ML20202G652
| ML20202G652 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1986 |
| From: | George Thomas PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.151, RTR-REGGD-1.151 SBN-1154, NUDOCS 8607160032 | |
| Download: ML20202G652 (32) | |
Text
... -
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d George S. Thomas Vice President-Nuclear Production Put2c Service of New Hampshire July 3, 1986 New Hampshire Yankee Division SBN-1154 T.F.
B7.1.3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5
Reference:
(a) Construction Permit CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444
Subject:
FSAR Revisions
Dear Sir:
During discussions with the Staff regarding the Seabrook Station Technical Specifications, and as result of our own in-house review of these technical specifications, changes to the Seabrook Station FSAR were identified. These changes are provided herewith in Attachment 1.
Attachment I also provides a further clarification of Seabrook Station's conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.151.
These revisions will be incorporated into the FSAR by a future amendment.
Very truly yours, s
Gecfrge S. Tho2nas Attachment cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List 8607160032 860703 DR ADOCK 05000443 M,(
PDR P.O. Box 300. Seabrook, NH 03874. Telephone (603) 474-9574
Disna Curran, Esquirs Patar J. Mathavn, Mayor Nermon & Weics City Hzl1 2001 S. Street, N.W.
N wburyport, MA 01950 Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 Judith H. Mizner Silvergate, Gertner, Baker, Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
. Fine, Good & Mizner Office of the Executive Legal Director 88 Broad Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Boston, MA 02110 Tenth Floor Washington, DC 20555 Calvin A. Canney City Manager Robert A. Backus, Esquire City Hall 116 Lowell Street 126 Daniel Street P.O. Box 516 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Manchester, NH 03105 Stephen E. Merrill, Esquire Philip Ahrens, Esquire Attorney General Assistant Attorney General George Dana Bisbee, Esquire Department of The Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Statehouse Station #6 Office of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Chairman, Board of Selectmen Mr. J. P. Nadeau RFD 1 - Box 1154 Selectmen's Office Kennsington, NM 03827 10 Central Road Rye, NH 03870 Carol S. Sneider, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Department of the Attorney General Chairman of the Board of Selectmen One Ashburton Place,19th Floor Town of Newbury Boston, MA 02108 Newbury, MA 01950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. William S. Lord U.S. Senate Board of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 Town Hall - Friend Street (ATTN: Tom Burack)
Amesbury, MA 01913 Richard A. Hampe, Esq.
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Hampe and McNicholas 1 Pillsbury Street 35 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 Concord, NH 03301 (ATTN: Herb Boynton)
Thomas F. Powers, III H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Town Manager Office of General Counsel Town of Exeter Federal Emergency Management Agency 10 Front Street 500 C Street, SW Exeter, NH 03833 Washington, DC 20472 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esquire RFD Dalton Road Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Brentwood, NH 03833 Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
P.O. Box 360 Holmes & Ells Portsmouth, NH 03801 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03842 Robert Carrigg Town Office Mr. Ed Thomas Atlantic Avenue FEMA Region I North Hampton, NH 03862 442 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse Boston, MA 02109
=
SBN-ATTACHMENT 1 FSAR Revisions (Seabrook Station) l 1
l I
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 53 FSAR August 1984 3.8 DESIGN OF CATEGORY I STRUCTURES 3.8.1 Concrete Containment The containment structure houses the major portion of a PWR nuclear steam supply system (NSSS).
Durin.3 the operating life of the plant, it will also provide the following functions:
Limiting the leakage rate to the maximum allowable Type "A" test a.
o*is */p leakage rate,M by weight of the containment contained air mass J per day at calculated peak prcssure and associated temperature, resulting from any loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and other postu-lated accidents.
b.
Providing continuing radiation shielding during normal plant opera.
tion in accordance with 10CFR20 and during accident conditions in accordance with 10CFR100.
Protecting the reactor vessel and all other safety-related systems, c.
equipment and components located inside the containment against all postulated external environmental conditions and resulting loads.
3.8.1.1 Description of Containment The containment, Figures 1.2-2 through 1.2-6, is a seismic Category I rein-l forced concrete dry structure, which is designed to function at atmospheric 44 cond itions.
It consists of an upright cylinder topped with a hemispherical dome, supported on a reinforced concrete foundation mat which is keyed into the bedrock by the depression for the reactor pit and by continuous bearing around the pe riphery of the foundation mat.
The inside diameter of the cylinder is 140 feet and the inside height from the top of the base mat to the apex of the dome is approximately 219 feet; the net free volume is app roximate ly 2,704,000 cubic feet.
A welded steel liner plate, anchored to the inside face of the containment, serves as a leaktight membrane. Although not a code requirement, welds that are embedded in concrete and not readily accessible are covered by a leak chase system which permits leak testing of those welds throughout the life of the plant. Exemptions to these inaccessible welds are the welds joining mechanical penetrations X-60 and X-61 to the steel liner plate.
(The venting pipes which join the leak chase channels for these penetrations to the atmosphere were not provided; however, these welds underwent proper testing before they became inaccessible). The liner on top of the foundation mat is protected by a four feet thick concrete fill mat which supports the contain-1 ment internals and forms the floor of the containment.
The containment is designed to assure that the base mat, cylinder, and dome behave integrally to resist all loads.
Located outside the containment building and having a similar geometry is the containment enclosure building. This structure provides leak protection for the containment and protects it from certain loads, as discussed in Subsection 3.8.1.3.
The containment enclosure building is described in Subsection 3.8.4.
3.8-1
SB 1 & 2 Amendernt 56 FSAR November 1985 8.
Containment Ambient Temperature Monitors Platinum resistance temperature detectors are strategically located throughout the containment to detect local temperature changes and will assist in localizing a leak.
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c.
RCS Water Inventory Balance The periodic RCS water inventory balance is designed to be conducted during steady state conditions with m';imal T-AVG variance.
In the course of this inventory, the following parameters are monitored:
1.
Time 2.
T-Avg 3.
Pressurizer Level 4.
VCT Level 5.
PRT Level 6.
RCDT Level l
7.
