revision 4 PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
Wftwl59h'L s-t!-97 SIGNATURE DATE
, <I e REVIEWS PEER:
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- f,s1 ( /WY SIGNATURE 3Ch8/97
'DATE CONCURRENCES CEG-H && / F7 SRP: m 3*l0*87 SIGNATURE DATE ,
SIGNATURE
- DATE APPROVED BY:
M .6. b effif N/A ECSP M'ANAGER ~DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
- SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OPERATIONS CEG l
Subcategory: Accessibility Element: Accessibility Problems Report Number: 305.01-SQN Revision 4 IN-85-189-001 IN-85-189-002 IN-86-306-001 PH-85-003-006 IN-85-220-001 IN.-85-617-001 RII-86-A-0116 Evaluator: N U ! / /0 I C. W. Tou hato Date Reviewed by: ' MF // 5//C/[f OPS CEG/enjksr ' Date Approved by: 3[/A/F7
,,W. R. Lagergren Date 1266T
Esvisica 4' I. ACCESSIBILITY PROBLENS J
This report examines accessibility issues and the program for identifying accessibility problems at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) which may affect normal plant operation, maintenance, testing, or inspection. This scope does not preclude consideration of industrial safety and health physics aspects of these plant activities. However. l ALARA issues and access issues related to industrial safety are more IR4 thoroughly discussed in ECSP subcategory reports 31100, 90700, and l 90900. Six evaluated employee concerns are Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l (WBN) specific, but have generic applicability to SQN; the seventh is specific to both plants. Examples of previous corrective actions proposed and/or implemented are included.
II. SPECIFIC EVALUATION NETHODOLOGY A thorough review of the K-forms (reference 1) was conducted to evaluate the scope of this element. Historical information such as engineering change notices (ECNs), workplans, previous reports, and surveys are listed in section VI. Interviews with SQN personnel were conducted to address items related to accessibility. Among those contacted were an engineer and supervisors in the Industrial Safety Section, two engineers in the Mechanical Engineering Test Section, an assistant shift engineer (ASE) and unit operator (00) in Operations Section, several assistant unit operators (AD0s) in Operations Section, and a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) representative.
An evaluation of the effect of limited access on the operation of l safety-related equipment was determined to be a primary objective in IR4 conducting an access survey at SQN. This objective was implemented by l the evaluation of concern RII-86-A-0116 and was limited to access l
determination for local control stations which are needed to operate emergency, safety-related, or radwaste equipment in the SQN Auxiliary Building (AB). This scope was met by interviewing operations personnel, by conducting plant walkdowns of affected areas, and by reviewing -
previous efforts in access determination. Following is a list of the concerns evaluated for applicability to SQN:
Concern IN-85-189-001 WBNP unit number 2, once scaffolding is removed, some valves would be hard to get to, e.g., 15 feet off floor, to manually open or close valve. CI could not provide specific valve numbers, systems, buildings or elevations. CI stated this condition exist throughout the plant.
Concern IN-85-189-002 Valves located in WBNP number 2 South Valve Room are very congested and inaccessible. Only a small person would be able to get to them. CI stated one example is Drain Yalve on Nain Steam System in South Valve Room unit number 2. CI could not provide any additional details.
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R3visica 4 Concern IN-86-306-001 Yarious equipment that could be needed during an emergency is not readily accessible to applicable personnel. Example: Auxiliary Building 713' Elev (also Containment Building) the instrument panels and the auxiliary feedwater pumps are so congested it is very time consuming to get in there to read the instruments. Nuclear Power Concern. CI has no !
further information. ;
Concern PH-85-003-006 Watts Bar Instrumentation is not properly designed for accessibility. CI has no more additional information available.
Concern IN-85-220-001 Due to excessive number of hangers and overcrowding in unit 2 Reactor Building, especially accumulator room number 4, Health Physics problems (ALARA concerns) during plant operations are anticipated. CI feels that not enough concern was shown regarding the number of hangers being used. Construction department concern. CI could not provide any additional details / specifics.
