Text

Rev 1 to Calculation SEWS T-39-002, Diesel Oil Storage Tank T-39-002
	ML20198H367
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	08/27/1998
From:	; GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20198H339	List: ML20198H333; ML20198H367; ML20198H396; ML20198H453; ML20198H483; ML20198J883;
References
	REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC SEWS-T-39-002, SEWS-T-39-002-R01, SEWS-T-39-2, SEWS-T-39-2-R1, NUDOCS 9812290326
	Download: ML20198H367 (25)
	v • d • e

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99-09-98 14:44:59 yg .3 rQQ slb Revision 2 Corrected, 6/28/91 Status Y N U SCREENING EVALUATION. WORK SHEET ($EWS) Sheet 1of[3. Equip. ID No. f-3f-Mf-Equip. Class 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchanoers Equipment Description b/ESEl-fae*NERATor ft4EL-o f L-Sfb4A fa E fAA/K Location: Bldg. AfrB Floor E1. /8' 4" _ Room, Row / Col l Manufacturer Model, Etc. (optional) AMEX. WAuJrt/Al. f'EcgA/oe-o(f y M *P E L- - VfAMAL rYrc p Buckling capacity of shell of large, flat-bottom, vertical tank is equal to or greater than demand: @N U N/A ses c.es.c u usria m M ArTAcs'M &4 Y A ANCHOR.nol.T5 AND.EMEDMENT Capacity of anchor bolts and their embedra:ts is equal to or greater than demand: hN U N/A Sea cAs-ceSe #rYOUS /N hr4 * " Y CDetlECTION BET M DI ANCHOR. BOLTS A B SHELI, Capacity of comp.-tions between the anchor bolts and the tant shell is equal to or greater than the demand: @N U N/A AE6 CAL cw ee rtom IH brrAce SJ r A FLEXIBILITY OF ATTACHED PIPIM Attached piping has adequate flexibility to accongedate action of large, flat-bottom, vertical tank: sig, as7s 2,/f Y hu N/A TAM FOU MATION Ring-type foundation 'is not used to support large, YN U N/A flat-bottan, vertical tank,, YhU 15 EQUIPMENT SE1SMICALLY ADE00 ATE 7 A rr p 8.21-1 6-9 g 0 L i

09-O'9-98 14:44:59 2-4 700 h [ g f/Whf Revision 2, rrected 6/28/91 SCREENIIIE EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS) Sheet 2 of Equip. ID Mo. I"'3f-oo2-Equip. C1 ass 21 - Tanks 'and Heat Exchanaers Equipment Description CINEIENTS i 1. TANK OL7st/U /NCL UO/MG-A MCNef Bel.ro 4No CA,fAtas co4Fonns n osa. os2 Acv.s Aivo o p-j tacy,4, 2= ffW AMD O!S6/4tcir Lid 4.5 JUpg,So gogggg, MAy, gaskig lMd$r 4&ovi-60 71 0F TANK = 3 (ppit,) App 3'/g* (cysw.) t ~ IM413-off51.7 s Bi*., Vf471 CAL.pNrou~.r Eg" ga plu,. List. To Finsr sys: soar ( gu op,y ~ lheit, Offstr

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~. '.09-0N-9814:44:59 y,~ h ebh Revision 2 Corrected, 6/28/91 Sheet I of 2 Exhibit 5-1 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) 1. OUTLIER IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION, AND LOCATION Equipment ID Number r-2 7-d p A Equipment Class A/ Equipment Location: Building.d&d Floor Elevation /B'- / Base Elevation /B '- t ' Room or Row / Column Equipaent Description.bi&SeL G6dEAAf0A. FR EL O/L S/DAMnF 7Aax. 2. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.) Mechanical and Electrical Eauinment Tanks and Heat Exchancers Capacity vs. Demand Shell Buckling' Caveats 7 Anchor Bolts and Embedment Anchorage Anchorage Connections Seismic Interaction Flexibility of Attached Piping!. Other Other Cable and Conduit Raceways Essential Relavs Inclusion Rules Capacity vs. Demand Other Seismic Performance Concerns Mounting, Type, Limited Analytical Review Location Other Other 1 Shell buckling and flexibility of attached piping only apply to large, flat-bottom, vertical tanks. b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy): Aloetts A/3 diet To F W s A/?^sret pha~ /N ADEGu os rc F f 5 4 / d / L / 7 Y / / M 6 /.T FLieH&ee Ar Top or rMax kb A v a's .bixscrt y 7 o" SourW HAU_ WNMG YMr LsHE ff AddAbd#b 6steerdQ /N 4Aa. 5-10 I I 4 8

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OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) l l Equipment ID Number 7-31-0 02. 3. PROPOSED METHOD OF OLJTLIER RESOLUTION (OPTIONAL) a. Define proposed method (s) for resolving outlier. Ar heu /Ga reArres/ ftAar ettm/aswas e MArswAv heowa.h Na tte.ar. b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundemntal frequency). - un' " sv!f ne bh 4 l M 8Dietc.a.w o o AT WALL NE:MATso ) e pt.gTED iu Ac.c.o h ed wrTw 1kmC 3 E -6 62-22-oe / sw.AVA s M mhhs m, M,eAL. wh/n 4. CERTIFICATION: The information on this'0SVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to l be verified for seismic adequacy: Approved'by: (For Equipment Classes #0 - #22, all the Seismic Capability Engineers on the seismic Review Team ($RT) should sign; there should be at least two on the SRT. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer. For Relays, the Lead Relay Reviewer should sign.) l Sh*D5tn C. Ehub e ed h 4 -f 7 --f3 Print or Type Name Signature Date t/oL. WHilt* dlA4/ V /4 - V -f Y Print or Type Name Signature Date Print or Type Name Signature Date 5-11 e e

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7_ '.09-0$-9814:44:59 i2 #q' M Calculation Sheet ArrAcHmgar A. autvect Calc No. Rev.No. Shost No. fp A S of J f, % Dieset. 014.srosses raiox 7:31-oo:n. SM 7::39.ao1. o %n== oei. mw o 6-//-f3 d(,6(/ /6*V-'TY sre,o s beremme rus we saw w.a. 1 1 Stam FMetu 7.3, hite g :.;? It h/b fy// o.oo3L d2 ' = 0 74 G 'id Sag 0 76x lllsuo.n 0 /9 = /S255 As. = = frt/ 4 .Dera wue rws Anss i:vuruaams Moonsor (#) i%n fiduAs 7~f,kn# N/se =.;? n,, dp = 0 oo.22 j M'r C. f o l M '(JJ x d s 2 ) M = 9 1 0 *V (no.roo x /72 z V' x o /2) = /392,423 19 >~ /4 s I

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#id3r A7 of N origi[0 /fh&b 8-796 JLW V on U 11 oste Reviewed by STEP 8: Too Plate Evaluation The Diesel Generator Oil Fuel Oil Storage tank at Oyster Cree'k has the type of anchor bolt chair shown in Figure 7 6a of the GlP. This chair type, the " inverted chelf',is shown to be an acceptable method of transferring the anchor bolt loads to the storage tank wall. Steps 811 of the GlP were developed for the typical chair type, that is with the horizontal plate between stiffener plates to be on top of thrin. On page 2-34 of Reference 9 EPRI states that the GlP procedures are focused on the typical chair configuration (i.e. horizontal plate on top) and similar checks on details need to be performed on other types of connections (e.g. the attemate chair type as shown in Figure 7-6a of the GIP).

The GIP analysis uses the AISI approach to evaluate the horizontal plate bending stress. It assumes a prismatic beam the width of the distance from the outside edge of the bolt hole to the free edge of the plate. The beam is considered to have partial fixity at the supports caused by the stiffeners The horizontal plate for the diesel fuel oil Storage tank at Oyster Creek is welded all around the tank base reinforcement pad. Therefora it is conservative to check the bending of the plate using the AISI equation as follows. P "g(0.375 g - 0.22.d) S<F to be acceptable / Sm y fc / p.h \\ yo W \\ J Y4 \\ /, & ok \\ A .[ N n f q;= P u := 6.43.idp Bolt tension capacity IN ; 't' d4 f := 1.125.in Outside of plate to edge of bolt hole. pgg c := $ in Base plate thickness, use c = 0.75 In as the thickness as that is I 4 the thickness of the chair base p! ate and reinforcing pad. g := 7 in Distance between stiffeners. d := 3 in Anchor bolt diameter. l 4 F y := 38 ksi The yield strength of the tank. S = 25.0 ksi F y = 38 ksi } Plate stress OK Fuelos haCo Paon 1 h N0016110-88) s

09-Ob-9814:44.59 \\G Wmucts g g Criculadon Sheet &~** 4 e Subsect D/ar6dr 6 a>JeR.k16s. heb Os L C.ic No. Rev.No. Sheet No. ~ S-Fbumap '"/8,4L P 3 9 - C2"D 2. - 36k/$ 7~ Jf-&2-661rA hr 8 of /'/ i orisin.t.,$. 8 hea d 2-745 a.vi.oy }W V o.t. o.t. i ) r tto-96 / t STEP 9: Tank Shell Stress The method to determine the tank shell stress in the AISI approach is based on the work of Bijlaard. The shell stress resulting from a rectangular lug on a cylindrical shell and a longitudinal moment is as follows: Note use 1/2 P as the load is being taken by the stiffener plates u separately. p u,,.. I .s y = 2.. .1M Z .,. Q,31 t,* 1.43 n h* .(4ah) -Rt, 2 R t,,, e 6 l whers: 1.0 Za t f 0.177 a t I II b ~ b i j 1 - . + 1.0 j ( JR t, i sj t r i P u = 6.43 idp Bolt tension capacity e := 2.875 Anchor bolt eccentricity with respect to shell surface (inches). I t,= Shellthickness (in) i This is the width that represent 2 the distance between stiffener

', _ 3 + 3 plates. As this chair does not have a top plate, conservatively g

consider each of the lugs pull separately. This results in the highest stress in the shou as the load is spread out over a much smaller amount of the shell. Use the stiffener thickness plus the thickness of the welds attaching them to the tank (inches). 3 h := 6.0 This is the height of the chair, or in this case the height of the stiffenars where they attach to the tank. (inches) R := 79 Nominal shell radius (in) t b :=.75 , This is the base plate thickness. This was defined as "c" above. Z = 0.86 8 shell = 37.7

ksi, F y = 38 kal

} Plate stress OK Fuelod.MCo P=se a h NOOl 6 (10-88)

'09-05-98 14:44:59 ^ A EED*GScuCLEAR g g Celcukution Sheet /6 0F 'Y m ww_ w m m._ o~ c. n. t. 5,u n m,a 7 4 k T=-39-C2O% SEVS >=3foo2-9e!?,*,rn M es N I origin. tor o.te n.wi.w.d by o.t. kW k) B ~ ~I-90 JLWV f-/0-96 STEP 10: Vertical Stiffener Plates The stiffener plates are loaded pnmarily in shear. The plates mustsatisfy three conditions in order to be acceptable-

1) Compressicn checit; 2) Shear stress check 3)' Chair to-Tank Wall Weld; 1) The compression check forwidtirtethschness ratiohnotappli-:e"- b Le 0,.
Or: i diesel-- - -

fuel oil tank as itis loaded in tension However conservatively Abeck.dirgentiopa;, _.._. k = 3.75 width of stiffener plate (inchas) J := 0.25 width of stiffenerplate (inches)' .k- = 15.0 = 15.41 Condition 1 satisfied, ~ / } p Y 3 1000

2) The compression ched for klJr ratio is not applicable to the Oyster Creek diesel fuel oil tank as it is loaded in tension. However conservatively check dimensions:

J = 0.25 4: .04.(h _ c) = 0.21 in or 1/2 inch Though the stiffener plates do not meet the width cnteria they are acceptable as the Oyster Creek plates are not in compression during loading but are. tensile loaded. Conservatively, failure of gWs condition results in the anchorage being declared to fall in a "bnttle" manner in the following steps for determining overtuming momenit capacity.

3) Shear stress to be less than 21 ksi(page 718 of the GIP).

P.1000 u = 3429 psi Condition 3 satisfied ~~ (2 k j) ) FondoEM Page 3 h N0016 (10-88) a s p

09-05-98 14:44:59

\\ G78'E8CUCLKAN g g Calculation Sheet O # sun, : bissat G esmwrba. Fve o u cwe we. n.v.m[g Afo,, /// sh m. Swma ~78 /- 3 9 - C2p 2.- $6k/3 r Jf-Ot22. p6 I b./)s,ojh $"7-18 huA/V N-/o-9s i y STEP 11: Chair.to. Tank Wall Weld The weld of the anchor bolt chair to the tank wall is evaluated as fbur line welds per the methodology of Reference 10. Modal the weld pattom as 4"long. They are (2) 2-1/2"long finet welds separated by a small amount. Conservative to consider them together as the more distance between them the stronger the weld pattom. AL:o conservative to use 4*long. ~~ weld._longth.:=. 4:lp f S,,y := 2. wdd leh'Y' 2 Sweld = 10.67.*in M := P.e M = 1848Sith y M w dd.." 1733*b ~ f,,g := S f mW h The allowable stress in the weld is defined as a gia,:= 30.6.ks on page 7-19 of the GlP. The weld is a 3/16" fillet weld. F gio,:= a giow.(.707. 3 F.g3o, = 4056 lb - in 16 in The allowable weld stress exceeds the actual stress dotarmined by the allowable bolt. pullout load times the bolt distance fmm the shell of the tank. ) ru xx.uco Pm4 h N0016 (10 88) r ____..__m

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t ENCLOSUREI GPU NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DATED SEPTEMBER 9,1997 i UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE A-46 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l 1 l l i I 4

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 (GENERIC LETTER 87-02) OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (Requested on September 9,1997) l OUES' LION No.1 On page 10, the report mentions that the SSEL [ Safe-Shutdown Equipment List] contains 512 components ofwhich 390 components were evaluated during the walkdown to verify their seismic adequacy. Provide information to show how the remaining 122 components were verifledfor seismic adequacy.

