ML20154L842
| ML20154L842 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1988 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154L827 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-87-211, NUDOCS 8806010082 | |
| Download: ML20154L842 (10) | |
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bMITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Dccket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304 Commonwealth Edison Company -
Zion Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Licenses No. OPR"39 Lad OPR-48 '
EA 87-211 ORDIR IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I
Connonwealth Edison Company (licensee) is the holder of Operating Licenses No. DPR-39 end DFR-48 (licenses) irisued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC/Comnission) on April 6 and November 4,1973. The licenses authorize the licensee to operate Zion Generating Station in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
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A special inspection of the licensee's activities was conducted on September 21 through October 26, 1987. The results of this inspection indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with N3C requiremen'ts.
A written Notien of Yiolation and Proposed Irposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the licensee by letter dated January 4, 1988. The Notice stated ,
the nature of the violttions, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that the licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violations. The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation and Proposed ,
Imposition of Civil Penalty by letter dated February 3,1988. In its response, the licensee admits certain violations, disagreed that its pressure isolation t
valve testing program was inadequate, denied that Violation B occurred as stated in the Notice, took partial excepticn to Violation C, and requested mitigation of the civil penalty.
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After consideration of the licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanation, and argument for m;tigation contained therein. the Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Ordeh, that the violations occurred as stated and that the penalty proposed for the violations in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty should be imposed.
IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as anended ( Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount Of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) within 30 days of the date of this Ordet, by check, draft, or r,aney order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.
The licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order.
A request for a hearing should be clearly marked as a "Recuest for an 3 En'forcement Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cort.aission, ATTN: Dor'l ment Control v
Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555; to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137; and to the NRC Resident Inspector at 7'on.
If a hearing is requested, the Comistion will issue an Order designati'ig the time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be ef fective without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
(a) whether the licensee was in violation of the Comission's requirements as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty referenced in Section II above and (b) whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Jam s'M. Tay , Deputy Executive Of rector or Region 1 Operations Dated at Rockville, Maryland thisj, W ay of May 1988.
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- e APPENDIX f
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION In a letter dated February 3,1988, the licensee responded to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) dated January 4, 1988. In its response the licensee (1) admitted to two of the four l
violations documented in the Notice, (2) denied that Violation 8 had occurred,
' (3) admitted to Violation C in part, subject to qualifications, (4) asserted that it had aggressively pursued correction of pressure isolation valve testing deficiencies, and (5) requested mitigation of the civil penalty based on its l prompt corrective actions, its prior performance indicating responsiveness for regulatory concerns, and its denial that one of the violations had occurred.
Provided below are (1) a restatement of contested Violation B, a sumary of the licensee's response to Violation B, and the NRC's evaluation of the contested violation; (2) a restatement of Violation C (which the licensee has admitted fr, part), a summary of the qualifications associated with the licensee's admission of Violation C, and the NRC's evaluation of the licensee's qualifica-tions; (3) the NRC's assessment of the licensee's corrective actions concerning its Pressure Isolation Yalve (PIV) testing program; (4) the NRC's evaluation of the licensee's arguments in support of mitigation of the proposed civil penalty; and (5) the NRC's conclusion.
l l I. Evaluation of Violation B A. Restatement of Violation 8 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterio,. ., as implemented by Comonwealth Edison Company's Quality usurance Topical Report, CE-1-A, requires, in part, that t tast program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, -
systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures.
Contrary to the above, as of October 26, 1987, the licensee's test program failed to assure that all testing, required to demonstrate that pressure isolation check valves will perform satisfactorily in service, was performed in accordance with written test procedures.
The procedure did not provide eJequate direction as to when
' procedures were required to be performed. Specifically, during the refueling outage from March 1987 through August 1987, and after the safety injection which occurred on July 29, 1987, check valve leakage testing was not specified nor done to assure that the LPI/RHR check valves were installed correctly and functioning as pressure isolation barriers prior to plant startup.
B. Sumary of Licensee's Response In its February 3,1988, response, the licensee contends that procedures in place as of July 29, 1987, provided adequate direction as to when the PIV tests were to be performed. The licensee asserts that testing of the PIV's after the safety injection on July 29, 1987 was not required becau:e: (1) testing after a single valve actuation does not measurably decrease the already low level of risk from check valve failures as determined by testing every refueling outage,
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Appendix (2) the NRC has accepted Zion's testing program without requiring a test afte" each valve actuation, and (3) the testi.g1 programs in place at the majority of PWRs do not require testing more frequently than every refueling outage.
