ML20196G277
| ML20196G277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1997 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196G272 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705160011 | |
| Download: ML20196G277 (59) | |
Text
. _ _
May 17,1995 3/4 1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTDt$
[
314.1.1 BORATION CONTROL U
SinfTDOWN MARGIN - N0 DES 3. 4 AND E LOOPS FitLED
.. e LIMITING CGNDITION FOR OPDtATION 3.1.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to the limits shown in Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-3 and4. -4 for four loop operation and in Figure 3.1-2 for three loop operation.r a APPLICABILITY: NODES 3, 4 and 5 EI1Qti:
With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the required value, imediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6600 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEXTS 4.1.1.1.2.1
'ihe SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be detencined to be greater than or equal to the required value:
Within I hour after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at a.
least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.
If the inoperable control rod is imovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the imovable or untrippable control rod (s); and b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the following factors:
1)
Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)
Control rod position.
3)
Reactor Coolant System average temperature, t n 4)
Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
~~
5)
Xenon concentration, and 00 6)
Sacarium concentration.
06 4.1.1.1.2.2 Valv 3CH5;VIO5' spa'ifbe vertfiad-closed and locke at least once 88 per '31 days' Y
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FIGURE 3.1-4 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN F.OR MODE 5 WITH RCS LOOPS FILLED
2 1
j j l May 17,1995 aracTry m co m oL sysfuns SittfDOWN MARRIN - COLD SillTDOWN - LOOPS NOT FILLED i
LIMITING C0WITION FOR OPERATION i
i i
3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than_ar equal to l
5.g a) the limits shown in Figure 3.1 =or t iC b) the limits shown in Figure 3.1
,Mth the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) aligned to preclude reactor coolant system boron concentration reduction.
APPLICABILITY: N0DE 5 LOOPS NOT FILLED
]
ACIlQH:
a.
With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the above, imediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6600 ppa boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
b.
With the CVCS dilution flow paths not closed and secured in position in accordance with Specification 3.1.1.2(b), imediately close and secure the paths or meet the limits shown in Figure 3.1-5.
SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be detemined to be greater than or equal to the above:
a.
Within I hour after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.
If the inoperable control rod is imovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the imovable or untrippable control rod (s); and b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the following factors:
1)
Reactor Coolant Systen boron concentration, 2)
Control rod position, 3)
Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
~ 41 Fuel burnup_ based __on gross thermal energy generat on-
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FIGURE 3.1-5 i
8 REQUIRED S'RITDOWN NARGIN FOR NODE 5 WITH RCS LOOPS NOT FILLED l
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FIGURE 3.1-5 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 5 WITH RCS LOOPS DRAINED
H8tE3.3-1(ContlDMidl EE REACTOR TRIP SY$ifM IN51RUNDITAT10ll
- EU MINIMUM E
YOTAL No.
CHAMELS CHAMELS APPLICASLE OF CHANNELS 10 1Rif OPEMBLE
__ MODES -
Killst FUNCTIOML WIT E
Reactor 1rlp System Interlocks (Continued)
U 17.
4 2
3 I
8 w
Power Range Neutron c.
Flux, P-8 4
2 3
1 8
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Power Range Neutron Flux, F-9 Pwer Range Neutron 2
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4 Flax, F-10 2
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1, 2 18,13 R
Reactor Trip Breakers (2) 18.
2 1
2 3*, 4*, 5*
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Automatic Trip and Interlock 1
2 3*, 4*, 5*
11 19.
2 Logic 2
8 I, 2 1
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- 20. Three Loop Operation (1 sultch per (Fromdiffer-y Bypass Circuitry loop in each ent loop eo g
train) switches in D
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TARLE 1.1-1 (continuedi TABLE NOTATIONS
- T.
- When the Reactor Trip system breakers are in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.
" Above the P-7 (At Power) Setpoint.
'"Above the P-9 (Reactor Trip / Turbine Trip Interlock) Setpoint, ifBelow the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
fHBelow the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
C9 The Shutdown Margin monitor may be blocked during reactor startup in accordance with approved procedure.
(!) The applicable MODES and ACTION statements for these channels noted in Table 3.3-3 are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.
(2)
Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing a reactor trip breaker.
ACTION STATEwrNTS ACTION 1 - W%h the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 2 - With the number of CPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition 1
within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel say be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per specification 4.3.1.1, and c.
Either. THERML POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERML POWER for four loop operation or 50% of RATED THERML POWER for three loop operation and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85 % of RATED THERML POWER for four loop operation or 60% of RATED THERML POWER for three loop operation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once par 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per Specification 4.2.4.2.
MILT 3 TONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 77. IE 93 em
-.. ~ - -.
r Nov3mber 14,1996 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) 4 ACTION STATENDff5 (Continued) l ACTION 3 -
With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
1.
I a.
Below the P 6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)
Setpoint, restore the inoperable chant:21.to OPERABLE i
status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER nbove the P-6 Setpoint, and j
b.
Above the P 6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)
Setpoint but below 105 of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the l
inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing j
THERMAL POWER above 105 of RATED THE.RMAL POWER.
ACTION 4 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Ninimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving l
positive reactivity changes.
ACTION 5 -
(a) With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the j
Ninimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or E
suspend all operations involving positive reactivity J
Tr W
/f' changes via dilution and rod withdrawal, and verify valves as per Specification 4.1.1.2.2 are closed and secured in j
pot u%
position within the next four hours.
(b) With no channels OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes via dilution and rod withdrawal, i
and verify valves per Specification 4.1.1.2.2 are closed and i
secured in position within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of i
Specification 3.1.1.1.2 or 3.1.1.2 as applicable within the next hour.
Continue to verify valves closed and secured l
every 14 days and verify SHUTDOWN MARGIN every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
p ACTION 6 -
With the number of OPEPABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION say proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
4 j
a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and I
b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; hcwever, j
the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per i
specification 4.3.1.1.
I (Notused)
ACTION 7
\\
With less than the Minimus Number of Channels OPERABLE, within i
ACTION 8 I hour determine by observation of the associated permissive i
annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required
]
state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
I i
MILLSTONE - IMIT 3 3/4 3 6 Amendment No. 77, 77, 131 i
I
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l" TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)
-4 PEACTOR TRIP SYSTEN INSTRIBENTATION SURVEILIANCE REWIRDtENS R
TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING NODES FOR E
CHANNEL DEVICE WICH q
CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS REOUIRED
- 18. Reacter Trip Breaker N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N(7,II)
N.A.
ggg,3*,
2 4,$*$*,
'19. Automatic Tris and N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N(7)
I 2 I
Interlock Logic
- 20. Three Loop Operation N.A.
N.A.
M.A.
R N.A.
1, 2 Bypass Circuitry i
- 15. Reacter Trip Bypass M.A.
N.A.
N.A.
4, $*3*',
N(7RLIE)15)
N.A.
I 2 i
I Breaker
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January 3,1995 t
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued) l
"('10) Satpoint verification is not applicable.
(11) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.
(12)
(not used)
(13) Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Speed Sensor may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(14) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual
- Reactor Trip Function. The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker trip circuit (s).
(15) Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.
(16) Automatic undervoltage trip.
(17)
(not used).
(18) The surveillance frequency and/or MODES specified for these channels in Table 4.3-2 should be reviewed for applicability.
f(6) Quarterly surveillance shall include verification that the SD {
argin Monitor is set per the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (C i
i I
l NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 12. 77.100 77.77.
