ML20197K085
| ML20197K085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1985 |
| From: | Mcdonald D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Harold Denton NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197K090 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-729 NUDOCS 8508050312 | |
| Download: ML20197K085 (20) | |
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UNITED STATES g
i! 8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,j :;; p wasMNGTON, D. C. 20555 July 25,1985 t
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Docket Nos. 50-250
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,; and 50-251 R. Bernero MEMORANDUM FOR: H. Denton
. D. Eisenhut J. Knight i G. Edison W. Russell
., H. Thompson B. Snyder
- F. Miraglia T. Speis G. Lainas / 'A."Holaha~n'~
D. Crutchfield D. Vassallo I T. Novak .J. Miller
- . J. Stolz
'f _. THRU: . Steven A. Varga, Chief -
~
,. Operating Reactors Branch #1 L -
Division of Licensing b FROM: Daniel G. Mcdonald, Project Manager l . Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
DAILY HIGHLIGHT - TURKEY OINT UNITS 3 & 4 . ~
,. PART 21 NOTIFICATION RELA TO MAIN S ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE TIME i"
. In accordance with 10 CFR 21, Florida Power and Light Company notified the NRC by telephone of a design deficiency relating to Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). Turkey Point Plant uses
, MSIVs in conjunction with Main Steam Check Valves to Isolate the steam generators from the steam header. The MSIVs have a trip feature designed ii to prevent steam flow from the steam generator to the header. The criteria !
- I for the trip feature, identified in FSAR Section 14.2.5, is that the MSIVs close in less than 5 seconds under no steam flow conditions.
A partial travel spring and any steam flow will assist in closing the MSIVs. Operating air for the MSIV is stored in accumulators mounted on the
, valve assemblies and backed up by the Instrument Air System. The Instrument i Air System is neither safety related nor seismically qualified. Tests-perfonned by the licensee indicates that MSIV closure is not assured if instrument air is unavailable and no steam or low steam flow exists. I
- The MSIVs are taken credit for the following accidents. )
- Loss of' Coolant Accident }
- Steam Generator Tube Rupture ;
i - Main Steam Line Break The licensee has perfonned evaluations for the accidents identified above 4
assuming the MSIVs do not close and concluded the results would be i acceptable for the first two. However, for the Main Steam Line Break i downstream of the MSIV, a continued blowdown of the secondary system could ,
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July 25, 1985 f
I result under certain conditions. The steam pressure for the three
! safety-related steam driven auxiliary feedwater pumps would eventually be
} lost; thus, resulting in the loss of the secondary system's capability to remove decay heat and control plant conditions during and after the i accident. These circumstances would place the plant in an unanalyzed i condition. The licensee has detemined this is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21.
It should be noted that the Turkey Point site has two 100% capacity nonsafety-related auxiliary feedwater pumps and the capability to supply
. steam to the three shared safety-related steam driven pumps from either Unit 3. Unit 4. or the fossil units. The licensee has implemented the following compensatory measures until modifications are implemented which L.- will assure the closure times assumed in the accident analysis are valid. "
l . The compensatory measures are:
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Backup diesel air compressor available
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Cross ties ter the fossil units service air j ,
Procedures requiring plant shutdown on loss of plant air The licensee will provide a followup written submittal. The staff is ,
assessing the information provided and possible generic- implications.
Y '
Daniel G. Mcdonald, Project nager Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Licensing
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g FPL-JHL 628 P.82 JUL 24 '85 11:39 set ,
. BACKGROUND
. Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 use Main Steam Isolation Valves (M$1V) in conjunction :
with Mala 5 team check Valves to taolate the steam generators from the steam l header. The M5tV has's trip feature designed to prevent steam flow from the steam )
generator to the header. The criteria for the trip feature, identified in PSAR Section ;
I4.2.5, is that the M51V close in less than 5 seconds under no steam flow conditions. ;
i Closura is initiated by any of the following signals:
- 1. high containment pressure in coincidence with high-hlgh containment pressure,
- 2. high steam flow in coincidence with either low RC5 av,e rage temperature or Jew steam line pressure, or
- 5. manually (from the controlroom).
i The M5!Y is a dwck valve Installed in a reverse direction. Under normal operattort, l
the M51V is held open (against steam flow) by air pressure acting on the bottom of the !
operating piston. On a trip signal, air is directed to the top of the piston while air is l i
vented, from the bottom. A partial travel spelng and steam flow assist in valve closure. Operating air for the M51V is stored in accumulators mounted on the valve j assembly and backed up by the Instrument Air System. The Instrument Air System is neither safety related nor selsmically quellfled.
