ML20199D014
| ML20199D014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1996 |
| From: | Teator J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199C790 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-365 NUDOCS 9801300119 | |
| Download: ML20199D014 (14) | |
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c l
c EXHIBIT 30 l
l 9801300119 980128 PDR FOIA HICKEY 97-365 PDR Information in this reccid was d:!ted in accordance with the freedom of infurinalwa 3
F0IA grjn tiuns '7C f
Act, ex 7365 Case No. 1 96 005 Exhibit 30 l'{Jl y co { { c:'t
t INTERVIEW REPORT OF LOU CASEY On December 16, 1996, CASEY was interviewed by the reporting agent. The interview eas conducted under oath in Conference Room C. Vermont Yankee Nu: lear Power Plant (VY), Training Center, Brattleboro, VT. He was re. interviewed by the reporting agent on January 6,1997, to obtain clarifying information. CASEY provided the following information regarding an allegation that former VY coployee James MASSEY was discriminated against because he had raised concerns with a design change for the YY Advanced Off Gas System (A0GS).
res te ephone number 1 ivers license identification 1
He gk duated from he Franklin Institute of Boston in it an Associate of A')1ied Science deg
/V Automotive Technology.
raduated from Northeastern University ith d Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering. CASEY has been esp o by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) since 1990, and i.as been assigned to the VY Project since being hired. He is presently an Engineer in the Instrumentation and Controls Decartment, and his supervisor is Roger VIBERT.
CASEYexplainedthatYAECprovidese1EYwasassignedtotheprojectin ineering services to nuclear power
,(.
plants in the New England region. CA November 1991 to work for the Cognizant Engineer, Harry HYMES. CASEY said that when HYMES wts assigned to another project in March 1992, he (CASEY) became the ADGS Project Cognizant Engineer at YAEC. In that assignment he was responsible for the A0GS design and the bulk of the technical work, while MASSEY was dssigned as the Plant Engineer / Project Manager. MASSEY was responsible for implement.ing the design provided by him (CASEY),
CASEY acknowledged that everyone, including him, involved with the project
' ~ '
agreed that the ADGS control wire drawings (CWDs) were a mess and that the
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A0GS was a ' nuisance and troublesome" system that VY wanted fixed by the design :hange/ugrade. CASEY said that the very first thing he did after being assirw.d to the project was to issue e June 18, 1992, sco m memorandum (attacW; and then he began working on improving the CWDs in Xcember 1993.
CASEY stated that the design was completed and signed by YAEC in late July 1994 and presented to MASSEY for implementation and to begin producing the Installation and Testing Procedure and material procurement process.
CASEY acknowledgad that MASSEY had concerns with the A03S' CWDs. CASEY stated that on March 23,1994, he first became aware of NASSEY's concerns and objectionstotheA0GSdesignchange. CASEY recalls that on March 23rd he was in NASSEY'S office preparing for a meeti where they would present the design change scope to VY and YAEC manegement.
said that MASSEY told him that they couldn't begir. work on the design implementation until the CWDs were verified as correct, and that the project would need $600,000 in funding to conolete. CASEY later realized that NASSEY's belief that $600,000 was needed C'.
to 'omplete a walk down of the A0GS wiring was an excessive end ludicrous c
fictre. CASEY said that & 'ing the first two weeks of the 1995 VY outage, the walk down was performed and completed in two weeks for a total cost of
$18.000.
EXHIBIT b__
1-96-005'gggn[4C PAGE
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CA5END.
a
At first, CASEY felt that MASSEY appeared to have true concerns for personnel and plant safety if the design change were implemented prior to assuring that C'
the CWDs were accurate.
His perception of MASSEY's objections later changed to where he believed that NASMY was only being an obstructionist who didn't really want to resolve the issues with the A0GS.