Concern IN-85-617-001 The building of hangers & pipe support systers to the point of accessibility being made impossible. This concern involves both units 1 & 2. The primary places of interest are: roof, Auxiliary Building elevation 737, the ERCW vent valves, CCS valves to heat exchangers, number 4 accumulator room, north &
south steam valve rooms & elevation 713, boron l injection tank (BIT) room. Accessibility is 1R4 nonexistant due to potentially hot pipes &
i congested areas. Presently there are scaffolds to some inaccessible areas, when scaffolds are j removed, no access will be available.
Concern RII-86-A-0116 The alledger stated that at Watts Bar and Sequoyah, control panels or stations are physically located such that there is no way to get to them to
- operate the emergency equipment. As an example, a panel was observed to be located six to eight inches from a wall, facing the wall, so that i there was no physical way to even read the tags on the panel. The alledger said that there were a " lot" of awkwardly located panels at Watts Bar.
l l Note: SQN elevations are 23 feet below those at WBN. SQN main steam valves rooms are situated east and west.
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R:visica 4 l III. FINDINGS SQN, like all nuclear plants, has areas that tend to be less accessible than other areas. The primary areas of concern are the main steam valve rooms, the accumulator rooms, and valve and instrumentation accessibility in general. This report examines the SQN accessibility program in general, the_ specifics of the program including problem identification and resolution, and the extent to which access conditions affect lR4 operation of safety-related, radwaste, and emergency equipment. l l 1. SQN Accessibility General Nothods used for access determination at SQN include the Platform l and Yalve Accessibility Program (reference 2), the Operations' l Verification and Validation Program (see section III.3), plant lR4 section safety meetings, employee suggestions, the Employee Concerns l
. Program, and plant formal and informal correspondence. l The Platform and Valve Accessibility Program was initiated several lR4 years ago to identify and propose corrective action for specific access problems. Industrial Safety Section was unsure of the program's present status but believed that many of the items were either canceled or slow to be implemented. They felt the level of priority given to some of the items was perhaps lower than what personnel safety dictated.
Investigation of the above revealed that although some of the items have yet to be worked, many are presently scheduled and some are totally complete. Few of the items have been canceled and those which have are mostly minor. Upon hearing this, one Safety Section individual acknowledged that until workplans to correct problems actually "come across the desk" for review, status of proposed items is generally in question.
Although the Platform and Valve Accessibility Program is no longer IR4 employed at SQN, access problems are brought to the attention of l cognizant plant personnel. A Safety Section supervisor noted that accessibility items of any nature are of definite interest to Industrial Safety and felt that coordination through them has been fairly good. He noted that plant sections' safety meetings are one example of how access concerns may be expressed. Reference 3 documents a few accessibility concerns identified in Electrical Naintenance Section safety meetings. Furthermore, employee suggestions, employee concerns, and plant section informal and formal notification are also methods by which access problems may be identified. An assistant shift engineer agreed that coordination with plant "line" organizations was generally not a problem and that Industrial Safety Section would likely be consulted if the need arose.
However, he added that the Operations Section does have frequent difficulty in coordinating activities in general with design organizations.
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R:visica 4
- 2. SQN Accessibility - Specific This section addresses specific accessibility issues discussed in the SQN Generic Concern Report and the SQN Platform and Valve Accessibility Program.
A. SQN Generic Concern Report SQN Generic Concern Report (reference 4) discusses particular accessibility facets at SQN and additionally comments on how SQN solves access problems. The report states that a walkdown was conducted to evaluate access in the BIT tank room, the east and west main steam valve rooms, and the number 4 accumulator room (most congested of all accumulator rooms). Access was found to be difficult; however, Operations Section personnel are able to access and operate all valves within these areas. The walkdown .
also considered the Auxiliary Building (elevation 714), the ERCW vent valves, and the CCS Hz valves and found these areas were accessible but cumbersome in some cases.
The report further notes that remote operators have been installed for valves that are not readily accessible during normal operation. An ASE at SQN also noted that emergency equipment could be accessed in a timely manner. Examples of such equipment are the flood-mode spool pieces, some of which are located in congested areas. The ASE said that despite the congestion, spool pieces could be installed within time limits.