BAB Flow Totalizer Changes in inventory due to' sampling, draining, and steam generator tube leakage are accounted for separately.
During the conduct of this inventory, every effort is made to avoid additions to the RCS, pump down of the RCDT, or diversion of letdown from the VCT.
l
~
52 Changes in the parameters are calculated over a convenient time period (the longer the period the more accurate the results). The inventory change rate is determined by summing the volume change associated with each parameter and dividing this value by the time interval. The difference between the containment sump leakage rate and the inventory change rate will indicate leakage from sources other than the primary system.
5.2.5.4 Intersystem Leakage Detection The following three types of detection methods are employed to monitor systems connected with the RCPB for signs of intersystem leakage:
a.
Primary Component Cooling Water System Radiation Monitors These are gamma sensitive scintillation detectors. Liquid sample is drawn from the discharge side of the primary component cooling water pumps and returned back to the suction side. This system monitors primary component cooling water for radioactivity indica-tive of a leak from the reactor coolant system or from one of the radioactive systems which exchanges heat with the primary component cooling system. These detectors are provided with the relevant flow information, so as to get the radioactivity in terms of micro-curies per cubic centimeter.
b.
Condenser Air Evacuation Monitors This method is employed for detection of steam generator tube leaks.
Noble gases present in the steam generator tube or tube sheet coolant 5.2-27
~
SB 1 & 2 Amendment' $9 FSAR May 1986 e
TABLE 5.2-7
\\
REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY VALVE NUMBERS CSV-0002 RCV-0009 RCV-0079 RHV-0031 SIV-0082 I
i.
CSV-0018 RCV-0010 RCV-0080 RHV-0050 SIV-0086 q
CSV-0034 RCV-0013 RCV-0081 RHV-0051 SIV-0087 CSV-0050 RCV-0017 RCV-0087 RHV-0052 SIV-0106 Y
RCV-0088 RHV-0053 SIV-0110 CSV-0175 RCV-0022 CSV-0176 RCV-0023 RCV-0090 RHV-0059 SIV-0118 CSV-0178 RCV-0033 RCV-0091 RHV-0061 SIV-012d i
CSV-0179 RCV-0034 RCV-0094 RHV-0063 SIV-0126k
)
\\
CSV-0181 RCV-0037 RCV-0097 RHV-0065 SIV-0130 CSV-0182 RCV-0040 RCV-0098 SIV-0003 SIV-0140 CSV-0185 RCV-0041 RCV-0099 SIV-0005 '
SIV-0143 CSV-0186 RCV-0044 RCV-0102 SIV-0006 SIV-0144 "
s s v -0W7 CSV-0471 RCV-0045 RCV-0109 HV-00M sty _0147
/
CSV-0472 RCV-0050 RCV-0110 SIV-0020' SIV-0148 CSV-0473 RCV-0051 RCV-0115 SIV-0021 SIV-0151 CSV-0474 RCV-0060 RCV-0116 SIV-0032 SIV-0152 CSV-0752 RCV-0061 RCV-0117 SIV-0035 SIV-0155 RCV-0001 RCV-0064 RCV-0122 SIV-0036 SIV-0156 f
RCV-0003 RCV-0067 RCV-0124 SIV-0047 RC-PCV-456A RCV-0004 RCV-0072 RHV-0015 SIV-0050 RC-PCV-456B RCV-0006 RCV-0073 RHV-0029 SIV-0051*
RC-LCV-459 RCV-0008 RCV-0076 RHV-0030 SIV-0081 RC-LCV-460 54 ac - ec e - 4SSA Tscis hi,V'/""
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tc - it * - M rF 2 re ww.ch ccep < leoz <p resi;y in a cc o< <4 a c <
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2.
Subsequent Leakage from Components in Safeguards Systems With> respect to piping and mechanical equipment outside the containment, considering the provisions for visual inspection and leak detection, leaks will be detected before they pro-pagate to major proportions. A review of the equipment in the system indicates that the largest sudden leak potential would be the sudden failure of a pump shaf t seal. Evaluation of leak rate, assuming only the presence of a seal retention ring around the pump shaft, showed that flows less than 50 gpm would result. Piping leaks, valve packing leaks, or flange gasket leaks tend to build up slowly with time and are considered less' severe than the pump seal failure.
Larger leaks in the ECCS are prevented by the following:
(a) The piping is classified in accordance with ANS Safety Class 2 and, receives the ASME Class 2 quality assurance program associated with this safety class.
1 (b) The piping, equipment and cupports are designed to ANS Safety Class 2 seismic classification, permitting no loss of function for the design basis earthquake.
i (c) The system piping is located v ithin a controlled area on
'(
the plant site.
(d) The piping system receives periodic pressure tests, and is accessible for periodic visual inspection.
(e) > The piping is austenitic stainless steel which, due to its
- ductility, can withstand severe distortion without failure.
--.y.rNCEA.T 6 lb.S A 1
Based on this review, the design of the primary auxiliary building and related equipment was verified for its ability to handle leaks up to a maximum of 50 gpm.
Leakage would drain to and collect in the primary auxiliary building sump. Automatic initiation of the sump pumps at a predetermined set point would be indicated at the main control board and would alert the operator to an abnormal condition.
Corrective action would include determining the location of the leak by visual inspection, and remote or manual isolation of the leak point
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frca the rest of the system within 30 minutes.
c.
Potential Boron Precipitation
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Boron precipitation in the reactor vessel can be prevented by a backflush of cooling water through the core to reduce boil-of f and
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resulting concentration of boric acid in the water remaining in the reactor vessel.
This is accomplished by a switch from cold to hot leg recirculation about 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> following an accident.
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SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 FSAR April 1986 f
Instrument error bands were calculated accounting for uncertainties such as measurement accuracy, calibration accuracy, signal drift, environment changes, etc.
