ML20135E329
| ML20135E329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1996 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135E326 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9612110176 | |
| Download: ML20135E329 (154) | |
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PUBLIC MEETING 4
PART I MEETING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF AND MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY TO DISCUSS THE MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SAFETY ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION OF THE MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.
PART II
)
MEETING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR i
REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF AND THE PUBLIC 1
TO DISCUSS THE INDEPENDENT SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND FINDINGS.
t 6:00 P.M.
OCTOBER 10, 1996 WISCASSET MIDDLE SCHOOL GYMNASIUM WISCASSET, MAINE THE REPORTING GROUP Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell 170 U.S.
Route 1, Falmouth, Maine 04105 4
(207) 781-3728 9612110176 961018 PDR ADOCK 05000309 T
4 2
PART I
{
j PANEL MEMBERS j
FOR THE USNRC EDWARD L. JORDAN, Director, AEOD ELLIS W. MERSCHOFF, Team Leader HUBERT J. MILLER, Regional Administrator STEVEN A. VARGA, Division Director FOR MAINE YANKEE CHARLES D.
FRIZZLE, President and CEO GRAHAM M. LEITCH, Vice President, Operations G. DOUGLAS WHITTIER, Vice President, Licensing and Engineering PATRICK LYDON, Vice President, Finance and Administration MARY ANN LYNCH, ESQ., General Counsel PART II PANEL MEMBERS FOR THE USNRC EDWARD L. JORDAN, Director, AEOD ELLIS W. MERSCHOFF, Team Leader HUBERT J. MILLER, Regional Administrator STEVEN A. VARGA, Division Director FOR THE STATE OF MAINE PETER WILEY, Director of Special Projects, Office of the Governor ULDIS VANAGS, State Nuclear Safety Advisor THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
___.m______._
3
]
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4 INDEX i;
PART I 1,
Pace i
Introduction 4
{
Presentation of ISA Team Results 7
Response by Maine Yankee 35 PART II i
PUBLIC DISCUSSION BILL LINNELL 44 2
KRIS CHRISTINE 49 NIGEL CALDER 54 PETER CHRISTINE 59 EDWARD MYERS 64 i
STEVE COMLEY 68
]
ROBERT MOLDAVER 78 PAUL CRARY 83 NANCY COTE 84 i
j RENA CATER 85 I
ABOTT FLETCHER 87 JIM GOODSELL 89 DAVID HALL 93 WOODY HODGKINS 95 i
KEN GRAY 97 H. G.
BRACK 101 JAMES MALLON 107 RAY SHADIS 108 CLAIRE JOHNSON 117 AdNE D.
BURT 117 JON KIRSCH 121 BARBARA ERICKSON 123 PAUL WILLOUGHBY 123 RODNEY DEE 124 MIKE EVRINGHAM 126 i
ALAN CLEMENCE 129 HENRY MEYERS 135 JOHN MICHAEL DEBARTOLO 140 KRIS ANDERSON 142 DAVE HULBURT 143 BILL THOMPSON 147 CHONTEAU CHAPIN 148 THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
4 3
1 PROCEEDINGS 2
PART I 3
(The meeting convened at 6:00 p.m.)
4 MR. JORDAN:
Ladies and gentlemen, could I ask you 5
to take your seats?
4 6
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
I'd like to 7
start the meeting, please.
8 I'd like to begin this two-part public meeting.
9 The meeting from 6:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m.
is between the 10 NRC and the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company to convey 11 the findings of the NRC's Independent Safety Assessment.
i 12 The first part is open for public observation, with the 13 understanding that a second part, from 8:00 p.m. until 14 10:00, will be an opportunity for public participation 15 regarding the process and findings of the Independent j
16 Safety Assessment.
17 A transcript of both portions of the meetings is l
^
18 being made and copies will be available in the public i
4 19 document room and on file as a record of this meeting.
20 During the 30 minutes between the meeting parts, i
21 the NRC participants will respond to media questions.
22 Members of the public who wish to ask questions or 23 comment on the Independent Safety Assessment are 24 requested to sign up on the log -- and it's, I believe, 25 at the podium -- during the interval between Part I and THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
5 1
Part II from 7:30 to 8:00, and I understand that many of i
2 you have already signed up, and I appreciate that.
i 3
In order to provide an opportunity for as many 4
people to raise their questions as possible, at this 5
point I propose to allot two Linutes to each individual, 6
and then we will try to respond with a two-minute 7
response.
And if we use up all of the questions in that 8
scheme, then we'll accept questions from the floor.
At 9
any rate, the meeting will end at 10:00 p.m.
10 I will repeat the meeting protocol at the beginning 11 of Part II for any late arrivals.
We do not plan to 12 repeat the NRC presentation on findings in the second 13 part.
14 copies of handouts are available at the rear of the i
15 room at the door by the entrance on the table.
The 16 handouts are in two parts, contain the transmittal 17 letter to Maine Yankee and the executive summary of the 18 report, plus a set of breifing slides to assist in 19 following the presentation.
20 I apologize for any inconveniences you may have 21 experienced in getting access to the findings.
Express 22 Mail, World Wide Web and faxes were used to try to l
23 satisfy the needs.
I hope the presentation in Part I 24 and the response to your questions and Part II provide 25 the necessary communications.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
_ _ ~ _.
6 i
1 The principal purpose of Part I is to convey and 2
discuss the findings between the NRC directly with Maine l
3 Yankee Atomic Power Company.
Please respect that 4
purpose by remaining silent.
H 5
The principal purpose of Part II is to communicate 6
with the public to clarify the process and the findings l
7 of the Independent Safety Assessment.
8 I would like to begin by introducing the NRC 9
participants.
On my left is Mr. Ellis Merschoff, the 10 Team Leader for the Independent Safety Assessment.
He's i
11 also the Director of Division of Reactor Projects in our 12 Region II office in Atlanta.
1 13 On my right is Mr. Hub Miller, who is the Director 14 of the NRC Region I.
15 To his right is Mr. Steve Varga, the Director of 1
16 Division of Projects, I and II, the Office of Nuc1 ar 4
17 Reactor. Regulations.
18 Also present -- and I'll probably miss somebody and 19 be sorry later:
Diane Sporinski is the Public Affairs 20 Representative from Region I.
21 Jimi Yerokun is the Senior Resident Inspector at i
22 Maine Yankee.
J 23 Bill Olsen is the Resident Inspector at Maine 24 Yankee.
25 Rich conte is the Branch Chief, Region I.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
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7 1
1 Peter Wiley is Director of Special Projects, the i
2 State of Maine Governor's Office.
He was a member of I
3 the State Process Team, which you'll hear a little bit j
4 of.
i Uldis Vanags is also from the State of Maine.
He 5
)
j 6
was a Team Member on the team.
7 Pat Dostie is from the State of Maine.
He is a 8
Maine Resident Inspector and Team Member for this 9
effort.
4 10 Dan Dorman is Project Manager at Maine Yankee.
l 11 And prompt me if I've left somebody out.
12 And at this point, Mr. Frizzle, would you introduce l
13 the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company representives?
14 MR. FRIZZLE:
Yes.
Thank you.
My name is Charles j
15 Frizzle.
I'm the President and CEO of Maine Yankee.
16 To my 'sr right is Doug Whit +-ier, Vice President of 17 Licensing and Engineering.
18 To my near right is Graham Leitch, Vice President 19.
of Operations.
20 To my far left, Mary Ann Lynch, General Counsel.
9 21 And to my near left is Patrick Lydon, Vice
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22 President of Finance and Administration.
23 MR. JOPDAN:
Thank you very much.
24 The order of presentations that I would like to
]
25 follow for this first part of the meeting is I will give THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
8 1
a brief discussion why this assessment was conducted and 2
the objectives of this assessment.
Mr. Merschoff will 3
provide a discussion of the methodology of findings and 4
the root-cause determinations.
I will provide an 5
opportunity for Mr. Miller and Mr. Varga to comment on 6
the findings from their areas of responsibility.
And 7
then an opportunity for Maine Yankee to ask any 8
clarifying questions they have and to make any comments 9
about the findings.
10 And you are requested to ask questions as we 11 proceed if clarification is warranted.
12 To set the tone of the meeting, I'd like to start 13 by reading the bottom line of this Independent Safety 14 Assessment, which is the second paragraph of the 15 transmittal letter from the NRC Chairman, Dr. Shirley 16 Ann Jackson to Mr. Charles Frizzle, President of Maine
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17 Yankee Atomic Power Company.
18 "Overall performance at Maine Yankee was considered 19 adequate for operation.
However, a number of 20 significant weaknesses and deficiencies were identified 21 that will result in violations.
These weaknesses and 22 deficiencies appear to be related to two root causes:
23 economic pressures to contain costs and poor problem 24 identification as a result of complacency and a lack of 25 a questioning attitude."
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
9 1
And now I'm on page 2 of the set of slides.
This 2
is the discussion of the selection of Maine Yankee.
3 This effort was begun based on allegations 4
regarding the RELAP/5YA code.
These allegations were 5
received by the NRC in December of 1995, and the 6
allegation was that Yankee Atomic Electric knowingly 7
performed inadequate analyses to support an increase in 8
rated thermal power.
After a technical review by the 9
NRC, an order was issued limiting power to 2440 MWt 10 pending further evaluation.
11 The Office of the Inspector General completed an 12 inquiry into this issue on May 8, 1996, which 13 established that Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company had 14 experienced problems with and made modifications to 15 RELAP/5YA computer code used for ECC -- this is 16 emergency core conting analyses -- which were not 17 reported as required.
In addition, weaknesses in the 18 NRC review and follow-up of this issue were identified.
19 Based on these concerns -- and there was a concern 20 over the safety of Maine Yankee and the effectiveness of 21 the regulatory oversight of Maine Yankee -- the Chairman 22 of the NRC had a discussion with the Governor of Maine, 23 and the Chairman decided to initiate an Independent 24 Safety Assessment.
25 I was assigned to develop and manage the THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
10 1
Independant Safety Assessment.
I was afforded 2
commission-level priority to assemble a large, 3
experienced team, drawing from Regions II, III and IV, 4
the Office of Research, and my own office.
This made i
5 the team independent of NRR and Region I.
The personnel 6
that participated from the NRC in this effort had not 7
previously reviewed or been involved in the regulation 8
of Maine Yankee.
9 Planning provisions included participation by State 10 of Maine representives; and based on the -- our plan, I 11 employed a modified diagnostic evaluation technique, 12 which was a formalized process with a great deal of 13 experience in the NRC in application.
The process 1
14 includes an extensive preparation phase; horizontal 15 assessment across functional areas, such as operations 16 and maintena"~e; vertical slices through safety systems 17 to assess design and licensing bases; and then an added 18 review of the application of analytic codes to determine 19 whether the RELAP/5YA issue was an isolated or a general 20 problem with respect to the application of codes; and 21 then finally, a root-cause analysis of the overall 22 findings.
23 At this point I would like to shift the microphone 24 to Ellis Merschoff, the Team Manager, and he will carry h
25 you through the discussion and the findings.
J THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
11 1
MR. MERSCHOFF:
Thank you.
Good evening.
Can I be 2
heard in the back?
If I trail off, somebody please 3
holler.
We've come a long way and you've come a long 4
way to hear this, so I'd like to make sure I stay 5
audible.
i t
(
6 On slide number 5 is a diagram of this large team l
l 7
that Ed described.
That team included industry 8
operating experience, architect engineer experience, 9
probabilistic risk assessment level experience, 10 practitioner level experience, and extensive inspection, 11 assessment and regulatory experience.
It was 12 independent of people with regulatory responsibility 13 over Maine Yankee, and a primary goal within the mission 14 of a fair, balanced and objective review assessment of 15 Maine Yankee.
16 An assessment is a function of findings, good and 17 bad, over an extent of effort or an opportlnity to find 18 those problems.
It's important, in terms of this 19 assessment, to understand'the denominator of this 20 fraction; just how large and extensive this effort was.
21 Trying to put it in context, this team spent 4,500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> i
22 onsite assessing.
That's about one-and-a-third times 23 the average number of hours spent in a year assessing i
24 and inspecting Maine Yankee by region-based and NRC 25 inspectors.
Typical numbers in '94 were 3,200 against THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
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12 1
the 4,500.
2 These 25 professionals were prepared, they had the 3
undivided attention of the licensee, and the ability to 4
leverage their efforts by an effective licensee J
5 organization to respond to our questions.
They 6
conducted over 100 interviews of one to two hours each, 7
reviewed probably over 100 shelf-feet of answers to 8
specific questions asked, observed activities, walked 9
down systems, did independent calculations.
This was an t
10 extremely thorough assessment.
11 Page 6 shows in a little more depth the state 12 participation.
The state participated in this effort on 13 three levels.
There was a technical team that was 14 involved in the day-to-day assessment activities; a 15 process team that observed at key points to determine 16 whether or not the process was fair, balanced and 17 objective; and a citizens group that participated in 18 periodic briefings of the Governor by the team in order 19 to keep appraised of the process.
20 Page 7 provides a little bit more about the l
21 licensee, the Maine Yankee-developed organization that 22 was formed as a counterbalance to our team.
Maine 23 Yankee organized an effective support organization, it 24 leveraged our resources, it maximized the benefit of the 25 assessment.
There were senior level counterparts, staff THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
13 i
1 to support those counterparts, an extensive library, a 2
good link to the operating organization.
3 When we started this, Mr. Frizzle, you indicated 4
that Maine Yankee was a learning organization and that 5
you went into this with an attitude that this was a a
6 learning opportunity.
It's clear that you carried that 7
approach through to the end, and Maine Yankee is as much 8
the architect of success of this effort as the NRC was.
9 Page 8 just provides an overview of the scheduling.
i 10 The preparation time and onsite time brings us to the f
11 public meeting, accounts for about 17,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of 12 effort, both onsite and offsite, preparing, reviewing, 13 assessing and conducting in this effort.
2 14 The Chairman has asked for a response by December 15 10, 1996, with your plans to address the root causes of l
16 the identified deficiencies.
This is also an 17 opportunity to document any disagreements you may have s
18 with the report.
19 Region I NRR will be responsible for following up 20 issues, overseeing the corrective actions, and taking 21 the appropriate enforcement actions and the State of 22 Maine will continue close monitoring of the effort.
23 Slide 9, again, is to give the feel for the 24 denominator, what this is all about.
This 25-person 25 team conducted walkdowns of the safety systems both THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
14 1
while Lhe plant was operating and while shut down, 2
including inside containment; extended control room 3
observations; vertical slices of systems, meaning 4
looking at the system all the way back to its design 5
basis to determine whether it has been maintained and 6
modified properly; program assessments; an analytic code 7
review to determine whether the requirements in safety 8
evaluation reports were appropriately met and whether 9
the analytical codes were appropriately applied in 10 interviews.
11 And finally, before I touch on the results, an 12 important aspect of the results are the standards 13 employed in the assessment.
We used a three-level 14 effort to perform this assessment.
The first are the 15 regulations, and the regulations form the foundation of 16 the assessment to assure adequate protection of tb-17 health and safety of the public, which is the mission of 18 the NRC.
And the regulations also formed the primary 19 measure for assessing it in the licensing and the design 20 basis.
21 The second leg of this triad is the assessment 22 itself, and that was done in terms of existing NRC 23 benchmarks of performance.
Those performance, superior, 24 good and acceptable, measure the margin of safety of the 25 plant as it's operated.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
15 And finally, probabilistic risk assessment was 1 >
2 employed to provide some perspective to the significance 3
of the deficiencies identified.
4 The next slide captures, very briefly, the key 5
points of those existing NRC benchmarks for assessment.
6 They're described in more detail, complete definitions, 7
definitions in Section 1.3 of the report.
But, as you 8
can see, Superior is just that, effective across the 9
board.
10 Good represents the margin over minimally 11 acceptable, but it includes problems that require 12 attention; that some program deficiencies exist.
Some 13 issues are not identified by self-assessment programs.
14 Some corrective actions are not complete.
15 An Acceptable performance is performance that may 16 exhibit one cr more of the characteristics listed there 17 and require actions by both the licensee and the NRC to 18 ensure improvement and that adequate margin is 19 established.
And those characteristics are programs 20 that -- instances of programs of insufficient control; 21 self-assessment that may not occur until the problem is 22 apparent; corrective actions that may not be thorough; 23 or root causes that may not probe deeply enough.
24 Within that context, the overall assessment found 25 on slide 12 found that Maine Yankee was adequate for THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
l 16 i
l 1
safo operation.
And by way of summary, the constituent l
2 parts of this assessment to lead to that conclusion of I
i 3
adequate or safe operation are listed here.
l 4
The first mission v onformance with design and I
5 licensing basis, and we have found that you were 6
generally in conformance.
And I'll go through each of 7
these areas in at little more depth.
8 Mission area two was to assess operational 9
performance.
And the results of those assessments were 10 that operations were very good; that maintenance was 11 good: testing acceptable, with significant deficiencies; 12 engineering was good; and self assessment / corrective 13 actions were acceptable.
14 The key weaknesses in this area were the testing 15 area and the corrective actions area.
16 And if you have questions as we go along, I'd 17 encourage you to interrupt.
18 On page 13, to talk now in some detail about the 19 licensing basis, and these next two slides, 13 and 14, 20 speak to that area.
The first mission was to assess the 21 adequacy of the design and licensing basis.
22 our overall conclusion was that you were in general 23 conformance with your licensing basis; with the tech 24 specs, with FSARs, with written commitments.
But that 25 licensing basis lacks specificity -- the tech specs in THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
. ~.
17 1
FSAR, for example; contains inconsistencies -- the FSAR 2
within itself and FSAR to tech specs; and that they're 3
not well-maintained -- a large number of deficiencies, 4
particularly in the FSAR.
5 The use of analytic codes within the licensing and 6
design basis was found to be excellent for 7
cycle-specific applications.
Typically, these are codes 8
that deal with single-phased fluids, tend to be easily 9
validated through the operating experience of the cycle, 10 and were well validated.
They're done often.
Precision 11 is important in terms of operational decisions.
And 12 those codes were handled in an excellent manner, were 13 well controlled, well validated.
14 On the other hand, the more complex codes that were 15 infrequently used had weaknesses.
In this case, we're 16 talking about two-phased flows that are not easily 17 validated against standard operating conditions, that 18 need to be validated against external experimental 19 conditions.
20 We found, with regard to the RETRAN code, some 21 errors and lacking validation in plant-specific 22 application, although validation was present for the 23 generic case.
24 In terms of the safety evaluation report 25 conditions, there were many conditions -- over 60 --
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
18 1
that were imposed on the use of those codes.
All those 2
conditions had been satisfied, although some required 3
new work to assure that they had been met, and relied on 4
known conservatisms to satisfy them.
5 This is an area, the use of analytic codes, that 6
the NRC has not looked at at this depth previously in an 7
assessment or an inspection effort.
In order to provide 1
8 some iridependent review of the work that this team did, 9
we formed a peer review of experts in the field.
That 10 peer review reviewed the results of this assessment and 1
j i-11 concluded that they fully endorse the findings that this 12 team had made relative to both the cycle-specific and 13 the complex, infrequently used codes.
l 14 The peer review included Dr. Marvin Thurgood, a 15 former employer of the National Laboratory, who is the 16 developer of *he COBRA code; Dr. Lothar Wolfe, from the 17 University of Maryland, and an expert in phenomenology 18 for the accidents; Dr. Harold Sullivan trom the Los 19 Alamos Laboratory, the developer of the RETRAN code and 20 TRAK code; and Dr. Novack Zuber, an expert on two-phased 21 flow.
22 In terms of the design basis, we found that 23 information was retrieveable; it was understandable; the 24 electrical area was very good, especially in new 25 calculations; mechanical areas had some errors and some THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
_ _ _. _. ___...___~ _ _ _. _ _ _. -. _ _ _ _ _
19 i
- L overlaps, but was usable.
2 We found that your design basis adequately supports 3
operation at 2440 MWt, but that eroded margins _ prevented i'
4 us from concluding that operation at 2700 was 5
appropriately demonstrated.
]
6 And in order to put that in perspective, it's 7
important to recognize that deterministically 8
established licensing basis, along with conservative 9
design, effective maintenance and thorough testing, 10 assure adequate safety through defense and depth.
We 11 have found vulnerabilities to that deterministically 12 established licensing basis at levels above 2440; but 4
13 those are narrow vulnerabilities.
14 In terms of the example for component cooling 15 water, it's a large-break loss-of-coolant accident 16 coupled with high inlet temperatures; so we have a i
17 seasonal limitation for the initiation of the accident.
18 And in the case of the containment spray NPSH, it's a 19 large-break loss-of-coolant accident.
l 20 So, those vulnerabilities are important in terms of 21 the deterministically established licensing basis, but 22 are somewhat limited in terms of the exposure to the 23 initiative for the accident.
24 The next page lists the operability issues raised 25 during this assessment.
These are significant instances THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
l 20 1
where the plant was outside any of the licensing basis 2
or design basis and forms a part of the assessment of 3
overall licensing / design basis issues.
Some of these 4
issues were identified by Maine Yankee, some of them 5
were identified by the Independent Safety Assessment 6
Team, but most were jointly identified as a result of 7
the leverage of Maine Yankee's support organization that j
8 we discussed earlier.
1 9
To go through these briefly:
10 The first one involved component cooling water 11 piping inside containment identified by Maine Yankee 12 lacking thermal relief valves.
13 The second issue involves transmitters that were 14 maintained and instrumentation that was maintained to 15 hot for the reactor water storage water transmitters.
16 The third issue is an equipment qualification for 17 submergence.
18 And by the way, each of these -- the component 19 cooling piping, of course, the plant shut down and has 20 been repaired.