B. SQN Platform and Valve Accessibility Program The SQN Platform and Valve Accessibility Program (reference 2) identified numerous access deficiencies which if uncorrected could result in operational, maintenance, testing, and safety problems for plant personnel. Fifty-three items were tabulated and their present status is described in references 2 and 5. Of the 53 items identified, 47 have either been completed, partially worked, scheduled, or ECNs written. Examples of these items and other items mentioned in reference 4 follow:
Nain Steam Yalve Room (NSVR)
Access to unit 1 and unit 2 west NSVR S/G blowdown throttle valves Access from north to south walls Access to west NSTR feedwater isolation valves Access problems in vicinity of main steam relief valves Page 4 of 13 1
Rsvisica 4
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Accumulator Rooms Platform and ladder for access to SIS cold les accumulator tank's level transmitter sensor bellows
- Fixed ladder access from Reactor Building raceway to accumulator number 4
- Poor access to vent valves, check valves, and isolation valves for leak testing. This item (ECN 5531, item 44) was canceled; however, plans are for Nechanical Test Section to consider alternative corrective action after plant startup.
Yalve/ Instrumentation Accessibility
- Fixed ladders to top of cooling tower lift pump motors for reading gages once per shift Four portable platforms for the condensate domineralizer polishers inspection view ports
- Installation of larger gages for diesel generator lube oil to l allow reading from floor
- Platform installation to allow access to steam generator inspection ports Nany other efforts including chain operators for inaccessible valves, steel scaffold, portable ladders, grating, hoists, and guardrails have been implemented to aid access to various equipment at SQN
- 3. Safety-Related Equipment IR4 The evaluation scope for concern RII-86-A-0116 was limited to lR4 l
inspection of local control stations which are needed to operate emergency, safety-related, or radwaste equipment in the SQN Auxiliary Building. Discussion with WBN Operations personnel I indicated that the best general criterion for an inspection of lR4 local control stations that operate emergency and safety-related l equipment would be the local equipment specified in SQN Emergency Instructions (RIs) reference 11 SQN Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs) reference 12, and SQN Function Restoration Guidelines (FRs) reference 13. A summary of SQN Operations' lR4 previous efforts in amergency equipment access determination is included. Inspections were also conducted for other safety-related equipment and stations, and for specific local stations that control radioactive waste systems.
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R3risics 4 Access to the following equipment and/or local control stations is potentially required following main control room (NCR) evacuation or during postulated emergencies (as described in the EIs and FRs). Inspection of these areas was normally limited to either unit 1 or unit 2 equipment for those features which are unitized. This was primarily done to reduce exposure and is permitted since auch of the plant layout and equipment follows an
" opposite hand" pattern. A summary of the inspection is itemized below; all areas were accessible unless otherwise noted.
- 1. Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump and level controls, unit I and unit 2 pumps AB 669; level controls in cabinets just outside pump roca.
- 2. IS-46-57 TD AFW pump auxiliary / normal switch, 2-IS-46-57 on wall facing TDAFW pump room (unit 2).
Notor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (NDAFW) LCVs and isolation l valves, AB 714 are very congested. TDAFW LCVs and isolation valves. AB 714 penetration room and main steam valve rooms (NSRVs) - okay.
- 4. Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal flow indicators, on wall, AB elevation 690 penetration room, unit 1 and unit 2.
- 5. FCV-62 Charging flow, IB centrifugal charging pump (CCP) room.
i
- 7. FCV-62-138 Emergency Boration, 2-FCV-62-128 on wall AB 690 penetration room - unit 2.
- 8. HCV-62-929 Alternate Boration, 2-HCV-62-929 on pipe, AB 690 penetration room - unit 2.
- 9. FI-62-1378 Emergency Boration flow indication, 2-FI-62-1378, panel 2-L-43 AB 690 penetration room - unit 2.
- 10. ISV-62-932 Borate flush, 2-ISV-62-932, on pipe, AB 690 penetration roca - unit 2. ,
- 11. Primary Water Pump start switch, near pumps AB elevation 669 unit 1 and unit 2.
- 12. Spent Fuel Pit Cooling (SFPC) pumps start switch, on wall adjacent to pumps, AB elevation 714.
- 13. Upper Head Injection (UNI) level switches LS-87-21, 22, 23 and 24 Additional Equipment Building (AEB), panels 490, 491, 492, and 493 located on walls and support columns - unit 2.