.=
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l Millstone 3 PTSCR No. 3-16-97
- Page 7 l
l INSERT FOR PTSCR # 313 97
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INSTRUMENTATION g' all 3/4.3.5 SHUTDOWN M ARGIN MONITOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
3.3.5 Two channels of Shutdown Margin Monitors shall be OPERABLE.
t a.
With a minimum count rate as designated in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT i
(COLR), or b.
If the minimum count rate in Specification 3.3.5.a cannot be met, then the Shutdown Margin Monitors may be made operable with a lower minimum count rate, as specified in the COLR, by borating the Reactor Coolant System above the requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1.2 or 3.1.1.2. The additional boration shall bc :
l.
A minimum of 150 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figure 3.1 1 (Mode 3 - 4 loops in operation) and Figure 3.1-2 (Mode 3 - 3 loops in operation), or 2.
A minimum of 350 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements #f Figure 3.1 3 (Mode 4), Figure 3.1-4 (Mode 5 RCS loops filled) and Figure 3.15 (Mode 5 -
RCS loops drained).
I APPLICABILITY :
MODES 3 *,4, and 5.
ACTION :
With one Shutdown MarF n Monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to i
a.
operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
b.
With both Shutdown Margin Monitors inoperable or one Shutdown Margin Monitor inoperable for j
greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />,immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes via l
dilution and od withdrawal. Verify the valves listed in Specification 4.1.1.2.2 are closed and l
secured in position within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and at least once per 14 days thereafter.** Verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specifi:ation 3.1.1.1.2 or 3.1.1.2 as applicable within I hour and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
StJRVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.5 a.
Each of the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN monitoring instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days that shall include verification that the Shutdown Margin Monitor is set per the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).
b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> VERIFY the minimum count rate (counts /sec) as defined within the COLR.
4 9
The Shutdown Margin Monitors may be blocked during reactor startup in accordance with approved plu procedures.
l
'Ihe valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls as noted in Surveillance 4.1.1.2.2.
l
i 1
May 17,1995 SEACT!YITY CONTROL SYSTEMS f
BASES dRTIONSYSTEMS(Continued 3.l d I
MARGIN 3 ex operating conditions of equivalent to that required by Figure ter xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.
The maximum boration $
capabil y (minimum boration volume) requirement is established to conservatively bound expected operating conditions throughout core operating life. The initial RCS boron concentration is based on a minimum expected hot i
full power or hot zero power condition (peak xenon.
The final RCS boron concentration assumes that the most reactive control ) rod is not inserted i
the core.
This set of conditions requires a minimum usable volume of 21,802 i
gallons of 6600 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or i
1,166,000 gallons of 2700 ppa borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).
A minimus RWST volume of 1,166,000 gallons is specified to be consistent with ECCS requirement.
j 5
With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable 4
reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions i
prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.
Jj-The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPER-ABLE and the surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 350*F provides assurance that a w.
mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single 4
i PORV.
The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN NARGIN of 1.3% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 1
4 140*F. This condition requires either a usable volume of 4100 gallons of
}
6600 ppa borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 250,000 gallons of l
2700 ppm borated water from the RWST.
The unusable volume in each boric acid storage tank is 1300 gallons.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not j
available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
j The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 7.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.
This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
The minimum RWST solution temperature for MODES 5 and 6 is based on j
analysis assumptions in addition to freeze protection considerations.
The j
minimum / maximum RWST solution temperatures for MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on l
analysis assumptions.
2 i
i i
l MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 1-3 Amendment 77. 77 77, 113 a
8313
_ m. e _ c.,,
._=m-l November 14,1996 INSTRimiXTATION
./
matre
. -REACTOR TR" > SYSTEN INSTRtMDfTATION and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION j
SYSTEM INSDtUMENTATION (Continued)
The Engineered ~ 'ety Features Actuation System interlocks p'erform the following functions:
P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip,he opening of the main closes main feedvater valves on T below Setpoint, prevents t feedvaterv7aveswhichwereclosedbyaSafetyInjectionorHigh Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.
Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.
P-11 On increasing pressurizer pressure P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure. On decreasing pressure, P 11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure.
P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arsing signal from the Steam Dump System.
P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves, main feed pumps and main turbine, and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.
M idown Marcin Monitors
Background:
The purpose of the Shutdown Margin Monitors (SPgi) is to annunciate an increase in core suberitical multiplication allowing the operator at least 15 minutes response time to mitigate the consequences of the inadvertent addition of unborated primary grade water (boron dilution event) into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) when the reactor is shut dm (14 odes 3, 4 and 5).
The Sms utilizes two channels of source range instrumentation (GM detectors).
Each channel provides a signal to its applicable train of Sm. The SMM channel uses the last 600 or more counts to calculate the count rate and updates the measurement after 30 new counts or I second, whichever is longer.
Each channel has to registers that hold the counts (20 registers X 30 count =
600 counts) for averaging the rate. As the count rate decreases, the longer it takes to fill the registers (fill the 30 count minimum). As the instrument's measured count rate decreases, the delay time in the instrument's j
response increaser. This delay time leads to the requirement of a minimum count rate for OPERABILITY.
/
Ac tE Tu hS-S GEC t o N gy SS "
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 83/43-3 Amendment No. 131 eseo
/M to QASE&
SEcmloM
'3,/e1 %g November 14,1996 i
RA5ES (continuedT i
J/
l
...During the dilution event, count rate will increase to a level above the normal steady state count rate. When this new count rate level increases above the instrument's setpoint, the channel will alam alerting the operator of the event.
j
- Aeolicable Safety Analysis i
The Sm senses abnormal increases in the source range count per second and alams the operator of an inadvertent dilution event. This alars will occur 3
at least 15 minutes prior to the reactor achieving criticality. This 15 minute window allows adequate operator response time to terminate the dilution, FSAR Section 15.4.6.
w.p
=
LC0 srovides the requirements for OPERABILITY of the instrumentacion of w the 5 s tsat are used to sitigate the boron dilution event. Two trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide protection against single failure.
Acelicab(11tv The S M sust be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 because the safety analysis identifies this system as the primary means to alert the operator and mitigate the event. The SMMs are allowed to be blocked during start up activities in j
MODE 3 in accordance with approved plant procedures. The alars is blocked to allow the SMM channels to be used to monitor the 1/M approach to criticality.
The $ m are not required to be operable in MODES I and 2 as other RPS is credited with accident sitigation, over temperature delta temperature and power range neutron flux high (low setpoint of 25 percent RTP) respectively.
The SMs are not required to be OPERABLE in Mode 6 as the dilution event is precluded by administrative controls over all dilution flow paths (Technical i
Specification 4.1.1.2.2).
Actions Channel inoperability of the SMMs can be caused by failure of the channal's electronics, failure of the channel to pass its calibration procedure, or by i
)
the channel's count rate falling below the minimum count rate for operability.
This can occur when the count rate is so low that the channel's delay time is 6
in excess of that assumed in the safety analysis. In any of the above z
conditions, the channel must be declared inoperable and the appropriate action.
}
o statement entered.
If the SMs are declared inoperable due to low count rates, an RCS heatup will cause the S M channel count rate to. increase to above the minisua count rate for operability. Allowing the plant to increase modes will actually return the Sm s to OPERADLE status. Once the $ m channels are above the minimum count rate for operability, the channels can be declared operable and the LC0 action statements can be exited.
E-With one train of SM inoperable. Action requires the inoperable 4(EEE '
O train to be returned to OPERABLE status within W hours.
