ML20237F106
| ML20237F106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1998 |
| From: | Kohn S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, KOHN, KOHN & COLAPINTO, P.C. (FORMERLY KOHN & ASSOCIA |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237F102 | List: |
| References | |
| LA-2, NUDOCS 9809020068 | |
| Download: ML20237F106 (54) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOg3 AC 18 IM 2: 30 PUBLIC Docunan guy;
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In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-295/304-LA
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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
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(Zion Nuclear Power Station,
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y o Units 1 and 2)
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August 18,1998 E38!
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CC o
h FS 0x PETITION TO INTERVENE AND INITI AL STATEMENT e
M OF CONTENTIONS AND REOUEST FOR STAY On August 12,1998 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") pqblished a I$veekly Notice in the Federal Register concerning a No Significant Hazards Consideration Finding
(" Finding") at the Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (hereinafter, " Plant Zion"). Vol.
63 Federal Register No.155, pp. 43200-20. This Finding concerned a March 30,1998 application filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (hereinafter, " Applicant") for an amendment to their license to operate Plant Zion Id., p. 43217. The original application was filed through a letter from John C. Brons, Site Vice President at Zion Nuclear Station to the NRC, dated March 30,1998. This letter contained a number of attachments. Attachment A contained a full statement of the proposed amendments.
On July 24,1998 the Staff of the NRC issued the Finding in this matter. On August 12, 1998 the NRC published a notice of this Finding in the Federal Register. This notice provided an opportunity for persons with an interest in the Finding to file a petition for leave to intervene on or before September 11,1998. The Petitioners herein hereby file their petition for leave to 1
9809020068 980826 PDR ADOCK 05000295 O
l intervene.
Additionally the August 12* EederalRegister notice also stated that contentions could be filed within 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in this matter. The Petitioners hereby are filing a set of contentions. However, the Petitioners reserve the right to amend this list of contentions and/or amend other parts of this filing within 15 days of the first prehearing conference.
Moreover, for the reasons set forth in this filing, the Petitioners' are requesting a stay concerning the implementation of the Finding.
l INTRODUCTION i
The Committee for Safety at Plant Zion (CSPZ), Mr. Randy Robarge and Mr. Edwin D.
Dienethal hereby file this petition for leave to intervene in matter referenced in Vol. 63 Federal Register No.155, pp. 43200-20 regarding Plant Zion. This petition includes, but is not limited l
to, a request for leave to intervene in the July 24,1998 "No Significant Hazards Consideration" finding reached by the NRC Staff.11, p. 43217. The CSPZ is a committee dedicated to ensuring l-that the operation and decommissioning of Plant Zion do not tarenten the health and safety of the public. Mr. Robarge and Mr. Dienethat serve as the co-directors of the CSPZ. Both Mr.
Robarge and Mr. Dienethal reside within ten miles of Plant Zion. Both worked at the plant as supervisors. Based upon their knowledge of actual plant operations, their ability to obtain information (and expert opinions) from current and former plant employees, and their direct 1
l personal interest in the safe operations of Plant Zion, CSPZ, Mr. Robarge and Mr. Dienethal are uniquely situated to positively contribute to the licensing proceeding.
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As is set forth in the proposed contentions, the proposed amendments pose significant hazards to the public health and safety. The proposed amendments will:
i involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident e
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previously evaluated; create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident e
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involves a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
e 10 C.F.R. $ 50.92.
This petition concems the failure of Applicant to properly manage Plant Zion. As a result I
of these failures, Plant Zion has been shut down many years ahead of schedule. This premature shut down will cost the tax payers hundreds of millions of dollars, it will directly or indirectly I
negatively impact on the tax base for the City of Zion and the surrounding communities, and it has already cost hundreds of employees theirjobs, forcing residents to relocate, enter early retirement, become unemployed, or otherwise suffer financially due to the misconduct and mismanagement of Applicant. Worse, the failure of Applicant to adhere to the requirements of L
its operating licenses and safety regulations resulted in significant and material threats to the public health and safety, the local environment and the health of plant workers, all of which contributed to the need to close down Plant Zion.
These mistakes and misconduct, which have resulted in this terrible state of affairs for the employees, former employees, and persons who reside around Plant Zion, cannot be repeated as l
the plant prepares for the " decommissioning" phase. The hazards to the public health and safety posed by the continued presence of radioactive material at the Zion site, and the work which 3
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must be performed to decommission the plant, are as severe, and in many cases more severe, than those that existed during the full operational phase of the plant. However, because Applicant is not caming a profit from Zion, its incentive to properly manage the plant and pay the costs necessary to fully protect the persons and property interests of the local community is diminutive. As will be set forth below, even now, as the first steps of the decommissioning process begin, Applicant is seeking to cut costs which will undermine the public health and safety.
Whether or not Plant Zion operates at a profit or a loss, and whether or not the safe l
decommissioning and continued maintenance of the plant costs Applicant resources, should be of I
no concem to the public or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In fact, the public and i
the NRC must fully recognize how the lack of a profit incentive will negatively impact on l
Applicant's shutdown and decommissioning process. Significantly, even when Applicant had a l
l profit incentive in the past to properly manage and operate Plant Zion, it utterly failed to exercise l
the professionalism necessary to run the plant.
Although Plant Zion has not produced electricity for a considerable period of tim md Commonwealth Edison has announced its intention to decommission the plant, the Applicants has not submitted a decommissioning plan to the NRC. Accordingly, Plant Zion is still h
considered an operational nuclear plant and must be held to comply with nuclear safety regulations and standards applicable to operational plants until it submits and receives approval i
of a decommissioned plant. However, Commonwealth Edison seeks through the proposed amendments to circumvent normal nuclear safety regulation standards.
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STANDING l
To comply with basic standing requirements, the petitioners need to prove three elements of standing. First, that the petitioners have or will suffer a distinct and palpable injury in fact within the zone ofinterest. Second, that the injury is or can befairly traceable to the challenged i
action. And third, that the injury is likely to be remedied by a favorable decision in the pending case. Yankee Atomic Electric Co.,43 NRC 61,68 (1996).
The possibility of health and safety or environmental injuries is palpable to substantiate injury in fact as long as "some, even minor, public exposures can be anticipated..." E,43 NRC at 70. The petitioners need only prove a reasonable possibility of a future injury-in-fact l
arising out of either residency or recreational activity in proximity to the facility, or by travel of common " waste transportation routes." E l
It has been long held that petitioners who reside within a 50 mile radius of the facility
- have sufficient standing to intervene.' Residing within this distance alone places petitioners within the " zone of harm," exposing them to concrete possibilities ofinjury-in-fact caused by the facility. Although a 50-mile presumption does not apply in all license amendment proceedings, the Commission has held it is sufficient to confer standing where a significant amendment is involved and there is an " obvious potential for offsite consequences." Florida Power & Light f,1,30 NRC 325,329-330 (1989). The facts of each case may be taken into account when 3 See Georgia Power Co.,32 NRC 89,92 (1990); Virginin Electric and Power Co. 9 NRC 54,56 (1979); Houston Lighting and Power Co.,9 NRC 439,443-44 (1979); Tennessee Vallev Authority,5 NRC 1418,1421 n.4 (1977).
