ML20198B138
| ML20198B138 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1998 |
| From: | Anderson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Rainey G PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812180071 | |
| Download: ML20198B138 (21) | |
Text
-_
3 i
December 8, 1998 l
Mr. G. Rainey, President PECO Nuclear
, Nuclear Group Headquarters j
Correspondence Control Desk l
P. O. Box 195 Wayne, PA 19087-0195
SUBJECT:
Mid-Year Inspection Resource Planning Meeting - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Dear Mr. Rainey:
On November 10,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM). The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region I to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in May 1999. contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues
]
Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this IRPM process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or
.other docketed correspondence between the NRC and PECO Energy. The IRPM may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.
This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normalissuance of NRC inspection j
reports and other correspondence.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Peach Bottom IRPM review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan, if you have any questions, please contact Clifford Anderson at 610-337-5227.
Sincerely, Original Signed by:
Clifford J. Anderson, Chief 9812180071 981208 PDR ADOCK 05000277 Projects Branch 4 G
PDR Division of Reactor Projects f
kU: R&dDG 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY Ifr4D
Gi Rainey 2
4
-l Docket Nos. 50-277,50-278 j
l
Enclosures:
- 1) Plant Issues Matrix 2)~ Inspection Plan
- cc w/encis:
J J. Hagan, Vice President, Nuclear Station Support J. Doering, Vice President, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station M. Warner, Plant Manager, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station G. D. Edwards, Chairman, Nuclear Review Board R. Boyce, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance i
. A. F. Kirby,111, External Operations - Delmarva Power & Light Co.-
G. J. Lengye!, Manager, Experience Assessment J. W.' Durham, Sr., Senior Vice President and General Counsel T. M. Messick, Manager, Joint Generation, At! antic Electric W. T. Henrick, Manager, External Affairs, Public Service Electric & Gas R. McLean, Power Plant Siting, Nuclear Evaluations
~ D. Levin, Acting Secretary of Harford County Council R. Ochs, Maryland Safe Energy Coalition J. H. Walter, Chief Engineer, Public Service Commission of Marylans Mr. & Mrs. Dennis Hiebert, Peach Bottom Alliance Mr. & Mrs. Kip Adams Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State of Maryland
- TMl-Alert (TMIA) a l-a i
.~
~
.-~..- -.--
t G. Rainey 3
Distribution w/encis:
Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)
H. Miller, RA/W. Axelson, DRA (1)
C. Hehl, DRP ;
J. Wiggins, DRS
' R. Crienjak, DRP
. L. Nicholson, DRS
. C. Anderson, DRP DRS Branch Chiefs D. Florek, DRP
. Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) l
-J. Noggle, DRS G. Smith, DRS N. McNamara, DRS M. Oprendek, DRP R.Junod,DRP NRC Resident inspector PUBLIC Distribution w/encis: (Via E-Mail)
B. McCabe, OEDO R. Capra, PDI-2, NRR inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
M. Thadani, NRR B. Buckley, NRR R. Correia, NRR M. Campion, ORA DOCDESK c.
i DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ BRANCH 4\\PPR\\PB\\PB-IRPM.11 To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:
"C" = Copy without attachment / enc)dRyp "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE Rl/pRh l
Rl/DRP l
NAME DF M k /
CAnderson (jo i
DATE 12'F6/98 12/g/98 l
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
,----,,-------.----m 3
Q ENCLOSURE 1 4
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX t
l i
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description 09/15/98 Negative IR 98-07 N
OPS 1A PECO properly completed a pressure test that verified the integrity of the unit 2 high 3A pressure coolant injection piping. The system was adequately returned to operable status.
However, the insulation removal from high pressure coolant injection piping and components was poorly controlled and executed during this test. Also, operations personnel did not monitor the high pressure service water pump room temperature during the test, until after the room high temperature alarm was received.
09/15/98 Positive IR 98-07 N
OPS 1C Nuclear Review Board members provided critical reviews in the areas of operations, 5B maintenance, and engineering during the meeting held on August 6,1998.
09/15/98 Positive IR 98-07 N
OPS 1C The recently issued procedure, OM-P-11.4, Revision 1, " Operations Peer Checking" provided enhanced guidance to operations personnel regarding responsibilities and criteria for performing peer checks. This procedure provided guidance that can help reduce human performance errors if fully implemented.
