ML20191A203

Issuance of Amendment Nos. 335 & 316-Revise Minimum Required Channels, Mode Applicability, & Actions for Source Range/Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Reactor Trip System Instrumentation

ML20191A203
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/06/2020
From:	James Kim Plant Licensing Branch 1
To:	Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group
Kim J
References
EPID L-2019-LLA-0229
Download: ML20191A203 (45)

Text

August 6, 2020 Mr. Eric Carr President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT:

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 335 AND 316 RE: REVISE MINIMUM REQUIRED CHANNELS, MODE APPLICABILITY, AND ACTIONS FOR THE SOURCE RANGE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NEUTRON FLUX REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (EPID L-2019-LLA-0229)

Dear Mr. Carr:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 335 and 316 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments consist of changes to the technical specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated October 23, 2019, as supplemented by letters dated May 11, 2020, and June 18, 2020.

The amendments revise TS 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.1.1, by modifying the applicable modes and required actions, and TS Table 4.3-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, to align the surveillance requirements.

A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

James S. Kim, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 335 to DPR-70

2. Amendment No. 316 to DPR-75

3. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv

PSEG NUCLEAR LLC EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-272 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 335 Renewed License No. DPR-70

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC, acting on behalf of itself and Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensees), dated October 23, 2019, as supplemented by letters dated May 11, 2020, and June 18, 2020, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 335, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Digitally signed by James James G. G. Danna Date: 2020.08.06 Danna 07:42:42 -04'00' James G. Danna, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 6, 2020

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 335 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Replace the following page of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 with the attached revised page as indicated. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert 3 3 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert XII XII 3/4 3-2 3/4 3-2 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13

instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level PSEG Nuclear LLC is authorized to operate the facility at a steady state reactor core power level not in excess of 3459 megawatts (one hundred percent of rated core power).

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 335, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) Deleted Per Amendment 22, 11-20-79 (4) Less than Four Loop Operation PSEG Nuclear LLC shall not operate the reactor at power levels above P-7 (as defined in Table 3.3-1 of Specification 3.3.1.1 of Appendix A to this renewed license) with less than four (4) reactor coolant loops in operation until safety analyses for less than four loop operation have been submitted by the licensees and approval for less than four loop operation at power levels above P-7 has been granted by the Commission by Amendment of this renewed license.

(5) PSEG Nuclear LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Renewed License No. DPR-70 Amendment No. 335

INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 PROTECTIVE AND 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

INSTRUMENTATION...................................................................... B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.............................................. B 3/4 3-1c 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION......................................... B 3/4 3-4 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION................................................................................. B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES............................................................................ B 3/4 4-1a 3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES.............................................................................. B 3/4 4-1a 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER................................................................................ B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE INTEGRITY.............................. B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE................................... B 3/4 4-4a 3/4.4.7 DELETED 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY....................................................................... B 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS............................................. B 3/4 4-6 3/4.4.10 DELETED......................................................................................... B 3/4 4-17 3/4.4.11 BLANK............................................................................................. B 3/4 4-17 3/4.4.12 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENTS................................................ B 3/4 4-17 SALEM - UNIT 1 XII Amendment No. 335

TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NUMBER MINIMUM OF CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. Manual Reactor 2 1 2 1,2, and

• 12 Trip

2. Power Range, 4 2 3 1,2, and 3* 2 Neutron Flux

3. Power Range, 4 2 3 1,2 2 Neutron Flux High Positive Rate

4. Deleted

5. Intermediate Range, 2 1 2 1(a),2(b) 3 Neutron Flux

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux A. Startup 2 1 2 2(c) 4 B. Shutdown 2 0 1 3,4, and 5 5 C. Shutdown 2 1 2 3*,4*, and 5* 7

7. Overtemperature T 4 2 3 1,2 6

8. Overpower T 4 2 3 1,2 6

9. Pressurizer 4 2 3 1,2 6 Pressure-Low

10. Pressurizer 4 2 3 1,2 6 Pressure--High SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 335

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (c) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks

• With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

• • Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

1. Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

1. 1. 1. If ACTION Statement 1 is entered as a result of Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) or Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers (RTBB) maintenance testing results exceeding the following acceptance criteria, NRC reporting shall be made within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2:

1. A RTB or RTBB trip failure during any surveillance test with less than or equal to 300 grams of weight added to the breaker trip bar.

2. A RTB or RTBB time response failure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the Technical Specification limit.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel (RTB) to OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range, Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 335

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or,

2. Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions** and,

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

ACTION 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions**.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 5 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 335

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 7 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement:

1. Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or

2. Initiate action to fully insert all rods within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and place the Control Rod Drive System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the next hour.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 8 - NOT USED ACTION 9 - NOT USED ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 12 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 14 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. 335

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS DESIGNATION CONDITION AND SETPOINT FUNCTION P-6 With 2 of 2 Intermediate Range P-6 prevents or defeats the manual Neutron Flux Channels block of source range reactor trip.

< 4.7x10-6 % of RTP.

P-7 With 2 of 4 Power Range P-7 prevents or defeats the automatic Neutron Flux Channels 11% of block of reactor trip on: Low flow in RATED THERMAL POWER or 1 more than one primary coolant loop, of 2 Turbine steam line input reactor coolant pump undervoltage pressure channels a pressure and under-frequency, pressurizer low equivalent to 11% of RATED pressure, pressurizer high level, and THERMAL POWER. the opening of more than one reactor coolant pump breaker.

P-8 With 2 of 4 Power Range P-8 prevents or defeats the Neutron Flux channels 36% of automatic block of reactor trip on RATED THERMAL POWER. low coolant flow in a single loop.

P-9 With 2 of 4 Power Range P-9 prevents or defeats the neutron flux channels 50% automatic block of reactor trip on RATED THERMAL POWER. turbine trip.

P-10 With 3 of 4 Power range neutron P-10 prevents or defeats the flux channels < 9% of RATED manual block of:

THERMAL POWER. Power range low setpoint reactor trip, Intermediate range reactor trip, and intermediate range rod stops.

