ML20197G968
| ML20197G968 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1984 |
| From: | LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197G965 | List: |
| References | |
| TG-OP-902-008, TG-OP-902-8, W3101400, NUDOCS 8406180231 | |
| Download: ML20197G968 (102) | |
Text
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 1.
E notified that electrical power is available to Startup Trans-formers AND Emergency Diesel Generators A AND B are NOT avail-able, THEN restore electrical power with the Startup Trans' arm-ers.
Refer to OP-6-001, PLANT DISTRIBUTION (7KV, 4KV, and SSD)
SYSTEMS, Section 6.1.
Objective:
1 The objective of this step to restore electrical distribution to a normal
([
lineup.
a Basis:
The preferred method of providing vital auxiliaries is from offsite power through the startup transformers.
This step ensures offsite power is restored properly to the plant from a station blackout condition.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Steo Content:
t NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA i
8406100231 840613 PDR ADOCK 05000382 A
PDR 11 W3101400
t TG-GP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries g
Success Path I-1 1
E0P Step Content:
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Step 2.
E notified that electrical power is available to Startup Transformers AND Emergency Diesel Generators A AND B are operating, THEN restore electrical power to normal distribution l
lineup.
Refer to OP-6-001, PLANT DISTRIBUTION (7KV, 4KV, and SSD) SYSTEMS, Section 6.6.3.
Objective:
)
The objective of this step is to restore electrical distribution to a j
normal lineup.
Basis:
The preferred method of providing vital auxiliaries is from offsite power through the startup transformers.
This step ensures offsite power is i
restored properly to the plant from a loss of offsite power and that the emergency diesel generators are restored to normal standby lineup.
Operational Considerations:
NA i
EPG Step Content:
NA i-Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 4
i 4
12 W3101400
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x TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 7
Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 3.
When electrical power is restored to normal distribution, start a Turbine Cooling Water pump.
Refer to OP-3-027, TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that turbine cooling water system is restored to normal lineup.
Basis:
This step is done to restore normal operating equipment to operation which was lost as a result of the loss of power.
This step ensures Instrument Air is available to supply valves which are required to control other safety functions.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 13 W3101400
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TG-0P-902-008 k,
Revision 1
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5-29-84 E~'NEC'** y Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
i Sucrass Path I-1 e
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. E0P Step Cont'e'nt:
s Step 4.
K a Turbine Cooling Water pump is operating AND Jnstrument Air Compressors have been aligned to Potable Water System, THEN l'
locally align Seal Water Cooler to the Turbine Closed Cooling
!,4/ater System by the following:
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Objectiv r f/
i The objective of this step is to ensure that cooling water for the instrument aiN ccepres'scrs is aligned to the normal source of cooling.
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Basis:
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When ' turbine co'oling water system is_. restored to normal lineup, the instrument air compressors are align $d N, the normal source of cooling.
This ensures InstrunWnt Air is available to supply valves which are S.
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required tt; control oth,er safety, functions.
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Operational Considerations:
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EPG Step Content:
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Justification of. Differences; f
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Source Document:
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: 'Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 5.
E CIAS has occurred, THEN open CNTMT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR (IA 908) valve.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that instrument air is available to containment.
Basis:
If instrument air is isolated from containment, then it has to be aligned so that pneumatic valves can be operable.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 15 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 6.
IF the following breakers are open AND BOTH A AND B safety busses are energized, THEN locally close the following breakers:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to restore electrical loads on distribution panels after electrical power is restored to normal distribution lineup.
Basis:
The action of this step is to ensure that electrical loads are restored to normal lineup so that all instrumentation is available to the control room operators and so that safeguards equipment may be reset when required.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA e
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 16 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1
Success Path I-1 i
FOP Step Content:
Step 7.
Check the following success path criteria:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.
Basis:
The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function.
Since each success path uses or may use di f ferer.t technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.
Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
l NA l
17 l
W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1
Success Path I-l E0P Step Content:
Step 8.
IF_ the success path criteria (step 7) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.
l Basis:
After checking the success path criteria, aaditional guidance is provided which alas the operator in determining the next course af action.
In this step, if control of the safety functi,n is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Operational Considerations:
NA i
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 18 W3101400
TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
Success Path I-1 1
E0P Step Content:
Step 9.
IF the success path criteria (step 7) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path I-2.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.
Basis:
I After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 19 W3101400
s TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 I
E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1
Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 1.
IF EITHER BUS A2 TO A35 TIE BKR OR BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR opens, THEN check the following:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify the emergency diesel generator A is providing electrical power to the A trait. safety busses.
Basis:
This step verifies that A safety busses are energized to provide power to safety related equipment. One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core cooling capability exists and that other safety functions are being satisfied.
Operational Considerations:
Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours nor 4400KW for continuous loading.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 20 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 l
E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries j
l Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 2.
IF EITHER BUS B2 TO B3S TIE BKR OR BUS B35 TO B2 TIE BKR opens, THEN check the following:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify the emergency diesel generator 8 is providing electrical power to the B train safety busses.
Basis:
This step verifies that B safety busses are energized to provide power to safety related equipment.
One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core cooling capability exists and that other safety functions are being satisfied.
Operational Considerations:
Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours i
nor 4400KW for continuous loading.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA e
1 21 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-2 E0P Step content:
i Step 3.
E Emergency Diesel Generator A did NOT start AND Emergency Diesel Generator A breaker did NOT close, THEN perform EITHER of the following:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to attempt to start emergency diesel genera-tor A in order to provide electrical power to the A train safety busses.