09/15/98 Negative IR 98-07 L
OPS 2A On July 17,1998, the 2A condensate pump had to be shutdown quickly due to rapid ly 1A climbing temperatures on the thrust bearing. These high temperatures were the result of flow restriction in the thrust bearing cooling system due to stem / disc separation on the turbine building closed cooling water outlet valve. High temperatures previously observed on the thrust bearing, on July 13, were treated as routine work rather than as priority work and were not recorded in any of the operator logs. Equipment operators were not fully aware of the design of the turbine building closed cooling water outlet valve and therefore did not realize that overtorquing the valve on its backseat could result in separation of the disc from the stem.
09/15/98 Negative IR 98-07 L
OPS 28 A reactor water level excursion on July 13,1998, during transfer between feedwater 3A control system computers revealed that instrument and control personnel did not have 2A sufficiently specific written guidance or criteria on computer signal differences for performing the computer transfer. Instrument and control personnel relied on inappropriate assumptions on acceptable computer signal differences. Corrective actions for this issue were good. A subsequent transfer evolution, after tuning of the control systems, resulted in no reactor level change.
From 3/98 to 9/98 1 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 09/15/98 NCV IR 98-07 L
OPS 1A On June 8,1998, the 3 start-up transformer became inoperable following a severe NCV 98 3A electrical storm, but this was not recognized by operators until June 22,1998. On June 01 2A 15, the inoperable 3 start-up transformer was aligned to the 2 start-up and emergency source for over nine hours to support off-site maintenance work. Technical specification 3.8.1 checks on the correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability were not performed on June 15. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Corrective actions from Licensee Event Report 96-005 were inadvertently removed from the round sheets when the sheets were converted from manual to electronic entry, which contributed to the violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1.,
7/16/98 VIO IR 98-06 L
OFS 5A On June 7,1998, the 3A recirculation pump ran back to 30% speed due to the VIO 98-06-03 3B unexpected loss of a 500 kV line during an electrical storm and the slow opening of 500 1B kV breaker. The 3B recirculation pump remained at full speed during this event. Due to the differences in pump speeds of the Unit 3 pumps, the flows in the recirculation loops were significantly mismatched. The recirculation loop flows remained mismatched outside of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.1.1 for over 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This mismatched flow resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 3.4.1.
Operations and engineering personnel did not understand the effects of the recirculation flows mismatch on the jet pumps and jet pump riser braces due to the excessive vibration stresses. They Oiso failed to recognize that Unit 3 was in single loop operation following the runback of the '3A recirculation pump.
In addition, no information was documented in the general procedure used during this event that would alert the operators to the need to balance recirculation flows quickly to prevent high vibration stresses in the jet pump loops. Also, the abnormal procedure for single loop operation did not contain any information regarding the vibration concerns or technical specification bases information about being in single loop operation when the mismatch between the two recirculation loops was greater than required limits.
From 3/98 to 9/98 2 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 7/16/98 VIO IR 98-06 L
OPS 5A On March 23,1998, the licensee identified that they failed to properly implement the VIO 98-06-04 3B improved Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.4 for the start of the first recirculation pump. Between January 18,1996, and March 23,1998, operations personnel were not verifying that the temperature differential between the reactor coolant in the recirculation loop being started and the reactor pressure vessel coolant was within 50'F. On October 29,1997, the 'B' recirculation pump was started with a differential temperature of 84 'F. Although this did not exceed design limits nor impact fuel performance, it was a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.4.9.4.
7/16/98 Negative IR 98-06 S
Gr o 3A During a Unit 2 downpower evolution on May 16,1998, operators reduced speed on an 1A incorrect reactor feed pump, resulting in a reactor level excursion and recirculation system runback. This event was indicative of poor operator performance, reflecting weaknesses in communications, self-checking, and peer / supervisory review. Following the event, the inspectors observed increased peer checking and improved oversight by control room supervisors.
7/16/98 Negative IR 98-06 S
OPS 38 The 3A stator water cooling pump tripped during system troubleshooting efforts on April 3A 28,1998, due to weaknesses both in operations review of the work and with communications regarding restrictions on the work scope. Operations personnel performed a good investigation of this issue and initiated appropriate corrective actions.
7/16/98 VIO IR 98-06 L
OPS SC On May 15,1998, operations personnelidentified that the trip relay for the VIO 98-06-01 3A Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) radiation monitor had not been in the 1A tripped status for approximately 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> while the 'B' channel radiation monitor was inoperable. This condition resulted in a violation of technical specification 3.3.7.1 since the 'B' channel was required to be tripped within six hours after the channel became inoperable.