The reactor water storage level 21 instrumentation problem has been fixed and the 22 instruments repaired.
The equipment qualification for 23 submergence issue was an instance where components were 24 found to be below the expected water level inside 25 containment on an accident involving important THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
21 1
parameters, steam generator level, vessel level.
That 2
issue has been fixed.
3 The fourth area on there are ventilation; and there 4
were a number of ventilation issues involving the spray 5
building, the protective switch gear, the control room, 6
and the emergency diesel generator.
Each of those 7
issues have been addressed or appropriate compensatory 8
measures have been put in place.
9 The fifth is logic circuitry.
In that instance, 10 many systems were found to not be adequately tested, and 11 when tested, four problems were found.
12 The next, on containment spray pump, is the 13 inadequate net positive suction heads in the event of a 14 loss-of-coolant accident.
15 The service water example, again, of operability
)
16 issues, involves material condition of one train of the j
17 service water and speaks, to some extent, to standards 18 and of accepting conditions.
And that's an area that 19 was visited frequently.
20 The final, check valve testing, involved four 21 systems that the tests being performed could not, did 22 not adequately show whether the check valves operated 23 properly when we tested, or performed satisfactorily.
24 In sum, considering the vast amount of information 25 that was reviewed, the problems found were significant, THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
22 1
but the conclusion was that generally Maine Yankee is in i
2 conformance.
3 Any questions on the licensing or the --
4 UNIDENTIFIED SPECTATOR:
We can't hear you.
l 5
MR. MERSCHOFF:
Pardon?
6 UNIDENTIFIED SPECTATOR:
We can't hear you.
7 MR. MERSCHOFF:
How about now?
l 8
Any questions on design or licensing?
9 (No response.)
i 10 On page 15 is operations, the operational area.
i 11 The conclusion in the area of operations was that i
12 performance was very good.
Strengths were noted in the 13 area of startup/ shutdown.
Routine operations were well 14 controlled.
Good command and control.
Good use of 15 procedures.
Operators responded well to equipment 16 problems.
Auxiliary operator rounds were thorough 17 Shift test advisors were experienced.
They had good 18 knowledge of the plant and were effectively used.
19 Online safety assessments and shutdown safety 20 assessments were effectively integrated -- or were 21 effectively integrated PRA in the day-to-day operations.
22 Shift turnovers were thorough, preevolution briefs 23 were effective, and the management was involved in the 24 day-to-day operations.
25 In terms of weaknesses in the area of operations, THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
23 I
generally, problem resolution and a willingness to 2
accept existing conditions was the barrier between very 3
good and superior performance.
4 We found a number of workarounds and compensatory 5
measures in place that unnecessarily burdened operators; 6
post-trip reviews that lacked rigor and completeness; 7
and log-keeping that missed some major components.
8 Post-trip reviews also struck a common theme with 9
the testing area.
And a trip is, in some ways, a 10 unscheduled test with complex interactions that provides 11 an excellent opportunity to determining where the 12 problems exist.
And thoroughness and ability to review 13 the data was somewhat limited due to equipment 14 limitations, i
i 15 Any questions or comments on operations?
16
("o response.)
17 Maintenance area, the overall performance was good.
18 There was good communication and coordination.
The I
i 19 maintenance area effectively identified deficiencies, 20 although some were missed.
There was good knowledge and 21 use of probabilistic risk assessment integrated into the 22 maintenance area.
A motivated, dedicated workforce, 23 good control of temporary repairs within safety systems, 24 and good quality of maintenance is indicated by limited 25 rework.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
24 1
Weaknesses in the maintenance area were considered 2
to be a declining material condition.
The service water i
3 bay area, the auxiliary feedwater pump performance, 4
equipment performance that has been adversely affecting 5
plant performance, most notably after the restart from 6
the steam generator tube sleeving outage has indicated 1
7 an overall decline in material condition.
8 An inconsistent equipment reliability.
In terms of 9
the review that was done for our vertical supply 10 systems, we found the auxiliary feedwater pump 11 reliability to be quite poor, diesels good, and 12 emergency feedwater pumps excellent.
13 The testing area overall performance was considered 14 acceptable.
There were a number of testing weaknesses 15 noted, the primary of which was the inadequate scope.
16 Important equipment was not being tested appropriately 17 at Maine Yankee.
Emergency diesel generator time 18 relays, logic testing in regard to 197 power meters, and 19 appropriate calibrations were examples of testing 1
20 problems of inadequate scope.
21 We also had concerns relative to the rigor with 22 which tests were performed.
Check-valve testing and the 23 RAS manual actuation switch were examples of tests where 24 the tests were being performed, but not really 25 satisfying the intent of the testing.
The test was, in THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
25 1
many ways, meaningless and not identified in the review.
2 And finally, weak evaluations.
Control and 3
ventilation failed its test in October of
'95, but was 4
not identified during the evaluation.
Post-trip 5
reviews, check valves, air-operating valves were 6
examples were the evaluations of tests that were done 7
were done weakly.
8 However, there were some strengths and successes in 9
the area of testing.
In terms of the steam generator 10 eddy current testing for tubes, Maine Yankee applied 11 state of the art techniques and identified and corrected 12 steam generator tube problems before they became 13 self-revealing.
14 Inservice tests for most pumps and valves that were 15 in the inservice test program were performed quite well, 16 and the integrate? leak-rate testing results showed a 17 good condition of the containment and the containment 18 isolation program.
19 In the area of engineering, performance was mixed, l
20 but good overall.
We found that calculations were i
21 detailed and comprehensive, 5059 reviews were good, 22 day-to-day communication and coordination with the other 23 departments were good and they were responsive to 24 problems.
There was a qualified, capable staff.
The 25 electrical design work was quite good.
Support to THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
26 i
1 operations and maintenance was good.
And there was 2
strong support provided by the Yankee Atomic 3
organization in terms of their reponsiveness and their l
4 knowledge of the plant.
5 Some deficiencies and weaknesses were noted 6
relative to limited ownership within the engineering 7
department.
Equipment qualification, for example, as an 8
at aas no assigned staff engineer with primary 9
esponsibilities to this area and is an area that we 10 found to have deficiencies during the assessment.
11 Fire protection is an area that you've recognized 12 recently as needing increased attention, and you've 13 developed an improvement plan to address that.
14 And testing is an area with distributed 15 responsibility with no clear advocate for the rigor and 16 quality of te-ting for any given system.
17 And then finally, one of the key problems is the 18 inconsistent identification and resol'2 tion of p;oblems.
19 In terms of the ventilation system, the atmospheric 20 steam dump valve, the auxiliary feed, the high-pressure 21 safety injection wire that was cut, the EQ submergence 22 issues, these are examples of either deficient 23 conditions that were unknown to you or deficient 24 conditions that were identified, but dropped with 25 ineffective corrective action taken.
This is an area I
i THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
l 27 1
1 that requires attention.
L 2
However, there have been many significant problems 3
that have been identified and addressed by Maine Yankee.
4 Your safety-related emergency feedwater ventilation, the 5
component cooling water thermal release, the steam 6
generator sleeving, the spray building inlet 7
ventilation, the flooding issue, the high-energy 8
line-break issue are all examples of significant issues 9
identified and addressed by the Maine Yankee 10 organization.
11 In terms of effectiveness of self-assessment and 12 corrective action -- I'm getting loud enough to get 13 feedback now.
Somewhere I'll find a happy medium.
14 Effectiveness of self-assessment and corrective 15 action improvement plans, overall effectiveness was 16 acceptable.
17 In terms of self-assessment, the internal / external 18 self-assessment effectiveness was mixed.
We saw good 19 use of external experts on audits.
The cultural 20 assessment was the right tool at the right time to 21 address issues at Maine Yankee.
You identified 22 weaknesses in the corrective action program and l
23 instituted changes of that.
24 However, the self-assessment process missed the 25 testing weakness identified and has had limited THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
28 1
effectiveness in the radiation protection area in terms 2
of tuKing action on the third-party assessments that 3
have been performed.
4 Oversight committees have been effective before the 5
INSAR, and a fragmented problem-identification process.
6 Twenty-nine different systems have generated some 7
confusion over which system is the right one to use for 8
a given problem, and threshholds within the process is 9
too high.
10 This is a problem that you identified, that you 11 established the learning process to address, and does i
12 need to continue to be addressed.
13 The corrective action program is weak and another 14 key problem with testing, in the view of the assessment.
15 Also, a fragmented process; 21 different processes for 16 corrective action, a large increase in backlog.
- Again, 17 this is an area which you've identified and put in place 18 measures to address that need to come to completion and 19 be implemented.
20 Trending and timeliness weak, and occasionally an 21 ineffective corrective action process.
22 Finally, improvement plans.
You had many plans, 23 and at the time we started the inspection, no integrated 24 plan, although one was being developed.
25 Results are mixed.
Some good plans:
shutdown THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
29 1
risk, industrial safety, maintenance reliability, the 2
learning process, all examples of improvement programs l
3 that had worked.
Design basis reconstitution, 4
air-operated valves, erosion / corrosion, specialty 5
training are ones that were weaker in terms of the l
6 timeliness and effectiveness.
7 And that brings us to the root cause.
The core 8
mission area assigned to this assessment team was to 9
find the root causes of the safety-significant findings.
10 We found two closely related causes.
The first was that 11 economic pressure to be a low-cost energy producer has 12 limited available resources to address corrective 13 actions and some plant improvement upgrades.
Management 14 has effectively prioritized available resources, but 15 financial pressures have caused the postponement of some 16 needed programs and actions.
17 Deficiencies which we saw which illustrate this 18 cause are things like the inadequate testing program, 19 the longstanding design deficiencies, equipment 20 qualification issues, the willingness to accept existing 21 conditions, operator workarounds and compensatory 22 measures, and delayed implementation of improvement l
23 programs.
l 24 The second root cause of the significant i
25 deficiencies identified is that there is a lack of l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
30 l
i questioning culture which has resulted in the failure to 2
identify or promptly correct significant problems in 3
areas perceived by management to be of low safety 4
significance.
Management appears complacent with the j
5 current level of safety performance and there does not 6
appear to be a clear incentive for improvement.
7 Examples which illustrate this are the undiscovered 8
deficient condition in the service water auxiliary feed 9
and ventilation systems, weak post-trip reviews, and 10 lack of a questioning attitude during our check-valve 11 control and ventilation test performance, are examples.
12 In order for Maine Yankee to properly address the 13 weaknesses noted within the good and the acceptable 14 areas, you must both change the culture to lower the 15 threshhold of problem identification and adequately fund 16 both problem discovery and problem resolution 17 initiatives.
18 If there are no questions on this, I'll turn it 19 back over to Ed.
20 MR. LEITCH:
I have no questions.
j 21 MR. JORDAN:
I would like to restate the assessment 22 with two messages.
23 The first message is to the utility.
The terms 24
" adequate for continued operation" means that minimum 25 NRC requirements are generally met, but several THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
31 1
1 significent areas and activities need improvement.
The 2
NRC has requested the utility provide plans for 3
addressing the root causes of the deficiencies 4
identified; in addition, resolution of specific 5
deficiencies.that were identified and follow-up to the 6
potential other deficiencies that remain unidentified.
7 And your corrective actions will be followed up by NRC's 8
Region I and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
9 The second message is to the public, where the term 10
" adequate" needs further explanation.
11 From my experience in managing a large number, 16, 12 similar ceam assessments and from results of other 13 assessments by teams in the NRC, the overall safety 14 performance at the Maine Yankee plant is average or 15 slightly below average, with evidence of a declining 16 trend.
So " hat puts, I hope, in perspective where we 17 view the performance of this plant.
18 I'd like to give an opportunity from Mr. Hub Miller 19 to make any comments at this time.
20 MR. MILLER:
Well, it's very clear that this has
)
21 been a very exhaustive assessment.
The kinds of 22 assessments, you know, that were done here are not done l
23 often by tha NRC.
And this assessment has pointed to i
24 some things that you were doing well; but it points to 25 numerous areas where you need to focus management 1
1 l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
32 1
attention.
Areas that you need to work on.
2 The Region, along with the people in the licensing 3
office in Washington, have the job now of following 4
closely your efforts to address these issues.
And Ellis 5
has talked about them.
I won't repeat them all.
But 6
there are issues with containment spray, design issues 7
with containment spray, ventilation, component coolant 8
water, and the like.
There are issues regarding the 9
burden on operators.
And we will be checking the things 10 that you do to address those rpecific issues.
11 But I think, at the same time and as we do that,
[
12 what we will be looking for is this questioning attitude 13 and aggressiveness in identifying your own issues and 14 problems and being self critical.
First of all, 15 checking to see if you are effectively raising the 16 issues and getting them brought to the surface.
17 And the second thing we will be looking for, as we l
18 check all of the specific issues that have been raised 19 by the team, is are you consistently resolving those l
20 issues effectively.
Are you committing the resources l
21 and do you have an effective process for addressing the l
22 problems and correcting them.
23 I mean, there are -- nuclear power plants are 24 complicated machines, and you can break down the i
25 activities laco many different disciplines; but, in the i
THE REPORTING GROUP /Hason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
33 1
end, the things that distinguish the top performers from 2
the average and certainly poor performers are really 3
several things, and they are having high standards, 4
having an aggressive, self-critical approach to doing 5
work, and thirdly, having effective corrective action 6
schemes.
And so, throughout this whole uversight, 7
that's what we will be focusing on.
8 At this point let me give the microphone to Steve 9
Varga from the Headquarters office.
10 MR. VARGA:
One thing I would like to emphasize, 11 and Ellis has pointed this out, is the independence of 12 this team.
No one from Region or from Headquarters that 13 had any involvement with Maine Yankee in the safety 14 assessment or in the inspection was involved in this 15 team effort.
We view that as a very, very strong plus.
16 There were people there without any inborn prejudices 17 one way or the other, and looked at it objectively.
We 18 think that's a very strong plus.
19 In addition to which, I think Ellis pointed out, 20 much of the success of the team was also due to Maine 21 Yankee's cooperation in terms of the team that it put 22 together responding to the team's findings and to the 23 team's activities.
24 It seems to me that that's a learning lesson, both 25 for NRC about an inspection and how it was conducted and THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
34 l
1 perhaps learn from that some insights into inspection 2
activities in general, and it also seems to me that 3
Maine Yankee, as a result of interfacing with that 4
inspection team, could modify or at least learn from 5
that a more questioning attitude.
6 MR. MILLER:
Before passing it back, I'd just like 7
to make one other comment.
I'm new to Region I, as you 8
know, and it's clear to me, as I look across the region, 9
that there are a number of plants that need attention.
10 And it is clear to me that we, in Region I, need to 11 commit resources to this effort to follow up on your 12 activities.
But one othcr thing strikes me, and that is 13 that there was a great deal of effort in this assessment 14 to work closely with officials with state government to 15 assure that our process was one that was understood, was 16 open.
And it's not lost on me that that's a very 17 important thing and not just really a matter for -- not 18 just a concern with the state officials, but cortainly 19 with the public.
20 So, I expect that as we do our work going forward, 21 this is not just the work of our resident inspectors who 22 are here on an ongoing basis, but the other specialists 23 who will come and visit Maine Yankee from our l
24 Philadelphia office, that we will do this in a very open l
25 way, so it's transparent what we are doing and how we THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
l 35 1
are doing our work.
l 2
So I think it's important to make that point.
And 3
we will continue to make a strong effort to keep the 4
lines of communication open, certainly, with the state, 5
and the public as well.
6 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you, Steve and Hub.
7 Mr. Frizzle, do you have any comments, please?
8 MR. FRIZZLE:
Yes.
Thank you, Ed.
9 Maine Yankee believes that this report reflects an 10 excellent effort, a highly professional effort, on the 11 part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and all of 12 those elements of the state that participated in this 13 effort.
q pleased that the report support Maine 14 We'r e 15 Yankee's position that the plant is operating safely and 16 has operated safely for over 24 years.
And the report 17 confirms that when issues are identified as 18 safety-significant, the necessary actions are taken.
19 We believe that the Independent Safety Assessment 20 Report is balanced in content and reasonable in its 21 subjectivity.
Maine Yankee does not have any 22 significant disagreement with the technical facts in the l
23 report.
Any minor technical disagreements will be l
24 addressed in our formal response.
I 25 We're pleased that many of the independent safety l
l THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
36 1
assessment issues been identified by Maine Yankee prior 2
to the inspection.
We've already mentioned our cultural 3
assessment and our learning process.
Additionally, in 4
the report, you make note of our maintenance improvement 5
program, our engineering quality' improvement program, 6
the safety analysis improvement plan, our industrial 7
safety improvement initiatives, and our supervisory 8
development and improvement plan.
9 The new issues that have been raised by the 10 Independent Safety Assessment are receiving prompt 11 attention.
In the course of this Independent Safety 12 Assessment, something in excess of 100 short-term 13 recommendations were made by the Safety AssescNent Team.
14 All of those short-term recommendations have been 15 addressed.
The majority of those were addressed even 16 before we received the written report.
17 We believe that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 18 root cause statements are reasonable when viewed in 19 context.
And I'll have more to say about the root cause 20 statements in a moment.
21 Overall, being subjected to the Independent Safety 22 Assessment was a significant learning experience for l
l 23 Maine Yankee.
We've learned an awful lot from this l
l 24 process with respect to regulatory threshholds, the i
[
25 best-in-the-industry practices, and opportunities for THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
.m.
l l
37 1
recalibrating our internal policies, practices and 2
procedures.
3 I would like to commend all Maine Yankee personnel 4
for their dedicated and competent response to all of the 1
5 challenges presented by this Independent safety 6
Assessment.
This is something, obviously, I could have 7
done internal to the company, but I wanted to do this 8
publicly to thank them for their dedication.
9 Personnel at Maine Yankee perform their jobs 10 proudly.
They endure long hours of never-ending public 11 and regulatory scrutiny.
And they demonstrate that they 12 truly care about this plant and the safety of the 13 public, and that they respect to the fullest the 14 regulatory environment in which we all work.
15 With respect to the root causes identified in the 16 Independent Safety Assessment, first of all, economic 17 pressures to contain costs, the report correctly notes 18 that notwithstanding these pressures, management has 19 effectively operated its plant within the budget 20 constraints.
21 The report also notes that management has 22 effectively prioritized available resources, but 23 financial pressures have caused the postponement of some l
24 needed program improvements and actions.
25 The report notes that safety has always been of l
l THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
l
38 1
paramount importance during these very tough 2
prioritization decisions.
Postponed activities were not 3
viewed, at least at the time, to have safety 4
significance.
We welcome the input of the Independent 5
Safety Assessment as to how we make those decisions and 6
draw those lines.
7 With respect to the second root cause, poor problem 8
identification as a result of complacency and lack of a 9
questioning attitude, we agree with this statement in 10 the context of the full report.
I would object to what 11 has become a popular characterization of this statement 12 as applicable to Maine Yankee in general or applicable 13 to all Maine Yankee employees.
14 I would note that the NRC also found a motivated 15 and dedicated workforce at Maine Yankee.
Our workforce 16 was not complacent regarding issues that personnel 17 believed to be of safety significance.
Those issues 18 were promptly addressed to the best of their ability.
19 We, the managers at Maine Yankee, will accept the 20 blame for those circumstances where we did not exhibit 21 an adequate questioning attitude.
It is our job to 22 ensure that potentially significant and credible 23 what-ifs are addressed in every circumstance.
In that 24 regard, the ISA has certainly helped us to recalibrate i
25 the way that we approach such issues.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
39 l
1 We will provide our formal response to the Nuclear 2
Regulatory Commission Independent Safety Assessment 3
within the 60 days, as specified.
We have already 4
announced our Commitment to Excellence Action Plan, 5
which provides an immediate response, not only to the 6
Independent Safety Assessment findings, but to other 7
Maine Yankee issues that have been raised in the past 8
few months.
9 This Commitment to Excellence Action Plan provides 10 a comprehensive approach for achieving and maintaining 11 excellent Maine Yankee performance.
It addresses the 12 resources that we will apply, the organizational changes 13 that we will incorporate, an invigorated level of board 14 of directors oversight, programs within the company and 15 within the plant, and the people, but more importantly, 16 the tools that we provide to people to do their job.
17 Maine Yankee's focus is clear.
Our commitment to 18 success is unwavered.
I said it yesterday at the 19 unveiling of the Commitment to Excellence Plan, I'll 20 repeat it here tonight, we are committed to providing 21 adequate resources to continue operating the Maine 22 Yankee plant safely or we will not operate it at all.
23 Thank you.
24 And I'd like to add a special thanks to the NRC 4
25 Independent Safety Assessment Team for their THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
40 i
l professionalism in the conduct of this very, very 2
rigorous inspection.
3 Thank you.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you, Mr. Frizzle.
I should 5
indicate that the team did enjoy excellent 6
administrative support with space and people, and the
{
7 report does take note of the fact that the utility 8
provided a counterpart team that, in fact, leveraged the i
9 work and efforts of the team very effectively.
I think 10 that was a beneficial role.
11 This was a large burden to the utility.
We came in 12 with a large group of highly skilled NRC personnel, who I
13 pored through records and crawled all over equipment and 14 examined calculations, perhaps to an extent that hasn't 15 happened at this plant.
It's happened only at a few.
16 So I believe that the utility response was excellent.
17 I would also want to comment on the interactions 18 with the State of Maine.
We achieved, I think, an 19 extremely high level of coordination and support with 20 the state, and I'm very comfortable with the 21 relationship that has grown from that in our interface.
22 Unless someone has a further comment on the panel 23 or the utility, then I would like to end this portion of 24 the meeting.
I would indicate that members -- I would 25 remind members of the public that wish to sign up to ask l
l l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
41 1
questions in the next portion should continue to do so 2
at the podium during this interval.