The time from accident initiation to the first required manual actions is G
dependent on initial tank water level, draw-down rate and "lo-lo-1" level alarm point. The minimum time from accident initiation to required action is calculated to be 21.9 minutes. This is the time required to draw 350,000 gallons from the RWST at conservatively high pump flow rates us follows:
Flow Rate / Pump Pump (epm)
- Safety Injection 450
- Charging 450
- RHR 4,000
- Spray 3,300 Total 16,400 It should be noted that the entire 16,400 gpm is assumed to come from the RWST, neglecting the additional volume available in the spray additive tank.
As can be seen in Figure 6.3-6, the 350,000 gallon injection allowance is contained between the extreme low range of the " tech spec" alarm error band and the extreme upper range of the "lo-lo-1" signal error band. The 30,300 I
U gallon transfer allowance is found between the low range of the "lo-lo-1" alarm and high range of the " empty" alarm. A 67.000lgallon pump shutoff ll allowanceisprovidedbetweenthelowrangeofthef" empty"alarmandthe
,[
calculated level for potential vortexing assuming /the worst single failure.
G% 500 )
The time available for the manual portion of the switchover is dependent on the rate of outflow. Table 6.3-10 lists the sequence of operator actions, estimated duration and maximum outflow rate at the end of each action.
In the event of a design basis LOCA, the sump isolation valves would be fully open 29 seconds after receiving the "lo-lo-1" signal. The combination of the containment pressure and elevation head from the sump would seat the check valves in line between the RWST and the CBS and RHR pumps (CBS-V3,
-V7. -V55. -V56) reducing the flow rate out of the tank to 1,800 gpm.p *e t'#-
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T Lim '.2-10 n "5 In an accident for which the RWST water is at the minimum allowed temperature, the containment heat sinks are at a low temperature and the heat transfer rate in the containment is high, the containment pressure may be high enough nee,ab +Ws b vote, d M &a% qpwx* inn be
- 10 second actuation
- 12. Winuter -}e vea& Net " tmh"alam Mevt
- 30 second actuation, delay delay, s's, sudic.ted he WallaQe fo r ceqtchdn op Ott (4.r. hows d44cvible a in Table 6.3-10.
4 6.3-18a 1
.~ -
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 FSAR April 1986 to actuate the spray, but not high enough to seat the check valves referenced above. This would result in a continued high flow rate from the tank until the RWST isolation valves (CBS-V2, VS) are closed (approximately 75 seconds fcer "lo-lo-1" signal by Table 6.3-10.
From this point there is at lea minutes of operation at 1,800 gpm, foratotalof()35/binutesbeforethe empty" alarm sounds. There is at least minutes of operation between 53 the "lo-lo-1" and possible vortexing in this case.
3c,o 53 The limiting single failure for the design is the failure of one of the RWST isolation valves (CBS-V2, -VS) to close.
If one of these valves does not close, the flow rate drops from 16,400 to 9,100 gpm (not 1,800).
At this high flow rate, the " empty" alarm will sound, alerting the operator to immediately shut off any pumps still taking suction from the tank. There is sufficient volume between the " empty" alarm and the calculated vortexing level for at least minutes of operation for shutting off the pumps.
l 1,8 45 53 Following the automatic manual switchover sequence, the two residual 63 heat removal pumps would take suction from the containment sump and deliver borated water directly to the RCS cold legs. A portion of the Number 1 residual heat removal pump discharge flow would be used to provide suction to the two charging pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. A portion of the discharge flow from the Number 2 residual heat re-moval pump would be used to provide suction to the two safety injection pumps which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. As part of the manual switchover procedure (see Table 6.3-7, Step 4), the suctions of the safety injection and charging pumps are cross-connected so that one residual heat removal pump can deliver flow to the RCS and both safety injection and charging pumps, in the event of the failure of the second residual heat removal pump.
See Section 7.5 for process information available to the operator in the control room following an accident.
46 i
1 l
6.3-18b l
1
Am:ndmant 48 SB 1 & 2 FSAR Janusry 1983 The small break analyses deal with breaks of up to 1.0 f t2 in area, where the safety injection pumps play an important role in the initial core recovery 48 because of the slower depressurization of the RCS.
The RCS depressurization and water level transients show that for a break of approximately 3.0 inch equivalent diameter, the transient is turned around and the core is recovering prior to accumulator injection.
For a 3.5 inch equivalent diameter break, the core remains uncovered with a decreasing level until accumulator action.
Thus, the maximum break size showing core recovery prior to accumulator injection will be approximately 3.0 inch equivalent Accumulator injection commences when pressure reaches 600 pe.ie,M i
dine ter.
i.e.; approximately 1200 seconds for the 3.0 inch break size.
i The analysis of this break has shown that the high head portion of the ECCS, together with accumulators, provide suf ficient core flooding to keep the calculated peak clad temperature below required limits of 10 CFR 50.45.
6.3.3.3 Large Break LOCA 2 or larger of the RCS piping f
A major LOCA is defined as a rupture 1.0 f t including the double-ended rupture of the largest pipe in the RCS or of any g
line connected to that system. The boundary considered for LOCA as related to connecting piping is defined in Section 3.6.
+
Should a major break occur, depressurization of the RCS results in a pressure decrease in the pressurizer.
Reactor trip occurs and the safety injection system is actuated when the pressurizer low pressure trip setpoint is reached.
Reactor trip and safety injection system actuation are also provided by a high
)
containment pressure signal. These countermeasures will limit the consequences i
of the accident in two ways:
Reactor trip and borated water injection provide additional negative a.
reactivity insertion to supplement void formation in causing rapid reduction of power to a residual level corresponding to fission product decay heat.
b.
Injection of borated water ensures suf ficient flooding of the core to j
j prevent excessive clad temperatures.
psia.
When the pressure falls below approximately 600 ps.ig the accumulators begin to i
inject borated water. The conservative assumption is made that injected
}
accumulator water bypassas the core and goes out through the break until the termination of the blowdown phase. This conservatism is again consistent with l
the Final Acceptance Criteria.
The pressure transient in the reactor containment during a LOCA af fects ECCS 4
j performance in the following ways. The time at which end of blowdown occurs is determined by zero break flow which is a result of achieving pressure equilibrium between the RCS and the containment.