The operations personnel installing the jumper to initiate a Division 11 isolation trip of the MCREV radiation monitor did not perform, nor did the procedure instruction require, a positive verification that the trip was properly inserted. The corrective actions from the July 10,1997 event were not comprehensive enough to prevent this subsequent event.
From 3/98 to 9/98 3 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 7/16/98 VIO IR 98-06 L
OPS 1C NRC review of a number of plant status contro! issues related to mis-positioned valves in VIO 98-06-02 3A safety related systems identified a common element of inconsistency between plant procedur 4, check-off lists, drawings, administrative guidance, and/or operations and maintenance practices. In some instances, plant personnel missed opportunities to identify the discrepancies.
In one instance, engineering personnel failed to take prompt and effective corrective actions following OA's identification of errors affecting several procedures for the residual heat removal system. Operators used one of the incorrect procedures approximately five months after QA's findings, and as a result, one valve was left out of its required position.
Although system operability was not affected, an engineering evaluation was necessary to reach that conclusion. This was considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
5/04/98 VIO IR 98-02 N
OPS 1C Around March 22,1998, the inspectors identified that high pressure coolant injection VIO 98-02-02 2A (HPCI) system operating procedure SO 23.1.B, "HPCI System Manual Operation," was not adequately maintained, because inaccuracies with the HPCI vibration monitoring system were not described. The procedures failed to account for vibration system inaccuracies during the first 30 minutes of operation. This was considered a violation of the station Technical Specifications for procedure adequacy. This was considered significant since the instructions in SO 23.1.B-2 to trip the HPCI pump on high vibration readings e7uld erroneously shut down a HPCI pump, when performing a safety function, at a time when the HPCI pump vibration monitoring equipment was known to be unreliable.
5/04/98 Positive IR 98-02 N
OPS 1A Operator performance during the April 6,1998, troubleshooting of a minor level increase in 3A the Unit 2 torus was very good. Operations personnel exhibited good planning and coordination for the troubleshooting activities.
5/1/98 Negative IR 98-04 N
OPS 3A NRC inspectors as well as PBAPS evaluators identified several crew weaknesses in the 1B areas of: crew briefings, emergency operating procedures (EOPs) markup, and 3-part communications. Shift manager oversight of CRSs to ensure these activities were properly conducted was also noted by NRC inspectors to be weak.
From 3/98 to 9/98 4cf16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description 5/1/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
OPS 3A The performance of both crews (one operating crew, one staff crew) was good in the 18 areas of event recognition and diagnosis, control board manipulations, technical specification usage, and event classification.
5/1/98 URI IR 98-0-4 N
OPS 3A Four licensed operators missed training for the two year requalification period that ended Negative URI 98-04-01 1C in March 1996 and never made up this missed training within a reasonable time thereafter.
This was unresolved pending NRC staff review for enforcement action with respect to 10 CFR 55.59 a(1) 5/1/98 VIO IR 98-04 N
OPS 1C For the development of the operating test, the training staff did not adhere to the licensed VIO 98-04-02 operator requalification training program procedure requirements for differences between crews and testing weeks with respect to the job performance measures (JPM) portion of the test. This condition was a violation of 10 CFR 50.54 (I-1),55.59(c)(4) and the PECO applicable procedure.
5/1/98 V!O iR 98-04 N
OPS 1C The past two annual operating exams did not test senior reactor operators who fulfilled VIO 98-04-03 the role of the control room supervisor (CRS) on their ability to execute the emergency plan. This condition was a violation of 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)(ii).
3/14/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
OPS SA The Nuclear Review Board provided good independent discussion and evaluations of the topics presented during the February 5,1998 meeting. The questions directed to the presenters by the members of the Board during this meeting were probing and insightful.
i r
From 3/98 to 9/98 5 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 3/14/98 VIO IR 97-08 N
OPS 1A On January 1,1998, the Unit 2 main turbine tripped on main oil pump low pressure during IR 98-01 3A plant startup efter the turbine rolled to a speed of 1400 rpm. Operations personnel were VIO 98-01-05 unaware that the turbine had been rolling for over two hours just prior to the trip.