Provides input to P-7.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 335

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS MODES IN CHANNEL WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK(15) CALIBRATION(15) TEST(15) REQUIRED

1. Manual Reactor Trip Switch N.A. N.A. (9) 1, 2, and *

2. Power Range, Neutron Flux (2), (3) (6) (17) (18) 1, 2, and 3*

3. Power Range, Neutron N.A. (6) (18) 1, 2 Flux, High Positive Rate

4. Deleted

5. Intermediate Range, (6), #, ## S/U(1) #, ## 1(a), 2(b)

Neutron Flux

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux (1)

A. Startup (6), #, ## (16),(8) and S/U 2(7)

B. Shutdown (6) N.A. 3, 4, 5 C. Shutdown (6), #, ## (10), #, ## * *

• 3,4,5

7. Overtemperature T 1, 2

8. Overpower T 1, 2

9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low 1, 2

10. Pressurizer Pressure--High 1, 2

11. Pressurizer Water Level-- 1, 2 High

12. Loss of Flow - Single Loop 1

1. If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.

1. 1. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the nominal Trip Setpoint at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the nominal Trip Setpoint are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and as-left tolerances are specified in the Technical Specification Bases.

(a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 335

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

NOTATION

• With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

(1) - If not performed in previous 31 days.

(2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(3) - Compare incore to excore axial offset above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Recalibrate if absolute difference 3 percent.

(4) - Manual SSPS functional input check in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(5) - Each train or logic channel shall be tested in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(6) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(7) - Below P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint.

(8) - If not performed within the frequency of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-6.

(9) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip mechanism for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.

The Test shall also verify OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker Trip circuits.

(10) - If not performed within the frequency of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 3 from MODE 2.

(11) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip mechanisms.

(12) - DELETED (13) - Verify operation of Bypass Breakers Shunt Trip function from local pushbutton while breaker is in the test position prior to placing breaker in service.

(14) - Perform a functional test of the Bypass Breakers U.V. Attachment via the SSPS.

(15) - Frequencies are specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program unless otherwise noted in the table.

(16) - At the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(17) - In MODES 1, and 2, the SSPS input relays are excluded from this Surveillance when the installed bypass test capability is used to perform this Surveillance.

(18) - The SSPS input relays are excluded from this Surveillance when the installed bypass test capability is used to perform this Surveillance.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 335

PSEG NUCLEAR LLC EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-311 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 316 Renewed License No. DPR-75

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC, acting on behalf of itself and Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensees), dated October 23, 2019, as supplemented by letters dated May 11, 2020, and June 18, 2020, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 2

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 316, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Digitally signed by James James G. G. Danna Date: 2020.08.06 Danna 07:43:54 -04'00' James G. Danna, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 6, 2020

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 316 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Replace the following page of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 with the attached revised page as indicated. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert 3 3 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert XII XII 3/4 3-2 3/4 3-2 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-8 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13

(4) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use at any time any byproduct, source or special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6) PSEG Nuclear LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level PSEG Nuclear LLC is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts (thermal).

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 316, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. PSEG Nuclear LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

Renewed License No. DPR-75 Amendment No. 316

INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 PROTECTIVE AND AND 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

INSTRUMENTATION .......................................................................... B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ............................................... B 3/4 3-1c 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION .................................................................................... B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 and SAFETY VALVES ............................................................................... B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.3 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER ................................................................................... B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES ................................................................................. B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.6 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE INTEGRITY ................................. B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE ....................................... B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.8 DELETED 3/4.4.9 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY........................................................................... B 3/4 4-6 3/4.4.10 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS ................................................ B 3/4 4-7 3/4.4.11 DELETED .......................................................................................... B 3/4 4-18 3/4.4.12 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENTS .................................................. B 3/4 4-18 SALEM - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No. 316

TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NUMBER MINIMUM OF CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. Manual Reactor Trip 2 1 2 1,2 and

• 12

2. Power Range, 4 2 3 1,2 and 3* 2 Neutron Flux

3. Power Range, 4 2 3 1,2 2 Neutron Flux High Positive Rate

4. Deleted

5. Intermediate Range, 2 1 2 1(a), 2(b) 3 Neutron Flux

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux A. Startup 2 1 2 2(c) 4 B. Shutdown 2 0 1 3,4 and 5 5 C. Shutdown 2 1 2 3*,4* and 5* 7

7. Overtemperature T 4 2 3 1,2 6

8. Overpower T 4 2 3 1,2 6

9. Pressurizer 4 2 3 1,2 6 Pressure-Low

10. Pressurizer 4 2 3 1,2 6 Pressure--High SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 316

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (c) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks

• With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

• • Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN

1. Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

1. 1. 1. If ACTION Statement 1 is entered as a result of Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) or Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker (RTBB) maintenance testing results exceeding the following acceptance criteria, NRC reporting shall be made within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2:

1. A RTB or RTBB trip failure during any surveillance test with less than or equal to 300 grams of weight added to the breaker trip bar.

2. A RTB or RTBB time response failure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the Technical Specification limit.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel (RTB) to OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range, Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

d. The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, as indicated by the remaining three detectors, is verified consistent with the normalized symmetric power distribution obtained by using either the movable in-core detectors in the four pairs of symmetric thimble locations or the power distribution monitoring system at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when THERMAL POWER is greater than 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 316

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or,

2. Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions** and,

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

ACTION 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions**.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 5 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

b. The Minimum Channel OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.1.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 316

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 7 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement:

1. Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or

2. Initiate action to fully insert all rods within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and place the Control Rod Drive System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the next hour.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 8 - NOT USED ACTION 9 - NOT USED ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 12 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 14 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. 316

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS DESIGNATION CONDITION AND SETPOINT FUNCTION P-6 With 2 of 2 Intermediate Range P-6 prevents or defeats the manual Neutron Flux Channels block of source range reactor trip.

< 4.7x10-6% of RTP.

P-7 With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron P-7 prevents or defeats the automatic Flux Channels 11% of RATED block of reactor trip on: Low flow in THERMAL POWER or 1 of 2 more than one primary coolant loop, Turbine steam line inlet pressure reactor coolant pump undervoltage channels a pressure equivalent and under-frequency, pressurizer low to 11% of RATED THERMAL pressure, pressurizer high level, and POWER. the opening of more than one reactor coolant pump breaker.