CASEY said that for four months prior to March 23rd he had already been revising and dispositioning the problems with the*CWDs that MASSEY had concerns with. CASEY complained that two years after the design change process began, MASSEY made his claim that there were all sorts of
>roblems with the CWDs and that the design change could not proceed until tiey were corrected, although CASEY said that the problems hid already been identified and were in the process of being resolved. CASEY said that, although MASSEY was aware of the work that CASEY had done to resolve the CWD problems MASSEY dismissed his work out of hand because MASSEY had no confidence in his (CASEY's) ability to understand and resolve the learned during the March 23rd meeting in NASSEY' problems. CASEY said he first s office, that MASSEY had not reviewed or verified the CWDs and that there was a difference between his and NASSEY's expectations of, and on the design change.
It is CASEY's opinion that MASSEY did not take his four araths (from December 1993 to March 1994) of drawing review and verification seriously, and that MASSEY gave no credence to anything that had been done prior to him becoming involved in the proiect in mid spring 1994. CASEY said that MASSEY considered that the project began only after he became involved in it. CASEY admitted that he had previously performed similar work on CWDs, but he didn't have very much experience in doing it.
C-CASEY said that YAEC oraftsmen John WARREN and Bill THEISING worked on correcting the oaiginal CWDs and the production of th9 new, correct CWDs, and they could testify as to when the CWDs were completed. CASEY said their testimony would support that the CWDs were available for NASSEY's review in time for that part of the project to be completed, so that the design could be implemented as scheduled during the February 1995 outage. CASEY stated that VY contractor Rick RUTHIER could support his testimony that MASSEY did not-review the new CWDs provided by him (CASEY). CASEY said that MAS!EY's failure to review the new CW)s negatively impacted the progress of the tbsign chanpe l
and that MARSEY had no regard for the design change process. CASEY said that MASSEY had a re on as being
- cantankerous
- among YAEC design engineers, including Rai MOSHELLA and Kathy HORELICK.
CASEY said that the meeting to present the design change scope to VY and YAEC was scheduled for March 24,1994, and that prior to the meeting he told VIBERT about MASSEY's concr.cns and belief that the project needed $600,000, versus the $120,000 that CASEY had budgeted for completion. CASEY said that VIBERT was not u> set with what he told him. CASEY said that he asked VIBERT many times if w should continue working on the design, even though MASSEY wasn't fulfilling his responsibilities for the project. CASEY said that VIBERT told him he should continue with his work.
CASEY-said that it became eviGent to him that the design would not be compMed as scheduled and that he eventually reelized that the design would not be conoleted at all. CASEY said that VY management did not realize until f
the fall o'f 1994 that the design change would not be ready for the February L
1995 outage. CASEY said that MASSEY kept com)laining about the need for additional resources on the project, but MASSEY didn t use the available Case No. 1 96 005 2
IRIT M PAGE
_OFdPAGE(S)
i.
r resources to address the :roblems or complete the work. CASEY said that
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MSSEY's method was to mate objections to the project, whether they were 4
founded or not, and then not do anything to investigate or resolve them.
CASEY added that, when MSSEY was given a task to solve a problem on the
, project, MASSEY wouldn't work on it, he would only complain how everything was wrong. CASEY said that during the pro p, he com)lained to his YAEC management that MASSEY was al owed to rule over tw (desi process." CASEY opined that RUTNIER has the same opinion of MSSEY-as he (
Y) does.
CASEY ined that MSSEY considered the cancellation of the A0GS design change i
>ro to be a major accomplishment by him (MASSEY). He felt that MASSEY
>el eyed that there ought not to have been a design change put together at all, but that VY should have put enormous resources into the field work, to t
walk down all of the wiring, to correct the >roblems which he believed existed with the CWDs. CASEY opined that, based on 4ASSEY's lack of work performed on the project MSSEY had no real interest in fixin) the W11 known problems with the ADGS.
It is his opinion that MASSEY is She type of person who likes 4
to point out problems, but not put-in the effort to correct or investigate them.
i CASEY said that it became apparent to him that MASSEY was not comfortable implementing or developing an engineering design. He o wanted to build or construct something first, and then, pined that MASSEYlater gene paperwork to document what had been done.
