ML20198A137

Comment Endorsing NEI Comments on Proposed Rulemaking to 10CFR50.65, Requirements for Monitoring Effectiveness at Npps

ML20198A137
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	12/10/1998
From:	Zinke G Maine Yankee
To:	Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-63FR52201, RULE-PR-50 63FR52201-00004, 63FR52201-4, GAZ-98-64, MN-98-74, NUDOCS 9812160161
Download: ML20198A137 (3)

Text

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• WIScASSET. MA:NE c4578 e (2c7) 8824321 l '98 CEF 14 P2 :43 i December 10,1998 MN-98 74 GAZ-98-64 y l /d.h Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff DCCKEf NUMBER m U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PROPOSED RULE ril 50 Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 [G3r#52aod l

Subject:

Maine Yankee Comments on Proposed Rulemaking to 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants (63 Fed. Reg. 52201 - September 30,1998)

The purpose of this letter is (1) to provide Maine Yankee's endorsement of the comments provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on the subject proposed rulemaking and (2) to register Mainc Yankee's concern regarding the scope and extent of maintenance rule implementation for permanently shutdown plants who have submitted 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) certifications.

NEI commented on how the proposed rulemaking introduces subjective, undefined terminology related to proposed requirement,50.65(a)(4), to conduct an assessment of the current plant configuration before performing maintenance activities on"in-scope" SCC. An example of the confusion that can be created by the introduction of subjective, undefined terminology is the terminology that was introduced into the maintenance rule, 50.65(a)(1) by tho Decommissioning Rule (61FR39278). This terminology was related to the scope of SCC's applicable to plants that have submitted 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) certifications and consisted of the phrase: all SCC's

" associated with the storage, control, and maintenance of spent fuelin a safe condition." There was insufficient dialogue on the meaning on the terminology, " safe condition." In particular, the dialogue should have addressed the parameters and criteria that constitute the " safe condition."

A close examination of the range of possible parameters and criteria that could constitute the

" safe condition" could conclude that they should be limited to (1) dose consequences, and (2) margin to criticality. Following, a modest level of fission product decay, the number of SCC's I which could reasonably affect these parameters is minimal. In contrast to this minimal scope is ig the NRC Inspection Manual Procedure 62801, dated August 11,1997. This procedure, without U defining the puameters and criteria used to determine the " safe condition," states that "the maintenance rule applies to those SSC's associated with the storage, control and maintenance of spent fuel"' (without regard to whether the SCC's are associated with the " safe condition.") The procedure then goes on to identify SSC's within the scope of the Maintenance Rule as anyth 1 W% u= %i rr=*,62soi poratroph o2.02.g se a l 9812160161 981210 0

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DES-14-98 BON 02:32 R1 nY EXEC HGnM r AX NJ. dd /dedol/3 F. 03 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MN-98-74 Mr. John C. Hoyle Page Two that could be called a structure , system, or component including walls, floors, roofs, tanks, sub-systems, sub-components, parts, pumps, valves, motors, pipes, hangers, snubbers, pool liner, l pool cooling systems, spent fuel racks, criticality control design features, radiation monitoring and radiological effluent instrumentation, and spent fuel tilling and handling equipment.2 Furthermore, the Inspection Procedure identines that SSC's associated with the maintenance of independent spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSI's) are required to be within scope, if the ISFSI is licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 72, Subpart K, (General License).2 It appears that the assumption is made that since a Part 50 licensee holds a general Part 72 license for an ISFSI then 10 CFR 50.65 implicitly applies to the ISFSI. This assumption is not based upon any nexus to the " safe condition" or any regulatory link besides the fact that the operator still holds a Part 50 license.

This so-called " requirement" is inconsistent with the fact that if the same ISFSI was licensed under a specific Part 72 license, then the maintenance rule would not apply.

Finally, the Inspection Procedure identifics that SSC's which are credited for accident mitigation or transients are required to be within the scope of the maintenance rule.' This guidance is based upon 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) which requires the scope of the maintenance rule to ine SSC's that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients. However, for permanently shmuown plants, the maintenance rule "only shall apply to the extent that the licensec shall monitor the performance or condition of all stmetures, systems, or components associated with the storage, control, and maintenance of spent fuel in a safe condition,"(10CFR50.65(a)(1)). Not all accidents or transients affect the safe condition of spent fuel.

The preceding discussion was presented to point out the kind of confusion that can be created by the introduction of subjective, undefined terminology. Thus, we support NEl's call for increased dialogue on the new terms identified in the subject proposed rule.

We also believe that the term " safe condition" needs increased dialogue. As indicated above, the

" safe condition" could be limited to a small set of parameters and criteria. The number of SCC's which could reasonably affect these parameters is minimal for a permanently shutdown plant that has completed a modest level of fission producs decay. The net safety benefit associated with the administrstion and monitoring of the maintenance rule for these minimal number of SCC is not enough ,ojustify its cost. This unnecessary expenditure of resources comes at the very time when the preservation and control of decommissioning funds is of greater regulatory concern.

Maine Yankee is hereby requesting that the NRC, as part of this proposed rulemaking, remove the applicability of the maintenance rule to 50.82(a)(1) certified plants following some modest level of fission product decay.

2 NRC Icspection Manual Procedure 62801 Paragraph 03.02, page 7 3

Tbid Ibid

DEC-14-98 MON 02:33PM FAX NO. 2078825773 P. 04

( MY EXEC MGMNT I

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MN 98-74 Mr. John C. Hoyle Page Three l The Regulatory Analysis for the subject proposed rule did not adequatelyjustify the expansion of the maintenance rule to normal shutdown operations, nor was the term " normal shutdown l

operations" adequately defined in the proposed rule. The Regulatory Analysis merely states that "used fuel and contaminated materials present a potential hazard."5 Unless this potential hazard relates to the scoping criteria presented in 10CFR50.65(b) or the " safe condition" of spent fuel in 50.65(a)(1) for permanently shutdown plants, it is not relevant to the maintenance rule. We helieve that the Regulatory Analysis should be re-written to better consider the expansion of the maintenance rule to normal shutdown operations and we believe that if the backfit requirements of10CFR50.109 are appropriately applied that this expansion will be shown to be unjustified.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the proposed miemaking. If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, h

George Zinke, Director Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs c: Document Control Desk Mr Hubert Miller Mr Michael Webb Mr. Michael Masnik i 8 NuclearPower Plants; Section 3.2.2 Regulatory Analysis: Ameadt n oring the EfTectiveness ofMaintenance at

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