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determining what distance is relevant. "Whether and at what distance a petitioner can be presumed to be affected must be judged on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature of 1
the proposed action and significance of the radioactive source." Geornia Institute of Technology, l
42 NRC 111,116 (1995).
Unquestionably, persons who reside or recreate _within the " general vicinity of the plant" qualify as injury in fact victims within the zone ofinterest.2 For example, a commuter who drives by the facility on a regular basis qualifies within the " zone of harm" of possible injury-in-fact. Georgia Institute of Technolonv,42 NRC at 117. Additionally, a person who lives 7 days per month in a house located 35 miles from a nuclear power plant would have standing to intervene in a license amendment case. Georgia Power Co.. et al.,37 NRC 96,106-107 (1993).
Moreover, a person who lives 45 miles from a nuclear plant and canoes in the general vicinity of the plant has been found to suffer " injury in fact" from a proposed license amendment to permit expansion of the capacity of the spent fuel pool. Virainin Electric and Power Co. 9 NRC at 57.
In this case, Petitioners Robarge and Dienethal resides within 10 miles of Plant Zion, well within the stand ud distance accepted for intervention. San Affidavit of Robarge.j 2; Affidavit i
of Edwin D. Dienethal,12. In addition, Mr. Robarge has significant contact with Plant Zion and I
the Zion community such that his intervention in this proceeding would serve the pubic interest.
I Exhibit 11, Tr. 470-508.
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Petitioners Robarge and Dienethal and, and their families reside, recreate, work, and 1
- 2Sgg Virginia Electric and Power Co.,9 NRC at 56 (holding that only the " existence of a reasonablepossibility that expansion of the spent fuel pool capacity might have an adverse impact upon persons living nearby" is needed to prove standing) (Emphasis added.).
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l-l perform virtually all of their everyday activities well within Plant Zion's " zone of harm."
Besides residing only ten miles from the facility, the Petitioner and his family boat, fish, swim,-
and play water sports in Lake Michigan, where Plant Zion discharges effluents and waste, ses Amdavit of Edwin D. Dienethal,16; the family frequents a bike trail that spans across Zion, Illinois, and passes directly in front of Plant Zion, E,17; Dienethal also golfs, and frequents a -
state public park in the town of Zion, Illinois,1; and Dienethal's children, ages nine and six, L
. play soccerjust nine miles from the Plant once a week for six months out of the year. E,15.
i Dienethal and his wife attend every soccer game each week. E Petitioner Dienethal's children's school is only twelve miles from the plant. Sac l
Amdavit of Edwin D. Dienethal.15. Additionally, the Petitioner Dienethal and his wife must l
l tavel within one mile of Plant Zion to visit the post office, shop, attend movies, or purchase gasoline, actions done at least three to four times a week. E,19. The water and food Dienethal and his family consume are also effected by Plant Zion. Food is purchased from local farms L
within 10 miles of Plant Zion, and water supplied by Lake Michigan where Plant Zion dumps waste. E,110. All of these interactions within the general vicinity of Plant Zion place Dienethal and his family well within the plant's " zone of harm."
i Activity near the facility places Petitioners in distinct and palpable risk of serious injury j
l in fact, directly traceable to Plant Zion. Injury in fact need not exist already. The definition i
i includes those who "have been injured in fact because of the possibility of an accident.... So:
injury in fact is indeed the same, in this context, as an allegation that a real injury might reasonably be expected to occur in the future." Georgia Power Co.,37 NRC 96,106 n.30 (1993).
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i The No Significant Hazards Determination concerning Plant Zion poses a concrete and serious risk of future negative health effects on Petitioners, their families and the community in which they live, eat drink water, breath air and own land. Sgg, I int of Contentions set forth below. Also see Affidavit of Robarne; Affidavit of Edwin D. Dienethn1,1110,18,19,20,21.
Petitioners allege that if Plant Zion functions under the proposed amendments, the risk of potential injuries to himself, his family, Plant Zion workers, the community, and the local environment will be increased as a result ofirter niin: "1. LOCA (Lost of Coolant Accident),2.
radiological concerns,3. unsafe levels of radiation for the employees at the plant and the general public, 4. undetectable radiation contamination by employees, 5. contamination of the local 1
community and the environment,6. increase risk of accident at Plant Zion, and 7. contamination l-of Lake Michigan." Id,120. Petitioners also allege that if Commonwealth Edison Co.'s request for amendment is approved other imminent risks would result due to the increased potential of failing to detect radiation in adequate time and the increase risk of the plant functioning unsafely and outside NRC regulations. Id. Additionally, if the request for amendment is approved the facility poses a serious negative impact on ?etitioners' property values, as well as the property I
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value of his surrounding community overall. These allegations are more than sufficient to satisfy the injtuy in fact and other standing requirements necessary to grant Petitioners leave to l
intervene.
l-In addition, it has been held that petitioners who regularly use the roads that may be employed by trucks carrying waste away from a nuclear power plant may be sufficient to confer standing to intervene. Yankee Afgic Electric Co.,43 NRC at 68-69. Petitioner Dienethal's
' daily business activities and work commute brings him directly past or very near Plant Zion three 8
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to four times a week. Srs Affidavit of Edwin D. Dienethal,18. An essential business supplier, whom Dienethat must visit on a regular basis to maintain his business, is locatedjust one mile from the facility. M. Many of the roads Petitioner Dienethal travels for business are the same roads which Plant Zion uses to transport radioactive waste from the plant. M. Accordingly, Petitioner's use of the very roads used by Plant Zion to transport radioactive waste is sufficient to meet the injury in fact test and to confer standing to intervene in this proceeding.
In a license amendment case involving allegations of the unfitness or lack ofcharacter and competence ofmanagement there is an obvious potential for offsite consequences, so standing is analogous to that in an operating license case. Orntgia Power Co. 37 NRC at 108.
In this case, Petitioners have set forth contentions that raise allegations that Commonwealth Edison Company management officials have intentionally violated nuclear safety regulations and operated Plant Zion in a deliberately non-safety-conscious manner and that a complete quality assurance breakdown exists at the plant. Moreover, Petitioners allege that if Commonwealth Edison Co.'s request for amendment is approved then these already unsafe conditions at Plant Zion will worsen. Accordingly, Petitioners have more than satisfied the standing requirements because they would be injured if Plant Zion's amendment request were granted due to the lack of character and competence of the plant's management.
Petitioners Robarge and Dienethal have formed the CSPZ. They serve as co-directors of this organization. This petition to intervene is also filed on behalf of the CSPZ, through the personal standing ofits co-directors. In accordance with Georcia Institute of Technoloev. LBP-95-6,41 NRC 281 (1995) and Duke Power Co., ALAB-528,9 NRC 146,151 (1979), all of the Petitioners request that CSPZ be granted intervener status. Both Mr. Robarge and Mr. Dienethal 9
grant CSPZ permission to represent their personal interests in this matter. However, should CSPZ not be granted intervener status, Mr. Robarge and Mr. Dienethal request that they be granted intervener status as a result of their personal standing in this matter.
Petitioners satisfy all of the essential elements of standing. They have alleged that their I
health, safety, property rights'and personal finances could be adversely affected by an order granting Commonwealth Edison Co.'s request for licensing amendment and/or through the No I
Significant Hazards Determination. There is a reasonable possibility of future injury in fact to Petitioners health and property value, and this threat of harm to Robarge and Dienethal, their families, and their communities, is directly caused by the proposed license changes to Plant Zion.