It is his opinion that MASSEY does 4
not enderstand the design process, but MASSEY does understand the construction and building portion of a design change. CASEY feels that NASSEY was the
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wrong employee for the job of implementing the A0GS design change because MASSEY came from the construction side of VY as a result of a 1991 company reorganization, and'after that reorganization, VY made MASSEY an Engineer and expected MASSEY to perform like an Engineer. He believes that MASSEY constantly identified problems with the A0GS design change because MASSEY
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didn't understand the design. CASEY believes that MASSEY shirked his responsibilities on the A0G5 design change project, and does not believe that 4
MASSEY's objections or concerns with the project were based on NASSEY's-conscientiousness.
CASEY was not informed of any disciplinary actions which were taken against MASSEY as a result of his (MASSEY's) work on the A0GS. He did not know that MASSEY was terminated from employment by VY.
Repoft by:
i
/
Ih 4
Jeff ey A. Teator Special Agent 3
Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I
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Attachment:
As stated EX E h Case 1 96 005 3
l PAGE OF11.PAGE(S)
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f) si n f _ _ J f irfll0 M
7%
MEMORANDUM h(f 'f YANKEE ATOMIC - BOLTON
, gg. 7u.,.,&
V To S. R. Miller Date June 18, 199?
Group #
VYl 35/92 From
- t. J. Casey W.OJ 4904 Subjed A0G INSTRVMENT SYtTEM UPORADE SCOPE LM.SJ Fue #
A0GSCOPE.MEM REFERENCES 1.
Memo, R.
t., Smith to D. C. Porter, Proposed initial _ Action for A0G
_ System Uporade, Dc'ed February 14th, 1992.
2.
Memo, H. T. Hysr.s to E. V. Bowman, A00 Instrumentation Verification, Dated March lfth, 1992.
BACKGROUND The evaluation of the A0G instrumentation loops as recommended in Reference (1) has been completed.
This memo details the findings of the testing and review of the A0G system and makes recommendations for a proposed design change.
The original parameters of this task were rather loosely defined, but pointed to instrument electrical problems.
For this reason, the bulk of the investigation focused on this area. Specific mention was made of a drain tank level control problem and this was examined as a specific problem.
Other areas such as valve solenoid control may present problems, but the chief con ?rns put forth by Operations and I & C were instrument related and these formed the focus of the walkdown and testing.
DISCUSSION A basic feature of the Advanced Off Gas System is the train configura; ion.
The process flow is arranged in two parallel 6nd independent paths, *A*
and
'B*.
Certain sections of the process, for practical reasons, are common. As a consequence, the instruments are divided into three logical groups, one for each section. The electrical independence of these groups of instruments is important to the proper function of the system.
I EXH BIT _ b PAGE OFd PAGE(S) m
o S. R. Hiller June 19, 1992 l{
Page 2 1.
A0G Instrument Power Feag Reference CVI Drawing A719 0205 CWD. G 191372 Sheets 1 & ?.
Power for the *A*,
"B" and Common instruments ($ supplied from Circuit 53 of Instrument a.C.
Power for the three annunciator modules is supplied from Branch 9 of the 125 volt d.c. distribution panel DC 2C. The Radiation and Hydrogen monitors and recorders are fed from Branch 5 of the A Sulpanel of Vital a.c.
I The valve control relays and solenoids are powered from a single circuit which originates on panel IP1 of the A0G Power Panels. This source normally takes power from HCC llc. but can be transferred to MCC 10C if 11C experiences a failure condition.
The feeds for the large power components of the A00 system have, as their source, buses 10 and 11 which supply Motor Control Centers IOC and 11C respectively. The ultimate power sources for buses 10 and 11 come from buses 1 and 2 which are independent of each other. Tha power components of the A0G system therefore originate from two independent sources.
The primary weakness with the A0G instrument power design is the lack of independence of the two trains, and the corresponding lack of redundancy. The failure of the single link to circuit 53 of the Instrument a.c. bus will cause f
complete failure of all instrument trains. This would constitute a violation L
of the Limiting Conditions of Operation of the Technical Specifications (Table 3.9.2).