Basis:
This step attempts to energize A safety busses in order to provide power i
to safety related equipment.
One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core cooling capability exists and that other safety functions are being satisfied.
Operational Considerations:
Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours nor 4400KW for continuous loading.
EPG Step content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 22 W3101400
r.
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E
Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 4.
IF, Emergency Diesel Generator B did NOT start AND Emergency Diesel Generator B breaker did NOT close, THEN perform EITHER of the following:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to attempt to start emergency diesel genera-tor B in order to provide electrical power to the B train safety busses.
Basis:
This step attempts to energize B safety busses in order to provide power to safety related equipment.
One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core cooling capability exists and that other safety functions are being satisfied.
Operational Considerations:
Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours nor 4400KW for continuous loading.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 23 W3101400
_ ~
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 2
5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Su5 procedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
Success Path I-2 1
E0P Step Content-Step 5.
E BOTH Turbine Cooling Water pumps are NOT operating, THEN locally perform the following:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to ensure that cooling water is available to the instrument air compressors during a loss of offsite power.
Basis:
According to the Nash Engineering Company, the instrument air compressors can operate without a cooling water supply for a maximum time of 30 minutes and not have any damage to the compressor.
When turbine cooling water is not operating, potable water is aligned for cooling of the air compressors.
This ensures Instrument Air is available to supply valves which are required to control other safety functions.
Operational Considerations:
f NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
24 03101400 i.
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1
Success Path I-2 l
E0P Step content.
Step 6.
IF CIAS has occurred, THEN open CNTMT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR (IA 908) valve.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that instrument air is available to containment.
Basis:
If instrument air is isolated from containment, then it has to be aligned so that pneumatic valves et i be operable.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Qocuppat:
NA-I i
25 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:
f Step 7.
IF the following breakers are open AND BOTH A AND B safety busses are energized, THEN locally close the following breakers:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to restore electrical loads on distribution panelr. after electrical power is restored to normal distribution lineup.
Basis:
The action of this step is to ensure that electrical loads are restored l
I to normal lineup so that all instrumentation is available to the control room operators and so that safeguards equipment may be reset when required.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA l
e P
26 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 8.
Check the following success path criterion:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to check the criterion associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.
Basis:
The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide.
The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function.
Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function.
Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.
Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are para-meters which can be read directly from the control board.
Operational ConsiCarations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 27 83101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 9.
IF the success path criterion (step 8) is met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.
Basis:
After checking the success path criterion, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Operational Cnnsiderations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA~
28 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 3
Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 10.
I_F the success path criterion (step 8) is NOT met, THEN go to Success Path I-3.
Objective:
The objective of tnis step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.
~
Basis:
After checking the success path criterion, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is not cchieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 29 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 1.
Verify 80TH CNTMT ISOL VLVS closed:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that all sources of inventory loss are secured.
Basis:
When all methods of makeup to the reactcr coolant system are lost, the sources of inventory removal have to be isolated.
Operational Consideraticns:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
I LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
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W3101400
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 2.
Verify the following RCS SAMPLING ISOLATION valves closed:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that all sources of inventory loss are secured.
Basis:
When all methods of makeup to the reactor coolant system are lost, the sources of inventory removal have to be isolated.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
I l
l 1
l 31
(
W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: $ubprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
Success Path I-3 l
E0P Step Content:
Step 3.
Verify the following valves closed:
Objective:
i The objective of this step is to verify that all sources of invenMry loss are secured.
A Basis:
When all methods of makeup to the reactor coolant system are lost, the sources of inventory removal have to be isolated.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA 1
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
i 32 W3101400
TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1
Success rath I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 4.
Locally open the following breakers on PDP 3MA-S:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.
Basis:
The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles.
By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
33 W3~01400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Suborocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 7
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 5.
Locally open the following breakers on FDP 3MS-S:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.
Basis:
.a
-j The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles.
By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.
Operational Considerations:
NA m
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
i 34 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 7
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 6.
Locally open the following breakers on PDP 3MC-S:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.
Basis:
The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles.
By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
35 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 7.
Locally open the following breakers on PDP 3MD-S:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.
Basis:
"]
The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles.
By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
36 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 8.
IF_ EITHER of the following conditions exists, THEN throttle OR stop Emergency Feedwater flow to the Steam Generator:
f Objective:
The objective of this step is to prevent excessive cooldown of the reactor coolant system.
Basis:
If either of the conditions exists, emergency feedwater is throttled or stopped to prevent pressurizer level from dropping to a critical point.
This level drop could cause voids in the reactor vessel head.
If a steam bubble forms in the vessel head, then adequate core cooling could not be verified.
j Operational Considerations:
Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.
If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual.
Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document.
Table 5-1, Level.
LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.
37 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 9.
Verify Emergency Feedwater pump AB Turbine operating with EITHER of the following valves open:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that both steam supply valves are open for the AB emergency feedwater pump.
Basis:
Since AB emergency feedwater pump is the only source of water to the steam generators, the steam supply valves to the turbine shall be verified open.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Centent:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA t
l 38 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries y
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 10.
Verify the following valves closed for BOTH Steam Generators:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that the steam generators are isolated.
Basis:
Since inventory for emergency feedwater can be critical when station blackout is extended to two hours, the steam generators are isolated to help control heat removal.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 39 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 i
Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
Success Path I-3 i
E0P Step Content:
Step 11.