In this condition, i
3 the remaining SM train is adequate to provide protection. If the above j
l required action cannot be niet, alternate compensatory actions must be MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3 3a Amendment No.131
SASES (continued)
November 14,1996 performed to provide adequate protection from the boron dilution event. AE operations involving positive reactivity changes associated with RCS dilutions i
l and rod withdrawal must be suspended, and all dilution flowpaths must be closed j
and secured in position (locked closed per Technical Specification 4.1.1.2.2)
D Vi~ thin the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
With both trains of Stfi inoperable, alternate protection must be provided: %
b
_1.
Positive reactivity operations via dilutions and rod withdrawal are M
suspended. The intent of this action is to stop any planned dilutions of the RCS. The SMMs are not intended to monitor core reactivity during RCS 9
temperature changes.
The alarm setpoint is routinely reset during the eq plant heatup due to the increasing count rate.
During cooldowns as the count rate decreases, %seline count rates are continually lowered g
automatically by the SMMs.
The Millstone Unit No. 3 boron dilution y
analysis assumes steady state RCS temperature conditions.
l 2.
All dilution flowpaths are isolated and placed under administrativa c.cntrol (locked closed). This action provides redundant protection and f.efense in depth (safety overlap) to the SMMs.
In this configuration, a boron dilution event (BDE) c:nnot occur.
This is the basis for not having to analyze for BDE in Mode 6.
Since the BDE cannot occur with the dilution flow paths isolated, the SHMs are rat required to be operable as the event cannot occur and operable SMMs trivide no benefit.
3.
Increase the shutdown margin survalliance frequency from every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to f
every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This action in combin: tion with the above, provide defense in depth and overlap to the loss of the 5M'is.
Surveillance Recuirements The SMMs are subject to an ACOT every 92 days to ensure each train of SMM is fully operational. This test shall include verification that the SMMs are set per the Core Operating Limit Report.
3/4.
MONITORING INSTR!
ATION 3 /4. 3. 3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS E
SEcd VtLS The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring inst'rumentau on for piant operations ensures that:
(1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) suffi-cient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance.
The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions.
Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-3b Amendment No. 127,131 oue
l-Millstone 3 FTSCR No. 3 _li_-97
', Page 8 INSERT FOR PTSCR # 3. lfo -97 INSTRUMENTATION
~ BASES 3/4 3.5 SHUTDOWN M ARGIN MONITOR The Shutdown Margin Monitors provide an alarm that a Boron Dilution Event may be in progress.The minimum count rate of specification 3/4.3.5 and the SHlTTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figures 3.1 1,3.1-2,3.13, 3.1-4 and 3.1-5 ensure that at least 15 minutes are available for operator action from the time of the Shutdown i
Margin Monitor alarm to total loss of shutdown margin. By borating an additional 150 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Figures 3.1-1 or 3.1-2, or 350 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Figures 3.1-3,3.1-4 or 3.1-5, lower values of minimum count rate are acceptable.
l l
f 6 fh)TbN M4(aG ir4 AActa (Ttcts (lAsss S ECM oN 3/y,z,i
-co i
kCS-b
?/#Y 3 -% %., %,
/
l
~
l
+
0 k
~b " ~l
JtTLY 26, 1993 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l '
CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (Cont.)
8.
WCAP-11946, " Safety Evaluation Supporting a More Negative ECL Moderator Temperature Coefficient Technical Specification for the
..y.
l M'.11 stone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3," September 1988 (H Proprie-
?,ary).
I 9.
WCAP-10054-P-A, " WESTINGHOUSE SMALL BREAK ECCS EVALUATION MODEL l
USING THE NOTRUMP CODE," August 1985 (W Proprietary).
(Methodology I
for Specification 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor.)
l l
- 10. WCAP-10079-P-A, "NOTRUMP - A NODAL TRANSIENT SMALL BREAK AND GENERAL NETWORK CODE," August 1985 (W Proprietary).
(Methodology for l
Specification 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor.)
- 11. WCAP-12610, " VANTAGE + Fuel Assembly Report," June 1990 (H Proprietary).
(Methodology for Specification 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor.)
12.
Letter from V. L. Rooney (USNRC) to J. F. Opeka, " Safety Evaluation for Topical Report, NUSCO-152, Addendum 4,
' Physics Methodology for PWR Reload Design'," TAC No. M91815, j
July 18,1995.
~
g 2,usEer i
l l
l HILLSTONE - UNIT 3 6-20a AmendmentNo.8i 0117
m l;
i<
I i
Docket No. 50-423 B16447 l
I L
r i
i Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 l
Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Shutdown Marain Reauirements and Shutdown Marain Monitor Operability for Modes 3. 4 and 5 PTSCR 3-16-97 Retvoed Paaes i
i 1
l i
l l
-i May 1997
I U.S. Nucinar Reg alatory Commission B16447\\ Attachment 3\\Page 1 RETYPE OF PROPOSED REVISION i
l Refer to the attached retype of the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications.
The attached retype reflects the currently issued version of the Technical Specifications. Pending Technical Specification _ revisions or Technical Specification revisions issued subsequent to this submittal are not reflected in the enclosed retype.
The enclosed retype should be checked for continuity with Technical Specifications l
prior to issuance.
i l
e f
t 5
i l
l l
i i.
IM)EX tiufTrun cannrrinut rna nornartnu aun cinwrfitauer ernaitarururt 2
SECTION EME 4
TABLE 3.3-13 RADI0 ACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION......................
3/4 3-75 TABLE 4.3-9 RADI0 ACTIVE GASE0US EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS......... 3/4 3-78 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION 3/4 3-81 3/4.3.5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR..................
3/4 3-82 l
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION Startup and Power Operation................ 3/4 4-1 Hot Standby........................
3/4 4-2 Hot Shutdown 3/4 4-3 Cold Shutdown - Loops Filled 3/4 4-5 Cold Shutdown - Loops Not Filled 3/4 4-6 Isolated Loop....................... 3/4 4-7 Isol ated Loop Startup...................
3/4 4-8 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES Shutdown 3/4 4-9 Operating......................... 3/4 4-10 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER........................ 3/4 4-11 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES.......................
3/4441.
3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS 3/4 4-14 TABLE 4.4-1 MINIMUM NUMBER OF STEAM GENERATORS TO BE INSPECTED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION................
3/4 4-19 TABLE 4.4-2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION 3/4 4-20 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems................. 3/4 4-2?
Operational Leakage....................
3/4 4-22 TABLE 3.4-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES 3/4 4-24 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY.........................
3/4 4-25 TABLE 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CHEMISTRY LIMITS 3/4 4-26 TABLE 4.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CHEMISTRY LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4 4-27 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.....................
3/4 4-28 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 vii Amendment No.
0518
INDEX BASES l
l SECTION PEE 2/4.0 APPLICABILITY B 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL..................... B 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS..................... B 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 MOVA8LE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES................ B 3/4 1-3a.
l l
3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3/4 2-1 l
3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR AND RCS FLOW PATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR B 3/4 2-3 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT. POWER TILT RATIO B 3/4 2-5 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS...................... B 3/4 2-5 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION l
3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4 3-1 l
3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION................ B 3/4 3-3 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION............... B 3/4 3-6 l
3/4.3.5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR B 3/4 3-7 l
l 1
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION B 3/4 4-1 j
3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES B3/44-2 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER B 3/4 4-2 l
l 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES B 3/4 4-2 l
3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS.....................
B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE..............
B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY B 3/4 4-5
}
3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS B 3/4 4-7 i
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 xiii Amendment No. pp, pp, 0619 l
i.
i.