Petitioners, therefore, should be granted permission to intervene in all proceedings directly or indirectly related to the matter published in the Federal Register on August 12,1998 (Vol. 63, No.155, pp. 43200-43220), including, but not limited to, the No Significant Hazards findings related to Plant Zion.
PETITIONERS' CONTENTIONS Petitioners must proffer at least one acceptable contention to be admitted as a party to this proceeding. Georgia Power Co. 32 NRC 89,91 (1990). A contention need not appear in the intervention petition itself but, rather, can be set forth in a supplement to the intervention petition filed not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference. Id.
A contention is admiseble if the requirements of { 2.714(b)(2) are met, which provides:
(2) Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue oflaw or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide the following information with respect to each contention:
(I)
A brief explanation of the bases of the contentions (ii)
A concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which l
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support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing, together with references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on cchich the petitioner intends to rely.o establish those facts or expert opinion.
(iii)
Sufficient information(which may include information pursuant to paragraphs (b)(2)(I) and (ii) of this section) to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of
' law or fact. '"his showing must include references to the specific po. ns of the application (including the aoplicant's environmental repon and safety repon) that the petdioner disputes and the supponing reasons for each dispute, or,if the petitioner believes that the application fails to contain information on a relevant matter as required by law, the identification of each failure and the supporting reasons for the petitioner's belief.
10 C.F.R. Q 2.714(3)(b)(2).
The contention regulations " require a clear statement as to the basis for the contentions" and " reference to specific documents and sources that establish the validity of the contention."
Arizona Public Service Comnanv. 34 NRC 149,155-156 (1991)(Sac 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168,33, 170 (1989)). However, the intervener need not prove its case at the contention stage or present factual suppon in affidavit or evidentiary form sufficient to withstand a summary disposition i
motion. Nonetheless, the petitioner must make a minimal showing that material f:, cts are in
-dispute such that a funher inquiry is appropriate. Yankee Atomic Electric Company,43 NRC at 63, (citing Georgia Institute of Technoloev,42 NRC at 117-118).
As set forth below, the Petitioners have established valid contentions. Each of these contentions demonstrate why the NRC Staff should not have issued and why the NRC should not issue a "no significant hazards" determination. Each contention elso demonstrates why a stay should be granted preventing the implementation of any of the proposed amendments to the 11 1
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Applicant's license.
CONTENTION 1 Statement Reanired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv2): All of the requested amendments to the licence must be denied due to the Quality Assurance (QA)/ problem identification breakdown which currently exists at Plant Zion and which has existed at Plant Zion for a considerable period of time. Sec, John C. Brons to NRC (March 30,1998)(hereinafter," Applicant's Application"),
. Attachment A.
Brief Funinnation of Basis for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Oninion. and References which Sunnort Contentian Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): Applicant's proposed amendments impact on core safety processes and procedures at Plant Zion and individually and collectively cannot be approved due to a breakdown of Plant Zion's QA program, problem identification program, and other reporting or quality assurance processes necessary for the safe operation for decommissioning of Plant Zion. Applicant's proposed amendments would result in the removal of key safety related personnel, such as the cite vice president, senior reactor operator licensed personnel, and the elimination of full-time radiation protection personnel on site. In addition, it would alter the l.
staffing requirements for the control room and the training requirements of all onsite employees.
Finally, the proposed amendments would alter all of the technical specifications which govem on l
site safety related work. Given the sweeping nature of the proposed amendments, the quality l
assurance / problem identification breakdown at Plant Zion mandates that no such amendments be
. approved.
The public record demonstrates that Plant Zion's QA/ problem identification program has r
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failed.- Ssa Exhibit 3," Notice of Viclation (NOV) and Enforcement Action (EA) Resulting from
- Quality Assurance Breakdown"; Exhibit 4," Notice of Violation (NOV) and Enforcement Action i
(EA) Resulting from Failure to Follow Procedures. Due to this breakdown, Applicant cannot insure that any of the amendment changes requested its the license shall be administered in a manner consistent with the controlling procedures, regulations, laws, and/or the requirements of public safety. The Petitioner can support this contention with a significant amount of evidence.
. First, Mr. Allen Mosbaugh will be an expert witness for the Petitioner. He was qualified as an expert on quality assurance matters during the Department of Labor (DOL) proceeding in Robarge v. Commonwealth Edison,98-ERA-2. 3During his testimony in that proceeding Mr.
Mosbaugh reviewed evidence related to the quality assurance and problem identification program at Plant Zion and testified that the evidence supported a finding of a QA breakdown. The transcript of Mr. Mosbaugh's testimony shall be introduced in this proceeding. Sgg Affidavit of Randy Robarge.
l Second, both the Petitioner, Mr. Robarge, and numerous other employees or former I
2 The Randy Robarge Department of Labor record is publically available from the US l
Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges. The entire public record of that l
proceeding is incorporated into all of the contentions by reference. Certain depositions were conducted in that proceeding which were not made part of the public record. Where relevant, i
excerpts from these depositions will be attached. In regard to the specific testimony given by Allen Mosbaugh in the proceeding, he was questioned under oath extensively by counsel for Mr.
l Robarge and counsel for the Applicant. This testimony, in its entirety, should be reviewed l
carefully by this board as further evidence of the QA breakdown. Mr. Mosbaugh was qualified as an expert in the Robarge proceeding, and the petitioner in this case intends to use Mr. Mosbaugh I
as an expert in this proceeding on both QA and character incompetence issues, and on other relevant technical issues. As can be seen by Mr. Mosbaugh's testimony in the Robmas case, Mr.
Mosbaugh possess expertise in a wide range of nuclear safety matters. Exhibit 10, Testimony of Allen Mosbaugh.
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I employees of the Applicant shall testify to the existence of"PIF wars" at Plant Zion. PIFS are
" Problem Identification Forms" for which employees at Zion were requireo to properly file.
PIFs constituted one of the most important, if not the most important, method for employees to identify safety problems onsite and for Applicant's management to correct and trend safety -
problems onsite. The NRC Staffhas fined Applicant for its failure to properly file PIFs, and in the Robarge DOL case numerous witnesses testified that the program had broken down. Plant Zion managers knew that employees were failing to file PIFs, managers were conducting illegal field modifications concerning the PIF requirements, employees were harassed merely for filing PIFs, and PIFs were routinely not filed in violation of procedure. San Robarge, 98-ERA-2.
The "PIF war" concept was very simple. As testified to by numerous witnesses during the Robarge DOL proceeding, if an employee or a department filed a PIF identifying problems with another employee or department's work, the target of the original PIF would retaliate ano file PIFs against the original alleger. This could escalate into a full scale 'Nvar" between departments or between people. "[I]f somebody PIF's our department, we PIF them back. If we l
PIF somebody else, they PIF us back to defend" Sag Exhibit 5, redacted excerpts from the l
Deposition of Rodney Bauman, Tr.16. See also Exhibit 6, redacted excerpts from the Deposition of Brent Robinson, Tr. 77-78; Exhibit 7, redacted excerpts from the Deposition of Ronald Schuster, Tr.17-19; Exhibit 8, redacted excerpts from the Deposition of John C. Meyers, Tr. 68-
- 69. Consequently, most employees would just not file PIFs. See testimony from Robarge and Satterfield placed on the official transcript of the Robarge DOL hearing. Also see, e.g. DOL testimony of Russell Satterfield given in the Robarge matter. Ex. 9, Tr. 432-35. This decision not to file PIFs led to a complete breakdown of Applicant's QA program and its ability to 14
determine the true condition ofits plant. Without the proper filing of PIFs, Applicant was unable
- to identify or trend problems, or to cor. duct proper root cause reviews, among numerous other problems.