Several examples of weak control room oversight of activities were noted from the Unit 2 main turbine trip during start-up on January 1,1998. These examples were as follows: 1)
The Control Room Supervisor directed the pulling of control rods to increase reactor coolant system pressure while the turbine condition remained unknown. 2) Shift turnover and the shift meeting occurred while the turbine was in this unknown condition even though members of the crew knew that the turbine had come off of the turning gear. 3)
The crew with the watch during most of this event had not received any just-in -time training such as simulator runs even though this was the first reactor start-up for the Plant Reactor Operator and the Control Room Supervisor.
Several examples of a violation of TS 5.4.1, " Procedures" occurred when the Unit 2 main turbine tripped during start-up on January 1,1998. This violation occurred due to the following: 1) Inadequate Instrument and Control and Operations procedures that failed to restore the Electro-Hydraulic Control system to the alignment required for start-up. 2) The failure of Operations personnel to refer to the main turbine start-up procedure when directed by the plant start-up procedure. 3) The failure of operations personnel to properly monitor the control room panels or recognize the main turbine status, position of the turbine control valves, or the selection of the speed set for the Electro-Hydraulic Control system. The monitoring and recognition of equipment status were required by Operations Manual procedures, OM-C-6.1 and OM-P-3.3.
3/14/98 VIO IR 97-08 L
OPS 1A On January 2,1998, the Unit 2 reactor operator failed to perform the Technical IR 98-01 3A Specification surveillance requirements for verification of proper flow in the recirculation VIO 98-01-02 loops. However, the recirculation loops were not operated outside of the Technical VIO 98-01-03 Specification requirements during this period. The Technical Specification surveillance requirements 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2 were not met on January 2 since ST-O-02F-560-2 was not performed and Unit 2 was in Mode 2 for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This licensee identified issue resulted in violations of surveillance requirements 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2.
From 3/98 to 9/98 6 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description et 3/14/98 VIO IR 98-01 N
OPS 3A The practice of the control room supervisor leaving the main control room work station for VIO 98-01-01 1A brief periods without temporary relief from another senior reactor operator demonstrated weak oversight of control room activities.
On January 28,1998, the control room supervisor left the main control room work station without temporary relief for several minutes and failed to verify acknowledgment of an expected alarm. This resulted in an NRC identified violation of technical specification 5.4.1 requirements for procedures due to the control room supervisor failing to verify alarm acknowledgment as required by the Operations Manuals.
OPS 3A A former Peach Bottom employee did not perform certain surveillance tests, yet he created a record to indicate that he had performed the tests. Nuclear safety was not compromised by these issues. Specifically, in one instance during the performance of "ST/LLRT 20.07E.02:LLRT *B" Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) Analyzer isolation Valves" test conducted at around August 20,1996, the individual signed a document indicating that the independent verification of the initial testing conditions for several valves had been performed, but had not entered the room to perform the verification. In the second instance, during the performance of "ST-M-014-626-2: Core Spray Loop B Primary Coolant Pressure Isolation Valves Leakage Test" conducted around September 18,1996, the individual signed a document indicating he had completed a prerequisite step verifying that a relief valve, set for 100 psig, was installed on a pressure test rig; however, the relief valves had not been installed.
09/15/98 Negative IR 98-07 L
MAINT 3A During observations of the 2A core spray pump maintenance, a quality verification 5A inspector recorded a foreign material check of the pump casing internals as unsatisfactory.
The quality verification check ivas performed after a worker verification of cleanliness.
The quality verification inspector found some small debris and paint chips, which were subsequently removed by the workers. Maintenance supervisors were taking steps to improve worker sensitivity to foreign material exclusion. In addition, the maintenance manager initiated an investigation into a trend of less than adegaate worker verifications during maintenance, including welding verification steps and clean:hess inspections.
From 3/98 to 9/98 7 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 7/16/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
MAINT 3A Unit 2 on-line scram solenoid pilot valve replacement activities, from June 5 through June 10,1998, were particularly well-executed. Nuclear Maintenance Division technicians and operations personnel displayed good procedure usage and sound work practices.
Supervisory personnel provided very good coordination and oversight.
5/04/98 NCV IR 98-02 L
MAINT 3B On July 9 and 10,1997, instrument and control personnel failed to comply with the NCV 98 technical specification action time requirement for placing the 'A' channel of the main 03 control room emergency ventilation (MCREV) system in trip within six hours of making the channelinoperable. This was a violation of Technical Specification 3.3.7.1. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
5/04/98 Positive IR 98-02 N
MAINT SA The controls to remove a control rod drive mechanism were good. Ucensee self 3A assessment activities were effective in that the licensee identified a future improvement in communications between the control room and maintenance personnel undervessel when the mechanism was first removed.