Testing (TOP 108, 11/3/84) Indicates that MSIY closure is not assured under zero steam flow when instrument air is isolated. Under these conditions, accumulator air volume is not sufficient and steam flow above an undetermined " threshold" must be available to assure valve closure. Previously, testing of the M5!Y (without steam flow) was performed with the Instrument air lined up and M5tV closure in 5 second
- was obtained.
By design, M5!V closure is assisted by atsam flow since it was Intended to mitigate the consequences of a large steam line besak. However there are other events (e.g.,
LOCA, tube rupture, steam system breaks) for which Ad5!V closure is required where large steam flows may not exist. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if the inability to assure valve closure below the threshold steam flow is a Substantial Safety Hazard (5SH).
EVALUATION A " Substantial Safety Hazard" (55H) rasna a loss of safety function to the extent that there is a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to pub!!c health and safety (10 CPR 21.3(k)). The reference to protection ap?lles "only" to radiologicalhealth and safety (NUREG-0302, Rev.1, July 1977 at p. 2,.1-4). Criteria '
that are appropriate for determination of creation of a Substantial Safety Hazard include (42 PR 28491.6/77):
o Moderate exposure to or release of lleensed material.
l l o Major degradation of essential safety.celated equipment.
I o Major deficiencies involvtry; design, construction, inspection, test or use of
! licensed facilities or materia.
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3PE.gs-26 Page 4 of 7 l
' Rev.0
v I JUL 24 '95 11:4e 001 FPL-JNL Sas P.03 .
These criteria mean (NUREG-0302 at pp. p4 at 3):
- " Moderate % sea 1s.an exposure in excess of 25 rem wtale body, or an i exposure to an Individual in an unrestrleted area of 0.3 rem.
- " Major Degradation" is a loss of redundancy, if, in conjunetton with a single failure, a required safety function could not be performed.
" Major Deficiency" is a condition or dreumstance which under , normal operating I
conditions or anticipated transient couM contribute to exceedirt a safety limit or cause an accident, or in the event of an accident due to etser causes could, considering an independent single failure, result in . loss of safety function necessary to mitigate the consequences of the accident.
The M5!Y deficiency involves the inability to automatically or remote manually close the MSIV's during periods when main steam flow is less than the threshold. Thus, the SSH criterion applicable involve the potential loss of a safety function. l l
The M51Y is taken credit for performing a safety function in the following accident I conditions: Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA): Steam Generator Tube Ruptures and, !
Main 5 team Line Break (M5LB). An evaluation of the M51V for performing its safety i
, function during these conditions la presented below.
j o Loss of Coolant AccM .; l j
Por the LOCA, containment atmosphere la separated from cutside atmosphere by l two barriers In series: these are the M51V and the closed secondary system inside !
containment. If the M51V's do not close, the remaining barrier is the closed '
secondary system. Fallure of this barrier involves a passive failure. :
Footnote 2 to the 10 CPR 30 Appendix A definition of " Single Failure" indicates that passive failures are appilcable only to electrical components. The ;
Commission Indicated that certain considerations "...have not as yet been suffielently developed and unifo1mly applied in the licensing process to warrant
' f their inclusion in the criteria (C, eneral Design Criterla] at this time..." These l
' Include considerations of the "...need to deslan against single failures of passive l components in fluid system..."(36 FR 3233 2/11).
y i
Since passive fa!!ure of the secondary system is not a design celterle for the !
- LOCA, the deficiency does not result in the loss of both fission product barriers. l Accordingly, the safety function la maintained even if the M51V's are assumed to remain open during this accident.
(
From a mechanistic standpoint, with main steam flow below the threshold at the i
time of the 1.OCA, the steam generators are expected to remain at a pressure
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, greater than that of the containment during the contain.nents' !
pressure / temperature translent. This is due to the large amount of energy stored t i
m the steam generator steel and water. Additionally, the steam generator liquid j
- level would be maintained above the top of the tube bundle. Thus, the pressure i
and wa'ter seal provide an effective barrier to fission product release caused by normal tube leakage.