3 We're running about 30 minutes ahead of the 4
scheduled time.
My proposal would be to break for 30 5
minutes, and then resume at 7:30, and save people's 6
time, and run for two hours beginning at 7:30.
7 I have a couple of hands up that may wish to 8
disagree.
9 Yes, please.
Come to the microphone, sir.
10 MR. ROBERT MOLDAVER:
Thank you very much.
Is this 11 on?
12 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
And your comment at this point 13 would only be regarding the change in time.
14 MR. MOLDAVER:
Correct.
Seeing that we are running 15 ahead of schedule, I know that many people here would 16 hope to not only ask you questions, but make some 17 statements that might run over your initial idea of two 18 minutes.
And I think it would be best to allow the 19 public the opportunity to make their statements, ask 20 their questions, and use the extra time to put that 21 together.
22 Now, I know that may not agree with some people 23 shaking their heads, but I can guess where they're from.
l 24 So, I would just suggest that since this is the one 25 public meeing that you're having on this inspection team THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
42 1
report, that you offer the public the time to comment 2
more fully.
I 3
MR. JORDAN:
We'll take that into consideration.
'4 I'm going to close this portion of the meeting 5
unless someone objects to shifting the tima frame to 6
begin the second part of the meeting at 7:30.
And we'll 7
discuss here --
8 MR. MOLDAVER:
I'd like to just submit that a 9
half-an-hour break at this point, what for?
10 MR. JORDAN:
The purpose of the break is to 11 reconfigure the stage, to respond to any media i
12 questions, if there are any, and then we would resume.
i 13 MR. MOLDAVER:
Maybe 15 minutes would suffice for
)
14 that, I would suggest.
15 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
I'm not going to argue.
We'll 16 resume at 7:30 This portion of the meeting is l
17 adjourned.
l 18 Thank you.
I 19 (Part I of the meeting adjourned at 7:03 p.m.)
l 20 21 22 23 24
.i 25 THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell 1
43 1
PART II 2
(The meeting reconvened at 7:30 p.m.)
i I
3 MR. JORDAN:
I would like to go ahead and convene l
4 the second part of the meeting now.
i 5
Thank you for staying and participating, and, in 6
particular, I appreciate the courtesy that you extended j
l j
7 to the NRC during the first part of the meeting.
It was 8
a very beneficial meeting for us, and we appreciate it.
l 9
The purpose of this Part II is to answer questions 10 regarding the NRC's Independent Safety Assessment of the 11 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.
Over the past four 12 months we've conducted an extensive assessment of the 13 safety of the Maine Yankee facility and response to the 14 concerns identified during the RELAP/5YA issue; the use 15 of the code RELAP/SYA.
16 The findings and the assessment were discussed in 17 some detail from 6:00 until 7:00.
And we nave handcuts 18 that I presume everyone has copies of in front of you.
l 19 We've looked over the number of people that have 20 signed up.
At this point there are some 41 people, so I 21 would confine it to a two-minute time limit for 22 comme:1ts.
23 I think it may be appropriate to reintroduce the.
j 24 people at the table.
25 Ed Jordan is my name, Ellis Merschoff, Hub Miller, THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
=
44 l
1 Peter Wiley, and Uldis Vanags -- and who is the older 2
guy down there?
Steve Varga.
3 MR. VARGA: -Thank you.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Steve and I pick cn1 each other as to
'S who's the older guy.
6 At this point I would like to go ahead with the 7
questions and comments.
I would ask that you try not to 8
digress from the safety assessment issue.
And I'would.
9 restate the protocol, that is, that you'll each be l
10 allowed two minutes, and then, if we have additional l
11 time -- and we will go ahead until 10 p.m.,
as was 12 suggested.
Then we'll take questions from the floor.
13 We will, among us, decide who is going to respond.
I'll l
14 try to direct the questions to the right person.
And 15 we'll also limit our own response to roughly two 16 minutes, as well.
l l
17 So I ask your cooperation, your respect for your 18 neighbor in affording uninterrupted questions and 19 answers.
l 20 The first question was from Mr. Bill Linnell.
And i
21 maybe I should identify, the next will be Kris
'22 Christine, and then Nigel Calder, so that they'll be t
23 ready to move to the podium.
24 MR. LINNELL:
Thank you.
My name is Bill Linnell.
25 I'm the spokesperson for Maine Safe Energy, a statewide THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
45 J
.1 nuclear watchdog organization.
And I'll be brief.
I i
2 have a couple of observations, and then I promise I will I
3 have a question for you.
4 From this report, from what I've been able to read 5
in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, I see some alarming trends.
The 6
margin of safety at Maine Yankee has come down in 7
contrast, I think, to Maine Yankee's -- their public 8
perspective.
My understanding is that the NRC has
~
l 9
deemed that the plant cannot run within safety margins
{
10 at 2700 MWt, so they're at 2440.
For at least six i
11 years, I think, Maine Yankee did run above 2440.
At the i
1 12 same time, their steam generator tubes cracked over 90%
13 of the way through, 15 feet of cable were missing from i
14 the control room, and so on.
15 In your report you talk about the root causes, and 16 that's what I want to talk about.
The economics of the 17 nuclear power plant.
18 And I want to just step back for a second.
I think 19 a very useful analogy is in this book by Tony Marchag, 20 called Seaworthiness:
The Foraotten Factor.
And this 21 written in the aftermath of the 1979 FASNET race off 22 England, where 15 sailors died in an international 23 sailing competition.
And in looking at it afterwards, 24 they determined that there was a trend, because of the 25 rules in international offshore racing, that i
i THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
46 i
i seaworthiness, in other words, safety, had taken a back I
l 2
seat to speed.
And I think, as engineers, you'll find 3
this book fascinating reading, and you'll understand it 4
a lot better than I do.
5 But I think similarly, at Maine Yankee, that safety 6
has taken a back seat to economics.
So I don't -- what 7
I'm going to ask you to consider doing is participating 8
in some sort of blue ribbon commission for an extensive 9
investigation of the financial climate at the Maine 10 Yankee Nuclear Power Plant.
It seems that there are 11 financial incentives for Maine Yankee to produce power 12 at the very cheapest cost, and as your report indicates, 13 safety has been compromised.
14 Deregulation, competition from natural gas, the 15 reliability of the eighth oldest pressurized water 16 reactor in the country, the oldest combustion 17 Engineering steam generators in the world, all are 18 casting doubt on Maine Yankee's economic future.
19 So, I think what we need is we need to see the 20 dollars on the table; that Maine Yankee can come up with 21 the money, if they wish to continue to operate -- the 22 money to repair the plant, to maintain the plant.
And j
l l
23 we need to be able to verify externally that that money f
24 and commitment is there.
And so, I invite you to participate in that.
25 l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
m 47 F
)
l 1
Mr. Wiley, I'd love to see the Governor take a look 2
at this, because I think this is one of the biggest I
I 3
parts of this investigation.
You've identified the 4
problem.
i 5
And so, I want to ask -- my question, then, is what 6
plans does the NRC have, if any, at this point to 7
address this root cause?
And I know before this, J
8 generally, you've been -- economics hasn't been your 9
sandbox.
Safety has.
So I think we have a very -- we 10 have a problem here that needs to be addressed.
11 MR. JORDAN:
Okay, Mr. Linnell.
I appreciate the 12 question.
And you're quite right, the NRC is concerned 13 industry-wide about the economic pressures on nuclear 14 power plants in the regulation process.
The NRC is 15 going through a strategic assessment of its own 16 programs, e-d one of the external factors that affects 17 the NRC regulatory process and the performance of 18 nuclear power plants is exactly that, the economic
)
i 19 pressure across industry for plants to achieve 20 competition with other sources of energy in their areas.
21 And so, we have on the large-scale a part of our 22 strategic assessment this issue to resolve and to be 1
23 able to monitor the industry's performance and look for, 24 in my terms, cases where there is economic stress and, 25 therefore, a safety strain.
So, some measures that we i
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
48 1
may look at will identify who is under economic stress 2
and what is occurring in terms of strain among the 3
plants.
i 4
In the Maine Yankee case, we, I believe, have 5
identified an issue that's appropriate for the utility l
6 to respond to.
We will review their response that 7
they'll send in December 10th, and then have a position 8
regarding its adequacy.
9 And, Hub, you look like you'd like to make a 10 comment?
11 MR. MILLER:
Yes.
You talked about verification, 12 and I'm the Chief of the Northeast Region, and my job is 13 one of verifying -- my staff -- of verifying that the 14 licensee --
15 MR. JORDAN:
Which applies to us, too, Hub.
16 MR. MILLER:
-- is meeting -- that's right.
The 17 Region, working with Headquarters, has the job of 18 verifying that the rules are being met.
And I think it 19 should be clear that the rules that we have are 20 structured to assure that there are multiple barriers, 21 that there is defense in depth.
And as licensees face 22 the economic pressures that clearly are out there, the 23 NRC will give no quarter, can give no quarter.
24 And so, while there are the plants that Ed talked
(
25 about, there is, and will continue to be, a very THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
49 1
1 aggressive oversight from our side to assure that they 2
are meeting limits and requirements and not taking 3
shortcuts that prevent them from doing that.
So that's 4
the other part ot e answer.
1 5
MR. LINNELL:
Thank you.
I'd just, you know, point 6
out that I think that the situation at Maine Yankee is 7
peculiar in the nuclear industry.
I think only Vermont 8
Yankee has that relationship with the owners, and so 9
forth, with several of the nuclear power plants all at 10 once.
So, I think you'll find that there are some 11 particular circumstances that might bear looking into to 12 reverse the trend.
13 Thank you very much.
14 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Linnell.
15 Kris Christine?
16 KRIS CHRISTINE:
Good evening.
I'd like to thank 17 you for giving us this opportunity to voice our 18 concerns.
Even if we only have two minutes, we really 19 appreciate those two minutes.
20 My concern is that in the sheltered environment of 21 an economically regulated market, Maine Yankee 22 management cut corners to the point which your executive 23 summary states impairs the licensee's ability to 24 complete improvement projects that affected plant safety
]
l 25 and which also compelled employees to engage in what the l
l l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagoplan & Ramsdell
.=.
50-1 cultural assessment team report referred to as selective 2
noncompliance with NRC regulations.
3 With deregulation looming on the horizon in the 4
year 2000, the pressure for management to cut corners j
5 will only intensify if Maine Yankee is forced into j
6 economic competition.
This will warrant more aggressive 7
scrutiny of the plant by the NRC to ensure public 8
safety.
9 Unfortunately, the two resident NRC inspectors have 10 failed, so far, to discover the severed wires in one of 11 the plant's emergency core cooling system pumps for over 12 six years.
They also failed to discover the lack of a l
13 pressure relief valve in the primary component cooling i
14 system.
For over six years they failed to detect the i
15 unqualified instrumentation cable into the reactor core, 16 and they also failed to identify the inadequate i
17 ventilation of the switch gear room, among other things 18 that your team discovered along with Maine Yankce.
19 How do you propose the NRC address the increased 20 demand for NRC oversight at Maine Yankee in a 21 deregulated market when the resident NRC inspectors seem 22 unable to identify noncompliance issues which impact 23 plant safety?
24 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
I'll start with an answer, and 25 then go to Hub.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
51 1
The answer I would start with is that the NRC 2
programs have not been focused in some of the right 3
areas; that we haven't been looking -- reexamining 4
previous licensing basis issues for -- and I would say 5
from the standpoint of backfits.
And then you have -- I 6
mean, I'd have to say I'm the guardian of the backfits 7
in the agency.
And so, some of the pressure that we've 8
put on our NRC people, somewhat like economic pressure 9
on the utilities, is if something has been previously 10 approved, you shouldn't reopen it, because it's a 11 backfit.
12 Well, the way we've conveyed that is a mistake.
13 The issue really is it's fine to examine previous work.
14 If there is a change to previously accepted findings, 15 there may be a backfit.
But some backfits are good and 16 appropriate.
17 So, if there's a compliance issue, an adequate j
18 safety-protection issue, or a significant safety benefit 19 that may be made as the basis to make a change, then 20 it's appropriate to do so.
So we're looking at arming 21 the NRC staff better so that there are no areas that are 22 off-limits, so to speak, for reexamination.
23 MS. CHRISTINE:
Well, I read a lot of the 24 inspection reports that come out, and one of the 25 patterns that I've noticed is that it seems like the THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
l 52 i
j 1
resident inspectors have a reactive rather than 2
proactive way of finding things.
It seems that if 3
something goes wrong, if a pump breaks, they're there 4
and they'll say, well, there was a violation because of 5
this, this, and this procedure.
But they don't seem to 6
come up with anything on their own that isn't related to a breakdown or a problem.
7 8
So, that makes me a little nervous, living near the 9
plant, that they aren't aggressive.
It appears to me, 10 from reading these reports, that they are not 11 aggressively looking for compliance with NRC j
12 regulations; that they're only finding things in a i
1 13 reactive style.
So --
14 MR. JORDAN:
Well, I would say that a large part of i
j 15 the problem is, in fact, the program that we provide the 16 residents and the training that we provide the residents 17 in regulatory review process.
And we're going to be l
18 meeting with the Commission October 18th to go over the 1
19 findings for Maine Yankee, and with emphasis on what are i
]
20 we going to do programatically to correct the NRC's 21 issues associated with the problem.
22 MS. CHRISTINE:
So that is something that you are i
{
23 looking at?
l 24 MR. JORDAN:
It really is.
25 MS. CHRISTINE:
Okay.
i l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
53 1
1 MR. MILLER:
I think there's much talk here about l
2 learning organizations, and we have to be a learning 1
l 3
organization as well.
I think it's wrong to focus just a
\\
i 4
on the resident inspectors.
It's a fair question.
It's 5
a very good question.
It's one we're always asking i
i 6
ourselves, how best to be proactive to identify our own 3
4 7
issues.
But it goes to those people who are out in the 8
Region and in Headquarters as well.
r j
9 And in that collective effort, it is important that 10 we be out looking for issues and not just responding and 11 reacting to what reveals itself through events at the j
12 plant.
That's the wrong way to be looking at things.
1 l
13 Now, certainly, we have to be reactive, and as 1
14 events do occur, we have to look at how the licensee 15 addresses those things.
l 16 The second thing I will say is that -- and I'll
)
17 reemphasize it -- I think it should be clear -- is that i
l 18 we have limited resources, and so our program is an i
l 19 audit program.
What we have to do, and much of the 1
20 trick in this business, is to string together those f
21 findings'that we make, detect patterns, and when we see 22 a pattern's weakness, to be effective in communicating 23 our concerns to the licensee.
Because it starts with 24 the licensee, and it must always start with the 25 licensee.
i THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell 4
54 1
As I mentioned before, the thing that we're looking 2
for here, even in a follow-up with these many issues, is 3
really the following:
Is this licensee consistently l
4 identifying their own issues and are they effectively
)
5 correcting them?
That's where it has to start.
6 MS. CHRISTINE:
So, does this mean that y 1'11 be 7
giving Maine Yankee, through your resident NRC 8
inspectors, more rigorous compliance oversight in the 4
9 future, especially with deregulation coming in three 10 years?
11
_MR. MILLER:
I'll just say that in this period we 12 will be looking very carefully at all plants, and this i
13 includes Maine Yankee, at compliance.
1 14 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
Thank you very much.
i 15 Nigel Calder.
And after Nigel is Peter Christine 16 and Edward Myers.
n 17 NIGEL CALDER:
Good evening.
My family and I moved j
18 to this area five years ago knowing there was a nuclear 19 power plant down the road, and we did so without any 20 qualms at all.
In fact, one of the reasons we chose 3
4 21 this area to live was because there's an excellent i
22 educational system which owes, at least in part, to 23 Maine Yankee money.
And we greatly appreciate that 24 educational system.
25 However, in the course of the past year, our f
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
55 1
confidence in the plant has been severely rocked.
I'd 2
like to say briefly why that is, and then pose you with i
3 a question relating to that.
Because there's a little 4
here that I don't think the team has crossed, and I e
i 5
think that we, as a community, and the team needs to 6
cross.
)
7 It seems to me that the twin pillars on which the 8
nuclear industry in this country rests are the 9
integrity, or the assumed integrity, of the management 10 in these plants and the ability of the NRC to detect Il problems if the management steps out of line.
}
12 The whistleblower's letter last year, which is what i
l 13 triggered my concern, stated explicitly that the l
14 management in the plant was dishonest; that they had 15 rigged their computer code, and knowingly had done so, 16 to get a power upgrade.
Subsequently, the allegations i
17 regarding the computer code have been confirmed.
The j
18 allegations concerning whether this had been deliberate 19 or not have been investigated and are now in the hands i
20 of the U.S. Attorney.
21 The other things that the whistleblower's letter 22 said is that the NRC has been, at best, incompetent and, 23 at worst, is polluted in not getting to grips with this 24 computer code.
25 Your own report, which I stayed up late last night THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
_ - _ - - - _ =
56 1
1 to read, and which, incidentally I was most impressed 2
with.
The team has done tremendous work here.
But it 3
also reveals other areas in which Maine Yankee hasn't 4
played by the rules over the years.
There are some 5
issues they've known about that needed resolving for 6
seven years and ten years.
They haven't been resolved, t
7 and the NRC hasn't made them resolve them.
i 8
In the past two wecks, Pat Sears, the former 4
9 project manager at the NRC for Maine Yankee, has filed 10 an action alleging that he was flat-out lied to by Maine 11 Yankee management.
1 j
12 Ed Trottier, the regional chief for the NRC, the 4
13 overseer of Maine Yankee, has been put on administrative 14 leave -- which is a fancy word for suspended -- amidst 15 allegations that he's been colluding with the management 16 and passing sensitive documents to them.
4 17 So we see a pattern here, which, over the past year 18 has been confirmed several times, of the dishonest 19 management, or at least some segments of the management.
20 And the NRC has not given thrift to these issues.
And j
21 as I started out by saying, this strikes at the two 22 fundamental pillars of the nuclear industry in this 23 country, which is an honest management and an NRC that 24 can keep them straight if they're not honest.
25 So my question to the team is, even if you've 4
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
57 1
uncovered every compliance failure on one side, and even 2
if these are all corrected, what assurance does the 3
public have that without going on and breathing down the 4
necks of Maine Yankee management, they'll play by the 5
rules in the future, and if they don't play by the 6
rules, you'll catch them and make them play by the 7
rules?
8 MR. JORDAN:
Well, it is a very tough question.
I 9
like the analogy of the two pillers of integrity on the 10 part of the utility and the NRC's ability to detect 11 problems.
12 There is an ongoing investigation and review, and I 13 can't comment on that.
14 I can comment on the NRC's ability to detect 15 problems.
We've got a blind spot with regard to the 16 allegations in our own program to collect the 17 information regarding allegations and respond to it.
18 That's had some deficiencies.
There has been an 19 overhaul, and I don't think that work is done.
But it 20 is an important issue that has affected a large number 21 of plants in the U.S.,
and there is a correlation 22 between numbers -- plants with numbers of allegations 23 and plants that have other problems.
That's a 24 manifestation of problems.
So, it is an indicator that 25 we're working harder on responding to.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
58 1
Anybody else have any comments?
l 2
MR. MILLER:
I agree with the analogy.
3 MR. CALDER:
Yeah, but what are we going to do 4
about it?
If I could make a comment here.
I think, 5
when the Governor announced this -- or asked for this 6
inspection, it was supposed to be a nuts and bolts top i
7 to bottom inspection to restore confidence in the plant.
l 8
We don't understand high-pressure safety-injection l
9 currents.
We don't understand pressure relief valves.
i 10 We want to know that management is honest and they're l
[
11 playing by the rules.
And you didn't address that 12 issue.
For us, that's the central issue.
13 And it's simply not.even been opened.
The l
l 14 question hasn't been opened, let alone answered.
And 15 until it is opened and answered to the satisfaction of 16 the public, I am not going to feel any confidence in j
17 that plant.
I'm sot going to feel happy with its 18 continued operation.
19 And incidentally, if it shuts down, my children's 20 education suffers, I lose a large portion of the equity 21 in my house, I have a lot at stake riding on that plant l
22 staying in existence.
But I'd rather see them shut 23 tomorrow than continuing under the current management 24 team.
And I wish you would address that problem.
25 MR. MERSCHOFF:
Thank you, Nigel.
In terms of the THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
59 I
1 nuts and bolts aspect, there were problems with the 2
corrective action program.
There were problems that 3
have not been identified.
There were problems that were 4
identified years ago and dropped and not corrected.
5 That's a problem that can be and will be addressed 6
in terms of the licensee's new corrective action program 7
and the NRC's oversight of it.
8 I agree fully that long-term confidence that those 9
problems will not reoccur rests in the assumption of 10 integrity of the management.
That issue is being 11 addressed and investigated separately.
If there is an 12 integrity issue, action would be taken.
But I can l
13 assure you that the problems that were identified in 14 their corrective action program that allowed these 15 discrepant conditions to exist for an extended period of 16 time will be addressed, and it will be closely followed 17 by the regional inspectors to assure that it remains 18 effective.
19 MR. JORDAN:
Peter Christine.
20 PETER CHRISTINE:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this 21 opportunity.
First of all, I'd like to thank the NRC 22 for undertaking this inspection.
Moreover, I applaud 23 the whistleblower and every citizen who raised the 24 awareness of these issues.
Without them, this I
25 inspection and Maine Yankee's valuable learning j
l THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
60 1
experience would never have taken place.
2 I would like to address some basic flaws, though, 3
in this entire process and its stated solutions.
4 My_ question, which I'd like you to address after I 5
finish this presentation, is how to change the NRC's 6
direction and how to make the NRC a more powerful and 7
effective regulatory body.
