ML20203N985
| ML20203N985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/1973 |
| From: | Bradbury C, Loose R, Snyder W WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203N965 | List: |
| References | |
| 1.14-01, 1.14-1, NUDOCS 8610200169 | |
| Download: ML20203N985 (47) | |
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TITLt SYSTEMS STANDARD DESIGN CRITERIA NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION APPLICABLE PIANTS:
PRW, ANC, CQL, CRL, CSL, CTL, CGE. CAE CBE, GAE, GBE, NEU AND FUTURE PLANTS FOR EXTERNAL USE 8610200169 861010 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P
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WESTINGHOUSE sysTsus sicwm3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 Introduction 4
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2.0 Containment Isolation Criteria 5
3.0 Testing of Isolation Valves 12 4.0 Imgend 14 S.0 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 15 6.0 Chemical & Volume Control System (CVCS) 17 7.0 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) 22 8.0 Component Cooling System (CCS) 23 25 9.0 Waste Processing System (WPS) p 10.0 Safety Injection System (SIS) 27 11.0 Containment Spray System 34 12.0 Sampling Syatem 35 13.0 Containment Pressure' Instruments 36 Appendix A Relief Valves 37 Appendix B Containment Pressure Instruments 40 Appendix C Remote Manual Operation of Isolation 42 l
Valves in Safeguards Lines l
Appendix D Seal Injection Lines 43 s
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
We purpose of this. document is to provide criteria for containment isolation
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and standard arrangements for meeting this criteria for each of the NSSS lines penetrating the containment wall. Typical diagrams showing NSSS fluid system De lines penetrating the containment wall are included in this document.
sketches include brief notes describing the standard isolation valve arrange-ments shown. We diagrams also indicate recommended locations for gas test
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connections to be provided by the customer.
In many cases, existing vents and a
drains can be used for these testing functions.
In general this document includes typical containment penetrations for the NSSS for Westinghouse PWR plants. However, for some plants there may be cases which may not be specifically covered by this document.
In this event, these special cases shall be handled on an individual basis.
De information contained in this document reflects Westinghouse Nuclear F,nergy Systems (W NES) interpretation of good design practice as to provisions to be made for meeting current Atomic Energy Cotanission (AEC) requirements regarding containment isolation.
Specifically, the basis for the design requirements included in this document meet criteria 55, 56 and 57 of the AEC General Design 1
Criteria which became effective in July 1971. This document will be updated as necessary to reflect any new information.
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s WESTINGHOUSE SYSTItst stale 04s0 2.0 CIETAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA 2.1 General In general all piping which penetrates the containment must be provided i
with isolation valves in compliance with the AEC General Design Criteria I
(55, 56 and 57).
These criteria are as follows:
Criterion 55 - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Pe.ietrating Containmnt i
Each line that is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and that penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided wf th containment isolatite, valves as follows, smieso it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions for a specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on some other defined basis:
(1) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment, or (2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed isola-tion valve outside containment, or (3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic isola-tion valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment, or (4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.
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Isolation valves outside containment shall be located as close to con-tainment as practical and upon loss of actuating power, automatic iso-lation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides greater safety.
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WESTINGHollSE sysTenes afrM0:c3 Other appropriate requirements to minimize the probability or conse-quences of an accidental rupture of these lines or of lines connected to them shall be provided as necessary to assure adequate safety.
Determination of the appropriateness of these requirements, such as higher quality in design, fabrication, and testing, additional provi-t sions for inservice inspection, protection against more severe natural phenomena, and additional isolation valves and containment, shall inclue' l
consideration of the population density, use characteristics, and physi -
cal characteristics of the site environs.
Criterion 56 - Primary Containment Isolation Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere and i
penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with contain-ment isolation valves as follows, unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions for a specific class of lines, such as i
instru=ent lines, are acceptable on some other defined basis:
(1) One locked closed isolation valve inside and 'one locked closed isolation valve outside containment, or (2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed isola-tion valve outside containment, or (3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatie isola-tion valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment, or (4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automati: isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment.