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R visies 4
- 14. UNI FCVs-87-21, 22, 23, and 24, unit 2 AEB.
- 15. S/G Blowdown Radiation Nonitor RN-90-124, main corridor, AB elevation 690 near pipe chase /chen lab.
- 16. Residual Heat Removal (RNR) pump start, RNR pump rooms unit 1 and unit 2.
1
- 19. Steam generator power operated atmospheric relief valves (S/G PORVs), S/G PORVs in NSVRs; local indicating transmitters inspected were 1, 2-PIT-1-6 (SG 1 main steam header pressure - atmospheric relief valve transmitter), '
AB 690 penetration rooms unit 1 and unit 2.
These transmitters are located on an instrument rack shielded by a large corrugated sheet metal wall.that apparently serves as a separation barrier. Both unit 1 and 2 transmitters are facing the barrier and are approximately six inches from it. Access to the transmitters is difficult and would especially pose problems for maintenance. ;
l Note: During the evaluation, these transmitters were i mistaken for controllers. SQN in their response l f
to CATD 30501-SQN-01 notes that S/G PORY local controllers are located in the west main steam valve rooms and will be relocated under the Environmental l Qualification (EQ) program. Furthermore, the t transmitters are accessible for maintenance and not required for local operation of the PORVs.
Previous Efforts-In March 1986, SQN Operations in committing to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performed the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Verification Program for Local Plant Hardware (reference 14). The purpose of this procedure is to verify local operator actions required in the E0Ps (IIs, FRs, and Emergency Contingency Actions (ECAs)) and objectives include verification that equipment is available and accessible for operators' use. In addition to many of the stations previously discussed, the following were verified accessible in this procedure:
i Steam header traps l
l Main steam line drains Page 7 of 13
l R:visien 4 S/G blowdown monitors RM-90-120, 121 Air supply to S/G PORVs and steam dumps ,
Containment air supply valves (elevation 714)
FCV-32-80 (81, unit 2)
FCV-32-102 (103)
FCV-32-110 (111)
High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) isolation to RCPs i (669 penetration room)
RCS sample valves FCV-43-2, 3 FCV-43-11, 12 FCV-43-22, 23 BIT bypass valve ISV-63-697 BIT valve to holdup tank (HUT) HCV-63-573 RCP thermal barrier isolation (AB 714)
ISV-70-677A Booster Pump A discharge ISV-70-677B Booster Pump B discharge RCP seal return isolation (reach rods, AB 690)
ISV-62-642 Seal water filter inlet ISV-62-643 Seal water filter bypass RCP seal injection isolation (reach rods, AB 590)
ISV-62-546 Seal water injection filter bypass ISV-62-549 Seal water injection filter A outlet ISV-62-550 Seal water injection filter B outlet j
Interviews An open forum discussion with seven SQN AUOs did not identify any problems with access to emergency equipment local control stations. However, access to the motor driven AFW pump LCYs (item 3 above) was mentioned as a difficult area to access for operation of the air-operated LCVs and manual isolation valves.
! Inspection of unit 1 LCVs-3-148,156,164, and 171 and their associated manual isolation valves revealed that accessibility to these valves located on an elevated north wall platform on Auxiliary Building elevation 714 is indeed difficult.
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R visica 4 Also mentioned as someWhat inaccessible was the control panel for the Condensate Domineralizer Waste Evaporator (CDWE) Building ventilation dampers which is located in a high radiation environment and presently accessed by passing through a contamination (C)-zone. Assistant unit operators stated that up to 10 RIN/hr had occurred as the result of the disposal of RCP seals in close proximity to the control panel's location.
Frequent access to the panel has been necessary in the past to reset dampers which closed on spurious Auxiliary Building isolation signals.
Radwaste Stations The following radwaste control stations were inspected for accessibility; each was a large panel and is easily accessed for operation - none were located within or near C-zones.
Waste gas analyzer panel 0-L-206, near AB unit 2 elevation 690 pipechase Boric acid evaporator panel - AB elevation 669 on unit 2 side, 2 large panels in main north-south corridor.