8 In Chairman Jackson's cover letter to Mr. Frizzle 9
regarding the ISA team's report, she says, "I request 10 that following this meeting you" -- Mr. Frizzle --
11
" determine the actions needed to ensure the long-term 12 resolution of the deficiencies noted.
I also request 13 that by December 10, 1996, you provide to the Commission j
14 your plans for addressing the root causes of the 15 deficiencies identified by the ISA team."
16 However, under the Executive Summary under the 17 heading "Self Assessment and Corrective Actions," it 18 states, " Weaknesses were identified in the areas of 19 problem identification and resolution....
Some 20 weaknesses were found in the overall implementation of 21 improvement plants."
22 So, it seems in the Chairman's letter we find that 23 the NRC's solution for addressing Maine Yankee's 24 deficiencies is to ask the licensee to perform in a 25 manner in which the NRC has just found them deficient; THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Haqopian & Ramsdell
61 1
1 that is, problem resolution and implementation of 2
improvement plans.
3 The ISA team also found two root causes for the 4
deficiencies noted in their report:
number one, 5
economic pressures, and, number two, a lack of a i
i 6
questioning culture.
)
7 The first, economic pressures, led to Maine 4
j 8
Yankee's inability to complete projects and other 9
efforts that would improve plant safety and testing 10 activities.
11 But the second, the lack of a questioning culture, 12 you cannot develop a questioning culture if you cannot j
l 13 afford to ask the questions when the answers lead to
~
expenditures that intensify the first root cause, the 14 15 economic pressures.
If you want to alleviate the first, 1
4 16 you must avoid the second.
i 17 This process in which the NRC and the licensee are i
18 engaged is a cycle of reprimands, followed by 19 ineffective solutions, followed by reprimands.
And 20 while it remains so, there will be little progress.
21 I believe the NRC's solutions are unrealistic for 22 two reasons:
23 First, you cannot ask Maine Yankee to resolve 24 problems by doing something you say they are not good at 25 doing, which is resolving problems and implementing THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
62 1
corrective actions.
2 Secondly, by calling for the development of a 3
questioning culture, you are asking Maine Yankee to cut 4
it's own economic throat, something no business would 5
willingly do.
And we are left hoping that the plant 6
doesn't melt before it bleeds to death.
l 7
When will the NRC begin to tell the licensee what 8
the Commission wants done to resolve problems and make 9
the penalties following violations exceed the financial 10 benefits for evading them?
11 MR. JORDAN:
I can answer that one, I think, quite 12 simply.
I don't think you would like it if the NRC ran l
13 plant, because --
14 MR. CHRISTINE:
Well, I --
15 MR. JORDAN:
Excuse me.
Now I'm speaking.
I 16 listened while you did.
17 I don't believe you'd like it if we ran the plant 18 or told the utility how to run the plant, because then 19 we'd become the utility.
And federal utilities didn't 20 work very well in England, and I don't think that they 21 would work very well in the U.S.
TVA is a federal 22 utility, and as Ellis would say, it has had its own 23 difficulties with management.
24 So the U.S. private enterprise is the right way to l
25 run a utility.
I don't see a paradox in causing a THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
63
)
1 utility to provide -- to recocalze, first, the problem, 2
and agree to it, and then to provide their proposed 3
solution, and then monitor -- first of all, agree that 4
it's the right solution, and then monitor their 5
implementation of it.
If either the solution as 6
proposed is inadequate or that the monitoring shows that 7
it's not working, then the NRC is in a position to take l
8 action.
But it would be a big mistake for the NRC to l
l 9
tell a utility how to do its business, how to be run.
10 MR. CHRISTINE:
But It would not be a mistake for l
11 the NRC to dictate to the utility exactly what it wants i
12 done, rather than ask the utility, please show us what r
i 13 you are willing to do.
There is a big difference there.
i 14 And you have found yourselves that when the utility i
15 has a problem with implementing changes and finding l
16 problems and resolving them -- and, by the way, when you 17 were at the plant this summer, the plant ran very well 18 and a lot of problems were detected that had gone l
19 undetected for quite a while.
So I'm not so sure I 20 wouldn't mind seeing you run the plant.
21 MR. MILLER:
Ed is exactly right in his response.
l 22 At another level, our regulations define our i
23 expectations of the licensee.
The things that are in j
l l
24 the licensing documents are a statement of what we 25 expect the licensee to meet.
i l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
64 1
And so, at some level, well, Ed is exactly right in 2
terms of operations at the plant.
It's a thing we 3
cannot do.
It would be a contradiction in terms for us 4
to be in dictating the details of how they operate the 5
plant.
But in the broad level, it is defined.
And it 6
is in our roles and in our licensing documents.
And 7
it's our job to oversee the licensee to assure that they 8
are meeting those commitments in return.
So at some 9
level it is defined.
10 MR. CHRISTINE:
But I don't believe the cycle, 11 though, of inspection followed by implementation plan 12 followed by inspection will end until the NRC decides to 13 put some teeth into the structure of violations.
14 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you for your comment.
15 Edward Myers, and then Steve Comley and Robert 16 Moldaver.
17 EDWARD MYERS:
I'm Edward Myers, a retired 18 shellfish farmer from South Bristol and a teuovaring 19 writer.
20 If I can speak swiftly enough, I have five 21 questions related to liability.
They can all be 22 answered monosyllabically, so I will speak swiftly and I 23 hope you will answer swiftly.
24 Is it true that when Price-Anderson was renewed, 25 the limit of liability for any nuclear accident remained THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
65 1
at 165 million?
2 MR. JORDAN:
That's my recollection.
I think that 3
is correct.
4 MR. MYERS:
That is the limit of their liability?
5 MR. JORDAN:
For Price-Anderson, yes.
6 MR. MYERS:
Yes.
And that was just renewed after 7
its first passage in
'72.
8 That being true, is it so that an accident 9
disabling, let's say for convenience, Licoln County, 10 which now has an assessed valuation of about $4-billion, 11 that this would result in a payoff by Ma2no Yankee of 12 less than 4 cents on the dollar?
13 MR. JORDAN:
Well, given a serious nuclear 14 accident, the state would request that a disaster be i
15 declared.
A presidential declaration would then be 16 considered and would be declared to fund the necessary 17 mediation of an area.
So, this is a funding for a 18 particular part of an accident --
19 MR. MYERS:
That would not increase Maine Yankee's 20 liability, however.
The limit remains at $165 million.
21 If you divide $4 billion into it, you get.039, or 22 something like that.
\\
23 I've got to hurry on, because I promised to stay 24 under two minutes.
25 Since this less than 4 cent payout is now THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
66 1
established on the basis of valuation, is it true that 2
Maine Yankee has no liability whatsoever for an accident 3
affecting churches, schools, hospitals, the Darling 4
Center of the University of Maine, and every 501(c) (3) 5 institution?
6 MR. JORDAN:
Well I respectfully have to say that I 7
am not expert in the Price-Anderson and that law.
I am 8
an expert in emergency response.
I know how the front 9
end of that works.
But it's off the story that we're 10 here to respond to.
We're here to talk about this 11 assessment and the relevance of the assessment to Maine 12 Yankee.
13 MR. MYERS:
Exactly.
And if there is no relevance 14 to the assessment, if there is -- if we cannot discuss 15 that the assessment is not accurate and there is an 16 accident, there is not a corporate culture or steward or 17 whatever, then there is a definite limit of liability.
18 I would say to you, sir, with all due respect, that 19 Price-Anderson is one of the few laws that I do 20 understand.
i 21 MR. JORDAN:
Well, I didn't say you didn't 22 understand it.
I said I didn't understand it.
23 MR. MYERS:
In about three lines it says a nuclear 24 is responsible for no more than 165 million.
25 Do you also confirm that all mortgages and liens THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
67 l
1 and other debt on automobiles, homes, boats will, i
t 2
nonetheless, continue to be payable to the lending
]
3 institutions?
4 MR. JORDAN:
I'm sorry, sir.
This is not a 5
useful --
6 MR. MYERS:
I was hoping, sir, for monosyllables.
7 Then I'll cut out the other one, since we're not getting 8
anywhere.
9 There is not a soul in this room -- not a soul in 10 this room who has insurance in his homeowner's that 11 specifically accepts nuclear accidents, and his fire 12 policies that specifically nuclear accents, in his 13 automobile policies that specifically accepts it.
And l
14 you cannot get it.
There is not a soul in this room 15 that is insured for a life-threatening or whatever i
16 accident.
And you can collect no more than 4 cents on 17 the dollar.
That is $980 for a $25,000 mobile home; 18 it's it's S7,890 for a $100,000 residence.
19 I think this -- I do not like to argue with you, 20 sir, but I think this is gravely relevant to this 21 report, and particularly to the last paragraph of the 22 memorandum accompanying Shirley Jackson's letter.
If 23 you will look at that for the key words, it's failed, 24 inadequate, cannot resolve.
The pejorative words in 25 that last paragraph are appalling.
And I do thank you THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
. =.
l 68 1
for your patience.
2 MR. JORDAN:
All right, sir.
Well, I appreciate 3
your comments.
4 At the risk of stepping on my own toes, I would not 5
want to leave the public meeting with the idea that the 6
risk of an accident today, tomorrow or yesterday at 7
Maine Yankee is a grave risk in the probabilistic sense.
j 0
The risk analysis that the utility did and that the NRC 9
has examined is not strongly affected at all.
In fact, 10 in the report the value is of the order of 10% and 6%,
11 which is on top of a 10 to the minus 5, 10 to the minus 12 6 probability of a serious event.
13 So these are not great changes.
What the NRC is 14 concerned about is, of course, an accumulation of 15 problems, a continuing set of problems.
And so, we are 16 bringing to the utility's attentions and meeting with 17 you over the concern that unless addressed, things may 18 slip.
but I do not want to leave you with the view that 19 this is an unsafe plant that I would not live next to 20 today.
That is not the case.
21 Next is Steve Comley.
22 And excuse me, Steve.
After that is Robert 23 Moldaver and Paul Cesey.
You can correct me when you 24 come to the mike.
I'm sorry.
25 MR. COMLEY:
(Placing poster before the podium.)
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
69 1
Before you start the clock on me, I would just --
2 just a point of order.
I can't help but have the 3
remarks of President Clinton when he said that he wants 4
more activeism in government while he's in office.
And 5
that's really to make our government better.
And I must 6
say that I wasn't prepared -- I was prepared to have at 7
least more than two minutes, because it's like trying to
]
l 8
run the 26 miles of the marathon in two minutes.
And 9
I've got quite a bit to say here.
i 10 But I think, really, that it makes a mockery of our 11 democratic process when you limit the public to have 1
12 something to say about the dangers that are -- could 13 occur in our own backyard.
And I think, from now on, 14 that the NRC -- I would recommend that they publish the 15 amount of time that the public are going to have to 16 speak.
Because, as you know, all of us work and --
17 MR. JORDAN:
Sir, I accept the criticism, but we 18 published this as a two-hour pu'blic meeting, and we're 19 going to give you two-and-a-half hours.
And you're 20 using your time --
21 MR. COMLEY:
But you didn't publish how long the 22 public will have to speak, and I --
23 MR. JORDAN:
You have to divide the number of 24 people by the time.
I'm sorry.
25 MR. COMLEY:
All right.
I'm Steven B.
Comley.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
70 1
Live in Standish Maine now.
I am the executive director 2
and founder of We the People, Incorporated, which is 3
national nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting 4
whistleblowers in the nuclear power industry and safety i
5 at our nation's nuclear power plants.
6 The organization was founded in '86 after Chernobyl 7
disaster.
At that time I was running my family's nurse 8
home near the Seabrook plant, and I was told that the 9
people with special needs in my nursing home were not 10 included in evacuation plans in the event of an 11 accident.
That was the beginning of an a long road; one 12 that took me Washington, D.C.,
in a somewhat futile 13 attempt to end this discrimination against our elder 14 population and other people with special needs.
15 During my numerous trips to Washington in '86 I got 16 the attention of officials by using petitions, 17 billboards and flying planes close to the White House.
18 I got their attention, and some unintended attention 19 from a top-level official in the NRC who confided in me.
1 20 He told me, quote, "Whenever safety allegations come in 21 to the NRC that may pose a threat to the further 1
22 operation or licensing of a plant, those allegations are 23 pencilled away."
24 Then I received in the mail evidence that there are 25 counterfeit substandard parts in more than half of the THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
71 1
nuclear power plants in this country.
These parts are 2
pipe, pipe flanges, valves, circuit-breakers, nuts and l
3 bolts that were stamped as U.S.
made when they weren't, j
l 4
4 and more importantly, they were stamped as being tested, l
5 when actually they weren't.
l 6
That was later confirmed by this report by the l
l 7
General Accounting Office, and again confirmed in '94 by i
l 8
the NRC's own Inspector General.
Wiscasset is listed in 9
this report as receiving those counterfeit, substandard 10 parts.
i j
11 After publicizing this information, I then began to l
12 realize what it's like to become a whistleblower, 13 because the NRC came after me.
And for six years they 14 chased me in the courts, trying to get me to reveal 15 sources within your agency.
I can't, and nobody can, 16 run a whistleblower organization if we give up names.
17 It was then that I founded We the People, 18 Incorporated, of the United States, so that nuclear 19 industry and NRC whistleblowers could come forward 20 without worrying abe.t' losing their jobs and suffering 21 harassment and irc' 4dation, as so often accompanies 22 their efforts to correct safety problems.
23 over the last 10 years we've been able to help 24 numerous whistleblowers and force the industry to 25 correct some of the safety problems at these plants.
We THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
72 1
also were successful in getting the NRC to finally look i
2 sideways.
3 Our most recent case was featured on the cover of 4
the March 4,
'96, issue of Time Magazine, which you see 5
in the back of this room.
6 I have included some of other efforts and 7
accomplishments in this statement, but in order to give 8
local folks here a chance to express their concerns, I 9
will move along.
10 Now we've been involved in seven Inspector 11 General's reports.
And, by the way, it was We the 12 People who really brought about the existence of the 13 Inspector General's office.
14 The reports include the existence of counterfeit 15 substandard parts and proof that the NRC deferred their 16 responsibility on that.
17 NRC's failure to regulate Millstone 1.
And 18 unbelievably, the NRC was found by the :;hv s own 19 Inspector General to have given up informants' names 20 back to the utilities when they were told not to.
21 Now the root cause of what's going on here in the 22 industry -- and I don't want to get -- I don't want 23 anyone to feel here that I'm going after -- doing any 24 personal attacks on anybody, because I don't do that.
25 I'm a citizen, an American citizen, and I'm not a THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
_ ~ - -
i 73 1
nuclear engineer, and don't claim to be.
But we protect 2
people like people in this room.
You know why?
Because f
3 there's people in the industry -- there's some people in 4
the industry and the NRC that make people expendable to i
5 keep this industry alive.
f 6
Now, in iodine right here, this was recommended, i
7 and it's a policy still in effect.
Mr. Victor Stello, i
8 back in 1986, in a meeting with me -- and it's in 4
9 writing -- August 19, 1986, he said, quote, "For the few 10 individual residentu that cannot be moved in the event 11 of a nuclear disaster, we suggest you leave them behind 12 and give them a bottle of iodine to drink."
13 Now, Christopher Reeves, I watched on the 14 Democratic Convention.
That's the kind of evacuation 15 plan that the NRC still has a policy.
I don't think 16 that's good enough for the President.
i 17 And I met with the President just a couple of days 18 ayu, and I've been in touch with his office for a good i
19 long time, and I've been in direct contact with Leon 20 Panetta.
And he asked the Justice Department to 21 investigate some of the things that we've been giving to 22 them.
Unfortunately, Justice never got in touch with 23 us.
And the President, when I talked to him, wasn't too 24 happy about that, and he says, I will get back to you.
25 Now --
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
74 1
MR. JORDAN:
Mr. Comley, can you please draw this 2
to an end?
3 ELIZABETH KING:
I'd be happy to give my two 4
minutes to Mr. Comley.
I'm Elizabeth King.
You can 5
cross my name off.
6 MR. COMLEY:
Thank you very much.
I appreciate 7
that.
8 UNIDENTIFIED SPECTATOR:
He's already used it.
9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Let's go to the next one.
10 MR. COMLEY:
Are we going to have some order here?
l 11 You know, I said I'm not here for personal attacks.
I d
12 don't want any on myself, either.
13 MR. JORDAN:
No one is --
14 MR. COMLEY:
Well, there were comments --
j 15 MR. JORDAN:
Excuse me.
I'm trying to maintain a 1
16 meeting with some kind of a semblance of schedule, and 17 there are still many people yet to be heard, close to 3
18 40.
And so, will you draw it to a close, plesse, sir?
19 MS. KING:
Can I give him my two minutes?
1 I
20 MR. JORDAN:
He's used six so far.
I'm sorry.
21 MR. COMLEY:
My questions to you are what will you 22 doing to ensure the safety of this plant is put first?
23 I stress the word "do," not what you will say.
Since 24 not all of the problems at Maine Yankee are due to i
25 internal management but are part of the inadequate job THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
- _ ~ -
75 1
the NRC is doing with you, Mr. Frizzle.
2 And I ask the and the same with the Governor.
Mr.
3 Wiley?
Mr. Wiley?
4 MR. WILEY:
Uh-huh?
5 MR. COMLEY:
I -- you know, and some of these 6
reports I know the Governor has in your office, because 7
they were given to the Governor not too long ago, as I 8
understand it.
9 I can't understand, for the life of me, why the 10 Governor feels that the NRC has any credibility.
And 11 based on -- not me.
I'm talking about what the NRC's 12 own Inspector General says in these reports.
And just 13 like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, hindsight 14 administration isn't going to cut it with the people of 15 Maine if we have an accident.
16 And I would like to know also -- we are here to 17 help.
We've been asked to come here.
And we want to 18 help Maine rankee.
Mr. Frizzle, we want to worn with 19 you.
And we hope that the information that's in your 20 Inforuation Center will include some of our works.
21 Well, I'd like some assurance that the Inspector 22 General's reports that we've been involved with, because 23 every report that we've been involved in is generic.
I 24 And if you're really going to have an open door and i
1 25 prove to the public that you want safe plants, then I'd THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell i
76 1.
like some assurances that we are going to be welcome.
2 Because obviously -- and the whistleblower that brought 3
about-this investigation, let's not overlook one thing.
4 He doesn't trust Maine Yankee and the officials that run 5
it.
He does not trust the people in the NRC.
So I 6
think we need as many options as we can and keep the 7
open door so our neighbors are safe.
8 But I'd like to know from you gentlemen up there if 9
you think that iodine for people who seemingly need us 10 the most is good enough, because the President doesn't.
-11 And he said, back in '92, when I met him again -- he 12 said, Under my administration we're going to hold 13 utilities accountable when they take risks with families 14 without the public's position.
15 And I suggest to everybody in this room, we're all 16 familiar with the failings in Washington, and they have 17 failed miserably at being a watchdog, the NRC and this 18 industry.
They're more like a consultant.
19 And I know there's people at Maine Yankee that are 20 very dedicated to safety.
And we've met some of the 21 best people in the nuclear industry over the years, and 22 I have a lot of respect for them.
But when they don't 23 get direction from the top, you know, you undermine 24 their credibility.
And that's awful, because I'm used 25 to being -- I was an administrator for 30 years in a
._J THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
77 I
1 nursing home.
I'm used to working with very dedicated 2
people.
But if they don't trust me, you're not going to 3
run a viable operation.
J 4
MR. JORDAN:
Okay, Mr. Comley, you've used up your 5
time.
I 6
MR. COMLEY:
I have?
Well --
E 7
MR. JORDAN:
Thank you very much, sir.
8 MR. COMLEY:
Aren't you going to answer my 9
question, sir?
,l A
10 MR. JORDAN:
If I can figure out what it was.
We i
]
11 are going to express an answer that I hope addresses it.
12 First of all, the Chairman, Chairman Shirley 13 Jackson, is extremely concerned about the issue of 14 allegations and that they be taken seriously, and the 15 names and identities of people that make allegations be 16 protected.
The NRC has had some foul-ups in the past in l
i 17 releasing those names, and we're very concerned about 18 it.
It hurts the program, it hurts the people, it 19 prevents good information from coming forward.
l I
20 So I stipulate that the process of receiving 21 information that a utility will not listen to is 22 essential.
It does, in fact, support the idea of the 23 integrity pillar idea, that a utility has to have a 24 process to collect information.
If it's not working, 25 then the NRC has to be responsive to it, and that people THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
78 l
1 who seek help can in fact get somebody to listen.
]
2 So, that is a very strong point with our Chairman, j
i 3
and I hope you will see over the next few years that i
4 that process is substantially changed.
5 Thank you.
6 MR. COMLEY:
And my question about the lodine.
How 7
do you really feel about that?
I understand that Maine 8
Yankee stockpiled the iodine for their employees, but, 9
you know, how about the people outside the plant area?
10 MR. JORDAN:
That's pretty much an irrelevant 11 issue.
There is a federal policy between the Federal 12 Emergency Management Agency and the NRC with regards to 13 the stockpiling of iodine for the public.
It has not 14 been shown to be ecomically and safety-beneficial to 15 provide stockpiles across the U.S.
for use of the public 16 because of the difficulty in delivering iodine.
It's 17 not a paliative.
It's not a real solution.
And so, the 18 iodine issue is really irrelevant to this discussion 19 about the performance of Maine Yankee and this 20 assessment.
21 So I'd like to move on to Mr. Moldaver, please.
22 MR. COMLEY:
Thank you.
i 23 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
24 ROBERT MOLDAVER:
Thank you for your patience.