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Isolation valves outside containment shall be located as close to the i
cont ainment as practical and upon loss of actuating power, automatic isolation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides greater safety.
Criterion 57 - Closed System Isolation Valves r
Eacti line that penetrates primary reactor containment and is neither part of the reactor coolant pressure botmdary nor connected direct ty to the containment atmosphere shall have at least one containment iso-lation valve which shall be either automatic, or locked closed, or i
capable of remote manual operation.
This valve shall be outside con-tainment and located as close to the containment as practical. A l
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ek valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve.
In general, the methods of providing isolation for NSSS lines penetrating containment fall into the following categories:
L Case A Isolation valve outside and isolation valve inside (both incoming and outgoing lines).
Case B Isolation valve outside and check valve inside (incoming lines only).
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Case C i
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Isolation valve outside and closed system inside (both incoming and out-going lines).
Illustrations of the above cases are shown in Figure 2.1.
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T or P, or remote Case C manual operation Closed T or P or rerpote 5Ystem mnual, operation i
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. Any exceptions to the above configurations (such as for engineered safety systems which must operate af ter an accident) will be explained on an individual basis. These special cases will be described in the diagrams appendices in this document.
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f lo conform to CDC 55, 56 and 57, containment isolation valves out<f de the containment must be located as close as practical to the containment wall.
- his practice should also be followed for containment isolation valves
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located inside containment.
2.2 Isolation Valves All containment isolation valves must be capable of tight shutoff against gas leakage with a pressure equal to containment design pressure down to approximately zero psig. A cantainment isolation valve can be an auto-matic trip valve (air or motor operated), a locked closed valve, a check valve located inside containment, or a remote manual valve outside contain-ment for the closed system case.
Automatic trip valves close on a T signal (HI containment pressure and/or safety injection) or a P signal (hI-HI containment pressure). The contain-ment isolation signals (T cr P) override all other automatic control signals to the isolation valves. These trip valves may be gate, globe or diaphragm type valves. Air-operated isolation valves fall to the closed position on loss of air or control signal.
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Control features are provided for the containment isolation valves such that:
a) The valves will remain in the closed position if the T or P trip signal is reset.
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is reset, c) Even with the T or F signal present, a containment isolation valve can be re-opened in an eme'rgency, such as a spurious T or P signal, by manually holding the control switch in the open position.
Locked closed manual valves have a mechanical device under administrative
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i control which locks the valve in the closed position.
Normally closed motor operated valves may be " locked closed" by lock-ing the power breaker in the "off" position or by electrical interlocks which prevent power from being supplied to the valve. Manual operation (hand cranking) of remote valves used for containment isolation is under strict administrative control.
A check valve inside containment may be used as a containment isolation valve.
It must be capable of tight shutoff against gas leakage and be located as cloas as practical to the containment.
In some instances relief valves form part of an isolation barrier. These are special cases and are discussed in Appendix A.
2.3 Closed System Inside Containment The requirements for a closed system inside containment include the following:
1.
Must not communicate with either the Reactor Coolant System or the containment atmosphere.
2.
Must.be missile protected.
3.
Must meet ANS Safety Classification 2.
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design pressure and temperature.
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Must withstand accident transient and environment.
2.4 Overpressure Protection
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In some cases following a loss of coolant accident it is possible that the fit.id contained between two closed isolation barriers may be heated and expand. This expansion may result in overpressurization of the piping On lines whare overpressurization may occur, relief protection and valves.
is provided. On some lines, a small line conceining a check valve is The check installed to bypass the isolation valve inside the containment.
valve allows fluid between the valves to discharge to the line further in-This check valve is regarded as part of the isola-side the containment.
tion barrier and is air tested accordingly. Pressure between air operated globe or diaphragm valves will cause the stem to lift slightly providing relief.
In several cases relief valves are located between isolation valves for system protection. An overpressure will cause the valve to lift and relieve toward the inside of the containment. These are special cases and are discussed in Appendix A.