Waste Evaporator and Auxiliary Waste Evaporator on unit 1 side near AB 669 east-west corridor.
CDWE Panel, located in CDWE building, easily accessed.
Nain Radwaste control panel-669; ADO headquarter station.
Other Safety-Related Stations A thorough inspection of the AB unit 1 elevation 690 pipe chase (C-zone area) was conducted to evaluate access to local control stations within. Access was possible to 22 safety-related valve
- controls mounted on several junction boxes. Examples of controls found include SIS cold les injection RHR cold leg injection, and RC3 charging flow isolation. Inspection of the AB unit 2 669 pipechase revealed several valve stations for containment spray and safety injection - none of which were inaccessible.
Conclusion
! Accessibility to certain areas is a recognized problem at SQN. SQN has identified many areas in which access is a problem and has taken measures to rectify these problems. Consideration of safety, IR4 ,
operational, and maintenance aspects of access problems has been used ;
in addressing the issues. Reference 6 notes that experience at SQN l indicates that although difficult, adequate and proper maintenance can be accomplished.
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R3rioica 4 The SQN Verification / Validation Program supplemented with this i evaluator's survey of various safety-related, radweste, and emergency l equipment are examples of the many processes (e.g., plant operating l history - maintenance, testing, inspections, and outage activities) at lR4 SQN which have directly or indirectly discovered conditions of limited l access. These efforts as well as others discussed in this report ensure l that conditions of limited access do not impact the safety of l operations at SQN. l l l
The concerns below are all valid to certain extents; however, actions I such as those described in this report have been taken to minimize the difficulties encountered. No safety-related deficiencies were identified in this evaluation.
IN-85-189-001 Valve accessibility has been a continual effort at SQN with many corrective actions already implemented.
Examples are chain operators, steel scaffold, portable ladders, grating, hoists, and guardrails.
IN-85-189-002 Nain Steam Valve Rooms (NSVRs) are high on the " safety list." Efforts by safety section to monitor these areas have been very safety conscious and several modifications have been planned or implemented. l Examples include access to: S/G blowdown throttle valves, north to south walls, feed water isolation valves, and main steam relief valve areas. Access to the NSVR's though difficult at times is possible by l operations personnel for operation of equipment.
IN-86-306-001 The Auxiliary Building is indeed congested; however, Operations personnel do not consider the turbine or motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps excessively l congested at SQN. Emergency equipment is accessible at SQN.
PH-85-003-006 Problems with access to instrumentation have not gone unnoticed and various actions have been taken to identify / correct these problems. Exemples include:
platform installation' for access to S/G inspection ports, portable platforms for condensate domineralizer polisher view ports, fixed ladders to top of cooling tower lift pump motors for reading gages, and installation of larger gages for diesel generator lube oil to allow reading from floor.
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R:visica 4 IN-85-220-001 The accumulator room number 4 is indeed congested, hence, it has received paramount attention. Examples of action planned or taken include a ladder / platform for access to accumulator tank's level transmitter sensor bellows, a fixed ladder access fram reactor building raceway to accumulator number 4 and improved access to vent valves, check valves, and isolation valves for leak testing. Operations personnel are able to access and operate valves in accumulator rooms.
IN-85-617-001 Accessibility to these areas is congested, however SQN has taken actions to minimize its effect.
Operations personnel are able to access these areas and operate equipment.
RII-86-A-0116 Inspection of local control stations in the SQN Auxiliary Building indicates panels needed to operate emergency, safety-related, and radwaste equipment are generally accessible. Access to local controllers for S/G number 1 PORVs (both units) is via the west main steam valve rooms. SQN notes these controllers will be relocated under the Environmental Qualification (EQ) program. Access to S/G PORY pressure indicating transmitters (PITS) (item 19, this report) is possible for maintenance activities - local operation of the PORVs is not required from the PITS. The NDAFW pump level control and isolation valves are very congested; however, operation of the LCVs is possible from the NCR and auxiliary control room (ACR). The control panel for the ABSCE ventilation dampers in the CDWE is located in a high rad area resulting from nearby disposal of RCP seals. SQN notes these dampers are operated an average of once per month and are not operated under emergency conditions.
