ML20198H380
| ML20198H380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1998 |
| From: | Van Noy M HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | Alexion T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198H330 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812290329 | |
| Download: ML20198H380 (69) | |
Text
.-.-.. _.
TO:
Tom Alexion DATE: 12/1/98 NRC/NRR FROM:
Mark Van Noy 1
Nuclear Licensing
SUBJECT:
INFORMAL REPLIES TO INFORMAL QUESTIONS POSED WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSED OPERATOR ACTION TO MITIGATE POSTULATED SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT i
Re:
NRC/ Westinghouse /STP Telcon November 17,1998 Attached are our answers to the questions posed by Mr. Jim Bongarra of your l&C Technical Branch during our telephone conference. The questions are listed in Attachment 1 and answers are either provided or their location in subsequent attachments is indicated.
l If there are further questions or if clarification of a particular point is needed, i
please call and we will be happy to provide the information.
MTVN Attachments: 3 L
$k 8
D
-P ATTACHMENT
+
a
REPLIES TO QUESTIONS ON SBLOCA OPERATOR ACTION Pego1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 1 l
NRC QUESTIONS AND INFORMATION REQUESTS Following are Mr. Bongarra's questions and requests for information as we understand them. The response for each, or its location in an attachment, is indicated after the item.
- 1) Provide a copy of the draft EOP.
a) See Attachment 2. Change bars in the right margin indicate changes.
- 2) Describe the proposed operator action process. Include training material that would enhance understanding.
a) See Attachment 3, item 1 (and supporting material).
- 3) To aid in understanding, provide training information for a " critical task" in a current SBLOCA training scenario that includes RAISING the SG PORV setpoint (similar to the LOWERING of SG PORV setpoint, except that the UP button is depressed instead of the DOWN button).
a) See Attachment 3, item 2 (and supporting material).
- 4) Describe operator redundancyin the control room during this emergency evolution, and how it would lower the probability of operator failure.
a) See Attachment 3, item 3 (and supporting material).
- 5) Explain and justify the last sentence at the bot' tom of page 4 of 5, in submittal, which says, " Consequently, STPNOC believes that sufficient time is available for the operators to complete the required actions, verify 4
i system responses, diagnose any errors in performing the required operator actions and to complete any recovery actions necessary."
a) See Attachment 3, items 1,2,3 and 4 (and supporting material).
- 6) Describe effects of a " double failure" of operator action coupled with worst-l case equipment failure, a) [This analysis is in progress, and will be provided when available]
- 7) Describe credible failure modes of this operator action, their effects, and 4
specific actions necessary to recover.
a) See Attachments 3, Items 5 and 6.
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a FN4 Weg &4 &
e-eWM6 epe e " S
-
- M 4ened'*
44 p-
REPLIES TO QUESTIONS ON SBLOCA OPERATOR ACTION Page 2 of 2
- 8) Re: IN 97-78. Item #9. STPNOC says,"STPNOC has submitted the STP Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Individual Plant Examination (PRA) in letter dated August 28,1992 (ST-HL-AE-04193). The current STP PRA models the operator action to depressurize the RCS for a small break LOCA, including depressurizing the secondary side using the SG PORVs if the steam dumps are not available."
a) Does this model exist now?
- 1) Yes, b) is this the same operator action to change the PORV setpoint that is referenced in your submittal?
l) No. The current PRA model is fer an operator action in the SGTR event tree to depressurize the RCS using SG PORVs if the steam dumps are not available. This is not specific to the submitted proposal.
However, it is sufficiently similar to serve as the basis for general conclusions regarding the proposed operator action.
c) Does PRA analyze both the success and failure branches of the fault tree for this operstor action? If so, what are the results?
l} Yes. The event tree Top Event OD (operator depressurization) represents the likelihood of failure of this operator action. Failure frequency is based on sequence specific operator interviews and is 4.4 42 x10 on demand.
(1) These interviews were conducted a number of years ago, prior to the intense training level now considered standard for the industry.
An update is planned, and it is expected that operator confidence will be significantly higher. Thus,4.4 x 10* is quite conservative.
j
_ _...... ~. _.. _
REPLIES TO QUESTIONS ON SBLOCA OPERATOR ACTION I
l ATTACHMENT 2 DRAFT EOP to aid discussion of proposed SBLOCA Operator Action f
I
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~
SOUTH TRIAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION 1 POP 05-EO-E010 Rev.
L N
LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECOND LANT af k
DEPARTMENT PROC, SAFETYRELATED(b!
h!ll$Ei!!!ll!@!p i UNIT OPERATION MANAGER TE VEDP DATE EFFECTIVE USAGE CONTROL:
Control g Station Only
% War
!h st'shSm,,'6$1ng Containment B2 Monitoring I, n 1
o dendum3'!
tablDhing Alternate Charging Flow Control "e,nd u i
o, jrgencyElectricalLoadingRequirements g-j
$gndue 4.koguencerLoadingVerification-MODEIII oi lt. tonal formation Page o
9lll This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2. and 3.
I I'
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-E0-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 1 0F 22 i
F11RPOSE This procedure provides actions to recover from a loss of reactor or secondary coolant.
SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS 1
This procedure is entered from:
1.
OPOP05-E0-E000 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 22 and OPOP05-E0-FRH1, l
RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 29, when a pr g,suriz e PORV is stuck open and its isolation valve cannot be closed.
ljf i
2.
OPOP05-E0-FRH1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SIN 29, when PORV bleed path has been. secured and pressurizer level is still
. j l
OPOP05-EO-E000REACTORTRIPORSAFETYINJECTION,f)p27, 3.
following symptoms: High Containment Radiation,.
- dsure, or High Containment Emergency Sump Level.
. f 1
M 4.
OPOP05-EO E000 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECT
$5te 41, OPOP05-E0'EC21.
UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENE Step 11 and OPOP05-EG-FRH1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Step 31 -
!$CS pressure is LESS THAN l
the shutoff head pressure of the low l)
}
p mps
[j{jil!]l).
l LOW PRESSURIZER LEVEL, Step 5, if SI ha
' gfif[$d(ated.
5.
OPOP05-E0-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Step 9 aB OPOP05-EO-FRI2, RESPONSE TO 6.
OPOP05-EO-E020. FAULTED STEAM AATORI ION, Step 6, after identification and 1 solation of a faulted SG.
ll l
7.
OPOP05-E0-ECO2, LOSS OF M KC POW!l3;#!Qt200Vp.Y WITH SI REQUIRED, Step 12, after normal injection mode con'$( Mns' MN N Mldshed.
f kN O IDEbO(f({41 MENT, Step 6,whenaLOCAo 8.
OPOP05-EO-EC12, LOC 4[l, I
isolated.
l
'p 9.
OPOP05-E0-FRC1f
- dPONSE TO PEQUATE CORE COOLING, Step 17 and Step 25 and i
OPOP05-E0-FRC2,4
? NSE TO IiGltADED CORE COOLING, Step 18 after core cooling has been reestablish 8
]j l
?
OI Nd
(
- 10. OPOP05-E0-FRH1, RESPON$
@ OSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 29. after secondary i
heat sink has been reest iished and all pressurizer PORV's are closed.
O i
. 11. OPOP05-RO-ES11 SI TERMINATION, Steps 9 and 27, after a loss of subcooling.
- 12. OPOP05-E0-ES00, REDIAGNOSIS, Step 3 after checking for other procedures in effect.
h.-
7
-e6
,--.7.
,,-.io
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1 POP 05-E0-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 2 0F 22 ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS II any of the following conditions are met 2EiX USE adverse containment values:
i o Containment pressure GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5 PSIG.
o Containment radiation levels GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 105 R/HR.
e Containment integrated radiation dose GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 106 RADS.
fi g(>fjhb k}l0 5
dh,{P dispOp sA) 3 R)
Ahpu(lEf,flME!EP('
r 8
I H
rjflil[p )
kgg j I
l i
l REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 3 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
)
HQIE A loss of reactor coolant is a potential ALERT per OERP01-ZV-IN01. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION.
(Matrix)
]
, !i k l-1 CHECK If RCPs should Be Stopped:
h
- a. HHSI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- a. GO e
gIy--------- &fp: -- --- -- --- - ---
f alg h!)'g
- c. STOP all RCPs i,
d[@!!!
NjIbr l
2 DEPRESSURIZEIntactSGsTo1000PMIG !!Ii!l l kl ff 4lh7 Il i
THAN1985PSIGPSIG.321EHpLOCK
( l l",lIll i!
i
- a. WHEN pressurizer pressure LESS j{p j
Low Steam 11ne Pressure 4Ib!)0f
@, d !Ii! E @
jl t h Ui;
)
l Ilpj 4
t h 1l 4
ill]
j Stcp 2 continued on next page.
I
~.
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 4 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Stcp 2 continued from previous page,
- b. CHECK condenser - AVAILABLE
- b. PERFORM the following:
j
- 2) ENSURElif[I'PORVcontrollersin I
AUTgk 3) kg0RVscontrollingSG pEessurs EEN 995 PSIG and i})l/l Q
p, PSI I
Kj ifyj#gGPORVsareHQI gjl]q!
rolling SG pressure i
i.g je BETWEEN 995 PSIG and 1000 l
.Ehntrollers in MANUAL and
'l!
l
~
TO Step 3.
}
!! c. PERFORM the following:
- c. CHCCK steam dump in s i
I pressure mode i
1 4[&if[$
SI P' b
tl
- 2) ADJUST "HDR PRESS CONT i
hk b!p PK-0557* setpoint to BETWEEN gl l
- 3) ENSURE "HDR PRESS CONT 4
l PK-0557" in AUTO.
dd
- 4) PLACE steam dump " MODE SEL" (pk h
switch in the STEAM PRESS l
position.
l
- 5) GO TO Step 2.f.