5/1/98 VIO IR 98-04 N
MAINT 2B One system was identified which should have been in scope of the maintenance rule VIO 98-04-05 program, but was not. The system was area radiation monitoring system used in secondary containment control emergency operating procedures. This condition was a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b).
i From 3/98 to 9/98 8 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 4/24/98 eel IR 98-05 S
MAINT 2B The foreign material exclusion reesirements for the emergency core cooling systems eel 98-05-01 (ECCS) suction strainer replacement during refueling outage 3R11 failed to provide EA 98-221 adequate controls for the ECCS suction strainers and associated system. The controls were focused on the torus area and failed to adequately consider the components and work activities directly associated with the ECCS system. This failure resulted in foreign material entering the 3A core spray pump. In addition, the corrective actions for a number of foreign material control deficiencies identified by Quality Assurance were narrowly focused and did not address the overall inadequacies with foreign material controls. The licensee did not establish instructions and procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances for the ECCS suction strainer modifhation activities. This is considered an apparent violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.
3/14/98 NCV IR 98-01 L
MAINT 28 incomplete Rod Withdraw Block surveillance testing, from 1989 through January 1996, NCV 98 was a non-compliance with Custom Technical Specification 4.2.C, Minimum Test end 07 Calibration Frequency for Control Rod Blocks Actuation. Deficiencies in standby gas treatment system and residual heat removal system surveillance testing of system logic channels were violations of Technical Specifications 3.3.6.2.5, and 3.3.5.1.5, respectively, which required logic system functional tests of these systems. These non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violations are being treated as Non-Cited Violations, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
3/14/98 VIO IR 98-01 L
MAINT 28 From June 12,1995 throuGh January 21,1997, PECO failed to identify and correct VIO 98-01-06 inaccurately calibrated feedwater temperature instruments, resulting in the operation of Unit 3 as high as O.6% above licensed thermal power level for approximately fifteen months. This was considered a violation of the facility operating license. Further, PECO did not adequately control the measuring and test equipment used to calibrate the feedwater temperature instruments. Although this issue was identified by the licensee, there were several significant missed opportunities to identify this issue sooner.
From 3/98 to 9/98 9 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 09/15/98 NCV IR 98-07 L
ENG SA On June 22,1998, a reactor building equipment operator discovered during routine NCV 98 4B operator rounds that the Unit 3 reactor core isolation cooling system mechanical overspeed 03 2A trip tappet was not fully reset. Station personnel determined that the reactor core isolation cooling system had been inoperable since May 4,1998 which was the last time the overspeed trip function was manipulated and successfully tested. This condition resulted in a violation of technical specification 3.5.3 since the reactor core isolation cooling system was inoperable for greater than 14 days while Unit 3 was operating. Th's non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Engineering personnel fully investigated all of the causes of the failure of the trip tappet to reset and adequately diagnosed and repaired each of the problems identified.
09/15/98 NCV IR 98-07 L
ENG 4C The failure to perform an inservice testing surveillance requirement for main steam NCV 98 2B isolation valve stroke timing during cold shutdown conditions revealed performance 02 weaknesses among engineering personnel in the procedure revision and review processes.
Written communications for, and reviews of, a surveillance test procedure revision were poor and failed to identify an error in the test frequency. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Viciation (NCV),
consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
t From 3/E to 9/98 10 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Soune ID SFA Cocle Item Description 7/16/98 Negative IR 98-00 L
ENG 3B Engineering personnel failed to recognize the potential for high vibration stresses on the 4B
'A' jet pump loops due to the large recirculation flow mismatch following the 3A SC recirculation pump runback on June 7,1998. The potential for recirculation flow mismatch to cause excessive vibration of the jet pumps and the jet pump riser braces was described in the Peach Bottom Design Basis Document (DBD) for the recirculation system.
This lack of understanding of the effects of this mismatch contributed to the failure of engineering personnel to provide the necessary technical information to operations personnel. This resulted in the failure to recognize the need to expeditiously resolve the mismatch between recirculation loop flows. Since operations personnel were not provided these technical insights, the Un813 recirculation loops were operated with mismatched flows greater than the technical specification required limits for over 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This condition resulted in the vibration stresses in the loop 'A' riser braces exceeding the design endurance limit, above which vibrations measurably increase design fatigue usage.
