ML20195F967

Requests Review of Encl Info Re Safety Classification of Refueling Interlocks at Facility & Assistance in Resolving Matter Prior to Restart

ML20195F967
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	01/06/1987
From:	Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Bernero R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20150E217	List: IR 05000293/1981037 ML20150E214 ML20154D919 ML20154D979 ML20154D997 ML20154E011 ML20154E031 ML20154E036 ML20154E048 ML20154E067 ML20154E079 ML20154E160 ML20154E171 ML20154E191 ML20154E203 ML20154E224 ML20154E248 ML20195F967
References
FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8702190275
Download: ML20195F967 (9)

Text

- _. _ _.____. _ _ _ _... _ _ _ _ _ _

2

- ~

eHo gn

,j g.,

s UNitge stAtts NVCLE AR Rt0VLATORY COMYl5$10N E

j RI QioN I e

pi s a t #4 a st a v ais yt mines or p a wstr a. pt ain lnvam A e

teses JAh 6 15 MEMDRANDLH FCR:

Robert Bernero, Directer Division of E.4 Licensing, NRR FRCK:

W1111a'n F. Kane, Cirector Division of Reactor Projects, Region !

SUBJECT:

5AFETY CLA551FICATION OF REFUEL!N3 !NTERLC<K AT FILGRIM This forwards to yev infermation about the safety classification of th ing intericcis at Pilgrim and requests your timely re"tew of this matt e refuel-er.

brid;e, including portions of the refueling interlecksBest The new being safety related.

$wtsecuently, t,wo pot.ential design deficiencies were, was discovered with the new refueling is The Regien telieves that these deft

.rlocks durirg preo;eratienal testing.

had the brid;e received the level y, encies could have been detected earlier safety related work activities, engineering review typically provided to ing evaluatien v.htch is attached to this eemo.in respcmse The engineerin n engineer-c1wded that the intericcks had been pecterly classified as nong evaluation c The evalt.atien used Attactrent, G to the F5AR, General Electric Se Safety-related.

tion Letter ($!L) 372, ard other information frcm General Elect i rvice Informa-the det,erminatten.

rents ard precedural coaar:15The e,alvat, ten ieplied that Technical specif r c to support criticality during refuelin;, are t,he primary means of prevent,ing an inadvertent not the intericcLs, Hc.ever, the Regicn notes that the Ptigrtm FSAR 7.6.4, "Safety Evaluation", states that the refuelinlocks", c ection to present criticality during refueling operat. ions, g interlocks are designed described as a fcurth level of backup to the interlocksFrecedural controls are that the interlocks are reqvtred along with certain ref Section 7.6.6 states tiens considered by the station safety analysis,t,1ons to prov i

velcpe of condl-i The stasien safety analysts appears to use the inter 1:cks actor prctecti0n s) stem,

, aleng with the re-enveicpe of the devign basis fuel h4FdIing accident.to place an inadvertent ir;ose restrictions.hich prevea.t atsectien 14.55, "FL,,el Handling Acci The analysis, F5tR c;erations.

Frcce bral centrols ar, inatiertent criticalitj d rts; refueling a*alysis n o t, discussed ir this secticn of t,he l

?

l

9te

\\

I I

E Region I believes that licensee incorrectly classified the refueling inte t

It is our positten that.,

measures to prevent fuel heedling accidents, they should te cla r ocks, 1

safety related.

assist the Regicn in resolving it with the licensee prior to res l

'i If you have any questiens re;arding this reRutst, please call either Harti M: Bride (!!7 747 0555), er Jim Wiggins (4SS-1123) of ry staf f, i

l

)

W 1114m F. Kane, Director Division of Reactor Project',

Enclosure:

As Stated

\\

i ec w/ enc 1:

l 1 J. 2.olinski. NRR

'l 1

_R. Aulue. M R l

t.. Bettenhausen. RI

{

J. Partlew.

i I

l i

i

{

4 4

I i

1 l

)

j

(

~

4 im

I 6, N C L OS ut?.(*

i j

l OfflCC MCMORANDUM j

Boston [dison Cce;any i

hMG control Nader e'

Date: Oc t obe r 15, 1986 Cept. Doc, NCO 86-781 Record lype As.08.