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As a general requirement, containment isolation valves must be tested periodi-cally with gas to determine their leaktightness. These test requirements are set forth in Appendix J of 10CFR50, Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors. Testing will be.done by establishing a test volume in the piping so that the valve is exposed to gas at containment design pressure. Check valves and single disk gate valves must have the test pressure applied to the inboard side of the valve (the side toward the center of the a
containment). Diaphragm valves may be tested from eia.her side since their leakage characteristics are the same in either direction.
Double-disk gate valves may be tested by applying the test pressure between the disks. Globe valves may be :ested either by pressurizing the inboard side or by pressurizing under the seat.
Wherever isolation valve testing is to be done, various connections must be made to supply test gas to the appropriate sections of piping. The general locations of these test connections are indicated by the TC symbol on the following disgrams. It would also be necessary to vent the piping connected to the valve on the side opposite the test volume. The locations of these test vents are indicated by the TV symbol on the following diagrams.
In most cases, existing equipment vents or drains can be used to perform this function.
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Since the test gas must impinge directly upon the valve being tested, the test connections and/or vents should be located so as to facilitate adequate draining of the test _ volume.
The piping should be layed out and the valves which are the boundaries of the test volume should be located so as to minimize the size of the test volume.
Loop seals, sloping pipe, etc. can be used to help keep the test volume small thus minimizing the amount of water to be drained and providing more accurate leak rate measurements.
In some cases, TV's and TC's can be com-bined in a single connection.
In general, TV's and TC's should be connected to s
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De testing of relief valves which form part of an isolation barrier is dis-cussed in Appendix A.
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INDICATES VALVE CLOSES ON T SIGNAL (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION(1)
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P INDICATES VALVE CLOSES ON P SIGNAL (CONTAINNENT ISOLATION (1) i
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r WESTINGHOUSE systsass staascasp APPENDIX A RELIEF VALVES In a few special instances pressure relief valves form part of containm'ent isolation barriers.
In all cases the containment atmosphere impinges only on the discharge side of the valve and in all cases the relief valves are f
located inside containment.
He relief valves-are spring loaded closed and if an overpressure in the system causes the valve to lift, the fluid would be discharged into containment (to the pressurizer relief tank or directly to the containment sump).
In a post-accident situation any containment atmosphere which leaks into the valve through the discharge line or through the valve bonnet will be prevented from entering the piping system by the closed valve.
All relief valves are periodically removed from the lines ar.d bench tested
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to check their set pressures. Any relief valve which forms part of an isola-tion barrier is leak tested from the discharge side with gas at containment design pressure before removal. De valve is then removed, bench r.ested, and re-installed in its line. Another gas leskrate test is then perforned on the valve.
Se leakrates as determined by these gas tests must be sithin the limits of Appendix J of 10CFR50 and within the Westinghouse limits for leakage through containment isolation valves.
He following is a list of the relief valves which are part of isolation barrier and a description of tha function of each.
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LETDOWN LINE RELIEF VALVE nis relief valve protects the letdown heat exchanger and piping downstream of the letdown orifices from overpressurization if the orifice isolation valves are open and flow is stopped downstream.
The valve is sized to relieve 43,400
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lb/hr of steam at 600 psig. His discharge is routed to the pressurizer relief tank where the steam is quenched.
He relief valve cannot be located outside containment because there is no tank available which could. handle this steam discharge without danger of releasing radioactivity to the atmosphere.
RESIDUAL llEAT REMOVAL SUCTION LINE RELIEF VALVE Re relief valve in each suction line protects the RHRS from overpressurization during residual heat removal operation.
Se design basis assumes that the RCS is water solid and that the charging line control valves go fully open. Bis could result in a large flowrate (approximately 900 gpm) through the relief valve.
This flow is discharged to the pressurizer relief tank which is designed to handle large flows of hot water and/or steam. D e relief valve in located inside containment in order to minimize the amount of radioactive fluid which must be handled outside ' containment and to minimize the danger of a possible release caused by a large volume of hot water oc steam discharged to one of the available holdup tanks.