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 80 RATION CONTROL SIRITD0lBI MARGIN - N0 DES 3. 4 Alm 5 LOOPS FIltFD LIMITlius COMITION FOR OPERATION j
4 3.1.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to the limits shown in Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-3 and 3.1-4 for four loop operation and in Figure j'
3.1-2 for three loop operation.*
l j
APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4 and 5 I
ACTION:
l With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the required value, immediately initiate j
and continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution j
containing greater than or equal to 6600 ppe boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.2.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the required value:
a.
Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.
If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s); and b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the following factors 1)
Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)
Control rod position, 3)
Reactoi> Coolant System average temperature, l
4)
Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, 5)
Xenon concentration, and 6)
Samarium concentration.
4.1.1.1.2.2 Valve 3CHS-V305 shall be verified closed and locked at least once
- Additional SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements, if
- required, are given in Specification 3.3.5.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. pp, JJJ, 0481
~.
t I
of:g i:G 5
4 i
m 1
l (20so,3.4ss)
E 2 3.5 i
[,
<1 (2500,3.495) l 83 z
~0 2.5 E
4 2
2 7
,1 Z
/
j I
3 1.5 j
o o
(o,1.300)
(700,1.30c )
p 1
{
O r
g m 0.5 n
i if o
l o
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 w;
RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (ppm)
?
E FIGURE 3.1-1 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN FOR MODE 3 WITH FOUR LOOPS IN OPERATION s
t
- - ~ _ -.
i*
-FM I
a 4.5 m
i
~
l g
(2100,4.045)
^4
~
2 e
4 (1632'3.
t (2500,4.045) g 3.5 y
i f
Z 3
0 E 2.5 42
~
2 Z
g 4
0 1.5 j
h
'(o,1.300)
' aso,1m)
{
(
F 3
a z
U) 0.5 5
5 o
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
=
RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (ppm)
=
?
=
i FIGURE 3.1-2 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 3 WITH THREE LOOPS IN OPERATION f
i
!5
-F Ei E
m 6.5 5
6 (2o7s,s.ess)
= - - - - - - - - - -
2 (1324,s.2st) f
- - - - -- (2soo,s.ess)'
5.5 4
[
~
i gR 5
w z 4.5 r
C' 4
ot
/
i e
4 3.5 f
g
/
a 3
Z
=
g 2.5
[
O 2
O
'(o,1.300)
/
gg 3
Z 1
(t)
(355,1.3oo}
0.5 5
a 0
5 0
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
=
i RCS CRmCAL BORON CONCENTRATION (ppm) e 1
FIGURE 3.1-3 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 4
L
!=
l
'FMa m
7 i
6.5 n
j (22ans.sso) l l
s
[
~5 (1441,s.163)p (2soo,s.sso) l z
/
- 45 o
/
E 4
<st
[
i o
3 s 3.5 7
4 Z
3 N 2.5 f
O
/
O 2
7 i
F 1.5
~ (o,1.300) 3 e
(390,1.300) z us O.5
[
0 a
o 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 i
B a
RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (ppm)
!r
=
l FIGURE 3.1-4 j
REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 5 WITH RCS LOOPS FILLED
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS DRITD0WN NARGIN - COLD SHUTDOW - LOOPS NOT FILLFD LIMITING COMITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to l
a) the limits shown in Figure 3.1-5* or l
b) the limits shown in Figure 3.1-4*, with the chemical and volume l
control system (CVCS) aligned to preclude reactor coolant system boron concentration reduction.
APPLICABILITY: NODE 5 LOOPS NOT FILLED ACTION:
a.
With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the above, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6600 ppe boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
l b.
With the CVCS dilution flow paths not closed and secured in position in accordance with Specification 3.1.1.2(b), immediately close and secure the paths or meet the limits shown in Figure 3.1-5.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the above:
a.
Within I hour after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is-inoperable.
If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s); and b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the following factors:
1)
Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)
Control rod position, l
3)
Reactor Coolant System average temperature, 4)
Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
- Additional SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements, if required, are given in Specification 3.3.5.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. pp, pp M.
0401
__ __ _ _. ~. -. _ _
i I. "-
0; i
g t
7 7
5 6.5 n
(2200A150) 6 4
(1252,s.523)
(2500,s.150) i e4
[
5 v
z
/
- 4.5 C-
)
E 4
f 4
/
5 2 3.5 7
I z
3 3 2.5 f
O
/
i O
2 i
2 1.5. (o,1.aco)
/
p (3s5,1.300)
I I
1 i
(t)
,E 0.5 0
o 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,M RCS CRmCAL BORON CONCE.NTRATION (ppm) y 9
j FIGURE 3.1-5 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 5 WITH RCS LOOPS NOT FILLED k
- m..
..m
. m r
-i= v.
[5 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
"P"i REACTOR TRIP SYSTEN INSTRMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE E
FUNCTIONAL UNIT DE.. CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTIM A
- 17. Reactor Trip System Interlocks (Continued) w c.
Power Range Neutron Flux, P E 4
2 3
1 8
l t
d.
Power Range Neutron 4
2 3
1 8
Flux, P-9 l
e.
Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 4
2 3
1,2 8
,1 18.
Reactor Trip Breakers (2) 2 1
2 1, 2 10, 13 2
1 2
3*, 4*, 5*
11
- 19. Automatic Trip and Interlock 2
1 2
1, 2 13A l
Logic 2
1 2
3*, 4*, 5*
11
(
k
- 20. Three Loop Operation 8
2 8
1, 2 1
I Bypass Circuitry (1 switch per (From differ-a loop in each ent loop train) switches in
.I bypass) l
- 21. DELETED l
?
i 9
i a.
t m.
m
_ _ ~ _.. _
TABLE 3.3-1(Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS
- When the Reactor Trip System breakers are in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.
- Above the P-7 (At Power) Setpoint.
- Above the P-9 (Reactor Trip / Turbine Trip Interlock) Setpoint.
- Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
- Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
l l
(1) The applicable MODES and ACTION statements for these channels noted in l
Table 3.3-3 are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.
i.
j (2)
Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing a reactor trip breaker.
J ACTION. STATEMENTS j
ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or irc in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1, and c.
Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER for four loop operation or 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER for three loop operation and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85 % of RATED THERMAL POWER for four i
loop operation or 60% of RATED THERMAL POWER for three loop operation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT l
RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per j
Specification 4.2.4.2.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 77, pp, 77, 0482
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued 1 ACTION STATENENTS (Continued 1 ACTION 3 -
With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
a.
Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)
Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint, and b.
Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)
Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERHAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
ACTION 4 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.
ACTION 5 -
(Not used) l ACTION 6 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one 1e:s than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed l
provided the following conditions are satisfied:
a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per i
Specification 4.3.1.1.
(Not used)
ACTION 7 l
ACTION 8 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within i
I hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
l l
l l
l NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 77, Q, JU,
0492
i x
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) f REACTOR TRIP SYSTEN INSTRINIENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIRENENTS a
m TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING NODES FOR CHANNEL DEVICE WHICH E
CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE-
-i Q
FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS REQUIRED
- 18. Reactor Trip Breaker N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N(7,11)
N.A.
jg 2,3*,
g 1 2 i
- 19. Automatic Trip and N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N(7) 4, $*3*,
1 Interlock Logic
+
- 20. Three Loop Operation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
1, 2 Bypass Circuitry J
l 1 2 l
- 21. Reactor Trip Bypass N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N[7 N.A.
R(IE)15) 4, $*3*,
4 Breaker
- 22. DELETED l
,1 f
wb
?
[
i I
I a
wg E.
5 y
l TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued 1 TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued) l l
(10) Setpoint verification is not applicable.
l (11) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.
l (12)
(not used)
(13) Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Speed Sensor may be excluded from CHANNEL l
CALIBRATION.