~

WM -safety Related Subj ec t :

O Cetemination of Ref ueling Bridge Interlocks i

1 1

1 Upon caref ul review, the Nuclear Engineering Departrent hat confi

{

ref ueling interlocks are properly classified 'non-Q' per the attached s r*ed that the u T.ary.

1 i

1 i

l i

I i

i i

i I

\\

t I

t I

\\

i 1

\\

-. ~ " " " ' '

-- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

l

- 1 l

i 1

.I v.

\\

1.

$VMARY The following document provides the required justi 1

cy411ty cate;ory detertninat. ion.

section 111 will clarify our position with respect to statementsSec provided in the FSAR.

1 11.

JV5flFICafl01 Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10, Section 50, Appendia 8 defines 2

that equipment to which 'Q' quality controls must be applied.

' structures, systems, and coeponents that prevent or mitigate the i

Those are health and safety of the public.' consequences of postulated acciden applying the criteria specified in 10CTR50.49(b)(1) for electricallette equipment.

relied upon to remin functional during and fo110 wing d 1

events (refueling) to ensure (1) the integrity of the teactor coolant i

pressure boundary.

Nintain it in a sa(fe shutdown condition, and (iii) the cap

11) the capability to shut dost the reactor and prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in i

potential of fsite espesures comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.'

These will be discussed individually.

(1) intf arity of the Reactor Coolant, Pressure Boundary t

FSAR, Appendix G identifies the Refueling Interlocks as System 1

[

in the event Ntrices.

I Operating States A and 8.They are only credited for Cperation in 4

by re eval of the Reactor vessel head.Beth Operating states are characterQ I

cannot be considered essential to the achievement of this sa goal.

i' (2)

[apabilityle 5kutde%n the erector and Main _tain it in a 5af e Shut ee.m Cenditien during refueling operations.1his safety goal raises t,he questi interlocks prevent an inadvertent criticalhy uring refuelin i

operations.'

However, failure of the interlocas alone will not I

cause an inadvertent criticality.

cocained with the f ailure of more than one individual to ope a

whhin the limitations imposed upon them by established procfdu

{

and administrative controls.

k 1he fuel handling evolution is carefully controlled under the guidelines of h00 procedure 4.3.

Specifications ensure that certain trerequbites have teen me prior to tuher the mosement of f uel or rexval of control rods tirAting Conditiens for 0;eratten asscciated with Cere Alterations are described in Secticn 3.10 of the lechnical Stecificatiens respectise Sur eillance Repiremenu are delineated in Section 410 The I

I e-

--yw.w-e

__,__.c--- - - -

• p,q, y

T 51L 372 of June 1987 l

i i

and consequences of a(Anatheent 1) discusses 'the potential for ref ueling operations conducted under the standard 1

}

$pecifications' Therein, GC concluded that the offsite e'

radiological releases frem such an event would not exceed i

limits. Additionally i

per reatter year,on the basis of several assumptio) 10 4 regarding plant ennditions.

Hewever, tholt assumed glant cond'aiens are not allowed at FNFS, as describH in the fo enanpies:

(a) Assumption:

'TwJ adjacent control rods are withdram '

LCO: 'All control root in a 3x3 array tentered un each of the control rods being removed are fully inserted and electk cr hydraulitally disarred, or have the svrrounding four fuel

)

assemblies removed from the tore cell '

i (b) Astutstion:

been negated.The refueli19 interlo:k signal to both drives has i 1

I

\\

LCO:

the refueling interlocks shall be cperable.Ourin

{

fuel assemblies h4ve been remsved...'.the 'ont

'... except that

.. after the 1hese restrictions reduce the probability of the inadverten I

criticality to less than the threshola defining a ' credible j

(3)