Check the following success path criterion:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to check the criterion associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.
Basis:
)
The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function.
Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function.
Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.
Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are para-meters which can be read directly from the control board.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
t NA Justification of Differences:
NA i
Scurce Document:
NA c
40 W3101400
IG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 7
success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 12.
If, the success path criterion (step 11) is met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success pa S is satisfactorily completed.
Basis:
After checking the success path criterion, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the oper.' tor is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
L Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
i NA i
41 W3101400
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A,
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 1
,/
)
E. Recovery Actions: Sub' procedure I. Vital Auxiliaries g
-Success Path I-3
~
E0P Step Content:
Step 13.
If_ the success path criterion (st'ep 11) is NOT met, THEN centinue with Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.
[
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.
p s
Basis:
If the criteria are not met, then Vital Auxiliaries is still in jeopardy.
)
The operator should not leave Vital Auxiliaries until this function is fulfilled.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA P
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 3
l l
42 W3101400
TG-0P-902-003 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l
Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 14.
IF the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, TliEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to
{
pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on Vital Auxiliaries.
Basis:
The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety funct. ions but must continue to attempt to establish Vital Auxiliaries.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA 43 W3101400
t TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Agtfons: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 1.
IF <2 CEAS are NOT fully inserted, THEN go to Success Path II-2.
Objective:
The objective of this stap is to direct the operator to the next success path if <2 CEAs are not fully inserted.
Basis:
Since Success Path II-1 only applies if >2 CEAs are not fully inserted, this step direct: the operator to go to the next success path which deals with other causes for Reactivity Control being in jeopardy.
Operational Considerations:
Reactor coolant system temperature changes should be minimized anytime Reactivity Control is in jeopardy.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justificaticn of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA E
l t
t I
i 44 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E ' Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2 -
Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 2.
IF SST A32 FEEDER AND SST B32 FEEDER breakers were cycled in OP-902-000 EMERGENCY ENTRY PROCEDURE, Section C.
Immediate Actions, THEN go to step 4.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to bypass step 3 if the operation has been performed.
Basis:
Since certain conditions require this oparation to be perforn.ed in OP-302-000, Emergency Entry Procedure, Section C.
Immediate Actions, it is not necessary to perforn this operation again.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA i
45 W3101400
TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 3.
Open BOTH of the following breakers for 5 seconds AND reclose:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to open the supply breakers to the busses, which supply the CEDM MG sets, in an attempt to insert the CEAs into the Core.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-16, step 2)
An attempt is made to manually insert the CEAs into the core.
This is done by performing as many of the following actions as necessary:
a) Manual trip buttons are pushed b) CEA trip breakers are opened c) Control rod drive motor generators are deenergized d) [If other methods are available to insert CEAs, that information is inserted.]
These actions are performed to deenergize the CEAs.
Operational Considerations:
If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial tran-sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until reactivity control is satisfied.
Temperature is maintained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-111, step 2)
Attempt to manually insert the CEAs into the core.
Perform all of the following actions:
46 W3101400
i TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 l
E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-1 E0P Step 3 (Continued).
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
t n
47 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E
Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 4.
IF
>2 CEAs are still NOT fuly inserted, THEN perform the following:
' Objective:
The objective of this step is to attempt other methods of inserting CEAs into the core if the previous methods have failed.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-16, step 2)
An attempt is made to manually insert the CEAs into the core.
This is done by performing as many of the following actions as necessary:
a) Manual trip buttons are pushed b) CEA trip breakers are opened c) Control rod drive motor generators are deenergized d) [If other methods are available to insert CEAs, that information is inserted.]
These actions are performed to deenergize the CEAs.
Operational Considerations:
NA 48 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-1 E0P Step 4 (Continued).
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-111, step 2)
. Attempt to manually insert the CEAs into the core.
Perform all of the following actions:
Justification of Differences:
NA
.2 Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
49 W3101400
TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:
Step S.
IF Emergency Boration is in progress, THEN go to Success Path II-2.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to direct the operator to the appropriate procedure if emergency boration is in progress.
k Basis:
Since this success path does not deal with emergency boration and since emergency boration may be in progress for Reactivity Control, the operator is directed to go to the success path which will deal with emergency boration.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA t
l 50 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:
Step 6.
Check the following success path criterion:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to check the criterion associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)
The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function.
Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success
. patL 'ar each safety function.
Since each success path uses or may use differen technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging t.1e success of that path are specific to the technical means.
Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are para-meters which can be read directly from the control board.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
51 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:
Step i.
IF the success path criterion (step 6) is met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.
I Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)
After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operatcr is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
52 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-1 I
E0P Step Content:
Step 8.
IF_ the success path crite-ion (step 6) is NOT met, THEN go to Success Path II-2.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.
.a q
'I ~ l Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)
. I After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is l
instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.
Operational Considerations:
NA I
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
i NA i
Source Document-CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
l i
53 W3101400 I
n TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 1.
JF Emergency Boration is NOT in progress, THEN commence Emergency Boration as follows:
Ot.jective:
The objective of this step is to ensure emergency boration is in progress if Reactivity Control is in jeopardy.
4 Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boro, injection.
Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commnced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits.
The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].
b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245").
54 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E, Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step 1 (Continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].
The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps.
These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.
Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition.
Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool].
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
Operational Considerations:
If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial tran-sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until Reactivity Control safety function is satisfied.
Temperature is main-tained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases f
due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with t
l i
Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS.