(14) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the J
OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function. The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker trip circuit (s).
(15) Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.
(16) Automatic undervoltage trip.
(17)
(not used).
(18) The surveillance frequency and/or MODES specified for these channels in l
Table 4.3-2 should be reviewed for applicability.
l l
1 i
i l
l l
i 1
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. JJ. PP, 77, 77, oeos
- JPP,
\\
i INSTRMENTATION 3/4.3.5 SHUTD0W NARGIN N0NITOR LIMITING C0WITION FOR OPERATION i
3.3.5 Two channels of Shutdown Margin Monitors shall be OPERABLE j
i a.
With a minimum count rate as designated in the CORE OPERATING f
LIMITS REPORT (COLR), or b.
If the minimum count rate in Specification 3.3.5.a cannot be met, then the Shutdown Margin Monitors may be made operable with a lower minimum count rate, as specified in the COLR, by borating the Reactor Coolant System above the requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1.2 or 3.1.1.2.
The additional boration shall be:
1.
A minimum cf 150 ppe above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figure 3.1-1 (Mode 3 - 4 loops in operation) and Figure 3.1-2 (Mode 3 - 3 loops in operation),or 2.
A minimum of 350 ppe above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figure 3.1-3 (Mode 4), Figure 3.1-4 (Mode 5 - RCS loops filled) and Figure 3.1-5 (Mode 5 - RCS loops drained).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 3*, 4, and 5.
ACTION:
a.
With one Shutdown Margin Monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
i b.
With both Shutdown Margin Monitors inoperable or one Shutdown Margin Monitor inoperable for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes via i
dilution and rod withdrawal. Verify the valves listed in Specification 4.1.1.2.2 are closed and secured in position within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and at least once per 14 days thereafter.**
Verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1.2 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
- The shutdown margin monitors may be blocked during reactor startup in accordance with approved plant procedures.
- The valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls as noted in Surveillance 4.1.1.2.2.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-82 Amendment No.
0496
i l
INSTRMENTATION jf.3.5 SillTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.5 a.
Each of the above required shutdown margin monitoring l
instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by an ANALOG CHANNEL l
OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days that shall include verification that the Shutdown Margin Monitor is set per the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).
b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> VERIFY the minimum count rate (counts /sec) as defined within the COLR.
l l
i l
l l
i f
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-83 Amendment No.
0496
j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 1
j B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued) j MARGIN from expected operating conditions of equivalent to that required by 4
Figure 3.1-4 after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.
The maximum boration capability (minimum boration volume) requirement is established to conservatively bound expected operating conditions throughout core operating i
life.
The initial RCS boron concentration is based on a minimum expected hot i
full power or hot zero power condition (peak xenon).
The final RCS boron concentration assumes that the most reactive control rod is not inserted into i
the core.
This set of conditions requires a minimum usable volume of 21,802 gallons of 6600 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 1,166,000 gallons of 2700 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).
A minimum RWST volume of 1,166,000 gallons is specified to be consistent with ECCS requirement.
With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPER-ABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 350*F provides assurance L;at a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.
The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.3% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F. This condition requires either a usable volume of 4100 gallons of 6600 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 250,000 gallons of 2700 ppe borated water from the RWST.
The unusable volume in each boric acid storage tank is 1300 gallons.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 7.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.
This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
The minimum RWST solution temperature for MODES 5 and 6 is based on analysis assumptions in addition to freeze protection considerations.
The minimum / maximum RWST solution temperatures for MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on analysis assumptions.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment Jg, pp, p), JJ7, com
INSTRUNENTATION RAtFR REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION and EhGINEERED SAFET SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:
P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater valvesonT.,IveswhichwereclosedbyaSafetyInjectionor below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater va Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.
Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.
0-11 On increasing pressurizer pressure, P-ll automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure. On decreasing pressure, P-Il allows the manual block of Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure.
P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arming signal from the Steam Dump System.
P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves, main feed pumps and main turbino, and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.
3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that:
(1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) suffi-cient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance.
The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. J#,
0497
i i
[
INSTRUMENTATION
~
j BASES l
3/4 3.5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR The Shutdown Margin Monitors provide an alarm that a Baron Dilution Event may be in progress. The minimum count rate of Specification 3/4.3.5 and the i;
SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-2, 3.1-3, 3.1-4, and 3.1-5 ensure that at least 15 minutes are available for operator action from the j
time of the Shutdown Margin Monitor alarm to total loss of shutdown margin.
By borating an additional 150 ppe above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Figure 3.1-1 or 3.1-2, or 350 ppa above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Figure 3.1-3, 3.1-4, or 3.1-5, lower values of minimum count rate are accepted.
1 i
Shutdown Marain Monitors 1
l Backaround:
The purpose of the Shutdown Margin Monitors (SM) is to annunciate an increase in core subcritical multiplication allowing the operator at least 15 minutes response time to mitigate the, consequences of the inadvertent addition of j
unborated primary grade water (boron dilution event) into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) when the reactor is shut down (Modes 3, 4, and 5).
a The SMs utilizes two channels of source range instrumentation (GM detectors).
Each channel provides a signal to its applicable train of SMM. The SM channel uses the last 600 or more counts to calculate the count rate and updates the measurement after 30 new counts or I second, whichever is longer.
Each channel has 20 registers that hold the counts (20 registers X 30 count -
600 counts) for averaging the rate. As the count rate decreases, the longer it takes to fill the registers (fill the 30 count minimum). As the instrument's measured count rate decreases, the delay time in the instrument's response increases. This delay time leads to the requirement of a minimum count rate for OPERABILITY.
During the dilution event, count rate will increase to a level above the normal steady state count rate. When this new count rate level increases above the instrument's setpoint, the channel will alarm alerting the operator of the event.
Aeolicable Safety Analysis The SMM senses abnormal increases in the source range count per second and alarms the operator of an inadvertent dilution event. This alarm will occur at least 15 minutes prior to the reactor achieving criticality.
This 15 minute window allows adequate operator response time to terminate the dilution, FSAR Section 15.4.6.
LC.Q LCO 3.3.5 provides the requirements for OPERABILITY of the instrumentation of the SMMs that are used to mitigate the boron dilution event. Two trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide protection against single failure.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. JJJ o4ee
i i,
BASES (continued) i l
Anolicability i
\\
The SM must be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 because the safety analysis l
identifies this system as the primary means to alert the operator and mitigate the event. The SMMs are allowed to be blocked during start up activities in j
j MODE 3 in accordance with approved plant procedures. The alarm is blocked to allow the SMM channels to be used to monitor the 1/M approach to criticality, f
The SM are not required to be operable in MODES 1 and 2 as other RPS is credited with accident mitigation, over temperature delta temperature and power range neutron flux high (low setpoint of 25 percent RTP) respectively.
The SM s are not required to be OPERABLE in Mode 6 as the dilution event is precluded by administrative controls over all dilution flow paths (Technical i
Specification 4.1.1.2.2).
l Actions i
i Channel inoperability of the SMMs can be caused by failure of the channel's i
electronics, failure of the channel to pass its calibration procedure, or by i
the channel's count rate falling below the minimum count rate for operability.
This can occur when the count rate is so low that the channel's delay time is in excess of that assumed in the safety analysis.
In any of the above 1
conditions, the channel must be declared inoperable and.the appropriate action statement entered.
If the SMMs are declared inoperable due to low count rates, an RCS heatup will cause the SM channel count rate to increase to 3
above the minimum count rate for operability. Allowing the plant to increase 3
modes will actually return the SMMs to OPERABLE status. Once the SMM channels i
are above the minimum count rate for operability, the channels can be declared operable and the LC0 action statements can be exited.
i LC0 3.3.5, Action a. -
With one train of SM inoperable, Action a. requires the inoperable train to be returned to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
In i
this condition, the remaining SMM train is adequate to provide protection.