[n abilityj o Frevent er Miti that (Gid rnvit in Fotential Of f site Lmures et rsrablftte the t J.0f R Fo rt 100 Guioelines,

0 e to the the F5At defines ' Radioactive raterial release exceeding t i

l guideline values of 10tFR100' as the Unstte; table Safe e

'Attidents' (lable G.2-1),

entterassing attidents in F5At G.5.2.2.3.tvents 38 - 41 are defined as or is considered in Operating States A and B. Of these, enly event 40 i

those operating states, the Refueling Interlo

{

For the u.atrices for An em 15) are (chseqWences of [ vent 40.

e 111. c t h allita11tM 4

Ref erring again to the F5AR Appendix G ratrices i

'Re f ueling testri:.tions'.for Piarned C;eration' with which the l

, the 'Saf ety A ticns t

j restrictions category, the 'Unatteptable Safety Reuh' ae are Ge 1 -4 Fer lable G.2-1, U5R 1-4 is defined as the 'ttis tente e

s condition net censidered by statien safety analyset.' of a untion

}

j remsins within a condition fer which it has teen i

I the plant the staticn safety analysis f er tr e design tasis (CCA ns. es theter esa ple.

W

-.maA E

E

~

a availebility of ECCS systems to provide coolant rakeup an the core.

However, there are no physical, mechanical interlocks ng to preventing operation of the plant with Operator compliance with procedural res!Lo ECCS systems available.

(ase with the refueling interlocks.for Operation must be Such is also the allowed wtnch could lead to an inadvertent on is not In GCSSAR 11 (Attachment 2), General Electric has clearly position that refueling interlocks are 'not co a en the system.'

e y-related b

of General Elec tric (409-925-6139),

operators and procedural / administrative controls with o backup As reflected in the opening paragraphs of this secti 11, comented that use of the tem ' safety' in the FSAR is n on and in Section consistent with current practice associated with the tem 'saf related'.

FSAR Section 1.2.4 indicates that use of the related to concerns considered to be of primary safety si e y-e y 'is other definitions in Section 1 imply that there This and categories used in the licensing basis of the plant.

either associated with plant safety, power generation ee major Equipment was Within the safety category were three levels of i

, or neither safety, nuclear saf ety and en1intered safeguards.mportance - proce.

engineered safeguards are considered to be 'saf ety relat d'Of ss lY.

CONCLUS10W e

1he refueling interlocks are not required to remain assurance of any of the prinary safety goals.

operable for detemined to be inoperable during the required If an interlock is Additionally, the interlocks cannot f ail in su h quence.

independent failures would prevent another system f c

way that their a

consequences of an accident.

They ray rom mitigating the nonsaf ety-related and classified s 'no,n-Q'.therefore, be considered It should be further noted that in the only operating operable refueling interlocks (Operating States A and B) states 8.10.1 requires verification cf interlock operabilit

, NOO Procedure 8.10.lA must be signed by both the Watch Engi y prior to y

Check of f Tom Supervisor to signify acceptable perforrance of 'ae req i perating core alterations are al'3wed if '.he interlocks are fo u red tests.

No inoperable.

'I i

9.

.g w,g~,v c-

.c (sfkdQ

'?

i'

,,2' A3fF 'A _y 5

~

w>w Jwne 1 M2 rile Tib A

$ll ino. 372 9G5600702 category 1 R,[CCP9(4*(D M CKtif.Al $ PCClf!CA f!CK$ FDR FVf t (Cg The purpost of this Service Informatim Letter 15 to infore wtility persemel w i th cpe ra t ing B WR t o f a proc ot ed (Nange to the S ta nda rd tM Mic al teet t f f ca.

tions, h7(C.0123. Revision 3, dich g( plant Licensing Revte, crows and to the MC.