RESPONSE

The Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) has 31 components designated uith an "R"in the "RVW SORT" field. This indicates that the component only requires a relay review. 'Ih are components, which do not need to operate and which upon loss of power, will fail in the desired position or state or which are classified as part of the NSSS system. Section 3.1.2.6 of the approved Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) defines this equipment as passive for the purposes of defining the SSEL. In GIP section 3.1.2.7, the relays that control these passive components must be evaluated for relay chatter since chatter could cause the equipment to operate in an undesirable manner. However, these components are not required to have the evaluation approach adopted per the GIP by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG), only the relays that control these components need be evaluated. The seismic evaluation of the essential relays associated with these components can be found in GPUN Calculation C-1302-900-5320-011. In addition, the housing structures for the essential relays were also verified to be seismically adequate. The Composite SSEL also contains 95 components, which are categorized as being in the " rule of the box" These components are mounted on another component also appearing on the SSEL, such as instruments mounted on panels or the fuel pumps mounted in the diesel generator enclosure. Section 3.3.3 of the GIP states that equipment falling within this category does not need to be evaluated separately. Only the major item of equipment, the host, need be verified for seismic adequacy. The Seismic Capability Engineers (SCEs) evaluating the host components, visually checked all externally attached components and documented outliers on SQUG packages as necessary. To assist in prosiding clarification on which components were categorized as in the " rule of the box", we have attached a list (Attachment No.1) of those components. This list identifies, under the column titled " LOCATION", the host component that the item is mounted on. A separate Screening Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS) package was not generated for " rule of the box" components. There are four (4) components (Line No's 479,480,481, and 482 of Appendix A of the report) that are common to both categories described above (i. e., relay review and " rule of box"). i l

Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 Page 2 OUESTION Noj Item 9 on page 20 ofthe report did not include in the SSEL those equipment items that (iffailed during and after an SSE [ Safe Shutdown Earthquakre]) were postulated tofailin the desiredposition. However, a' malfunction ofthe controldevices ofsuch equipment canfall the equipment in an undesirable state. Therefore, show with examples that the control devices ofsuch equipment were included in the SSEL.

RESPONSE

Refer to the response provided in the first paragraph of question No.1. The following two examples demonstrate that the control devices of such equipment are included in the relay list. This list was created as a result ofevaluating the equipment on the relay review SSEL (Appendix D of the report). These items were verified Dr seismic adequacy. SSEL Line # Component Control Device Mounting Location Verification Documents (Appendix A) (Appendix A&D) (Appendix G) (Appendix A) (Host & Control Device) 95 V-20 0003 Motor Contactor 1 A21 A-460V-MCC SQOC-1 A21 A-460V-MO,MC (page (Appendix A Line #1265) MCC& C-1302-900-14) 5320-011 479 SO-305-0120 Relays 4K3451 PNL ERI SQ-OC-PNL-ERI & C-A, B thru (Appendix A Line #1194) 1302-900-5320-011 4K3027 (page 11)

Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page 3 OUESTION No. 3 in reference to item 4. Section 2.1.1.2, page 21 ofthe report, the structuralintegnty ofequipment was not considered as afalhare mcde (e.g., rupture ofa valve). Since this assumption was Oyste, Creek plant-specific, provide a list ofall cases where the structuralintegrity was not considered as afathtre mode and explain how the equipmentfitnctionali.y was vertfledfor those cases so that the impact ofthis assumption can be evaluated

RESPONSE

This assumption is consistent with the GlP methe I in Section 3 for selecting equipment in the safe shutdown path and was used only for identifica-i of the SSEL components. It was not used for host equipment seismic verification, which was perfbo ned in accordance with the GIP caveats. This assumption is taken from the GIP Section 3.2.6, second paragraph, which states: "An equipment failure is defined as the failure of the active functional capability of the equipment, not its structural integrity. For example, for a motor operated valve, failure of the valve to open or close with the motor operator is a failure of the valve to perform its active fun: tion. It is not necessary to consider rupture or leakage of fluid for the valve as a failure mode." This assumption was listed in the Oyster Creek Seismic Evaluation Report in section 2.1.1.2 " Plant Specific Criteria and Assumptions" It should have been listed in section 2.1.1.1 " Generic Criteria and Assumptions" since it is simply applying section 3.2.6 of the GIP. This guidance applies to all active valves on the SSEL (see Appendix A of the Seismic Evaluation Report). The valves are verified in accordance with the caveats specified in the GIP. f

-. - - - - - - - -.. - _ -... ~. - _. -. - Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page 4 OUESTION No. 4 i Item 5 on pog: 22 indicates that " inherently rugged" equipment types include " pressure and temperature gauges, flow elements and other items defined in the GIP (Generic Implementation Procedure). However, the GIP (Section 3.3.5) does not include the temperature gauges andflow elements, nor does it list any items other than the valves already included in the Oyster Creek report. List all equipment types that were considered " inherently rugged", andfor those items that were not listed in the GIP, provide information to show the sessmic adt quacy ofequipment, including their mountings. BESPONSE: This statement in the report refers to items which are part of the pressure boundary of a piping system. A list of equipment types included in this category is as follows: a. pipe mounted pressure gauges b. pipe mounted temperature gauges c. in-line flow elements d. self actuating check valves without external operators e. manually operated valves, and f. test connections. The active function of equipment (a), (b), (c), and (f) is not relied on for safe shutdown of the power plant. This equipment was incorrectly classified as " inherently rugged"; the actual classification should be " passive equipment" Per section 3.3.4 of the GIP, "It is not in the scope of USl A-46 to verify the scismic adequacy of passive equipment such as piping,. " This equipment is passive and the mounting is considered as part of the piping, widch is also passive. Therefore, following the requirements of the GlP this passive equipment is not required to be verified, including its mounting, for seismic. Equipment (d) and (e) is classified as inherently rugged per section 3.3.5 of the GIP. In this section, the GIP states that it is not necessary to verify the seismic adequacy ofinherently rugged equipment. The Oyster Creek SSEL does not contain a list ofinherently rugged equipment that is relied on to perform an active function, namely, items (d) and (e). As stated in section 3.3.5 of the GIP, inherently rugged . equipment is not required to be evaluated for seismic adequacy in the USI A-46 program. i

Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 Page 5 OUESTION No. 5 In Section 2.3.1 on page 38, the report states that the operator "IVill eventually be directed to the use of equipment andinstruments on the SSEL even though the operator may havefirst tried to shut down using equipment not includedin the SSEL. " This may delay the operator 's actionflirther ifultimately the A-,f6 shutdown path is to befailowed. Provide information to demonstrate that this delay in operator action will not compromise safety and was considered toward on time recoveryfrom potential malfunctions, especially in light of this requestfor additional information (IL41) Item No. 7.

RESPONSE

The referenced quote from our report is a paraphrase of a statement in the GIP on page 3-44 which states the operator, "will eventually be directed to the use of the safe shutdown equipment and instruments even though the operator may have first tried to shutdown using equipment not included in the USI A-46 SSEL" The operator is trained to respond to the symptom-based Emergency Operating Procedures to bring the plant to a shutdown condition. There is no prescribed requirement to seek-out the SSEL equipment as a special path for achieving shutdown. A " desk top" review documented in the Oyster Creek Seismic Evaluation Report (section 2.3), shows that the actions required following an A-46 seismic event are included in existing approved procedures. Licensed Operators and Supenisors routinely exercise these procedures in simulator training and demonstrate that the plant can be safely shut down. The scenarios which are used to train Operators on the Symptom Based Emergency Operating Procedures and Abnonnal Procedures adequately demonstrate the Operator's ability to perform the necessary actions. Use of the symptomatic procedures in response to an A-46 seismic event is the same response as any other transient and adds no additional delays in equipment selection. i l

l Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 l Page 6 OUESTION No. 6 For cabinets andpanels containing relays, the report in Section 3.5.1 on page 48 states that " relay evaluation ofthese cabinets andpanels is not required. " It is not clear what is meant by " relay evaluation" ofa cabinet. Have the safety-sigmficant relays been svaluated? Have the cabinets containing these relays been evaluated? Ifboth ofthese answers are affirmative, clanfy uhat "is not required" then. Ifany ofthe answ ers are negative, provide information to show how the seismic adequacy ofrelays including the housing cabinets was venfled.

RESPONSE

The cabinets and panels described in Section 3.5.1 of the report function only to house and support relays associated with various components including those on the SSEL. Essential relays mounted in these cabinets were evaluated to ensure that the seismic capacity of these relays exceeded the demand placed on them (reference GPlJN Calculation C-1302-900-5320-011). Cabincts and Panels that house and support these essential relays are verified for the Oyster Creek SSE in recordance with the procedure described in the GIP. All outliers identified during the walkdown are currently being resolved. Therefore, the essential relays housed and supported in these panels and cabinets, and the panel and cabinet structures themselves have been verified to satisfy their intended function for the Oyster Creek safe shutdown carthquake (SSE) event, pending the resolution of outliers. The intent of the statement that a " relay evaluation of these cabinets and panels is not required"is to clarify that the panel or cabinet itselfis not th: active component which define the essential relays. Relay review of active components listed on the SSEL such as valves, pumps, dampers, etc. determine which relays are essential. The cabinets and panels are not active components, not controlled by relays, and serve only to house and protect the relays. 1 i l 1 )

I Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 i Page 7 l _ QUESTION No. 7 Regarding operator action, very high reliance has been placed on operators ' abilityfor recovery ofmany l seismically vidnerable items within a short period oftime. Section 3. 7 on pages 49 and 50 stated that 53 relays are identified as requiring operator action to restart or reenergize the component after the SSE. Any one or afew ofthese operations may easily be performed. It is questionable whether all ofthe cited operator actions can be performed reliably within the short available period oftime given the potential for absence ofelectrical light and egress that could have been created after an SSE-type earthquake as a result offalling orfailure ofnonseismic components on seismic components. Provide information to show that the assumed recovery ofall malfimctions/ damages within the neededperiod can be l accomplished in the plant condition after an SSE-type earthquake. l l

RESPONSE

I. Equipment-Requiring-Access as a Result of Relay / Contact Malfunction The OCNGS USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report, Section 3.7, identifies 53 relays and contacts j that could potentially initiate an Operator Action (OA). These 53 relays and contacts are l associated with ten (10) components. In addition, two (2) 460V unit substations, which are not j susceptible to relay chatter, require re-energizing following a loss of off-site p ver. l A subsequent review of the relays and contacts that could potentially initiate an OA was performed resulting in the elimination of 27 of these relays and contacts due to the ability to establish their seismic adequacy for their application and location Two (2) additional relays were determined to be chatter acceptable (CA). This eliminates OA's. nociated with six (6) of the twelve (12) components. The twelve components include the 4o0V unit substations. The n:maining 24 relays and contacts statused as initiating OAs are associated with four (4) pieces l ofequipment: Two (2) relays are associated with FN-59-008 (4160V SWGR Vault 1C Roof Ventilator), Two (2) relays are associated with FN-59-019 (4160V SWGR Vault iD Roof Ventilator), = One (1) relay is associated with the 125 VDC MG SET-B, and = Nineteen (19) relays and contacts are associated with FN-826-008B (Control Room Ventilation). FN-59-008. FN-59-019 i The IC and ID SWGR vault ventilation fans FN-59-008 and FN-59-019 are required to be ] functional following an SSE. In the. event of a relay malfunction that causes the fans to shut down, I I these fans will require manual restart. Both of these f ans can be restarted with one (1) OA from a common Local Control Panel, ER-821-226, located in the Turbine Building on elevation 23'-6" l l 1

l l 1940-98-20549 l Page 8 l If a loss of off-site power is associated with the seismic event, the 460V unit substation I A1-460V-USS will require an OA to restore the necessary power for the fans. Should additional temporary l ventilation be required, an OA to restore 460V unit substation 1B1-460V-USS will be required. l The restoration of ventilation to the SWGR vaults is not required for several hours following the loss of ventilation. These OAs are part of the necessary steps to restore ventilation and are included in existing station procedures. l 125 V MG SET B l Since the submittal of the Seismic Evaluation report, MG Set B was modified to incorporate an auto start capability. Upon restoration of AC power, the Set will automatically restart. However, a reverse current condition will shutdown the Set and requires one (1) OA to reset the relay before the unit will restart. Reset of the reverse cunent relay is performed at the DC-B panel located in the A/B Battery Room in the Reactor Building on elevation 35'-0" Once the reverse current relay is reset the unit will auto-start or can be manually started from Control Room Panel 9F. The station batteries have sufficient capacity to support plant systems in excess of three (3) hours following a loss of the MG Set before restoration of the Set is necessary. The reset of the reverse current relay and start-up of M3 Set B is currently included in existing station procedures. FN-826-00H B The remaining 19 relays and contacts are associated with FN-826-008B, Control Room System 'B' HVAC Supply Fan. The malfunction of any one of these relays and contacts could cause a shutdown of the unit requiring it to be manually restarted. In the event of relay malfunction, the unit will require two (2) OAs to restart it. One to reset the compressor over-current relays and one to re-start the unit. The reset of the compressor over-current relays is accomplished at the fan unit itselflocated on the Mechanical Equipment Building Roof at panel ER-826-134. The unit can then be restarted in the Control Room from Panel 9XR. The reset of the compressor over-current relays and the restart of the system are accomplished in accordance with established station procedures. A Control Room loss of ventilation test was previously performed to verify how long the temperature would remain within the acceptable maximum calculated temperature. The test concluded that the temperature would remain below the acceptable maximum during the first 4% hours following a total loss of ventilation, regardless of the time of year and external temperature. This allows operators up to 4% hours to restore Control Room ventilation following an SSE. Use of the Control Room ventilation System 'A' that has been evaluated and found to be scismically adequate but provlies ventilation only, will increase the Operator Action time available to re-establish System 'B' to nine (9) hours. These OAs are part of the necessarv steps to restore Control Room ventilation and are included in existing station procedures. In summary: 1. The original 53 relays and contacts statused as OA were, upon further review, reduced to 24 relays and contacts that result in four (4) OAs associated with four (4) pieces of equipment. l 2. Three (3) of the four (4) OAs are located outside the Control Room. ( l