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM TO THE EXCESS LETDOWN HX AND REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK HX The relief valves for each of these heat exchangers are designed tc relieve overpressurization caused by a tube rupture or by thermal expansion if the HX's are isolated. We relief valves are locat9d inside containment because the heat' -
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WESTINGHOUSE systems sTAnf0ARD APPENDIX A (Cont.)
containment and also because a tube rupture would cause a hot radioactive discharge which should be kept inside containment.
The valves discharge to the sump rathe - 'han the pressurizer relief tank in order to prevent the chromates it; the component cooling water from getting into the pressurizer relief t ank and possibly the CVCS.
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WESTINGHOUSE systsus stucaco APPENDIX B CMTAINMENT PRESSURE USTRUMENTS here are four instrument lines which penetrate the containment and.whi,ch are _
recuired to remain functional following a LOCA or steam break. Rese lines sense the pressure of containme'nt atmosphere on thd inside and are connected to presure transmitters on the outside.
Signals from these transmitters can i
j initiate safety injection and containment isolation on high containment press _.
They also, upon hi-hi containment pressure, produce the only signal to initiate containment spray. In view of this function it is essential that the line remain open and not be isolated following an accident.
Based on this require-ment, a sealed sensing line as described below is used.
Each of the four channels has a separate penetration and each pressure trans-mitter is located immediately adjacent to the outside of the containment wall.
It is connected to a sealed bellows located immediately adjacent to the inside containment well by mens of a sealed fluid filled tube.
his tubing along with the transmitter and bellows is conservatively designed and subject to strict quality control and to regular in-service inspections to assure its integrity. his arrangement provides a double barrier. (one inside and one j
outside) between the containment and the outside atmosphere.
Should a leak occur outside containment,' the sealed bellows inside containment, which is designed to withstand full containment design pressure, will prevent the escape of containment atmosphere. Should a leak occur inside containment, the diaphragm in the transmitter, which is designed to withstand full containment design pre-e, will prevent any escape from containment. his arrangement provides automat 16_,.
double barrier isolation without operator, action and without sacrificing any reliability with regard to its safeguards functions (i.e. no valves to be CESTimomouSE ELECTsic C0sP3e ATION
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inadvertantly closed or to close spuriously). Both the bellows and tubing inside containment and the transmitter and tubing outside containment are enclosed by protective shielding. This shielding (box, channel or guard pipe, e'tc.)
prevents mechanical damage to the components from missiles, water jets, dropped tools, etc.
i Because of this sealed fluid filled system, a postulated severance of the line during either normal operation or accident conditions will not result in any release from the containment.
If the fluid in the tubing is heated during the accident the flexible bellows will allow for expansion of the fluid without overpressurizing the system and without significant detriment to the accuracy of the transmitter.
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WESTINGHOUSE SYSTEMS STON217.3 APPENDIX C REMOTE MANUAL OPERATION OF ISOLATION VALVES IN SAFECUARDS LINES There are several isolation valves in lines which penetrate containment and are required t o perform a safeguards function.following an accident. Since these valves m.st remain open or be opened, a trip signal obviously cannot be used.
Instead each of these valves is capable of remote manual operation.
Upon completion of the Gafeguards function of the line, the operator can close the isolation valve from the control room.
Lines which fall into this category include the following:
low head injection lines, high head injection lines, containment spray lines, and containment sump recirculation lines.
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i WESTINGHOUSE SYSTEMS StateOARD APPEND 1X D SEAL INJECTION LINES Re seal injection lines provide flow from the charging pumps to the main seale.
on the reactor coolant pun.ps.
This seal flow provides cooling to the seals and the s'tafts.
Part of the flow splits and goes into the RCS through the 1.abyrinth seal while the remainder is recovered in the secondary seal leakoffs. A backup system is provided by the thermal barrier which is located lower down on tbc pump shaft. This is basically a coil carrying component cooling water.
If seal flow is interrupted, the theriaal barrier will cool the reactor coolant which will flow up through the seal. Se component cooling water lines to and from the thermal barrier are isolated on a P signal.
If for any reason flow of cool water passing through the " seals is interrupted for more than a minute or two - severe seal damage and/or shaft damage will occur. This is t tue whenever the RCS is above 160*F whether or not the RC pumps are in operation.