to pre s m t to the 8WR owtwrs i n t ee t th a t f ue l I c4 d in g t< t u s ;< rded wheft v e r 411 c oe t ro l ro fwliy instrted, e 4CIOTED ta f we l l e,g i n te r l oc k s ha n t+to s pec i f i ed f o r a l l SWR peo&c ', 18 45 to rtie focce c44ntier.al proce&rts to prohibit fuel lo4, ding with eay control blade witMrew in order to prevent the poteettal of criticality encurstems during re f we n t,9 09e r s t i ces. Operetth i

a l l e e4 bypa ll o f t he rt f we " * ;g p l a n t tec hn t e.a l spu t f t ca t t een ha ve, t.s d

t - * "1 x k i * " 1 to ta l er. tat con trol rW dri ves a t l or.; a t l e v er a l c r i t e r i a ( e. g.. reno v a l o f the f ue l a no41 t et wrrowns i ng ep, t he' bl a d t t o t< w i th!r.v ) we re s4 t i s f i ed.

N1tiple coctrol rod drivt or blade metntmance.The purgote of this wet to permit M

$ cme tMhaital itscifications then evolved throvsh utility ot90tiet toot with the sutc to ptfutt fwl loading Oa with withtram control bla$et.

N W. twbte4.ently 1stwd the BWt Standard '

s technica) $9ttifications (rat %-Cl23) which rtflKted this potttion.

$4stwetly. in rinxnte to a cwite:mer rewtst to twcly a refweltag interlt.;'.

b f; a t t pa rd ). Et in i t i a t ed a n i n.4eg t h rt e t tv o f re f we l t og inteelock rogs t re.

sects. A s o n et o f the res t w. a tott i f i c re f ue l t og ette t e w) at (centif tH watch twid lead to an c9ee vettel critic 411ty and stpatficant

~

f uel d.au ge. T he s ta rda rd tu ha i c a l t r ac t f t c a t i ons wert vted a t a ba t t s f or o

this eva194 0 en.

CM As a result, g( in trt90 ting a thange to the s tanda rd tMhnical spec t f tcattees.

N res tons f:r t hi s p r eoc t M c ha e ge a rt d i s cu s s ed be l c= f o11 cmq gy Geeer al g i e< t r i c ' s r e c ors < rda t i on f o r c& t r a t i n g $ W R t.

Ol5CVS$l0*t w eg (l....'. $. analysed the ra'*-*1 'a* and coet m a - **

a' a Iccal criticality twent attociatM with ri weling cotratices condxted unoer the f

stan?ard technical 1;Kificaticos..This tvet Can rttwlt from innteting a f wel bu ndl e a t t he re t i rm f wt 1 gr a sp l e L C et4 o f 40 f oe in to a f we l ed reg i on

.a ed.

,a

, a'*h hat withdelen ccMrol bladtt.

Its protability of occurrtnct AltMwgh thlt 1146 titrteely wnllitly tient. 6 ptr reactor ytar, the thetthold for defining a crtdible18 I

1 gegater than 10 e UI.

(,gn t> cwt of f s te rs iolcgical reltattl for thil event wN1d not tiettd10U110 II"Ul* IN I'"I il CCM U U d i' W * ID III'If I I *< ' I I P I '

f y r t fx 1 is*att 18 tre 1citi.

IIIIIAI I(l$IIl$

)

[

$WW N

~S A

Akk~'+ l 51L Mo. 372 2-Category 1

~

The primary rtatem for this event beleg probable it th4t 'h4 standard techetcal s p ec i fic a t t ee t (be fo rt t h e p ro po s e d... ;... s a l l o w l o a d t a g o f f we t bwedl e s

~

teto the cort with control blades witNrawn. The event stemario it at follows' 1,

To........ c on si v e visoe t are withdrawn.

2.

&cth Cth are valved out of service.

3.

The re fditag teterlock 11 041 to bo t h d r t re s ha s bee n me ys t ed (e. g., by j,ime.e rt, p ro b4 fault or totarluk fault).

1 4

Twel c ell s a dj a c e n t t o t he wi t hd raw bl a die s h4 rt bete Isaded a rts pt fo r the last bundle.