If the above required action cannot be met, alternate compensatory actions must l
be performed to provide adequate protection from the boron dilution event.
All operations involving positive reactivity changes associated with RCS
]
dilutions and rod withdrawal must be suspended, and all dilution flowpaths j
must be closed and secured in position (locked closed per Technical l
Specification 4.1.1.2.2) within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
l LCO 3.3.5, Action b. -
With both trains of SMM inoperable, alternate e
protection must be provided:
1.
Positive reactivity operations via dilutions and rod withdrawal are suspended. The intent of this action is to stop any planned dilutions of the RCS. The SMMs are not intended to monitor core reactivity during RCS temperature changes. The alarm setpoint is routinely reset during the plant heatup due to the increasing count rate. During cooldowns as the count rate decreases, baseline count rates are continually lowered automatically by the SMMs. The Millstone Unit No. 3 boron dilution analysis assumes steady state RCS temperature conditions.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. JJJ, 0498
BASES (continued)
I 2
2.
All dilution flowpaths are isolated and placed under administrative i
control (locked closed). This action provides redundant protection and defense in depth (safety overlap) to the SMMs.
In this configuration, a boron dilution event (BDE) cannot occur. This is the basis for not having to analyze for BDE in Mode 6.
Since the BDE cannot occur with the dilution flow paths isolated, the SMMs are not required to be operable as the event cannot occur and operable SMMs provide no benefit.
i 3.
Increase the shutdown margin surveillance frequency from every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This action in combination with the above, provide defense in depth and overlap to the loss of the SMMs.
Surveillance Reauirements i
The SMMs are subject to an ACOT every 92 days to ensure each train of SMM is 1
fully operational. This test shall include verification that the SMMs are set
[
per the Core Operating Limit Report.
i i
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. ///,
o4ee
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL 5 CORE OPERATING LINITS REPORT (Cont.)
8.
WCAP-11946, " Safety Evaluation Supporting a More Negative E0L Moderator Temperature Coefficient Technical Specification for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3," September 1988 (W Proprie-tary).
9.
WCAP-10054-P-A, " WESTINGHOUSE SMALL BREAK ECCS EVALUATION MODEL USING THE NOTRUMP CODE," August 1985 (W Proprietary).
(Methodology for Specification 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor.)
- 10. WCAP-10079-P-A, "NOTRUMP - A NODAL TRANSIENT SMALL BREAK AND GENERAL NETWORK CODE," August 1985 (W Proprietary).
(Methodology for Specification 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor.)
- 11. WCAP-12610 " VANTAGE + Fuel Assembly Report," June 1990 (M Proprietary).
(Methodology for Specification 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor.)
- 12. Letter from V. L. Rooney (USNRC) to J. F. Opeka, " Safety Evaluation for Topical Report, NUSCO-152, Addendum 4, ' Physics Methodology for PWR Reload Design,' TAC No. M91815," July 18, 1995.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 6-20a Amendment No. pf, o4ee
i Docket No. 50-423 B16447 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification
. Shutdown Marcin Reauirements and Shutdown Marain Monitor Operability for Modes 3. 4 and 5 PTSCR 3-16-97 P,2ckaround and Safety Assessment May 1997
4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
B16447\\ Attachment 4\\Page 1 1
I l
Backaround The Shutdown Margin Monitor (SMM) measures neutron flux during reactor shutdown conditions.
The purpose of this monitor is to identify any statistically significant increase in count rate that would indicate a loss of reactor shutdown margin. From the applicable analysis (e.g., Boron Dilution. Event), the increase in neutron flux is determined for which an a; arm is required and therefore, an alarm setpoint can be l
selected that gives the operator sufficient time to stop an unplanned loss of shutdown margin. The alarm function is credited in the current Boron Dilution Event analyses for Modes 3,4 and 5. Based on Reg. Guide'1.7L. the minimum available operator action time for Modes 3,4 and 5 must be greater than or equal to 15 minutes.
In performing its function, the SMM continually monitors the neutron count rate and multiplies the count rate by the Alarm Ratio in order to determine the Alarm Setpoint.
The Alarm Ratio is determined by the position of a switch on the SMM. The Alarm i;
Sdpoint is updated so that the lowest previous value is used for monitoring purposes.
As discussed below, the current and revised analyses assume that the alarm occurs at the time of count rate doubling. If the indicated count rate were identical to the actual count rate during the loss of shutdown margin event, then an Alarm Ratio of 2.0 would l
be appropriate and consistent with the analysis. However, a time lag exists between l
the indicated count rate and the actual count rate due to the metL. of calculating the indicated count rate. W lower the initial count rate, the slower the indicated count rate will follow the actual count rate. Additionally, the actual count rate is a statistically varying signal and therefore. an additional uncertainty is introduced to ensure that there is a 99% probability that the alarm will be initiated.
l Therefore, to account for the lag between the indicated and actual count rates and the statir.tical variations in the signal, the Alarm Ratio must be set at a conservative value
(< 2.0) to be consi at with the analyses of the Boron Dilution Event. Also, a minimum acceptable initial count rate must be established to ensure that the Shutdown Monitor wil(function in a manner which is consistent and conservative with regard to the i
analysis.
The re-analysis of the Boron Dilution Event to support this Technical Specification change was performed by Westinghouse. This re-analysis assumed additional time delays in the alarm provided by the SMM relative to the initiation of a limiting boron l
dilution event. These additional time delays resulted in increased Shutdown Margin l
requirements, as well as requiring minimum SMM count rate values to be specified, to ensure that the boron dilution analysis remains bounding.
1 LER 96-009-00, submitted on 5/21/96, first identified that a minimum SMM count rate needed to be specified to ensure that the boron dilution analysis remained bounding.
l Because of the potential for the SMM to become inoperable solely due to decreased l
l i
I
l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
)
B16447\\ Attachment 4\\Page 2
)
count rates from long outages, NNECO submitt'ed to the NRC on June 3,1996, a request for the SMM to be exempt from LCO 3.0t, so that it was permissible to go to higher operating modes with the SMM inoperable. The NRC approved this request in Amendment 131 on November 14,1996.
i The re-analysis of the Boron Dilution Event to support this Technical Specification change is intended to provide additional conservatism in the boron dilution analysis, so i
that the SMM's will remain operable at low count rates, except during very long outages. This will ensure that minimum reliance is made on the SMM exemption from LCO 3.0.4.
Current Shutdown Marain Monitor Status While unrelated to this proposed revision to the Technical Specifications, for i
completeness, it should also be noted that Northeast Utilities recently under 10CFR50.59 declared the SMMs operable for SMM count rates as low as 0.38 l
counts /sec. This was documented n LER 96-009-02, submitted on March 24,1997.
j The current and proposed boron dilution analysis assumed a conservative Inverse j
Count Rate Ratio (ICRR) curve which will bound the response of the SMM's for i
expected conditions of core loading configuration and outage leagih/ neutron count rate decrease. The analysis to lower the minimum SMM count rates and justify current opere5 ility of the SMM's used a less limiting (but still conservative) ICRR curve. This I
was possible because the neutron sources eventually reached a condition of being essentially inactive due to the long outage in progress. This was an interim measure j
for this outage only.