An upgrade of the instrument power supply feed should include the following:
a.
Two independent sources of power should be established for the.
instruments which are protected by fuses FU 8 63 (Train "A*) and FU 8 64 (Train
- B*).
One of these sources can' remain as circuit 53 on instrument a.c.
The other source should originate in vital a.c.
b.
The instruments which are protected by fuse FU 8 65 (Common) should be fed from an independent bus which cla obtain its power from either instrument or vital a.c.
The bus would have the ability to transfer between the two sources to allow the Common Instruments to receive power from the same bus as the operating train.
- c..
Instruments which are now protected by fuse FU 8 88 should be powered from-their respective trains.
These instruments are Hydrogen and Radiation annuncletors and recorders, d.
The installed fuse system would be altered. This is detailed separately in the section on fuses.
.C The existing instrument power and ground design lacks a proper bus e.
structure.
The details associated with this aspect of the instrument wiring are dealt with in the next section.
l EXHIBIT CI)
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S. R. Miller June 19. 1992 Page 3 2.
InstrumentPowerSuDDivanddroundBuses The existing installation uses three 24 volt d.c. power supplies to power all of the service instruments.
In operation, the "A" or *.he "B"
instrument supply feeds it's respective train in conjunction with the supply for the common instruments. Each supply handles over thirty control room indicating or recording instruments.
Each of these control room instruments, in turn, supplies.ts associated field instruments such as transmitters monitors, etc.
The deficiency with this arrangement is the lack of a proper supply bus. The wiring diagraras show that, in thcary, the instruments are all wired in parallel. The actual practice however, is that the instruments are wired in a daisy chain fashion where the power feed is run to the first instrument's power terminal.
This terminal then forms the supply feed for the next instrument.
With this structure. the only way to deal with a failed instrument. or to perform any sort of maintenance or calibration, is to jumper around that section of the chain.
Discussion with Bob Selby of VY I&C indicates that this practice is a frequent' source of fa'ilure, as the entire train is' brought down through power interruption.
Another diawback is that instruments at the end of the chain are receiving power from a segmented wire with a screw termination between the sections.
Each termination constitutes an electrical weakness to the succeeding instruments.
g The recommendation for an upgrade to this aspect of the system is as follows:
The three t4 volt d.c. power supplies are adequate for their task.
a.
No particular change is needed.
The redundancy will be built in by separating their sources into three independent feeds.
b.
The 24 volt d.c. wiring of the instrument system should be completely rewired with a' branching bus bus structure.
No instrument should be wired in series with the bus.
The purpose of the change is to enable any single instrument to be removed from service without affecting any other instru.nent in the system, A further option to consider is the addition of a redundant or second c.
power supply for each train.
While this is not a neccessary step, the addition of a second supply celd be used to build in redundancy within an instrument train, or provide more' latitude in the power supp1" configuration.
A very similar situation exists with the common wiring to de various instruments. The wiring on this side is even more troublesome as there is nc clear separation between trains, The common wiring is connected between instruments to both trains. Because et a lack of discernible direction in the daisy chain wirino, there is no simple way for a technician to determine what C
other instruments in the system are going to be affected if the ground lead is lifted from a particular instruraent.
Ex 181T PAGE OF O PAGE(S)
S. R. Hiller June 18, 1992 Page 4 The exis',ing method of instrument gr,ounding also includes ground loops.
Even with the direct current instruments, the lack of a single point ground is detrimental to instrument operation.
This is also contrary to the normal practice employed in the wiring of instrument loops at VermcM Yankee, lhe A0G instrun,entation is a combination of alternating and direct current and tt'e currents and voltages introduced into the connon lines by ground loops can cause erratic or incorrect operation of the instruments. An example of this would be a voltage Fresent on a connon line causing a reduction in the nominal supply voltage at the instrument terminals.
This would possibly result in erratic operation of instrument electronics.