1 Allen Mosbaugh, an unquestioned expert in quality assurance and problem identification, testified about PIF wars. Exhibit 10. Mr. Mosbaugh, in his testimony, stated as follows: "If 1
something like a PIF war as I understand it was guiag down going on I would consider that virtually a complete breakdown of the PIF program and the quality assurance program that it implements. The concept as I understand is that people would retaliate against each other by writing PIFs. Has no place in the nuclear industry. The management should be by problem address the problems that are known. There is to be no element of retaliation. It's totally unprofessional and its a breakdown of the system." Exhibit 10 Tr. 981-82.
Applicant's highest levels of management were fully aware of the "PIF war" problem and failed to take reasonable steps to correct the problem. In fact, the NRC Staff found that managers themselves were failing to file PIFs San Robarge,98-ERA-2.
In addition to the PIF wars, Applicant's supervisors and employees committed knowing I
and willful violations of mandatory safety procedures. San Robarge,98-ERA-2. Applicant had full knowledge of these willful violations and failed to take any action to identify, correct, or punish those persons who committed wilful violations. In testimony obtained in December 1997 from depositions conducted in Robarge, supervisors of the Applicant admitted, under oath, to knowing that intentional violations of procedures occurred onsite and that the existence of these intentional violations were well known. Mr. Ron Schuster, a long-term supervisor-employee of the Applicant, testified under oath that he " physically witnessed" a supervisor " operating outside 15 i
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' of the bounds." Ex. 7, Tr. 24. Mr. Schuster also confirmed that other supervisors were fully t
aware of these wilful violations and that the supervisor in question had a " reputation among the l
supenisors" as "someone who did not strictly adhere to procedures." Ex. 7, Tr. 24-25. Mr.
Schuster's allegations were confirmed by three other management level employees of the Applicant during the deposition process in the Robarge case. Sag, Ex. 5, Tr. 29-30 (Bauman);
l Ex. 6, Tr.17-18 (Robinson); Ex. 8, Tr. 24 (Meyers). Official representatives of the Applicant (i.e. their counsel) participated in these depositions and leamed of this wilful misconduct.
Consistent with the past practice onsite, however, no investigation or action was taken after these l
i depositions were taken to verify, punish, and correct the willful misconduct.
At the hearing conducted in the Robarge DOL case, numerous other witnesses testified, under oath, that they knew that willful violations had been committed by more than one supervisor and that it was common knowledge on site (including site management) that such wilful violations were occurring. Sag Robarge,98-ERA-2. Also see, Exhibit 9, excerpts from the I
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Robarge hearing testimony. For example, Mr. Gerald Ruffolo testified, under oath, to personally witnessing three separate supervisors give instmetions that safety-related procedures bc i
intentionally violated. Ex. 9, Tr. 219-232. Some of these witnesses testified to personally being instructed to wilfully violate procedures. E Moreover, witnesses confirmed that the reputation of some of the persons who wilfully violated procedures were well known throughout the plant and through every level of management. E Additionally, Applicant has engaged in the harassment and intimidation of whistleblowers at Plant Zion. The NRC Staff has issued a Notice of Violation due to a contractors harassment of a whistleblower and a number of employee's for the Applicant have 16 i
alleged harassment, wrongful diseharge and intimidation. In a July 22,1997 letter to Thomas Maiman, Applicant's Senior Vice President for Nuclear Operations from A. Bill Beach, NRC Regional Administrator, the NRC Staff wamed Applicant about the " chilling effect" harassment and intimidation may be having on employee whistleblowing at the Plant Zion site. All twenty seven allegations ofdiscrimination referenced in this letter indicate a QA breakdown. It is reasonable to assume that the NRC Staffis currently aware of other allegations of harassment and intimidation which were filed after the July 22"d letter was issued. Again, the " chilling effect" caused by the improper harassment of employees indicates a QA breakdown at Plant Zion. Evidence of harassment and intimidation was also introduced during the Robarge DOL claim and, upon information and belief, other employee's have filed discrimination claims under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act which are currently under investigation by OSHA.
Procedures onsite were regularly violated. For example, at the hearing in Robarge.
testimony was given that Radiation Work Permits (hereinafter "RWP")often were approved, even though they approved work was outside of the scope of the procedures. Sgs Robarge,98-ERA-2 (testimony by Ruffello). The NRC Staff was never informed about the result of an audit of these violations, despite the fact that numerous supervisors and mangers knew of the apparent violations. The NRC has issued a Notice of Violation (NOV)in wluch Applicant violated technical specifications (TSs) concerning RWP. For example, NOV 295(304)/92034 cites violation of TS 6.2.2 when an operator entered a high radiation area without the correct RWP.
Petitioner himself has witnessed violations of procedure, including improper instruction regarding PIFs: One of Petitioner's supervisors asked him illegally to change information on PIF Number Zl998-00041 which was generated by Petitioner. In addition, the NRC Staff has noted 17
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l numerous instances in which Applicant did not follow procedures, subsequently resulting in the
- issuance of numerous NOVs, including, but not limited to, those listed in Exhibit 4. The NRC has also issued Notices of Violation citing the willful violation of procedure, including, but not limited to, NOV 295(304)/94008-01 in violation of TS 6.2.2.a.
L In an attempt to hide some of the QA breakdown, Applicant has entered into agreements (i.e. protective orders) which prevent Petitioner from discovering matters relevant to this proceeding. These protective orders much be vacated, in part, to allow Petitioner permission to mterview all persons who have executed such agreements over the past fifteen years in order to obtain information relevant to this proceeding. One such agreement is the subject of an ongoing l
2.206 petition filed in the Robarge matter my the National Whistleblower Center. However, regardless of the outcome of that proceeding, the Petitioner has a right to interview potential I
witnesses, and the Applicant cannot use protective orders or any other form of agreement to prohibit Petitioner from learning additional facts to support this petition.10 C.F.R. Q 50.7(g). In a Director's Decision, the use of a private contract to hide information from a party to a licensing proceeding, such as Mr. Dienethal, was found to be void and illegal. Texas Utilities Electric Co.,
37 NRC 477, Director's Decision (1993), slip op. DD-93-12. Sag also " Preserving the Free Flow ofInformation to the Commission," 55 Fed. Reg. 10397,10402 (1990).
Throughout its existence, employees at Plant Zion have not been properly trained in QA requirements. During the hearing in Robarge, expert witness Mr. Mosbaugh reviewed various documentation related to the Zion QA program and interviewed at least one Zion employee with knowledge of the QA program. Mr. Mosbaugh testified, under oath, that Zion appeared to have a j
l QA breakdown.
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Mr. Mosbaugh's entire testimony is included as part of the basis for this contention, as is the testimony provided at the Robarge DOL proceeding given by Randy Robarge, Jerry Ruffolo, Mike Masosput, Robert Chavez, Russ Satterfield, Al Vedder, Brent Robinson, Ron Schuster, Petitioner, Alan Brown, Rodney Bauman (by deposition) and John Meyers (by deposition), in
' addition, the entire transcript of Robarge and the entire record of Robarge (including pre-trial depositions, correspondence between counsel, and in-court testimony by witnesses for Commonwealth Edison) are part of the basis for this contention.