My 25 name is Robert Moldaver, and I live in Portland.
And THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
79 i
1 I'm the associate director of We the People, 1,
i j
Incorporated, and I run the main office.
We've 2
4 3
officially opened that office recently.
4 And this report.has some very really troubling 5
findings.
I want to address them quickly, then ask you 6
some questions.
1 i
7 Economic pressures are at the top of the list, and 8
I think we can all relate to that.
We all feel economic d
9 pressures.
The company feels it has a responsibility to 10 their stockholders and their employees; employees feel
}
11 economic pressures as a responsibility to their i
3 12 families; and even the NRC is feeling these economic 13 pressures as their budgets are being squeezed.
14 We the People has recognized these pressures and 15 has made many resourc 'n available to whistleblowers.
5
/
16 Aside from 100% confidentiality, we offer moral support, 17 legal support, and even a form of counseling because of 18 some of.the stress that these whistleblowers are under 19 during their or deals.
20 When employees call our office, they're usually at 21 their wit's end.
They're distressed, afraid, and often 22 very angry.
They've been abandoned by their superiors, 23 and often find that the NRC is of no help whatsoever.
I 24 see many letters that employees have received from the 25 NRC's senior allegations coordinator.
Now, the common THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
1 denominator in all of these letters is that phrase that
[
a i
l 2
says, Your concern is of a low priority.
This case is 3
closed.
4 Now, how'would that make you feel, I wonder, if you 5
were in that position?
That's not a direct question, 6
it's rhetorical.
But, in any case, it is We the 7
People's view that employees are the front line of l
i j
8 defense against an accident at a nuclear power plant.
j
}
9 It only stands to reason.
But what now, because the t
f 10 report shows -- proves again that the economic pressures 1
11 are really driving management decisions at the plant.
l 12 And when that atmosphere is created, safety concerns are 13 not sought out, as your report has shown, and, indeed, j
j 14 management has doesn't really want to hear about the
{
15 problems, they just want to hear about production.
16 So where does that get Maine Yankee?
- Well, l
l i
17 actually the Wall Street Journal answered that question i
l 18 on Monday with a front-page article by d-
.rfaing the i
l 19 decline of Northeast Utilities.
Northeast Utilities J
20 used cost-cutting measures as its guiding light, and now 21 four of their plants are shut down, and perhaps 22 Connecticut Yankee for good, as reported in today's 23 Boston Globe.
24 I just want to express again that We the People 25 acknowledges the hard work of the local and state groups THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
i 81 1
in Maine.
We acknowledge the employees.
We want to 2
support groups like Friends of the Coast, who have been a
i 3
posting a hotline for employees to call if they have 1
4 concerns.
And we want to support the workers at the i
i 5
plant in any way possible.
And I will be handing out
]
6 information so than people can get in touch with us in 3
7 the future, if they care to.
8 A couple questions are:
9 During the inspection, I'm wondering, did the 10 inspection team find Maine Yankee management pointing to 11 any outside contractors to lay some of the blame for 12 their weaknesses as you found?
13 And, will the inspection team perhaps use the 14 current shutdown that Maine Yankee is now experiencing 15 to review some of the areas that they did not inspect 16 physically because the plant was operating during the 17 initial inspection?
18 MR. MERSCHOFr:
With regard to the first question, 19 the licensee took responsibility for the issues we 20 found.
I was not aware of any blame-shifting.
21 In terms of the second, this was a four-week 22 assessment onsite.
The plant operated for the first 23 week and was shut down for the next three.
We went to 24 every area of that plant that we deemed appropriate, 25 covered it essentially from top to bottom.
I don't see THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
82 1
a need in terms of this assessment for further work.
2 There is a need for extensive continued inspection and 3
oversight to assure that the corrective actien plan 4
developed and implemented resolves the issues addressed 5
in this inspection.
But there was ample time during the 6
inspection, while the plant was shut down, to gain 7
access to all the areas that we needed access to.
8 MR. MOLDAVZR:
Including, for instance, the steam 9
generators that were recently resleeved or some of the 10 core components, as well?
Those were included?
11 MR. MERSCHOFF:
There are other aspects of the 12 inspection program that assured that the vessel, the 13 vessel internals, and the steam generators are 14 inspected.
For the purpose of this assessment to 15 determine the assessment of safety, conformance to the 16 design and licensing basis and the root causes of 17 problems, we had access to areas and equipment and 18 performance and tests sufficient to draw thosa 19 conclusions.
20 The inspection program that's implemented, and will 21 continue to be implemented, will assure that those areas 22 are inspected as they come due within the cycle of 23 operation of the plant.
24 MR. MOLDAVER:
Thank you for your time.
i
)
25 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you very much.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
83 1
Paul Casey?
I'm sorry.
Please correct me.
2 PAUL CRARY:
You're not the first one.
My name is 3
Paul Crary.
I'm a recently retired physician, a 4
radiologist, with approximately 30 years' experience in 5
nuclear medicine.
I have trained in the Navy's program, 6
and have worked on and off for years with you, first the 7
Agency, and then the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 8
the oversight of nuclear medicine programs.
9 I'd like to thank you for the nice job you've done 10 over the years, strictly because I think the quality of l
11 nuclear medicine is the way it is because of the efforts l
12 of people of your caliber, working with professionals.
13 That said, I have one simple question to ask.
It's 14 a kind of cut-to-the-chase question.
It's a 15 monosyllabic answer is all you need to give, because 16 you've pretty well answcred my question to begin with.
17 Did you, in your perusing, oversight, searching 38 through Lhe matters that have been discussed hete 19 tonight, find anything of such an egregious nature that 20 you would pull this plant's license right now or 21 threaten to do so in the future?
22 That's my question.
23 MR. MERSCHOFF:
No.
24 MR. CRARY:
Thank you.
25 MR. JORDAN:
Nancy Cote.
And next is Rena Cater THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
84 1
and Abott Fletcher.
i l
2 NANCY COTE:
Hi.
My name is Nancy Cote and I live i
j 3
in Dresden.
I have a deep concern for our environment 4
and what the future holds for our children.
Energy i
5 production is a necessity, and we must weigh the 6
consequences of our choice.
7 In January of this year, 1 million gallons of fuel 8
oil was spilled off the coast of Rhode Island.
Just 9
this month, Casco Bay experienced 170,000 gallon oil 10 spill.
My question is, has a nuclear plant in this 11 country ever had the adverse impact on the environment 12 that the Rhode Island oil spill had, killing fish and 13 wildlife for a half mild radius?
That area is still 14 being tested for contamination.
15 That's my question.
16 MR. JORDAN:
The question is has there been a 17 radiation --
18 MC. COIE:
It doesn't have to be radiation.
Any 19 environmental impact of such destruction in this country j
20 by a nuclear power plant?
21 MR. JORDAN:
Not to my much knowledge.
Certainly 22 not from radiation.
23 MS. COTE:
Has Maine Yankee ever had an effect on 24 the environment comparable to the Casco Bay event?
i 25 MR. JORDAN:
Not to my knowledge.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
1 MS. COTE:
And I'd also like to thank you for the 2
wonderful job you've done regulating the utility, the 3
industry.
I only wish fossil fuel can be handled such.
4 Thank you very much.
i 5
MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
6 RENA CATER:
Hi.
My name is Rena Cater, and I am 7
very proud to say that I am an employee at Maine Yankee.
8 But I stand before you today as a member of the public.
9 In the past, there has been a lot of talk about the 10 danger to our children and in Maine in regards to the 11 safety of Maine Yankee.
And I guess my question is more 12 to the audience in that do you really think that we who 13 live in Maine with our families would work at a place i
14 that could be harmful to us, our children, our 15 community, and our state?
16 UNIDENTIFIED SPECTATOR:
Yes.
17 MS. CATER:
I believe in the integrity of Maine 18 Yankee's safety systems, the integrity of our leaders, 19 and I especially believe in the trust and the honesty 20 and the hard work that are exhibited by Maine Yankee 21 employees.
I have every confidence that we will go from 22 adequate to excellent in all accounts.
23 And just for the record, I do not foresee ever l
l 24 needing to use or desiring to use the services of We the l
l l
25 People.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
86 1
The Linnells and the Shadises of this world have 2
built their name by bashing nuclear power.
The true
)
3 facts about Maine Yankee are boring to read.
So, when i
4 you read something that is interesting, there are 5
figures and some facts in there surrounded by adjectives 6
and adverbs that create a controversial untruth, and it 7
puts fear into people that do not understand nuclear 8
power.
9 So what is safe energy?
Is it tankers running 10 aground while en route to deliver oil to oil-fired 11 plants?
Is it the emissions that coal-fired plants put i
12 out?
Is it the dams that disrupt the environment and j
13 the aquatic life?
14 I guess it just depends on which one more people do 15 not understand and playing with the fears of those I
16 people that come with not understanding.
I 17 So, I ask you, if you took all the energy that is 18 spent in bashing nuclear power, making signs and flyers 19 and coordinating groups to meet at meetings such like 20 this, and you concentrated that energy on drug pushers, 21 drug dealers, child abusers, child pornography, black l
22 market weapons, and the list goes on, do you think that I
23 would be of much greater benefit to our children?
24 Because I'll tell you, it is this type of stuff that is t
25 going to harm and kill our children and ruin our THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
]
m..
87 l
1
' communities in the State of Maine long before a small 2
nuclear power plant located in Wiscasset.
3 Thank you.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
And this is Abott 5
Fletcher?
6 ABOTT FLETCHER:
That is correct.
I live nearby.
7 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
Next will be Jim Goodsell and 8
David Hall.
9 MR. FLETCHER:
It is good to have Maine Yankee 10 produce electricity in Maine, to pay people in Maine, 11 and to buy services in Maine rather than to send that 12 money out-of-state to buy electric power, especially 13 some of it it would have to come from southwest of here 14 from coal-and oil-fired plants, and we would get the 15 pollution from them.
16 This nation imports over 50% of its oil, and that's 17 a great dependency.
And for this country to not go to 18 things like nuclear power, in-house power, it is a very 19 poor policy.
20 Maine Yankee's low cost power, around 3 cents a kilowatt-hour, is very low cost energy for a quarter of 21 22 our electricity.
It keeps our electric rates from going 23 higher and makes Maine more competitive.
24 Maine's job growth picture has not been good in the l
25 last six years.
It's been negligible for all of that.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
88 1
Wa rank 45th out of the 50 states.
Maine's income 2
average is 38th of the 50 states.
In other words, it's 3
pretty well down the list.
And Maine Yankee is one of 4
the reasons that we are not in worse economic shape than 5
we are.
Maine Yankee makes a great positive 6
contribution to Maine's economy.
7 As major sources of electricity, pressurized water 8
reactors like Maine Yankee have far and away the lowest 9
impact on the environment and on public health.
Far and 10 away.
The contained burning of nuclear fuel versus the 11 open-vented fossil fuels is a big comparison, and the 12 enormous amounts of fossil fuels compared with the small 13 amounts of nuclear fuel.
14 In the total cycle of studies of mining, drilling, 15 transporting, burning, effluent, waste, pressurized 16 water reactors such as Maine Yankee are way, way below 17 those other sources of -- of major of electricity.
Way 18 below.
19 There are over 400 pressurized water reactors 20 throughout the world.
There are 8,000 operating years 21 of experience with pressurized water reactors.
Some 22 countries have 70% of their nuclear power that is 23 provided.
It has been a safe record.
Pacific Rim i
24 countries are building nuclear power plants.
25 The inherent design, which was wisely done back in THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell i
89
)
1 Rickover's time, of using a stable moderator, water, 2
with a reactor vessel containment building and multiple 3
safety systems were very wise choices, and they have 4
made a major safe industry and a major fine source of 5
electric power.
Maine Yankee -- keeping Maine Yankee 6
going is to win economically, environmentally, and as 7
far as public health is concerned.
8 Have you ever done a more thorough research on a 9
power plant than you've done on this plant recently?
10 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
The Millstone review was more 11 detailed, sir.
12 MR. FLETCHER:
But this is one of the more 13 thorough?
14 MR. JORDAN:
This was one of the more detailed.
15 MR. FLETCHER:
Thank you.
16 MR. JORDAN:
Jim Goodsell?
17 JIM GOODSELL:
I'll bet you gentlemen thought you 18 r.2d come into a snakepit tonight until the last few 19 speakers.
20 Actually, I think most of the people in this room 21 do trust you and respect what you have done and 22 appreciate what you've done.
23 I have some questions.
First of all, I'd like to 24 say I have lived in or near the shadow of Maine Yankee 25 since before Maine Yankee's ground was broken.
In fact, THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
90 1
I had told Charlie Frizzle that I got very angry at 2
Maine Yankee because they ruined a beautiful view out my 3
bedroom window when they put in the railroad tracks and 4
had the tear out the woods that were there.
But since 5
then I've become a friend of Maine Yankee, and I don't 6
apologize for that at all.
7 My question is for you.
Number one, today, do you 8
feel that Maine Yankee is capable of operating at 90%?
9 MR. MERSCHOFF:
Yes.
The report concluded that 10 Maine Yankee was safe at the current power level.
11 MR. GOODSELL:
Thank you.
Number two, the shutdown 12 that occurred yesterday, was that what was supposed to 13 happen when a test was run, a problem was found, and the 14 system shut itself down?
15 MR. MILLER:
Would you restate your question?
16 MR. GOODSELL:
The shutdown that occurred 17 yesterday, I understand, was a steam pump shutdown, and 18 this was as the result of a test that was run.
Anu 19 something went wrong, and the pump was supposed to shut 20 down and it did?
And I want to know if my information 21 is correct on that.
22 MR. MILLER:
I have to beg off on the question, 23 because I'm not familiar with that.
Our inspectors are 24 onsite and are looking at what the licensee has done to 25 address it..
So, my understanding is yes, that all THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
91 1
systems worked.
It was a reactor plant trip.
And so, 2
broadly speaking, I can say yes.
3 MR. GOODSELL:
Thank you.
Number three, do you 4
feel that the present management has the capability to i
5 address and correct the problems that you have told them I
6 about?
7 MR. MERSCHOFF:
That remains to be seen.
There 8
will be a letter with the corrective actions submitted 9
by December 10th and a fairly extensive oversight of the 10 implementation.
And until enough time has transpired to 11 judge the success of that effort, it would be premature 12 to answer the question.
13 MR. GOODSELL:
Let me turn it around a little bit.
I 14 Do you have any anticipation that they will not be able 15 to handle the problem?
16 MR. MERSCHOFF:
That remains to be seen.
17 MR. GOODSELL:
By golly, I didn't think you fellows 18 were bureaucratic, but you make my wonder.
19 MR. MERSCHOFF:
We're just skeptical.
l 20 MR. GOODSELL:
You are talking with the number one 1
21 skeptic in town, I think.
22 Number -- the last one is Maine Yankee's capability 23 of going to 100%.
Do you anticipate that they will be 24 able to do what is necessary to go to 100%, or is this 25 going to be another bureaucratic answer?
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
92 1
MR. MERSCHOFF:
-I'll let another bureaucrat answer.
2 MR. MILLER:
You want to answer that, Steve?
i' 3
MR. MERSCHOFF:
He've got enough bureaucrats to go l
4 around.
5 MR. VARGA:
Well, that remains to be seen.
6 (Laughter) 7 But there's no question, as you'll notice in 8
reading the report, there are some serious concerns.
9 There are some demonstrations that need to be performed 4
1 10 to assure the NRC by a rigorous evaluation and analysis 11 by the licensee, which we will oversee.
There's also j
J 12 significant questions about the small-break LOCA code 13 that has been used.
1 14 All of these will require verification, approval, j
15 and then the decision will be made about the 2700 i
16 plateau.
l 17 MR. GOODSELL:
I thanP. you gentlemen for the fine la job thac you have done and for the report that you l
19 issued.
I've read it twice, with a great deal of i
20 appreciation.
21 I do want to make one statement, and that is that 22 most of this room is filled with people who like Maine 23 Yankee and want it to continue, and have the expectation 24 that the management will continue to do the good job 25 that it has done for the last 24 years.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
i 93 1
Thank you.
2 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
David Hall.
Next is Woody 3
Hodgkins and Christiann Tirrell.
l 4
DAVID HALL:
I've noticed that one of the core 5
problems or root problems you found was a lack of 6
questioning attitude.
This creates a problem, because 7
historically in areas of nuclear weapons, nuclear power 8
and radioactive waste, a questioning attitude has been 9
penalized by being fired, by being discredited, or 10 worse.
I'm thinking of Karen Silkwood, amongst other.
11 Almost anybody with a questioning attitude was 12 weeded out long ago.
So how go we now turn this whole 13 thing around so we start having people with questioning 14 attitudes who feel comfortable working in the nuclear 15 power industry?
16 MR. JORDAN:
Well, it is an environment and culture 17 issue with an organization.
The NRC itself has to have 18 a questioning attitude -- our inspectors, our staff, 19 managers.
And so, it is providing an environment that 20 supports people's questions, when they raise issues, to 21 take them seriously, to review them and to respond to 22 them in a technically competent way.
23 I think largely the industry has that feature, and 24 we try to bring it to people's attention when it doesn't 25 occur.
The issue of allegations is a clear case where THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
94 l
1 it's evidenced that a questioning altitude is not being 2
supported within a utility.
So I very receptive and 3
very understanding about the issue of the attitude that 4
accepts, listens to, and responds to concerns at the 5
first level.
And if not, there's a process through a 6
second or third level, or finally to the NRC, if 7
necessary.
8 MR. MILLER:
I would just add that, as I mentioned 9
earlier, I'm kind of new to this region.
I've been to 10 17 plants in the last three months, and as I look across 11 those plants, as I've mentioned earlier, one thing that 12 clearly distinguishes the best performers from those who 13 are average is having a questioning attitude.
l 14 So, what I would say to you is that I'm not -- I 15 don't agree with your premise that all of those folks 16 who have had a questioning attitude have been 17 marginalized and are not there.
I would say that the 18 thing that distinguishes the better performers, and I 19 see it at many, many plants, is a very strong 20 questioning attitude on the part of the people at the 21 top as well as from people in the ranks.
There have 22 been instances of failure, and they're well publicized, 23 and we will not deny that.
l 24 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you very much.
25 Woody Hodgkins?
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
.. - - - _ = _
95 l
1 WOODY HODGKINS:
My name is Woody Hodgkins. I'm a j
2 resident of Westport Island.
And tonight I'm proud to 3
be numbered among the folks in this community that have 4
been labeled " mindless drones" who support Maine Yankee.
5 I want to congratulate the management and the i
6 employees of Maine Yankee for the generation of over 100 l
7 billion kilowatt-hours of clean, safe and inexpensive 8
electricity over the last 24 years.
The citizens of 9
Maine owe them a tremendous debt of gratitude.
- However, 10 instead of gratitude, the people who have made such a 11 positive contribution to the health and welfare of Maine 12 are demonized, criticized and threatened by a few folks 13 who haven't thought through the horrendous health and 1
14 welfare implications that would result from not having 15 the clean, safe and inexpensive electricity provided us 16 by Maine Yankee.
17 My question really is parenthetical to the 18 presentation, but we've talked a lot tonight about 19 economic pressures on Maine Yankee, and as a taxpayer, I 20 have a couple of questions for you.
I'd like to know 21 how much the ISA costs the taxpayers, both federal and 22 state.
And then I'll follow that up after I have the 23 answer.
24 MR. JORDAN:
Well, I can can't answer that in terms 25 of federal and state taxpayers.
The NRC is a 100%
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
96 1
fee-recovery agency, so our costs, our wages, our 2
expenses, are paid through the licensees we regulate, 3
whether it's a materials license or a reactor license.
4 So your taxes don't go to pay our salaries.
We 5
have a federal budget.
But the fees that we charge the i
l 6
utilities and our licensees pay our salaries.
7 In terms of the costs, I would say that there were 8
25 people for four months that were involved directly 9
and continuously in this effort.
So their salaries 10 were, in fact, a part of this.
11 Now -- and we explained to the utility, did not 12 explain during this meeting, that because this was an 13 exploratory effort, because it wasn't clear whether or 14 not there was a problem with Maine Yankee, this was not 15 a fee charged against this utility.
The fee for this 16 review was spread across all utilities.
So, when there 17 is a diagnostic or an effort like this, where there is a 18 question about the utility, then all utill.1 ; pay.
So 19 this costs the ratepayers of all the utilities in the 20 U.S. spread across the 110 plants to pay for this 21 effort.
22 MR. HODGKINS:
And that number is?
23 MR. JORDAN:
I haven't established the number.
24 MR. MERSCHOFF:
Approximately $2 million.
25 MR. HODGKINS:
And my second question is would THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
97 1
another anonymous letter generate that expense?
2 MR. JORDAN:
At another plant, yes.
3 MR. HODGKINS:
At Maine Yankee?
4 MR. JORDAN:
At Maine Yankee, if it was not 5
something we just investigated.
We have --
6 MR. HODGKINS:
So that it --
7 MR. JORDAN:
-- done a quite thorough review of 8
this particular plant and have a very good understanding 9
of performance across the functional areas and across 10 the safety systems and equipment.
And another letter 11 might warrant a specific review in that particular area 12 to understand it, but not a broad-based, I don't 13 believe.
14 MR. HODGKINS:
Thank you.
15 MR. JORDAN:
Christiann Tirrell?
16 UNIDENTIFIED SPECTATOR:
I think she's gone home.
l 17 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
Richard Alden?
18 UNIDENTIFIED SPECTATOR:
That's her father.
He 19 took her home.
20 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you, sir.
Ken Gray?
21 KEN GRAY:
Hi, I'm Ken Gray from Wiscasset and 22 Friends of the Coast.