Perform the following l
l actions:
l Justification of Differences:
The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
Source Document:
l CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
l 55 W3101400
(
e
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 2.
IF Charging Header flow <40 gpm through the normal Charging pump discharge path, THEN align Charging pumps to discharge through HPSI Header A OR B as follows:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to realign the charging pump discharge to the high pressure safety injection header if the normal charging path is
..a
~f, not available.
?
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by baron injection.
Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin
[
I in accordance with Technical Specification Limits.
The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].
b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].
56 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step 2 (Continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and co.re)].
The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps.
These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.
f Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation.
This is the preferred method for boron addition.
Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool).
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
Operational Considerations:
l If high pressure safety injection pumps are operating, the charging pumps should not be aligned to the high pressure safety injection header. The normal charging pump discharge path is through the charging header isola-tion valve (CVC 209).
Charging header flow will not indicate with the charging header isolation valve (CVC 209) closed.
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS.
Perform the following actions:
Justification of Differences:
The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions t
of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
57 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 I-E0P Step 2 (Continued).
[
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
- l d
58 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 3.
E BORIC ACID MAKEUP TANK A LEVEL LO-LO (CP-4, H-6) alarm OR_
BORIC ACID MAKEUP TANK B LEVEL LG-LO (CP-4, H-7) alarm occurs with the associated Boric Acid pump operating, THEN perform the following:
I Objective:
The objective of this step is to transfer to the opposite boric acid
' j makeup tank if a low level occurs on the tank in service.
2 Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
In the case where the control rods do nst insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can--be accomplished by baron injection.
Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].
b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].
{
59 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 l
.E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step 3 (Continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].
The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the. boric acid makeup pumps.
These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.
j Baron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation.
This is the preferred method for baron addition.
Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool].
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
I Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Comence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with i
Technical Specification Limitt. using the CVCS.
Perform the following actions:
i s
Justification of Differences.
The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each.
The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
4 i
h 60 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Re activity Control 2
Success Path 11-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 4.
Evaluate Emergency Boration flow capacity as follows:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to determine if adequate emergency boration flow capacity exists from the boric acid makeup tanks.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
)
In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can ce accomplished by boron injection.
Borated water can be added to the RCS using chargirig and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commenced using the CVC3 to achi ve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits.
The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].
b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the l
l normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
L c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].
l l
l 1
61 W3101400 i
_ _ _ _ _ ~
+
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 i
5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step 4 (Continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].
l The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps.
These r
sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.
~ )
Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from.the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation.
This is the preferred method for boron addition.
Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool].
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
' Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS.
Perform the following l
l actions:
Justification of Differences:
I The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the su:: tion sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each.
The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
l Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
l 62 W3101400 t
,,,-----,---,n---.-,,.,-_.......--~.,n--...--.-..n,-.,
TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84
[
f E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 i.
l E0P Step Content:
Step 5.
IF Emergency Boration flow capacity is NOT within specified i
limits (step 4), THEN align the Charging pumps to take suction from the Refueling Water Storage Pool as follows:
5 Objective:
j The objective of this step is to align the charging pump suction to the refueling water storage pool if adequate emergency boration flow does not i
exist from the boric acid makeup tanks.
l 1
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional
[
negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron infection.
Borated water can be added to the rCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits.
The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a r.e. Mon from (boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed).
P b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the i
normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS
[
c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-
]
surizer level between [35" and 245"].
I 63 W3101400 t
[
.--n
., - - - -,,. -. - - - ~ - -,. -.. - - -.,.,, ~,. -,.,,,--,,.,,.--,,,,,. -,-,,
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step 5 (Continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].
The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps.
These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent baron precipitation.
Boron precipitation is. only a concern if charging frcm the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation.
This is the preferred method for boron addition.
Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool].
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with l
Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS.
Perform the following actions:
Justification of Differences:
l i
The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction l
sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each.
The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
l Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
h r
64 W3101400 I
TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path Il-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 6.
Check the following Emergency Boration termination criteria:
i Objective:
The objective of this step is to determine if emergency boration can be terminated, i
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
+
k.
In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity' is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity' control can be accomplished by boron injection.
Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition f
portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS ta achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits.
The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid l
makeup tanks using either. gravity feed or the boric acid makeup l
pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].
b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
i l
c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].
i i
r 65 W3101400
d.4-4e.
A.
E
___A42
,.A of TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path 11 E0P Step 6 (Continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].
The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents tsay reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps.
These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.
,~l Baron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation.
This is the preferred method for boron addition.
Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and 4
f the [ spent fuel pool].
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the l
I charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the. RCS through the HPSI header.
1 Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS.
Perform the following actions:
Justification of Differences:
The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions f
of each.
The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
4 E
I 66 W3101400-
.~.s,
..--.-.,,,,,-.--..,2
-_,e....~..-
c.-4. - - -
.yw..
--wwww..
,, ~. -,
em.-,-,.,.r...._w.-,.,erm.mr.-
e,,.,
-e
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 7.
IF the Emergency Boration termination criteria (step 6) are met 4
AND Letdown is in operation, THEN terminate Emergency Boration as follows:
i Objective:
The objective of this step is to terminate emergency boration if the criteria are met and letdown is in service.
a :s Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
In the case where the control rods do net insert or where additional negative reactivity is
- eeded to compensate for temperature defect, reactisity control can be accomplished by boron injection.
Corated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].
b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the normal charging lines are not available, lir.c up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].
b 67 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step 7 (continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].
