Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re ESFAS Instrumentation & Reactor Trip Instrumentation
	ML20155C452
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	10/03/1988
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20155C441	List: ML20155C437; ML20155C452;
References
	NUDOCS 8810100037
	Download: ML20155C452 (8)
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AITACHMENT 1 REVISED PROPOSED MCGUIRE UNIT 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES l0R010100037 gegoog AbOCK 050003 9 p

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TABLE 3.3-3(Coatinued]

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Ng ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION I

M MINIMUM

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TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE F0i1CTIONAL UNIT OF Cf!ANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE F.GES ACTION n

3.

Contairment Isolation (continueds u

E b-Phase "B" Isolatica 1)

Annual Initiaticn 2

1 2

1,2,3,4 18 2)

Automatic Actuation 2

1 2

1,2,3,4 14 Logic and Actuation Relays

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3), Pressure--High-High Containment 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 16

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c.

Purga and Exhaust 3

Isolation I

1)

Manual Initiation 2

1 2

1,2,3,4 17 2)

Automatic Actuation 2

1 2

1,2,3,4 17 Logic and Actuation Relays 3)

Safety Inject. ion See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating fun'ctions and requirements k

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d TABLE NOTATION

rip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer T

Pressure Interlock) Setpoint.

"Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam pressure is not blocked.

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- These values left blank pending NRC approval of three loop operation, int envar.~s a spr<,e,asr..u s.o., aar ~or msoes sn.

, sort > : r-n one owe ~ a n~,m e n+.m two w oa ~* r seu r *~ A s**~r si&~a s c*,~< >n r w,ow 4 wov w:w-e* A'CTION STATEMENTS ACTION 14 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2. hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION l'5 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of C3 the next required OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE cnannels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in th6 bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met.

One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge supply and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

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McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-23 Amencment No.

(Unit 1)

AmendmentNo,jb (Unit 2)

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) c)S ENGINEERED SAFETY TEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TRIP c-3 ANALOG ACTUATING MODES i

N CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR kHICH CHANNEL CilANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE l

H FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST in' ' ' TEST TEST TEST IS REQl11 RED

[3.ContainmentIsolation a.

Phase "A" Isolation

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1) Manual Initiation N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3, 4

2) Automatic Actua-N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

Q 1, 2, 3, 4 tion Logic and i

Actuation Relays

3) Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

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b.

Phase "B" Isolation y

1) Manual Initiation N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3, 4 5

2) Automatic Actua-N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

Q 1, 2, 3, 4 tion Logic and Actuation Relays

3) Containment 5

R H

N.A.

1, 2, 3 Pressure-High-High c.

Purge and Exhaust Isolation

1) Manual Initiation N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

N.A.

!!. A.

1, 2, 3, 4

2) Automatic Actua-N.A.

N.A.

N.A M(1)

N(1)

Q M, 2, 3, 4

l tion Logic and

}h Actuation Relays i

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3) Safety Injection l 53.

See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) i 4

TABLE NOTATION j

(1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

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McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-39 A N-9~r~r~e.

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INSTRUMENTATION 3ASES e

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident:

(1) Safety Injection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reat, w trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generator', (5) containment spray pumps start and autoinatic valves position, (6) contat vnent isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) Turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatie. valves position, and (10) nuclear service water pumps start and automatic valves position.

Technical Specifications for the Reactor Trip Breakers and the Reactor Trip O Bypass Breakers are based upon NRC Generic Letter 85-09 "Technical Specifica-tions for Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.3," dated May 23,198:i.

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O McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 3-la Ar.endment No. ' Unit 1)

Amendment No fUnit 2)

ATTACEMENT 2 REVISED JUSTIFICATION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS PORTION 4

t The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Functional 1

Unit 3.c.2 and Table 4.3-2 Functional Unit 3.e.2 seek to add requirements to these Engineered Safety Features Actuation. System (ESFAS) Instrumentation

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Tables. These proposed changes are the result of an event at McGuire in which both trains of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) were inoperable for testing which disabled the automatic isolation capacity of the containment Purge Ventilation (VP) system from radiation monitor EMF-39 (Ref. Licensee Event Report 369/86-10).

Technical Specifications 3/4.3.2 and 3/4.3.3.9 have different requirements imposed on the automatic isolation capability of the VP System.

T.S. 3/4.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation (Functional Unit 3.c.2 - containment purge and exhaurt isolation automatic actuation logic and actuation relays) requires the automatic isolation actuation capability of the containment purge and er.hnust valves in Modes 1,2.3, and 4, but not for Modes l

i 5,6, and "No Mode" (no fuel in the reactor) status. A minimum of two channels are required to be operable in Modes 1-4, or the containment purge supply and exhaust valves are to be maintained closed in accordance with Table 3.3-3 Action 17.