The question I want to pose, I 23 guess, comes off the document which I've just been 24 reading this afternoon.
On page 33 of the assessment 25 report it states -- I'll just run through this.
On the
)
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
98 1
observation of the ISAT Team on July 19, 1996, the plant 2
was shut down with some equipment problems.
3 It states one of the problems as the electrical 4
trip of the main feedwater pump; and the second problem 5
as a slow response to a main feedwater regulator valve; 6
the third problem as an inability to operate the control 7
element assemblies in the manual sequential mode due to i
8 the plant commuter, which was easily overloaded.
l 9
Now, if you read that, it brings a major concern 10 that the plant computer is easily overloaded.
11 And the fourth was the manual sequence mode problem 12 contributed _to the operator's decision to manually trip 13 the reactor.
14 If you get back to the letter that Shirley Jackson 15 sent to Mr. Frizzle, it states that, in addition, the 16 ISA noted certain deficiency errors.
Either Maine 17 Yankee was unaware of the errors, or it's aware of them 18 and failed to take action on them.
19 And I feel it's the latter.
That they are aware of 20 deficiencies in the plant, but due to financial 21 problems, they're unwilling -- management, top 22 management -- to take action on them.
23 And as far as the plant computer being easily 24 overloaded, I think that was a question posed to Charlie 25 Frizzle perhaps 18 months ago.
We asked whether there THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
99 1
was a problem with the older systems in the control room 2
and whether they were able to handle all the information 3
that's coming in.
And he said there was not a problem.
l 4
Can you react to that?
5 MR. MERSCHOFF:
The examples you listed were 6
examples in the category of compensatory measures and 7
what we call operator workarounds.
There was some 8
concern that the number of these problems burdened the 9
operators and made their lives difficult.
But none of 10 those individual problems that you listed or that we saw 11 were individually unacceptable in the way they were 12 treated.
l 13 The plant computer, for example, doesn't provide 14 any safety-related actions or initiations, but is a 15 source of important information.
The the post-trip 16 reviews, for example, that we felt were weak.
One of 17 the weaknesses was associated with the inability at 18 times tv gec all the information from the plant 19 computer.
20 It's a problem.
There are plans in place to 21 replace that computer and upgrade it.
22 MR. GRAY:
With the plant working within the last 23 year at a 30% capacity for the last two years is worth 24 221 days, which gives us about a 31 or 32% capacity 25 rating.
Do you think, with the additional financial THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
100 1
costs and burdens on Maine Yankee, they're going to be i
2 able to update this plant to handle the equipment that 3
right now is getting much older?
4 MR. MERSCHOFF:
That's maybe another bureaucratic 5
answer, but it's the truth.
The plan that's expected to 6
be, that will be, submitted by December 10th needs to 7
come to grips with just that sort of thing; to lower the 8
threshholds on problems and develop a plan to address 9
them.
10 We recognize, the utility recognizes, that all 11 problems can't be addressed immediately.
But the 12 important ones need to be*done promptly and a 13 prioritization scheme for the balance down to a 14 reasonable threshhold has to be established.
That's 15 what the plan is all about, and there will be intensive 16 oversight of that plan, it's acceptability and it's 17 implementation.
18 HR. 111LLER:
And I think you're focused -- if I 19 could just add, you're focused on the things that 20 constitute operability of a plan.
It is one of the 21 factors that we use in making the determination of 22 what's most important and in setting priorities.
And 23 so, we will watch that.
24 MR. GRAY:
Well, I guess a lot of the public's 25 concern is the equipment and the older -- this is a THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
~
101
]
1 24-year old plant, and a lot of equipment probably could 4
2 use upgrading.
And the steam generators, during the 3
next recycling, will be looked at very critically.
And 4
I guess there's a question with a 24-year old steam 5
generators what the future life is.
6 MR. MILLER:
I think Mr. Frizzle's answer -- his 7
statement at the end is the right one, and that is that i
j 8
the plant has to be safe.
If it cannot be operated I
9 safely -- they have to make the decision, but it needs 10 to stop operating if it's not safe.
And that's the 11 company's decision, that's not ours.
It's our job to 12 make sure they meet the requirements.
13 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
Next is H.
G.
Braib?
And I may 14 have mispronounced the last name again.
I'm sorry about 15 this.
16 And next will be James Mallon and then Ray Shadis.
17 H.
G.
BRACK:
Yes.
My name is H.
G.
Brack.
18 MR. JORDAN:
Mr. Brack.
I'm sorry.
19 MR. BRACK:
And I live on Mount Desert Island.
And 20 I'd just like to say thanks to the Governor's office for 21 providing a Quickcard copy of this report yesterday, and 22 also electronic copies.
I guess there's no one here 23 from the office except Uldis.
24 Anyway, I think this Safety Assessment Report 25 provides a very timely distraction from the ongoing THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
102 1
criminal investigation of the power operating scam, and 2
I realize that's off-limits for the discussion tonight.
3 But I think that, after reading the report just 4
last night and today, there are a lot interesting key 5
words here that are very ominous key words to me, as an 6
outsider here:
shortage of resources, declining trend 7
in material conditions, poor surveillance procedures and 8
evaluations, longstanding design deficiencies, 9
previously undiscovered deficient conditions.
10 I think it's very interesting that most of you 11 people here in the room today put a pretty positive spin 12 on this report.
I don't share your optimism as far as 13 what's in the future here.
14 And I think I have one quick question here relating 15 to this Maine Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which 16 I he.ve reviewed for RADNET.
I'm the editor of RADNET, 17 nuclear information on the Internet, and we'll be 18 posting a review of this report next week.
19 And in the the Maine Radiological Emergency 20 Response Plan -- and we are talking about safety 21 assessment tonight -- I find it interesting that the 22 action level, the emergency action level for you 23 authorized persons in a nuclear accident who would be in 24 an emergency operation center in Brunswick or several of 25 the other county centers, your action -- your THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
~
103 1
protection -- what's called the protection action 2
guideline, is contamination, bodily contamination of 300 3
counts per minute above background.
And that's all fine r
j 4
and dandy.
5 But then, when we take a look at the radiological 6
response plan, the Emergency Protection Action 4
7 Guidelines for citizens who are not authorized persons 8
in the emergency operations centers, and we see that
(
{
9 they're -- we have a more nuclide-specific guideline for l
10 the daily intake of the radiocesium 134 and 137 by 50 1
l 11 microcuries per day.
And in case that sounds like less a
)
12 than 300 counts per minute, if we translate microcuries J
13 to counts per minute, we have the startling revelation j
14 here that the Emergency Protection Action Guideline for I
{
15 adults and pregnant women, teenagers, my kids, and many i
16 of the children who live in Wiscasset, is actually 333 17 million counts per minute for your daily intake of 18 radiocesium.
f 19 This is a radical difference from the FDA 20 protection action guidelines after the Chernobyl 21 accident of 10,000 picocuries per kilogram, which is
}
- l 22 22,000 counts per minute per kilogram.
1 23 And I just think this is symbolic of the reason why I
24 a lot of people don't have too much confidence in Maine 25 Yankee or in the situation here, with the various safety THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
104 1
quetions that arise out of the ongoing degradation of 2
your aging equipment.
3 And I'd just like to get a comment from one of you 4
about why would there be such a discrepancy for you 5
fellows in the emergency operations centers?
The 6
Emergency Action Guideline for your contamination is 300 7
pounds per minute, but information people who are 8
experiencing a nuclear accident who live outside of 9
the -- who live in the area, who are not authorized 10 persons, you have this radically different Emergency 11 Protection Action Guideline, which was published by the 12 FDA in the Federal Register, and it's a component of 13 your Maine Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which I 14 might note is a restricted document, and FEMA was kind 15 enough to give me a copy to review for RADNET?
16 Any comment on that discrepancy?
17 MR. JORDAN:
No, I'm sorry, I do not.
18 nR. BRACK:
Ace you familiar with the Radiological 19 Emergency Protection Guidelines?
20 MR. JORDAN:
Quite.
21 MR. BRACK:
Okay.
You know about the 150 22 microcuries --
23 MR. JORDAN:
One of my responsibilities is managing 24 the agency's Radiological Response Program.
And so I 25 run the NRC Operations Center in Washington and interact THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
105 1
with FEMA on their guidelines; but I do not -- I do not 2
know what the basis for the discrepancy is.
You've 3
described it.
It will be in the transcript, and we'll 4
look into it and let you know.
5 MR. BRACK:
It's just one of the many things that 6
I've run across as I've worked on Maine Yankee issues i
7 over a period of 25 years.
I've also published a number 8
of books; bibliographies, primarily, with very boring 9
annotations.
And I find this extremely disturbing.
10 And I also find it disturbing, I think, the 11 attitude of many people here in the room that I'm from 12 away and what happens in Wiscasset is essentially none 13 of my business.
But, in fact, you make it my business, 14 because for every $20 that we spend on your electricity j
15 we generate a curie of high-level waste that will have 16 to be funded by persons other than you who benefit from 17 this scam.
18 And if we looK in the future, with the deregulation i
l 19 of energy production, it's going to be very difficult to 20 collect the waste disposal funding from the out-of-state 21 vendors.
And, in fact, that effectively brings down the 22 production of high-level waste to really $10 of 23 electricity purchased will produce a curie of high-level 24 waste here that we then have to dispose of at a later 25 date.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
_. ~. __
m._._
106 1
s 1
So I think you hava to undarstand that thoro's a i
2 lot of people outside of Wiscasset, who are not here 3
tonight, who resent this waste-disposal scam, who have 3
1 i
4 anxieties about the main safety issues that this report 5
only partially touches upon.
6 There's many things -- many safety issues that are 7
not dealt with by this report; reactor vessel 8
embrittlement, the differences in the service life i
9 between your high-tech turbo -- or your high-tech steam 10 generator, the sleeving and the unrepaired sections of i
l
'11 the sleeves.
That's a major safety issue over a period 12 of time.
4 i
13 And I'd just like to comment than I think that the 14 nuclear generation of electricity is now drawing to a 15 close.
It may take a few years for Maine Yankee to j
16 close down.
It may take 20 years for the industry to i
17 close down.
But this report, this meeting of the issues 18 that we've talking about here, these are a part of this 19 changing energy scene here, and nuclear power has a very 20 unfortunate footnote to the Cold War.
We've gotten rid i
21 of the Berlin Wall.
The cold war is over.
This is the 22 last vestige of the Cold War.
And you're benefitting i
23 from it here now, but I don't think that's going to last l
24 much longer.
I think the time is up.
i 25 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you very much, sir.
i THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell i
_. _. _ _.. ~. _.. _
107 l
l 1
James Mallon.
2 JAMES MALLON:
My names is James Mallon, and I live 3
in Brunswick.
And I guess my first comment is I don't i
4 presume to speak for the public, as some people have
.j 5
tonight.
I can only speak for myself.
And the first i
6 thing I would like to do is return this to the gentleman i
i 7
who brought it.
8 (Returning poster to Mr. Comley.)
f l
9 MR. COMLEY:
Thank you.
10 MR. MALLON:
Some of the points to be raised in the i
11 main root cause is the questioning attitude.
For 12 technical issues, the NRC has put out a lot of very good i
13 guidance in the form of the reg guides and the new regs.
I 14 Self-assessment is something a little difficult for l
15 analytical types to perform.
When you have performed i
]
16 things large-scale all-method inspection teams, has
)
i 17 self-assessment been a common at other nuclear 18 utilitim-?
And, at those utilities, have any of them 19 turned around, and who could provide uc, with a role i
20 model as we move forward to improve our performance in 21 this area?
22 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
I would answer by yes.
And one 23 of the roll F.odels is in Ellis Merschoff's region, and 24 it is the Brunswick plant, which now has a quite i
l 25 effective self-assessment program and has turned its THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
}_ _
108 l
I t
1 performance around dramatically.
2 MR. MERSCHOFF:
Another is the Virgina Power, Surry 3
Plant.
4 MR. MALLON:
Thank you.
5 KR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
6 Ray Shadis?
7 RAY SHADIS:
Thank you, Mr. Jordan.
It's a 8
pleasure to meet you in person.
I much appreciate your 9
help and cordiality when I called your office, and your 10 informative response in your letter to me yesterday.
11 If you will check out that sign-up sheet, I think 12 you'll see my name is scratched out there along about 13 number 4.
That's all right.
Halloween's coming, so 14 we're just skating along here.
So it is fun and games.
15 We have a problem in terminology.
I am often 16 called an anti-nuclear activist, and it always has 17 bothered me, you know.
And I was always looking for an 18 antonym for it, and I found it in your report.
It's the 19 word " complacent."
You know, what is the opposite of an 20 activist?
Well, it's a person who is complacent.
And 21 we -- our name was taken in vain here before in terms of 22 trying to stir fear in people.
We never do that.
But 23 we do suggest that they not be complacent, whether they 24 are pro-or anti-nuclear.
25 I have an objection to raise in the procedure with THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
109 1
this wholly ISAT process.
The public has really been
~
effectively excluded from the very beginning.
And 2
r l
3 although you may have very little to learn from us 4
general members of the public, that little bit may l
3 1
5 sometimes make a difference.
1 j
1^
6 Your entrance meeting was held at Maine Yankee, 7
which put a chilling effect on participation for many of j
8 us.
Many of us simply don't care to be there.
9 In addition to that, you took no questions at your 10 entrance meeting; and that was a problem.
11 And then, this report did not get into the 12 Wiscasset public document room until two days ago, and 13 even though Friends of the Coast is on the service list 14 as an interested party in Maine Yankee issues, we did 15 not get our copy until today.
16 So really, it precludes a really effective analysis
]
17 of the report, as short as it is.
18 I want to tell you anecdotally here that I got into
]
19 an argument with Dan Bestar, who is the editor of the 20 Lincoln County News, and he called for a comment on the
'21 report.
22 He said, have you read it?
Have you looked at it?
23 I said, yeah, I skimmed through.the Executive 1
24
- Summary, i
25 And he said, the executive summary?
Did you see THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
110 1
the whole report?
2 I said, no, the executive summary.
You know, 3
whatever the hell it was, it was 65 or 70 pages.
I just 4
skimmed it.
5 And he said, no, that's the real report.
6 I said, it can't be.
There's only a paragraph or 7
two in here on the erosion / corrosion problems in the 8
high-energy piping.
9 You know?
It just seems meaningless, if that's all 10 that can be said about a phenomenon that has bothered 11 the industry and is, you know, of generic concern to all 12 these plants, and especially at Maine Yankee, where 13 we've had a number of incidents where that piping has 14 had to be replaced because it was deteriorated.
We had 15 a pipe break.
16 And, you know, I think of the Surry Nuclear Power 17 Station, where it was a main steamline break and a 18 two-by-three foot section of pipe blew out and four 19 workers were killed because of the steam.
20 And I think that to give that issue, given Maine 21 Yankee's experience with erosion / corrosion, only a 22 paragraph in the report is short-circuiting it.
23 So, I'm real concerned because our Governor sold 24 this report as the end-all ultimate declaration on the 25 safety of this power plant.
He said this was going to THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
111 1
bs a top-to-bottom, nuts-and-bolts inspection.
And I 2
think that it sends the wrong message to people, both 3
the people that work at the plant and the general 4
public.
This is a good assessment, I believe.
It's a 5
good study.
But it's an assessment of process and l
l 6
procedures.
It is not a nuts-and-bolts examination of 7
this plant.
8 And I think that your letter to me, Mr. Jordan, a
i 9
confirms that in that -- in that you say in your letter 4
10 that essentially no material testing was done.
There 11 were no independent rad camples of anything sent down to 12 any independent labs for analysis to recheck what Maine 13 Yankee had done, proclaimed to be in good shape.
14 As Mr. Comley pointed out, Maine Yankee is one of 15 those companies that had noncertified parts; and yet, 16 there was no sampling of fasteners sent out to see if 17 there were more uncertified parts.
18 I think that if you look at the prob'-me that the 19 company has had with its steam generator, which began in 20 the upper reaches, I believe, of that steam generator --
21 that's where they had thu precursor to a steam tube 22 break -- you'll understand that that's an important 23 place for the NRC to be taking a solid look.
24 I think that you know that there have been problems 25 with the control element assemblies, with pieces falling i
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
112 1
off of them, that had to be redone and rebuilt; that no 2
one in this company knows all the locations of the use 3
of Incanel 600 in this plant.
The French, of course, 4
have found it on the bushings on their control drive 5
assemblies -- the control drive mechanisms for the 6
But we haven't even looked at that here.
7 We have not given this plant the thorough global 8
physical examination that a facility which has been used 9
good and hard -- it's had record runs, production runs, 10 over the years.
It's very much like a very good, very 11 tired race car.
It's been used hard.
But we have not 12 looked at the physical aspects of it.
13 And I think that in fairness to the public of 14 Maine, I think you need to make that statement; that 15 your assessment is essentially not physical examination 16 of this plant, but, rather, an examination of the 17 processes and procedures.
18 And you dregged off the track a little bit.
I'm 19 glad to hear you say that Millstone was a much more 20 extensive examination.
I wonder what the examination at 21 Trojan was before they decided to shut that puppy down.
22 I think it probably was a more extensive examination in 23 every respect, including -- as we asked Governor King 24 back in June of 1995 -- including an economic assessment 25 of the future viability of the plant.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
113 i
4 1
So, I'd like to see you, for the sake of the broad 4
2 public out there, put it in perspective.
This is not, 1
i 3
as our TV station Channel 13 said, the world's most I
4 comprehensive examination of a nuclear power plant ever.
5 I think one of the big problems here is information.
i 6
So I guess that's -- that's essentially my comment.
7 I'd like you gentlemen, just in all honesty -- you can
\\
8 talk about probabilities.
People have raised those
]
9 questions before.
I don't know why NRC Commissioner 1
10 Delinsky would say that a nuclear power plant accident, l
11 a core melt in the near future in the United States, was 12 a virtual certainty.
How does that jibe -- I mean, I 13 know commissioners can be difficult to talk to, but how I
14 does that jibe in your sense of possibilities when you 15 talk about 1 in 10,000 years?
How does it jibe in your h
l 16 sense of reconciling these odds when an NBC tanel was i
4 I
17 brought before Congress in 1985 and predicted that the 18 chances of another core-melt accident the equiv=1 art of i
19 Three Mile Island or greater in the United States for i
20 the next 20 years were 50/50.
f l
21 I don't think that -- as much as we all love this 22 planet, I don't think that it's excluded.
I don't know 23 how we can count it out of those statistics.
24 So I'd like you to -- given that, to let these 25 people know what you know about the risks they take in j
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
=.
- - - ~..._...
114 l
1 i
1 terms of WASH 1400, WASH 740.
You can even throw in the 2
source term stuff from TMI, if you like, to mitigate all 3
that.
Bu. give them a shot at understanding what it is 4
that we risk by continuing to operate this plant.
5 Thank you.
6 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
Thank you, sir.
7 MR. MERSCHOFF:
That was a large, performance-based 8
inspection that looked formally at the hardware and i
9 particularly the testing of the hardware and the design i
10 and design calculations of the hardware to ensure that 11 the installed equipment was -- or to determine whether 12 or not it was able to meet the original design 13 assumptions and whether or not it was being properly 14 tested to prove that it can, in fact, meet those 15 assumptions.
Many instances were.found where there were 16 problems and some where the components could not meet 17 their intended function.
18 A ::d on that, I would have to conclude er disagree 19 strongly that we worked in the field and it was 20 hardware-oriented.
21 MR. MILLER:
I'd like to just add that on an 22 ongoing basis a big part of our inspection program is, 23 in fact, monitoring and overseeing the testing that is I
l 24 done by licensees; testing of steam generators, for 25 example, which is done, really meeting criteria that we i
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
115 1
stipulate and methods that we approve.
2 So, I think your concern about the need for testing 3
and monitoring equipment is a good concern.
But this is 4
a part of the program; what we stipulate they do and 5
what we check.
6 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
And I'll try one quick 7
statement about risk.
/ 9 90 8
There have been a number of risk studies.
KASH 289 9
was, you might say, the original risk study for power 10 reactors.
Since then there was a NEWREG 1150 that was a 11 study of risk associated with five plants.
And since 12 that time, each power plant in the U.S. has done a risk 13 analysis of itself, a probabilistic risk assessment, to 14 determine what the core damage frequency was based on j
15 equivocal performance of the design.
And the NRC has 16 been reviewing those since that time.
17 And I would say that in 1985 the risk of a plant --
18 a core dar. aging event were significantly greater than 19 they are today across the U.S.
Principally, the change i
20 that has occurred is that the initiating transients, the 21 frequency of arrival of events, has been reduced alusst 22 by an order of magnitude since 1985.
That is probably 23 the largest contribution to reductions in risk.
And 24 this is plants that in fact run better, and when they 25 trip there are not complications.
THE REPORTING GROl'D/ Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
116 1
The reliability of safety equipment is a parameter 2
that the NRC is monitoring, measuring and making a great 3
deal of analysis of.
The safety system reliability has 4
not improved very much during that time, and so, it's a 5
feature that we're putting attention on.
6 This particular review looked at great depth at the 7
reliability of safety equipment.
And in this case, we 8
found one train of the feedwater system that was not 9
performing as well'as the utility thought it was, and 10 that was a very interesting finding in our understanding 11 of how safety systems are treated.
12 The bottom line in terms of risk I've essentially 13 already given; that this plant is operating very close 14 to its risk analysis value, that there were not 15 significant accident sequence precursors, we call them, 16 in which things lined up in an adverse fashion and i
17 substantially increase risk in a given year.
18 So I'm reasonably comfortable with the risk value 19 associated with the operation of this plant.
20 And with that, I think I would simply move on, 21 unless some of you had any comments.
22 And I have to maybe stop for just a moment.
We are 23 moving slowly.