1940-98-20549 Page 9 3. The two (2) Control Room ventilation system OAs can be accomplished over the four and one half (4-l/2) hour period following an SSE. 4. The one (1) 4160V IC and ID Switchgear Room ventilation systems OA can be accomplished over a several hour period following an SSE. 5. The one (1) MG Set B OA can be accomplished over the three (3) hour period following an SSE. 6. The re-energizing of the 460V unit substations l Al-460V-USS and IB1-460V-USS is associated with the actions required to restore ventilation to the 4160V Switchgear IC and iD Rooms. This is a necessary step in restoring ventilation to the SWGR rooms, which is not required for several hours following the loss of ventilation, and becomes necessary only if there is a loss of off-site power. Therefore, based on the time periods available to restore the equipment to operation, the number of OAs required as a result of the SQUG Program will not over burden the Operators. II. Operator Impacts to Areas Requiring Access The access path the operators must traverse to perform the 5 actions (items 3,4,5&6 above) were walked through to verify if access will be compromised following a SSE event. The results and new activities as a result of the walk through are summarized below. 1. Access to ER-821-226 in 4160 V Switchecar Room in Turbine Buildine El. 23'-6" Access to this area can be easily obtained following a SSE event from either inside or outside the Turbine Building (TB). This room has two entry doors, one located on the north end and the other at the south end of the cast wall. The potential for physical barriers resulting from equipment or structural earthquake damage which co ad inhibit operator ability to access the ER-821-226 panel is not considered to be a vgnificant hazard. 2. . Access to I Al-460V-USS & IB1-460V-USS in Turbine Building El. 3'-6" Access to this area can be easily obtained following a SSE event from either inside or outside the Turbine Building (TB). This room has two entry doors. One is located at the northeast comer of the floor area and the other is located at the southwest end of the floor area. For access to this equipment through the northeast door, the potential for physical barriers resulting from equipment or structural earthquake damage which could inhibit operator ability to access the area is not considered to be a significant hazard. Access to this equipment through the southwest doors may be limited due to the presence of non-seismic block walls around the stairwell. These walls may be damaged during the earthquake and block access to this area. Access to this area is assured through the northeast door, which is the normal access to this area by the operators.

Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 Page 10 3. Access to panel DC-B in the A/B batterv room located in the Office Buildine at EL. 35'-0" Access to this room is through the Main Office Building (MOB). The corridors that define the path to be traversed by the operators are composed of concrete block walls, which have not been evaluated to determine their ability to survive a seismic event. There is a potential for earthquake damage to these walls that may block the operator's access to the one entry door into the A/B Battery Room. This pathway was examined in detail by both operations and engineering personnel. It was determined that an entry could be made to this room to reset a tripped relay in pam, DC-B given the projected time involved for a recovery team to clear the pathway. This particular pathway and its significance will be identified in the plant seismic response procedure as an area needing prompt assessment and reaction following the event. 4. Accm to ER-826-134 on roof of Turbine Buildina Mechanical Eauinment Room at EL. 74'-0" Normal access to the steel building that houses this panel is via the corridor and stainvay south of the control room, through the door to the roof of the Office Building, up the 1 permanent steel ladder on the east wall of the Mechanical Equipment Room (MER), across the roof to the southwest corner where the steel building is located. The potential for physical barriers resulting from equipment or structural earthquake damage which could inhibit operator access to the ER-826-134 panel is considered to be a significant hazard only in the corridor and stainvell south of the control room. The north wall of the stainvell consists ofnon-seismic block walls which may be damaged in a SSE event and block access. If the stainvell is not available then emergency access can be via the control room to the heater bay roof, to the roof of the annex south of the control room, to the MER roof or to the office building roof then to the MER roof. To facilitate this access, a ladder will be staged at the north end of the heater bay roof. This ladder will be used, after the SSE, to climb from the heater bay roof to the annex roof, then to the MEB roof. Access from the annex roof to the Oflice Building roof does not require a ladder. The plant seismic procedure will be revised to include this emergency path.

~.. _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ - ____._.___..__._.__s l Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page11 OUESTION No. 8 The report on page 58 states that " anchor bolt tightness checks were performedin accordance with the GIP where tightness checks were determined to be required. " This implies that the GlP criteria were used to perform the bolt tightness check andprior to that another set ofcriteria was used to determine whether such a check is required. Specify the criteria that were used to determine whether an anchor ' bolt tightness check was required. 1 i

RESPONSE

The i ent of the statement in the report is to convey that all tightness checks were performed in accordance with the criteria contained in the GIP. In addition, the criteria contained in the GIP were used to determine if a tightness check was required. In all cases, except those described below, a tightness check was performed for all anchors associated with the SSEL equipment as specified by the GIP. 1. Anchor bolts loaded in tension due to dead weight were not inspected per the guidelines of Section 4.4.1 of the GIP. 2. In some cases, the reduced inspection guidelines contained in GIP section 4.4.1 and Appendix C, C.2.10 were used as a basis for eliminating the need to perform a tightness check. 3. In some cases, anchors were determined to be inaccessible for testing. The GIP states that it is not the intent of the procedure to require disassembly of structures to perform the tightness checks. In all cases, the SCE stil) performed a visual inspection of the anchorage to ensure that conditions do not exist, which could adversely impact the adequacy of the anchors. In addition, the SCEs performed the following to verify adequacy of the inaccessible anchors: a. For lightweight components with inaccessible anchors, tug test by hand was performed to verify adequacy of the anchors. b. For other components with some inaccessible anchors, engineeringjudgment based on successful test of similar accessible anchors in the same configuration was used for acceptance of the untested anchors (two cases) or the calculation did not consider the inaccessible anchors (one case). i I.

~ l l Enclomre I 1940-98-20549 Page 12 OUESTION No. 9 l Regarding the ThirdParty Review, the report onpage 66, Section 4.6, states that "Dr. Stevenson's i comments were.. satisfactorily resolved byfitrther analysis. " Did Dr. Stevenson concur with the resolution ofhis comments? Provide a more descriptive response to Dr. Stevenson 's observations in l Appendix Mso that an independent evaluation can be made. \\ 1

RESPONSE

i The resolution of Dr. Stevenson's comments was made by an in-house peer review.1%tential approaches to re.:olve the comments were discussed with Dr. Stevenson during his review of the SQUG walkdown results. GPUN has reviewed all SEWS to address concerns and questions raised by Dr. Stevenson. Where appropriate, revisions were made to the SEWS by two SCEs, Dr. Stevenson was apprised of the resolution of his comments on July 2,1998 and he concurred that all comments were resolved to his satisfaction in his letter dated July 7,1998 A summary of the peer review is provided below with item numbers referring to the numbers in Dr. Stevenson's August 15,1994 letter (Appendix M). 1. No resolution required. Dr. Stevenson in his response agrees that the transformer anchorage is quite adequate. The GlP caveat was checked YES since the SCEs inspected the transformer anchorage and load path and in theirjudgement determined that it is adequate. This is consistent with SQUG training on conducting and documenting watkdowns of SSEL components. i Note: Component BT-CHG C2 was determined to be an unnecessarily redundant component on the SSEL and was subsequently deleted from the final SSEL. However, a similar component still exists, BT-CHG Cl, on the SSEL and was reviewed for the same comment. 2. No resolution required. 3. No resolution required 4. No resolution required 5. No resolution required (see reason below). Item SQ-OC-P-002A Reactor Feedwater Pump. 6. No resolution required (see reason below). Item SQ-OC-P-6-001 Instrument Air Compressor 1-1. 7. No resolution is required. 8. Conunent resolved by performing the action recommended by Dr. Stevenson. The seismic demand on the component is small (.24g x 30 lb. = 71bs) in comparison to the estimated tug test load (in excess of 40 lbs.). Comment #3 in SEWS package resolves this outlier SQ-OC-IPS-826-009. 1

1940-98-20549 Page 13 9. The comment expressed a concern that calculation C-1302-735-5320-005 includes an un-conservative assumption. The calculation assumes the base of the cabinet is rigid which is un-conservative because the stiffness of the anchorage, as it might affect its frequency, should be considered in the calculation if there is overturning. Review of the calculation determined the following: i The existing calculation modeled the cabinet as a cantilever with two lumped mass points for determining the fundamental frequency of the cabinet (Page 7). The calculation inappropriately j assumed the anchorage was rigid. However, the calculation detennined that the anchorage is unacceptable even with the cantilever model and proceeded to design a modification. The modification involved installing a rigid 'two way' restraint at the top of the cabinet. A new estimate of fundamental frequency was not made. However, on page 19 of the calculation, the engineer judged that the new restraint will increase the frequency to above the frequency calculated using the cantilever model. On this basis the engineer designed the restraint. An independent engineer has reviewed this calculation and agrees with the conclusion of the design engineer that the frequency will be increased since the model changed from a simple cantilever to a vertical pin supported beam. The review also concluded that the seismic acceleration factors used are consistent with the spectra used and are conservative when compared to accelerations obtained from the response spectra curves developed for resolution of A-46 at Oyster Creek. 10. No response required. GPUN concurs with Dr. Stevenson's comment. A new calculation, C-1302-157-5320-006, which accounted for both horizontal and the vertical direction seismic forces concluded that the diesel generators would not slide under SSE conditions. I 1. No resolution required. 12. No resolution required (see reason below). Item SQ-OC-H-5-003, TB Closed Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 1-1. These comments address similar concerns and are therefore grouped together. On the Feedwater pump the assumption that horizontal shear was carried by base friction rather than the anchor bolts was questioned. On the air compressor the basis for the attachment of the pedestal to the floor was questioned. On the heat exchanger the lack of adequate anchorage (i.e., anchored against sliding only) was questioned. Subsequent to the walkdowns and neer review, the safe shutdown path was revised to eliminate reliance on the Turbine Building uosed Cooling Water System (TBCCW). These items are not safety related nor relied on for safe shutdown of the plant and do not pose an interaction hazard to any safety-related equipment. Herefore, from an administrative standpoint, resolution of the corr 1 . Its is not necessary. However; the current SSEL component Seismic Qualification packages j .mwed ai,d a detennination was made that the comments are not applicable to any of these s of equipment. 13. GPUN concurs with Dr. Stevenson's comment nd the subsequent modification was changed. The recommended fix from the OSVS sheet was not used. The outlier was resolved by modification of the top two connections, The modification details removed reliance on the spot welds in the load path. The SCEs were trained to look for spot welds and to evaluate spot welds per the GIP.

- --~.-.-.- - _.- - - j

l.

1940-98-20549 l. - Page 14 ] l 14. No response required. 15. GPUN concurs with' Dr. Stevenson's comment that this component is adequate in the existing configuration. A new calculation, documented in the SQ-OC-SP-1D seismic qualification package, determined that the Space Heater Panel is adequately restrained for seismic and dead loads. 16. Items 16 through 24. No resolution required. ) l l l J

Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page 15 OUESTION No.10 The briefdiscussion of the Description Code and the Resolution Code as included on page K6 in Appendix K does not provide adequate information in characterizing the deviations andfor evaluating acceptability ofthe licensee'sjustification that led to the conclusion ofmeeting the intent ofcaveats. This observation is applicable to many ofthe caveats listed in Appendix K. In order to understand and evaluate the acceptability of the licensee's evaluation, it is requested that a thorough documentation of the deviation andjustification ofthe caveat be providedfor thefollowing sample equipment items (called System Numbers): System Numbers 225, 211, 642, 732, 822: It should be noted that Appendix B of the GIP describes the specific concerns related to each caveat. For the above sample equipment items, the licensee should address in detail all ofthe concerns as discussed in the GIP.

RESPONSE

) A description of the caveat and detail on its resolution is contained in the table below: System Equipment Mark Caveat Number Class Number Number Description Resolution ) 225 - 07 V-15-0121 6 The centerline of A calculation demonstrated that the l the pipe to the top yoke can take a static load of 3g's., of the operator satisfying the GIP requirement as exceeds the stated in Caveat No. 6 as an alternate restrictions of to/or when the distance requirement is Figure B.7-2 of exceeded. Appendix B. 225 07 V-15-0134 5 The centerline of A calculation demonstrated that the the pipe to the top yoke can take a static load of 3g's., of the operator satisfying the GIP requirement as does not meet the stated in Caveat No. 6 as an alternate i restrictions of to/or when the distance reqmrement is Figure B.7-1 of exceeded. Appendix B. 225 07 V-15-0135 7 The body of the The configuration isjudged to meet the l valve is supported intent of the caveat. Note that the SCE by a horizontal made this note to SEWS package since i strut connected the valve has a support attached to its with a standard body even though the caveat pipe clamp. (independent support of the actuator and yoke) is not violated l 225 07 V-15-0136 7 The body of the The configuration is judged to meet the l valve is supponed intent of the caveat. Note that the SCE by a horizontal made this note to SEWS package since strut connected the valve has a support attached to its with a standard body even though the caveat pipe clamp. (independent support of the actuator and yoke) is not violated. I 225 07 V-15-0137 - 7 The body of the The caveat is satisfied as is, without valve is supported furtherjustification. The support does l by a horizontal not attach to the actuator or the yoke. strut connected This should not have been identified in with a standard the report in Appendix K. pipe clamp.

Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page 16 System Equipment Mark Caveat Number Class Number Number Description Resolution 241 07 V-21-0021 4 Piping is %" and The piping will not be overstressed or 1" damaged due to the light weight of the valve (< 5 #). 241 07 V-21-0022 4 Pipmg is %" and The piping will not be overstressed or 1" damaged due to the light weight of the valve (< 5 #). 241 07 V-21-0023 4 One of the lines The condition isjudged to meet the i attached to the intent of the caveat due to the low valve is %", the weight of the valve (< 15#). other is 1" 241 07 V-21-0024 4 One of the lines The condition isjudged to meet the attached to the intent of the caveat due to the low valve is %", the weight of the valve (< 15#). other is 1" 642 20 ER-642-113 A2 The panelis The %" AUKS have a 4" embedment anchored with per as-installed documentation. The %" & 3/8" AUK anchorage isjudged to be adequate bolts and falls based on the capacity of the bolts outside the GIP versus the estimated demand. The table. weight of 2 panels is approximately 150 #. The capacity of %" AUK is 1600# tension and 1830 # shear, and 3/8" AUK anchor is 3635 # tension and 2213 # shear. By inspection and engineeringjudgement the anchorage is acceptable. Bolts were inspected using GIP methodology even though bolt type is not included in Appendix C. Inspection was supplemented by QA installation documentation. 642 20 ER-642-115 A2 The panelis This panelis mounted on the same anchored with anchor panel as ER-642-113. See %" & 3/8" AUK Resolution above. bolts and falls outside the GIP table. 732 04 1 Al-XFMR-USS A4 Cast in place Calculation in SEWS package l Al-anchors do not 460V-USS shows no overturning of have nuts unit. Two of the four bolts are covered installed in mortar and one bolt has a nut installed. Since no overturning moment is present, the level of work required to install the three (3) missing nuts is notjustified. The existing condition is judged to be acceptable.

Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page 17 System Equipment Mark Caveat Number Class Number Number Description Resolution 732 04 IB1-XFMR-USS A4 Cast in place Calculation in SEWS package l Al-anchors do not 460V-USS shows no overturning of have nuts unit. All four bolts were fouled to some installed degree with mortar. Two of them are covered. Since no overturning moment is prewnt, the level of work required to install all four (4) nuts is not justified. The existing condition is judged to be acceptable. 822 07 V-27-0001 2 The body and This is a wafer style butterfly valve. A yoke of this piping analysis previously performed valve is on this system indicated that the mechanite cast highest stress was $406 psi. and is iron. located far away from the valve. As ) such, the stresses in the valve are very small and the cast iron isjudged to be adequate. 822 07 V-27-(X)01 3 The body and See resolution for caveat No. 2. yoke of this valve is mechanite cast iron. j 822 07 V-27-0002 2 The body and This is a wafer style butterfly valve. A yoke of this piping analysis previously performed valve is on this system indicated that the mechanite cast highest stress was 5406 psi. and is iron. located far away from the valve. As such, the stresses in the valve are very small and the cast iron isjudged to be adequate. 822 07 V-27-0002 3 The body and See resolution for caveat No. 2. yoke of this valve is mechanite cast iron. 822 07 V-27-0003 2 The body is cast The valve is a wafer style butterfly iron. valve. The seisnQ forces imposed on it would not cause tensile stress in the body, because eight steel bolts between pipe flanges will carry all the seismic shears, moments and axial forces. This meets the intent of the caveat. 822 07 V-27-0004 2 The body is cast The valve is a wafer style butterfly iron. valve. The seismic forces imposed on it I would not cause tensile stress in the l body, because eight steel bolts between l pipe flanges will carry all the seismic shears, moments and axial forces. This meets the intent of the caveat. l l 4 l 1940-98-20549 l Page 18 l OUESTION No.11a l Thefollowing questions pertain to the outliers discussed in Appendix L: a) The briefdiscussion ofthe description and resohition ofoutliers includ?d in Appendix L does not provide adequate information in characterizing the identified deficiencies andfor evahiating acceptability ofthe proposed' implemented modifications. This observation is applicable to more than 300 caveats listed in Appendix K. As describedin the GIP, it is expected that the deficiencies and modifications have been thoroughly documented to allow an independent review. To illustrate thoroughness ofsuch documentation, submit complete information that led to the resolution ofthe outliersfor thefbilowing equipment items identified by System Numbersibfark Numbers. Any deficiencies includingfield information (e.g., configuration, size, design, etc.) and analysis / testing data should also be inchided. Equipment items: System Number 212:Afark Number P-20-002B, 5) stem Number 215'Afark Number V-16-0001, 5)' stem Number 41 liAfark Number V-1-0008, System Number 41liAfark Number V-1-0176, System Number 61hAfark Number PNLl6R, System Number 642/PNL ER8B.

RESPONSE

For the line items requested, the list below cross-references the documents that contain the resolution to the outliers for each component. Following this list is a summary of the caveats on which outliers were written and the resolution to the outliers. Note that at time of the report's submittal GPUN considered the outlier for V-1-0008 resolved. Recent reviews of that analysis has determined that additional work to resolve the outlier is required. COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION GPUN RESOLUTION DOCUMENTATION P-20-002 B SQ-OC-P-20-002B V-16-0001 SQ-OC-V-16-0001 V-1-0008 EQE Calculation No. 240031-C-016 V-1-0176 EQE Calculation No. 42112-C-006 PNLl6R SQ-OC-PNL-16R PNL ER8B GPUN Calculation No.C-1302-642-E310-007 Mark No. Caveat Outlier Description Resolution N o. P-20-002B 4 Core Spray piping is flexibly This outlier was initially resolved by a supported and lacks horizontal calculation performed by the walkdown (SCE) restraint at the pump nozzle. team and included in the SEWS package. This Review calculation for nozzle was the basis of resolution reported in GPUN's stresses and determine anchor USl A-46 Summary Report. Since then GPUN bolt demand when nozzle loads determined that a non-conservative analytical are included and compare to technique was utilized in the calculation. In capacity of anchor bolts. addition, inputs to this calculation representing the nozzle loads came from a pipe stress analysis that has come under question. l Therefore, this outlier was reanalyzed This revised status was reflected in our revision to Appendix L of the report submitted on April 15, 1998 under GPUN letter No. 1940-98-20206. The new analysis has been completed. The results indicate that the anchorage and nozz!cs of the pump are within allowable loads.

. _. - -. - -. - -. - -.. - _ - = _ _.. _. _. -. - -. l 1-L l 1940-98-20549 Page 19 Mark No. Caveat Outlier Description Resolution No. V-16-0001 I1 Valve operator stem protector is The valve stem protector was determined to be within approximately 5/8" of pipe. excessively long and not in conformance with the i Review piping analysis for seismic design. Deviation Report No. 96-075 was issued. deflections at the top of the valve The valve stem protector was cut and replaced operator. May need to resiew the during Cycle 16R under Job Order No. 503633. This pipe seismic analysis to reduce resolved the outlier due to interference with the pipe displacement with valve in cold support. position. Distance to pipe support is 5/8" With valve in hot position it moves 1.4" l V-1-0008 C/D Subject valve (MSIV)is not An analysis has been perfonned which meets the I represented in the class of 20 IEEE 344 1975 standard with exception of equipment covered by SQUG consideration of the OBE which is not required for Bounding Spectrum. The USI A-46. The analysis used seismic forces component capacity versus demand generated from the Main Steam piping analysis. could not be determined. The results indicate that the MSIVs are seismically adequate for the SSE at Ovster Creek V-1-0308 6 Restrictions of GIP Figure. B.7.An analysis has been performed which meets the are not met for this MSIV. IEEE 344-1975 standard with exception of consideration of the OBE which is not required for USI A-46. The analysis used seismic forces generated from the Main Steam piping analysis. The results indicate that the MSIVs are scismically adequate for the SSE at Oyster Creek. V-1-0176 1 Pilot operated relief valves are not The outlier was resolved by demonstrating 6 included in the GIP definition of representation and adequate performance of similar the equipment class. valves in the scismic experience database. Pertinent information is contained in EQE Calculation 42113 C-006. PNL 16R 11 Shift storage locker on west side of The storage locker was removed from the Control 16Ris unrestrained and can Room during Cycle 16R. Removal of the storage overturn on to a fire extinguisher locker is documented on page 2 of the OSVS form that is loosely supported. This may attached to the SEWS package for Panel 16R. generate a seismic missile in the control room PNL 16R 12 Water cooler on west wallis The water cooler was provided with/. seismic unrestrained. restraint via modification during Cfcle 16R. The modification was determined to be adequate via a followup SQUG inspection performed by a team of SCE engineers. The followup inspection was documented on page 2 of the OSVS fonn attached to the SEWS package for Panel 16R. PNL ER8B 9 The anchorage calculation shows Modification was performed in Cycle 16R to provide 11 the existing anchorage is not adequate anchorage. GPUN Calculation C-1302-A9 adequate. 642-E310-007 documents the adequacy of the modified anchorage. PNL ER8B A4 Anchor bolt failed the tightness Modification was performed in Cycle 16R to proiide

test, adequate anchorage. GPUN Calculation C-1302-l 642-E310-007 documents the adequacy of the modified anchorage.

1940-98-20549 Page 20 OUESTION No. lib Thefollowing questions pertain to the outliers discussedin Appendix L: b) For Core Spray System Pump NZ01-B, System Number 212 Mark Number P-20-001 B, the Description Code identified: " Seismic capacity ofadjacent or overhead item is unknown, potentialinteraction hazard, "and the Resolution Code specified: " Perform seismic testing of relay, Replace afrelayfails acceptance criteria. " It is not clear as to how the proposed resolution will resolve the identafled deficiency. Providefitrther details that show how this outlier was resolved

RESPONSE

The resolution code identified for NZ01-B is a typographical error. The proper code should have been "12" instead of"21" For this code, the resolution is: " Additional anchorage will be installed in cycle 16/17R." The outlier refers to an overhead chiller, which is supported by two trapeze type hangers. The chiller was attached to its supports with vibration isolators in a non-rigid manner. This made the chiller a potential missile hazard to the pump below. A modification was performed during 16R, which provided the chiller with restraints to prevent it from slipping offits suppoits. l 1 l i

Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page 21 OUESTION No.11c Thefollowing quntions pertain to the outliers discussed in Appendix L: c) For several outlier relays that were identified as inadequate or ofunknown seismic capacity, the outlier code (20) specified: " Modify circuit or replace relay. " For relays that are not being replaced, the resolution code does not provide usefid information (i.e., how the modification of circuit will resolve the issue). Explain what actions are being taken to resolve those outlier relays.

RESPONSE

There are 71 relays and contacts identified in Appendix L as having a relay resolution code of 20, which states " Modify circuit or replace relay." Circuit modification was a possible option available to resolve a relay outlier, at the time of submittal. No actual circuitry modifications, however, were made to resolve relay outliers. The information below provides a more detailed description of how these 71 relays had their outliers resolved. Upon further review, seven (7) relays were found to be seismically adequate for their function and location based on GERS per GPUN Calculation C-1302-900-5320-011. Two (2) relays were modified during Cycle 17/17R to change their contact arrangement to meet the GERS caveats. These relays are now seismically adequate for their function and location based on GERS per GPUN Calculation C-1302-900-5320-011. Forty-Six (46) relays and contacts located within the Diesel Generator Control Cabinets were replaced along with their circuitry during the refueling outagel5R and 16R. The modifications resolved the seismic issues as well as up-graded the control logic to a state of the art system. The two (2) Diesel Generator Fuel Day Tank level switches and four (4) motor contactors for the Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps were replaced during the refueling outage 16R and were completed along with the Diesel Generator Control Cabinet modifications. These circuitry modifications were made for non-A46 reasons and also resolved the seismic issues associated with them. The six (6) Diesel Generator Switchgear relays require replacement of the contact assemblies within the existing relay in order to meet the GERS caveats. These contact assemblies are to be replaced by the completion of the refueling outage 18R. After contact assembly replacement these relays will be seismically adequate for their function and location based on GERS. No circuit changes are required to support these contact assembly changes. The four (4) Rotary Inverter Control Panel relays will be tested or replaced by the completion of the refueling outage 18R. No circuit changes are required to support these replacements. I l r

l 1940-98-20549 Page 22 i OUESTION No.12 Appendix N ofthe licensees report provides the schedulefor completing all modifications required to l resolve outliers. However, it is noted that the equipment items listed in Appendix N does not include all the outliers reportedin Appendix L ofthe same report. Provide the missing information or explain the discrepancy between the two lists. RESPONSE-Appendix L is a complete list of all outliers while Appendix N is a list of modifications which have already been performed or which are planned to be performed to resolve outliers. It should be recognized that there are other means available to resolve outliers than just performing modifications. A one-for-one correspondence between Appendices L and N cannot be drawn. There are several reasons for this difference: 1. Several outliers have or will be resolved through the plant's maintenance system without performing any type of modification to the equipment. 2. Several of the outliers have been resolved using analytical methods to demonstrate seismic adequacy. 3. There are 108 relay outliers listed in Appendix L; however, there is only one generic line item in Appendix N for relays. It was not known at the time of submittal whether some additional relay outliers would be resolved by further analysis. In some cases simple relay replacement was possible or a circuit modification might also be required in order to accommodate a design variation as the replacement. 4. There are 87 raceway outliers on Appendix L. Forty-eight (48) of these outliers were determined to have no affect on any SSEL component. Therefore, no further action was required. 5. Some components will have several outliers posted against them, but only one modification is required to resolve all issues. As an example, the 1B3-XFMR-USS (system 732) has 6 outliers listed. However, one modification addressing the anchorage problem was performed during Cycle 16R, which resolved all the outliers. It should be noted that GPUN tracks all outliers to final resolution. Once resolved, the SEWS package for each outlier is annotated to reflect the resolution of the outlier. GPUN updated Appendices L and N in a revision submitted to the NRC under GPUN Letter 1940-98-20206 dated April 15,1998. 1 ~ i i

Enclosure ! - 1940-98-20549 Page 23 OUESTION No.13 Section 4.1: Provide graphical comparisons ofan amphfied bounding response spectrum with the in-structure response spectra at thefollowing locations: Reactor Building: Elevatlon 23ft. 6 in., 51ft. 3 in., 75fl. O in.; Drywell: Elevations 46ft. 2 in., 75ft. 3 in.; Turbine Building; 46ft. 6in.; DieselGenerator Building: 18ft..I in., 23fl. O in.; Intake Structure: 6ft. O in. (

RESPONSE

The requested information is included with this submittal as Attachment No. 2 through 11. The amplified bounding response spectrum is included on the graphs for the horizontal spectrum. We do not have IRS available for Drywell Elevation 46'-2", 75'-3" or Diesel Generator Building Elevation 18'-4". We have included the available spectra for elevations closest to that which you have requested. Note that the calculation for the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank (provided for Question No 16) conservatively utilized the spectrum values for Elevation 23'-0" of the Diesel Generator Building even though that tank is located on Elevation 18'4" s

l Enclosure I j 1940-98-20549 Page 24 OUESTION No.14 i Section 4.):It appears that in some cases, the seismic demandfor equipment located within 40ft. above \\ the effective grade has been defined by the site-specific Ground Response Spectrum (GRS) instead ofthe amphfiedin-structure Response Spectra (IRS). For example, in line numbers 488 and 487 ofthe screening verification data sheets (SVDS), the same type ofequipment (i.e., HDR vent valves in the Reactor Building) at the same elevation seem to have been screened by the two diferent approaches. Providejustificationfor not using Method B of Table 4.1 ofGIP-2 in a consistent mannerfor screening the equipment at various elevations.