P-8 With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron P-8 prevents or defeats the automatic flux channels 36% of RATED block of reactor trip on low coolant THERMAL POWER. flow in a single loop.

P-9 With 2 of 4 Power range neutron P-9 prevents or defeats the automatic flux channels 50% of RATED block of reactor trip on turbine trip.

THERMAL POWER.

P-10 With 3 of 4 Power range neutron P-10 prevents or defeats the manual flux channels < 9% of RATED block of:

THERMAL POWER. Power range low setpoint reactor trip, Intermediate range reactor trip, and intermediate range rod stops.

Provides input to P-7.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 316

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS MODES IN CHANNEL WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK(15) CALIBRATION(15) TEST(15) REQUIRED

1. Manual Reactor Trip Switch N.A. N.A. (9) 1, 2, and *

2. Power Range, Neutron Flux (2), (3) (6) (17) (18) 1, 2, and 3*

3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, N.A. (6) (18) 1, 2 High Positive Rate

4. Deleted

5. Intermediate Range, (6), #, ## S/U(1) #, ## 1(a), 2(b)

Neutron Flux

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux (1)

A. Startup (6), #, ## (16), (8) and S/U 2(7)

B. Shutdown (6) N.A. 3, 4, 5 C. Shutdown (6), #, ## (10), #, ## * *

• 3,4,5

7. Overtemperature T 1, 2

8. Overpower T 1, 2

9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low 1, 2

10. Pressurizer Pressure--High 1, 2

11. Pressurizer Water Level-- 1, 2 High

12. Loss of Flow - Single Loop 1

1. If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.

1. 1. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the nominal Trip Setpoint at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the nominal Trip Setpoint are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and as-left tolerances are specified in the Technical Specification Bases.

(a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 316

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

NOTATION

• With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

(1) - If not performed in previous 31 days.

(2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(3) - Compare incore to excore axial offset above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Recalibrate if absolute difference 3 percent.

(4) - Manual SSPS functional input check in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(5) - Each train or logic channel shall be tested in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(6) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(7) - Below P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint.

(8) - If not performed within the frequency of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-6.

(9) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip mechanism for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.

The Test shall also verify OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker Trip circuits.

(10) - If not performed within the frequency of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 3 from MODE 2.

(11) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip mechanisms.

(12) - DELETED (13) - Verify operation of Bypass Breakers Shunt Trip function from local pushbutton while breaker is in the test position prior to placing breaker in service.

(14) - Perform a functional test of the Bypass Breakers U.V. Attachment via the SSPS.

(15) Frequencies are specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program unless otherwise noted in the table.

(16) At the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(17) - In MODES 1 and 2, the SSPS input relays are excluded from this Surveillance when the installed bypass test capability is used to perform this Surveillance.

(18) - The SSPS input relays are excluded from this Surveillance when the installed bypass test capability is used to perform this Surveillance.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 316

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 335 AND 316 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 23, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19296B108), as supplemented by letters dated May 11, 2020, and June 18, 2020 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20133K108 and ML20170A896), PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed amendments would revise Salem, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1.1, to address conditions of channel inoperability that are currently not described in the TSs and require entry into TS Action 3.0.3. Specifically, the proposed changes would modify the applicable modes and required actions associated with the source range (SR) and intermediate range (IR) neutron flux trip channels and add new applicable modes and required actions associated with the SR neutron flux trip channels. The amendments would also revise TS Table 4.3-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, to align the surveillance requirements for the SR and IR instruments with the TS 3/4.3.1 changes and to provide a time allowance in the requirement to perform the SR channel functional test under specified conditions.

The supplemental letters dated May 11, 2020, and June 18, 2020, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on December 17, 2019 (84 FR 68953).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 System Description The proposed changes to the Salem TSs are associated with the design and operation of the reactor trip system (RTS) trip functions of the SR and IR neutron flux instrument channels. The Enclosure 3

RTS consists of all components from the field-mounted process instrumentation to the reactor trip breakers, whose functioning initiate a reactor trip when required. Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 7.2 states that the RTS includes the nuclear instrumentation system, process control system, and the solid-state protection system.

The nuclear instrumentation system is designed to provide continuous overlapping ranges of neutron flux monitoring from shutdown through startup/power ascension and reactor power operations via the source, intermediate, and power range (PR) neutron flux instruments. The core neutron flux spans several decades in level; therefore, monitoring with several ranges of instrumentation is necessary. Each range of instrumentation (i.e., SR, IR, and PR) is specifically designed to monitor the leakage neutron flux in that range and provides primary or redundant overpower reactor trip protection during operation in that range. The overlap of instrument ranges provides reliable continuous protection beginning with source level through the intermediate and low power level from a completely shutdown condition to 120 percent of full power. In addition, the two safety-related Gamma Metrics wide range post-accident neutron monitors, which are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3, provide additional, continuous visual indication in the control room, displayed as source range count rate and wide range logarithmic power level, and have a range and sensitivity capable of providing indication across the SR, IR, and PR levels.

The PR neutron flux trip circuit initiates a reactor trip when two of four PR channels exceed the trip setpoint. There are two bistables per PR channel used for a high and low reactor trip setting. The PR neutron flux - low setting reactor trip provides overpower protection during startup and can be manually blocked when two out of four PR channels indicate above approximately 9 percent rated thermal power (i.e., the P-10 interlock). Three out of four PR channels indicating below the P-10 interlock automatically reinstate the PR neutron flux - low setting reactor trip.

The IR neutron flux trip circuit initiates a reactor trip when any one out of two IR channels exceeds the trip setpoint. Per Salem UFSAR Section 15.2.1, the IR neutron flux trip function provides additional protection against an uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip function provides redundant protection to the PR neutron flux - low setting trip function and can be manually blocked when two out of four PR channels are above the P-10 interlock. Three out of four PR channels indicating below the P-10 interlock automatically reinstate the IR neutron flux reactor trip.