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l 3PE-33-26 I l Pqe 5 d 7 '
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Rev.O
, [UL24'83 ris41 Cet FPL- M.t es P.84 , 4 i .
I o 5 team Gowrator Tube paturg in the steam generator tube mpture accident the M5tV is used for two safety functions: a) to minimize the release of radioactive material to the environre.ent, and b) to prevent cont!nued loss of reactor coolant inventory-outside of containment.
to less than 1100During!gps prior to isolating the faulted steam generator (abou minutes). '
l If the MStV falls to close upon demand during a tube rupture event, the redundant l means of Isolation are effected to mitigate the sccident (f.e., shut downstream i valves). If an active failure of a redusd'ant valve occurs, Isolation of the faulted generator is still achievable by additlenal downstream valves. The worst case failure would be failure to close a non-faulted steam generator reverse Bow check valve. In this event, two steam generators would at RCS pressure and one steam generator would be used to remove decay t. The atmospheric dump _.
i valve on the unaffected steam steam flew (3.3Wof the total) generator la sized for 10% of full steam generator i and the safetles are sized for more than 100% of 1 that generator steam flow. The steam dump valve and safety valves are capable j l
j of removing sufficient decay heat post accident to control and cool down the unit.
This failure would be difficult to detect, but could be noticed by small differences In generator pressures,. abnormal activity in more than one generator or low APW flow to maintain level once recognl ed, the generator with the faulty check valve would be isolated. Therefore the safety functions of heat removal and
.. mlnlmizing radioactive release can be, performed for. this accident.
l o Ruoture of a 5 team Plos !
i, During the design basis main steam line break accident there is a slanificant l I -
amount of ste_am flow through the MSIV to as11st in closure. Under this condition, MSN 4300Lin 5 seconds is exptcied regardless of operating _ air availability. .
From a practical standpoint, longer M5tV closure times may be acceptable for reduced flows resultlng from smaller break sizes. However, since analyses for smaller break sizes have not been performed, the PSAR Infers the 3 second closure criterlon applies to low steam flow conditions as well as the M5LB condittor6 There is a threshold flow below which M51V_ closure is not _ assured when -
l Instrument air _ ls iso _Isted. This threshold is not known quantitatively. It is assumed for this evaluation that the ihreshold flow is In excess of the auxillary feedwater system flow' capability. If an umcontrolled steam flow of this 1 J magnitude were to occur and the MSIV's did not shut, a continued blowdown of the socondary system could result. Por this case, steam pressure for continued l l
auxillary feedwater pump turbine operation would eventually be lost. This results l In the loss of secondary system capability to remove decay heat, l i
Since the heat sink of the secondary system is necessary to achieve and maintain I safe shutdown conditions after a main steam line break, any loss of this capability j
could jeopardize the ability to control plant conditions during and after this accident. This places the plant In an unanalyzed condition since the steam generator of with APW flow la the only available heat removal sys, tem until the point RHRentry.
3PE-35-26 i Page 6 of 7 :
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$$H Conclusion T!w loss of capablilty of the M5tV's during an uncontrolled steam release could be i postulateo so resun m the blowdown of all three steam _ generators. Since the secondary heat sink is the only analyzed meanal heat removal until entry into shutdown cooling, a loss of this espability comprom ses the ab111ty to-adequately ;
' remove decay heat from the plant. !
i Accordingly, the MSIV deficiency could result in a potential loss of safety function i i and is thus a major degradation in the system. This constitutes a Substantial Safety l L
Hazard that is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21.
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Justification for Continued Operation l
Until modifications are completed to assure MSIV closure regardless of steam flow,
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continued plant operation is Justified for the following reason. Instrument air is l availabhshut the M5!V's in the event _steamilow_laLnot suffielent. Presently the- l plant has placed restrictions (ONOP 1560L1) on the availabpity of .'astrument air. i Should the aiuoply of W ha lost, plant shutdown is reautred. In the event the ~ normal !
plant's instrument air compressors are not sufficient, the procedure requires starting a diesel airmrejeor to provide the required supply. Cresejles to the fossil plant i service air are also ava11able to provide an additional source of air. These actions .
. : ..enture a continuous supply of instrument alr is available to operate the MSIV's at all times during plant operaf kn. Thus, continued operation of the Turkey Point Nuclear units is justlfled until permanent modifications to correct the noted deficiencies are
. In place.