- d. ADJUST "HDR PRESS CONT PK-0557" setpoint to BETWEEN 7.10 and 7.14
(
Stcp 2 continued on next page.
REV. DRAFT IPOP05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGB 5 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
St:p 2 continued from previous page.
,_ e. ENSURE "HDR PRESS CONT PK-0557" in AUTO
- f. M RCS TAVG decreases to 563'F.
M PLACE steam dump "INTLK SEL" switches to BYPASS INTERLOCK lhl*
i
- g. VERIFY steam dumps controlling SG
- g. PERF0 fe following:
j
)
'j pressure BETWEEN 995 PSIG and d
j 2000 PSIG 1)4 11,
, PRESS CONT PK-0557" M '.N I!h'i dONTROLSG EuresBETWEEN 11 9
fSIG and 1D00 PSIG.
3 CHECK If SG Secondary Pressure 1(
[ g g! 0 h!!,,., y %d ced SG is unisolated Boundary D. tact:
q;g gi-
'OIII$
4-
- s. CHECK pressures in all SGs -
j p
'!f]l h
'Alidi"HQI needed for RCS cooldown, l
jhi TEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-E020 o CONTROLLED E INCREASINp o GREATER THAN CONTAINMENI h
lq (AULTED STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE i l @!!!IdlI ISOLATION. Step 1.
L 4
RESET SI dIt
-ESP c2ptng%
5 RESET Contg t Isola Phase A 6
olation Phase B RESET Coetainme,nt 7
q;;pr b 4 4 6 g h Sh & 44
- G'P M-Mf h45 6 h 9'*Ma9 p-9
REV. DRAFT IPOP05-EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 6 0F 22 STEP
. ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8
CHECK INTACT SG Levels:
- a. NR levels - GREATER THAN 14% [34%]
- a. PERFORM the following:
1
- 1) MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 576 GPM until NR 1evel GREATER THAN 14% [M%)
in at et one SG.
- 2) IE
!nFW pump fails to i
s
! !!M:
dIll!E!
gd~ RESETflli.
lglisa SG LO-LO Level Qy-
^ ~ ~
b]{llgp0SEapplicableAFW a
i eegulating valve.
,;;j}
) OPEN applicabic AFW cross l(
onnects.
ul l [
d)'dNTROLAFWflowtoLESS i
'y THAN 675 GPM per AFW pump.
J j
i l ,! gL....................................
b.CONTROLAFWflowtom/
k k h
.b. II NR level in any SG continues f (\\j%} anf iIO%
11l 1 to increase in an uncontrolled levels BETWEEN 14%.
, j hj j!!l 'i j;;lhlljlg{ji,q!p @!
@ !! !! y manner, M GO TO ll 0 POP 05-E0-E030. STEAM GENERATOR il T'JBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
$%!!p%[Qp f
8 l$gfk l
l l
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-BO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 7 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
9 CHECK 8econdary Radiations
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 2) RESET SG blowdown and sample gl isolations f
- 3) NOTIFY Chemistry to sample all SGs for activity I
- a j[
- b. MONITOR the following:
- b. [ )TO OPOP05'
$0}0. STEAM
'i NERATORTUBERpURE, Step 1.
h I, gl,
o Main steamline radiation -
' qql ]I,
[lfj Ilh l;l jg NORdAL l
o IE SG blowdown in service. M ig,
SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL
'h I
i o CARS pump radiation - NORMALt j
i q
- c. M SG sample results, dh,
- c. GO TO OPOP05-EO-E030, STEAM received. M VERIFLlil %sespie k
,l GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1, i
activity - NORMAL I!
Ilf k
I l
ll
%gf
_~
REV. DRAFT l
LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT I
1 POP 05-E0 E010 PAGE 8 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAlriED l
l 10 CHECK Pressuriser PORVs And Isolation Valves:
- a. Power to isolation valves -
- a. DISPATCH operator to restore AVAILABLE power to PORV isolation valves:
o "PRZR PORV /CV 655A" "ISOL M "l(2)
NOV-0001A" NCC El; E2A2)/J1 & KIL o"fN pi CV 656A" DN6L M O
l71(2)-RC-M0l l; JB" p;i hCC ElB1(E2B !/&L1R
" ~ " " ~ ~ " " " " ~ ~ " " ~ ~ "
23)dressurizerpressureLESSTHAN
- b. PORVs - CLOSED b.'l IG, M:
S 3
1 4
hl!!g,i j any PORV can HQI be closed,
..i y-M CLOSE its isolation valve, l
[
j lj
!MNEj*jj:
c.Isolationvalvesygfll LEAST!
llr;;!ly
- c. PERFORM the following:
11l15 f"!!!$ld!! w OPEN 4
i' a
[ l
- 1) If.1 solation valves closed to isolate open PORVs. M GO TO l
h 1
4 !
- 2) OPEN one isolation valve.
k jgkIl f
,j y/
I REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT l
PAGE 9 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
l 11 ESTABLISH IA To Containment:
- a. DISPATCH operator to start one IA compressor:
i l
(29 ft TGB NE) o " INS AIR" "COMPMi5$0R NO. 11(21)"
j !!
l$
ifSTRU S o
jipMPaESSO,giq2(22)"
$controlroom.THENDISPATCH opprher to perform the following:
lh l
PENT space) d EI!!ll1" 0
'U 4
i glll1!f lloillI'llf(j[h i$
I "1(2)-IA-1515" II I N.llh' "RCB INSTRUMENT AIR" l
b l
!h l
ll!
g
- 2) UNLOCK and OPEN:
i "1(2)-IA-1516"
%ylp i
bphg
~j i, j ],
"RCB INSTRUMENT AIR" 4
i "k(gffl l!!I l
"0VERRIDE VALVE"
- - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~
l
REV. DRAFT IPOP05-E0 E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT-PAGE 10 0F 22 i
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 12 PLACE SFPC In Service Within 2.5 HOURS Of Loss Of SFPCs
- a. CHECK CCW pumps - AT LEAST TWO
- a. PERFORM the following:
RUNNING
, wthlht'
- 2).'g' g/pg4}4M GO TO Step 13 et HQI be placed in y lg gUd5C"y lieu I ) Step a.'. 'O@tton prior to f
I "hllV"""""""""""""
4 lg J$
fgbWflowcanHQIbealigned
- b. 1.LIGN CCW flow to SFPC heat l
exchanger (s) d som the main control board 'DIEN NplTCHoneratortoopenthe
)]b folh1hgvalves:
l qj iP! !
q {lql[Dglh'ljk jji I%
11 l o "l(2)-CC-MOV-0447"
" SPENT FUEL POOL EXS" d
l o "1(2)-CC-MOV-0032" t
li f' lf 9,,
" SPENT FUEL POOL EXS"
,, gi Fd pp "CCW SUPPLY HEADER" l llj pllP 1
"SECOND ISOLATION MOV OPERATOR" p
di l
kh, A
l 4
- c. CHECK SFPC pttag[dg'g Jl,jlI"JNG HH
- c. START SFPC pump (s). REFER T0 u
l OPOP02-FC-0001. SPENT FUEL POOL j
COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM.
i t
l
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 11 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IContainmentH2concentra CAUTIDH cvoid explosive H2 concentrations.
13 CHECK Containment H2 Concentration:
l0
- a. Contninment H2 - GREATER THAN OR a.PLg fhmentH2monitordu.
EQUAL TO ZERO (QDPS QUAL PAMS) s skam in og per Addendum 1.
lY...........'..!p..............
- b. H2 concentration - GREATER
,;;j!
PEPf the following:
THAN OR EQUAL TO 0.5%
d ilF IIEN H2 concentration is E.
!jj',P5'RFORM Step 13.c and 1 GREATER THAN 0.5%. IHEN k
n O
TO Step 14.
l i....................................
!!ipll%
l i
c.H2 concentration-LEdbTHAE i
l !
- c. PERFORM the following:
Il !
'i d![!
d $$k!!!$P, 1) 4% BY VOLUME p
NSULT TSC staff for additional recovery actions.
p il y ( p
'" : '""1 j
!ll d
n
- d. PLACE h gggin, recomb service perepFOR02-Cg% rs in 01.
ELECTRIC HYDROGEd3ECO)GINERS
"*Wi!!l$P
i l
PJtV. DRAFT 1PC"05-EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT l
PAGE 12 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 14 CHECK If Charging Flow Has Been i
Established:
- a. CCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 1) If,CCW flow to RCP(s) thermal barriers is lost. M ISOLATE seal in RCP(s) jection to affected sing seal injection OCIV(a peforestartingCCPs.
- b. Charging flow - ESTABLISHED b.
ER RM theN(
ing:
ii CLOSE charg1 fIlowcontrol
.dlll#j v
p.
11 Io bbRF
, igj e fol;.owing:'
f k8TABLISHchargingflowper I
adendum 2 g
k hl 1
GO TO Step 15.
I 1
p j.,
j
!l
- 3) ENSURE CCP discharge valves p ll j;l[!
ff I l OPen.
l l'
- 4) ENSURE normal or alternate t
4 l f '$$l]HP'
- 5) ENSURE charging OCIV open.
i p@py q ] Ij!
6)HchabringOCIVwillHQI d h, l'
)p to open charging OCIV:
- CPen, DISPATCH operator pi I
I
(
Il l l (29 ft MAB RM 108C) h "1(2)-CV-MOV-0025" lii;h b jic "CVCS CHARGING ORC" i
d Q
" CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" 4jp j
"MOV OPERATOR" l
- c. CONTROL charging flow control
- c. E charging flow control valve l
valve to restore pressurizer level will HQI close. M ESTABLISH charging flow to restore pressurizer level per Addendum 2
i REV. DRAFT IPOP05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 13 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
15 CHECK If SI Flow Should Be Terminated:
- a. RCS subcooling based on ccre exit
- a. GO TO Step 16, OBSERVE note prior T/Cs - GREATER THAN 35'F [45'F]
to Step 16.