C. NRC Evaluation
- 1. The licensee asserts that testing check valves following valve actuation (such as after the July 29, 1987 safety injection) does not affect check valve failure probability. That assertion is not relevant to this violation. This violation resulted from the licensee's failure to establish an adequate program to assure that testing required to demonstrate that components would perform satisfactorily in service was carried out.
- 2. The licensee asserts that the NRC has accepted Zion's testing program without requiring a test after each valve actuation.
The licensee states that in a January 25, 1980 meeting, the NRC staff described how annual testing of check valves could reduce risk from check valve failures to an acceptable level. The licensee states that, in the formubtion of the February 29, 1980 Confirmatory Order, and in Inspection Report Nos.
50-295/80-14 and 50-304/80-14, the NRC established the position that Zion's testing prLgram was acceptable without the requirement to test after every valve actuation. It also cites t'a NRC endorsement of the Zion Probabilistic Safety Study
( 3 35) and NUREG-1150 results as further indication of NRC acceptance absent comitments to perform testing following each I valve actuation.
The NRC's Confirmatory Order issued on February 29, 1980 and the licensee's letters to the NRC dated March 14 and 28, 1980 described critoria for PIV testing. The Order specified the testing to be performed and the letters stated that procedures had been revised incorporating the requirement that these check valves will be tested whenever the primary coolant system pressure is brought to within 100 psig of the system designAfter pressure on the low pressure side of these check valves.
the July 29, 1987 safety injection, check valve testing was not done to assure that the LPI/RHR check valves were installed correctly and functioning as pressure isolation barriers prior
. to plant startup, even though the primary coolant system pressure i
' was brought to within 100 psig of the system design pressure on the low pressure side of these check valves.
Neither the NRC Confirmatory Order issued February 29, 1980, nor Inspection Report Nos. 50-295/80-14 and 50-304/80-14, nor the NRC endorsenent of the ZPSS and NUREG-1150 involved a detailed review of, or acceptance of, the PIV testing program and procedures being implemented by the licensee.
- 3. The determination of how and when to test PIVs is based on written comitments made by the licensee as well as on Orders and Technical Specifications. The Confimatory Order of 1
Appendix l February 29, 1980 which contained specific requirements for testing PIVs was imposed on Zicn Station because, unlike the majority of PWRs, Zion is located in a high population density l area. Regulatory requirements for eact facility are unique and requirements imposed on other licensees are not relevant to this case.
D. NRC Conclusion The NRC concludes that the PIVs had not been tested at the frequency required by the February 29, 1980 Confirmatory Order nor as described in letters to the~NRC. Therefore, the NRC concludes that the violation did occur as stated in the Notice.
II. Discussion of Violation C A. Restatement of Violation C 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, as implementea by Connonwealth Edison Company Quality Assurance Tcpical Report, CE-1-A, requires, in part, that the licensee comply with NRC Safety Guide 33, dated November 1972. Safety Guide 33 states that the requirements and recommendations in proposed standard ANS-3.2, "Standard for Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants," Jated November 2, dj72 (issued as ANSI N18.7), provide an adequate basis for complying (sith the quality assurance program requirements of Appendix B to 10
'CFR Part 50. ANSI-3.2, Section 5.4, requires that each procedure be reviewed periodically to ensure that the procedures in current use provide the best possible instructions to the operators.
Cc.. rary to the above, periodic reviews of test procedures PT-2P, PT-2M, and PT-2N, RHR Hot Leg and Cold leg Injection Check Valve Leak Check, were not performed from November 1980 through August 1987 to ensure that the best possib:e instructions were provided to the operatore.
B. Summary of Licensee Response The licensee admits the violation in part, with the following qualifications: (1) the licensee did perform periodic reviews of the subject procedures, and (2) the periodic procedure review i
l is outlined in Zion Administrative Procedure IAP 5-51-3. under I which guidelines the periodic procedure reviews were performed.
The licensee interpreted the violation to address the adequacy of I
the periodic review.
1 C. NRC Evaluation l
In August 1979, IAP 5-51-3, "Periodic Prccedure Review," established the licensee's periodic procedure review program. As implemented at Zion, procedures were considered to be reviewed when the procedures were performed and the results were evaluated. However, the NRC concludes this does not constitute a periodic review of the procedure, as recuired by ANSI-3.2 Section 5.4. In addition, guidance was not proviced in the procedures to ensure that, as the procedures were
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k Appendix being used, that an evaluation of adequacy of the procedures was conducted. Several procedural deficiencies had not been identified by the licensee's review process.
D. NRC Conclusion Based on the above, the NRC concludes that the violation did occur as stated in the Notice.
III. Assessment of Corrective Actions for Pressure Isolation Valve Test Program Deficiencies A. Sumary of Licensee's Response The NRC letter dated January 4, 1988, from A. B. Davis to J. J.