In this way, the amount of accumulator water bypass is also af fected by the containment pressure, since l
6.3-21
\\
i
SB 1 & 2 Amendatnt 56 Novtabsr 1985 FSAR 1
TABLE 6.3-1 l
(
(Sheet 1 of 3)
Su EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENT DESIGN PARAMETERS Accumulators 4
Number 700 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature ( F) 100 to 150 Operating temperature ( F) 650 Normal operating pressure (psig) 600-585 Minimum operating pressure (psig) 1350 each Total volume (ft )
Nominal operating water volume (ft )
850 each 500 Volume N gas (ft )
2 Boric acid concentration, minimum (ppm) 1900 700 Relief valve setpoint (psis)
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2
Number 2800 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature ( F)
Design flow (*} (gpm) 150 5800 Design head (ft) 550 Maximum flow (gpm) 1400 i
Head at maximum flow (ft) 6200 Discharge head at shutoff (ft) 600 Motor rating (hp) e t
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TABLE 6.3-9 NORMAL OPERATING STATUS OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR CORE COOLING 2
Number of safety injection pumps operable 2
Number of charging pumps operable Number of residual heat removal pumps operable 2
2 Newber of residual heat exchangers operable 477 oco j
Refueling water storage tank volume (gal) 45,000 (min.)
Boron concentration in refueling water storage tank, minimum (ppm) 2,000 Boron concentration in accumulator, minimum (ppm) 1,900 4
Number of accumulators Minimum accumulator pressure (psig) 600 3
Nominal accumulator water volume (ft )
850 System valves, interlocks, and piping required for the above components which are operable All i
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Amendment 58 April 1986 i
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- lNSTRUMENT ERROR REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
FIGURE 6.3-6
S3 1 & 2 Am2ndmnnt 59 FSAR May 1986 areas, mechanical piping penetration area and engineered l
safeguard equipment cubicles, so that any fission products 49 leaking from these systems and from the primary containment will be retained in these areas and eventually processed through the filters. The filter unit also accepts the discharge from the post-LOCA containment hydrogen purging duct, as discussed in Subsection 6.2.5.2.
l 2.
The exhaust capacity is based on a conservative leak rate of il 0.20 percent / day of the containment air mass at maximum internal pressure following a design basis LOCA as given in i
Table 6.5-7.
Each containment enclosure exhaust fan is s
designed to exhaust at the race of g CRf, which is gI l9 equivalent to a volumetric inleakage race of 325 percent / day from the containment structure to the containment enclosure j
sf annulus.
Idi 52 E
3.
The time required to reduce the containment enclosure volume I
and the additional building volumes associated with the i
electrical penetration areas, mechanical piping penetration t
tunnel and engineered safeguard equipment cubicles to a
(
_ negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches of water is
( rr_. r._ --b ).64 minutes after CIS.
ll
- s. V 4.
Sizing of the high efficiency particulate air filters (BEPA) and carbon adsorbers is based on the volumetric flow rate required to maintain the negative pressure in the containment enclosure annulus and connected penetration and engineered i
safeguard areas, and for fission product removal capability employing the conservative inventories given in Subsection i
15.6.5.
5.
The containment enclosure emergency air cleaning system is a seismic Category I, Safety Class 2, system.
b.
Fuel Storage Building Emergency Air Cleaning System 1.
The fuel storage building emergency air cleaning system is designed to maintain a negative pressure of 20.25 inches of l
s water within the fuel storage building while in the s.
irradiated fuel handling mode, to remove and retain airborne particulates and radioactive iodine, and to exhaust filtered air to the unit plant vent following a fuel handling acc ident.
2.
The exhaust filter system is designed to remove and retain airborne particulate and radioactive iodine, and to exhaust the filtered air to the unit plant vent following a fuel handling accident while either or both filters are operating.
6.5-2
SB 1 & 2 FSAR Amendment 59 May 1986 3.
Sizing of the REPA filter and carbon adsorbers is based on 1
the volumetric flow rates required to maintain the required negative pressure in the fuel storage building for both the normal fuel handling mode and the fuel handling accident mode, and for fission product removal capability employing the conservative inventories presented in subsection 15.6.5.
4.
The fuel storage building emergency air cleaning system is a seismic Category I, Safety Class 3 system.
l 6.5.1.2
System Design
I Containment Er. closure Emergenev Air Cleaning System a.
The filter system consists of redundant
~
dampers and controls and a common ductwork system. filter trains, fans, The air flow required to maintain a negative pressure in the containment enclosure building is passed through demisters, which also function as prefilters, and through EEPA filters located both upstream and downstream of the carbon filter prior to exhausting through the plant vent -(see Figure 9.4-2 for an air flow diagram).
i 1
A ductwork cross-connection is provided between the two filter l
trains at a point between the downstream HEPA filter and the fan inlet.
insure a continued air flow by manual startup of the redunda fan.
Each redundant filter train is complete, separate and independent from both electrical and control standpoints.
8T fan is supplied power from an independent ESF power train source Each filter train which will furnish power to its fan during abnormal and post-accident conditions.
The operation of mechanical equipment is discussed in Section 7.3. controlled and monitored in the plant unit control room, a based on DOP smoke test.The HEPA filters have 's certified test efficiency of 9 For impregnated carbon filter efficiencies, see Table 6.5-4.
The evaluation of off-site effects due to potential l
ll accidents has been made in accordance wit minimumcarbonfilterefficienciesof(kh)hAppendix15B, assuming iodines and 95 percent percent for organic l
for elemental todines for the conservative case.
The carbon filters use a deep bed design which provides a gas residence time of'O.5 seconds.
.l5 Cm N M M-6.5-3
SB 1 & 2 Amendmant 59 FSAR May 1986 6.5.1.3 Design Evaluation Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleaning System (CEEACS) l a.
ST The containment enclosure exhaust filter trains are redundant, to insure the maintenance of a negative pressure in the containment enclosure and related areas and to insure cleanup of the exhaust air following an accident. All safety-related equipment and ductwork supports have been designed and seismically analyzed to withstand and function through a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
The system is designed to limit off-site post accident doses to values below those specified in 10CFR100 (see Subsection 15.6.5 for evaluation of system performance).