Finally, Applicant's QA breakdown was one of the root causes of the premature shut-
~ down of Plant Zion. If this root cause is not properly investigated, identified, and corrected, numerous health and safety violations will occur or re-occur during the decommissioning phase i
ofPlant Zion.
On July 31,1998 Mr. Edwin Dienethal filed his Amended Petition to Intervene and Statement of Contentions in a related NRC proceeding (ASLBP No. 98-744-04-LA). In that filing, Mr. Dienethal made reference to the complete Department of Labor whistleblower proceeding conceming the claims filed by Mr. Robarge. Although the entire DOL record in the Robarge proceeding was referenced as a basis for the contentions in ASLBP No. 98-744-04-LA, in order to avoid any confusion as to the relevance ofportions of the Robarge proceeding to this
' petition to intervene, the Petitioners hereby explicating additional facts contained in the Robarge H
proceeding.
Exhibit 11 contains additional redacted excerpts from the DOL hearing conducted in the Robarge proceeding (98-ERA-2). Mr. Brent Robinson testified at the Robarge proceeding. Mr.
Robinson worked in the nuclear power area since 1981 and worked at Plant Zion for "the past 14 19
years." Ex. I 1, Tr. 265.Mr. Robinson was a supervisor who worked in the Plant Zion radiation chemistry department and the radiation protection department. He worked as an " operational lead health physicist in the ALARA group and became the lead Radiation Protection Supervisor at Plant Zion in 1996. Along with the lead position, he also was the ALARA supervisor during that time period. Ex. I1, Tr. 265-69.
Mr. Robinson was questioned about a radiation protection supervisor (the same supervisor identified by the other Comed witnesses as having violated procedures). Mr.
Robinson testified, under oath, that this supervisor had the reputation as a "get-the-work-done type person" who "didn't reference procedures." Ex. I1, Tr. 284.
Mr. Robinson also provided testimony on PIF Wars. He confinned that PIF Wars existed on-site. He also confirmed the fact that Applicant never provided any " formal training" concerning PIF Wars, and only addressed the issue through " informal direction." Ex.11, Tr. Pp.
306-07.
Mr. Randy Robarge also provided testimony during the Robarge proceeding. He testified extensively about his background and wcrk experience in the nuclear area and at Comed. Ex. I1, Tr. 470-539. This testimony clearly establishes his expert qualifications concerning a number of matters at issue in this proceeding. E Mr. Robarge confirmed the fact that employees "would not generate PIFs when problems became known." Ex. I1, Tr. 582. He testified that employees were " told not to generate PIFs" I
and testified that, on one occasion, a PIF he had drafted was " ripped up." E, Tr. 582-83. He also testified that a " chilling effect" existed concerning some persons who did not file PIFs.11 He also testified that the practice of requiring employees to submit PIFs to levels of supervision 20
i not referenced in the PIF procedures would have a chilling effect on employee PIF writing. E, Tr. 595-96. Mr. Robarge also testified that PIF Wars existed at Plant Zion and that management never conducted trainings on this problem. E, Tr. 584-85 Mr. Robarge provided extensive testimony conceming a number of PIFs he wrote in 1996. E Tr. 610-70. He testified about the continuing problem at Plant Zion regarding finding radioactive materials outside of the radiation protection areas ("RPA") and the failure of Applicant to keep its radiation monitors properly working E, Tr. 613-14,621-22 ar.<d 627-29.
Additionally, Applicant violated procedures by returning radiation monitors to service without properly testing the monitors. E, Tr. 627-29. He also testified concerning on-going violations of radiation protection requirements, such as persons eating and drinking in the protected areas. E, Tr. 618-19.
- Mr. Robarge provided extensive testimony conceming an incident which arose on November 1,1996. E, Tr. 630-670. This is a very significant incident. It started when a person was found contaminated with a hot particle after they had left the radiation protection area. E, Tr. 630-32. Specifically, this person was " supposed tohave gone through some form of detection system which would determine" if he carried contamination prior to leaving the "RPA." For whatever reason, this person was found outside of the RPA with contamination on his person. E Moreover, the person who was found to have the contamination on his person was questioned and it was determined that this person had not entered the RPA. Thus, the l
contamination most likely came from an area which should have been free from radiation. E, Tr.
637.
21
On November 4,19% the existence of radioactive material outside of the RPA was confirmed. The material was found in the IM Shop. E, Tr. 642-44. The contamination was found in numerous locations at the IM Shop, including the workbench. Contaminated gauges were found on a " lunch counter" and contamination was found next to the " coffee pot." E, Tr.
643. Contamination was found where employees "took their breaks" and " ate cookies." E The contaminated gauges had been improperly transported from the RPA area to a non-RPA area. E, Tr. 644. The Radiation Protection department should have prevented this from happening. E, Tr. 645. The existence of contaminated gauges outside of the RPA indicated that contamination could have been spread to other areas beside the IM Shop. E, Tr. 650-51.
Applicant has failed to control radioactive materials, not only at Plant Zion, but at other facilities as well. This failure is a " reoccurring problem" and indicates that the quality control process at Plant Zion (and throughout Comed) is not working. E, Tr. 664-65. The failure of employees to file PIFs has contributed to this problem. Due to the quality assurance breakdown in the problem identification process, Applicant has not been able to properly trend problems. E In fact, a witness called by Applicant during the Robarge proceeding confirmed that Plant Zion had a major problem with radioactive material (" RAM") being found outside of the protected areas. At the hearing Applicant called Mr. Gregory Kassner as a witness. Ex. I1, Tr.
1210. Mr. Kassner cunently works for INPO. However, he worked for 13 years for the Applicant and served at the top manager of the radiation protection department at Plant Zion between 1993-96. E, Tr.1211,1216-17.
Mr. Kassner confirmed that, as a result of only one rurvey, "a good number" ofitems (approx. 60-70) contaminated with radiation, which had been improperly identified and l
22 i
improperly labeled were found outside of the RPA at Plant Zion. E, Tr.1370-71.
Moreover, Mr. Kassner testified conceming a violation ofNRC safety procedures in a matter in which a 1000 millirem particle (at 30 centimeters) was found unprotected and
- unlabeled. E,1347-49. Mr. Kassner admitted that the practice which had caused this violation had ' existed for years on-site. He also confirmed that after the violation was identified, no efforts were made to " determine how widespread the practice was and how deficient" the "depa:tment" was conceming the procedural violations which caused this major safety concem. E, Tr.1348.
Mr. Kassner also confirmed that Mr. Robarge informed him that the improper practices had been
" going on for years." E, Tr. 1348-49.
In regard to PIFs, Mr. Kassner was confronted with INPO findings which confirmed that his department did "not generate problem identification forms for radiological occurrences" and that "as a result, radiological protection and station management are insufficiently aware of problems or their root causes." E, Tr.1368. Although he originally denied knowledge of these INPO findings, he finally admitted that he was aware that INPO had criticized his department's inability to "generath PIFs" in June of 1996. E, Tr.1369.
In addition, Mr. Kassner provided testimony conceming the PIF procedure. His testimony confirmed the rendition of the PIF process testified to by other employee's of the Applicant, including persons who should be exercising management control over that process.