RESPONSE

When comparing equipment seismic capacity to demand, GPUN used Method A from Table 4-1 in GIP-2 in some cases and Method B in odier cases. The reason for this is that two teams of SCEs performed the g walkdown. One team has consistently used Method A while the other used Method B. GPUN is aware that i a question has arisen regarding the use of Method A at sites with a shallow soil layer overlying rock or other competent material. OC.is not a shallow soil site. However, GPUN has reviewed all cases where . method A was used (total 76 cases) and determined that Method B could be used interchangeably without impact on the conclusions reached. Both methods are considered acceptable in the GIP Revision 2 and in the associated NRC SSER on Revision 2 of the GIP. GIP Revision 2 states that the capacity can be compared to a demand, which is defined in terms of either a ground response spectrum or an in-structure response spectra. The GIP further states that the ground response spectra used for making comparisons per Method A should be the free field SSE ground response spectra. The SSE ground response spectra L described in the OC FSAR is defined at grade in the free field. Therefore, GPUN appropriately applied Method A as described in the GIP Revision 2 to perfonn this comparison. l Mtiti l 1. At OC the bounding spectrum envelops the ground response spectra for all frequencies. 2. The ratio of the SSE ground response spectrum peak to the SQUG bounding spectrum peak is 1 l 0.55. l-i f 3. Input for generating the in-stmeture response spectra used in Method B was defined at grade. l These spectra are conservative in-structure response spectra. l i 4. In applying Method A, the 40 feet ruit; was applied from grade which at OC is defined as Elevation 23 '-6". 1 1

.__.________._._m.__._ l ' Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 l Page 25 1 i l OUESTION No.15 i l Section 4.3.]: GIP-2 (Section 4.4) recommends that expansion anchors should not be usedfor anchoring 1 . vibratory equipment, such as pumps and air compressors. Ifused, the GIP-2 recommends a large margin between the pullout loads and the pullout capacities. The SVDS in Appendix D do not provide l any information regarding the type ofanchors usedfor the listed equipment. Provide information about l' the seismic adequacy ofvibratory equipment secured by expansion anchors. 1 j..

RESPONSE

The only vibratory SSEL component found to be anchored with expansion anchors is the 125VDC MG Set B. Two ofits anchors are cast in place while the other two are shell anchors. A review of the SEWS ) package for this component shows that the component has no net uplift during a seismic event and l subsequently the anchor bolts see no tensile load. The only seismic load the anchorage sees is a shear load of 248 lbs. per bolt, which is far less than the nominal capacity of 2380 lbs.(before reduction factors) for L %" expansion anchors. A tightness check on the shell anchors, during the SQUG walkdown, determined l that the anchors were adequate for tightness. -i i. l [ l l t i t f e v l

.,- ~ -.- -. - ~. -. - -. 1940-98-20549 i= Page 26 OUESTION No.16 Section 4.3.2 and Appendix L: The summary states that thefour large heat exchangers and one large - flat-bottom vertical tank are outliers. Provide thefollowing information about thefour heat exchangers and the tank describing how the outliers were resolved: a. Sketches showing the tank (heat exchangers) dimensions, anchor chairs, anchorages (including embedment), saddle restraints, andfoundation. i b. A detailed calcidation ofthe tank that demonstrates the seismic adequacy of the tank utilizing the GIP-2 procedure. 1

RESPONSE

There is only one outlier identified for T-39-002, the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank. This outlier identified the tank's vent line as having inadequate flexibility. The vent line was flanged at the top of the tank and I was routed directly to a wall penetration where it was grouted into the wall. The outlier was resolved by replacing the rigid grout interface at the wall with a flexible foam joint. Two outliers associated with each of the four Containment Spray heat exchangers were identified dunng - the walkdown. The first outlier deals with the presence of chainfalls in the vicinity of the heat exchangers. j The chainfans have been restrained and supported to prevent interaction with the heat exchangers. Subsequent walkdowns by a team of seismic capability engineers have verified that the restraints are adequate to resolve the outlier. The second outlier deals with the fact that the heat exchangers are installed vertically instead of horizontally and that the configuration of the attached piping could result in significant anchor loads due to j pipe movement during a seismic event. To address this outlier, section 7.2 of the GlP states that tanks and 1 heat exchangers not specifically covered by the guidelines in the GIP may be analyzed using analytical l methods which verify seismic adequacy of the component provided that the types ofloads addressed in the E GlP are considered. GPU Nuclear has thus performed an analysis of the heat exchangers taking into consideration flexibility of the component as well as all applicable loads from all of the attached piping. This analysis has sufficiently addressed the failure-modes identified in the GIP and in the walk-down l package and is therefore sufficient to close the outlier.- As stated in GPU Nuclear letter (No. 1940-98-20206) dated April 15,1998, the evaluation of the heat exchanger anchorage had been completed prior to submittal of the A-46 summary report in March 1996. l= This analysis demonstrates that the anchorage is acceptable and that the outlier is resolved by analysis as [ indicated in the summary report. However, the design verification wa not complete when the A-46 i ( Summary Report was submitted. Subsequently, during the design verification process, the need to obtain L more realistic loads on the anchorage due to the effects of the attached piping, was recognized as described in GPU Nuclearletter (No. 1940-98-20374) dated July 13,1998. To obtain appropriate and more realistic i loads on the heat exchanger anchorage, an analysis of the attached piping has been prepared. The piping { analysis includes all four pipas attached to the heat exchanger as well as the heat exchanger itself. The analysis incorporates all applicable loads including thermal and seismic. Loads on ~ -. ~..

Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 Page 27 the heat exchanger anchorage were obtained from this piping analysis. Utilizing the newly calculated loads, the seismic capacity of the heat exchangers and their anchorage have been evaluated and found to be seismically adequate. This analysis, which has been design verified, demonstrates that the heat exchangers and the anchorage are sumcient to withstand a seismic event equal to the Oyster Creek SSE. This analysis employs a methodology similar to that described in the GIP and considers all loads and failure modes specified in the GlP. Therefore, this outlier is resolved by analysis as indicated in the original A-46 Summary Report. Included with this submittal as Attachment No.12 through 16 are the following drawings, which include the details, requested in part A of your question. 1. Amer Industrial Technologies Inc Drawing No's 082-1, Rev 6 and 082-2, Rev 5, "15000 Gallon Diesel Oil Storage Tank." 2. Bums and Roe Drawing No 4020, Rev 1, " Emergency Diesel Generator Vault, Plans, Sections & Details." 3. Perfex Drawing No D9361-S-100, Rev J, " Containment Spray Heat Exchanger." 4. Burns and Roe Drawing No 4053, Rev 13, " Reactor Building First Floor at El. 23'-6" Plan and Details." Note: The anchor detail for the Diesel Fuc! Oil Storage Tank as shown in Section J-J of Burns and Roe Drawing 4020 is typical for all the tank's anchors. However, during replacement of the tank in 1991, one of the anchors required repairs. The physical configuration of this repaired anchor bolt utilized a threaded extension. The repair was designed to provide the bolt with the same anchorage capacity as the other tank anchor bolts. In response to Part B of your question we have enclosed a copy of the SEWS package for the diesel fuel oil storage tank, SQ-OC-T-39-002, Rev 1. This package contains the calculations you requested. See Attachment No.17. Sections 8,9,10, and 11 of the calculation were recently reperformed to more closely match the GIP requirements. l l

1 i 1940-98-20549 l Page 28 OUESTION No.17 Section 4.3.3: The limited analytical reviews indicated that 7 out of 20 reviews of the raceway supports required outlier evaluations. The refined evahiations of these outliers demonstrated seismic adequacy. Provide the detailed seismic evaluation work sheetsfor these seven supports with the original and the refined calculations.

RESPONSE

EQE Calculation No. 42112-C-001 documents the initial analytical review of all selected 20 raceway supports. Appendix A of this calculation includes the analytical review data sheets with the field collected data and sketches. EQE Calculation No. 42112-C-002 represents the resolution of the 7 outliers resulting from the limited analytical review. These calculations are included in this submittal as Attachment No.18 and 19. l

Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 Page 29 OUESTION No.18a Our reviews and audits ofafew A-46 plants indicate irregidarities in the use ofSection 8 ofGIP-2for raceway supports. Please provide thefollowing information in that context: Elaborate on the basisfor assuming " ductile " support systemfor the raceway support a. configurations not documented by the experience database;for example, two nonuniform columns ofcable trays supported by three supports (anchorages). Also, see Figure 8-5 ofGIP-2, where the analysis ofthe complete configuration would be requiredfor lateral seismic load as opposed to the analysis ofindividual " ductile " supports. Provide the method utilized to resolve the issue ofquestionable " ductile" support systems. RESPONS.Et The GIP methodology for evaluating cable and conduit raceway systems is a two step process. In the first su.p, all electrical raceways located in any areas that may contain cables associated with any equipment on the SSEL are inspected. The raceways are evaluated with respect to the inclusion Rules described in Section 11.8.2.2 of GIP-2 and the Seismic Performance Concerns described in Section 11.8.3 of GIP-2. Supports that are not documented in the experience database are not covered by the inclusion Rules and are therefore classified as outliers. Supports classified as outliers due to not meeting the inclusion Rules are evaluated separately and are not included in the Limited Analytical Review. Since no outliers were identified based on an evaluation with respect to the inclusion Rules, all support configurations at Oyster Creek are covered by the experience data. Support configurations are also evaluated with respect to the Seismic Performan :e Concerns. These concerns include (Concern 8) "Hard Spots" as defmed in Figure 8-5 of GIP-2. As stated in Section 11.8.2.1 of GIP-2, the Other Seismic Performance Concerns are included in the GIP-2 as examples of types of concerns which the Seismic Review Team (SRT) should be aware of and evaluate. As stated in GIP-2, if the Seismic Perfonnance Concerns are not met, the SRT should exercise engineering judgement to determine if the condition significantly compromises the seismic adequacy of the raceway system. Ifit appears that the area of concern is not significant, the SRT should note the condition and provide a written explanation for this conclusion. If the condition is significant, the affected portion of the raceway system should be classified as an outlier and evaluated in a manner similar to the inclusion Rule outliers. Supports, which are hard spots as, defined in Figure 8-5 of GIP-2, are either evaluated during the general raceway walkdown and determined not to be a concern, or are identified as outliers requiring separate evaluation. In either case, none of the "hard spots" would be included in the Limited Analytical Review based on their being "hard spots" Once the first step of the evaluation process is complete and all inclusion Rule outlius and Seismic Performance Concern outliers have been identified and set aside for separate evaluation, the supports for ( the Limited Analgical Review are selected. These supports are selected using the guidelines contained in Section 11.8.2.4 of GIP-2. Each of the supports selected for the Limited Analytical Review is evaluated using the procedure contained in Section 11.8.3 of GIP-2. In many cases, this evaluation includes the requirement to determine if a particular support behaves in a ductile manner during seismic loads. Section 11.8.3 of GIP-2 states that supports characterized as ductile do not require an explicit lateral load check. For ductile supports, seismic ruggedness is assured by the vertical capacity check. Section 11.8.3.3 of GIP-l 2 provides criteria for performing a ductility check of raceway supports. In general, raceway supports are l characterized as ductile if they can respond to lateral seismic motion without degradation of primary

Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 Page 30 vertical support connections and anchorage. In making this assessment, local deformation and yielding of primary and secondary support members is acceptable prosided the deformation does not lead to brittle or premature failure ofoverhead vertical support. Section 11.8.3.3 of GIP-2 also states that supports are characterized as ductile if the anchorage and connection details have sufficient strength to develop the plastic strength of the main member. The criteria provided in Section 11.8.3.3 of GIP-2 were used to determine if supports selected for the Limited Analytical Review respond in a ductile manner. Supports, which were determined to respond in a non-ductile fashion, were evaluated for lateral loads as specified in Section II.8.3 A of, GIP-2. The two-step probess described above was used to evaluate raceway and raceway support systems at Oyster Creek in response to Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1. In the NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER-2), the NRC staff concurs that the plant walkdown guidelines contained in GIP-2 represent an acceptable approach for evaluating the seismic adequacy of existing cable and conduit raceways. The staff also stated that the proposed analytical procedure contained in GIP-2 is a reasonable approach to ensure that the cable and conduit raceways and supports are as rugged as those observed in past earthquake experience data. The methodology contained in GIP-2 was used to evaluate raceway systems and select supports for the Limited Analytical Review. The Limited Analytical Review, including an assessment of ductile behavior, was then conducted in accordance with the criteria contained in Section 11.8.3 of GIP-2. There are thus no questionable " ductile" support systems at Oyster Creek. All supports included in the Limited Analytical Review sampic that were detennined to be non-ductile were evaluated for both vertical and lateral loads as specified by GIP-2. The criteria contained in the GIP were used as the basis of determining if particular configurations exhibit ductile or non-ductile behavior. The determination was based on knowledge of structural behavior by the engineers performing the walkdowns and analysis and on conclusions reached from a review of the experience database. Columns of cable tray supported by supports consisting of three or more vertical members are ductile if they meet the GIP criteria for ductile behavior. In addition, configurations similar to those shown in Figure 8-5 if any exist in the plant are not inherently non-ductile. The only concern with such configurations is that the hard spot (i. e. the short support) will attract more load than would normally be expected. The short supports must be evaluated for this additional load but may still be evaluated as ductile if they exhibit ductile behavior. Thus, the raceway support evaluations are consistent with the implementation requirements of GIP-2.