The SR neutron flux trip circuit initiates a reactor trip when one out of two SR channels exceeds the trip setpoint. The SR neutron flux trip function provides redundant core protection for reactivity accidents and can be manually blocked when one out of two IR channels indicates above approximately 4.7x10-6 percent rated thermal power (i.e., the P-6 interlock) and is automatically reinstated when both IR channels decrease below the P-6 interlock. The SR trip function is automatically blocked by the P-10 interlock. The SR neutron flux reactor trip setpoint is established between the P-6 interlock and the upper range of the SR scale.

The PR neutron flux - low setting reactor trip, IR neutron flux reactor trip, and SR neutron flux reactor trip described above are designed to protect the reactor core against postulated power excursions during reactor startup and low power operation. The SR and IR neutron flux reactor trips provide redundant protection to the PR neutron flux - low setting reactor trip.

2.2 Description of Proposed Changes The licensee proposes the following TS changes in the LAR:

The TS Index would be revised to reflect an updated Bases page number.

The applicable modes for Functional Unit 5, Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux, in TS Table 3.3-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, would be revised as shown in Table 3.3-1 below. Table notations (a) and (b) would be added to TS Table 3.3-1.

The applicable modes for Functional Unit 6.A, Source Range, Neutron Flux, Startup, in TS Table 3.3-1 would be revised as shown in Table 3.3-1 below. Table notation (c) would be added to TS Table 3.3-1.

New Functional Unit 6.C, Source Range, Neutron Flux, Shutdown, and its requirements would be added to TS Table 3.3-1 as shown in Table 3.3-1 below.

Table notation ** would be added to TS Table 3.3-1 as shown in Table 3.3-1 below.

The following Table 3.3-1 is a partial excerpt of the proposed TS Table 3.3-1 and presents the proposed changes from the LAR. This partial TS Table 3.3-1 shows added text in italics with wave underline and deleted text in strikeout.

TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL MINIMUM NUMBER CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS ACTION OF TO TRIP MODES OPERABLE CHANNELS

5. Intermediate 2 1 2 1(a), 2(b) and

• 3 Range, Neutron Flux

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux A. Startup 2 1 2 2(c) and

• 4 C. Shutdown 2 1 2 3*, 4*, and 5* 7 TABLE NOTATION (a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (c) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks

• With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

• • Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

TS Table 3.3-1 Action Statements 3, 4, and 7 would be replaced with:

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or,

2. Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions** and,

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

ACTION 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions**.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 7 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement:

1. Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or

2. Initiate action to fully insert all rods within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and place the Control Rod Drive System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the next hour.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

The licensee proposes the following changes to TS Table 4.3-1:

Functional Unit 5, Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux In the Modes in Which Surveillance Required column, note (a) would be added to limit applicability in Mode 1 to below the P-10 interlock and note (b) would be added to limit applicability in Mode 2 to above the P-6 interlock. Table mode applicability notations (a) and (b) would be added to TS Table 4.3-1. The asterisk applicability

notation for conditions when the reactor trip system breakers are closed and the control rod drive system is capable of rod withdrawal would be removed.

Functional Unit 6, Source Range, Neutron Flux Functional Unit 6 would be expanded to the following three separate SR functions that reflect the design basis of the SR instruments and correspond with the changes to the SR functional units in Table 3.3-1.

Functional Unit 6.A, Startup Mode. In the Mode in Which Surveillance Required column of TS Table 4.3-1, note (7) would be added to Mode 2, which limits the surveillance applicability to below the P-6 setpoint to align with the range of applicability as described in the LAR. This addition of note (7) to Mode 2 would make note (7) in the Channel Check column of TS Table 4.3-1 unnecessary; therefore, that note would be removed.

Functional Unit 6.B, Shutdown Modes 3, 4, and 5 with reactor trip breakers open and the control rod drive system incapable of rod withdrawal. The channel check and channel calibration would be required to be performed at the frequencies specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. When in this condition, the SR instruments perform a monitoring function only, as discussed in the LAR. Therefore, the channel functional test is not applicable and would be marked N.A. In addition, there are no instrument channel setpoints associated with operability for Functional Unit 6B; therefore, the TS Table 4.3-1 # and ## notes for as-found channel setpoints would not be applied to the channel calibration.

Functional Unit 6.C Shutdown Modes 3, 4, and 5 with reactor trip breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal. The channel check, channel calibration, and channel functional test are required to be performed at the frequencies specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Note (16), At the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, is not required for the channel functional test since Functional Unit 6.C only has a single periodic frequency that is already addressed by Note (15), Frequencies are specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program unless otherwise noted in the Table.

The licensee proposes these additional changes to TS Table 4.3-1.

Functional Unit 6, Source Range, Neutron Flux Functional Unit 6.A, Startup Mode. In the Channel Functional Test column of TS Table 4.3-1, note (8) would be added, which provides a 4-hour allowance to perform the required surveillance when power is reduced below the P-6 setpoint.

Functional Unit 6.C, Shutdown Mode. In the Channel Functional Test column of TS Table 4.3-1, note (10) would be added, which provides a 4-hour allowance to perform the required surveillance when entering Mode 3 from Mode 2.

The following Table 4.3-1 is a partial excerpt of the proposed TS Table 4.3-1 and presents the proposed changes from the LAR. This partial TS Table 4.3-1 shows added text in italics with wave underline and deleted text in strikeout.

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS MODES IN CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CHANNEL WHICH FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK(15) CALIBRATION(15) SURVEILLANCE TEST(15)

REQUIRED

5. Intermediate Range, (6) #, ## S/U(1) #, ## 1(a), 2(b) and

• Neutron Flux

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux (16), (8) and A. Startup (6) #, ## 2(7)

S/U(1), #, ##

B. Shutdown (6) N.A. 3, 4, 5 C. Shutdown (6) #, ## (10), #, ## 3*, 4*, 5*

1. If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.

1. 1. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the nominal Trip Setpoint at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the nominal Trip Setpoint are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and as-left tolerances are specified in the Technical Specification Bases.

(a) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks (b) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks The following Table 4.3-1 is a partial excerpt of the proposed notation to TS Table 4.3-1. The partial notation to this Table 4.3-1 shows added text in italics with wave underline.

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

NOTATION

• With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

(1) If not performed in previous 31 days.

(6) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(8) If not performed within the frequency of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-6.

(10) If not performed within the frequency of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 3 from MODE 2.