I 1
1 Safety Assessment J
Current Boron Dilution Event Analysis i
The analysis of the Boron Dilution Event is provided in the Millstone 3 FSAR Chapter 15.4.6 (Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in i
the Boron Concentration in the Ree.ctor Coolant). The current analysis of record was performed by Westinghouse in support of the upgrade to VANTAGE SH fuel. The analyses were performed to bound Cycle 4 operation in Modes 1 through 5.
The analysis was not performed for Mode 6 since a dilution event during refueling is precluded by administrative controls.
For Modes 3,4 and 5, the Boron Dilution Event analyses apply to the following five conditions:
= Mode 3 - N Loop,
- Mode 3 - N-1 Loop, i
. Mode 4,
. Mode 5 - RCS Filled,
. Mode 5 - RCS Loops Not Filled.
1
i U.S. Nucicar Regulatory Commission B16447\\ Attachment 4\\Page 3 Analyses were performed to define the minimum shutdown requirements for each of these conditions. These shutdown margin requirements ensure that the minimum time requirement of 15 minutes is met for the time from alarm / indication to the loss of shutdown margin.
The SMM is used to provide an alarm if there is an increase in count rate that would indiccte a loss of reactor shutdown margin. As noted previously, the initial / minimum count rate (at the start of a boron dilution event) and the Alarm Ratio are important parameters to assure that the operation of the Shutdown Monitor is consistent with the analysis.
l In summary, the Shutdown Margin requirements for Modes 3,4 and 5 are provided in the current Technical Specification Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-2, 3.1-3, 3.1-4 and 3.1-5. These i
requirements assure that the operator has a minimum of 15 minutes from the alarm to loss of shutdown margin during an assumed Boron Dilution Event.
Revised Boron Dilution Event Analysis Re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Event have recently been performed by Westinghouse. The re-analyses assumed additional SMM time delays, which were greater than those assumed in the current analysis of record for the Mode 3,4 and 5 conditions.
The re-analyses, with increased SMM delay times, result in revised shutdown margin /boration requirements which are more limiting than the current requirements; however, they provide operating margin in allowing the SMM to be considered operable at lower initial count rates.
The Shutdown Margin requirements provided by Westinghouse assume an additional SMM delay in the Mode 3,4 and 5 re-analyses. The use of these revised Shutdown Margin requirements and the lower allowed count rate continues to assure that the operator will have at least 15 minutes to mitigate the consequences of a Boron Dilution Event. The additional SMM delay times included in the Boron Dilution Event analyses resvitad in revised Technical Specification curves for Modes 3,4 and 5 (Figures 3.1-1, 3.1 "
3.1 -3, 3.1 -4 and 3.1 -5) of Shutdown Margin vs. RCS Critical Boron Concentration. As expected, the revised requirements are more restrictive since an additional SMM time delay was included in the analyses.
Additional re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Event were performed by Westinghouse with l
SMM delay times, which are more conservative (larger) than that used to develop the i
revised Shutdown Margin requirements. The results of these re-analyses were used to develop the additional boration values which are included in Specification 3/4.3.5. This specification directs the boration of the RCS above the Shutdown Margin requirements in i
Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5 in order to allow for the SMM to be considered operable for count rates which are lower than allowed by implementation of only the Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5 requirements. The additional boration values included in Speci*
a 3/4.3.5 are 150 4
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
B16447\\ Attachment 4\\Page 4 ppm for Mode 3 (to be added to the requirement in Figure 3.1-1 and 3.1-2) and 350 ppm for l
Modes 4 and 5 (to be added to the requirement in Figures 3.1-3, 3.1-4 and 3.1-5).
The proposed Shutdown Margin requirements for Modes 3,4 and 5 (Figures 3.1-1,3.1-2,3.1-3, 3.1-4 and 3.1-5 and LCO 3.3.5) will continue to assure that the operator has a minimum of 15 minutes from the alarm to loss of shutdown margin during an assumed Boron Dilution Event and also allow the SMM to be considered operable for count rates which are currently allowed. Values of the minimum count rate and Shutdown Margin alarm ratio required for operability will be specified in the Core Operating Limits Report l
(COLR).
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The Boron Dilution Event analysis is documented in FSAR Chapter 15.4.6. The proposed l
Technical Specification changes are based on the Westinghouse re-analyses of the Boron l
Dilution Event. As such, the re-analyses will become the " analysis of record" for the Boron Dilution Event in Modes 3,4 and 5.
Description of Technical Specification Chanaes Paaes 3/41-3 and 8 (Revised). Fiaures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5 (Revised) and Specification 3/4.3.5 (Added) i l
The proposed changes related to the revised Shutdown Margin requirements (Figures 3.1-l 1 to 3.1-5) and the Shutdown Margin Monitor operability (Specification 3.3.5) are based on re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Event for Modes 3,4 and 5 performed by Westinghouse.
In the re-analyses, assumptions were revised in order to provide two separate sets of Shutdown Margin requirements for Modes 3,4 and 5. The two sets of Shutdown Margin requirements and the manner in which they are used for this Technical Specification change were summarized in this Attachment.
l Additionally, a footnote (*) is added to Specifications 3.1.1.1.2 and 3.1.1.2 to note that additional Shutdown Margin requirements are given in Specification 3.3.5.
I in summary, the results of the Westinghouse re-analyses provide the following Technical Specification revisions:
More limiting Shutdown Margin requirements in Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5 are added which allow for the SMM to be considered operable for lower count rates in Modes 3,4 and 5.
Additional boration values included in Specification 3.3.5 which are to be applied to the Shutdown Margin requirements in Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5. The addition of Shutdown Margin above the requirements in the Figures allows the SMM to be considered cperable for count rater which are lower than allowed by implementation of only the Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-3-5 requirements.
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U.S. Nucinar Regulatory Commission B16447\\ Attachment 4\\Page 5 Specification 3/4.3.5 is added which includes the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements for the SMM. This LCO refers to the COLR in order to specify the minimum count rate /a! arm ratio requirements for SMM operability (LCO 3.3.5.a).
These requirements are a function of the Shutdown Margin which has been established (i.e., requirements of Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5 or additional boration as per LCO 3.3.5.b).
Additionally, Specification 3/4.3.5 includes Actions and Surveillance Requirements which are based on the current requirements in Table 3.3-1 (Functional Unit 21) and Table 4.3-1 (Functional Unit 22) for the SMM. Also, a footnote (**) is included in Specification 3/4.3.5 to make the Specification treatment of the valves consistent with the Mode 6 and Mode 5 loops drained requirements.
Deletion of Shutdown Marain Monitor Requirements in Tables 3.3-1 and 4.3-1 The addition of Specification 3/4.3.5 allows deletion of the guidance related to the SMM in Tables 3.3-1 and 4.3-1.
Specifically, Functional Unit No. 21 (Shutdown Margin Monitor) and the related Notation (@) and Action Statement (ACTION 5) are deleted from Table 3.3-1 since these Specifications are provided in LCO 3.3.5.
Also, the related Surveillance Requirements (Table 4.3-1 and Notation 19) are deleted. Without these deletions there would be redundant guidance between Tables 3.3-1/4.3-1 and the Technical Specification (Section 3/4.3.5) which is to be added.
Bases 3/4.1.2 (Revised) j in Bases 3/4.1.2 (Boration Systems), the Reference to Technical Specification Figure 3.1-5 (Shutdown Margin for Mode 5/ drained) is changed to Figure 3.1-4 (Shutdtwn Margin for Mode 5/ filled). This change makes the Bases consistent with the ACTION statement requirements of Technical Specifications 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.6.
Bases 3/4.3.1 (Revised and Moved to Bases Section 3/4.3.5)
The BASES for the Shutdown Margin Monitors in BASES Section 3/4.3.1 is moved to the added BASES Section 3/4.3.5. This Bases information is also revised to be consistent with the added Specification 3/4.3.5.