Recommended Corrective Action it is recommended that design modifleations be implemented on an ' expedited basis that wl!! assure MSIV closure in 5 seconds without steam flow assistance. (Note:
This design activity would also resolve the !$1 deficiency identified in Inspection Report 85-05 in that fa!! safe testing can be accomplished.)
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3PE-g5-26 Page 7 of 7 Rev.0 4
'~WP D15C#/TP0001/3PE-L.85 26/0645/EN
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s OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (NO, 85-13)
AUGUST 13, 1985 TURKEY POINT - 3/4 -
UNIT 3 POST-TRIP LOSS OF AFW MSIV DESIGN DEFICIENCY INVERTER FAILURES FOREIGN REACTOR EVENT -
LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER WITH PARTIAL LOSS OF AFW
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SALEM-2 -
RX TRIP, AFW, STEAM PROBLEMS
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MAINE YANKEE -
COMMON-MODE PROBLEM WITH STEAM
, GENERATOR PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION OCONEE'- 1 -
REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS SLOW RESPONSE CALVERT-CLIFFS -
REACTOR TRIP BREAKER PROBLEM POINT BEACH.- 1/2 -
SAFETY INJECTION PUMP MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION DESIGN DEFICIENCY
, OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST
^ ROBINSON, HATCH CALVERT CLIFFS ,- MSIV PROBLEMS OYSTER CREEK -
DEGRADATION OF EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM BRUNSWICK - 1 -
PEACTOR BUILDING FLOODING ST. LUCIE - 2 -
REACTOR TRIP /SIAS -
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VERMONT YANKEE -
RADIATION EXPOSURE F/9
TURKEY POINT 3 POST-TRIP LOSS OF AFW
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qua y,zy, ger 40GLv. o, m85 (J. B. HENDERSON, IE)
PROBLEM:
ALL THREE TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMPS BECAME INOPERABLE DURING POST-TRIP REC 0VERY PERIOD. --
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE - IMPAIRMENT OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS TWO TURBINES TRIPPED TO LOCK OUT ON MECHANICAL OVERSPEE TRIP.- FLOW CONTROL VALVE ON THIRD UNIT FAILED. '
DECAY HEAT REMOVED WITH MFW ON BYPASS THROUGHOUT EVENTl 1
LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTION -
l 1.
RETRAINING ON TURBINE GOVERNOR RESET.
2.
PERFORM OVERDUE MAINTENANCE ON AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM TO '
VALVE GENERIC IMPLICATIONS '
OVERSPEED TRIP PROBLEM MAY BE GENERIC TO A SIZEABLE Ci 0F TURBINES -
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DIFFICULTY IN RESETTING TURBINES IS POTENTIAL GENERIC IS 1 ,
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TURKEY POINT PLANT - 10 CFR 21 NOTIFICATION -
MS1V DESIGN DEFICIENCY JULY 23, 1985 (H. BAILEY) .
PLANT STATUS UNIT 4 AT POWER, UNIT 3 STARTUP FROM -100 DAY REFUELING DEFICIENCY
'-- INADEQUATE STORED CLASS I AIR SUPPLY TO CLOSE MSIVs AT LOW OR NO STEAM FLOW
- RE-EVALUATED ACCIDENTS MSIVs TAKEN CREDIT FOR MSLB COULD RESULT IN CONTINUED BLOWDOWN AND MOTIVE POWER FOR STEAM DRIVEN AUX FEED PUMPS IDENTIFICATION AND NOTIFICATION FPL IDENTIFIED AS POTENTIAL PROBLEM 11/84 REGION INFORMED OF POTENTIAL PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND TESTS PERFORMED PART 21 NOTIFICATION BY TELEPHONE 7/23/85 WRITTEN 7/29/85 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i' * }
- PROCEDURES REQUIRING PLANT SHUTDOWN ON LO
- BACKUP DIESEL DRIVEN AIR COMPRESSOR AVAILABLE DESIGN MODIFICATION GENERIC IMPLICATIONS ,
5 FOUR PLANTS POTENTIALLY AFFECTED HAVE BEEN '
TURKEY POINT ST. LUCIE ROBINSON CONN. YANKEE NRC FOLLOWUP ,
i
- VERIFY DESIGN MODIFICATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION POTENTIAL FOR INFORMATION NOTICE - DISCONNECT
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OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS BRIEFING (85-16)
~