(15) Frequencies are specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program unless otherwise noted in the table.

(16) At the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

2.3 Regulatory Requirements and Guidance 2.3.1 Regulatory Requirements Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) paragraph 50.36(c)(2) requires, in part, that TSs include LCOs. LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow the remedial action permitted by the TSs until the LCO can be met.

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) requires, in part, that TSs include surveillance requirements. Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met.

Salem, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, were designed in accordance with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) proposed general design criteria (GDC) published in the Federal Register on July 11, 1967 (32 FR 10213). The AEC proposed GDC applicable to Salem are documented in Salem UFSAR Section 3.1. The AEC proposed GDC applicable to this LAR are 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, and 23.

AEC Criterion 12 - Instrumentation and Control Systems. Instrumentation and controls shall be provided as required to monitor and maintain variables within prescribed operating ranges.

AEC Criterion 14 - Core Protection Systems. Core protection systems, together with associated equipment, shall be designed to act automatically to prevent or to suppress conditions that could result in exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits.

AEC Criterion 15 - Engineered Safety Features Protection Systems. Protection systems shall be provided for sensing accident situations and initiating the operation of necessary engineered safety features.

AEC Criterion 19 - Protection System Reliability. Protection systems shall be designed for high functional reliability and in-service testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed.

AEC Criterion 20 - Protection Systems Redundancy and Independence.

Redundancy and independence designed into protection systems shall be sufficient to assure that no single failure or removal from service of any component or channel of a system will result in loss of the protection function.

The redundancy provided shall include, as a minimum, two channels of protection for each protection function to be served.

AEC Criterion 23 - Protection Against Multiple Disability for Protection Systems. The effects of adverse conditions to which redundant channels or protection systems might be exposed in common, either under normal conditions or those of an accident, shall not result in loss of the protection function.

2.3.2 Regulatory Guidance Documents The NRC staff used NUREG-1431, Revision 4.0, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants, which includes Volume 1, Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML12100A222), and Volume 2, Bases (ADAMS Accession No. ML12100A228)

(NUREG-1431, the STS), to verify consistency claims made by the licensee.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 TS Changes The NRC staffs review focused on determining whether the TSs, as amended, would continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety in conditions where the reactor trip system instrumentation is relied upon. Specifically, the proposed changes to the Salem TSs are associated with the design and operation of the IR and SR neutron flux channels identified in TS Table 3.3-1 for Functional Unit 5 (IR neutron flux) and Function Unit 6 (SR neutron flux).

3.1.1 Proposed Changes to TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 5 - Intermediate Range Mode 1 Changes The proposed change would modify TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 5 (IR), from Mode 1 applicability to Mode 1 and below the P-10 interlock applicability, by adding a superscript (a).

In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

The existing TS requires the IR channels to be OPERABLE in Mode 1 up to and including full power operation, a range for which the IR channels are not intended to monitor and provide over power protection. Limiting the IR Mode 1 applicability to below the P-10 interlock is consistent with the UFSAR described design of the IR instrument channels. In MODE 1 below the P-10 setpoint, when there is a potential for an uncontrolled RCCA [rod cluster control assembly] bank rod withdrawal accident during reactor startup, the IR Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE as a redundant trip function to the PR Neutron Flux - Low Setting trip function.

The IR trip function is not credited to mitigate any accident or transient described in Chapter 15 of the Salem UFSAR. Therefore, limiting the Applicability within Mode 1 as proposed does not affect the current design basis.

Mode 2 Changes The proposed change would modify TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 5 (IR), from Mode 2 applicability to Mode 2 and above the P-6 interlock applicability, by adding a superscript (b). In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

The existing TS requires the IR channels to be OPERABLE in Mode 2. The IR neutron flux trip function is not required in Mode 2 below the P-6 setpoint because the SR channels provide monitoring and redundant over power protection in Mode 2 (from initial startup to the P-6 setpoint). The current TS Mode 2 applicability for the IR channels below the P-6 setpoint is overly conservative with respect to the design of the IR channels. In Mode 2 above the P-6 setpoint, the IR Neutron Flux trip is required to be OPERABLE as a redundant trip function to the PR Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint trip function.

The IR trip function is not credited to mitigate any accident or transient described in Chapter 15 of the Salem UFSAR. Therefore, limiting the range of applicability within Mode 2 as proposed does not affect the current design basis.

Applicability for IR with Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) in Closed Position and Control Rod Drive System (CRDS) Capable of Rod Withdrawal The proposed change would modify TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 5 (IR), by removing the asterisk notation, which specifies the mode applicability to include With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal. In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

Given the proposed changes described above to define Mode 1 and Mode 2 applicabilities for the IR function for operation below the P-10 setpoint and above the P-6 setpoint respectively, the required range of operation of the IR channels is clearly bounded during operation when the RTBs are closed and the CRDS is capable of rod withdrawal. For power levels below the P-6 setpoint, the SR channels provide the necessary overpower protection in parallel with the PR

Neutron Flux - Low Setting trip function and the IR trip function is not required.

Similarly, above the P-10 setpoint, the IR channels are not required for over power protection. Therefore, the need for the asterisk in the Applicable Modes column is unnecessary.

Changes to Surveillances Requirements The proposed change would modify surveillance requirements in TS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 5 (IR), to add note (a) to limit applicability in Mode 1 to below the P-10 interlock and add note (b) to limit applicability in Mode 2 to above the P-6 interlock. Additionally, the proposed change would remove the asterisk notation applicability condition when the reactor trip system breakers are closed and the control rod drive system is capable of rod withdrawal.

NRC Staff Evaluation of Changes to Functional Unit 5 - Intermediate Range The NRC staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and LAR Reference 6.2 (i.e., PSEG Nuclear LLC June 2, 2015 letter to the NRC; ADAMS Accession No. ML15153A193) and confirmed that the IR trip function provides defense-in-depth protection from overpower events during startup and is not credited to mitigate any analyzed accident or transient in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. The staff determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis, provide more direct and expeditious guidance, and remove redundancies. Additionally, the staff compared the proposed TS changes to TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 5 (IR), with the corresponding functions in NUREG-1431 and confirmed that the revised Salem TSs are consistent with the STS. The proposed changes to surveillance requirements in TS Table 4.3-1 align the surveillance requirements with the changes to Functional Unit 5 for consistency.