A single component failure will not result in loss of function of this ESF system.
In the unlikely event that an accident requiring filter operation occurs, both of the redundant filter train fans will be auto-matically started on the "T" signal (see Drawin 9763-N-503515) to lV) provide an air flow velocity of approximately 40 fpm through their A4 associated filter beds.
In the further unlikely event of failure of one operating fan, the ductwork cross-connection will provide redundant air flow from the redundant fan across the partially-loaded or fully loaded filter bed.
gg The following analyses have been performed to demonstrate the capability of the system to draw-down the containment enclosure building to a negative pressure of 0.25 inches of water gauge in less than 4 minutes:
1.
Air In-Leakage Analysis A calculation was performed to determine the containment enclosure building air in-leakage through various air flow paths such as electrical, piping and duct penetrations, concrete structure, construction joints, doors, seal plates, metal partitions, ducts and floor drains. Air in-leakages were determined using data from the penetration sealant supplier, analytical calculation and experimental leakage data provided in " Conventional Buildings for Reactor Containment - NAA-SR-10100 (1965)", issued by Atomics International, a Division of North American Aviation Incorporated. The calculated maximum in-leakage was 62h scfm which includes maximum leakage of 4 scfm from the primary containment at a rate of 0.2% of the primary containment volume for the first day following a design basis LOCA.o The design capacity of the exhaust system is 2025 sefm.
59 wt MitwffTuS W teet4%vmW1.tbt.tM iG PmMWt tawmenneet tammu W um%Tg o. 58 95 wemmt
- _b Note: All drawings referencea in ents section will be provided under a separate submittal to the NRC (see Section 1.7).
6.5-5
SB 1 & 2 Amsndm2nt 59 FSAR' May 1986 i
1 2.
Air Change Analysis An alternate calculation was performed considering one air change per day as the minimum required exhaust capacity of an i
exhaust system to produce the required negative pressure of 0.25 inches of water within the enclosure. This approach 1
'j 5(
required 615 scfm exhau capacity. The exhaust capacity L/
actually provided is scfm which has the potential for
{
i exhausting 3.25 volumes per day.
1 I
The calculated wind speed that would initiate building exfiltration is 17 miles per hour. At this or at a higher wind velocity, any I
exfiltration will be adequately dispersed.
HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers were tested at the expected accident environmental conditions for this secondary system. Results indicated no degradation of filtering efficiency. Subsection 15.6.5 analysis i
conservatively assumes lower efficiencies.
The systems are designed to meet the intent of Regulatory Guides 1.4 and 1.52.
See Table 6.5-1 for a discussion relative to con-formance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
5 I
b.
Fuel Storage Building Emergency Air Cleaning System (FSBEACS)
The fuel storage building exhaust filter trains are redundant, to insure cleanup capability and the ability to maintain a negative pressure following a fuel handling accident. All safety-related air handling equipment, equipment support and ductwork supports are designed to operate during and following an SSE. The system is designed to limit off-site post-accident doses to values not I
exceeding the requirements of 10CFR100 (see Chapter 15). Loss of one emergency exhaust filter train will not prevent the safety function from being performed. During fuel handling, only one set of filters and fan will normally be operaciag.
In the unlikely j
event of an accident, the second set of filters and fan can be manually started to provide redundancy. The operating filter will provide an sii-flow velocity of approximately 40 fps through its associate filter bed. In the further unlikely event of failure of t
i the operating fan, the duct; work cross-connection will provide
]
redundant airaflow across the partially-loaded or fully-loaded filter bed.
g,
/
HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers have been tested at the expected accident environmental conditions for this secondary system.
Results indicated no degradation of filtering efficiency; however, conservative parameters based on Regulatory Guide 1.25 were used in the conservative analysis in Subsection 15.7.4.
l St.
The systems are designed to meet the intent of Regulatory Guidea l
1.25 and 1.52.
See Table 6.5-2 for a discussion relative to l
conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
56 6.5-6
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O-SB 1 & 2 Amendment 56 FSAR November 1985 4
The iodine removal function and effectiveness of the containment building spray system is discussed in subsection 6.5.2.
This system will begin operation within 62 seconds after receipt of a LOCA generated "P" signal, as described in Subsection 6.2.1.1.
The function of the containment isolation systems is discussed in Subsection 6.2.4.
No credit is taken for iodine removal by the containment online purge system since it is only operated intermittently during normal plant operation and will isolate on a containment isolation signal if operating at the onset of an accident.
Subsection 15.6.5. Radiological consequences of this occurence are addressed in t
The combustible gas control system hydrogen recombiners, permanently located inside the containment, are designed to be operational within seven days I
following a DBA as described in Subsection 6.2.5.
Should both recombiners be inoperable for 50 days after the DRA, hydrogen concentration in the con-tainment will be controlled by use of the hydrogen purge line to the plant j{
vent via the containment enclosure emergency cleanup system described in Subsection 6.5.1.
6.5.3.2 Secondary Containment The secondary containment is comprised of a reinforced concrete cylindrical structure with a concrete hemispherical dome, the engineered safety features (ESF) equipment cubicles, and the pipe and electrical penetration areas 6"
The release of airborne contamination following an accident du a filtered exhaust system which maintains a subatmospheric (-0.25" W.G.)
I pressure in each subcompartment.
system (CEECS) is the only fission product control system in the secondaryThe containment.
This system directs a nominal 2000 cfm of charcoal filtered exhaust air to the plant vent.
Actual exhaust flow rate will be the sum of from the surrounding environment.the primary containment leakage (see Subsectio The CEECS, which is powered by the emergency busses, starts up within 12 seconds and will establish the desian qp subatmospheric pressure of at the containment isolation signal, as described in Subsectileast-0.25"W.G.withinGgggg/minu 6.5.1.
Iodine 5s removal efficiency of the charcoal beds is assumed to be iodide and 95% for inorganic iodine for the conservative case; for the for organic f
realistic case, the iodine removat efficiency is assumed to be 95% for (s{;j organic iodines and 99% for inorganic lodines.