The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps.
These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.
Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation.
This is the preferred rethod for boron addition.
A?ternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool].
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
Coerational Consideraticns:
If possiMe, to prevent core power increases following the initial tran-sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until Reactivity Control safety function is satisfied.
Tecperature is main-tained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases t
due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS.
Perform the following actions:
Justification of Differences:
The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction I
sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each.
The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
68 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 i
Revision 1 5-29-84 E
Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 f
E0P Step Content:
Step 8.
E the Emergency Boration termination criteria (step 6) are met f
AND Letdown is NOT in operation, THEN terminate Emergency Bora-tion as follows:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to terminate emergency boration if the criteria are met and letdown is not in service.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)
In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.
Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits.
The following actions are performed.
a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid f
makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].
b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header.
If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
c) Chargir.g pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"J.
9 I
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4 TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step 8 (Continued).
Basis: (Continued)
The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].
The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps.
These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.
,g 1
Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation.
This is the preferred method for boron addition.
Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool].
If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.
Operational Considerations:
If possible, to prevent cora power increases following the initial tran-sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until Reactivity Control safety function is satisfied.
Temperature is main-tained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)
Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS.
Perform the following actions:
Justification of Differences:
The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 9.
Cht-k the following success path criteria:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path,
~ f; Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)
The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function.
Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function.
Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.
Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be road directly from the control board.
Operational Considerations:
j NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:
r Step 10.
IF the success path criteria (step 9) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
i Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this j
success path is satisfactorily completed.
3
{
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)
After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:
Step 11.
IF_ the success path criteria (step 9) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path II-3.
Objective:
[
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.
- Gj Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)
After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA g
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Documant:
t CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
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TG-0P-902-008
[
Revision 1 5-29-84
[
E. Rec very Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control
[
2 Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 1.
E Pressurizer pressure drops to <1684 psia OR Containment j
pressure rises to >17.4 psia, THEN verify SIAS occurs as follows:
Objective:
i The objective of this step is to verify SIAS occurs when required.
f Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 2)
T i, If pressurizer pressure decreases to 1684 psia or if containment pressure
~
increases to 17.4 psia, initiation of an SIAS must be verified.
If l
[
necessary, SIAS is manually initiated. This action is primarily to ensure that RCS inventory, pressure, and heat removal are being maintained.
However, this will also provide another method of boration at reduced RCS i
i
[
pressure:
f t
a) If RCS pressure <1385 psia then the HPSI pumps may-be effective j
b). If RCS~ prersure <250 psia then the CS pumps may be effective c) If RCS pressure <183 psia then the LPSI pumps may be effective.
l 3
Operational Considerations:
Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injection flow.
Multiple indications and core temperatures should be used j
l to determine the reactor coolant system temperature.
If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial transient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until Reactivity Control safety function is satisfied.
Temperature is maintained constant instead t
j' of _ reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator r
i
~ coefficient.
Where multiple indications for one parameter temperature than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular I
exist, more reading.
5 I
[
I F
l 14 W3101400
}
?
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step.1 (Continued).
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 2)
If pressurizer pressure decreases to [1600 psia] [or if containment pressure increases to 4 psig] verify initiation of an SIAS.
If necessary manually initiate an SIAS and/or depressurize the RCS to permit ECCS injection.
This action is primarily to ensure that RCS inventory, pres-sure, and heat removal are being maintained.
However, this will also provide another method of boration at reduced RCS pressures:
.- p
)
?
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document.
Table 5-4, Pressure.
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l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 j
E. Rec very Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control f
2 Success Path II-3 i
E0P Step Content:
i Step 2.
IF, either of the following conditions occur, THEN stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps:
(
i Objective:
i The objective of this step is to stop reactor coolant pump operation when l
pressurizer pressure 11621 psia following an SIAS or when component l
i cooling water is lost.
e Basis:
f
+
This step serves to prevent continued reactor coolant pump operation when i
reactor coolant system pressure is 11621 psia during a Loss of Coolant l
Accident.
Continued reactor coolant pump operation at reactor coolant
[
system pressures below 1621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident may
(
t result in more severe reactor coolant system conditions.
When component i
cooling water is lost to the reactor coolant pumps, damage to pump j
components could occur -if the reactor coolant pumps are not secured.
i Operational Considerations:
Since other events could cause rapid depressurization, anytime pressurizer h
f pressure drops below 1621 psia following an SIAS, all reactor coolant pump
[
operation is terminated. 'Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be - used to obtain a particular t
reading.
l i
EPG Step Content:
[
NA Justification of Differences:
l
"^
i Source Decument:
PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document.
Table 5-4, Pressure.
L 76 r
W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Rec very Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control l
2 Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 3.
E SIAS has occurred, THEN complete Attachment 1:
SIAS Automatic Actions.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify all actions required by an SIAS.
b Basis:
i Due to the number of valves, pumps, fans, and other equipment actuated by e
~
automatic safety signals, the verification is done by use of a checklist.
Operational Considerations:
This step should be performed concurrently with this procedure and pre-ferably by an operator not required for other duties.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
NA i
1 77 W3101400 l
i TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 4.
Check the following Safety Injection termination criteria:
Objective:
This step evaluates certain criteria associated with terminating safety injection flow.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 3)
If an SIAS has been initiated and the SIS is operating, it must continue i
to operate at full capacity until SIS termination criteria are met.