The solid state protection system supplies reactor and component t

3 trip signals and initiates Engineered Safety Features (two redundant trains, i

l identical in function, provide equipment and personnel protection during l

normal operating and emetgency conditions).

Both trains of SSPS are allowed

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to be out of service by T.S. 3/4.3.2.

T.S.

3/4.3.3.9 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation (Instrument No.5 containment purge system low range noble gas activity monitor EMF-39) provides alarm and t

automatic termination of release.

A minimum of one channel is required to be operable "at all times" in order to provide for the isolation of the VP System as ap- *opriate (if EMF-39 detects high radiation it will send a signal to the SSPS to energf re a relay (K615) which in turn isolates the VP System), or l

purging or venting of radioactive effluents vis this pathway is to be l

immediately suspended in accordance with Table 3.3-13 Action 38 (Note that a proposed Technical Specification change currently under NRC review would allow l

credit to be taken for radit tion monitor EMF-36 (unit vent monitor) if EMF-39 i

is inoperable below Mode 4 (ref. DPC to NRC letter dated April 1,1988)).

y Since EMF-39 requires one train of SSPS to be operable in order to energize relay K615, the proposed T.S.3/4.3.2 changes would require the operability of the containment purge and exhaust isolation autoeatic ac tua tion logic and actuation relays in Modes 5,6, and in "No Mode" statue (note that while the overall SSPS may be removed from service below Mode 4, temporary viring may be installed to maintain power to relay K615).

Although EMF-39 is not an ESFAS device and does not serve a safety function (no credit is taken for it in the mitigation of an accident as assumed in the safety analysis), the changes I

would duplicate relevant T.S. 3/4.3.3.9 requirements to clarify that at least 1

one channel of the automatic isolation capability of the containment purge i

system must remain operable below Mode 4 (in order to maintain T.S. 3/4.3.3.9 requirements which require one channel to be operable "at all times"), with a minimum of two channels required in Modes 1-4 (pursuant to the current T.S.

3/4.3.2 requirements).

The T.S. 3/4.3.2 accion requirement (i.e. action 17)

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applicable in Modes 1-4 (i.e. for Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 3.c.2) remain as j

currently required by T.S.

3/4.3.2 (which is more restrictive than I

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i currently require.d by T.S.

3/4.3.3.9 for Moden 1-4), but the added T.S.

3/4/3.2 action requirement (i.e. action 17A) applicable below Mode 4 (i.e. for j

added Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 3.c.2A) is identical to the corresponding T.S. 3/4.3.3.9 action (i.e. Table 3.3-13 Action 38) as proposed to be revised in the above referenced April 1,

1988 submittal.

A full discussion and justification of the proposed Action 38 versus the existing requirements are contained in the April 1, 1988 submittal. [Should the proposed changes in the 1

April 1,

1988 submittal be denied, this proposal should, at that time, be considered modified to specify Action 17 for proposed Table 3.3-3 functional l

j Unit 3.c.2A instead of Action 17A).

Tne three asterisks on Action 17A are to i

denote that the provisions of Specification 3.0.3 do net apply for this item below Mode 4, as is now specified in T.S. 3/4.3.3.9.

Appropriate revisions to Table 3.3.3's table notation and action statements are madr to reflect the added requirements (i.e. Table notation definitions for "Hi" and "***", and statement of Action 17A).

The surveillance requirements as specified in T.S.

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3/4.3.2 Table 4.3-2 are also changed.

Presently, the Table, under "Modes for i

which surveillance is required", specifies Modes 1,2,3, and 4; the proposal i

would expand the requirements to "at all times".

This will ensure operability

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of the components below Mode 4.

The Bases section for Specification 3/4.3.2 is also revised to reflect these proposed changes.

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The proposed changes include no new substantive proposals or requirements.

The changes to Specification 3/4.3.2 Fur.c tional Unit 3.c.2 ensure the operability of the automatic isolation capability of the containment purge i

1 system by duplicating (a s a minimum) the requirements of Specification 1

3/4.3.3.9 Instrument No. 5.

The requirements of the two Specifiestions be.'ov Mode 4 would be identical, with the ESFAS Specification more restrictive u Modes 1-4 (as it now exists). The duplication will alert the operators to the J

fact that one channel of the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for containment purge isolation must remain operable at all times, even when there is no fuel in containment.

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ML20155C452

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