CEECS fans are shown in Figure 6.5-2.
l l
6.5-15 i
SB 1 & 2 Amendm2nt 58 FSAR April 1986 TABLE 6.5-4 (Sheet 2 of 2)
Component Parameter b.
Batch Requirements l
Low Temperature 97%
Ambient Pressure Methyl Iodide at 95% RH and 300C l
l High Temperature 99%
Ambient Pressure Methyl Iodide at 95% RH and 800C I
Except Pre and Post Sweep at 250C Elemental 99.9% Loading Iodide Retention at 1800C 99.5% Recentivity Media Activated Coconut Shell Carbon !
Impregnating Material KI3 Ignition Temperature (ASTM D3466) 3300C Density (ASTM D2854) 0.38g/cc (min) l%
Hardness (ASTM D3802) 97%
Mesh Size (ASTM D2862) 5% Maximum Retention on 8 90-100% Thru 8 on 16 (8 x 12 Mesh 40-60%)
(12 x 16 Mesh 40-60%)
5% Maximum Thru 16 l
1% Maximum Thru 18 j
Depth of carbon bed 4 inches si 45 Total weight of carbon 804 lbs Carbon Bed Envelope Material Type 304 Stainless Steel 4)
Filter Mounting Frames Type 304 Stainless Steel 5)
Filter System Housing Epoxy Coated Carbon Steel 6)
Ductwork Calvanized Steel 7)
Fan Carbon Steel
~
p
~
T_
yn : YkSgA H W.lf 9199. S 144. WitMit 489WitMCit5 h554MtT 16R. %Citte OM ts Mt.ubewer.
SB 1 & 2 Amandment 58 FSAR April 1986 TABLE 6.5-5 (Sheet 2 of 2)
Component Parameter Low Temperature 99.9%
Ambient Pressure Elemental Iodine at 95% RH and 300C High Temperature 99%
Ambient Pressure Methyl Iodide at 95% RH and 800C b.
Batch Requirements Low Temperature 97%
Ambient Pressure Methyl Iodide at 95% RH and 300C High Temperature 99%
Ambient Pressure Methyl Iodide at 95% RH and 800C Except Pre and Post Sweep at 250C Elemental 99.9% Loading Iodine Retention at 1800C 99.5% Retentivity Media Activated Coconut Shell Carbon Impregnating Material KI3 Ignition Temperature (ASTM D3466) 3300C Density (ASTM D2854) 0.38 g/cc (min)
Hardness (ASTM D3802) 97%
Mesh Size (ASTM D2862) 5% Maximum Retention on 8 90-100% Thru 8 on 16 (8 x 12 Mesh 40-60%)
(12 x 16 Mesh 40-60%)
5% Maximum Thru 16 1% Maximum Thru 18 Depth of carbon bed 4 inches Total weight of carbon 45 6500 lbs Carbon bed envelope material Type 304 Stainless Steel 5)
Filter Mounting Frames Type 304 Stainless Steel 6)
Filter System Housing Epoxy Coated Carbon Steel 7)
Ductwork Calvanized Steel 8)
Fan N
Carbon Steel g
pg % t.UT Mf9. & 9441. Twitet, eF90tWCM hh get, MittM WS 8Keggepr
=
~
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 56 FSAR November 1985 7.1.2.12 Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.151 f
The recommendations of ISA Standard S67.02, 1980, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.151, have been followed for the design and installation of safety-related instrument sensing lines, with the exceptions and clarifications listed below. See Subsections 7.1.2.2, 7.1.2.3 and 7.7.2 for discussion of specific sections.
1.
The instrumentation defined as Category I by Regulatory Guide 1.97 is the only instrumentation considered to be required to monitor safety-related systems.
2.
In clarification of paragraph 5.2.2 (2) of ISA S67.02, where instrument tubing penetrates a shield wall, measures have been taken to reduce potential personnel exposure for radiation
" streaming" from radioactive sources unless the radiation from piping nearby would be the larger source of exposure. These measures have included:
a.
Locating penetrations high enough to eliminate a concern from a radiation protection stand point.
b.
Locating some penetrations so as to avoid a direct streaming path from the source of radiation.
When the above two methods were not used, apply a radiation c.
absorbing penetration sealant.
3.
The sensing lines from safety-related HVAC ductwork are designed to the same standard as the ductwork.
4.
The sealed sensing lines for containment pressure, wide range reactor coolant pressure and the reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS) are Safety Class 2 and installed to requirements of ANSI B31.1, seismic Category 1, rather than ASME Class 2, as recommended by Regulatory Position C.2.b or ISA S67.02, Section 4.1.
The sealed sensing lines are supplied by Westinghouse and are in accordance with their standard design.
The containment penetration sleeve is part of the BOP scope and is ASME Class 2.
5.
Common instrument taps are used for redundant sensors for pressurizer pressure and RCS flow (low pressure tap only). This is in conformance with the standard Westinghouse design.
= xNsEALT* 7,I 4" n
7.1.3 References 1.
Gangloff, W. C. and Loftus, W.
D., "An Evaluation of ' Solid State Logic Reactor Protection in Anticipated Transients," WCAP-7706-L, July,1971 (Proprietary) and WCAP-7706, July, 1971.
(Non-Proprietary).
2.
Marasco, F. W. and Siroky, R. M., " Westinghouse 7300 Series Process l
i s
Control System Noise Tests," WCAP-8892-A, June, 1977.
3.
Letter dated April 20, 1977 from R. L. Tedesco (NRC) to C. Eiche1dinger (Westinghouse).
1 7.1-27
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3
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m A
4.
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- 6. An evab= rim has been perfomed'of those instruant linna g
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were domsraded in accordance with the p wissens ac chts messaatosy gl
'y
- a. y guide fmn ASMC Class 2 or 3 to AIEI B31.1. This evali= rim was d.one to
~
d determine if the failure of any of these lines would affect the safety
};
i function of the aswimrad systen. Eere a passive failure of the instnxnent line would adversly affect the safety function of the I
system, an inspection of the line has been done to equivalent quality assurance requirements of ANS Safety Class 2 lines. Also, the lines
\\
have been installed to Seimnic Category 1 criteria. Hence, a passive
.(
failure of one of these lines is not postulated to occur.