The recommendation is to rewire the connon side to implement a branching bus structure such that the removal of any instrument frcm service does not affect any other instrument.
The bus should employ branches which all terminate at a single point to minimize the introduction of stray currents or voltages in any one branch.
j 3.
iy.}f s, (Reference Attachment 1)
The field walkdown and the electrical test of the control room instruments showed that approximately two hundred instruments are indirectly protected by three fuses.
These are fuses FU 8 63 FU+8 64 and EU 8*65 which are located on the a,c.
input lines of the three power supplies.
There are two disadvantages to this design.
The first is the lack of isolation between instruments, and between the instruments and the power supply. The second is the difficulty encountered in locating instrument failuae.
Regarding the first concern. the lack of isolation between instruments allows any electrical disturbance in one part of the system to propagate to any other part.
Additionally, an attempt to remove or service 'any single instrument creates unwanted power disruption to th? other instruments in the system.
On the second issue,1 & C has stated that locating a failed instrument is usually done by observing which fuse blows ce panel instrument reads erroneously. Given the large number of instruments per fuse, however, there is Liten considerable hunting with a large loss of time in the process.
A redesign of the fuse arrangement should incorporate the following:
Fuses FU 8 63. FU 8 64 and FU 8 65 are acceptable as input fuses to a.
their respective power supplies even though each fuse would be fed from an independent bus as outlined above.
EXHI T PAGE OFMPAGE(S)
S. R. Miller June 18, 1992
(
Page 5 b.
The rewiring of the 24 voit d.c. bus needs to incorporate an extensive number of fuses. Ideally eacii instrument should be fused individually, but fer simplicity, the secondary blanches of the power bus would each have a fuse which protects a small group of connected instruments. The removal of the fuse would affect only the instruments on that particula" Oranch.
In this way, maintenance and troubleshooting would be greatly simplified.
An adequate number of fuses, placed in the bus secondary branches, is essential to provide the needed electrical isolation for the instruments.
This change should be considered basic to the upgrade of the A0G system.
4
_ Instruments Vermont Yankee may have specific requests for instrumentation chi,nges.
The scope of the investigation revealed several items which merit attention.
6.
The recorders should be clearly train dedicated.
Titis is to be consistent with the practice of providing two independent trains. This is important not only from an operational point of view, but also for purposes of easy maintenance, b.
Pressure Indicator Pl 1301 is 'acated at the outlet of the SJAE.
It C
normally indicates a vacuum.
Pressure indicator PI '302A is located downstream of PI 1301 in an open line at the inlet to the
'A' train hydroger recombiner stage.
PI 1302A records 5 psig of pressure.
The cause of this error should be investigated and the problem rectified.
c.
1/P 0G 516 (A,B) are part of the process flow controllers out of the SJAE section.
These were found to be powered through the common instrument line to the Fisher power supply.
They should be train dedicated.
5.
Drain Tank level Control and PumDs (Ref. Dwg. 33600 A 207. A 217)
The A0G process lines drain all extracted moisture to an 81 gallon drain tank TK 104-1.. Pumps P 151 1 A and P 151 1B then pump the water to the main condenser.. It is important to maintain the drain tank level within bounds in order to provide a water barrier between condenser vacuum and the A0G process lines.
The tank has pumped itself dry on a number of occasions.
Loss of the water seal has resulted in the destruction of the 151 pumps, either through failure of the irrpeller, or through short circuiting _of the motor. The design of the-pump features a motor internal to the housing.
C E
IBIT PAGE
_ 0FL PAGE(S)
- 5. R. Miller June 19. 1992 Page 6 The pumps are of constant volume design. The normal oper6tional configuration sets one purap to run continuously in manual mode. The second pump is placed in auto mode and will turn on in the event of a high drain tank level alarm.
Olscussions with VY Operations and I & C indicate that under steady state, the level controller works well, but if the tank is pumped dry, the controller is overpowered by condenser vacuum and is unable to maintain level.