- b. Secondary heat sink criteria -
b.GOTOStgfijII6,OBSERVEnoteprior SATISFIED toStepjff.
o Total AFW flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 576 GPM ild l
i, l
fiff OR o NR level in at least one SG -
qj GREATER THAN 14% [34%]
g i
i
...ak A
I T
ep 16, OBSERVE note prior
- c. RCS pressure criteria - SATISF hg i hj l'lahteP 16.
i l
j l.!'lyl 0p o Pressure - GREATER THAN i
l 1745 PSIG t i
$!!hhhhh.
O o Pressure - STABLE O NCRh8ING I
4 dead -------
d.Pressurizerlevel-GK dTHAN
- d. PERFORM the following:
j!I!!$lhh!
[!!
j [!
- dhij y ]jp.,gldy
- 1) STABILIZE RCS pressure using h
V normal pressurizer spray.
lig p
g (di
- 2) IE normal pressurizer spray M I available, IHEN USE auxiliary spray.
l
- 3) INCREASE charging flow to raise pressurizer level.
- 4) GO TO Step 16. OBSERVE note prior to Step 16.
l
- e. GO TO OPOP05-EO ES11. SI TERMINATION, Step 1
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT l
PAGE 14 0F 22~
l STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
l l
i EQII It may be necessary to run Containment Spray for up to 6.5 hrs following a design basis LOCA in order to reduce Containment Iodine levels low enough to support Control Room and TSC 30-day habitabMity. (Ref. Calc NC6013)
Ml!!k,
@ Y i
l 16 CHECK If Containment Spray should Be
{
p Stopped:
])TOStepl'
- a. Spray pumps - RUNNING a
ilif J!Ok
- b. Containment pressure - LESS THAN PERE 0 the following:
i:
6.5 PSIG
- Il! ll llf[
y containment pressure LESS k(!gglh Tgl%.5 PSIG. M PERFORM
.uq ;jg l
Steps 16.c and 16.d.
l TO Step 17.
, $Up h
i.....................................
likl l
lN'
- c. CONSULT TSC staff ta!determN
' :1 if I
Containment Spray,j ld I
jy h,
stopped.
1;
,hl
- d. M permiss}o g g yjceTSC staff.
- ZHEdasp'"erciqm th(from
]ljp jj J Tl@p1 le fol.lowinf j'jid"'
i 14ll h
1)RESEbi(g inment gy signal
- 2) PLACE Conta $6a ray System in Standby: !!!( f a) STOP containment spray pumps and PLACE in AUTO
_b) CLOSE containment spray pump discharge valves
I l
~
REV. DRAFT IPOP05-EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 15 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED REE Oh.iB RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 17 CHECK If LHSI Pumps should Be l
Stopped:
- a. CHECK RCS pressure:
- 1) Pressure - GREATER THAN
- 1) GO TO Step 19.
415 PSIG
...........i ;>......................
- 2) Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING
- 2) G 18.
..... $h.... Eq
- b. STOP LHSI pumps and PLACE in AUTO k
f 18 CHECK RCS And SG Pressures:
,(
- a. CHECK pressures in all SGs -
af a y SG pressure is decreasing.
h!.RETURNTOStep1.
CONTROLLED OR INCREASING il ff
1 9
OR DECREASING
[
E d, P 2][EN RETURN TO Step 1.
l l!f l
pq 4 g d J2WP II O$$$b%l h
4 bg,/
d hg l
l t
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-E0 E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 16 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 19 CHECK If STBY DGs Should Be Stopped:
- a. TRY to restore offsite power:
BY OFFSITE POWER
- 2) H cff e power can E be t,P M manually LOAD l
resto#
des 4$ equipment on the AC ES ;$itses.REFERTO j
dll *
- gy - - - - - - - - fy: - - - - -
- b. RESBT any unloaded DG(s)
[ y j
non-emergency trips 4;
j
,!Nllphj I
- c. RELEASE any unloaded DG(s) from iig l
EMERGENCY mode alii l
- d. STOP any unloaded DG(s) h!
jl llY 20 INITIATE Evaluation Of Plant Statust 4 I
'a. PERFORM the following:
a.VERIFYcoldlegrecircu1NI'84 d!
k M hll!Ilili%
l I
h'
- 1) TRY to restora power, capability:
i g
o Power to LHSI pp'liijjf l
MBCBjjjpl i
ga.
A ll!I!Rilililli!!!Iiilil!
ghljy
o Power to HHSI pumpst,!
ILABLE LHSI) of cold leg g
recirculation capability can
'd!!!NI!Riakn grgepc ump 9 ' on E be verified. M GO TO o Power to l
OPOP05-EO-EC11. LOSS OF AILABLEp'ipf h
valves
'I EMERGENCY COOLANT
('
f o Power I pump nUdflow RECIRCULATION. Step 1.
g lhll valves -
LABLE oPowertoLHSI'hiihdh'n1 flow k
valves - AVAILAMM,pgu,.m hd l
l o Power to RWST suction isolation valves - AVAILABLE j
Stcp 20 continued on next page.
l I
~
~
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 17 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSB RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Step 20 continued from previous page.
- b. CHECK MAB and FHB radiation -
- b. TRY to identify and isolate NORMAL leakage:
- 1) CVCS letdown containment isolation valves - CLOSED "ICI, lh.6,,V-0024"
'0023" "0C I!!
!!b 2) pasn normal sump latf*"7 ves - CLOSED E#064" "DISCH IC V 0
'I
" DIS 7800" Hi$h,CHOCIVF dhj g '!!tCP seal return containment h
' k@i)" solation valves - CLOSED L
N siti RTN ICIV MOV-0077" U$
i i
f i
"5E RTN OCIV MOV-0079" l
li WPS isolation valves - CLOSED 4
"ICIV MOV-0312" d,l e;L A
) IE the cause of the abnormal
" " ~ ' " ' '
4(jjit i
IhigIMedsip 5
f utin i
condition is a loss of RCS inventory outside containment.
lB THEN GO TO OPOP05-EO-EC12 f
gflpn F
h LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.
k di Step 1.
it t
iQ]
l
/
- c. NOTIFY Chemi
$ tog lement OPCP08-AP- 0003."4,0ST. CCIDENT SAMPLINGOFLIQUIds?ANDRCB ATMOSPHERE AT PASS
~
l REV. DRAFT l
IPOP05 EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT l
PAGE 18 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 21 CHECK If RCS Cooldown And Depressurization Is Required:
- a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN
l llll"
- b. GO TO OPOP05-EO-ES12. POST LOCA il d'j C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1 j
!?
22 CHECK If Transfer To Cold Leg 4
j l
Recirculation Is Required pr f0 Step 2b.
,jgf g
b.GOTOOPOP05-EO-ES13 TRANSFER ["!'{
f lr l
COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1 W
d
! ill f$dlIll" i
23 CHECK If SI Accumulators Should Be W
! '!!q li Isolated:
jji a.AtleasttwoRCShot/
nl.h,a.PERFORMthefollowing:
temperatures - LESSftHAN 42L 1
(
6 f j l
'wiih. diig!gy-
- 1) M at least two RCS hot leg jfjj al temperatures LESS THAN 420'F, u
bjg;gge, p
M PERFORM Steps 23.b. 23.c l!
ll$$
j[
and 23.d.
[
a
- 2) GO TO Step 24.
llgkl j
l Step 23 continued on next page.
1
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-E0-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 19 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE-RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Stcp 23 continued from previous page,
- b. ENERGIZE all SI accumulator
- b. DISPATCH operator to restore isolation valves power to SI accumulator isolation valves.
o "SI ACCUMULATOR 1A(2A)"
" DISC ISOL" "l(2) 3 E1A4j $,. OV-0039A"
)/E3 & G1 EILATOR 1B(2B)"
o".k$CHd%
r !jf'!)1(2)-SI-MdllI, L*
E 3
k SB"
.gh $'ElB4(E2B4)/F if4
[CCUMULATOR1C(20)"
(d!hj p, ISCHARGE ISOL" o
b ljl, (2)-SI-MOV-0039C" 4(E2C4)/D4 & J4 l jkj!
E!I!!F i
i g
BRT any unisolated accumulators:
- c. CLOSE all SI accumulator 1 solation valves g'i 9
l l
- 1) CLOSE N2 supply.
f!
Nllh "N2 SPLY OCIV FV-3983" ll l
- 2) OPEN unisolated accumulator d[!
u vent isolation valve.
]y '
l o "ACC 1A(2A)"
)p qlf "N2 SPLY/ VENT" i
d ggd "PV-3930" h
j lfp:
o "ACC 1B(2B)"
$i "N2 SPLY/ VENT" "PV-3929" o "ACC 1C(20)"
l "N2 SPLY/ VENT" l
"PV-3928" H
- t:p 23 continued on next page.
l 1
1 POP 05-E0-E010 LOSSOFhtEACTORORSECONDARYCOOLANT PAGE 20 0F 22 l
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Stcp 23 continued from previous page.
l
- 3) OPEN accumulator vent to containment:
o "HDR VENT HV-0899" OR o"d ENT HCV-0900" lllr
- d. DEENERGIZE all SI accumulator p
1 solation valves hF q
qll 24 CHECK If Intact SGs should Be Depressurized To RCS Pressures
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN INTACT
- a. 00 SG PRESSURES
~
g 4tep 25.
gr hh y.............................