It's my fault.
I'm the moderator.
I'm 24 going to have to enforce more stringently the two-minute 25 rule, and I apologize for that.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
117 l
l 1
Next is Claire Johnson, then Anne Burt and Jon 2
Kirsch.
3 CLAIRE JOHNSON:
I'll try to be quick.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
5 MS. JOHNSON:
If Mr. Narko of Connecticut Yankee, 6
head of that, claims the reason for closing down that l
7 nuclear plant was economic, how can the continued l
8 operation of Maine Yankee be justified?
9 The age of the plant is practically the same.
The 10 Wiscasset license expires in 2008 and Connecticut l
I 11 Yankee, 2007.
The claimed reason for the Connecticut i
12 Yankee shutdown is that natural gas and other 13 alternatives are cheaper.
Please explain why Maine 14 Yankee should continue?
15 MR. JORDAN:
It was licensed, it's meeting the 16 conditions of its license, and it is running acceptable 17 to the regulatory requirements.
And the economics of 18 the plant in its environment are a business decision 19 that the utility must make within the community.
20 MS. JOHNSON:
Thank you very much.
21 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
22 ANNE D.
BURT:
Good evening.
I'm Anne D.
Burt from 23 Edgecomb.
And we've haard a lot about your review which 24 involved looking at processes and looking at hardware of l
25 the plant.
I have a different concern that I think THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
118 1
wasn't covered, and yet it's an issue of meeting
)
2 standards that haven't been met for a long time.
3 At Three Mile Island it was a simple human error 4
that caused the accident.
It was found that the plant 5
was understaffed, that workers were overworked, and at 6
that time a new standard was set by the industry in 7
terms of the numbers of staff that would be employed at 8
a nuclear plant.
9 Yesterday, or rather, I think it was this morning, l
10 I read in the Portland Press Herald that Mr. Charles 11 Frizzle, the President of Maine Yankee, said that he's j
12 going to bring in a top-level compliance vice president 13 to stay on top of industry standards and a team of 14 technical advisors to provide expertise in the area of 15 NRC regulations, operations and personnel.
i 1
16 I know that at this time Maine Yankee hasn't met 17 the industry's standard that was put into place after 18 Three Mile Island, the suggestion that there be one 19 worker per kilowatt output by a plant.
I know that they 20 have basically half that number of employees.
And given 21 the root cause is that we've talked about an economic 22 pressures versus safety, what I want to know is did you 23 at all look at this as a potential factor and a safety 24 concern at the plant, and do you share my concern with 25 regards to that?
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
119 1
MR. MERSCHOFF:
We looked at staffing as part of 2
this effort.
In particular, control room staffing.
We i
3 looked at the operators.
We looked at overtime across 4
the board in terms of operators, maintenance, 5
engineering.
6 We found that this plant was operating within the 1
7 guidelines that the NRC has established in terms of 8
overtime.
So they are meeting the requirements with the i
9 staff they have.
i 10 However, the common thread that we drew throughout 11 the significant deficiencies that were identified were 12 resource constraints, and those resource constraints are 13 in terms of people and of funding for programs.
So, 14 yes, there is a concern there that needs to be addressed 15 as part of the licensee's corrective action to this 16 area.
The answer isn't necessarily more people or more 17 money, but perhaps some combination of the two.
18 MS. BURT:
3 ell, can you tell me why '.a c would be 19 this standard or guideline that would come in terms of 20 hindsight from an accident where maybe we have learned 21 something, and why is that not being put into place at 22 other plants, such as Maine Yankee?
23 MR. MILLER:
Maybe I can add something here.
There 24 were an enormous number of lessons learned from Three 25 Mile Island, and I think the most significant ones are THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
i 120 l
1 not related to the number of people at a plant, but 2
they're related to the basic procedures that were 3
available to the operators to deal with at emergencies 4
and accidents.
And those have been fundamentally 5
changed.
Training has changed fundamentally across the 6
board in the industry.
At the time there were very few 7
plants that had simulators that are used to practice 8
operators on response to emergencies and the like.
That 9
has changed.
And beyond that, the design of the systems 10 has fundamentally changed since the time of Three Mile 11 Island.
12 So, when you look at the mix of things, the number 13 of people can be important.
And the team pointed to 14 resources in general at an issue.
But far and away the 15 biggest lessons learned by Three Mile Island had to do 16 with the kinds of things that I just talked about.
And 17 those are things that have changed since that time.
18
'IS. BURT:
I guess I would also raise this issue in 19 light of the internal report that came out of Maine 20 Yankee.
I think it was inadvertently released to the 21 public.
But where there were indications that workers 22 were overworking, safety concerns, and so on.
There was 23 a concern that people were perhaps overworked, and so 24 on.
25 So that's -- you know, all I know is what I read, THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
121 1
1 and those are some of the conclusions that I drew.
And l
2 I'm glad that you're concerned -- that there is some i
3 concern about the human resources there.
4 Thank you for your time.
5 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
6 Jon Kirsch, then and Barbara Erickson and Paul 7
Willoughby.
8 JON KIRSCH:
Thank you for giving me this chance to 9
speak.
I've been at Maine Yankee about 18 years.
I 10 During that time I've been involved with operations of l
11 the plant, training operators.
I've also work with the 12 maintenance department during the outages, and so forth, 13 just to give you a little background of where I've been 14 here.
I've been in nuclear power for well over 20 years 15 now, with the nuclear Navy behind me.
16 I've had an excellent chance to view one of the I
17 items that keeps coming up during this meeting over the 18 last couple of days, the the post-trip review t--.u.
And 19 I sat in as an observer of that team, and I was quite j
20 impressed with their questioning attitude.
I think the 21 public, if they could see what went on during that 22 meeting, would have a lot of confidence in the in-depth 23 questioning that did take place in that in determining 24 whether or not Maine Yankee should start up after that 25 trip that took place yesterday.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
122 1
As a matter of fact, it was a clean trip.
It 2
responded as it was supposed to.
4 3
I'm having a real hard time visualizing the 4
complacent attitude that is in your report.
Certainly, l
5 among the people I have work with over the years -- and j
l 6
I necessarily work with upper management -- I certainly 7
have a hard time visualizing it with them, too.
8 However, I don't have the same hard time J
i 9
visualizing the hard-working dedicated group of people i
j 10 at Maine Yankee, because that is what we have at Maine 11 Yankee.
We have a dedicated workforce at Maine Yankee.
12 The people working at Maine Yankee really care a
i 13 about the public's safety and our own.
We wouldn't work I
1 14 there if we didn't think it wasn't safe.
I feel that we 15 at Maine Yankee strive for it to be a safe place to 3
16 work, as well as to live near.
We want our neighbors to 17 be comfortable, and, hopefully, they are, as has been 18 described by some people that have talked earlier.
19 Yeah, there's always ways to improve.
That 20 attitude has been, and is, alive at Maine Yankee now.
21 I've the years I've seen that.
It is a safe and clean 22 producer of electricity, and we will continue to be a 23 safe and clean producer of electricity.
24 Thank you.
25 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you, sir.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
123 P
]
1 BARBARA ERICKSON:
Hi, I'm Barbara Marx Erickson.
2 I've been work at Maine Yankee for six years.
And I i
3 guess when I think of the group of people that I work 4
with every day, words like " professional" and 5
" dedicated" come to my mind, not " complacent."
Ensuring i
l f
6 public safety is of utmost importance to me.
I take 7
issue with " complacent."
I am not a complacent 8
employee.
]
9 Thank you.
j 10 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
Paul Willoughby.
Next a
11 will be Rodney Dee and Mike Evringham.
l 12 PAUL WILLOUGHBY:
Good evening.
I'm Paul l
l 13 Willoughby.
I live in Lichfield.
I'd like to have a a
14 little balance to what's been said here so far tonight.
15 Most people have been focusing on the negative things in l
16 the report.
I'd like to point out particularly some j
17 items in the executive summary where it states that the l
18 operatiene people do a very good job, the engineers 9-l 19 overall do a good job, the maintenance people do a good 20 job.
There are all these people at the plant that do a 21 good job.
And yes, there are some deficiencies.
- Yes, 22 Maine Yankee has some work to do.
But I think the 1
23 bottom line is that Maine Yankee is safe.
24 And I would ask, since we've already heard from the 25 NRC and they have concurred that the plant is safe to THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
. =.
124 l
1 operate, does the state, as well, concur with that?
i 2
MR. WILEY:
Yes.
i 3
MR. VANAGS:
Yes.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Rodney Dee.
5 MR. DEE:
Good evening and thank you for the 6
opportunity to speak.
I did have some notes here, but I i
7 think I'm just going to set it aside and speak from my i
I 8
heart, because that's really where my thoughts are j
l 9
coming from tonight.
~
t 10 And I want to thank you for bringing up the-11 discussion on risks, because I think that one of the big 12 things that I've seen, observing operations at Maine 13 Yankee, is that Maine Yankee is very sincerely concerned l
14 with the risks that we pose in terms of the operation of 15 the plant.
16 And I think that I'd like to give one example of 17 how I've seen risk applied to the plant and how it 18 speaks to something very different than the caricaturc l
19 that I've seen painted about Maine Yankee is an 20 organization which is only bent on production.
21-Starting up with the 1995 refueling, we ran into a 22 situation where we had a very minor oil leak from one of 23 our standby safety system pumps.
It should be noted 24 that this pump was not required to be operable by 25 regulation, it was not required to be operable by our THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
125 1
tech specs, but yet, Maine Yankee management made a 2
decision that we would stop the power installation of 3
the plant at a very low power level to allow maintenance 4
of this work to continue before we continued with 5
raising the power up in order to put the plant online.
6 And I think that that's just one example of how 7
Maine Yankee exercises prudence in terms of observing 8
and making sure that we maintain risk within acceptable 9
limits.
10 And as you mentioned, there are a lot of studies on 11 what risk is, and in nuclear power plants in this 12 country and Maine Yankee in particular, I believe we've 13 made some excellent strides in terms of minimizing the 14 risk that nuclear power does present to the public.
15 What I also want to bring out is that the people 16 that we have working at the plant have a very good 17 knowledge of risk.
And I want to bring that up on your 18 report, as well; is that there is very good use of PRA.
19 There is very good use and understanding by the 20 operators of the plant of the type of risk that is 21 posed.
22 And as was said by several of the people that stood 23 up before me, is that we do believe that the plant is a 24 very safe place to work.
And like the others have said, 25 and I'll say it again, that if I thought the plant was THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
126 1
not safe, I would not work there either.
Thank you.
2 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
3 Mike Evringham?
4 MIKE EVRINGHAM:
Close enough.
5 MR. JORDAN:
All right.
Thank you.
Next we have 6
David Flaherty and Alan Clemence.
7 MR. EVRINGHAM:
For the sake of the record, it's 8
Mike Evringham.
9 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
10 MR. EVRINGHAM:
I am also an employee of Maine 11 Yankee.
I'm also a local citizen of Maine.
And, like 12 other Maine Yankee employees that are here this evening, 13 I speak as an individual employee, a ratepayer, a 14 taxpayer, a voter, and a father of two children.
15 I just wrote down some things that I felt were 16 important as I kind of listened through the evening to 17 your report and to some of the other speakers.
18 Unfortunately -- well, I'll try to get this to a 19 question, but Paul stole my question.
But that's okay.
20 I'm personally glad that the NRC team is satisfied 21 that the inspection you did was thorough and you seem to 22 be very satisfied with it as a product of what you 23 intended it to be.
I'm personally glad the inspection 24 is over.
Mainly so that we can concentrate on getting 25 back to improving the areas you identified.
We need to I
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
127 1
do that.
We need to get focused now on looking at the 2
things you identified and improving them.
We need to do 3
that so we can continue to provide the safest, most 4
reliable and cost-effective power available to the 5
citizens of Maine.
6 The one thing from your report that I want to 7
comment on,.I think you used the word " average."
You 8
graded us as average.
I can tell you that I'm not 9
satisfied with average.
I can tell you that every 10 employee of Maine Yankee here tonight is not satisfied I
i 11 with average.
i i
12 And to those previous speakers who expressed some 13 concern about the ethics of Maine Yankee management, I'd 14 also like to respond to that.
15 First of all, I'd like to say that I have high 16 regard for the ethical values of all the Maine Yankee 17 senior managers.
With that aside, I can assure you that 18 your best assurance of the safe operatin"
- iaine 19 Yankee are the ethical values of the 450 employees who 20 work there, most of whom live in this community with 21 their families.
I think you can all take solace in 22 that.
23 I can assure you that if we felt this plant was 24 compromising safety, we would shut it down.
Charlie 25 Frizzle would be behind us, but he wouldn't have to be THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
. ~. -
128 1
t 1
the one to tell us that.
When Mr. Frizzle stated that 2
we would operate safely or not at all, I believe he's
)
3 called it clearly for all employees.
4 Again, Paul kind of stole me question, so I want to 5
rephrase it just a little bit.
Since I understand that 6
the Governor is the one that called for this million 7
dollar inspection, I want to make real sure, is he I
8 satisfied that Maine Yankee is safe to operate at 90%
j 9
power?
l 10 MR. WILEY:
Yes.
We're satisfied with the report, 11 we're satisfied with the response that the NRC, Chairman 12 Jackson and all the people here gave to the State of 13 Maine.
We are most appreciative of the amount of i
14 resources ant'. time.
I'd just like to acknowledge the 22 1
i 15 people who aren't here tonight who are members of the i
16 full-time team, who I observed over the period of four s
17 months, who I saw at not only the hands-on examination
)
18 c
Li.is plant, but bringing up their issues and i
19 defending their viewpoints with a real passion that i
~'
20 demonstrated to me they really, really cared.
21 I think the Governor feels they've brought forth a 22 top-notch product, and we look forward to working with 23 you all at the plant take care of the issues that remain 24 in the report.
1 25 And I also would like to thank the Maine Yankee THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
~.. - -
l 129 1
people who have displayed an excellent cooperative 2
attitude in some troubled times and some real special 3
times during the last four months.
4 MR. EVRINGHAM:
Thank you.
5 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
i 6
David Flaherty?
7 (No response.)
8 Alan Clemence?
Next will be Henry Myers and John 9
Michael DeBartolo.
3-10 ALAN CLEMENCE:
Hello, my name is Alan Clemence.
]
11 I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to comment and i
I 12 and ask a question.
I i
13 I found that your report disclosed some rather 14 alarming practices and conditions.
You alluded to 1
1 15 material deterioration, calling it declining material.
16 condition, as one notable weakness; and also 17 inconsistent equipment reliability.
But the bulk of 18 your assessment tends to be that of practice Onl 19 procedure pertaining to the operation of a largely 3
20 unquantified physical entity.
21 Questions of reactor embrittlement, degradation of 4
22 the steam generators, integrity of the original 23 metallurgical properties, such ductility of the miles of 24 piping and other major operational components, which 25 should, in my opinion, be the very foundation of the i
THE REPORTING GROUP /Masco Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
130 l
l 1
assessment.
Certainly, after 24 years of operation, r
l 2
engineering projections are useful, but I think it would 3
be much better to do the actual testing.
4 As far as the two root causes that the assessment 5
identified regarding -- or the two things that --
6 regarding the first one about economic pressure, it 7
would seem to require a comprehensive cost analysis 8
which uses criteria open to the public and regulatory I
9 review.
Obviously, the utility is continually doing its 10 own analysis, but as the record and your assessment 11 indicates, safety programs have suffered.
And by virtue 12 of that, the criteria need to be examined.
13 Regarding the second root cause, a lack of 14 questioning and culture, I want to say that I'm 15 absolutely shocked at Mr. Frizzle's response to your j
16 assessment.
Explaining the determination that you have 17 made that the Wiscasset plant at rated at 90% power, but 18 not 1001 pcuer, Mr. Frizzle is quoted in an n.rc:ciated 19 Press story, news story, as saying, yesterday, quote, in 20 the months to come we will satisfy them that we are safe 21 to operate at 100% power, Frizzle said.
22 In his response to your presentation during the 23 first portion of tonight's meeting he appeared to me to l
24 be defiant and contradictory toward the conclusions l
(
25 directed toward him and the corporation he heads.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
131 1
In the past year there have been significant 2
cooling pool accidents, the Justice Department feels 3
warranted to involve itself in the operation of the 4
plant, and, as it has been pointed out, in past years 1
5 unplanned shutdowns due to faulty equipment are routine.
6 He claims this evening that he has been running the 7
plant effectively while your report and, in fact, the 1
8 whole reason we're here tonight would indicate j
9 otherwise.
10 To me, this hardly seems to be a good way to start 11 off the new era of the questioning culture.
So my i
12 question to you tonight really regards the comments I 13 made before about material deterioration.
When will the 14 NRC definitively determine the level of embrittlement in 15 the reactor vessel, the reactor core, and should that 16 determination be made before any increases in power 17 levels are considered?
18 ThmA you.
19 MR. JORDAN:
The reactor internals and the reactor 20 vessel, steam generator and primary system piping, all 21 those components are subject to what we call a 10-year 22 in-service inspection interval.
So that over a 10-year 23 cycle there is a physical inspection, that is, an 24 ultrasonic testing of joints, an inspection physically 25 of interior welds, pulling of coupons, radiation samples J
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
132 1
from the vessel, and doing ductile testing of samples.
2 Those are ongoing processes that at this point were not 3
a part of this inrpection, and we were satisfied met 4
sufficient industry standards.
5 And I believe there was sufficient review that we 6
feel quite comfortable without doing an independent 7
assessment of those properties.
So that was not within 8
the design of this review.
It was not indicated, based 9
on the original issue that was raised.
10 The steam generators, some of you, I'm sure, 11 observed the public meeting and participated in it, and 12 in the sleeving and inspection process.
So that has 13 been thoroughly aired, and there was no need to 14 reexamine that effort.
15 So that's the reason for the scope.
Maybe we 16 didn't make that clear at the front end of it.
17 MR. MILLER:
If I could just add, you know, 18 repeating what I said before, that a component of our 19 inspection program is, in fact, examination of the 20 testing that is done by a licensee meeting criteria and 21 the requirements that Ed talked about.
]
22 MR. CLEMENCE:
Well, my question specifically is 23 about the reactor embrittlement.
And you're talking of 24 industry standards, and industry standards or 4
25 experience, the track records record shows that THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
133 i
1 embrittlement happens and it's been the cause of the i
2 Rowe plant -- and it's my enderstanding that for Rowe l
3 Yankee to prove that the reactor was was not embrittled-4 would have been too expensive; but embrittlement 5
occurred there.
There's not a whole lot of disagreement 6
there.
So, given that historical precedent, why 7
wouldn't you check for embrittlement in the Wiscasset 8
plant?
9 MR. JORDAN:
But that's a part of the -- that's 10 what I was trying to explain; that this 10-year 11 in-service inspection included the state of metal 12 samples that have been placed in the reactor vessel, in 13 the original vessel material, that are irradiated during 14 the operation of the plant, and taking those to a 15 metallurgical lab and examining them with micrographics,.
i 16 to to determine that the structure has, in fact, l
17 changed.
It does -- the vessels do embrittle.
18 Radiation does damage metal.
19 MR. CLEMENCE:
Metal is sort of my expertise.
I do 20 know a little bit about it, yes.
21 MR. JORDAN:
Right.
So the question is, is the 22 rate of damage occurring such that by the end of the 23 life this particular vessel will be outside the 24 acceptable range of properties.
And the projection for 25 this vessel, I understand, is that it will be within the THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
134 1
range of properties.
2 So that was not a part of this review.
There is --
3 MR. CLEMENCE:
But my question is before the power 4
level is allowed to be raised, will it be part of 5
that --
i i
6 MR. JORDAN:
I'm trying to --
7 MR. MILLER:
Embrittlement is something that occurs l
8 over time when you integrate the number of hours that a 9
plant is at power.
The NRC has what are called 10 screening criteria, which help assure that 11 embrittlement, as it proceeds, is arrested well before j
12 the time that it can cause a real threat to the plant.
f 13 In fact, that's what the issue was at Yankee Rowe.
e 14 And so, not only do we specify what kinds of tests
{
15 that have to be done, we have criteria that are 4
16 conservative and that assure that well before the point i
17 at which you reach an immediate problem, that you have 18 detected that and it is examined and addressed.
19 MR. CLEMENCE:
So, will it be part of the dialogue, i
20 the discussion that goes along with the perceived a,
21 request in the future for raising the power level?
4 i
22 MR. MILLER:
It's an assessment that is done 23 regardless of the power level, and it has been done and 24 projections have been made.
l 4
l 25 MR. CLEMENCE:
Thank you.
a l
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell 1
135 1
MR. JORDAN:
Thank you.
Henry Myers.
2 And Henry, it's nice to see you in this setting.
3 HENRY MYERS:
Well, these questions come about from 4
many years experience as a senior staff person at the 5
U.S. House of Representatives Primary Oversight 6
Committee to the NRC.
4 7
Is it the NRC's position that Maine Yankee is in 8
substantial compliance with the Commission's 1
9 regulations?
10 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
11 MR. MYERS:
It doesn't say that in the Chairman's 12 letter to Mr. Frizzle.
It says that overall performance 13 at Maine Yankee was considered adequate for operation.
14 I've been around long enough to know --
15 MR. JORDA%.
Well, they're words cue could use.
16 MR. MYERS:
No, but I mean, it's a simple -- you 17 talked earlier on about complying with regulations, and 18 that's how you judge if something is oPrf.. act.
And a 19 simpler sentence would be yes, we found that Maine 20 Yankee is in substantial compliance with Commission 21 regulations.
Instead, it uses the words, its overall 22 per forinance was considered adequate for operations.