Baces 3/4.3.5 (Added)
Bases 3/4.3.5 (Shutdown Margin Monitor) is added to cupport the added Specification (3/4.3.5).
Section 6.9.1.6.b (Revised) l Reference 12 is added to the list of references in Section 6.9.1.6.b to include the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for NUSCO-152, Addendum 4 in the list of NRC approved l
analytical methods. This topical report describes the nuclear physics methodology used by NUSCO for PWR reload design. The addition of this reference is not related
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16447\\ Attachment 4\\Page 6 to or required by the changes proposed for the Shutdown Margin requirements or Shutdown Margin Monitors, in summary, this change results in the revision to Shutdown Margin requirements (Section 3/4.1.1, Tables 3.1-1 to 3.1-5), the addition of Specification 3/4.3.5 and its BASES, the revisions to Tables 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1 and the revision to BASES Section 3/4.1.2. The changes provide consistent guidance regarding Shutdown Margin requirements and SMM r
operability in Modes 3,4 and 5. Also, a footnote (") is included in Specification 3/4.3.5 to make the Specification treatment of the valves consistent with the Mode 6 and Mode 5-loops drained requirements.
The Shutdown Margin requirements are specified in Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5 and LCO 3.3.5 (additional boration) and the related SMM minimum count rate and Alarm Ratio requirements will be provided in the plant COLR.
The changes to the Technical Specifications and the related Westinghouse re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Event will not adversely affect the assumptions or results of other FSAR accident analysis and it is concluded that this change is safe. The changes do not adversely affect any equipment credited in the safety analysis. Also, there is no impact on the margin of safety as specified in the Technical Specifications.
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- Based on the above, the proposed Technical Specification changes are safe.
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1 1
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i Docket No. 50-423 B16447 i
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Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 t
Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Shutdown Marain Reauirements and Shutdown Marain Monitor Operability for Modes 3. 4 and 5 PTSCR 3-16-97 Sianificant Hazards Consideration and Environmental Consideration b
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9 4
i May 1997
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16447\\ Attachment 5\\Page 1 Sianificant Hazards Consideration j
i NN: JO has reviewed the proposed changes in accordance with 10CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC).
The bases for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR 50.92(c) are not satisfied. The proposed changes do not involve a SHC because the changes would not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed Technical Specification changes will revise the current shutdown margin requirements for Modes 3,4 and 5 in Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-2, 3.1-3, 3.1-4 and 3.1-5 and allow for additional boration of the RCS as directed by Specification 3.3.5. The new Shutdown Margin requirements are based on re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Event provided by Westinghouse. In the re-analyses, assumptions were modified in order to justify the operability of the Shutdown Margin Monitor for count rates which are lower than currently allowed.
The proposed Shutdown Margin requirements for Modes 3,4 and 5 will continue to assure that the operator has a minimum of 15 minutes from the alarm to loss of shutdown margin during an assumed Boron Dilution Event.
The proposed change also adds Technical Specification 3/4.3.5 to provide the LCO and Surveillance Requirements for the Shutdown Margin Monitors. LCO 3.3.5 refers to the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) which will specify the minimum count rate / alarm ratio requirements in order to consider the Shutdown Margin Monitors operable. The LCO also directs the additional boration of the RCS in order to allow the Shutdown Margin Monitors to be considered operable for lower count rates. Also, a footnote (**) is included in Specification 3/4.3.5 to make the Specification treatment of the valves consistent with the Mode 6 and Mode 5-loops drained requirements.
Due to the addition of Technical Specification 3/4.3.5, the related Bases information is added as BASES Section 3/4.3.5.
Additionally, the Bases information for the Shutdown Margin Monitors which is currently in BASES Section 3/4.3.1 is moved to the added BASES Section 3/4.3.5. This Bases information is also revised to be consistent with the added Specification 3/4.3 5.
Also, due to the addition of Technical Specification 3/4.3.5, the guidance related to the Shutdown Margin Monitor in Tables 3.3-1 and 4.3-1 is deleted to avoid redundancy.
Additionally, Section 3/4.1.2 of the Bases is revised so that it refers to Figure 3.1-4 (Shutdown Margin for Mode 5/ filled) instead of Figure 3.1-5 (Shutdown Margin for Mode 5/ drained). This change will make the Bases consistent with L
L
I [,
U.S. Nucl:ar R:gulatory Commission B16447\\ Attachment 5\\Page 2 the ACTION statement requirements of Technical Specifications 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.6.
Finally, Reference 12 (NUSCO-152, Addendum 4) is added to the list of references in Section 6.9.1.6.b.
The addition of this reference is considered administrative and is not related to or required by the changes proposed for the Shutdown Margin requirements or Shutdown Margin Monitors The new requirements for increased Shutdown Margin (Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5) and additional boration (LCO 3.3.5) continue to assure that the operator will have a response time of at least 15 minutes to mitigate the consequences of a Boron Dilution Event. The implementation of the new requirements does not alter the alignment of any plant equipment and therefore, the change cannot increase the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accident.
The proposed changes will not adversely affect the assumptions or results of other FSAR accident analysis and it is concluded that this change is safe. The changes do not adversely affect any equipment credited in the safety analysis.
Based upon the re-analyses of the boron dilution event, revised plant operating requirements (shutdown margin) are generated to maintain the required operator action time. Therefore, there is no effect on the probability of occurrence or consequences of previously evaluated accidents.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed Shutdown Margin requirements for Modes 3,4 and 5 (Figures 3.1-1 to 3.1-5 and additional boration as per Specification 3.3.5) will continue to assure that the operator has a minimum of 15 minutes from the alarm to loss of shutdown margin during an assumed Boron Dilution Event. Additionally, the use of these revised requirements allows the Shutdown Margin Monitor to be considered operable for count rates which are lower than currently allowed.
The changes do not introduce any new failure modes or malfunctions since the changes implement revised, more conservative plant operating requirements (shutdown margin) which are based on re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Evant.
Also, the changes do not eliminate any existirig requirements.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
b U.S. Nucl:ar R:gulatory Commission B16447\\ Attachment 5\\Page 3 3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The propcsed Shutdown Margin requirements for Modes 3,4 and 5 (Figures 3.1-1 to 2.1-a and additional boration as per Specification 3.3.5)~will continue to assure that the operator has a minimum of 15 minutes from the alarm to loss of shutdown margin during an assumed Boron Dilution Event. Additionally, the use of these revised requirements allows the Shutdown Margin Monitor to be considered operable for count rates as low which are lower than currently allowed.
The re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Event demonstrated that the required operator action time is maintained. As such, the re-analyses will become the
" analysis of record" for the Boron Dilution Event in Modes 3,4 and 5. The Boron Dilution Event analysis is documented in FSAR Chapter 15.4.6.
The re-analyses of the Boron Dilution Event and the proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications do not adversely affect the results of the current FSAR accident analysis and therefore, it is concluded that this change is safe.
1 Additionally, the change does not adversely affect any equipment credited in the l
safety analysis.
The changes do not have an adverse impact on the protective boundaries and there is no reduction in the margin of safety as specified in the Technical Specifications.
Thus, this proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
In conclusion, based on the information provided, it is determined that the proposed changes do not involve an SHC.
Environmental Considerations NNECO has reviewed the proposed license amendment against the criteria of 10CFR 51.22 for environmental considerations. The proposed changes do not involve a SHC, l
do not significantly increase the type and amounts of effluents that may be released off site, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Based on the foregoing, NNECO concludes that the proposed changes meet the criteria delineated in 10CFR 51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirements of an environmentalimpact statement.