Due to the sensitive nature of the seals it is highly desirable to provide seal flow at all times.
On plants where the charging pumps are used for safety injection, flow will be provided by the pumps through the seal injection lines following an accident.
Because of this high pressure inflow there is no need.
to provide any sort of trip valves in these seal injection lines.
Each line is equipped with a remote manual containment isolation valve which the opera-k tor can close when the charging pumps have completed their safeguards function.
On plants where the charging pumps are not 'used for safety injection the valves in the individual lines will be tripped closed on a T-signal.
Dese valves will have the ability to be re, opened inuoediately froni the control room without re-setting, the T signal in case of a spurious trip. A T-signal rather than a
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P-signal in used so that a single spurious signal will not close both the seal injection lines and the component cooling lines to the thermal barrier at the same time.
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WESTINGHOUSE sYstemas staascano APPENDIX E RECIRCULATIGi SUMP LINES ne lines from the containment sump to the auctions of the low head SI recirculation (RHR ) pumps are each provided with a single remote manual gate valve. His valve is enclosed in a compartment which is leaktight I
at containment design pressure. The piping from the sump to the valve is enclosed in concentric guard pipe. which is also leaktight.
A seal is pro-vided so that neither the compartment nor the guard pipe is connected directly to the sump or to the containment stuosphere.
At the beginning of the SI recirculation phase the sump is full of water, the line from the RWST is closed, and the sump line valves are opened.
Since the sump is always submerged and no containment atmosphere can impinge upon the valve, this valve is not a containment isolation v.1ve an such.
I he valve does provide a barrier outside containment to prevent loss of sump water should a leak develop in a recirculation loop.
(he valve is closed remotely from control room to accomplish this). Should a leak develop in the valve body or in the pipe between the sep and the valve, the sump fluid will be contained by the leaktight compartment and/or by the guard pipe.
Since the sump line connection to the suay is always submerged, there is no need for a valve inside containannt to prevent the escape of containment atmosphe re.
v With this system no single failure of either an active or passive component will prevent the recirculation of core cooling water or adversely affect the inte-grity of the containment. He present arrangement asets all safety requirements and any additional valves are anecessary for containment isolation.
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APPENDIX F RHR SUCTION LINES ne lines from the RCS hot legs to the RHR pump suctions each contain two remote manual (motor operated) valves, which are closed during normal plant power operation. The valves are interlocked such that they cannot be opened when the RCS pressure is greater than the design pressure of the RHR system.
he valves closer to the RCS are interlocked with one pressure transmitter while the valves closer to containment are interlocked with a separate trans-mit ter.
The valve which is located closer to the RCS inside the missile barrier is not considered a containment isolation valve. He second valve defines the limit of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. His valve also provides the containment isolation barrier inside containment and is considered to be locked closed.
Since these lines connect to the SI recirculation loops which are filled with.
sump water and at least one of which is in operation post-sceident, there is y
no need for any containment isolation valves in these lines outside containment.
If a leak occurs in the line upstream (toward the JtCS) of the valve inside con-tainment, ' the closed valve isolates the line.
If a leak occurs in the recircu-lation system outside containment, the sump valve is closed to prevent loss q
of sump water and the closed valve in the RHR suction line prevents any contain-ment atmosphere from entering the system outside containment.
If a leak should occur in the short langth of pipe between the valve inside containment and the containment, any containment atmosphere will get only as far as the fluid-filled system.
Since this system is filled with sump water and is most likely in ope tion, no gas could escape to the outside. He fluid in the RHR suction line would drop to approximately the level of fluid in the sump and any containment' atmos-1 phare which did leak into the line would be contained in this length of closed i
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Another closed valve in the line would do nothing except somewhat decrease the length of pipe outside containment which could possibly be exposed to containment atmosphere following a leak.
It is possible that a valve in.
this section of pipe would increase the probability of leakage of gas through the stem packing and could not be considered as tight as a clean length of pipe. No single failure of any active or passive component anywhere in the present system can cause any release of containment atmosphere to the outside.
Any additional valves would complicate normal residual heat removal operation and are unnecessary for containment isolation.
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