23 It's...: clear what overall performance refers to.
It's
~
24 not clear, when it said it was considered, was 25 considered by whom.
And the question is does anyone THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
136 1
here --
2 MR. JORDAN:
By in gentleman and by myself and by i
3 the team.
f 4
MR. MYERS:
It doesn't say that.
5 MR. JORDAN:
It was intended to be implied.
6 MR. MYERS:
Yeah, but why doesn't it say that?
I 7
mean, you can --
8 MR. JORDAN:
I'm not going to be defensive about 9
what it didn't say.
10 MR. MYERS:
It doesn't say --
11 MR. JORDAN:
We've attempted to explain what we 12 meant by the words that were used.
13 MR. MYERS:
Well, but you did nut use -- the 14 simplest, the logical thing to do would be to use the is language that has the most meaning to people, and that 16 was --
17 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
\\
18
.fR. MYERS:
Even though substantial compliance, or 19 something like that, we can argue but what substantial 20 compliance means.
But it certainly means more than 21 saying overall performance was considered adequate.
22 Because you can make the finding, I suppose, that it's 23 safe even though it doesn't comply with regulations.
24 And maybe that's what you want to say.
It could be safe 25 and not comply with regulations.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell i
137 1
But why does this document not say the NRC staff
)
2 believes that Maine Yankee is in overall compliance with 3
the commission's regulations.
And I believe there's a 4
reason for not having said it, and I hope you'll tell me 5
what that reason is.
6 Or, either that or send them a new letter saying we 7
find that you are in overall compliance with the 8
Commission's regulations.
It would be better than this 9
sentence, which has a lot of basis for challenging this.
10 MR. MERSCHOFF:
We thought the letter was written 11 accurately to portray the assessment team's conclusion.
12 MR. MYERS:
Is it the position of the NRC staff 13 that Maine Yankee is in substantial compliance with NRC 14 regulations?
15 MR. MERSCHOFF:
It's the position of the assessment 16 team.
17 MR. MYERS:
Well, who's in charge here?
Is it the 18 Commission's position?
19 MR. MERSCHOFF:
The purpose of this meeting was to 20 explain the process and the findings --
21 MR. MYERS:
No, but the NRC is allowing Maine 22 Yankee to operate.
Is it the NRC's porition that Maine 23 Yeankee is in substantial compliance with the 24 Commission's regulations?
25 MR. MERSCHOFF:
The purpose of this meeting was to THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
.~
~
. -. - - _ _. ~ - - - -.. - _. - - -
5 138 i
I describe the process and the findings of the assessment 2
team.
i 3
MR. MYERS:
No, but you referred to this letter i
4 from Chairman Jackson.
5 MR. JORDAN:
Mr. Myers, this is a matter of 6
semantics that I don't really think deserves the 7
attention --
8 MR. MYERS:
Well, it's your view -- it's the view 4
9
-of some member of -- you say you want comments from 10 citizens.
Well, I am a citizen.
11 MR. JORDAN:
I've accepted your comment, but I 12 don't choose to --
13 MR. MYERS; Well, but why are you choosing not to 14 answer my question?
15 MR. JORDAN:
I answered'it when you first asked it.
16 I said yes.
17 MR. MYERS:
Yes to what?
That it is the o
18 Commircica's position that Maine Yankee is in 19 substantial compliance with the Commission's --
20 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
21 MR. MYERS:
Will you say that?
22 MR. JACKSON:
I just did.
It's on the record.
23 MR. MYERS:
Okay, say it.
You're not saying it.
24-And will you send them a letter saying that?
That's the 25 important thing.
Will you send a letter to Maine Yankee THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
1 139 1
saying that it's the position of the NRC staff --
2 MR. JORDAN:
Mr. Myers, we've sent the letter that j
3 we intended.
And I appreciate your comments.
Do you 4
have a question that you'd like to ask in addition?
5 MR. MYERS:
Well, I asked you this question.
I 6
don't think you've --
7 MR. JORDAN:
You've asked it and I gave you the 8
answer that we are not going to change the letter.
l 9
Thank you very much.
10 MR. MYERS:
Is it the Commission's position that t
11 Maine Yankee is in substantial compliance wit'.s the NRC's i
12 regulations?
13 MR. JORDAN:
Sir, I have --
14 MR. MYERS:
Is it the Commission's position that 15 Maine Yankee is in substantial compliance with NRC 16 regulations?
17 MR. JORDAN:
Sir, I'm not going to continue this.
18 MP.. MYERS:
Is that -- would you answer that 19 question?
20 MR. JORDAN:
I've answered it to you several times.
21 MR. MYERS:
Oh.
What did you say?
I don't think 22 you did.
23 MR. JORDAN:
Sir, I'm having great difficulty 24 maintaining my composure at this point.
Would you 25 please sit down?
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
140 4
1 John Michael DeBartolo.
2 JOHN MICHAEL DEBARTOLO:
Good evening.
Thank you 3
for this opportunity for these minutes.
My name is John 4
Michael DeBartolo.
I work at Maine Yankee.
I live in
)
5 Wiscasset within three myself of Maine Yankee with my 6
family, my extended family, my father, my mother and my J
7-mother-in-law at the current time.
I'm also a senior 4
8 examiner of the Margaret Chase Smith Quality Award, and i
k 9
I've been associated with that process for eight years.
I 10 I've read the report and I find it very 11 satisfactory, but I do have one question that deal with I
12 the lack of a questioning culture which has resulted in 13 the failure to identify or promptly correct significant i
14 problems in areas perceived by management to be of low l
15 safety significance.
l 1
l 16 I'll give you my question, but my concern is my l
17 involvement at Maine Yankee as an engineer, as an 18 engineer for the last seven years.
Currently I'm an 19 industrial safety coordinator, and I have had the 20 opportunity to touch and talk to just about every 21 employee at Maine Yankee in the last seven months in my 22 current position.
23 I've been involved in high-impact safety briefings.
24 I've been involved in safety briefings of all types.
25 And I've been involved in work committee meetings THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
141 1
whether that questioning culture has been there.
2 It's very difficult to get a procedure, to get a 3
work package, to get a design change through there with 4
that questioning attitude that that governing body has.
5 One other thing about a questioning culture.
I'd 6
like state, and I'm sure that you probably would never 7
hear this anywhere else, but I did witness it in a 8
high-impact safety briefing of the maintenance workers 9
on a very difficult task.
I saw the manager of that 10 department, the maintenance department, look the 11 maintenance person in the eye and say, are you sure you 12 understand, are you okay with this job?
And the manager
-l 13 stood there, eye-to-eye, and made sure he got 14 confirmation that the job was understood and everything I
15 was safe.
And that attitude was portrayed throughout 16 that entire briefing.
And I see that continuously there 17 in my job.
18 My question related to that clause.
Did you find 19 evidence in some areas that a questioning attitude did 20 exist at Maine Yankee?
21 MR. MERSCHOFF:
Yes.
22 MR. DEBARTOLO:
Okay.
23 MR. MERSCHOFF:
It could be improved.
There were 24 certainly successes in terms of questioning attitude.
25 At one point where I discussed a significant number of THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
i 142 1
problems that Maine Yankee had identified and addressed 2
before the team came, flooding from the IPEEE, 3
high-energy line break, ventilation for EFW.
4 Nonetheless, there is substantial-room for 5
improvement.
There were many problems that were found 6
during this assessment that were unknown, or some that 7
were known, with no action taken.
And that's not 8
acceptable.
9 MR. DEBARTOLO:
I understand that we could improve 10 in that area, but the culture does exist there.
We need 11 to expand that culture.
12 MR. MERSCHOFF:
Yes.
13 MR. DEBARTOLO:
Thank you.
14 MR. JORDAN:
Chris Anderson, and next is Dave 15 Hulbert and Bill Thompson.
16 KRIS ANDERSON:
My name is Kris Anderson.
I'm a l
17 resident of Bath, and I'm also a mechanical engineer.
18 And I've reviewed the reports and I've been in contact i
19 with Maine Yankee numerous times.
And I just want to 20 state, as a citizen and someone who has some sort of 21 technical background, that I feel very confident in the 1
22 ability of Maine Yankee, the management, and the people 23 there, and I'm glad that they're there.
I appreciate j
24 the generation of the low cost of power that they've 25 been producing.
And that's my comment.
And I don't THH REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
4 143 i
1 have a question.
Thank you.
2 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you very much.
j 3
DAVE HULBERT:
I'm Dave Hulbert.
Thanks for the l
4 opportunity to speak.
i 5
There is a perception that Maine Yankee is a dying i
6 giant.
Now that there is blood in the water, a feeding i
l 7
frenzy has started.
This is paranoia and just plain t
j 8
wrong.
People need to realize that Maine Yankee is i
l 9
continually improving.
10 In the very same reports the media has portrayed as i
l 11 negative, there are also many strengths.
Nothing as i
12 complex as nuclear power is simple.
It's not simple to j-13 run and it's not simple to explain.
14 I've been at Maine Yankee for 15 years, and there 15 is no way I can turn around and fit that knowledge into 16 a 10-second sound bite.
All that experience and 17 training is necessary to understand our industry.
And 18 yet, we're asked to do just that, expla'n 1; o you in 19 10 seconds on the evening news.
It just can't be done.
20 So, instead you have to trust us.
We know that's a lot 21 to ask.
22 What the public wants to know is why is that a 23 reasonable thing to do.
This is why.
Maine Yankee is 24 continually audited.
First we do a self-assessment; 25 second, we are assessed by the quality assurance THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
_. _ _ - ~
144 1
]
1 department; third, by Yankee Atomic; fourth, the 2
Institute of Nuclear Power Operators, an organization 1
3 that comes in; fifth, the State of Maine; sixth, FEMA; finally, the NRC.
And I'm sure the list is not 4
5 complete.
We undergo continual scrutiny.
6 All of this is for the purpose of learning how to j
7 improve.
We study mistakes in the industry to improve; 8
to look at a why a piece of equipment failed to improve; i
9 j
we spend a great deal of effort on training to improve.
10 Operators alone spend one week out of every six to j
11 improve.
12 The ISA has found some areas in which we can i
13 improve.
You can believe we will.
We're committed to 14 improving.
15 Historically, we've operated this plant safely. Our 16 SALP reports have been very good.
SALP is an just an 17 acronym for self-assessment licensing performance.
It's Forchmark that the NRC uses to gauge plants by.
For 18 a
19 example, we've received a SALP 1 in operations the past 20 nine years.
That's the best rating you can get and very 21 difficult to hold.
22 So what do you have to reassure you?
There's the 23 constant assessment of performance, historical 24 performance, and finally the people who work at Maine 25 Yankee.
And this is who I am.
I'm part of the team THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
1 145 1
that works in the control room.
And at 2 a.m.,
if 2
something goes wrong, I have to deal with it.
I'm the 3
one that's accountable.
4 So, I have a great deal of interest in computer 5
codes that tell if the emergency core coolant pump is 6
going to do its job or not, how the maintenance was 7
done, whether it's done correctly.
I'm the one left 8
holding the cards if they go wrong.
9 As I look around this room tonight, I see many i
10 people that are my colleagues, and I can tell you these 11 people are professionals.
And what that means to me is 12 they have skill, and just as important, a conscience.
13 And they're motivated to do the right thing.
14 Outside of work, these people are your neighbors, 15 they volunteer in your community, and their kids go to 16 school with your kids.
You'd better believe they have a 17 great stake in the safety of Maine Yankee, and they 18 don't take that trust lightly.
19 And I have one question.
Could you explain 20 barriers that are in place to do -- to dispel the notion 21 that the NRC is in bed with the industry?
22 Thank you.
23 MR. JORDAN:
Well, it's certain from the industry 24 viewpoint that the NRC is not in bed with the industry.
25 From the public's view, I think there certainly is a THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
i 146 1
perception, and that's why in this case an independent 2
assessment was done, to assure the public.
3 I mentioned something earlier about the -- a 4
reexamination, a strategic assessment of the NRC itself.
5 Chairman Jackson started that a little over a year ago, 6
and we've recently published a set of directions setting 7
issues that some of you may wish to read off of the 8
Internet.
And there were stakeholder meetings around 9
the country to be held to discuss these.
And certainly, 10 part of that is to assure that the agency, the NRC, is 11 in fact being an objective regulator, is providing the 12 credibility to the public that it demands.
13 The public is our customer, not the utility.
And 14 so, there is a very strong effort on the part of the I
15 Chairman to make sure that we are an effective i
16 regulator.
We're doing a a great deal of lessons 17 learned out of the Millstone plant, and, in fact, Maine 18 Yankee =^ti'/ities.
There will be a Commissior. =ccting 19 October 18th, I mentioned.
A part of that will be to 20 discuss the lesson the NRC learned from this review and 21 the way we do our business.
22 So we are highly introspective.
And I hope at our 23 next meeting you'll feel a little better about the 24 regulator side of us.
25 Next is Bill Thompson.
And we're down to about THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
147 1
five, I believe.
It's a few minutes after 10, but we 2
will clearly finish.
4 3
BILL THOMPSON:
I would like to address the element i
4 of risk, which I think we've all heard tonight.
There 5
is risk; and I think a good example of ignoring risk is 4
6 the steamship Titanic.
7 I would like to see evacuation signs posted so that 1
8 if we have to leave we know how to do it without 9
creating hopeless traffic jams.
The disaster of the 10 Titanic would not have been so serious if they had known 11 how to use the lifeboats and they had gotten in the 12 lifeboats.
For us, the evacuation r@ates are the 13 lifeboats.
14 I would also like to ask, had the whistleblower not 15 blown the whistle, would you be comfortable with the 16 operation of the plant, not knowing what you know now?
17 MR. JORDAN:
With respect to the latter question, 18 it's sort of rhetorical.
The NRC is quite uncomfortable 19 with the idea that it is a -- that our normal program 20 does not find these kinds of issues.
And so, thht's why 21 I was saying that we're dealing with lessons learned so 22 that the program is changed and is more effecti m in 23 identifying these kinds of issues.
24 We learned, for instance, that the idea of 25 reviewing codes, previous work, is a feature of the THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
148 1
NRC's programs that we're going to reexamine, reopen.
2 The idea of looking at the current licensing basis is a 3
matter that -- in fact, today a letter was transmitted 4
to the CEOs of every utility from Jim Taylor, the 5
Executive Director for Operations, requesting each 6
facility to advise the NRC what they're doing and what i
7 they plan to do in reconstituting the design basis for 8
each plant.
9 This is the documentation that, in the case of 10 Maine Yankee, there were failures, flaws, errors in the i
11 documentation that, in fact, affect the conservative 12 operation, and it would affect subsequent modifications, 13 I would way, very definitely.
14 With respect to the evacuation routes, I heard your 15 comment.
That a different issue outside of this 16 subject.
17 Next is Chapin.
18 CHONTEAU CHAPIN:
I have no expertise whatsoever.
19 I have no expertise whatsoever.
I really can't pose a 20 proper question.
I want, however, to say I'm very glad 21 that I survived this, and I think we should all be in 22 bed.
23 (Laughter.)
24 MR. JORDAN:
That was my favorite comment of the
- 2. 5 evening.
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
-. - ~
149 1
Nancy Bryant?
2 (No response.)
3 Nancy Hall?
4 j
4 (No response.)
5 MR. JORDAN:
The last name, Jonathan McKane.
6 (No response.)
7 I would like to thank this group for being a very 4
8 patient, very tolerant set of people.
You've been 9
extraordinarily courteous and kind to us.
So we thank 10 you very much.
I 11 This meeting is closed.
12 (The proceedings concluded at 10:12 p.m.)
13 14 CERTIFICATE i
}
15 I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true-and 16 correct transcription of my stenographic notes taken es!
17 the afore-captioned matter.
18 19 Harold M. Hagoppn' RegisteredDiplo{mateReporter 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
101 1
24-year old plant, and a lot of equipment probably could 2
use upgrading.
And the steam generators, during the 3
next recycling, will be looked at very critically.
And 4
I guess there's a question with a 24-year old steam 5
generators what the future life is.
6 MR. MILLER:
I think Mr. Frizzle's answer -- his 7
statement at the end is the right one, and that is that 8
the plant has to be safe.
If it cannot be operated 9
safely -- they have to make the decision, but it needs 1
10 to stop operating if it's not safe.
And that's the 11 company's decision, that's not ours.
It's our job to 12 make sure they meet the requirements.
1 13 MR. JORDAN:
Okay.
Next is H.
G.
Braib?
And I may 14 have mispronounced the last name agair..
I'm sorry about 15 this.
16 And next will be James Mallon and then Ray Shadis.
17 H.
G.
BRACK:
Yes.
My name is H.
G.
Brack.
18 MR. JORDAN:
Mr. Brack.
I'm sorry.
19 MR. BRACK:
And I live on Mount Desert Island.
And 20 I'd just like to say thanks to the Governor's office for 21 providing a Quickcard copy of this report yesterday, and 22 also electronic copies.
I guess there's no one here 23 from the office except Uldis.
24 Anyway, I think this Safety Assessment Report 25 provides a very timely distraction from the ongoing THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
102 1
criminal investigation of the power operating scam, and 2
I realize that's off-limits for the discussion tonight.
3 But I think that, after reading the report just 4
last night and today, there are a lot interesting key 5
words here that are very ominous key words to me, as an 6
outsider here:
shortage of resources, dec]ining trend 7
in material conditions, poor surveillance procedures and 8
evaluations, longstanding design defici6ncies, 9
previously undiscovered deficient conditions.
1 10 I think it's very interesting that most of you 11 people here in the room today put a pretty positive spin 12 on this report.
I don't share your optimism as far as 13 what's in the future here.
i 14 And I think I have one quick question here relating 15 to the Maine Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which 16 I have reviewed for RADNET.
I'm the editor of RADNET, 17 nuclear information on the Internet, and we'll be 18 posting a review of this report next week.
19 And in the the Maine Radiological Emergency 20 Response Plan -- and we are talking about safety 21 assessment tonight -- I find it interesting that the 22 action level, the emergency action level for you 23 authorized persons in a nuclear accident who would be in 24 an emergency operation center in Brunswick or several of 25 the other county centers, your action -- your THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
103 4
d 1
protection -- what's called the protection action 2
guideline, is contamination, bodily contamination of 300 3
counts per minute above background.
And that's all fine 4
and dandy.
i.
5 But then, when we take a look at the radiological 6
response plan, the Emergency Protection Action i
7 Guidelines for citizens who are not authorized persons 8
in the emergency operations centers, and we see that 9
they're -- we have a more nuclide-specific guideline for 1
10 the daily intake of the radiocesium 134 and 137 by 50 i
j j
11 microcuries per day.
And in case that sounds like less 12 than 300 counts per minute, if we translate microcuries 13 to counts per minute, we have the startling revelation 14 here that the Emergency Protection Action Guideline for 15 adults and pregnant women, teenagers, my kids, and many 16 of the children who live in Wiscasset, is actually 333 17 million counts per minute for your daily intake of 18 radiocesium.
19 This is a radical difference from the FDA 20 protection action guidelines after the Chernobyl 21 accident of 10,000 picocuries per kilogram, which is 22 22,000 counts per minute per kilogram.
23 And I just think this is symbolic of the reason why 24 a lot of people don't have too much confidence in Maine 25 Yankee or in the situation here, with the various safety I
THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell l
104 1
a i
quotions that arise out of the ongoing degradation of 4
I 2
your aging equipment.
l 3
And I'd just like to get a comment from one of you 4
about why would there be such a discrepancy for you 3
5 fellows in the emergency operations centers?
The 6
Emergency Action Guideline for your contamination is 300 7
pounds per minute, but information people who are l
8 experiencing a nuclear accident who live outside of i
9 the -- who live in the area, who are not authorized i
10 persons, you have this radically different Emergoncy i
l 11 Protection Action Guideline, which was published by the k
12 FDA in the Federal Register., and it's a component of 1
13 your Maine Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which I 4
14 might note is a restricted document, and FEMA was kind 15 enough to give me a copy to review for RADNET?
1 16 Any comment on that discrepancy?
1 17 MR. JORDAN:
No, I'n sorry, I do not.
j 18
'iR. BRACK:
Are you familiar with the Radiological 19 Emergency Protection Guidelines?
20 MR. JORDAN:
Quite.
21 MR. BRACK:
Okay.
You know about the 150 22 microcuries --
23 MR. JORDAN:
One of my responsibilities is managing 24 the agency's Radiological Response Program.
And so I 25 run the NRC Operations Center in Washington and interact THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell
105 I
1 with FEMA on their guidelines; but I do not -- I do not 2
know what the basis for the discrepancy is.
You've 3
described it.
It will be in the transcript, and we'll 4
look into it and let you know.
5 MR. BRACK:
It's just one of the many things that 6
I've run across as I've worked on Maine Yankee issues 7
over a period of 25 years.
I've also published a number 8
of books; bibliographies, primarily, with very boring 9
annotations.
And I find this extremely disturbing.
10 And I also find it disturbing, I think, the 11 attitude of many people here in the room that I'm from j
i 12 away and what happens in Wiscasset is essentially none 13 of my business.
But, in fact, you make it my business, 14 because for every $20 that we spend on your electricity 15 we generate a curie of high-level waste that will have 16 to be funded by persons other than you who benefit from 17 this scam.
18 And if we look in the future, with the deraen1-tion 19 of energy production, it's going to be very difficult to 20 collect the waste disposal funding from the out-of-stace 21 vendors.
And, in fact, that effectively brings dos.n the 22 production of high-level waste to really $10 of 23 electricity purchased will produce a curie of high-level 24 waste here that we then have to dispose of at a later 25 date.
l THE REPORTING GROUP / Mason Lockhart Hagopian & Ramsdell