.~
.__ =
1
!ill 1&2 Amcmimen t 56 FSAR November 1985 i
Figure 7.2-1, Sheet 5, shows the logic for overtemperature oT trip function.
(b) Overpower oT Trip This trip protects against excessive power (fuel rod j
rating protection) and trips the reactor on coincidence as listed in Table 7.2-1, with one set of temperature measurements per loop. The setpoint for each channel is continuously calculated using the following equation:
1+
is 1
AT (
)
(
)
1 + r2S 1 + r3s
) -T" - f 061)}
I fK4-K5
(
)
(
) T-K6 T(
SAT 2
o I + r7S 1 + 76S I + '6S Where:
Measured AT by RTD manifold instrumentation; 6T
=
Time constants utilized in lead-lag controller for AT; T1, T2
=
4 l
Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, i
'3
=
(
i l
Indicated AT at rated thermal power; l
6To
=
K4 Preset bias;
=
K3 A constant which compensates for piping and instru-
=
ment time delay; I
T7 Time constant utilized in rate-lag controller for
=
j Tavgi
}
'6 Time constant utilized in the measured Tavg lag
=
i compensator; l
K6 A constant which compensates for the change in
=
I density flow and heat capacity of the water with temperature; Average temperature OF; i
T
=
I d
Indicated Tavg at rated thermal power; T
=
e f (61) 0 for all AI 2
=
i SG l
i fs Laghca % nam gea %, sac'
=
t 7.2-6
(
SB 1 & 2 Avendment 55 FSAR July 1985 The stator windings are cooled by de-ionized water circulating in a closed loop between the generator and a generator stator cooling water unit on the ground floor. The heat absorbed by the de-ionized water is removed in a heat exchanger by the secondary component cooling water.
Failure of the stator cooling water system initiates a unit power runback which reduces power to 22%.
10.2.2.3 Steam Ext,rac, tion Connections Turbine steam extraction connections are provided for six stages of feedwater heating.
Steam is extracted from one stage of the high pressure turbine, from the high pressure turbine exhaust piping, and from four stages of the low pressure turbines. A combination of positively-assisted check valves in the extraction steam lines and automatically controlled heater drain valves protects'the turbine against water induction.
Check valves are provided in extraction steam lines 3 through 6.
There are no check valves in extrac-tion steam lines 1 and 2, since these lines are located within the condenser neck. However, in all cases, the combination of valving and heater drain valve controls is such that no single equipment failure will result in water entering the turbine. The check valves in extraction steam lines 3 through 6 will also provide additional protection against turbine overspeed following a load reduction. The extraction steam valves will close in less than 2 seconds under low flow conditions. The positive-assist action on the check valves is provided by spring-load air actuators. Limit switches on the air 55-cylinders will allow plant personnel to verify, by periodic tests, that the operating pistons are free to move under the action of the spring when the cir pressure is released.
10.2.2.4 Automatic Control _s The automatic control functions are programmed to protect the reactor coolant system with appropriate corrective actions, as explained in Chapter 7.
The turbine is tripped every time the reactor is trip ed.
A reactor trip is initiated upon a turbine trip above approximate 1' of full power.
The turbine generator is controlled and protected by an electro-hydraulic control system (EHC) that combines solid state ciectronic and high pressure hydraulic components to control the steam flow through the turbine. Single failure of any component will not lead to destructive overspeed. The proba-bility of multiple failures involving undetected electronic faults and/or stuck valvec at the instant of load loss is extremely low due to the high reliability of the control system components and periodic in-service testing and inspection of the main steam and intermediate reheat valves.
The EHC system consists of the following subsystems:
Speed Control Unit a.
b.
Load Control Unit c.
Flow Control Unit 10.2-3
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l Amendment 53 i
August 1984
]
HIGH NEUTRON FLUX SOURCE RANGE ** I/2
[
EXCESSIVE HEAT REMOVAL DUE TO
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FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS j 1
l HIGH FLUX INTERMEDIATE RANGE t/2 1
HIGHFLUX power RANGE 2/4 POWER
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MAIN CONTROL RODS CONTROL 2005 TURSINE FEED l
GRAVITY GRAVITY TRIP WATE R 4
INSERTION INSE RTION 150LATlON PASSIVE PASSIVE l
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CONTROL ROD CONTROL ROD TURSINE MAIN Fw i
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REACTivlTV REACTIVITY STM mim TROL CONT W VALVE 5 VALVE 5 r
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J PUSLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMP9 HIRE FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I
SEA 8 ROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2
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FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
FIGLME 15 0 4
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?.' J c
R
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+
t Amendment 53
(
DEPRESSURIZATION OF, August' 1984 HIG.H NEUTR% flu,a PO ERRA o 2,
c Ok ft o?R 2/4 SI StGNAL j
l PRE 55uRE LOW PRE 55UnifER 2 r4 l
tilGH 2 - CONTAINAAENT 773 515IGNAL L
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PRE 55uRE y
HIGH-1 2/3 E5FAS ESFAS LOW STEAAatrNE 2/3 l
5/G HIGH HIGH LN E5FAS CONTAINAAENT PRE 55utt rwtuvat IN I LOOP l
LEVEL IN ANY
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LOW 5fE AAs tfNE MGH NEGAffvE 57EAAA 2/3 5/G
%I 'I PRE 55uRE IN ONE PWE550RE RATE R4 6 LOOP LOOP 2/3 f
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AAANUAL 1/2 REACTOR Trip SREAKERS 515 STEAAA LINE ngAsq ISOLATION pw VALVES 150LATION
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CONTROL ROD IN 6 5/G gg pg RE AC T sviTV g,,p CONT ROL AAANUAL 1/ 2 EFW5 OPERATOR TERAAINATES SAFETY INJECTION FLOW TO UAAIT RCS PRES $URE AND
/' '%
PRE 55URIZER LEVEL.