(I,
- b. NOTIFY Chemistry to samply all SGs for radioactivity l
- c. REQUEST a dose pro on o I
steaming SGs from.,
TSC i
jy d.Doseprojectionforh
- d. DO EI dump steam from a SG with l
" ""- * "6' d " " $ "** "-
^oc"="'"pft i
hrom
- e. DUMP steam using intact SG PORVs e.DUMPstesl condense educef'repressure to reduce SG pressure to LESS intact SG I
re's THAN RCS pressure.
to LESS THAN 25 CONSULT TSC Staff To Determine If Reactor Vessel Head Should Be Vented l
l l
l
REV. DRAFT l
1 POP 05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT l
PAGE 21 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESP 0!!SE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 26 CHECK Containment H2 Concentrations
- a. H2 concentration - GREATER.
- a. PERFORM the following:
THAN OR EQUAL TO 0.5%
- 1) M H2 concentration is l
GREATER THAN 0.5% M PERFORM Step 26.b and 26.c.
- 2) GO TO I' I"p 2 7.
J l~"'""""""""'"
- b. Pili 1pRM t kl q
- b. H2 concentration - LESS THAN lowing:
lIr Igl g 4% BY VOLUME f J a1>ionalree(fffor CONSULT TSC' d
bvery actions.
- c. PLACE hydrogen recombiners in hln service per OPOP02-CG 0001, ii!
y o
i ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS 4q l
{l$P I
I d.
MlW)
I, A
f gjj$$] q ljp 4h'gIl.
I ll[ggb
l r
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 22 0F 22 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 27 At 4.5 HOURS After Event Initiation.
PREPARE For Hot Leg Recirculation:-
- a. DISPATCH operator to unlock and close breakers for each cold leg injection valve:
o "LHSI PUMP 1A(2A) DISCH T0"
" LOOP 1 COLD LEG" f
!O" "1(2)-SI-MOV-0031A" fl I
I! P E1A1(E2A1)/C3 & V6L l
4kg!(]!i 4![i!ik d
- Ij ! !!
r
'l'lijl i
o "LESI PUMP 1B(2B) DISCH T0"
'k
" LOOP 2 COLD LEG"-
[lj'$r d
[!d "
jll
" 1 ( 2 ) '- SI-MOV- 0031B"
!]lgi,0lij/
ElB1(E2B1)/A4 & W2R 1l1 o "LHSI PUMP 1C(2C) DISCH T0"
! %l hf m f
" LOOP 3 COLD LEG" "1(2)-SI MOV 0031C" "li,jl h]lr
$ )qg lf!I)' l!j jr l
E1Cl(E201)/D1 & S4R Illlli l
f 4
- b. ENERGIZE HHSI pumps hot leg injection valves
(
- j l-
- c. ENLRGIZE LHSI pumps hop llh!!'i
^
[1 I
injection valves iAlilij l
At 5.5 HOURS After Ey*eCO TO OPOP05-BO-ES14. ii.TBANSFBg"!!!Td nitiststs !! gtj'y 28 I
HOT LEC RECIRCULATION. s
~
29 EVALUATE Long ti j;p taff oCONSULT{A hy/
4
-END-
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-EO-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT-l-
PAGE 1 0F 2 ADDENDUM 1 ESTABLISHING CONTAINMENT H2 MONITORING STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
RESET SI 2
RESET Containment Isolation Phase A 3
OPEN H2 sample OCIVs for each train 4
PLACE "CNTMT H2 SAMELE SELECT" for IEFV-4100['
HQI available DE otherare($!Mhitored.22iEN each train to the desired position des top of dome is desireQ Mi-SELEC NlM de U '
sample point:
TRAIN A TPi TION o FV-4100 4j V-l'I Above SG o
5 SG compartment
.h! jyr Inside primary h htm D!!jl!!hjjjf t
i N
shield
,ki I
IM h
j II q l TRAIN C IN C LOCATION o FV-4103 FV-4129 Above SG l
I l k! I g($
o FV-4131 Inside primary f
Sli l shield gp Qg Nllu$
5 OPEN selee j;ENTMTH2S I
E valve for each trairfkl g f OPENH2sampleICITh ach train 6
7 PLACE' mode select switch to OPERATE for each train ew-we-
IPOP05-EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 2 0F 2 ADDENDUM 1 ESTABLISHING CONTAINMENT H2 MONITORING l
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8
VERIFY H2 reading for each train NOTIFY TSC staff of H2 monitor GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO ZERO after failure.
l 1 minute of operation (QDPS DETAIL DATA MENU PAGE 7) 9 RETURN TO procedure step in l l3, F effect 4h N jld1 l)-
f 4,!!! )i#
4y n.
(,f.
't jd>
f
'll g
9,gpHI h
Ull glll2iQ b l) lh
.c jj((
l i
i l
I
REV. DRAFT
-1 POP 05-E0-8010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 1 0F 4 l
l ADDENDUM 2 j
ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL l
\\
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1 DISPATCH operator to perform the following:
- s. THROTTLE charging flow control l.
manual bypass two turns open ph"
[(i t
l b
l (19 ft MAB RM 79) f@! !!I "l(2)-CV-0255"
'S g$[l
]
l[l*
"CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE"
,l! e
i !D l
"FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE" l )
l I
1 f
p,,
- b. CLOSE charging flow control fj
,ijjlf, i, yf lMQllp manual inlet isolation valve i
p (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"1(2)-CV-0254A" nil I!)
fl'*j i
"CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" "FCV-0205 INLET VALVE" 4
j!r rh ll lk 2
CHECK normal or alternate ch,a g,ing PPENnormaloralternatecharging
-loop isolation valve - OPy$ 1'f l p
loop isolation valve.
l g!!
l
)....................................
i i
r g
8 3
CHECK charging OCIV -
'l L
PERFORM the following:
pp"h N
l
IHEH DISPATCH operator to open
%glip,l charging OCIV.
lj,
L
<>e er - e =
Ml "l(2)-CV-MOV-0025" l
"CVCS CHARGING ORC"
" CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" "MOV OPERATOR" 4
CHECK if maximum charging flow is GO TO Step 6 of this Addendum and required CBSERVE caution prior to Step 6 of this Addendum.
. ~. - -
~
REV. DRAFT l
1 POP 05-E0 E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT I
PAGE 2 0F 4 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED i
5 ESTABLISH maximum charging flow:
- a. PERFORM the following:
- 1) OPEN a ar.t one CCP suction valves
. in the RWST.
- 2) CLO$
g,,{eastoneCCPsuction F
E the VCT.
-- ghy(------- g-hy
- b. CHECK running CCP(s). 7 charge valve - OPEN i!
,g,d............................
i q,
f!I charging flow control manual h,,k'3
- c. DISPATCH operator to adjust bypasstoachievedesiredflowh,gl((glj j s]p e
g'!
l l'
bil l
(19 ft MAB RM 79) h "CVCS CHARGING DISCHAn,yll 4llljp "1(2)-CV-0255"
,f p!
l h
gb li l !
"FCV-0205 BYPASS V
{
- i
- d. CLOSE the running fhJ bili {l(
recirculation valve
- e. PERFORM the following:
i f
g l
- 1) ENSURE seel injection OCIV(s)
I ii a
- OPEN.
t a
- 2) ADJUST 1(2)-CV-HCV-0218 Uligi
,I to establish between k
6 and 13 gpm RCP seal injection flow.
- f. RETURN TO procedure step in effect
?
(
l IPOP05-EO E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT 4
PAGE 3 0F 4 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL d
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
4 i
f CAUTION Nazimum seal injection flow will result when charging pump 1B(2B) alt discharge to
.A,,!l (j0!!*
RCP seal isolation CV-0236B is opened.
l t!jjkFil!$'lj' i
1 6
DISPATCH operator to perform the
'h i
f!gk
!)]).
I
"*"8 j
- a. OPEN alterna icharge to i
(!
fl [,
RCP seals:
3 (19 ft MAB RM 79)
"CENTRIFUGALCHARGINGPUMP1B(k,!I hi.
"1(2)-CV-0236B"
!!!llly li
" ALT RCP SEAL SUPPLY VALVE" 91; j
jir CLOSE CCP IB(2B) discharge,
k, 7
'l P Jh' bh isolation MOV-8377B
,h 1 Nazimum seal injectionc
'f seal isolation MOV-l!!iMll[o
. I!i@l i
p 8
CHECK CCP UNNI GO TO Step 9 of this Addendum.
- a. OPEN CCP 1A(2A)hifidillihMk k
- I! discharge 4
isolation to RCP '"hMia MOV-8348
- b. CLOSE CCP 1A(2A) discharge isolation MOV-8377A i
1 POP 05-EG-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 4 0F 4 ADDENDUM 2 ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW CONTROL STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9
ESTABLISH desired charginh flow:
- a. DISPATCH operator to open:
(19 ft MAB RM 79) i
/ )>
i j [',,
! N "1(2)-CV-0255" "CVCS CHARGING DISCHARGE" ilI -
"FCV-0205 BYPASS VALVE"
- b. THROTTLE HCV-0206 to establish r
gli-ihk desired charging flow g
j ff"k!l!!! 'j 10 ENSURE seal injection OCIV(s) - OPEN i
l h,,
ilq%
llgg l
11 DISPATCH operator to THROTTLE i
AlternateSourcetoSealInjection,Q,, Isolation va iiijyjjg i gjjgp ijgg 6 and 13 gpm RCP seal flow T
W!
O (19 ft MAB RM 79) k kj ll "1(2)-CV-0246" n
"CVCS CHARGING PUMPS" g!
N E
" ALT RCP SEAL SUPPLY ISDMl AL
'ill 12 RETURN TO procedure
(
I "p
%)
. -. ~ _ _.