O'Connor, transmitting the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, stated:
"We are particularly concerned that CECO continued to maintain, until shortly before the October 30, 1987 Enforcement Conference that its PIV testing program was adequate to test the pressure isolation function of the PIV's and that it did meet regulatory requirements."
The licensee response to this issue asserts that once Ceco had become aware of specific test procedure deficiencies that had effectively prevented it from satisfying test requirements and comitments, it imediately began an aggressive program of rectifying the deficiencies and retesting the check valves.
- 8. NRC Evaluation While the NRC agrees that corrective actions began as early as September 24, 1987, execution of these actions was not pe-formed in accordance with the licensee's quality assurance program and required significant NRC involvement to ensure that PIV testing was performed correctly. The following are examples:
- After the NRC inspectors informed licensee management of specific PIV testing concerns on September 23, 1987, radiographic testing (RT) of some PIVs was conducted on September 24, 1987. However, review of the radiographs was not performed by Quality Control
- (QC) until October 5, 1987, after NRC inquired about documenta-tion of the RT, review of the results, and acceptance criteria used to evaluate the results. As of March 18, 1988, the licensee had not provided to the NRC the acceptance criteria used for that OC review. The licensee later had these valves leak tested because of ambiguities associated with the use of radiography as a PIV test method.
- On about October 2, 1987, the NRC asked whether calibrated test instrumentation was used for leak testing valves. On October 6, 1987, the inspectors learned that a flowmeter had been used in the past which was not in the licensee calibp tion program and had not been calibrated following repairs in 1982. This finding resulted in invalidation of all PIV testing performed since 1982, including the retesting of PIVs after September 23, 1987.
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Appendix - The licensee's response also states that on November 13, 1987, upon submittal of the proposed Technical Specifications (TS) regarding pressure isolation valve testing, the station ininediately implemented the proposed TS by issuing a standing order to operating shift personnel. On December 21, 1987, the resident inspector noted that the standing order had not yet been issued. A standing order was subsequently placed in the shift engineer's office on December 21, 1987, as a result of the resident's inquiry.
C. NRC Conclusion The NRC agrees that by November 24, 1987, the licensee completed all PIV testing on both units using calibrated instrumentation and in accordance with its Quality Assurance program; however, NRC involve-ment was required to ensure that test procedures were adequate to demonstrate the operability of PIVs and that the Technical Specifica-tion requirements were implemented in accordance with the licensee's commitment. The NRC has concluded that the licensee's corrective actions did not reflect an aggressive response to identified concerns.
IV. Assessment of Civil Penalty Escalation and Mitigation A. Sumary of Licensee Arguments for Mitigation The licensee believes that credit should be given for prompt corrective actions in response to the identified concerns, coupled with its past performance with regard to responsiveness to regulatory concerns. The licensee states that implementation of the regulatory improvement program in February 1984 has improved awareness of regulatory requirements, and that the absence of Severity Level III violations since 1983, except for the HVAC issue, which was attributed to original construction, is indicative of improved regulatory performance. The licensee states that Zion Station does not diminish the importance of any Level IV or V violations that were incurred during the past years; however, those violations do not indicate a lack of management initiative or unresponsiveness to regulatory concerns.
B. NRC Evaluation The NRC does not agree that the licensee took an aggressive approach to resolving identified concerns. Although the licensee's responsivenese to identified concerns has been enhanced by its regulatory improvement program, the program was ineffective in this case. A large number of quality program violations associated with PIV testing were identified.
Although the licensee's responsiveness has been improving in many areas, in this case the corrective actions were not prompt and were only minimally acceptable.
The licensee's past performance in the area of testing has only been satisfactory (i.e., rated Category 2 in the 1ctest SALP) and there have been several licensee event reports and violations related to testing and control of test equipment. Therefore, mitigation of the proposed civil penalty based on the licensee's past perfomance in this area is not considered appropriate.
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Appendix
- 6-C. NRC Conclusion Based on tne above, the NRC concludes that a sufficient basis has not been provided to mitigate the proposed civil penalty.
V. Conclusion After careful consideration of the licensee's response, the NRC staf' s<
concluded: (1) that Violations B and C described in the Notice occurre.c as stated, (2) that the licensee's corrective actions did not reflect an agressive response to identified concerns, and (3) a sufficient basis was not provided for mitigation of the proposed civil penalty. The NRC staff considers the violations to collectively constitute cause for significant concern and are appropriately classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level III violation. Accordingly, a civil penalty in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) should be imposed.
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