(5 FI SEE TABLE 15-1 FOR ecICATOR$
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AND REColtDERS AVAILASLE TO THE OPERATOR FOLLOWING THE EVENT.
DELIVER EAAERGENCY FEEDWATER TO CONTROL CCIE NEAT REAAOiAL PU8UC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPRESSURt2ATION OF SEA 8 ROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
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V UNDERVOLTAGE LOW RCS FLOW IN 2/3 LOW RCS 2/3 LOW RCS 6oW f Wiwg UNDERFREQUENC M 9 RTS 1 LOOP 2/3 FLOW IN 2/4 LOOP FLOW IN 1 LOOP
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FIGURE is.o-is
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9
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RUPTURE OF A mTu e DRevt MECMANISM MOusweG rERO POwf R PULL POwtR I
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sAFETv valves sAFETv valves seGee asfuTROce Flus 1/3 OPEN TO RELsEVE OPEN TO RELIEVE RCS PRESSURE RCS PRESSURE SOURCE RANGE REACTOR Trip TRep EREARERS DREAAERS e
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esOTE 1 NOTEa NOTE 1 SEQUENCE FOLLOwlmeG ESF AS ACTUATDON e5 SmMLAR TO YMAT FOR A sasALL LCSS OF COOLANT Evteuf Wp PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE RUPTURE OF CONTROL ROD SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 DRIVE MECHANISM HOUSING FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
FIGURE 15.0-21
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i SB 1 & 2 Amendmeet 56 FSAR November 1985 j n
. +
15.4.5 A Malfunction or Failure of the Flow Controller in a BWR Loop l
That Results in an Increased Reactor Coolant Flow Rate Not applicable to Seabrook.
15.4.6 Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction Thatt Results in a Decrease in the Boron Concentration in The Reacto'r Coolant 15.4.6.1 Identification of Causes and Accident Description Reactivity can be added to the core by feeding makeup water into the reactor j
coolant system (RCS) via the reactor makeup portion of the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). A boric acid blend system is provided to permit the operator to match the boron concentration of reactor makeup water during i
normal charging to that in the RCS. The boric acid from the boric acid tank l
is blended with primary grade water in the blender and the composition is
{
determined by the preset flow rates of boric acid and primary grade water on 1
the control board. The CVCS is designed to limit, even dader various postulated j
failure modes, the potential rate of dilution to a value trhich, after indication
{
through alarms and instrumentation, provides the operator' sufficient time to j
correct the situation in a safe and orderly manner.
\\
The opening of the reactor makeup water (RMW) control valve 'and one of the stop valves provides a flow path to the RCS, which can dilute tae reactor coolant. Inadvertent dilution from this source can be readily terminated by closing the control valve. The rate of addition of unborated makeup water to the RCS when it is not at pressure is limited by the capacity of the RMW pumps. Normally, only one RMW pump is operating while the other is on standby.
In order for makeup water to be added to the RCS at pressure, at least one charging pump must be running in addition to a RMW pump. With the RCS at pressure, the maximum delivery rate is limited by the capacity of the charging l
pumps, which is more limiting than the capacity of the RMW pumps.
I i
Information on the status of the RMW is continuously available to the operator.
i Lights are provided on the control board to indicate the operating condition j
of the pumps in the CVCS. Alarms are actuated to warn the operator if boric j
acid or demineralized water flow rates deviate from preset values as a result j
of system malfunction.
i An additional source of unborated water which can dilute the reactor coolant is the boron thermal regeneration system (BTRS). Borated RCS water is depleted j
of boron as it passes through the BTRS.
i j
The combined dilution capability from the RMW System and the BTRS potentially represents the worst possible case for RCS boron dilution. However, the BTRS is excluded as a potential source of unborated water during refueling, cold shutdown, and hot shutdown. Technical Specifications require that th6e.
M re'er':::17 ::: ;11 e r' ty r.;l;;i ; er - f ^ !1ler : g ;; _
i..y...M.
i M i, y.. L.s m. o m o........ 61.
2._1..e;d i::::. Thus, the limiting dilution flow rate during these three modes of operation is assumed to be the maximum 1
t1ow capacity of " '**' c;-WLW R*t W &
S&
(a----owe RmW pay amd Ae. 6TRS be veudenA ;,operaMe M ere44 mods 4.
~
j 15.4-21 l
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 FSAR April 1986 C.
Valve Movement Times Discussed in applicable accident analyses.
1 D.
Adsorption and Filtration Efficiencies 1.
Containment Enclosure Emergency Exhaust Filter Efficiencies:
Conservative Analysis Elemental Iodine 95%
l Organic Iodine Particulate Iodine - h5%
\\
\\
Realistic Analysis
~,-
Elemental Iodine
- 99%
i Organic Iodine
- 95%
Particulate Iodine - 99%
Note:
No credit for filters (Filter Efficiency = 0) for ll the first 8 minutes following the accident. No
% 55 credit for mixing within the annulus region for the conservative analysis and 50% mixing credit for the realistic analysis.
Containment Enclosure Emergency Exhaust Filter By-Pass Fractions:
Conservative Analysis = 0.60 La M
155-6
n SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 FSAR April 1986 s
Realistic Analysis
= 0.075 La 51 2.
Fuel Storage Building Exhaust Filter Efficiencies:
Same as given above for Containment Enclosure Filterse except a.ek Todine, - 9 O */,
3.
Control Room Makeup Air Intake Filter Efficiencies:
Conservative Analysis, not applicable.
\\
Realistic \\ nalysis A
i
\\
Elementpl Iodine
- 99%
s Organic Iodine
- pr 95%
Particulate Iodine - 99%
E.
Recirculation System Parameters Not applicable.
F.
Containment Spray Parameters (Refer to Section 6.2.2 for details)
Conservative Case 1(elemental)
= 10.0 hr-1 A(organic)
= 0.0 hr-1 A(particulate) = 0.45 hr-1 i
l l
15B-7 g
$