Enclosure i 1940-98-20549 Page 31 OUESTION No.18b Our reviews and audits ofafew A-46 plants indicate irregularities in the use ofSection 8 ofGIP-2for raceway supports. Please provide thefollowing information in that context: b. Provide procedures that will be utilizedfor thefuture addition ofcables in the raceway trays, when partial-fill assumption is used in the limited analytical reviews ofthe raceway supports.

RESPONSE

The following procedures contain requirements that will ensure that new loads to all cable trays in the power plant, including those where partial fill assumption is used in the limited analytical review of raceway supports, will be adequately evaluated. ' A copy of each procedure is attache.i 1 1. Engineering Division Procedure EMP-002, Modification (Attachment 20) 2. Engineering Division Procedure, EP-009, Design Verification (Attachment 21) For resoludon of USI A-46 GPUN has conducted a verification of cable trays using the methodology per the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP). GPUN now uses the verification documents created as the base document for all cable trays in the power plant. The application of the GIP methodology for future use at Oyster Creek is controlled by procedure number EP-050, 'Use of SQUG methodology at GPU Nuclear'. Addition of cables to raceways will primarily be evaluated using GIP methods, normal engineering methods wdl be used where detailed analysis is necessary, Addition of cables to raceways is considered a configuration change to the power plant and requires that modification documents be piepared per GPUN procedure EMP-002 and be verified per procedure EP-009. Section 4.1.1 of EMP-002 requires that Exhibit 3 guidelines be followed to determine inputs to the design process. When cables are to be added to raceways, items No. 8 and 16 institute controls that must be addressed. These items state the following: Item No. 8: "If the modification involves chuges to raceway loads or meeway supports at Oyster Creek the PM shall notify the Manager, Mechanical / Structural Engineering, requesting that the change be evaluated against the load analyses and concurred with. item No.16: "If a modification impacts or involves any equipment on the USI A-46 Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) an evaluation of the effect of the modification on the SSEL components shall be performed in accordance with the methodology contained in the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure" To evaluate seismic effects of cable addition to raceways, the manager of the Mechanical / Structural section will assign a lead Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) and verification SCE per procedure EP-050 to review and evaluate the raceway structure. The lead SCE will first determine cable tray fill, then review existing calculations to determine if the loads used in the existing analysis bounds the added cable weight. Ifit does, the existing calculation is referenced in the modification document without any changes. Ifit does not,

f Enclosure I 1940-98-20549 Page 32 but there appears to be adequate margin in the existing analysis, then the calculation will be resised using GlP method per EP-050 or normal engineering method per EP-006 as applicable. If the GIP is applicable, l then verification is performed per EP-050. If normal engineering method is applicable, then verification is l per calculation procedure EP-006. This process ensures that cable or cables added to raceways are tracked, controlled and correctly addressed, including raceways that were evaluated bad., " rtial fill l assumption in the GIP limited analytical review. 1 Any modification prepared per procedure EMP-002 that falls within the scope of the GPU Nuclear l Operational Quality Assurance Plan must be design verified per GPUN procedure EP-009. Section 4.9.3 of this procedure states that 'The Verification General Checklist per Exhibit 3 shall be used as guidance by j the Design Verification Engineer for all design verifications except calculations' (Note: Design Verification of Calculations is addressed in Engineering Division Procedure EP-006). Item No. 5.5 on this checklist is Raceway Loads. The Design Verification Engineer checks this box once to indicate that racewny loads ' have been adequately addressed, not adequately addressed or not applicable. This verification will ensure that loads from cable addition to raceways have been adequately addressed per plant criteria. i i t l i i I l { l 1

l 6 l-L f l l ENCLOSUREII l GPU NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DATED MARCil 2,1998 l l IIUMAN FACTORS ASSESSMENT FOR TIIE RESOLUTION OF UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE A-46 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION i

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HUMAN FACTORS ASSESSMENT RESOLUTION OF USl A-46 (GENERIC LETTER 87-02) OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (Requested on March 2,1998) OUESTION No. A Describe what reviews were performed to determine ofany local operator actions required to safely shutdown the reactor (i.e., implement the SSEL) could be affected by potentially adverse environmental conditions (such as loss oflighting, excessive heat or humidity, or in-plant barriers) resultingfrom the seismic event. Describe how staffing was evaluated and describe the reviews which were conducted to ensure operators had adequate time and resources to respond to such events.

RESPONSE

As described in GIP-2, Part II, Section 3.2.5, the only potential events which must be considered in the USl A-46 program are a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and loss of offsite power (LOOP). The plant operating procedures used to shut down the reactor following a LOOP have previously been validated for local operator actions as one of the USAR Chapter 15 accident scenarios. This includes potentially adverse environmental conditions such as loss oflighting and excessive heat and humidity. Note that the USl A-46 accident scenario (SSE + LOOP) explicitly excludes loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) and high energy line breaks (HELB). Therefore, the heat and humidity conditions in the plant are postulated to be equivalent to those in a Chapter 15 LOOP scenario. The potential for failure of plant structures and equipment is not considered credible at eastern U.S. earthquake levels. Earthquake experience has shown that typical industrial structures are able to withstand earthquakes larger than the SSEs for eastern U.S. nuclear plants without collapse or failure. The potential for local failure of architectural features (such as suspended ceilings in the control room) and the potential for adverse seismic spatial interactions in the vicinity of safe shutdown equipment, where local operator actions may be required, was explicitly evaluated as required in GIP-2, Part II, Section 4.5 and Appendix D. For example, this review included a check that the masomy walls near safe shutdown equipment are seismically adequate based on the results of the IE Bulletin 80-11 program. The systems and equipment selected for seismic review in the USI A-46 program are those for which Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures are available to bring the plant from a normal operating mode to a hot shutdown condition. As required by GIP-2, Part II, Sections 3.2.8 and 3.7, the safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL) was resiewed by the plant Operations Department to confirm that it is compatible with these plant procedures. Since these plant procedures had already been validated to ensure that adequate time and resources are available for operators to respond to a LOOP incident, it was not necessary to re-validate these procedures for the USI.(-46 program. The only additional operator actions, beyond those associated with the LOOP accident scenario, which must be performed to bring the plant from a normal operating mode to a hot shutdown condition are those specifically associated with the vibratory motion of the SSE. The results of the review of these operator actions with respect to whether there is adequate time and resources to respond to the postulated events are summarized below. l The number of operator actions as a result of the vibratory motion of the seismic event has reduced to a total of l four. Defining each " operator action" relay as such gives the impression that there are a large number of l individual and separate operater actions i.e. 53. Given that the number of operator actions (as detailed in the response to Question No.7 (Enclosure I)) is limited to four, staffing is not viewed as a problem. Any difficulty associated with operators accessing these areas was also covered in the response to Question No.7 (Enclosure I). A concern with the actuation of CO2 fire suppression systems from detectors sensing dust as smoke (from a real fire) was evaluated; the system of concem was determined to be a manually actuated system rather than an automatically actuated system.

1 j

Page 2 l OUESTION No. B l As part ofthe licensee 's review, were any control room structures which cordd impact the operators ability to respond to the seismic event identified? Such items might inchade but are not limited to: MCR ceiling tiles, non-bolted cabinets, and non-restrainedpieces ofequipment (e.g., computer keyboards, monitors, stands, printers, etc.). Describe hu each ofthese potential sources ofinteractions has been evaluated and describe the schedulefor implementation ofthefinal resohitions.

RESPONSE

1 The control room structure and contents were reviewed for seismic ir luced missile and interaction hazards and other structural concerns. A single document was not created fo. this review, instead the review was tied to the components verified in the control room. Outliers were issued on hazards that could cause malfunction of equipment. The basis for concems that could be readily resolved from the inspection were documented in the SEWS. The outliers were resolved either by modification, by removal of the hazard or j by detailed inspection to establish adequate seismic behavior. Interaction concerns that were handled under other NRC programs were not re-evaluated as part of SQUG, but a review was conducted to veriry that the l associated activity that corrected the problem was completed. These concerns, outliers and NRC,rograms 1 are discussed below. The discussion shows that the operator's ability to respond to a seismic event is not compromised. Control Room Ceilina (concem) A detailed inspection of the control room (CR) suspended ceiling was performed. The ceiling grates are clipped in place to the ceiling runners which a c hung by wires from the underside of the concrete slab above the CR, the hanging wires are configured in vertical and tension X brace configuration. The ends of the ceiling runners are attached to the CR walls. The SCEs judged that this configuration will adequately support the ceiling and grates during a seismic event. This basis is documented in EQE calculation 42112-C-001. Non Bolted cabinets (outlier) Outliers document that cabinets 10F & 10XF and 12R and 12XR are not bolted together. A modification installed bolts that adequately tie these cabinets together resolving these outliers. The modification document is OC-CCD-403024-001. Non-Restrained pieces of equipment (outliers) 1. Panel 10F: Walkdown determinet en interaction issue between panel 10F and copiers, printers and file l cabinets located in the east aisle-way. These components were removed from the control room. 2. Panel 16R: Walkdown determined interactions with a storage locker ana a water cooler. The storage locker was removed from the CR while the water cooler was restrained to the CR west wall resolving these outliers. The modification document is OC-CCD-403024-001. j i

~..- - -... ~ - -. -.. - - ~ - l. l L 1 - l_ Page 3 I l l 3. Panel 17R-l Walkdown determined an interaction with an un-anchored file cabinet. The file cabinet was removed from the control room. l 4. Panel 19R: l Walkdown determined that a ladder stored in the vicinity of panel 19R may pose an interaction issue. A seismic restraint was installed to secure the ladder. The modification document is OC-CCD-403024-001. l All CR oanels (outlier.) i Duther. l-Fluorescent light bulbs inside CR panels need to be positively restrained. This outlier was resolved by - i detailed inspection of the existing light bulb support configuration. The inspection determined that the light bulb is adequately restrained in the slip-in socket and cannot be easily dislodged by hand force but can be dislodged by prying with an insulated screw driver at the ends. The SCEs judged that the required prying force to dislodge it is larger than the earthquake loads caused by the inertial mass; therefore, the light bulbs will stay in place during a seismic event resolving this outlier. ' NRC Procrams (IEB 80-11) l The block walls that form the East and South boundaries of the CR were evaluated / corrected so that m a seismic event they do not pose an interaction hazard with components located inside the control room. This protection ensures that operators in the CR will not be impeded from responding to a seismic event. i L l j-e U i r L

I 1 Page 4 OUESTION No. C Describe what reviews were performed to determine ifany local operator actions were required to reposition " bad actor relays. " For any such activities describe how adverse environmental conditions (such as loss oflighting, excessive heat or humidity, or in-plant barriers) resultingfrom the seismic event were analyredanddispositioned Describe how staffing was evaluatedanddescribe the reviews which were conducted to ensure operators had adequate time and resources to respond to such events.

RESPONSE

The term " bad actor" relays is a colloquial expression typically used to refer to the specific relays listed in l the relay review procedure EPRI Report NP-7148, Appendix E. Technically these relays are defined as l l " low ruggedness" relays and, for purposes of the functionality review, are assumed to malfunction. The response to RAI 1 Question No.7 (Enclosure I) discusses Oyster Creck's evaluation of operator actions resulting from the relay functionality review This discussion also addresses the impact of adverse environmental conditions resulting from the event, staffing, and time required to respond to such events. No " low ruggedness" relays were identified at Oyster Creek as a result of the operator action evaluation. y Therefore, no operator actions result from the malfunction of any " low ruggedness" relays. h ( J l l l l ,. -i

l 1 Page5 OUESTION No. D Describe which ofthe operator actions associated with resetting SSEL equipment q/fected bypostulated relay chatter are considered to be routine and consistent with the skill ofthe craft. Ifnot considered skill ofthe craft, what training and operationalaids were developedto ensure the operators willperform the actions required to reset effected equipment?