Furthermore, the two safety-related Gamma Metrics wide range post-accident neutron monitors are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 per Salem TS Table 3.3-11, Item 22. The Gamma Metrics channels provide additional, continuous visual indication in the control room, displayed as source range count rate and wide range logarithmic power level, and have a range and sensitivity capable of providing indication across the SR, IR, and PR levels. Therefore, the staff finds these changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and TS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 5 (IR), to be acceptable.

3.1.2 Proposed Change to TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6 - Source Range Mode 2 Changes The proposed change would modify TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6.A (SR - Startup), from Mode 2 applicability to Mode 2 and below the P-6 interlock applicability, by adding a superscript (c). In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

The existing TS requires the SR reactor trip function to be OPERABLE in Mode 2. The SR reactor trip function provides over power protection from shutdown conditions up to the lower range of flux monitored by the IR channels.

The SR trip function is designed to be manually blocked once any one of the two IR channels is indicating greater than the P-6 setpoint which is set at a value ensuring overlap between the SR and IR channels.

In Mode 2 above the P-6 setpoint, the IR channels provide redundant over power protection. The proposed change to the Startup Mode for the SR channels in TS Table 3.3-1 provides an upper bound of the P-6 power level in Mode 2 for SR

channel operability which is consistent with its design and operation. The SR trip function is redundant to both the IR reactor trip and PR - Low Setting trip functions.

The SR trip function is not credited to mitigate any accident or transient described in Chapter 15 of the Salem UFSAR. Therefore, limiting the range of applicability within Mode 2 as proposed does not affect the current design basis.

Applicability for SR with RTBs in Closed Position and CRDS Capable of Rod Withdrawal The proposed change would modify TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6.A (SR - Startup), by removing the asterisk notation, which specifies the mode applicability to include With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal. In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

This specified condition of Applicability, identified as an asterisk note in the Applicable Modes column for Functional Unit 6.A is proposed to be moved to a new Functional Unit 6.C (SR Neutron Flux - Shutdown).

Proposed New Functional Unit 6.C The proposed change would modify TS Table 3.3-1 by adding Functional Unit 6.C (SR -

Shutdown) to provide explicit requirements for SR channel requirements that were implied in the asterisk note described above under Functional Unit 6.A (SR - Startup). In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

Providing a separate line item for SR channel requirements for Modes 3, 4 and 5 whenever RTBs are closed and the CRDS is capable of rod withdrawal provides a more explicit description of mode applicability for SR trip operability whenever reactivity additions via rod withdrawal can occur during Shutdown. The proposed change maintains the same channel operability requirements established by the asterisk note that is applied to current TS Functional Unit 6.A.

Changes to Surveillances Requirements The proposed change would modify surveillance requirements in TS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 6 (SR), to expand to three separate SR functions corresponding to the proposed changes in TS Table 3.3-1. The proposed changes to Functional Unit 6.A (SR - Startup) and Functional Unit 6.C (SR - Shutdown) aligns with the other proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 to provide direct and expeditious guidance and to remove redundancy. In Functional Unit 6.B (SR -

Shutdown), the SR instruments perform a monitoring function only, and the trip function of the SR is not required to be operable, so the channel functional test is marked as N.A.

The proposed change would modify surveillance requirements in TS Table 4.3-1 with two additional notes. In Functional Unit 6.A (SR - Startup), note (8) would be added to the Channel Functional Test; this note provides a 4-hour allowance to perform the required surveillance when power is reduced below the P-6 interlock. In Functional Unit 6.C (SR - Shutdown), note (10) would be added to the Channel Functional Test column; this note provides a 4-hour allowance to perform the required surveillance when entering Mode 3 from Mode 2.

NRC Staff Evaluation of Changes to Functional Unit 6 - Source Range The NRC staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and LAR Reference 6.2 and confirmed that the SR trip function provides defense-in-depth protection from overpower events during startup and is not credited to mitigate any analyzed accident or transient in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. The staff determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis, provide more direct and expeditious guidance, and remove redundancies. Additionally, the staff compared the proposed TS changes to TS Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6 (SR), with the corresponding functions in NUREG-1431 and confirmed that the revised Salem TSs are consistent with the STS. The proposed changes to surveillance requirements in TS Table 4.3-1 align the surveillance requirements with the changes to Functional Unit 6 for consistency. The 4-hour time allowances allow adequate time to perform the required test and bring the SR channel into surveillance and declared operable and prevent the need to enter associated actions for inoperable SR channels. Furthermore, the two safety-related Gamma Metrics wide range post-accident neutron monitors are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 per Salem TS Table 3.3-11 Item 22. The Gamma Metrics channels provide additional, continuous visual indication in the control room, displayed as source range count rate and wide range logarithmic power level, and have a range and sensitivity capable of providing indication across the SR, IR, and PR levels. The Gamma Metrics post-accident neutron monitors are available in case the SR channels are in the 4-hour surveillance allowance period and have not been declared operable. Therefore, the staff finds these changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and TS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 6 (SR), to be acceptable.

3.1.3 Proposed Change to TS Table 3.3-1 Action 3 for Functional Unit 5.

The proposed change would modify Action 3 of TS Table 3.3-1. Specifically, Action 3 would be replaced with the following:

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or,

2. Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement

1. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions**

and,

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

• • Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

Action 3 of TS Table 3.3[-]1 currently does not provide direction in the event both IR channels are inoperable, thus requiring entry into TS Action 3.0.3 to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply. The proposed new TS

Table 3.3-1 Action 3.b provides direction for the condition where both IR channels are inoperable. The direction calls for immediate suspension of positive reactivity additions and reducing THERMAL POWER to below the P-6 setpoints within two hours. The allowed outage time will allow a slow and controlled power reduction to less than the P-6 setpoint and takes into account the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the IR Neutron Flux trip. Once below the P-6 setpoint, redundant core overpower protection is afforded by the SR trip function. The proposed Action 3.b provides an allowance for normal plant control operations that add limited positive reactivity (boron dilution and reactor cooldown) as long as these are factored into the SHUTDOWN MARGIN calculation.