Mr. Kassner's testimony provides additional evidence that upper management within Comed has failed to properly implement or police the PIF process. E, Tr.1373-93.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a 23 l
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finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 2 l
Statement Reanired undar 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv21: The Applicant engages in wilful and knowing violations ofmandatory safety related procedures and the harassment and intimidation of employee's who seek to raise safety concems. Due to these practices, Applicant cannot insure I
i that any of the work to be performed under any of the proposed amendments to the license shall 1
l be performed in a manner consistent with the controlling procedures, regulations, laws, and/or L
the requirements ofpublic safety. Sac, Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Explanation of Basis for Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and c
l the Concise Statement of Facts. Oninion. and References WHeh Sunoort Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Viil: The basis for this contention is contained in the explanation section for Contention 1 and 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. { 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 3 Statement Reanired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv21: The Applicant cannot be granted any license amendments which would directly or indirectly permit it to conduct any future work at Plant Zion or participate in any manner in the decommissioning process. The Applicant lacks the character, competence, and integrity to engage in any licensed activities at Plant Zion, l
24 I
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including those licensed activities which would be directly or indirectly authorized under the
. pending amendments to the license. Se, Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Fvnlanation of Basin for Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and l.
the Concine Statement of Facts. Oninion. and Referencas which Supoort Contention Reauired undar 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): For all of the reasons set forth in the explanation section for Contention 1, Applicant lacks the competence, character, and integrity to operate Plant Zion.
This lack of competence, character, and integrity is also documented in the numerous NOVs issued by the NRC staff during the preceding six year time period and the numerous Licensee Event Reports (hereinafter "LER") filed by the applicant for which it was unable to close-out.
I Sg, e.g. Exhibits 3 and 4. Also see. NOV 295(304)/97003-0, citing the violation of TS 3.13.2.a.1 which resulted from a breakdown of the QA Program at Plant Zion, an issue which still remains open concerning an error in the original design ofpart of the ventilation system
)
)
causing effluent to escape the fuel building. LER 93002 was issued by the NRC citing the violation of TS 3.14.3.c.
Additionally, Applicant lacked the chameter, competence, and integrity to properly correct many of the problems identified in these notices. Applicant maintained a secret personnel filing system to hide the true extent of the incompetence, lack ofintegrity, and lack of character ofits work force. During the Robarge DOL hearing, counsel for Mr. Robarge made on-the-record references to this filing system and requested that the documents contained within that system be produced. Sn Robarge,98-ERA-2. Because the Robarge case settled prior to the l
completion of the hearing process, those records were not produced. However, they were identified on-the-record and, as set forth on-the-record in Robarge, contain relevant material i
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-__-___-___-______A
f conceming this contention and the method and manner in which the Applicant has responded to I
the misconduct (including criminal misconduct) of employees.
In addition, Applicant's lack of competence, character, and integrity is one of the root causes of the premature shut-down ofZion. If this root cause is not properly investigated, identified, and corrected, numerous health and safety violations will occur or re-occur during the decommissioning phase of Plant Zion.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. { 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 4 Statement Reanired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2): Applicant's proposal to amend its license to allow use of the Zion Station Custom Technical Specifications (hereinafter " CTS") and '
to abandon its requirement to utilize the Improved Technical Specifications (hereinafter "ITS")
must be rejected. Sac, Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Frplanation of Basic for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Supnort Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): The CTS has serious problems which required Zion to implement numerous field or other modifications. The ITS was an improvement on the CTS and enhanced the safety of the plant. The failures of the CTS, in part, contributed to the systematic quality assurance breakdown at Zion which has resulted in the shut down of Zion. The continued use of the CTS constitutes a serious safety hazard. The ITS must come into use as required 26 l
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I-under the current license, and any changes to the ITS, or the implementation of new technical specifications, must undergo the review and approval process mandated under law, regulation, and subject to the specific approval of this Board.
During the Robarge DOL proceeding significant testimony was introduced conceming the problem with procedures at Plant Zion. For example, during his deposition, Mr. Rodney l.
Bauman, a health physicist supervisory employee who had worked at Zion for six years, testified i
that the procedures used onsite were out of date, difficult to follow and referenced instruments which no longer existed. Postings for radiological controls were also " substandard." Ex. 5, Tr.
37-38.
l Additionally, Applicant failed to adhere to the requirements of the CTS. This is documented in numerous NOVs and other public source documents in which the NRC staff noted problems with Applicant's ability to follow technical specifications. Sag Exhibits 3-4.
There should be no downgrading of the technical specifications until the root cause behind Applicant's failure to adhere to existing specifications is identified and corrected.
The NRC Commission has issued a Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvement for Nuclear Power Reactors, Vol. 58, No.139 Federal Register 39132 (July 2b, l
1993) in which the NRC has recognized that implementation of" improved" technical
{
specifications, such as the ITS, were " expected to produce an improvement in the safety of nuclear power plants." E The goal behind the ITS was to " include greater emphasis on human factors principles in order to add clarity and understanding" to the technical specifications at nuclear plants. E,39133.
Any future retum to parts of the CTS must be individually analyzed and reviewed in light 27 L
of the entire ITS and the history ofproblems with the CTS. If any specific CTS procedure or requirement shall be re-implemented, this must be accomplished on a procedure-by-procedure basis. All such changes must be approved by this Licensing Board.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. { 50.92. Li addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 5 Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2): The Site Vice President position should not be eliminated. San Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Explanation of Basis for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and
. the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Support Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): Plant Zion has witnessed a systemic breakdown ofits QA program and the existence of numerous wilful violations of mandatory procedures. Any reduction in the accountability of corporate for these problems, and any reduction in the level of management oversight, will increase the QA breakdown already in existence. Tais QA breakdown contributed, in part, to the shutdown of Plant Zion, and any management actions which may contribute to the continuation of this breakdown cannot be approved or tolerated.
A corporate vice president is also needed onsite to directly oversee the actions of the plant manager or decommissioning plant manager, as the plant manager may be unwilling to 28
' self-identify problems and safety issues which may make himself or herself appear incompetent.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of t
Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the i
burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. 6 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 6
)
Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv21: The Fuel Handler Training and
{
- Retraining Program (Program) cannot be approved, and all management changes premised on persons being qualified under this procedure cannot be approved, until the Program is augmented i
to meet the particular needs ofPlant Zion and amended in a manner consistent with this contention. Sss, Applicant's Application, Attachment A. Sam also Attachment A,1,7,9.
Additionally, the Applicant filed a copy ofits training Program with the NRC. Sec Brons to NRC, letter dated March 16,1998 (including an Attachment A which consisted of the Zion Station Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retraining Program).
. Brief Explanation of Basic for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Support Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): The training program must address the systemic breakdown of the QA program at Zion, the existence of numerous wilful violations at Plant Zion, and the failure of Commonwealth Edison to properly manage Zion. The Program must address the systemic management and quality issues which resulted in the untimely shut down of Plant Zion.
29
Modeling this Program after Trojan and Maine Yankee fails to address the specific problems which have existed and continue to exist at Plant Zion, problems which rendered the plant inoperable and constitute a direct and grave threat to the public heath and safety.