RESPONSE

Resetting of relays as a result of a safe shutdown earthquake or restarting equipment by control switch manipulation is consistent with the skill and training required of operators. Such activities are included within the scope of expected operator actions contained in our Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency. Operating Procedures. No specific operational aids or training is required for resetting or restoring systems which may be affected - solely by relay chatter during a safe shutdown earthquake. i L 1 L 5. i l l i l. \\

__ - 1 Page 6 OUESTION No. E Assume the alarms associated with a " bad actor relays " are expected to anmmciate during the seismic event. Do the operators have to respond to those anmmciators and review the anmmciator response procedures associated with themfor potential action? How would those additional actions impact the operators ability to implement the Normal Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures required to place the reactor in a safe shutdown condition? I

RESPONSE

The term " bad actor" relays is a colloquial expression typically used to refer to the specific relays listed in the relay review procedure EPRI Report NP-7148, Appendix E. Technically these relays are dermed as " low ruggedness" relays and, for purposes of the functionality review, are assumed to malfunction. As described in EPRI Report NP-7148, Section 3.5.3, relays affecting alarms need not be seismically adequate and were screened as chatter acceptable during the functionality review. Since these nlays were screened as chatter acceptable, their manufacturer and model numbers were not determined. Therefore, i these applications may or may not contain " low ruggedness" or seismically adequate relays. The fact that these relays have not been determined to be seismically adequate would lead one to assume that they malfunction during a seismic event and cause spurious alarms. l As described in EPRI Report NP-7148, Section 3.5.3,50 to 100 or more alarms are expected to annunciate following an earthquake that causes the turbine to trip and the reactor to scram. In addition to this large number of alarms, there may be several earthquake induced spurious alarms resulting from such events as water sloshing in tanks, oil sloshing in transformers, actuation of vibration protective instrumentation on rotating eqeipment, and contact chatter of relays. When the avalanche of alarms occurs, the operator will clearly be aware that the plant has tripped. Plant procedures and operator traisig require that operators respond to the turbine trip and reactor scram by confirming the scram and trip and checking important levels, temperatures, pressures, flows, and electrical switching resulting from associated power transfers. These confirmatory checks will take more than a minute to go through during which time the operators will be busy making these checks and not responding to specific alarms. The earthquake motion is assumed to last less than a minute and the causes of the spurious alarms will have gone away during this period while operators are responding to the plant trip. As further described in EPRI Report NP-7148, Section 3.5.3, if an earthquake occurs and the turbine does not trip, the reactor does not scram, and off-site power is not lost, the plant will continue tc operate barring any operator intervention. A few spurious alarms may come up on the main control boards in this situation. The number of spurious alarms in this case is expected to be small because the more common l vibration induced relay actuations that have been noted to occur during earthquakes will result in a plant trip. l l The NRC staff and SQUG representatives discussed this topic in detail, including discussions held at a . meeting on August 3,1988, where this was a primary topic of discussion. The results of that evaluation and review are sununarized in EPRI NP-7148, Section 3.5.3, where the following conclusion is reached: "Accordingly, there app. irs to be no reasonable bases or evidence which would suggest that spurious alarms resulting from an earthquake may lead to abnormal operator responser. l Therefore, special operating procedures or relay evaluation actions to address potential spurious l alarms are not considered warrar.ted and relays affecting alarms need not be seismically adequate."

l^ 1 l 1 Page 7 l, The NRC staff accepted the relay functionality review procedure summarized in GIP-2 ad described in l. detail in EPRI NP-7148 (including the above conclusion) in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 on GIP-2. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to perform any additional reviews of the effect spurious alarms caused by " low ruggedness" relays or other causes as a rasult of a seismic event. i l l. l i i l ) l l J i ) i i I i i l i e i i i

. 1 Page 8 OUESTION No. F To the extent that Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures were modifled to provide plant staffwith additionalguidance on mitigating the A-46 Seismic Event, describe what training was requis ed andprovided to the licensed operators, nor.-licensed operators, and otherplant staffrequired to res, >ond to such events. l l -.

RESPONSE

i The response to the A46 seismic event involves following the existing normal, abnonnal and symptom-l based emergency operating procedures. As such no special procedural training is required for licensed and i l non-licenscxl operators and other plant staff. A revision to our Seismic Response procedure will be made, l however, to provide explicit information about the potential loss of equipment due to relay malfunction. Although restart of this equipment is included in existing procedures, the Seismic Response procedure will provide a more centralized repository for communicating this aspect of the A46 event. 1 l l f t I l 8

\\ ATTACHMENT 1 " Rule ofthe Box " Components on Oyster Creek NGS SSEL SYSTEM LINE NUMBER EQUIP ID EQUIP CLASS EQUIP DESCRIPTION LOCATION 211 DPIS-1B05 Al I8 EMER COND "A"II!Gli SYS FLOW RK-03,SECTION A g 2 DPIS-IB05 A2 18 EMER COND "A" IIIGil SYS FLOW RK-03,SECTION A DPIS-IB05 Bl 18 EA.ER COND "B"IIIGil SYS FLOW RK-03,SECTION A 3 DPIS-IBOS B2 18 EMER COND "B" filGil SYS 11DW RK 03, SECTION A 4 DPIS-IB1I Al I8 EMER COND "A"IIIGil COND FLOW RK-03,SECTION A 5 DPIS-IBl1 A2 18 EMER COND "A"111G11 COND 110W RK-03,SECTION A 6 DPIS-IBli B1 18 EMER COND "B" HIGli COND FLOW RK-03,SECTION A 7 DPIS-IBII B2 13 EMER COND "B"1IIG2 COND 110W RK-03,SECTION A g 212 IF/2F-0106 20 CORE SPRAY PUMP 'If MOTOR CURRENT CRIPNL IF/2F 46 AMMETER IF/2F-0107 20 CORE SPkAY PUMP'A' MOTOR CURRENT CR/PNL IF/2F 47 AMMETER IF/2F-3108 20 CORE SPRAY PUMP'ly MOTOR CURRENT CR/PNL IF/2F 4g AMMETER 1F/2F-0109 20 CORE SPRAY PUMP U MOTOR CURRENT CR/PNL IF/2F 49 AMMETER F1-RV0027A 20 C.S. SYS 1 FLOW IND CONTROL ROOM / 58 PNL IF/2F FI-RV0027B 20 C.S. SYS II FLOW IND CONTROL ROOM / 59 PNI. I172F Wednesday, September 09.1998 Page i of 7

_ _ - - - - - _. ~. - SYSTEM LINE NUMBER EQUIP ID EQUIP CLASS EQUIP DESCRIPTION LOCATION FI-RV-0004A 20 C.S. SYS I PMP PRESS IND CONROL ROOM / t 76 PNL IF/2F PI-RV-0004B 20 C.S. SYS 11 PMP PRESS IND CONROL ROONi/ t y . PNL IF/2F e 5 225 305-0125 21 IICUlI20! NITROGEN SCRAM ACCUMUIATOR llCU-305-XXXX 449 305-0128 21 IICUNITROGEN SCRAM ACCUMULATOR IICU-305-XXXX 450 CV-305-0126 07 CRD IN!ET SCRAM VALVE IICU-305-XXXX 452 453 CV-305-0127 07 CRD OUTIET SCRAM VALVE IICU-305-XXXX i 50-3054117 08B SCRAM AIR PILOT SOL VLV !!CU-305-XXXX 4n 478 SO-305-0118 08B SCRAM AlR PIIDTSOLVLV IICU-305-XXLT S0-305-0120 08B FLOW CONTROL WITIIDRAWL SOL IICU-305-XLTX 479 SO-305-0121 OSB 11JDW CONTROLINSERT SOL llCU-305-ATXX 480 S0-305-0122 08B FIDW CONTROL WITIIDRAWLSOL llCU-305-XXXX l 481 S0-305-0123 08B FLOW CONTROLINSERT SOL IICU-305-XXXX 482 241 i FI-IP0004A 20 CNTMNT SPRY 11.DW IND PANEL IF/2F 578 FI-IP0004B 20 CNTMNT SPRY FLOWIND PANEL IF/2F [ 579 243 L LI-243-0002A 20 TORUS WIDE RANGE LVLIND CONROL ROOM / 724 PNL IF/2F i Wednemlay, Septernher 09,1998 Page 2 of 7 I t

-y. ,4 l 4 4 k-SYSTEM UNE NUMBER EQUIP ID EQUIP CLASS EQUIP DESCRIPTION LOCATION LI-243-0002B 20 ~ TORUS WIDE RANGE LVLIND CONROLROOM/ 725 - PNL IF/2F LR-0037 20 TORUS WATER LEVE1/DRYWELL PRESSURE CONTROL ROOM / i 726 (WIDE RANGE) RECORDER PNL 16R r LR-0038 20 TORUS WATER LEVEllDRYWEli PRESSURE CONTROL ROOM / [ 727 (WIDE RANGE) RECORDER PNL 16R I PR-0053 20 . WIDE RANGE DRYWE11 PRESSURE RECORDER CONTROL ROOM / 732 PNL 16R PR4054 20 WIDE RANGE DRYWE11 PRESSURE RECORDER CONTROL ROOM / 733 PNL 16R 532 IF/2F-0102 20 ESW PUMP l-1 (52-A) MOTOR CURRENT CR/PNL IF/2F 916 AMMETER IF/2F-0104 20 ESW PUMP l-3 (52-C) MOTOR CURREhrr CR/PNL IF/2F r 917 AMMETER r 621 IRM-RIIO1B 0 LNTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR #12 CONTROL 1046 ROOM /PNL 3R 622 t DIT-5-IA009I A 18 RPV WTR LVL(FUEL ZONE)CII.A RK-03 1049 Il-1-IA0094A 20 RX FUEL ZONE IIVEL IND CONTROLROONU i 1056 PNL 5F/6F LI-2-IA009411 20 RX FUELZONE LEVEL IND CONTROL ROOhF 1057 PNL F/6F LI-RE-0021 A 20 REACTOR VESSEL LEVELINDICATOR CONTROL ROOMr 1060 PNL 5F/6F LI-RE-0021B 20 REACTOR VESSEL LEVELINDICATOR CONTROL ROOM / 1061 PNL 5F/6F Page 3 of7 Wednesday, September 09,1998 f h i

L.. i SYSTEM UNE NUMBER EQUlP ID EQUIP CLASS : EQUIP DESCRIPTION . LOCATION l LT-RE-05/19A 18 . RPV WTR LVL(NARROW RANGE)CIL A RK-01 1068 ? 1069' LT-RE-05/19B 18 RPV %7R LVL(NARROW P ANGE)CII. B RK42 PI-622-0849 20 RX FUELZONE PRESS IND , CONTROL ROONU 1076 PNL 5F/6F PI-622-0850 20 RX FUELZONE PRESS IND CONTROL ROOM / l 1077 PNL 5F/6F PS-IA0083A 18 EMRV NR108A ll!GII PRESS SW RK-01 l 1080 PS-IA0083C 18 EMRV NR108C IIIGIl PRESS SW RK-02, SECTION B 1082 IT-55-IA0092A 18 RX FUELZONE PRESS XMTR RK-03 1088 TE-57-0002A 19 RPV WTR LVL(FUEL ZONE)CILA RK43 3:00 UR-622-0024A 20 RPV LEVEI/ PRESSURE CIIANNEL A PANEL 5F/6F ,,g3 UR-622-0024B 20 RPV LEVE11 PRESSURE ClIANNEL B PANEL 5F/6F II04 628 RPIS 20 . CRD POSITION INDICATION (FULLCORE CONTROL ROOM / i195 DISPLAY) PNL4F 642 PI-642 0009A 20 NARROW RANGE DRYWELL PRESSURE CR/PNL IF/2F 1204 INDICATOR (CII.A) PI-642-0009B 20 NARROW RANGE DRYWELI PRESSURE CR/PNL IF/2F 1205 INDICATOR (CII.B) 664 AR-0001 20 DW %It2/02 CONCENTRATION . CR/PNL 16R 1216 AR-0002 20 DW %ll2A12 CONCENTRATION CR/PNL 16R 1217 I I l' age 4 of 7 Wednesday, September 09,1998 i [ ~

+ d, - SYSTEM UNE NUMBER EQUIP ID EQUIP CLASS EQUIP DESCRIPTION LOCATION RI-0790 20 CONTAINMENTI!!Gil RANGE RADIATION CONTROL ROOM / 1220-MONITOR (Cll.1) PNL2R RI-0791 20 CONTAINMENT 111G11 RANGE RADIATION CONTROL ROOM / 1221 MONITOR (Cll.2) PNL2R TI-664-0042A 20 SPTMS TEMP IND FOR TT-6644)030A TIIRU 35 A CONTROLROONU 1234 PNL IBR T1464-0042B 20 SPTMS TEMP IND FOR TT-6644)o30B TilRU 358 CONTROL ROONU 1235 PNL 19R "Il-6644)043A 20 SPTMS TEMPIND FOR DIVISION I CONTROL 1236 ROOM /PNL IF/2F TI-664-0043B 20 SrrMS TEMP IND FOR DIVISION 2 CONTROL 1237 ROOM /PNL IF/2F 666 Al-0001-A 20 DRYWELL%II2 CONCENTRATION IIVEL CONTROL ROOM / 123g INDICATOR (CIIANNEL A) PNL 16R Al-0001-B 20 DRYWELL%Il2 CONCENTRATION LEVEL CONTROL ROOM / 1239 INDICATOR (CIIANNEL B) PNL16R Al-0002-A 20 DRYWELL%O2 CONCENTRATIO' LEVEL CONTROL ROOM / A 1240 INDICA 11)R(CilANNEL A) PNL 16R Al-0002-B 20 DRYWELL%O2 CONCENTRATION LEVEL CONTROL ROOM / 1241 INDICATOR (CilANNEL B) PNL16R 735 DC-I-125V DC 20 MCC DC-1 125V DC AUTO XFER SW MCC DC-1 1326 SW-1B2 !4 MANUALTIIROWOVER 125V DC SW TO USS-1U2 480V SWOR RMtJSS 1335 1B2 SW-1B3 14 MANUALTi!ROWOVER 125V DC SW TO USS-ID3 EIEC. PAD / USS IB3 1336 SW-1D4160 14 MANUALTIIROWOVER 125V DC SW TO ID-4160 4I60V SWGR ID 1337 Page 5 007 Wedneminy, September 09,1998 I t m m = - -++++-- a . m

