ML20203N402
| ML20203N402 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203N401 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8610080224 | |
| Download: ML20203N402 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES fgg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N0.91 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL.
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT N0. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 4
DOCKET N0. 50-302 INTRODUCTION By letter dated April 23, 1984, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) proposed a change to the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Technical Specifications (TSs).
This change would allow operation (opening) of certain containment isolation valves when they would normally be required to be isolated provided that a i
dedicated operator is posted to isolate the valve when necessary. A portion of the change request has been denied for reasons discussed in this evaluation.
BACKGROUND NUREG-0103, Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock & Wilcox Pressurized Water Reactors, was issued to provide guidance to applicants in the development of plant specific TSs. One feature of NUREG-0103 is to allow certain valves listed in STS Table 3.6.2 of Specification 3.6.4, Containment Isolation Yalves, to be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. The administrative controls, while not specified by NRC, are usually in the form of a procedure which directs the establishment of a dedicated operator in continuous direct communication with the control room to facilitate a rapid valve closure should the conditions warrant such action.
During the development of the CR-3 TSs this provision was not incorporated.
It is also noted that CR-3 Surveillance Pequirement 4.6.1.1(a)(1) references the use of this provision as an exemption to the 31-day verification in that all penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.1.
Selecting which valves are to be controlled in this manner requires suitable justification for opening an inoperable valve (penetration).
EVALUATION The request to operate the following valves under administrative controls has been approved: CAV-1, 2, 3 and 126; CFV-25, 26, 27, 28, 11, 12 and 42; and SAV-23 and 24. The staff has denied the request to operate the following under administrative controls: CAV-4, 5, 6 and 7; and LRV-70, 71, 72 and 73.
8610080224 860916 PDR ADOCK 05000302 p
. For valves CAV-1, 2, 3 and 126, it is determined that a change to allow opening under administrative controls is acceptable when Reactor Coolant System sampling would otherwise be prevented by an inoperable valve.
It is concluded that the administrative ccatrols should be clearly defined by adding the following note to TS Table 3.6-1:
May be' opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control consisting of a dedicated operator stationed at the valve in continuous communication with the control room with necessary parameters to rapidly isolate the penetration on a valid indication.
Likewise, the staff determined it to be acceptable to operate valves CFV-25, 26, 11,12 and 42 under administrative controls to assure adequate boron concentration when necessary.
It is concluded that the administrative controls are sufficient to adequately control the valves.
Valves CFV-27 and 28, which supply nitrogen cover-pressure to the core flood tanks, are needed to maintain pressure in the Reactor Coolant System during an accident. The staff feels it is acceptable to operate these valves under the.
specified administrative controls.
For valves SAV-23 and 24, the staff determined that it is acceptable to operate the valves under administrative controls.
Particular attention was.
given to the fact that.both valves are manual type valves. These valves would be used during maintenance activities in the Reactor Building while in HOT STANDBY or H0T SHUTDOWN to provide air for respirators.
Service air pressure leakage would be into containment and would provide suitable assurance that personnel could be evacuated and the penetration isolated i
without a release.
The request for a change to allow hydrogen purge system valves LRV-70 71, 72 and 73 to be operated under administrative controls is denied. A system that provides containment purging during normal plant operations should meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, II.E.4.2, and its Attachment 1.
The system proposed by the licensee is neither designed nor proposed to be operated in accordance with these criteria.
In addition, the request to operate valves CAV-4, 5, 6 and 7 under administrative controls is denied. The basis for the request was to resolve a conflict between the environmental TS requirement (2.4.1.0) to sample steam generator chemistry and the containment isolation TS which precludes opening the subject valves. With the implementation of Radiological Effluent l
Technical Specifications (RETS), the requirement of 2.4.1.0 no longer exists and thus the basis for change is not valid.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility 1
component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in
. individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such J
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be. inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
September 16, 1986 Principal Contributors:
T. Stetka, J. Rogge, V. Panciera, H. Silver and B. Mozafart.
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