5.

Th e l a s t bv41 e i s l ow red i n t o t he eg t y a t t es41 y 1 x a t t en (i t he t been calcwlated that tM rtactivity wrth of this bW1e would be in t4 41 a c range).

6.

The control rtos operm f alls to observt $154 ewltiplicatten.

cp 7.

Th e rt a t ter goe s crit t a' and hig h f1W im<rse a Initia tet a st res s t ym41 hwt valved cwt drif ts Cam /ct SCrte.

8.

5tg6titcast twel fallwrt is prt4tett4.

State both the vettel arif drywell needs are recovtd kring rtfweltag, the o nl y ba r r t' r to re l e a l t a g f i t s t on p ro4 ve t s t o the eev i ron t 11 14 rsecto r buil d in g ( re e Ma rt I e M 11 C4a ta t ronee t t ).

-adiological estettenert of tAls 8

accidea'

.at:. P.at the radiatten rtlease rats will be withta 10Cftlto itsitt. htv t r. t M c om t e4s t+ c e s a re c oe t t de red su f f i c i tet l y seveet ts warrant a proposed champe to the standard tMMical trecificatteet.

O The p o pe t t4 t e c h s pet (N a te voy l d be to p roc te rt i ly pesA t h t t t he 1644 t a g o f fd 1 hw n dl e t t a t o t he c o rt wi t h a ny c on t rei b l a de risey,4.

N Tu rgtveltag taterlock tystes tatt:11ef am all Wits prtrents the 1644 tag of tw1 when a

.. trol blade it witMrawn.

4tt plant tHMical specificettent allte bytett o f th e ri f v411 m g t a t t ri oc k t to pe r f o re ow l t i p l e c en t ro l red d r t re a nd bl a de na t a tsmi mc e. idi t h L M pre po t t4 ll a nda rd t M h t h+c c ha nge.

• re f vtlle g int erlee n 'a p e rut t t he vi s..... i e t morv the m ea,s.....,.,<t blade wowld 1t111 b4 pervitted provided all bladel are riteterted triar te fw41 leadtag.

For the spKlai cast ehtch retstres coaplete of f.loadtag, a conglete ttt of bl a d e g si d e t o r a m a p p ro v e d p et< t dw rt e r me t >c d wou l d be reqwi rt i.

/

"'..,rs,w t e d s t a nd a r d ' e c h s p M c ha n ge w il l he l p p rt e t te e n t w r a n c e t ha t t w b.

criticality vt11 be salmtalmed throwgMwt t>e rifveltag estrattoa, t.e., the projablitty of occwrriste of this ty1:4 of ertat wowld be rtivctd Ost them 10* per rt atter yt a r.

1 *4 citrattmg plant tith spect 41rted; tacerecrate this feature.

L D

1

........ ~

• Wi

(

g tapery 1 1%4~41 393

(

at CcpotDESATIOn l

tee rti (1Mtric bellevet it would be prvdent for each utility to review its 44 adopt the concept of the proposed chaape to the stand i fic a t t ool.

Pri;4 red by:

R. C. 5 t t r1/R. C. 84 t e s A;pr$ved by:

_D. L. L47t oe. d N ye r H

litwed by:

Cutione r 5 e c e S* 29cet D. l. All red, MmA49ef Cuttener Servics !efsruntioc m et is?ereece:

A41. flant t w irteents n

O(

m N

0 4

- - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~~

e-.