The source of the high radiation will be removed when the Dry Active Waste (DAW) Building is completed - work is planned under ECN 6596 (DCR 1898), estimated completion for this activity is FY'87.
IV. ROOT CAUSE The original plant layout was based on data from Westinghouse and on similar designs by other utilities in the late 1960s. Because the internal building design could not be modified to accommodate modifications and additions, certain areas have proven to be
. insufficient to prevent tight and crowded conditions. (Reference 7)
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R:visica 4 i
V. GENERIC APPLICABILITY Crowded conditions are not unusual in nuclear plants TVA included.
Access issues will continue to arise and be handled on a case basis. 4 This evaluation is not made generic to other plants since no safety- l related deficiencies were identified.
Accessibility concerns for WBN have been evaluated in subcategory report 30500.
VI. REFERENCES
- 1. E-forms: IN-85-189-001 IN-86-306-001 IN-85-189-002 RII-86-A-0116 PH-85-003-006 IN-85-220-001 IN-85-617-001
- 2. Nemorandum and status report to Those listed from James Doty, o " Platform and Yalve Accessibility Program," June 6, 1984 (RINS L53 840606 843)
- 3. SQN " Electrical Naintenance January Safety Concerns." January 1986
- 4. TVA SQN Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) Report on Employee Concern: IN-85-617-001, " Accessibility Impossible Due to Hangers and Pipe Supports," by T. H. Huth, June 6, 1986 (revision 1) and February 18, 1986 (revision 0)
- 5. Status report for platform and valve accessibility as of July 1986 -
data obtained from SQN Planning and Scheduling Section (this information pertains to reference 2) !
- 6. Nemorandum to W. H. Thompson from W. T. Cottle, "QTC Concern IN-85-430-001," August 13, 1985, reported by R. Goode
- 7. Namoranden to E. W. Whitt from R. V. Pierce " Employee Concern
- Evaluation for IN-85-286-002," July 19, 1985
- 8. SQN Engineering Change Notice (ECN)-5889 and SQN Workplan (WP)-10954, " East Nain Steam Yalve Room Access Platform Addition,"
l April 19, 1984
- 9. SQN ECN-6170 and SQN WP-11618, revision 1. "Mainsteam Yalve Rooms - lR4 Emergency Descent Device and Hinged Gate," June 28, 1985
- 10. SQN ECN 5635 and SQN WPs 9936 and 11648, "RB Accumulator Room Ladder," Nay 30, 1985 Page 12 of 13
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- 11. SQN Emergency Instructions (IIs)
E-0, " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," revision 1. August 21, 1985 E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant " revision 1 August 21, 1985 E-2, " Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," revision 1 August 21, 1985 E-3.1, "SI Termination Following Steam Generator Tube Rupture,"
revision 0, October 4, 1984
- 12. SQN Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOI)-27 " Control Room Inaccessibility," revision 5. June 20, 1986
- 13. SQN Function Restoration Guidelines (FRs)
H.1, " Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," revision 1, August 21, 1985 H.3, " Response to Steam Generator High Level," revision 0, August 21, 1985 H.4, " Response to Loss of Normal Steam Relief Capabilities,"
revision 0, August 21, 1985
- 14. SQN Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Verification Program for Local Plant Hardware Narch 1986, Draft.
.VII. INNEDIATE or LONG-TERN CORRECTIVE ACTION CATD 30501-SQN-01 issued to SQN to address problem with access to S/G number 1 PORY local controllers.
The SQN response for this CATD states that S/G PORY local controllers are located in the West Nain Steam Yalve Rooms and will be relocated under the Environmental Qualification (EQ) program. The response notes that equipment identified as pressure indicating controllers (item 19, this report) are actually S/G PORY pressure indicating transmitters for which operation is not required and maintenance is not a problem, therefore no corrective action is required.
CATD 30501-SQN-02 issued to SQN to address problem with access to CDWE building damper control panel.
The SQN response for this CATD states that controls for ABSCE ventilation dampers are not operated under emergency conditions.
They are operated on a once per month average. The source of the high radiation area will be removed when the Dry Active Waste (DAW) building is completed - this work is planned under ECN 6596 (DCR 1898). The estimated completion for this activity is FY'87.
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