This situation resWts in potential failure of the 151 pumps, and the opening of condenser vacuum to the A0G process lines.
The root cause of this problem has been traced to the two back pressure regulating valve controllers loceted between the 151 pump outlet and the condenser inlet.
Hechanical failure of a linkage pin in the regulating bellows caused a change from the preset 20 psig setpoint up to 23 psig. This caused the associated valves PCV 0G 833A ard 8 to go full open, causing water to be sucked out of the drain t47k under full condenser vacuum, rather than being pumped out at the rate determined by the action of the level controller via modulation of the tank recirculation valves LCV 0G 506A & B. Condenser outlet valves OG 9047A & B are preset to a fixed value i
in making a repair to the pressure regulatirig bellows. I & C found a number of pellets from the catalytic recombiner which had gone past the recombiner retaining screen and had migrated through the A0G system, out to the condenser C
and ultimately through to the condensate demineralizer filter. This problem had been causing a loss of flow through the drain tank outlet lines to the condenser.
A loop seal failure had also allowed excessive water from the cooling water supply to leak into, the drain tank.
The comoination of these problems has been a source of operational degradation in the A0G system for some time.
These are not problems which. lend themselves to a design change, but are considered to be eno of life problems.
The recommended course of action for this part of the system first involves replacement of the 151 pumps with a design which features a motor external to the housing. Th's is a desirable feature as it would prevent the failure of the motnr. even given the loss of the impeller. An 6uto start trip separate from the high les al alarm trip, should be incorporated into the 151 pump control logic. This would allow the pump which is in auto mode to start prior to a high drain tank level alarm.
6.
-Floor Drain Sumo (Reference Dwg. 33600 A-207)
The A0G drain pit has a 10 gallon floor sump.
In addition to pump P 157 1A.
the floor - sump - has a capacitive type level. sensing probe LSH 0G 2809.
Hoisture entered the probe conduit via a junction box mounted on the wall.
The probe failed due to short circuit, and had to be replaced, in the course of the repair process, the ! & C technician noted that other wiring in the junction box had been damaged due to excessive heat and EXpBIT__ M PAGE 7 OFMPAGE(S)
-5. B. M111er June 18, 1992 Page 7 moisture. - The source of the prob 1'em was attributed to a leaky steam line which was subsequently repaired.
The technician also noted that the junction box cover had been previously removed end not replaced.-
The recommendation regarding this issue is to perform a thorough repair to the junction box wiring. There exists the degradation due to moisture will occur. possibility that electrical failure or Therefore, it is~further recommended l
that the junction box be replaced with a type more suited to a humid environment.
The drain pit is subject, during normal operation, to large variations in relative humidity and temperature at different elevations within the space.
A further difficulty, which would be advisable to correct. 'is that the
. junction box' is located at a high elevation. Any maintenance or repair which -
involves the box is complicated by this factor.
if the junction box is replaced. it is recommended that it also be installed at a more accessible height.
7.
.QTC111.D.gl A very large problem exists with the general state of the A0G system drawirigs.
The specific problems which were discovered are as follows:
I The drawings have been issued througa several sources.
These include a.
Suntac Nuclear, CVI. - Nuclear Consulting Services and Vermont Yankee.
Certain of these are redundant series which reflect the same information, but are drawn:to that vendor's standard, b.
There are no formal Control Wiring Diagrams.
The Instrumentation'and Electrical information has been incorporated in. the general drawings.
Additionally, there are no. formal Cable and Conduit Lists.
c.
The drawings are innacurate.
Either they do not reflect the At Built condition, or field changes have been made to the system over the years which were not properly incorporated into the prints.
There is an overall lack of consistency and control over the various revisions which have been made.
_ d.-
The revisions are generally out of date, There are old portions such as the Interim Off Gas System drawings which-e.
are being retained in the working files.