Early termination may be desirable when the criteria are met to preclude PTS situations or HPSI pump damage (e.g., shaft seals).
Operational Considerations:
Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101).
Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 3)
If the Technical Specification shutdown margin is achieved, the ECCS may be throttled or stopped one train at a time if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
Justification of Differences:
The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step covering termination I
criteria and the other covering termination direction.
Control board indications of subcriticality were used instead of shutdown margin due to the time considerations of sampling reactor coolant system boron and calculating shutdown margin.
This is more consistent with the success path criteria and the emergency boration termination criteria.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Rec very Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step 4 (Continued).
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
PV-OP-902, Parameter Values Document.
Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-4, Pressure.
=
e l
l' v
f i
79 W3101400
. _ _ - _ - - - -. _, _ _. _.... -,.. _ _. _. ~, _., _ _ _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
TG-0P-902-008 Revisici 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 i
E0P Step Content:
Step 5.
E ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) are satis-fled, THEN throttle OR, stop Safety Injection FLOW one train at a time AND stop Charging pumps as necessary to control Pres-surizer level 33% to 60%.
Objectivs:
The step maintains pressurizer level and prevents solid water operation.
l 9
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 3)
If the criteria are all met, the operator may either terminate or throttle the SIS.
The operator may decide to throttle rather than terminate if SIS is to be used to control pressurizer level or plant pressure. Termination of SIS should be sequenced by stopping one pump at a time while observing the termination criteria.
Operational Considerations:
Solid water operation is permissible only when reactor coolant system subcooling margin is <28'F.
To throttle cold leg injection valves, the switch must be taken to the "MORE" position which places them in SIAS override.
i l
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 3)
If the Technical Specification shutdown margin is achieved, the ECCS may be throttled or stopped one train at a time if all cf the following l
conditions are satisfied:
l 1
I i
l l
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E
Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step 5 (r stinued).
Justification of Differences:
The EPG step was divided into two steps, one covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction.
Specific direction te l
maintain pressurizer level is given since the safety injection system is providing inventory control until SIAS and CIAS are reset.
This allows letdown and charging to be placed back into normal service.
~~
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
I h
i i
V f-a 1
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actiors: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 6.
IF ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) can NOT be maintained after throttling 01 stopping Safety Injection flow, THEN reinitiate Safety Injection flow.
Objective:
This step allows initiation of safety injection system flow should condi-tions warrant the need.
+
t Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-22, step 4)
If any of the criteria of step 4 cannot be maintained, the safety injec-tion pumps must be restarted whenever necessary to satisfy all the criteria.
Operational Considerations:
Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.
EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 4)
If all the criteria of step 3 cannot be maintained after the ECCS has been stopped, the ECCS must be restarted.
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
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1 TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Controi 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
IF, Pressurizer pressure drops to <1385 psia, THEN verify proper F
Step 7.
Refer to Attachment 2:
HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a loss of Coolant Accident.
i Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-22, Reactor shutdown criteria, and page 10-21, step 2)
Reactor shutdown criteria are met if it can be shown that the minimum boration rate >40 gpm, results in decreasing core power.
Due to the boron concentration required by Technical Specifications for the 4
Refueling Water Storage Pool, if pressurizer pressure is below the l
shutoff head of the HPSI pumps, then 6he HPSI pumps may be effective for providing minimum boration flow.
l Operational Considerations:
Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.
EPG Step Content:
NA i
Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
PV-0P-902, Paramater Values Document.
Table 5-4, Pressure.
t i
i l
83 W31014( J t
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 I
5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 8.
I_F_ Pressurizer pressure drops to <183 psia, THEN verify proper LPSI t{eader flow exists.
Refer to Attachment 2:
HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.
Objective:
The cbjective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the t
react (Y coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.
(CEN 152, page 10.-22, Reactor shutdown criteria, and page 10-21, step 2)
Basis:
t Reactor. shutdown criteria are met if it can be shown that the minimum boration rate >40 gpm, results in decreasiiig core power.
Due to the boron,,cencentration required by Technical Specifications for the Refuelir.g Water Storage Pool, if pressurizer pressure is below the i
shutoff head of the. LPSI pumps, then the LPSI pumps may be effective for providing minimum baration flow.
Operational Considerations:
Where inultiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-i ment snould be used to obtain a particular reading.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 9.
E BOTH LPSI pumps A At:0 B are NOT available AND Pressurizer pressure <250 psia, THEN align one Containment Spray pump to the LPSI Header as follows:
Objective:
This step ensures safety injection flow to the reactor coolant system if both low pressure safety injection pumps are unavailable by using a S
containment spray pump to inject water.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 2)
This step provides another method of boration at reduced RCS pressure.
If Pressurizer pressure <250 psia then the containment spray pumps may be effective.
Operational Considerations:
If CSAS has occurred, then this step should not be performed.
Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.
EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document.
Table 5-4, Pressure.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 t
5-29-84 E. Rec very Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control
[
2 Success Path II-3 i
E0P Step Content:
Step 10. Check the following success path criteria:
Objective:
The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3) l
)
The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function.
Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success i
paths for each safety function.
Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.
Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.
i Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Centent:
NA l
Justification of Differences:
NA l
Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
r 86 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Rec very Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivit'/ Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 11. E the success path criteria (!.tep 10) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)
After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action.
In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the cperator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justificatice,of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
l
+
i J7 W3101400 1
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E
Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 12.
IF,the success path criteria (step 10) are NOT met, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control until a succass path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.
3 9
4 Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-123)
If the criteria are not met, then Reactivity Control is still in jeopardy.