~. _. _ - - - -. ~. ~
REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-E0-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 1 0F 1 ADDENDUM 3 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL LOADING REQUIREMENTS Components Train A Train B Train C (KW)
(KW)
(KW)
Pressurizer Heaters 1A/1B (2A/2B) 431.0 N/A 431.0-Hydrogen Recombiners N/A
, d >5. 0 7
75.0 stilgp i
e!!
bei RMW Pumps 41.0 lh
(
A 140.4 140.4 SFPC Pumps
%[Ij%jjii' lh 0.5 0.5 N f:
SFP Air Handling Unit MI!!!!!!!h,,.
I!hP$!!
k
- ti,.
Centrifugal Charging Pumps
'y N/A 450.0 j
BA Transfer Pump Room 0.4 N/A 0.4-e y a
y
!$h.d'lNhhhk
^
k Rxw Pum,s MA1. JM'915RIN b
w.
1.,
1.,
iiiusa!A
( 5/185 7'gs/N52Cs) in.5 72.5 92.2 480v x mqy. y
1 REV. DRAFT 1 POP 05-E0-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT PAGE 1 0F 1 ADDENDUM 4 SEQUENCER LOADING VET (FICATION - MODE III i
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Equipment should NOT be manually loaded on an ESF Bus until the respective ESF Load Sequencer has completed its automatic sequen e,0R it has been determined that the respective ESF Load Sequencer hag fulled to operate.
,,!!fli!!F 1
VERIFY the following equipment -
Manually "hent HQI LOADED ON ESF BUS previous G$ cure the Emergency Opera jkProcedurec fi, COMPONENT TRAIN
/
IN "B" TRAIN "C" 480V LC Feeder Breaker ECW Pumps d
himn,,,,.
1 !!A HHSI Pumps k
b$I ?!)
LHSI Pumps Ih!!
CNMT Spray Pumps (If Re
$11
!s RCFCs 2
J m'@ mimno CCW Pumps AFW Pumps J
N!N, b%
Essentia11 Ws.te a
EAB HVAC
$@A.
A Control Room HVACda!s!$ijf
'llllIi$$Hnsid w,yv FEB HVAC Fans Essential Chillers (150 ton)
'1 POP 05-80-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Rav. DRAFT
~
CONDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE SI TERMINATION CRITERIA t:
H cll conditions listed below occur. M GO TO OPCP05-EO-ES11. SI TERMINATION Step 1:
c.
RCS. subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 35'F (45'F]
b.
Total AFW flow to intact SGs - GREATER THAN 576 GPM DE NR level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 14% (34%)
e.
RCS pressure:
o GREATER THAN 1745 PSIG o STABLE OR INCREASING d.
Pressurizer level - GREATER THAN 8% [44%)
SI REINITIATION CRITERIA
(]
H EITHER condition listed below occurs. M manually ST ps.
- 0 o-RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs LESS THAN 35*46 E'
l; o Pressurizer level - LESS THAN 8% [44%)
l l.
$ECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA i
H cny unisolated SG pressure is decreasing in an htroJ1gd manner and NOT needed for RCS ccoldown. M GO TO OPOP05-EO-E020 FAUL'E{ ERATOR ISOLATION. Step 1.
E030 TRANSITION CRITERIA i i 8
H ANY SG 1evel increases in an uncontrolle manner D1
@g has abnormal radiation.
d GO TO PQf0)E0-E030. STEAM M manually START HHSI pumps, as necess, g;il![!g M
hij GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Step 1.
'ghiF h!
f/I Wiul T ^hp jg COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOYER CRITERIA d
(14%). M GO TO OPOP05-EO-ES13.
H RWST level decreases to LESS THAN 5.000 P
TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATIO 1.
APWST NAEEUP CRITERIA l
E AFWST level decreases to h$'
THA}(! $ K00Ql; ONS (26%). M INITIATE makeup to the AFW3TperOPOP02-AF-0001.AURIL{
gI3DW$71dLl! prevent inventory problems during cooldown.
tunI PUMP REATART CRTTE I ontth{!!g ed manner to LESS THAN 415 PSIG.
]
H RCS pressure decr g h in k M SIART the LHSgf ps to sup l water to the RCS.
Eh.
I PRESSURIZER PORY ISO Kp$ CRI 4
H cny pressurizer PORV'sh(g,.))sspse of high pressure M pressure is LESS T 2335 psig. M PERFORM t}ih bns of Step 9b.
SEQUENCER IAADINC VERIFICATION H a LOOP occurs. M PERFORM Addendum 4. Sequencer Loading Verification.
l RCP TRIP CRITERIA H BOTH conditions listed belor occur. M TRIP ALL RCPs.
l o HHSI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING o RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1495 PSIG I-
[
~ [ ~
~1 POP 05-E0-E010 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT '
Rsv. DRAFT CONDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE L755 0F EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION IE cmergency coolant recirculation is established and subsequently lost. IEEE GO TO OPOP05-EO-EC11, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION. Step 1.
M 4$pk.
flW b
kJgf@
q64p%>agr %
4/fgippNaap[?r p
g p
p!
36tyg '4g,
, y l
REPLIES TO QUESTIONS ON SBLOCA OPERATOR ACTION ATTACHMENT 3 SAMPLE TRAINING MATERIALS to aid discussion of proposed SBLOCA Operator Action 4
. =. -
Analysis of STPNOC Operator Action for Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Justification for the belief that " sufficient time is available for operators to 4
complete the required actions, verify system responses, diagnose any errors in performing the required operator actions, and to complete any recovery actions necessary.
Reference:
Letter from T.H. Clonninger to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated July 28,1998 (ST-NOC-AE-00151) Attachment 3; page 4 of 5, section IN Guideline 8.
1.
Operator Training to support lowering SG PORV setpo!nt:
Attached are pages 16 and 17 of the student handout for Initial Licensed Operator training lesson number LOT 202.44 " Qualified Display Processing System" (ODPS) Page 16 provides a graphical representation SG FORV control from either the Main Control Board (MCB) or the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP).
Page 17 describes the buttons which are used to adjust SG PORV setpoint.
The controller has to indicating pointers on the left side. The left pointer indicates actual steam pressure and the right pointer indicates SG PORV setpoint (
typically 1225 psig).
Operators are trained to call up the " PRl/SEC PRESS" screen on the ODPS display near the controller when adjusting SG PORV setpoints. The indications provided are on Figure 2.2-13 attached. NOTE: The values on Figure 2.2-13 are not expected values.
2.
Simulator Exercises Annual Simulator Examinations have demonstrated Operators abilities to complete required actions.
Attached is Licensed Operator Requalification Exam Scenario # 23. On page 7 of this scenario is a crew critical task " ENSURES THE FLOW FROM SG C IS ISOLATED". In order to meet this critical task the C SG PORV setpoint must be increased. For this years annual simulator exams alllicensed operators were distributed among 10 operating crews and 7 staff crews.. Nine of the 17 crews were evaluatea using scenarios that had this critical task and there were no failures.
Also, attached is Licensed Operator Requalification Exam Scenario # 15. This is a typical small break LOCA scenario that this new, Operator Action would be entered into as a crew critical task similar to 4.13 on page 10 of 13. This year 7 of the 17 crews were evaluated on small break LOOA scenarios and there were l
no failures.
l 3.
Implementation Process for EOP Action:
Attached (Figure 1.0) is an overview of the control room layout showing the minimum number of Licensed Operators that would be in the control room in the event of a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident.
The SS block displays the typical location of the Shift Supervisor (Senior Reactor Operator). This individual would be responsible for implementation of the Emergency Plan and monitoring control room activities.
The US block displays the typical location of the Unit Supervisor (Senior Reactor Operator). This individualis in a standing position on a raised platform. He would be facing to the left with the procedures open on a desk that is just above his waist level. The Unit Supervisor is responsible for directing the control board Reactor Operators to implement the procedure steps. Three way communications are required. He verbally identifies the responsible operator, reads the action step aloud, the RO repeats the step for clarity, and the US acknowledges that the RO understands the action needed or makes any needed correction. The RO completes the step and announces the step complete. The US repeats the step completed and the RO acknowledges that the US understands correctly the action that was done. The US then checks off the step completed and moves to the next step in the procedure.
The Secondary Operator would typically be assigned the action to lower the SG PORV setpoint on Control Panel 6. Figure 1.1 Expanded view of Control Panel 6 shows the locations of the A, B, C, & D SG PORV controllers, the 2 ODPS display screens, and the annunciator that would alarm if any SG PORV opens.
Figure 1.2 is a graphic of the SG PORV controller and the ODPS display screen.
Back to Figure 1.0, the STA block identifies the expected location of the Shift Technical Adv:sor. He is responsible for monitoring proper implementation of the procedures and for monitoring parameters associated with Critical Safety Functions.
4.
Probability of Failure to implement SG PORV selection.
The ability of Operating crews to use the Emergency Operating Procedures is l
evaluated annually. This evaluation includes criteria that they use the proper procedure in response to indicated symptoms. Therefore it is valid to assume
.n a-e 4
m w
d that they willimplement procedure, OPOP05-EO E010 " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant".
In order for them not implement the SG PORV setpoint reduction, the US would have to miss the step in the procedure and the SS, STA, SO, and PO would have to not realize that the step had baen missed. This is a very low probability.
5.
Probability of improper performance:
The Secondary Operator is in close proximity to both the STA and US when assigned the action to lower SG PORV setpoints. This activity requires manipulation of four separate controllers. When lowering the setpoint it would be expected that, the valve would open causing the "SG PORV NOT CLOSED" alarm, and the affected steam generator pressure would start to decrease.
There is little probability that improper operation would go unnoticed by the SO, US, and STA.
6.
Assuming the action is not performed and it is not corrected what happens?
The STA is responsible for monitoring Critical Safety Functions and all QDPS displays and multiple computer monitors also display the status of critical safety functions.