Additional changes to Action 3 of TS Table 3.3-1 are proposed to provide improved direction and increased operational flexibility for the condition when one of the two required IR channels is inoperable. Action 3.a covers the entry condition when THERMAL POWER is below the P-6 setpoint. The action requires the inoperable IR channel be restored to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 setpoint; the point at which the trip function of the IR channels is required.

Similarly, ACTION 3.b covers the entry condition when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint. Entry into ACTION 3.b limits power ascension activities to below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER until the inoperable IR channel is restored to OPERABLE status.

This proposed revision to ACTION 3 takes into account the design basis of the IR trip function and the power levels within modes 1 and 2 where the IR trip provides additional protection from potential overpower conditions. The IR Neutron Flux trip Function provides protection against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function is redundant to the protection provided by the Power Range Neutron Flux - Low Setting trip Function that is credited in the UFSAR Chapter 15 accident analysis.

In summary, the proposed changes to TS ACTION 3 provide[] guidance that is currently lacking in the Salem TS for the condition where both IR channels are inoperable and provide[] actions that are more appropriate than those directed by TS 3.0.3 and more reflective of the design basis of the IR trip function. The changes also reflect the above described range of power where the IR channels are designed to provide overpower protection.

NRC Staff Evaluation of Changes to Action 3 Proposed Action 3.a would provide operational flexibility when one of the two IR channels is inoperable and takes into account redundancies with the Salem UFSAR Chapter 15 credited PR functions. Proposed Action 3.a would also provide allowance for limited plant cooldown or boron dilution changes, provided that it is accounted for in the shutdown margin calculation.

Proposed Action 3.b would add direction for the condition where both IR channels are inoperable, which is currently not addressed and requires the plant to enter TS 3.0.3.

The NRC staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and confirmed that the IR trip function provides defense-in-depth protection from overpower events during startup and is not credited to mitigate any analyzed accident or transient in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. The staff determined that the proposed changes to Action 3 are consistent with the current design basis, provide more direct and expeditious guidance, remove redundancies, and eliminate an inconsistency between Salem, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. Additionally, the staff compared the proposed TS change to Action 3 of TS Table 3.3-1 with the corresponding functions in NUREG-1431 and confirmed that the revised Salem TS would be consistent with the STS. Furthermore, the two safety-related Gamma Metrics wide range post-accident neutron monitors are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 per Salem TS Table 3.3-11 Item 22. The Gamma Metrics channels provide additional, continuous visual indication in the control room, displayed as source range count rate and wide range logarithmic power level, and have a range and sensitivity capable of providing indication across the SR, IR, and PR levels. Therefore, the staff finds these changes to Action 3 of TS Table 3.3-1 to be acceptable.

3.1.4 Proposed Change to TS Table 3.3-1 Action 4 for Functional Unit 6.A The proposed change would modify Action 4 of TS Table 3.3-1. Specifically, Action 4 would be replaced with the following:

ACTION 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions**.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately open reactor trip breakers.

• • Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

Similar to the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 Action 3, the proposed changes to Action 4 for SR channels in Startup Mode provide direction for the condition where both SR channels are inoperable that is lacking in the current Salem TS and provide directions for channel inoperability that better reflect the design basis of the SR trip function.

The proposed change to TS Table 3.3-1 Action 4.a directs the immediate suspension of positive reactivity additions whenever one of the two required SR channels is inoperable while in Mode 2 below the P-6 setpoint. The suspension of positive reactivity additions prevents any escalation of power and reduces the potential for an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident that would require mitigation.

The allowance in Action 4.a for reactivity increases resulting from boron dilution and reactor cooldown as long as these are factored into the SHUTDOWN

MARGIN calculation accommodates minor, anticipated reactivity changes during the channel restoration period while ensuring there is limited impact on reactor power or the shutdown status of the plant. There is no time constraint while in this state to restore the inoperable SR channel given the availability of the remaining OPERABLE SR channel as well as the credited parallel protection provided by the PR Low Setting trip channels.

The proposed Action 4.a is conservative relative to the trip protection function of the SR system in Startup below the P-6 power level.

A second proposed change to TS Table 3.3-1 Action 4 provides an action statement 4.b for the condition where both SR channels are inoperable while in STARTUP and less than the P-6 setpoint; a condition that is not addressed in the current TS Action 4. The proposed change requires immediate opening of the reactor trip breakers, thus causing an immediate insertion of any withdrawn control rods, placing the core in a more stable condition and removing the potential for any reactivity transient resulting from RCCA bank withdrawal that would require mitigation. The current lack of a TS action for two inoperable SR channels forces the plant into TS 3.0.3 and its associated time frames for lowering reactor power to a COLD SHUTDOWN condition. The proposed Action 4.b provides more direct, conservative direction than the current need to enter TS 3.0.3.

NRC Staff Evaluation of Changes to Action 4 Proposed Action 4.a would apply when one SR channel is inoperable and it would require immediate suspension of additions to positive reactivity with an allowance for limited plant cooldown or boron dilution changes, provided that it is accounted for in the shutdown margin calculation. Proposed Action 4.b would add direction for the condition where both SR channels are inoperable, which is currently not addressed and requires the plant to enter TS 3.0.3.

The NRC staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR along with the information provided in the LAR and determined that the proposed changes to Action 4 are consistent with the current design basis and provide more direct and expeditious guidance. Additionally, the staff compared the proposed TS change to Action 4 of TS TABLE 3.3-1 with the corresponding functions in NUREG-1431 and confirmed that the revised Salem TSs would be consistent with the STS.

Furthermore, the two safety-related Gamma Metrics wide range post-accident neutron monitors are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 per Salem TS Table 3.3-11 Item 22. The Gamma Metrics channels provide additional, continuous visual indication in the control room, displayed as source range count rate and wide range logarithmic power level, and have a range and sensitivity capable of providing indication across the SR, IR, and PR levels. Therefore, the staff finds these changes to Action 4 of TS Table 3.3-1 to be acceptable.