SEPTEMBER 16, 1985 DAVIS-BESSE STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURIZATION
"- V. C. SUMMER INSTRUMENT AIR PRESSURE REDUCTION PALO VERDE UNIT 1 REACTOR TRIP,. SAFETY INJECTION, LOSS OF PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY SYSTEM -
I
- TURKEY POINT OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION OF l AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM BY IE TURKEY POINT TURBINE RUNBACK LOGIC MODIFICATION 1
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l TURKEY POINT - OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION OF I
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM BY IE AUGUST 26 - SEPTEMBER 13, 1985 (J. CALLAN, IE)
PROBLEM - INSPECTION IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT TRAINING, PROCEDURAL, TESTING, MAINTENANCE, AND DESIGN CHANGE PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE AFW SYSTEM
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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE t
DEGRADED OPERATOR ABILITY TO ISOLATE STEAM FROM THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR IN THE EVENT OF A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK
~- -
DEGRADED AFW ORERATION DUE TO LOSS OF BACKUP N
2 SUPPLY TO AIR-OPERATED AFW FLOW CONTROL VALVES POTENTIAL FOR DEGRADATION OF OTHER SAFETY SYSTEMS DUE TO SIGNIFICANT PROGRAMMATIC WEAKNESSES IN MAINTENANCE, DESIGN CHANGE / MODIFICATION PROGRAM, AND POST-MAINTENANCE / MODIFICATION TESTING DEGRADED AFW OPERATION IN THE EVENT OF A TWO-UNIT TRIP DISCUSSION DESIGN CHANGE PROCESS WEAK. LACK OF DESIGN DOCUMENTS, SUPERFICIAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS, POOR POST-MODIFICATION TESTING umn
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MAINTENANCE PROGRAM WEAK; HIGH TURNOVER, LACK OF i
DETAIL IN PROCEDURES, LACK OF TRAINING, AND NEAK 1 MANAGEMENT CONTROLS OPERATOR TRAINING AND E0PS DID NOT RECOGNIZE'THAT STEAM TO AFW PUMP TURBINES COULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM CONTROL ROOM IN THE EVENT OF A STEAM
[- GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 0PERATOR TRAINING AND E0PS PROVIDED MISLEADING '
AND INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ENSURE ADEQUACY OF N
[
2 SUPPLY TO AFW FCVS !
No BACKUP SYSTEM HAD NEVER BEEN ADEQUATELY TESTED i I
i FOLLOWUP !
t L
r LICENSEE COMMITTED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE i ACTION FOR MOST TRAINING AND PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS h AFFECTING AFW '
IE, REGION 11, AND NRR ARE IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE-i .
LONG-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i r
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Reportable Event Number 01531 Unevaluated Information Facility : TURKEY POINT Date Notified : 07/22/85 Unit : 3 Time Notified : 04:15 Region : 2 Date of Event : 07/22/05 Vendor : *, WEST, WEST Time of Event : 00:40 Operations Officer : Dill Jones Cl assi f i cati on : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified By : RON CONROY Category 1 : ESF Actuation Rad Release : No Category 2 : l Cause : Mechanical Failure Category 3 :
Component : BYPASS REG VLV Category 4 : ,
I UNIT IN HOT S/D, FOLLOWING RX TRIP (SEE EVENT #1529), GOT AUTO START OF ALL 3 (A, B, & C) AUX FD PMPS DUE TO LO LO LVL IN S/G #3B. LO LO LVL ( 15*/. ) WAS ]
CAUSED DUE TO FAILURE OF NORMAL FEED TRAIN BYPASS VLV TO OPEN WHEN CALLED TO DD SO BY OPERATOR. THERE ARE 3 STEAM DRIVEN PMPS. ALL 3 STARTED BUT 2 OF THE PMPS (A & C WHICH FEED "A" TRAIN) TRIPPED ON MECHANICAL OVERSPEED. B PMP '
(WHICH FEEDS "D" TRAIN) WORKED CORRECTLY AND SUPPLIED THE S/GS AND THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH HEAT SINK. WITH IN 1 HR, THE A & C AUX FEED PMPS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUCCESSFULLY TESTED AND CONSIDERED OPERABLE. IN FACT, ALL PMPS WORKED CORRECTLY WHEN CALLED UPON IN EVENT #1532 (NEXT EVENT).