When sufficient coolant inventory is lost to cause a Core Exit Thermocouple to reach 708 degrees F. The C on the QDPS screens will go reverse video and on the computer monitoring screens it will turn yellow. This will require implementation of OPOP05-EO FRC2 " Response to inadequate Core Cooling".
Step 9 of this procedure would require depressunzation of all SGs by manual opening of SG PORVs.
r e-.
_>-,,n
l LOT 202.44.HO.01 Rev. 8 Page 17 cf 53
'Ihis system provides full valve control in either manual or auto and from either the main control room or the ASP. It receives field inputs from a SG pressure transmitter and the valve position feedback transmitter. It also receives inputs from the Control transfer switch and the appropriate OIM manual / auto str. tion.
If SG PORV control is in automatic the system will receive signals fmm a pressure setpoint on the OIM controller.
l If SG PORV control is in manual the system will receive signals from valve position demanded setpoint l
on the OIM cont uller.
This system compares inputs from OIM station with field inputs and sends an output to valve controller.
The pressure setpoint may be changed at OIM by depressing the SP pushbutton and simultaneously depressing either the raise or lower pushbutton.
- 1 APCis Removed from Service All data on the #2 APC will not be displayed on the QDPS plasma displays, however the SG Pory will still operate in the proper manner.
- 2 APCis RESET Valve demand position will go to zero.
System resets to manual control Automatic SG pressure setpoint will reset to its default value (1225 psig).
Alllights on the OIM will go off.
l When re-energized System resets to manual control Automatic SG pressure setpoint will reset to its default value.
LOT 202.44.HO.01 Rev. 8 Page 16 of 53 The RESET pushbutton is used to reset the microprocessor. When this button is depressed system operation will halt and the system will first enter the initialization mode and then look at the W/R paddle switch and enter either the online or offline mode.
The MONITOR pushbutton is not presently used.
CLASS 1E CONTROL The following Class IE process control functions are performed in the upper cabinet of #2 APC:
4 Automatic and manual control of the SG PORVs.
Contact output signals for control of each AFW throttle valve.
Manual control of the Reactor vessel head vent valves.
SG PORY Control (Figure 9)
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VTD.W120-0300 R/0 PRI/SEC PRESS 06/04/91 11:32:26 PRESS RCS/SG A RCS/SG B RCS/SG C RCS/SG D 3000 -
3000 l
2600 -
2600 2200 -
2200 1000 -
1800 PSIG PSIG 1400 -
- 1400 1000 _
!_1ma 600 -
3 - 600 200 -
-- 200 0_
-0 RCS PRESS 4LO 4LO 4LO 4LO PSIG SG PRESS 1201 1202 1203 1204 PSIG PRI-SEC DP -1211 4LO 4LO
-1214 PSI DIFF SG PORV SETPT 200 100 800 0
PSIG SMHP2Il APC STATUS DPU-R DPU-C SOURCE ALME A-aK B-OK C-uK D-oK H-oK OK OK DPU-A SEE DIAG PAGE SECHDRY PRIMARY Figure 2.2-13.
Pri/Sec Press Page i
l t:24171 A.wpf:1b472994 2.2-26 Rev. 8 085
1 LRS023.00 Rev.2 Page 2 of11 t
l LICENSED REQUALIFICATION SCENARIO 023 i
t 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
Plant power is 27%. #11 MFP is in service. All controls are in automatic (eccept control rods).
Secondary cleanup is stillin progress.
2.0 SCENARIO OVERVIEW:
The contolling feedwater flow channel for S/G "C" regulating valve fails low, which requires the operator to take manual control of the feedwater regulating valve.
Soon after the crew responds to the feedflow channel failure, a small Stean Generator Tube Leak of approximately 20 gpm occurs. The operators respond to the leak in acc ordance with OPOP04-RC-0004, Steam Generator Tube Leakage.
A compensation voltage failure ofIR Channel 36 dictates manual energization of SR HV.
A SBLOCA occurs during the shutdown causing the SG leak to become s. 500 gpm SGTR.
The scenario is terminated when the crew commences RCS cooldown to cold shutdown at less than 100%/hr in EC31.
3.0 OBJECTIVES
Obtain the current objectiver from the VISION database. Verify CRO, SRO, and STA objectives are included.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 OPOP04-RC-0004 Steam Generator Tube Leak Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby 4.2 OPOP03-ZG-0006 4.3 OPOP04-FW-0001 Loss of Steam Generator Level Control Excessive RCS Leakage 4.4 OPOP04-RC-0003 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 4.5 OPOP05-EO-E000 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.6 OPO?05-EO-EO30 SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery 4.7 OPOP05-EO-EC31 Desired 5.0 COMMITMENTS AND INDUSTRY EVENTS:
5.1 None L.R S 2 3 2 C c a n 6/ lS, p, g (3 ef fst m s/vCeh E 'A' b--
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(iS64 I G**"'f 3 as wmp TMCR:98 EXAM 11/19/1998
LRS023.00 Rev.2 Page 3 of 11 6.0 MALFUNCTION INDEX AND SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOM PROGRAMMING GUIDE PLANT CONDITIONS: 25% power PLANNED EVOLUTIONS: Raise oower to 100%
TIME MALFUNCTION OR MANIPULATION MALFUNCTION VALUL t+[]
DESCRIPTION ID.
O Restore to 25% powerIC l
0 IR CH 36 UNDER COMPENSATED 01-35-02 T
5 LOSS OF FEED FLOW SIGNAL SG C 08-15-03 T
i 5
STEAM GEN TUBE LEAK - SG C (20 gpm) 05-03-03 0.03 15 SBLOCA(five minute ramp) 02-01-02 0.003 COND SGTR 1C (500 GPM) 05-03-03 0.7 (RX TRIP)
(after reactor trip) 7.0 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS / RESPONSES CUE INSTRUCTOR RESPONSE ACTION 1 Execute LP LRS023 (USER: Irs 021)
ACTION 2 Trigger Step I when crew takes the watch.
When Chem Analysis is Any SG samples will show increased activity in only SG C. Activity levels of l
called greater than LLD indicate that SG C has at least greater than.0035 gpm primary to secondary leakage.
Ifasked A quantitative analysis is in progress to APPROXIMATE leak rate (steady state conditions are necessary to give accurate results).
After 20 min. report that a gross estimate of 28000 gpd (20 gpm) leakage exists in SG C.
i TMCR:98 EXAM !1/19/1998 l
LRS033.00 Rev. 2 Page 4 of11 8.0 MALFUNCTIONS AND EXPECTED RESPONSES NOTES:
1.
Critical Tasks are identified by CT on the Malfunction Sheets.
SSC IR CH 36 UNDER COMPENSATED N/A POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE PO 1.1 Diagnose under-compensation ofIR channel 36.
STA 1.2 Evaluate plant conditions and confirms the crew is aware that IR channel N-36 is under-compensated and that the SR will have to be manually energized.
CREW 1.3 MANUALLY ENERGIZES SOURCE RANGE NIs WHEN IR CT CHANNEL 35 IS LESS THAN E-10 AMPS.
STA 1.4 Evaluate plant conditions and confirms that the SR channels are manually energized when N-35 indicates less than E-10 amps.
US 1.5 Begin investigation ofIR channel 36 compensation problem by informing I&C.
SSC FAILURE OF FEEDWATER FLOW CONTROL CHANNEL POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE SO 21 Acknowledges and announces annunciators 6M04 B2, SG IC LVL DEV HI/LO; 6M04-E3, SG IC STM/FW flow MSMTCH. (others as applicable)
US 2.2 Directs operators to trip the reactor if SG level decreases to 35%.
SO 2.3 Takes manual control of FRV and restores SG level.
STA 2.4 Evaluates plant conditions and ensures that the crew enters OPOP04-FW-0001, due to a failure feedflow channel SG C.
US 2.5 Refers to 0 POP 04-FW-0001, and directs actions of PO/SO to restore parameters.
STA 2.6 Reports values of steam flow, feed flow, and SG level as requested by the US.
I TMCR:98 EXAM 11/19/1998
LRS023.00 Rev.2 Page 5 cf11 1
SSC STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 074.01 POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE SO 3.1 Identify steam generator tube leak based on increased charging flow coincident with increased steamline or blowdown radiation levels and steam flow / feed flow mismatch to affected steam generator, i
US 3.2 Enter OPOP04-RC-0004, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE, and direct operator actions.
STA 3.3 Evaluate plant conditions and confirms the crew enters OPOP04 RC-0004 for a SG tube leak in SG C.
SO 3.4 When directed, isolate blowdown from affected SG.
PO 3.5 Control and monitor CVCS charging and letdown to keep PRZR level greater than 17%. Maintain VCT level greater than 15%.
STA 3.6 Monitors pressurizer pressure & level and SG C level & SF-FF for signs of an increase in the size of the leak.
US 3.7 Direct performance of POP 03-ZG-0006, Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby, concurrently with tube leak procedure.
PO/SO 3.8 Perform shutdown at.5 percent / min SO 3.9 Maintains affected SG level between 55-60%
US 3.10 Notify Chem Analysis that reactor power will be decreased greater than 15% in any one hour period.
US 3.11 Notify Chem Analysis to sample SGs for activity.
US 3.12 Notify Health Physics to survey the secondary plant.
US 3.13 Notify Chem Ops to monitor Oily Waste and Condensate Polisher discharges.
SO 3.14 Place SUFP in PTL prior to tripping any MFP to prevent inadvertent start of SUFP.
PO/SO 3.15 Verify PR Low Power Trip and IR High Flux level status lights OFF when reactor power is less than 25%.
SO 3.16 Secure LP HTR Drip and MSR Drip pumps when generator load is less than 262 MWe.