(i

/......a%,

• 'a UNITED STATES

(}<

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

R E C10N I o,

%,*...+/g M1 PARN AVINUf u ppo OF PRWl A. Pf NNsYLV ANI A tH06 APR 011987 The Honorable William 8. Golden Massachusetts State senate Boston, Massachusetts 02133

Dear Mr. coleen:

This letter is in reply to your letter dated February 25, 1987, regarding our proposed meeting to discuss issues relating to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

I recognize that considerable time has passed since you filed your July 15, 1986, which requested that the Boston Edison Company (BECo) be o to show cause why Pilgrim should not remain closed or have license suspended until While I appreciate your concerns on this matter been.esolved.

denied its contentions.it clear that this delay does not mean the NRC I want to make RP.her, the delay has resulted f rom the NRC staf f's r

recognition that the plant

'.956, ard, during this period, comiderable changes have occhas rem 50 in Mr. James Taylor'soccur in the substantive areas outlined in your Petition.urred a As was indicated letter to you, dated December 19, 1986, the NRC will formally respend to the issues raised in the Petition.

Further, 4RC will net prolonged shutdown have been addressed to the s ng its i

In response to the specific questions in your letter, tien is prorided.

the foll0 wing clarifica-First, our proposed meeting is not intended to substitute for the c agency action on your Petition.

ompletten of actions regarding the Pilgrim plant, and answer que.stions you h tinue to evaluate the licenste's program to correct previously ide

, as we. con-problems.

ing, and they will be able to address the technicalSeveral s the meeting.

i s sue s w'iich arise during well as any other interested party,Second, we are willing to h oners as sake of ef ficiency, ve request that each group beincluding the licensee.

However, for the preselected spokespersons and that time limits be pre-establish represented by one or two i

group and/or topic, we can discuss this matter further.Ve have no objection t.o a transcript of

, but

Third, NRC response t,o the issues raised in your petitionwe do not in Readiness Report for an mww

S -

y l

.ri 7

o Honorable Villiam B. Golden 2

App p l l997 My staff will be in touch with your of fice to arrange a meeting in the near future.

l Sincerely, I

a

~ /

Themas E. Murle Regional Administrator CC:

The Honorable Barbara A, Hildt The honorable Frank H. Hynes Rachel Shimshak, Massachusetts Pub'ic Interest Research Group William Abbott, Plymouth County N.: lear Information Committee Gail Reed, Pilgrim Alliance bec:

B. Kane P. Polk J. Wiggins p McBride to, Klingler. IE J. Partlew, IE T. Martin

r' s .*

Gn are d

'o UNITED STATES f~ * %' E Q q l'

l

$.*}\\'V"'

3,.,

NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

Y W ASHING TON, D. C. 20$$$

"f 8 i f

s

,o a

• e..e 1

1 EDO F RINCIPAL C ORRFIPONDENC F CONTROL

..)

FROM:

DI.iF : 04/06/87 EDO CONTROL: 602654 DOC DT: 03/06/87 REP. GERRY E.

STUDDS F I N Al. REPl.Y :

TO:

CHAIRMAN 7ECH FOR S10NATI.lRE OF:

GRFFN SEC.Y NO: 87-275 EXECUTIVE DIRF6TCR DESC:

(,j, t...s..

e' ROUTING:

4 ENCLO!.E3 LETTER FROM CITIZENS URGINO RFSPONSIBl E TAYLOR ENERGY (CURE) RE *AFETY 111.UF? RE PILORIM NilCl. EAR NnRRY PLANT DFNTON DATE: 03/20/97

. /d '

I4-FT' I'",.'

ASSIONED,TO: RF'Il' CONTACT: MURt EY SFECIAL INSTRUCTION! OR REMARI5:

1 I

I

,-----m.,-a--,we

s OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDE!!CE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER:

CRC-87-0275 LOGGING 0.'TE: Mar 19 87 ACTION OFFICE:

EDO AUTHOR:

G.E. Studds--Const Ref AFFILIATION:

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LETTER DATE:

Mar 6 87 FILE CODE: ID&R-5 Pilgrim

SUBJECT:

Criticizes the Co: nission's regulation of the nuc power industry ACTION:

Direct xcply bcgNe W

DISTRIBUTION:

OCA to Ack SPECIAL HANDLING: None NOTES:

DATE DUE:

SIGNATURE:

DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION:

P::'d Off. E00 0:te -

J'*f7 Time __

/.L : MCD V

1 ITO e,s

--- ---...