-They are marked FOR
-INFORMATION ONLY. but may not r2flect the actual state of the remnants
=
of the 10G system; 9
4 EXHigli M PAGE /b0FD PAGE(S) x
- 5. R 1
June. Hiller 19 Page 8,1992 J
The rec system. ommendation is to d YNSDspecificThe details the drafting departsuggestionsand scopeevelop a proper make of a
requir d work wset of working d d
the set of ent reand requirthe new wfth m
standards drawings, commendations. of ements e
The purpose isVermont 8
lnstr and practices but to bring the taff ascontingent upo um Instrum ent. Air Reference D ont Yankee. ting A0G of Verm exis not necessarilyd ent Air has well as of cooling loop for thair for the filteexperienced prob to B
to fall closed r repla 0203 ne C 9003 and cem ent period causesems during air fil Bothe hydrogen C 9002 recombiner The instrum fail the in theservice the ter outlet valves replacem B valves butent air piping is closed positionvalves C 9001A andheat ent.
first circulat the B aad cooling designed with the bypassHE 101 1Athe and instrthen throughes through path the C 90018 valis designed asindependence valves &
ument air shuts downthe C 9001A val effectively shut v
a The off.
only oneve to the A side throughseries'loopeen th w
recomm e heat exchangerthe B sid solenoids to the Cendation is to set of valves, but the
- i ch fall the exchanger
.her trainin the 9003 andrepla C 9002 volvesce the C 9060 and single flow path i Loss heat exchange would still allonpen position of C 9062 o s
r.
In this
SUMMARY
re way, spectively, perators w
coolant flow to the loss with replacementsand valve The circulate through of recommendations instrum theent air to are al Rewire th structur.e instrum sungnarized here f ternate e
ent or removed from theThe design 24 voltconvenien consider the possibi systemshould ellowd.c. feed syste ce.
y-with Rewire the lity of a m
effect onany instrumwith an g
no str to beappropriate bus ucture. common V
ent se nnd supply forother instrument instrument. The tusside g
electrically of should alsothe 24 vol 9
each s.
t d. c train Redesign the fu allow for. system Also gg in g
small logicallsystem to have the i isolationsimilar bus electrical with a se gg Ist 411sh i
.4 nected of each train dedicatiogroups. nstruments fused i roblem with epower the 516 con the n
1301 of ndivi ually, or the d
troller 1302Arecorders.
and 31 the 151 equipm Pressure Inv estigate o
trip, pumps ent wi rt trainIndica tir.g and repair the th separate frwith external mot ins trumt ets.
om the drain tankor types.o pendent source e
high Incorpora te level alarm a pump
- 5. R. Miller
'r June 18, 1992 t
{
Page 9 6.
Perform a thorough repair to the wiring of the junction box l'ocated in the drain tank room.
Replace the junction box with a more moisture proof type.
Relocate the junction box to' a place of easier access.
7.
Revise the system drawings to a standard workable set.
Incorporate separate CWDs.
8.
Replace the operators and solenoids of the C 9003 and C 9002 valves with types which fail in the open position.
The recommendations as outlined above should address the requirements of the original scope to enhance the reliability and maintainability of the A0G p
system.
The authorization for a design change is requested in order to begin work.
When such approval is granted, a more detailed scope for each task will be provided, prior to design change development.
The memorandum from E. J. Massey to D. C. Porter, dated June 9th 1992 has been reviewed. The concerns will be addressed in a separate cover memo.
1.
1
~"
~
L. J. Casey
((
l & C Group Vermont Project
\\
L-7 /L_
H. T. Hyam(
I & C Engineer Vermont Project f*h b R. T. Vibert Lead I & C Engineer Vermont Project C
g ne Manager Vermont Project E
BIT M PAGE OF/D PAGE(S)
S. R. Miller June 19. 1992 Page 10 c2 P. R. Johnson J. H. Callaghan R. L. Smith M. J. Bachmen E. V. Bowman (Vernon)
R. A. Selby (Vernon)
Action Taken (if any)
Recommendation Accepted Recommendation Denied Comments:
.a n1 nl A
Date:
v c.,I;@
Signed:
_ f,/6,/f1 t
O
\\
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