.-g_- K,. SYSTEM UNE NUMBER EQUIP ID EQUIP CLASS. EQUIP DESCRIPTION LOCATION 741 1343 Ml-DCP. 20 DG-I GEN CONT PANEL' EDG#1 .l t DG-2-DCP 20 DG-2 GEN CONT PANEL EDO #2 1345 = 823 DM-56-0079 10 EF-1-2u VORTEX DAMPER EF-t-20 137g DM-56-0082 10 SF-t-20 VORTEX DAMPER SF-l-20 1381 826 C-826-003B 21 C.R. A/C UNIT 1r DIRECT EXPANSION COOllNO M-826 001B 1410 COIL FN-826-008B 09 CONT RM IIVAC SPLY FAN SYSTEM *B* M-826-001B I435 t 852 j V 4200G 08B S. SCRAM DISC VOL VENT VLV PILOT S.V-V-15-0137 l 1473 t V-6-2003 08B N. SCRAM DISC VOL VENT VLV PILOT S.V. V-15-0136 1476 I r [ V42004 08B S. SCRAM DISC VOL VENT VLV PILOT S.V. V-15-0137 gg77 f V 42680 OSB MSIV4B PILOT DC SOL VLV RK-411001 1482 i 1483 . l V 42681 08B MSIV4B PILOT AC SOL VLV RK-41 I-001 t V-6-2684 08B MSIV4A PILOT DC SOL VLV RK-4Il-001 i 1484 r V 42685 08B MSIV4A PILOT AC SOL VLV RK 411-001 6 1485 V 42916 08B N. SCRAM DISC VOL VENT VLV PILOT S.V. V-15-0136 1486 I r i Wednesday, Segdember 09,1998 Page 6 of 7 { I m m e v- --4v--

o-4 L ' Gr. SYSTEM UNE NUMBER ' EQUIP ID ' EQUIP CLASS EQUIP DESCRIPTION LOCATION 861 P-39-001 09 DG-1 DUST HIN IROWER EDG#I 1495 t P-39-002 09 - IXb2 DUST BIN BIDWER EDG #2 M96 's P-39-003 05 DG #1 LUBE OIL CIRCUIATING PMP EIXi #1 1497 P-39-004 05 DG #2 LUBE OIL CIRCUIATING PMP EIX) #2 99g P-39-023 05 DG #11URDO LUBE OIL PUMP EIX) #1 j 1499 i P-39-025 05 DG #2 TURDO LUBE OIL PUMP EDG #2 1500 862 P-39-013 05 FUEL OlLTO DAY TANK T-39-003 XFER PMP M-39-001 150I. P-39-014 05 FUELOILTO DAY TANK T-39 003 XFER PMP M-39-001 1502 P-39-015 05 FUEL OILTO DAY TANK T-39-004 XFER PMP M-39-002 .I503 P-39-016 05 FUEL OILTO DAY TANK T-39-004 XFER PMP M-39-002 1504 r i 8 i I l l Page 7 of 7 Wednesday, September 09,1998 l t 1 ~.. _ - _, _ _ _ _ _ _ ..m. .m m-.m --a +-

East-West Direction (Y) North-South Direction (X) 1.2 ) 1.2 ) 1.0 \\ 1.0 \\ S \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ 6 ^ x 6 x r g f) o mL. 8 ( 4 o 4 .4 r-3:Y ~ ' %+ // ~g f/ M =' s r 3 1 'd 10 10 10 l 3 6' 10 10 10 Frequency (Hz) Frequency (Hz) m g e3 Vertical Direction (Z) Y .8 Legend: w CO Broadened 5% Envel. (5 Lo'c's-LB,BE & UB) 6 Broadened 3% Envel. a } (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) o o r 1.5 x SOUG Bounding U /

4

) i Spectrum 'g Notes: O 4 t 1 SSE Level

p 7

~ Accelerations in g's J BE Case Broadened 151 s 1 LB & UB Cases Broadened 101 'd 10 10 10 l Frequency (Hz) DI 50124-C-213: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Design Basis I i Reactor Building First Floor, Elevation 23'-6", Node 3 .D0

North-South Direction (X) East-West Direction (Y) 1.2 3 1.2 1.0 I-3 i \\ 1.0 .8 .8 r 3 s 1 j .6 s a d q j .6 r 'g / ) ^ g / o o 4 4 .4 - S g -n. Q ~FQ_ y ~g Y ~ 1, 1 1 3 6 10 10 10 6 10 10 10 s Frequency (Hz) Frequency - (Hz) n n g-C z 3 Vertical Direction (Z) H 7 .8 Legend: w t A l Broadened St Envel. h (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) 6 c \\ Broadened 3% Envel. o - j (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) { r U 1.5 x SQUG Bounding o (

4 T

Spectrum j U ) Notes: l \\ 1 SSE Level .2 q, ) Accelerations in g's ) d BE Case Broadened 151 [ s LB 5 UB Cases Broadened 101 l 10* 10 6 10 Frequency (Hz) Id[) 50124-C-213: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Design Basis DR Reactor Building Second Floor, Elevation 51'-3", Node 4

East-West Direction (Y) North-South Direction (X) 1.2 3 1.2 3 1.0 / i o 1.0 \\ \\ } a f h \\ J c \\ i c .6 .6 o M .4 o \\' / M 4 } / - A .2 p '7.e .2 7 / , / 6 10 10 10 ~ 10* 10 6 10 Frequency (Hz) Q Frequency (Hz) N mh h 3 Vertical Direction (Z) z H Y

1.0 Legend

S~ 01 Broadened 5% Envel. [1 (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) 'O l Broadened 3% Envel. c L (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) o g i p 6 { h 1.5 x SQUG Bounding r }

Spectrum,

)) s.. N f \\ Notes: 1 SSE Level / Accelerations in g's BE Case Broadened 151 LB & UB Cases Broadened 101 10* 10 6* 10 Frequency (Hz) 50124-C-213: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Design Basis Reactor Building Third Floor, Elevation 75'-3", Node 5 iR

North-South Direction (X) East-West Direction (Y) 1.2 1.2 1.0 /- / i 1.0 \\ \\ \\ .8 .8 e \\ \\ g h .6 g h .6 g 8 3 u / \\, u ( 4 .4 4 .4 j / \\ .2 p. - b l er g k- .2 y e,-- j f L ,_s y 6* 10 10* 10 5 '10 10* 10 n y Frequency (Hz) Frequency (Itz) g E E O X 16 Vertical Direction (Z) Y 4.0 g g Legend: Broadened St Envel. 3 f1 (5 Loc's-LB, BE & UB) f .0 f j Broadened 31 Envel. (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) g j U 11 u 1.5 x SQUG I}ounding 2.0 Q (( (C Spectrum. 8 r3 4 Y ( Notes: .0 3 33g 3,,,1 / f' Accelerations in g's g BE Case Broadened 15% l 2 'd 10 10* 10 LB & UB Cases Broadened 10% E Frequency (Hz) p I -l 50124-C-213: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Design Basis Drywell, Elevation 47'-10", Node 52

t ' North-South Direction =(X) East-West Direction (Y) 1.2 1.2 3 \\ 1.0 p - ---\\ q 1.0 I l '8 r '\\ ' 8 i ii / ) \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ O - 3 r U '6 2

6 2

lo h \\ ll 3 o o N .4 N 4 Q y l-,- { f( ..,1 .2 p .2 rf j / y [ s h -{gl 1 2 10 10 10 6' 10 10* 10 O l Frequency (Hz) I 7) Frequency (Hz) E b f X 16 Vertical Direction (Z) m

4.0 Legend

a M I J Broadened 5t Envel. (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) 3.0 e k Broadened 3% Envel. { [ ) (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) f o 1.5 x SQUG Bounding [ y 2.0 Y f l Spectrum [ 8 i 4 arq Notes: 1.0 1 SSE Level f Accelerations in g's f d BE Case Broadened 15% [ j 1 1 2 LB & UB Cases Broadened 10% '6 10 10 10 Frequency (Hz) [ i L F i S0124-C-213: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Design Basis t ( .Drywell, Elevation 71'-6", Node 56 k 3

1 1 I East-West Direction (Y) -North-South Direction (X) 1.2 3 1.2 1.0 /- 3 r f I 1.0 i } E k '\\ \\ .8 g g, \\ / 1 \\ .8 o / r .6 .6 - l l u u. 9 N .4 N 4 [ '- A .2 7 .2 l w 7 '~ P s p ,s 1 ' 6' 10 10' 10 a> '6 10 -10 10 ' Frequency (Hz) g-Frequency (Hz) 3 ,to c X 16 Vertical Direction (Z) g 1 w i 4.0 I Legend: .7 J Broadened 5% Envel. / p' (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) 3.0 i c Broadened 3% Envel, 0 3 (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) \\ 1.5 x SQUG Bounding u I L r ( i Spectrum *, y LJF l 8 ,1 N Notes: 1.0 1 33g g,,,g Accelerations in g's p d BE Case Broadened 151 l ~ l LB & UB Cases Broadened 10% 1

6

.10 10 10 i Frequency (Hz) l l 50124-C-213: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Design Basis f j Drywell, Elevation 82'-9", Node 57 I

North-South Direction (X) East-West Direction (Y) 1.2 1.2 L 6 1.0 1.0 .8 \\ \\ .8 \\ \\ .6 .6 d g g g u M .4 -- Q Q M 4 l ~.- _. / ) a / k .2 i .2 s ff c, ~ "~ ~~ 0

0 3

16 10 IO 10 '16' 10 10' 10 h Frequency (Hz) - Frequency (112) E ij; Vertical Direction (Z) y [ Legend: m Broadened 5% Envel. 4 / (6 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) J Broaden'ed 3% Envel. II (6 Loc *s-LB,BE & UD) .3 n g 1.5 x SQUG Bounding g / ([ Spectrum 1 ~ 3 .2 u y Notes: k I SSE L*V*1 '~ '1 Accelerations in g's 6 s BE Case Broadened 15% ~ 2

d' 10 10*

10 LB & US Cases Broadened 10% rrequency (Hz) I 50124-C-208: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Turbine Building, Operating Floor, Elev. 46'-6"

North-South Direction (X) East-West' Direction (Y) .1.2 i 1.2 i 1.0 1.0; \\ \\ .8 \\ .8 \\ \\ q j .6 --s j .6 -3 q g 1 g M .4 N M .4 [ -,\\ / \\ l i e [ ' k / .2 d t + .2 7 4_

P G

~ d* 10 10* 10 '16* 10 10* 10 1 k Frequency (Hz) . Frequency (Hz) h N so C 5 X 16g Vertical Direction (Z) o> 4.0 g b Legend: b Broadened St Envel. I 3.0 a (4 Loc's-LB, BE & UB) a Broadened 31 Envel. o j / (4 Loc's-LB, BE & UD) g j g p Q 1.5 x SQUG Bounding U 2.0 Spectrum O 4 Notes: 1.0 1 SSE Level [ Accelerations in g's BE Case Broadened 151 ~ 6 10 10* 10 LB & UB Cases Broadened 101 rrequency (Itz) lijii} @g i 50124-C-208: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Turbine Building, Control Room Floor, Elev. 4 6'-6" i

North-South Direction (X) East-West Direction (Y) 1.2 \\ 1.2 3 1.0 / / 1.0 \\ \\

t!.

if; a c .8 .8 U. 6 i 6 g d N .-4 g-r 3u ) \\ ( j \\ ~ o4 4 4 4 i / \\ A

~

f M_ y '2 7 d; s --E >H . 0 -1 . s 0 1 2 . 0 -1 0 1 2 10 10 10 10 10

10 10 10 g

n Frequency (Hz) Frequency (Hz) 12 to h Vertical Direction (Z) l U [ Legend: A Broadened 51 Envel. 3 4 il (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) l Broadened 31 Envel. ,3 ,r (5 Loc's-LB, DE & UD) '{ y (- [ \\ 1.5 x SQUG Bounding Spectrum j' g f i g .2 r g Notes: l 4 1 SSE Level J Accelerations in g's g y BE Case Broadened 151 ___d l l, . :q # l 3 f 10 10 10 LB & UB Cases Broadened 101 Frequency (Hz) i 50124-C-209: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, l. Intake Structure, Elevation 6'-0"

i North-South Direction (X) Erst-West Direction (Y) 1.2-1.2 3 1.0 / / 1.0 \\ ~ \\ 8 8 s \\ s 4 '6 - J( \\ c ) S ___1 t \\

6 O

2 ] O N N 2 ]/ '~" s c 8 / h 8 r

ll

/ .2 .2 g y x / / ( I A ~5 10 10 10 6 10 10* 10 Frequency (Hz) Frequency (Itz) o g oC

g 8

Vertical Direction (Z) H y .6 Legend: c ~ 03 / .5 Broadene'd St Envel. f S [ /~ ( (5 Loc *3-LB,BE & UB) r, t

4 Broadened 3% Envel.

{ f f (5 Loc's-LB,BE & UB) U

3 1.5 x SOUG Bounding f

{ Spectrum ' o 1 Yt .2 Notes: 1 SSE Level

1 Accelerations in g's

/ BE Case Broadened 15% ~ ' 6' 10 10 10 LB s UB Cases Broadened 10% 2 Frequency (IIz) il 50124-C-210: GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, E EDG Building, Foundation Accelerations, Elevation 23' _}}

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