Also, Unit 3 experienced a runback of the 3A pump in December 1993 due to the loss of power to the same relay that dropped out during this event. Part of the corrective action for this event was to install a modification which would provide a non-interruptible power supply to the recirculation pump runback relays. This corrective action, which could have prevented the 3A runback on June 7, was never performed.
7/16/98 Negative IR 98-06 S
ENG 4B Some emergency diesel generator (EDG) oil leak reduction strategies were not well-2A implemented or well-communicated to operations personnel. These factors contributed to oilleaks and flames observed on the E2 and El EDG exhaust manifolds in May and June, 1998, respectively. Engineering personnel concluded that EDG operability was not affected by the f!ames, but they were pursuing additional leak reduction initiatives.
7/16/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
ENG 4B Reactor engineering personnel provided good engineering support of plant operations by I
1 ensuring timely analysis and effective resolution of degraded conditions on Unit 2 scram solenoid pilot valves.
From 3/98 to 9/98 11 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description 5/04/98 Positive IR 98-02 L
ENG 1A Engineering personnel performed a good investigation of a shorter than expected reactor 4B period during the startup following outage 3J12.. The actions identified by engineering to improve the test data review for the Wide Range Neutron Monitoring Systern and the rod worth predictions by the PECO reactor fuel services group were comprehensive.
5/04/98 Positive IR 98-02 L
ENG 4B Plant engineering provided timely, comprehensive support following the identification of a 5B increasing trend in the tailpipe temperature for safety relief valve (SRV) 71K by control room operators during the Unit 3 startup following the 3J12 outage.
5/04/98 Negative IR 98-02 L
ENG 4B On March 22,1998 reactor engineers did not recommend positive actions to reduce a 4A thermal limit ratio when app oaching the Technical Specifications limit, which did not meet operations department expectations for conservative plant operations. No technical specification limits were exceeded. The licensee procedure enhancements and other corrective actions for this issue were adequate.
I 5/04/98 Positive IR 98-02 N
ENG 48 The engineering performance and ove~
of the contractors were good for the modification work associated with the Una 3 jet pump riser cracking repair.
4/24/98 eel IR 98-05 N
ENG 4B Engineering did not take a thorough, rigorous approach in evaluations related to foreign eel 98-05-02 4C material controls for the ECCS suction strainer modification. Engineering also did not EA 98-221 adequately consider FME controls on the components and work activities directly associated with the ECCS system during reviews of the FME plan. The engineering oversight of the modification work activities was inadequate due to a lack of accountability for FME coordination and the lack of documented formal observations by non-QA personnel.
The 3A core spray subsystem was not maintcined operable for the period December 24, 1997, through March 13,1998, while the Unit 3 reactor was at power. This is considered an apparent violation of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Technical Specification 3.5.1. System engineering personnel missed an opportunity to identify the degraded condition of the 3A core spray pump after surveillance testing in December 1997.
From 3/98 to 9/98 12 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 3/14/98 Positive
!R 98-01 N
ENG 48 The licensee was proactive in identifying, scoping, evaluating, and correcting the Westinghouse HFA and FA molded case circuit breakers failure to fully latch. Engineering and other station personnel exhibited a rigorous and systematic approach to the resolving this deficiency. The licensee performed an acceptable operability determination for the breakers.
3/14/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
ENG 4B The replacement of the original Unit 3 source range and intermediate range monitors with 4A a digital wide range neutron monitoring system (WRNMS) was implemented appropriately with very good engineering support. An acceptable surveillance program to satisfy the technical specification requirements for the new WRNMS and new response procedures for the WRNMS alarms were properly established.
09/15/98 Strength IR 98-07 N
PS SA PECO implemented an effective program for self-identifying and correcting radiological 5B control issues and initiating comprehensive self evaluations for radiological concerns.
Corrective actions were usually timely and the conduct of audits were of sufficient scope and depth.
09/15/98 Strength IR 98-07 N
PS 3A PECO continued to implement an overall effective ALARA program with respect to work 3C planning and control, use of dose reduction initiatives such as remote monitoring equipment, application of shielding, and work monitoring via closed-circuit television.
Outage work planning and control efforts to effect improved ALARA performance are continuing.
09/15/98 Strength IR 98-07 N
PS 3A PECO implemented effective internal and external exposure control programs with respect 3B to personnel monitoring and dose assessment, personnel dosimetry use and application, and radiation and high radiation area monitoring and control. No significant unplanned exposures were evident during the period under review. No violations or safety concerns were noted.