- NOTIFIED REG 2(VERRELLI).
1 FAi
Reportable Event Number 01532 Unevaluated Information Facility : TURKEY POINT Date Notified : 07/22/S5 Unit : 3 Time Notified : 04:15 Region : 2 Date of Event : 07/22/S5 Vendor : *, WEST, WEST Time of Event : 04:05 Operations Officer : Bill Jones Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified By : RON CONROY Category 1 : ESF Actuation Rad Release : No Category 2 :
Cause : Mechanical Failure Category 3 :
Component : BYPASS REG VLV Category 4 :
IN HOT S/D, AFTER TRIP (EVENT i41529), GOT AUX FEED PMP AUTO START DUE TO MAIN FD PMP TRIP DUE TO HI LVL IN 3C S/G. THE HI LVL WAS CAUSED DUE TO LEAKING OF FEEDWATER BYPA99 RJGULATING VLV WHICH WAS 2LOSED. OPERATOR ACTION WAS TAKEN DUT WAS NOT IN LIME TO STOP LVL INCREASE. IN THIS EVENT, ALL 3 AUX FD PMPS SUCCESSFULLY STARTED AND RAN. PLNT IS STILL ANALYZING TRIP TO FIND CAUSE DEFORE ANY ADD'L PLANS ARE MADE TO RESTART.
- NOTIFIED REG 3(VERRELLI)
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Reportable Event Number 01534 Unevaluated Information Facility : TURKEY POINT Date Notified : 07/22/85 Unit : 3 Time Notified : 06:04 Region : 2 Date of Event : 07/22/85 Vendor : *, WEST, WEST Time of Event : 04:40 Operations Of ficer : Bill Jones Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified By : RON CONROY Category 1 : .LCO Action Statement Rad Release : No Category 2 :
Cause : Mechanical Failure Category 3 :
Component : FLOW CNTL VLV Category 4 :
PLNT COOL DOWN REQUIRED FROM HOT S/D TO COLD S/D DUE TO REQUIRED REPAIR OF TRAIN 2 AUX FD FLOW CNTL VLV TO S/G 3C. VLV DID NOT CLOSE ALL THE WAY PREVIOUSLY WHEN CALLED UPON TO DO SO. THIS ACTION REMOVES 1 TRAIN OF AUX FD FROM SERVICE TO S/G 3C. THIS REQUIRES COOLDOWN. PLAN IS TO BE LESS THAN 350F DY 1040 AM 7/22. NRC RI INFORMED.
- NOTIFIED REG 2(VERRELLI).
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Reportable Event Number 01555 Unevaluated Information Fecility : TURKEY POINT Date Notified : 07/23/85 ,
Unit : 3,4 Time Notified : 12:56 i Region : 2 Date of Event : 07/23/S5 Vendor : *, WEST, WEST Time of Event : 12:00 Operations Officer : William Burton Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified By : SHIFT SUPERVISOR Category 1 : INABILITY TO REMOVE Rad Release : No Category 2 : DECAY HEAT Cause : INADEDUATE DESIGN Category 3 :
Component : Category 4 :
WITH UNIT 3 IN HOT STANDDY AND UNIT 4 AT 1 0 0*/. P O W L M , THE LICENSEE'S ENGINEERING DEPT. FOUND AN UNANALYZED CONDITION TilAT MAY SIGNIFICANTLY COMPROMISE PLANT SAFETY. CURINO LOW STEAM LINE FLOW CONDI'!IGN5, IF INSTRUMENT AIR (IA) IS LOST, THE MSIV'S WON'T CLOSE. THIS COULD RESULT IN TiiE INABILITY ;
TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT AND PROPERLY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT DURING A STEAM LINE )
DREAK DOWNSTREAM OF THE MSIV'S. THE LICENSEE HAS CHANGED IT'S IA SYSTCM PROCEEDURES TO RESTRICT IA USE, INSTALLED A BACKUP DIESEL AIR COMPRESSOR, AND INSTALLED A SERVICE AIR CONNECTION FROM THE FOSSIL PLANTS. THIS WILL REMAIN ,
UNTIL THE MSIV DESIGN CAN DE UPGRADED. R2 INFORMED. FP l 0000 l I
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