PO/SO 3.17 Maintains SG NR level in the normal range while transferring feedwater to the LPRVS.
PO 3.18 Control Tavg within 1 F of Tref with rods and,or boron while reducing turbine load.
1MCR:9tEXAM 11/19/1998
LRS033.00 Rev.2 Page 6 Ef11 SSC REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK 077.01 POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE I
PO 4.1 Responds to annunciators 4M06-D7, PRZR DEV LO B/U HTRS ON; 4M06-F8, PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLKD.
US 4.2 Refers to OPOP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage, and directs applicable steps.
STA 4.3 Evaluates plant conditions and confirms the crew enters OPOP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage.
l l
PO 4.4 Starts a second charging pump if necessary.
PO/SO 4.5 Observes containment parameters.
STA 4.6 Monitors parameters as requested by the US or SS.
l US 4.7 Directs a manual reactor trip and SI based on pressurizer level and pressure l
trends. (should be done iflevel decreases to < 8% or prior to auto SI)
US 4.8 Enters and directs actions of EOOO.
PO 4.9 Verifies reactor trip.
SO 4.10 Verifies turbine trip.
PO 4.11 Verifies power to AC ESF Buses.
l SSC RESPOND TO A SGTR USING EC31 177.01 POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE US 5.1 Transitions to E030, SGTR.
STA 5.2 Evaluate plant conditions and ensures that the crew makes the proper transition to EO30, SGTR STA 5.3 Begins and continues to report the status of Critical Safety Functions when crew transitions to EO30, SGTR SO 5.4 Identifies Ruptured SG as SG C.
STA 5.5 Evaluate plant conditions and ensures that crew correctly diagnoses that a SG l
tube leak has occurred on SG C.
l SO 5.6 When directed, adjusts SG C PORV setpoint to between 1260-1265 psig and places the PORV in auto.
TMCR:98 EXAM 11/19/1998
~
LRS023.00 Rev.3 Page 7 Cf11 SSC RESPOND TO A SGTR USING EC31 (Cont'd) 177.01 POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE CREW 5.7
' 77 CT FLOW TO SG C IS ISOLATED.
STA 5.8 Informs the Unit Supervisor of current CSF status PO 5.9 When directed, resets SI, SI AUTO RECIRC, ESF Load Sequencers, Phase A and B.
PO 5.10 When directed, restores instrument air to containment.
SO 5.11 Blocks the LOW STEAMLINE PRESSURE SI when RCS < 1985 psig.
CREW 5.12
- PROPERLY SELECT AND MAINTAIN TARGET TEMPERATURE CT FOR COOLDOWN BASED ON TIIE CIIART PROVIDED IN E030.
STA 5.13 Monitors / Logs / Records cooldown to required temperature as requested by the Unit Supervisor PO 5.14 When directed, establishes charging flow.
SO 5.15 Reports that Ruptured SG pressure less than 250 psig above intact SGs, (RNO step 19 ofEO30).
US 5.16 Transitions to EC31, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, and directs PO/SO actions.
STA 5.17 Evaluate plant conditions and confirms the crew makes the transition to OPOP05-EO-EC31, SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired.
CREW 5.18 Commences a cooldown to Cold Shutdown at less than 100%/hr.
US 5.19 Direct the STA to monitor shutdown margin to determine it is greater than required.
SS 5.20 Classifies the event according to the E-Plan as an ALERT based on a loss of the RCS, one fission product banier.
TMCR:98 EXAM i1/19/1998
~..
LRS023.00 Rev.2 i
Page 8 of11 l
9.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA EVALUATION
~
POSITION STEP EXPECTED RESPONSE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SAT /
4 UNSAT CREW l.3 MANUALLY ENERGIZES ENERGlZES SOURCE SOURCE RANGE NIs RANGE Nis AFTER THE WHEN IR CHANNEL 35 IS FIRST P-6 LIGHT IS IN.
LESS THAN E-10 AMPS.
CREW 5.7
- ENSURES THE FLOW ISOLATES FEEDWATER FROM SG C IS FLOWINTO AND STEAM ISOLATED AND THAT FLOW FROM THE i
AFW FLOW TO SG C IS RUPTURED SG. BEFORE ISOLATED.
TRANSITION TO EC31 OCCURS.
4 CREW 5.12
- PROPERLY SELECT PROPERLY SELECT AND i
AND MAINTAIN MAINTAIN TARGET
]
TARGET TEMPERATURE FOR TEMPERATURE FOR COOLDOWN PRIOR TO COOLDOWN P ? SED ON TRANSION FROM E030.
THE CHART PRCTIDED IN E030.
NOTE:
Acceptance Criteria MUST be evaluated as Satisfactory (S) or Unsatisfactory (U).
I
- Denotes Safety Significance i
TMCR:9BEXAM 11/19/1998
LRS023.00 Rev.2
~
Page 9 of11 i
SHIFT SUPERVISOR TURNOVER SHEET Plant poweris 27%.
- 11 MFP is in service.
All controls are in automatic (except control rods).
Secondary Cleanup is still in progress.
TMCR:98 EXAM 11/19/1998
. ~.. -.. -. - -. -. -. -
l LRS023.00 Rev.2 Page 10 of11 I
UNIT SUPERVISOR TURNOVER SHEET Plant poweris 27%.
- 11 MFP is in service.
i All controls are in automatic (except control rods).
Secondary Cleanup is still in progress.
t I
l l
h i
TMCR:98 EXAM 11/19/1998
.. ~
s LRS023.00 Rev.2 l
Page 11 of11 l
l l
REACTOR OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET Plant poweris 27%.
- 11 MFP is in service.
All controls are in automatic (except control rods).
Secondary Cleanup is still in progress.
l.
j l
l l
l l
TMCR:98 EXAM 11/19/1998
LRS015.00 Rev. 3 Page 2 of 13 LICENSED REQUALIFICATION SCENARIO 015 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
The unit is at 75% power. Scheduled evolutions are to increase power to 100%.
2.0 SCENARIO OVERVIEW:
"D" S/G feed regulating valve is stuck in its present position. The crew should enter OPOP04-FW-0001, Loss of Steam Generator Level Control.
Loop B Tc fails high. The crew should enter OPOP04-RP-0004, Failure Of RCS Loop RTD.
A small break LOCA occurs and it is discovered that the reactor will not trip.
The is terminated after transition to ES12, and the SS has classified the event.
Obtain the current objectives from the VISION database. Verify CRO, SRO, and STA objectives are included.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 OPOP03-ZG-0005 Plant Stanup to 100%
4.2 OPOPO4-FW-0001 Loss of Steam Generator Level Control Failure of RCS Loop RTD 4.3 OPOP04-RP-0004 Excessive RCS Leakage 4.4 OPOP04-RC-0003 Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby 4.5 OPOP03-ZG-0006 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 4.6 OPOP05-EO-EOOO Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 4.7 OPOP05-EO-EO10 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 4.8 OPOP05-EO-ES12 5.0 COMMITMENTS AND INDUSTRY EVENTS:
5.1 None FhM6 R.W D 4 0 7ll L A S~
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l TMCR:98 EXAM 7/lW98
e LRSO15.00 Rev. 3 Page 3 of 13 6.0 MALFUNCTION INDEX AND SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR PROGRAMMING GUIDE i
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
i PLANT CONDITIONS: 75% oower l
PLANNED EVOLUTIONS: Increase oower to 100%
TIME MALFUNCTION OR MANIPULATION MALFUNCTION VALUE t+[ ]
DESCRIPTION ID.
i O
Restore to 75% PowerIC O
Execute LP LRS-15 User: LRS011 O
ATWS-No Trip on Trip Signal 01-12-02 T
- i PENDING PCC PROT SET DOOR OPEN (21Ml-A1)
LA21M1-A-1 3
j PENDING LO-LO Tavg LOOP 2 01-23-06 T
PENDING LO Tavg LOOP 2 01-23-02 T
PENDING OP/DT REACTOR TRIP LOOP 2 01-224)2 T
f PENDING OP/DT RUNBACK LOOP 2 01-22-06 T
l PENDING OT/DT REACTOR TRJP LOOP 2 01-22-10 T
}
PENDING OT/DT RUNBACK LOOP 2 01-22-14 T
O MAIN FW REG VALVE STUCK FCV-554 08-17-04 T
I 8
RTD FAILS COLD LEG B TT-420B 02-26-02 1.0 J
15 SBLOCA (5 MINUTE RAMP) 02 01-02 0.003 SIMULATOR SETUP IC 2
LESSON PLAN USER LRS011 ACTION 1 Trigger Step 1 after the crew has the watch.