7/16/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
PS 3A Licensee personnel demonstrated good performance during an emergency preparedness mini-drill conducted on June 15,1998. The drill was adequately controlled, and the post-drill critique was good.
From 3/98 to 9/98 13 of 16
PEACH BOTTOM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 5/04/98 VIO IR 98-02 N
PS 1A On April 24,1998, the NRC identified that licensee failed to maintain the radiation area VIO 98-02-04 3A signs at the access to the North Isolation Valve Room (NIVR), a known and surveyed radiation area, visible and conspicuous. In addition, the inspectors found the NIVR door open and unguarded. This is considered a violation for failure to properly establish, implement, and maintain procedures and instructions as required by Peach Bottom Technical Specifications 5.4.1. This condition had the potential for plant personnel to unknowingly enter a posted high radiation arer without proper knowledge of ongoing conditions or radiological conditions for the NIVR.
3/14/98 Strength IR 98-01 N
PS 1C The Radiological Environmental Monitoring (REMP) and Meteorological Monitoring (MMP)
Programs were effective. The licensee's performance regarding environmental monitoring, meteorological monitoring, and quality assurance audits was good. Equipment for both of these programs was well maintained and properly calibrated.
From 3/98 to 9/98 14 of 16
t
?
AB8REVIATIONS USED IN PIM TABLE ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers t
FME Foreign Material Exclusion ISI inservice Inspection LER Licensee Event Report t
i NCV Non Cited Violation i
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PBAPS Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station PECO Philadelphia Electric Company l
QA Quality Assurance.
STA Shift Technical Advisor TS Technical Specifications UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 1
i From 3/98 to 9/98 15 of 16
... -. -. - ~.. ~..
- - _ - _ _ _ _ _. - _., - - - _ ~ - _ _ _ - -
n
_ _ - _ _ - ~
v t
L s
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE COLUMNS r
The actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence (mainly LERs), the date the source of the information was issued (such as for EALs), or the last date of the inspection period (for irs).
l Type The categorization of the item or finding - see the Type / Findings Type Code table, below.
Source The document that describes the findings: LER for Licensee Event Reports, EAL for Enforcement Action Letters, or IR for NRC Inspection Reports.
AD Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self identifying (events).
[
t SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
(
Code Template Code - see table below.
I Details of NRC findings on LERs that have safety significance (as stated in irs), findings described in IR Executive Summaries, and amplifying information contained in N
h EALs.
t t
=
s TYPE / FINDINGS CODES 1
Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; 8 - Operations During Transients; and C -
[
Programs and Processes ED Enforcement Discretion - No Civil Penalty i
2 Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or 8 - Programs and Processes
, Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance WJakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 3
Human Performance: A - Work Performance; 8 - Knowledge Skills, and Abil. ties / Training: C l
- Work Environment EEI
- Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Final NRC Action f
VIO Violation Level I,11, !!!, or IV
~
l 5
Problem identification and Remlution: A - identification; 8 - Analysis; and C - Resolution NCV Non-Cited Violation
[
DEV Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC NOTES:
I Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement P4sitive Individual Good inspection Finding action in accordance with the " General Staternent of Pohey and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"
[
Negative Individual Poor inspection Finding (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its fmal enforcement decision on l
the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified wnen the final decisions are made.
[
LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC B*f0'e the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the hcensee will be provided with an opportunity to either
[
111 respond to the apparent violation or 12) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URI" Unresolved item from inspection Report I
URis are unresolved items about which more infonnation is required to determine whether the issue in i
Licensing Licensing issue from NRR question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the MRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
are made.
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance issue, etc. The type of
+
all MISC findings are to be put in the item Description column.
TEMPtATE CODES f
?
From 3/98 to 9/98 16 of '. 6 l
ENCLOSURE 2 PEACH BOTTOM INSPECTION PLAN FOR DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH MAY 1999 Inspection Program Area / Title Planned Dates Type inspection.! Comments 92903 Motor Operator Valves 1-4-1999
. Regional Initiative 81700 Security 1-11-1999-Core 84750 Effluents 1-25-1999 Core 83750 Radcon-Non Outage 2-8-1999 Core Legend:
IP Inspection Procedure Number Tl Temporary Instruction Program / Sequence Number Core -
Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory at all plants)
OA Other inspection Activity RI Additional inspection Effort Planned by Region i SI Safety Initiative Inspection l
I I
.