The Program placed on the public record fails to contain specific information about exactly what will be included in the training and who will be conducting the training. San Brons to NRC, letter dated March 16,1998 Information war produced during Robarge concerning the qualifications of persons employed by the Applicant to perform trainings. During the testimony of Mr. Schuster (including his under oath testimony and the offer ofproofintroduced by counsel for Mr.
Robarge), information was placed on the record indicating that persons with considerable responsibility for trainings at Plant Zion may have engaged in serious criminal activity, implicating these persons character and competence to engage in any employment at a nuclear facility. It was also evident from this testimony that high ranking officials for the Applicant would have known of this conduct but failed to take adequate action concerning this conduct.
A review of the Program submitted to the NRC demonstrates as problematic nature. Scc Brons to NRC, letter dated March 16,1998. Section 1.0 of the Program allows the Applicant to make changes to the Program without " prior" NRC " approval." Additionally, the Program authcrizes Applicant to develop a retraining program. The retraining program does not need NRC approval and appears to give the Applicant full discretion concerning the contents, examination requirements (if any), and other rules related to the retraining program. These i
exemptions and deficiencies could be abused, and given the past misconduct at Plant Zion, it is reasonable to assume they would be abused. The NRC has issued NOV 295(304)/96021-07 30 i
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because Applicant violated TS 6.1.5 and ANSI N18.1 by lacking the proper training in Department of Transportation and NRC regulatory requirements.
The Program allows' Applicant to exempt persons from the training requirements. Ssg Program Sections 1.0,2.3.3 and 3.4.2. This authority can easily be abused, and Applicant would be able to override the training requirements anytime it needs to meet a schedule, save money, or exempt a personal friend from the training requirements. Given the systemic QA breakdown and the continued existence of wilful violations of plant procedures, this exemption cannot be approved. See Exhibits 3-8.
Page A-1 of the training program contains the areas for which written examinations would be administered to employees. Given the problems identified in Contentions 1 and 3, the training must also include trainings on the PIF process, the employee concems process, the QA process, and the personal responsibility employees have to report misconduct and to refrain from intentional violations of procedures.
Given the complete lack of quality work performed onsite, as evidenced in this filing, whatever Program is finally approved must be a high-quality training program for which all plant personnel-including the Site VP and the Decommissioning Plant Manager -must take and must pass. No employee of Plant Zion should be able to " grandfather" pre-approvals for this training.
Simply stated, the plant has had so many safety-related problems, as documented in the NRC NOV referenced in this filing, the decision of Applicant to prematurely shut down Plant Zion due to its inability to properly manage the project and as documented in Robarge, all employees at the site must be required to take and pass an augmented training program.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of 31 l
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Contention 1 and Contention 3. In this regard, any training program at Plant Zion must include very detailed trainings concerning problem identification, the rights of employees to blow the whistle, and the importance of strict adherence to QA procedures.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 7 Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv2): The Applicant request for permission to delete section 6.4 from the CTS must be denied. Sag, Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Sag also Attachment A,8.
. Brief Frnlanation of Basic for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2)(I) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Oninion. and References which Sunnort Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv2Viih The current ITS specifically references those pans of the Zion QA plan which would require the types of reponing required under CTS 6.4. Simply deleting 6.4, without appropriately compensating for this requirement, is inconsistent with the public health and safety. Additionally, this amendment request should be denied as Applicant should not be permitted to revert back to the CTS.
~ Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set fonh above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. { 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a 32
l finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 8 l
Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv2): Applicant's request to use Certified Fuel Handlers instead oflicensed personnel must be denied. Sss Applicant's Application, Attachment A. Sss also Attachment A,6-7.
Brief ExpInnation of Basis for Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Oninion and References which Suonort Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. S 2.714(bV2Viih First, the NRC has specific authority to take individual licensing action against any person who is personally licensed by the NRC. Given the breakdown in the Zion QA program, any change to the license which minimizes the oversight authority of the NRC over the conduct ofindividual supervisors or managers must be denied.
Second, Applicant has not demonstrated that the training program for the Fuel Handlers will meet the needs of the public health and safety. Third, there is no evidence that the Fuel Handlers will be trained or able to properly work during an accident condition as well as licensed I
personnel will be able to work. Fuel Handlers would not have the training, education, and background to make proper safety-related decisions during an accident condition, and they would lack this training / background to conduct or supervit;e proper root cause reviews. In addition, a licensed system engineer is needed to oversee the relevant system (s).
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the 33
burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. 6 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 9 Statement Reauired undar 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2): Applicant's proposal to have only one licensed person in the control room must be rejected. S.cs Applicant's Application, Attachment A. Ses Alan Appendix p. 9.
i Brief Fvnlanation of Racis for Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and 4
the Concise Statement of Facts. Oninion. and References which Sunnort Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): No less than two licensed personnel, one ofwhich should be a nonunion individual, must be on-duty in the control room at all times. Limiting the number of persons employed in the control room creates a direct and immediate threat to the public health and safety. Ifonly one such person worked in the control room, numerous reasonably I
foreseeable contingencies could not be properly addressed. The examples are infinite: what if the employee falls asleep, what if the employee has a medical emergency, what if the employee must leave his station due to an onsite emergency which needs his attention, what if the employee is 1
disgruntled about union-management negotiations, what about the need for second verifications for instrument readings, what about the propensity to improperly ignore plant instrumentation?
Simply stated, this proposal strongly suggests that cost saving measures are clouding the judgement of the Applicant.
Applicant not only requests that only "one qualified person" be required to " stand watch in the control room," Applicant also requests that the definition of who is " qualified" be further 34
I watered down, to permit non-licensed personnel to operate the control room and monitor the I
control room. This request is irresponsible. No less then two licensed personnel, properly trained and properly qualified, one of which should be a nonunion member, should be on-duty, at all times, to " stand watch" in the control room. The risk of accident, and risk that an accident would not be properly responded to, and the risk that a mistake would be made in this critical I
function, outweighs the cost-saving needs of the Applicant.
Finally, given the QA Breakdown and lack of character, competence, and integrity contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3, eliminating the implicit oversight and accountability function of having two licensed persons in the control room cannot bejustified.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 10 l-Statement Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv2): Applicant's request to eliminate the
" continuous onshift presence a of Radiation Protection Person" must be denied. Attachment A, 12.
Brief Exninnation of Basic for Contention Reanired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Oninion. and References which Support Contention Reauired 35
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undar 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Viih This request Applicant is completely irresponsible and again indicates that the Applicant is overly concemed with cutt ng costs and no longer is competent or i
capable ofproperly managing Plant Zion. It is absolutely necessary to have a Radiation Protection Person on site to ensure the safety of Plant Zion employees and the general public.
By eliminating a " continuous onshift presence", Applicant will increase the possibility of t
unnecessary and excess radiation exposure and increase the likelihood of harm inflicted on I
employees and the general public. A Radiation Protection Person needs to be onsite at all times to prevent radiation from leaving the protected areas or to quickly rectify the problem if the radiation is brought into unprotected locations. The presence of this person will also decrease the possibility of radiation being taken off-site, contaminating the community. The Radiation Protection program at Plant Zion has been riddled with intentional violations by supervisors and continuous and significant quality assurance problems. During the Robarge hearing, numerous witnesses testified to a complete breakdown of QA within that department. That evidence introduced by the Complainant in that case, which is part of the public record, is hereby incorporated by reference as part of the basis to this contention.