The operator should not leave Reactivity Control until this function is fulfilled.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:
Step 13.
IF the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to purst.a other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.
Objective:
The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continled on Reactivity Control.
Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-123)
The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish Reactivity Control.
Operational Considerations:
NA EPG Step Content:
NA Justification of Differences:
NA Source Document:
CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.
89 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 3.0. Generic Steps not included in the Waterford-3 E0P In the items cited below, step, precaution, and page numbers refer to the I
appropriate sections of CEN-152.
[
E.
Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0
Step 6 (page 10-103):
If the first (on the left of each tree) success path is being used for all the safety functions on Figure 10-3 and the criteria for that path are satisfied, implement the Reactor Trip Recovery guideline.
a Justification:
OP-902-000, Emergency Entry Procedure, Section D.
Diagnostics provides l
diagnosis and kickouts to each optimal recovery procedure.
Therefore, it
(
was decided to use only one kickout step in this procedure. The kickout i
step directs the operator to go to the entry procedure when all safety f
functions are being controlled.
No matter what success path is in use the diagnostics will determine the correct optimal recovery procedure to go to, ' i f any, or return the operator to the safety function recovery j
procedurc.
[
a j
i L
s i
i 439 W3101400 I
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path RC-1 Precaution 5 (page 10-112):
Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equal-ize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration.
If pressurizer spray is not avail-able, RCS boron concentration should be increased.
This avoids an RCS dilution below minimum shutdown requirements by a possible pressurizer outsurge.
~ i A
Justification:
Since the RCS Pressure Control safety function is a lower priority safety function, the availability of pressurizer spray may not have been deter-I mined at this time.
Using pressurizer spray during the Reactivity Control safety function deviates from the philosophy of this procedure and thereby can jeopardize other safety functions.
Emergency boration is terminated when specific criteria are satisfied.
If the criteria are satisfied, then the Reactivity Control safety function is no longer in jeopardy.
If later, the criteria are not being satisfied thereby placing the Reactivity Control safety function in jeopardy, then the operator is required to return to the Reactivity Control safety function due to its higher priority.
l l
l l
440 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Ravision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedere II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path RC-2 Precaution 3 (page 10-115):
Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equal-ize tne pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration.
If pressurizer spray is not avail-able, RCS boron concentration should be increased.
This avoids an RCS dilution below minimum shutdown requirements by a possible pressurizer outsurge.
Justification:
Since the RCS Pressure Control safety function 15. a lower priority safety function, the availability of pressurizer spray muy not have been deter-mined at this time. Using pressurizer spray di. ring the Reactivity Control safety function deviates from the philosophy of this procedure and thereby can jeopardize other safety functions.
Emergency boration is terminated when specific criteria are satisfied.
If the criteria are satisfied, then the Reactivity Control safety function is no longer in jeopardy.
If later, the criteria are not being satisfied thereby placing the Reactivity Control safety function in jeopardy, then the operator is required to return to the Reactivity Control safety function due to its higher priority.
f l
l l
c l
l i
l
[
+
(
441 W3101400 t
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control l
2 Success Path RC-3 i
Precaution 7 (page 10-120):
Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equal-ize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration.
If pressurizer spray is not avail-able, RCS boron concentration should be increased.
This avoids an RCS dilution below minimum shutdown requirements by a possible pressurizer outsurge.
Justification:
Since the RCS Pressure Control safety function is a lower priority safety function, the availability of pressurizer spray may not have been deter-mined at this time.
Using pressurizer spray during the Reactivity Control safety function deviates from the philosophy of this procedure and thereby can jeopardize other safety functions.
Emergency boration is terminated
.when specific criteria are satisfied.
If the criteria are satisfied, then the Reactivity Control safety function is no longer in jeopardy.
If later, the criteria are not being satisfied thereby placing the Reactivity
[
Control safety function in jeopardy, then the operator is required to return to the Reactivity Control safety function due to its higher priority.
f t
I I
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.. ~. - -. - -
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2
Success Path RC-4 l
Safety Function:
Reactivity Control Success Path:
Reactivity control using CEA drive down, RC-4 I
Justification:
Waterford-3 uses magnetic jacks for control rod drive mechanisms.
l Magretic jacks utilize holding coils to hold control rods stationary and I
lift coils to withdraw control rods.
Magnetic jacks utilize gravity force to insert rods.
Therefore if power is removed from the control
~'f drive mechanisms the control rods should gravity insert into the core.
If a control rod becomes mechanically bound (stuck) the control rod drive mechanism can not apply any inward force to insert the control rod.
Since Waterford-3 design does not provide any means of overcoming a stuck rod this success path was not used.
[
l l
I l
t l
443 W3101400
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3
Success Path IC-1 Precaution 4 (page 10-126):
Steam plant radiation alarms usually indicate a steam generator tube leak which may result in a loss of RCS inventory.
I Justification:
This precaution is an information only precaution.
There are no instruc-tions given here for what to do with a steam generator tube leak (i.e.,
isolate the affected steam generator).
Steam plant activity is part of j
the Containment Isolation safety function.
The safety function status checklist will alert the ope ator if the Containment Isolation safety function is in jeopardy due to steam plant activity.
l l
444 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 1 5-29-84 I
E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3
Success Path IC-2 I
Precaution 5 (page 10-130):
l f
Steam plant radiation alarms usually indicate a steam generator tube leak l
which may result in a loss of RCS inventory.