3.1.5 Proposed Change to TS Table 3.3-1 Action 7 for Functional Unit 6.C The proposed change would modify Action 7 of TS Table 3.3-1. Specifically, Action 7 would be replaced with the following:

ACTION 7 - With the number of channels OPERABLE:

a. One less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement:

1. Restore the channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or

2. Initiate action to fully insert all rods within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and place the Control Rod Drive System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the new hour.

b. Two less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement immediately open reactor trip breakers.

In the LAR, the licensee provides the following:

The proposed change to TS Table 3.3[]-1 to provide a new Functional Unit 6.C and new associated Action 7 provides improved clarity for the SR Neutron Flux trip function requirements in Modes 3, 4 and 5 with the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) closed and the control rod drive system (CRDS) capable of rod withdrawal. The proposed new Action 7 also provides direction for the condition of two inoperable SR channels which is not currently addressed in the Salem TS.

NRC Staff Evaluation of Changes to Action 7 Proposed Action 7.a would provide specific directions for the new Functional Unit 6.C. This proposed change would maintain the same channel operability requirements established by the asterisk note applied to the current TS Table 3.3-1 Functional Unit 6.A and the current Action 4.

Proposed Action 7.b would add direction for the condition where both SR channels are inoperable, which is currently not addressed and requires the plant to enter TS 3.0.3.

The NRC staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR along with the information provided in the LAR and determined that the proposed changes to Action 7 are consistent with the current design basis and provide more direct and expeditious guidance. Additionally, the staff compared the proposed TS change to Action 7 of TS Table 3.3-1 with the corresponding functions in NUREG-1431 and confirmed that the revised Salem TSs would be consistent with the STS.

Furthermore, the two safety-related Gamma Metrics wide range post-accident neutron monitors are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 per Salem TS Table 3.3-11 Item 22. The Gamma Metrics channels provide additional, continuous visual indication in the control room, displayed as source range count rate and wide range logarithmic power level, and have a range and sensitivity capable of providing indication across the SR, IR, and PR levels. Therefore, the staff finds these changes to Action 7 of TS Table 3.3-1 to be acceptable.

3.2 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) LCOs The NRC staff reviewed the LAR against 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2). Based on this review, the staff determined that the proposed changes continue to provide the necessary LCOs required for safe operation of the facility. Additionally, as described above, the staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and determined that the entry conditions are consistent with the current design basis, as well as NUREG-1431. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2).

3.3 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) Surveillance Requirements The NRC staff reviewed the LAR against 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3-1 align the surveillance requirements with the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 for

consistency. Based on its review, the staff determined that the proposed changes continue to provide the necessary surveillance requirements to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 4.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3).

3.4 AEC Proposed GDC Evaluation 3.4.1 AEC Criterion 12 - Instrumentation and Control Systems The NRC staff reviewed the LAR to ensure that the requirements of AEC Criterion 12 are met.

Based on a review of the proposed changes, the staff determined that compliance with AEC Criterion 12 is not impacted and that the instrumentation continues to monitor and maintain variables within prescribed operating ranges. In addition, the staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis.

Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of AEC Criterion 12.

3.4.2 AEC Criterion 14 - Core Protection Systems The NRC staff reviewed the LAR to ensure that the requirements of AEC Criterion 14 are met.

Based on a review of the proposed changes, the staff determined that compliance with AEC Criterion 14 is not impacted and that the core protection systems continue to be designed to act automatically to prevent or to suppress conditions that could result in exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits. In addition, the staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of AEC Criterion 14.

3.4.3 AEC Criterion 15 - Engineered Safety Features Protection Systems The NRC staff reviewed the LAR to ensure that the requirements of AEC Criterion 15 are met.

Based on a review of the proposed changes, the staff determined that compliance with AEC Criterion 15 is not impacted and that the protection systems continue to sense accident situations and initiate the operation of necessary engineered safety features. In addition, the staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of AEC Criterion 15.

3.4.4 AEC Criterion 19 - Protection System Reliability The NRC staff reviewed the LAR to ensure that the requirements of AEC Criterion 19 are met.

Based on a review of the proposed changes, the staff determined that compliance with AEC Criterion 19 is not impacted and that the protection systems continue to be designed for high functional reliability and in-service testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed. In addition, the staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of AEC Criterion 19.

3.4.5 AEC Criterion 20 - Protection Systems Redundancy and Independence The NRC staff reviewed the LAR to ensure that the requirements of AEC Criterion 20 are met.

Based on a review of the proposed changes, the staff determined that compliance with AEC Criterion 20 is not impacted and that the redundancy and independence designed into the protection systems continues to be sufficient to assure that no single failure or removal from service of any component or channel of a system will result in loss of the protection function. In addition, the staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of AEC Criterion 20.

3.4.6 AEC Criterion 23 - Protection Against Multiple Disability for Protection Systems The NRC staff reviewed the LAR to ensure that the requirements of AEC Criterion 23 are met.

Based on a review of the proposed changes, the staff determined that compliance with AEC Criterion 23 is not impacted and that the effects of adverse conditions to which redundant channels or protection systems might be exposed in common continue to not result in loss of protection function. In addition, the staff reviewed the Salem UFSAR and determined that the proposed changes are consistent with the current design basis. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-1 and Table 4.3-1 continue to meet the requirements of AEC Criterion 23.

3.5 NUREG-1431, Revision 4.0, STS NUREG-1431, Revision 4.0, was used as guidance by PSEG. The NRC staff reviewed the LAR to verify that its proposed changes were consistent with NUREG-1431, as claimed by the licensee. The staff confirmed that the proposed changes are consistent with NUREG-1431.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on February 19, 2020. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, published in the Federal Register on December 17, 2019 (84 FR 68953), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: C. Cheung C. Jackson K. Bucholtz Date: August 6, 2020

ML20191A203 *by memorandum **by e-mail OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL1/LA NRR/DSS/STSB/BC* NRR/DSS/SNSB/BC*

NAME JKim LRonewicz VCusumano SKrepel DATE 07/17/2020 07/16/2020 01/15/2020 05/26/2020 OFFICE NRR/DEX/EICB/BC* OGC - NLO** NRR/DORL/LPL1/BC NRR/DORL/LPL1/PM NAME MWaters JWachutka JDanna JKim DATE 06/30/2020 07/24/2020 08/06/2020 08/06/2020