TMCR:98 EXAM 7/14/98
LRS015.00 Rev. 3 Page 4 of 13 STEP 1 ATWS (hidden) 00:00:00 Instr Description ID/
Value Ramp Delay Ins /
Action Location Pend 1
ATWS-No Trip on Trip Signal Malfunctions, True 00:00:00 00:00:00 Ins RX Prot & ESF
- Act, 01-12-02 STEP 2 Loop B Tc Bistables to Pending 00:00:05 Instr Description ID/
Value Ramp Delay Ins /
Action Location Pend 1
LO-LO Tavg LOOP 2 Bistables, True 00:00:00 00:00:00 Pend
- RCS, 01-23-06 2
LO Tavg LOOP 2 Bistables, True 00:00:00 00:00:00 Pend
- RCS, 01-23-02 3
OP/DT REACTOR TRIP LOOP Bistables, Tnie 00:00:00 00:00:00 Pend 2
- RCS, 01-22-02 4
OP/DT RUNBACK LOOP 2 Bistables, True 00:00:00 00:00:00 Pend
- RCS, i
01-22-06 5
OT/DT REACTOR TRIP LOOP Bistables, True 00:00:00 00:00:00 Pend 2
- RCS, 01-22-10 6
OT/DT RUNBACK LOOP 2 Bistables, True 00:00:00 00:00:00 Pend
- RCS, 01-22-14 7
PCC PROT SET DOOR OPEN Malfunctions, 3
00:00:00 00:00:00 Pend (21MI-A1)
Annunc Windows, LA21Ml-A-1 J
I 1NCR:98 EXAM 7/14/98
-. - -. - -. -. - -. _. ~... - _. -... - -
LRSO15.00 Rev. 3 Page 5 of 13 STEP 3 Feed Reg Valve D Sticks 00:00:05 Instr Description ID/
Value Ramp Delay Ins /
Action Location Pend 1
MAIN FW REG VALVE STUCK Malfunctions, True 00:00:00 00:00:00 Ins FCV-554 Main FW, 08-17-04 STEP 4 Loop B Tc Falls High 00:00:05 Instr Description ID/
Value Ramp Delay Ins /
Action Location Pend 1
RTD FAILS COLD LEO B TT-Malfunctions, 1.0 00:00:00 00:08:00 Ins 420B RCS Page 1, 02-26-02 STEP 5 SB LOCA (five min ramp) 00:00:05 Instr Description ID/
Value Ramp Delay Ins /
Action Location Pend 1
RCS COLD LEG BREAK LP B Malfunctions, 0.003 00:05:00 00:15:00 Ins RCS Page 1, 02-01-02 7.0 INSTRUCTOR RESPONSES / ACTIONS CUE INSTRUCTOR RESPONSE When required Deactivate LA21M1-A-1 when the bistables have been tripped.
When P/O sent to check Report valve NOT moving. Air supply intact to operator.
FRV.
When P/O directed to After three minutes, delete ATWS malfunction and report that trip breakers open trip breakers, were successfully opened locally.
TMCR:98 EXAM 7/14/98 L
e l
LRS015.00 Rev.3 l
^
Page 6 of 13 1
8.0 MALFUNCTIONS AND EXPECTED RESPONSES l
NOTES:
1 1.
Critical Tasks are identified by Cr on the Malfunction Sheets.
1 l
SSC MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILS TO RESPOND 052.01 POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE SO 1.1 Responds to annunciators: SG ID LVL DEV HI/LO and STM/FW FLOW l
MSMTCH as applicable.
US 1.2 Enters OPOP04-FW-0001, Loss of Steam Generator Level Control, and directs operator actions.
STA 1.3 Evaluates plant conditions and confirms the crew enters FW-0001.
CREW 1.4 REDUCES TURBINE LOAD TO MEET FEEDWATER CAPABILITIES CT AND STABILIZE SG D LEVEL.
US 1.5 Directs / ensures that turbine load is reduced to meet feedwater capabilities and stabilize S/G D level.
STA 1.6 Monitors parameters as requested by the US or SS.
US 1.7 Dispatches personnel to investigate the problem with SG D FRV.
US 1.8 Initiates corrective action to repair stuck FRV.
t J
TMCR:98 EXAM 7/l4/98 4
LRS015.00 Rev. 3 Page 7 of 13
)
i SSC RTD FAILS HIGH 129.01 POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE PO 2.1 Acknowledges annunciators: AUCT TAVG HI, TREF /AUCT TAVG DEV, DT/AUCT DT DEV, TAVG/AUCT TAVG DEV, PRZR LEVEL DEV LO.
I US 2.2 Directs / ensures performance of applicable steps of OPOP04-RP-0004, Failure of RCS LOOP RTD Protection Channel.
STA 2.3 Evaluates plant conditions and confirms the crew enters OPOP04-RP-0004.
PO 2.4 Ensures Rod Controlis in Manual.
j PO 2.5 Accurately reports the identity of the failed channel.
f PO 2.6 Takes manual control of pressurizer level as necessary to maintain program value and restores control to automatic when appropriate.
j PO
, 2.7 Defeats the failed RTD channel.
)
US/SS 2.8 Refers to Technical Specifications to determine applicability.
l STA 2.9 Confirms entry into appropriate Technical Specifications and discusses with j
the US if any differences are noted.
f US/SS 2.10 Notifies I&C to trip associated bistables.
i i
)
SSC ATWS (1K1 AND IL1 BREAKER TRIP - FUNCTIONAL) 173.01 POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE i
CREW 3.1
- MANUALLY TRIPS THE REACTOR FROM THE CONTROL CT ROOM.
CREW 3.2 DISPATCHES P/O TO LOCALLY OPEN REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS.
STA 3.3 Evaluates plant conditions and confirms crew is aware of failure of reactor trip system to operate as designed.
US 3.4 Directs / ensures that the reactor is tripped per E000, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
htCR:98 EXAM 7/14/98
LRS015.00 Rev. 3
^
Page 8 of 13 SSC SBLOCA 077.01 POSITION EXPECTED RE"PONSE PO 4.1 Acknowledges and announces annunciat rs 4M06-D7, PRZR DEV LO B/U HTRS ON; 4M06-F8, PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLKD.
US 4.2 Refers to OPOP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage, and directs the supplemental steps.
STA 4.3 Evaluates plant conditions and ensures that the crew enters OPOP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage.
PO 4.4 Starts a second charging pump when directed.
PO/SO 4.5 Reports the values of containment parameters.
STA 4.6 Reports the values of parameters as requested by the US or SS.
CREW 4.7 MANUALLY ACTUATES AT LEAST ONE TRAIN OF SI-ACTUATED CT SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT US 4.8 Accurately reports the REACTOR TRIPPED..
SO 4.9 Accurately reports the turbine trip.
PO 4.10 Accurately reports the availability of power to AC ESF Buses.
PO/SO 4.11 Accurately reports that the SI is actuated.
PO/SO 4.12 Accurately reports that ECCS components have responded properly.
CREW 4.13
- TRIPS ALL RCPS WHEN TRIP CRITERIA IS MET.
CT STA 4.14 Evaluates plant conditions and ensures that the crew is aware of RCP Trip Criteria.
PO/SO 4.15 MAINTAINS total AFW Flow to intact SGs greater than 576 GPM while all SG levels are less than 14% [34%] NR.
US 4.16 Transitions to E010, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
STA 4.17 Ev1_.es plant conditions and ensures that the crew makes the transition to EO10.
STA 4.18 Begins and continues to report the status of Critical Safety Functions when the crew transitions to E010.
US 4.19 DIRECTS closeere of PZR PORV, if not done earlier.
SO 4.20 Reports that SG secondary pressure boundaries are intact.
STA 4.21 Informs the Unit Supervisor of current CSF Status TMCR:98 EXAM 7/14/98
LRS015.00 Rev. 3 Page 9 of 13 4
j SSC REACTOR CGOLANT SYSTEM LEAK, cont.
077.01
+
POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE 4
STA 4.22 Evaluates plant conditions and ensures the crew is aware when adverse i
containment values are in effect.
PO 4.23 Resets SI, ESF Load Sequencers, Containment Isolation Phase A & B, &
j establishes IA to containment when directed.
PO 4.24 Places Spent Fuel Pool Cooling in service when directed.
1 PO 4.25 Places containment H2 monitoring system in service and determines that H2 recombiners should not be placed in service.
PO 4.26 Establishes charging flow and maintains greater than 8%[43%] when directed.
US 4.27 Transitions to ESI1 c: ES12, based on conditions.
j STA 4.28 Evaluates plant conditions and confirms the crew makes the transition to ESI1 or ES12.
4
)
i 4
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TMCR:98 EXAM 7/14/98
LRS015.00 Rev.3 j
Page 10 of 13 i
9.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA EVALUATION l
l POSITION STEP EXPECTED RESPONSE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SAT /
UNSAT l
CREW l.4 REDUCES TURBINE THE REACTOR DOES NOT i
LOAD TO MEET TRIP ON LO-LO SG LEVEL.
FEEDWATER CAPABILITIES AND 4
STABILIZE SG D LEVEL.
f CREW 3.1
- MANUALLY TRIPS MANUALLY TRIP THE THE REACTOR REACTOR FROM THE IROM THE CONTROL ROOM BEFORE i
CONTROL ROOM.
COMPLETING STEP 1 OF j
EOOO.
I CREW 4.7 MANUALLY ACTUATES MANUALLY ACTUATES AT 1
AT LEAST ONE TRAIN LEAST ONE TRAIN OF SI-OF SI-ACTUATED ACTUATED SAFEGUARDS SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT BEFORE:
j EQUIPMENT.
PZR LVL REACHES 0%.
4
- AUTO SI CREW 4.13
- TRIPS ALL RCPS TRIPS ALL RCPS WHEN 3
WHEN TRIP TRIP CRITERIA IS MET, i
CRITERIA IS MET PRIOR TO TRANSION OUT l
OF EO10.
NOTE:
Acceptance Criteria MUST be evaluated as Satisfactory (S) or Unsatisfactory (U).
- denotes SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE l
TMCR:98 EXAM 7/14/98
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LRS015.00 Rev.3 Page 11 of 13 SHIFT SUPERVISOR TURNOVER SHEET Mode 1,75% for 15 days now.
All surveillances complete IAW daily schedule.
Increase Power to 100% IAW OPOP03-ZG-0005 4
i J-TMCR:98 EXAM 7/1#98
y LRS015.00 Rev.3 Page 12 of 13 UNIT SUPERVISOR TURNOVER SHEET I
Mode 1,75% for 15 days now.
All surveillances complete IAW daily schedule.
j Increase Power to 100% IAW OPOP03-ZG-0005 i
TMCR:98 EXAM 7/1488 I
+
3 LRS015.00 Rev.3 Page 13 of 13 1
.w REACTOR OPERATORTURNOVER SHEET Mode 1,75% for 15 days now.
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