Justification:
This precaution is an information only precaution.
There are no instruc-
[
tions given here for what to do with a steam generator tube leak (i.e.,
isolate the affected steam generator).
Steam plant activity is part of
]
the Containment Isolation safety function.
The safety function status checklist will alert the operator if the Containment Isolation safety l
function is in jeopardy due to steam plant activity, j
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4
Success Path PC-5 Step 5 (page 10-143):
(If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following to prevent steam generator feedring damage:
i Justification:
l Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for 7
automatic initiation of 200 gpa is acceptable.
The design of the Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-tions for waterhammer are minfalzed.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4
Success Path PC-5 Step'7 (page 10-144):
If all feedwater is lost and pressurizer sprays (main and auxiliary) are not available, go to PC-7, RCS Pressure Control using [PORVs].
Justification:
PC-7, RCS Pressure Control using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 i
5-29-84 E Recovery Actions:
Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4
Success Path PC-6 l
t Step 6 (page 10-147):
[If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following to prevent steam generator feedring damage:
Justification:
Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for automatic initiation of 200 gpm is acceptable.
The design of the l
Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-
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tions for waterhammer are minimized.
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TG-0P-902-008 I
Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4
Success Path PC-6 Step 7.c (page 10-147):
If feedwater cannot be regained in at least one operable steam generator, go to PC-7, [RCS pressure control using PORVs].
Justification:
PC-7, RCS Pressure Contral using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs.
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Tu-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4
Success Path PC-6 Precaution 5 (page 10-149):
Natural circulation flow should not be verified until the RCPs have stopped coasting down after being tripped.
Justification:
This precaution was not used because it was decided that operators would be trained to know when to monitor natural circulation.
Also, by the way the procedures are structured, the steps for monitoring natural circula-j tion are located at a point when reactor coolant pumps should have stopped
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coasting down.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4
Success Path PC-6 i
Pre w tion 6 (page 10-149):
Verification of temperature responses to a plant change-cannot be accom-f plished until approximately 5 to 15 minutes following the action due to increased loop cycle times during natural circulation.
Justification:
This precaution was not used because it was decided that the operators would be trained to know that natural circulation had longer loop tran-sient times which causes plant responses to be slower.
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i TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4
Success Path PC-6 Precaution 7 (page 10-150):
j When RCS. heat removal is conducted by natural circulation with an isolated i
steam generator, an inverted AT (i.e. T higher than T ) may be observed c
h in the idle loop.
This is due to a small amount of revers'e heat transfer in the isolated steam generator and will have no affect on natural circu-lation flow in the operating steam generator loop.
Justification:
i This precaution was not used bec.wse it was decided that operators would be trained to recogn'ize this inverted AT and its effect on cooldown.
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TG-OP-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S
Success Path HR-1 Step 4 (page 10-154):
[If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following to prevent steam generator feedring damage:
Justification:
Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for automatic initiation of -200 gpm is acceptable.
The design of the Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-tions for waterhammer are minimized.
453 W3101400
TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5
Success Path HR-1 l
Step 5.f (page 10-155):
If feedwater cannot be regained, go to [HR-4, RCS and Core Heat Removal using ECCS and PORVs].
Justification:
HR-4, RCS And Core Heat Removal using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5
Success Path HR-1 Precaution 6 (page 10-157):
If voids are present (see voiding guidance in IC-1 and IC-2), they may have to be eliminated to depressurize.
Justification:
By the philosophy of this procedure, anytime a higher priority safety l
function becomes in jeopardy the operator is required to go to that subprocedure.
The operator will be trained to know and understand this t
philosophy.
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E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5
Success Path HR-2 1
Step 5 (page 10-159):
[If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following
[
to prevent steam generator feedring damage:
Justification:
Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for automatic initiation of 200 gpm is acceptable.
The design of the Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-tions for waterhammer are minimized.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Rec very Actions: Subprocedura V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5
Success Path HR-2 Step 6.e (page 10-160):
If feedwater cannot be regained, go to [HR-4, RCS and Core Heat Removal using ECCS and PORVs].
Justification:
HR-4, RCS And Core Heat Removal using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs.
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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5
Success Path HR-2 Precaution 1 (page 10-162):
Natural circulation flow should not be verified until the RCPs have stopped coasting down after being tripped.
Justification:
This precaution was not used because it was decided that operators would be trained to know when to monitor natural circulation.
Also, by the way the procedures tre structured, the steps for monitoring natural circula-
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tion are located at a point when reactor coolant pumps should have stopped coasting down.
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w TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E. Recovery Actions: Su$ procedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5
Success Path HR-2 Precaution 2 (page 10-162):
Verification of temperature responses to a plant change cannot be accom-plished until approximately 5 to 15 minutes following the action due to increased loop cycle times during natural circulation.
Justification:
This precaution was not used because it was decided that the operators would be trained to know that natural circulation had longer loop tran-sient times which causes plant responses to be slower.
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q TG-0P-902-008 Revision 1 5-29-84 E Recovery Actions:
Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal g
Success Path HR-2 Precaution 4 (page 10-162):
If cooling down by ' natural circulation with an isolated steam generator, an inverted AT (i.e. T higher than T ) may be observed in the idle loop.
c h
This is due to a small amount of reverse heat transfer in the isolated steam generator and will have no affect on natural circulation flow in the operating steam generator loop.
Justification:
This precaution was not used because it was decided that operators would be trained to recognize this inverted AT and its effect on cooldown.
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