Additionally, during the discovery phase of the Robarge proceeding, evidence was introduced in depositions concerning the QA breakdown within the Radiation Protection Department. Sag Exs. 5-8. For example, Mr. Bauman testified that radiation monitors were
" substandard" and the ability of the Applicant to properly " inform workers" of potentially unsafe
" radiological conditions" at Zion were also " substandard." In this regard, in the Department of l
Labor case of Boudrie v. Commonwealth Edison. (Administrative Law Judge No. 94-ERA-15) it l
was proven that radioactive materially were improperly removed from Plant Zion and carried l
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home, undetected, by employees. The record in the Bourdie proceeding is hereby incorporated by reference.
. Moreover, Mr. Robarge (and other persons with expertise in radiation protection) shall testify as of the problems inherent in accepting this amendment. For example, during the Robarge DOL hearing, documentary and oral testimony was placed on the record (and information was produced during discovery, which was required to be retumed, uncopied, to the Applicant) demonstrating a complete QA breakdown within the area ofradiation protection.
This included, but was not limited to, numerous examples of radioactive particles being located outside of the radiation control areas, including radioactive particles being found at locations were employees ate.
As part of Contention No.1, the Petitioners have discussed the testimony contained in Exhibit No.11. This testimony, specifically the testimony of Mr. Robarge and Mr. Kassner, confirms the existence of a wide-spread contamination problem at Plant Zion. The testimony was summarized in Contention No. I and need not be duplicated here, as all of the facts contained in Contention No. I are incorporatui, by reference, into this contention.
However, the record in this matter confirms that not only should Applicant be denied permission to downgrade its radiation protection department, but Applicant must upgrade that department. The undisputable evidence demonstrates that radiation monitors did not work, that radiation protection supervisors wilfully ignored procedures concerning the handling of" hot particles," that Applicant failed to conduct proper root cause reviews of radiation issues, that " hot particles" left the RPA and were later found both outside the RPA on-site (i.e. at " lunch counters" and other locations) and were found off-site, in employee hotel rooms. See, e.g. the 37
public record in Boudrie v. Commonwealth Fdienn, U.S. Department of Labor Office of
' Administrative Law Judge file No. 94-ERA-15.
On the basis of these materials, an emergency stay should be granted on that portion of Applicant's proposed amendments which would allow a reduction in the radiation support staff and the managers or operators who have any oversight responsibility whatsoever in the area of radiation protection. The record indicates that, under no circumstances, can the Applicant or the NRC Staff meet their respective burdens on this issue as set forth under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92.
In this regard, the Petitioners are prepared to participate in an emergency, on-the-record hearing on this matter. Petitioners also reserve the right to file for injunctive relief should the NRC fail to stay this matter.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this m itter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 11 Statement Reauired under 10 C.F.R. Q 2.714(bV2): No amendments to Applicant's license should be granted until the LERs are fully reviewed. Su Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Fvnlanation of Basis for Contention Reanired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Sunnort Contention Re;auired 38
under 10 C.F.R; 6 2.714(bV2Viih When Applicant accounted that Plant Zion would be
- prematurely shout down, a large number of LERs were open and under review. As a consequence of announcing the shut down of the plant,'the NRC gave Applicant permission to close every open LER. This was evidenced by a letter Mr. Randy Robarge obtained in discovery of his DOL l
case which apparently he was required to return to Commonwealth Edison. In any event, the LERs in question clearly could be materially relevant to the issues raised in the proposed amendments and the contentions raised herein. The blanket closure of these numerous LERs was I
inappropriate, i
Completing LERs and properly conducting the root cause analysis required under the LER process is an essential component of the nuclear safety program. The NRC Staff and r
Applicant must be required to review each of the closed LERs and set forth specific justification
]
as to why, under no reasonable circumstances, each and every safety-related issue implicated in 1
the LER has no relevance whatsoever to the current safety of Plant Zion, any of the work
)
implicated by applicants proposed license amendments and/or any work which may be j
t performed during the decommissioning process. If any LER does contain matters which may have relevance to the current safety of Plant Zion and/or any work which may be performed in i
the future at Plant Zion, said LER must be completed and submitted to this Board for final approval. Until all such LER issues are addressed, and it is demonstrated that no outstanding issue contained in any of the LERs would impact on any of the amendments proposed by the Applicant, no amendment to the Applicant's license should be approved.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention I and Contention 3.
39 l
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 12 Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv2): No amendments can be approved until the Applicant demonstrates that it has proper knowledge of the actual condition of Plant Zion. Sag, Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Ernlanation of Basis for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Oninion. and References which Support Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): Due to the QA breakdown, and the lack of character, competence, and integrity, which were explicated in explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3, the Applicant does not have current knowledge of the actual condition of Plant l
Zion. For example, due to the "PIF wars" which existed onsite, problem identification forms were not filed. The failure of Applicant to insure that these forms were filed as resulted in the l
inability of Applicant to be aware of problems which exist onsite. In addition, due to the numerous wilful and non-wilful violations of procedure, the Applicant cannot demonstrate proper knowledge of actual plant conditions and cannot properlyjustify any amendments to its license.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the 40
i burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. { 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
l CONTENTION 13 l
Statement Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV21: The change to the specifications conceming the use of overtime (6.2.1) must be denied. Scs, Applicant's Application, Attachment A, 7.
Brief Fvnlanation of Basis for Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion and References which Sunnort Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bv2Vii): Mr. Robarge and other witnesses shall testify to the l
widespread abuse of overtime at Plant Zion and how this use of overtime created safety problems l
within the plant. The proposed anendments further waters down the ovenime rules and creates i
an ambiguous definition as to who is covered under those rules. Given the past abuses of overtime, and how the over-use of overtime has created safety problems, this proposal should not be approved. The NRC has issued NOVs concerning overtime, including, but not limited to,
[
i NOV 97013-02 which cites the violation of TS 6.2.1.i because of management oversight of t
l overtime; and NOV 97013-02 which cites the violation of TS 6.2.1.i in which overtime guidelines were not met.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set fonh above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a 41
finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 14 s
Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2): " Leak Path" safety problem. &g, Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Explanation of Basis for Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2)(I) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Sunport Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2)(iih The changes requested by the Applicant, specifically those changes related to qualifications, staffing, and training, cannot be granted until the " Leak Path" safety problem is properly identified and permanently corrected. Specifically, Mr. Dienethal (and other persons) shall provide expert testimony regarding the " Leak Path" concem. Briefly stated, the " Leak Path" issue is caused by the current non-operational condition of the Reactor Coolant Systems and various other systems. During system operation, the pressure from the system and liquid that runs through the system keep the seals and packing lubricated. Because the system is currently not in use and thus not being lubricated, it is highly likely that the packing and seals for the system components have dried out and cracked, which would create a potential leak path.
If the system is used again before the issue of dried out and cracked seals and packing is addressed, there is an enormous potential for disaster because the system may potentially release radioactive fuel into the atmosphere via direct ventilation that connects the system directly to outside Plant Zion.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of 42
Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the I
burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding ofno significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 15 Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2): " Spent Fuel Pool" safety issue. &c Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Explanation of Basis for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2)(I) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Supoort Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b)(2)(ii): Petitioner contends that the current fuel pool holding tank poses a serious threat ofradioactive leakage that cannot be maintained or prevented effectively by Plan; Zion. Specifically, Petitioner (and other persons) will testify that the fuel assembly tubing (otherwise referred to as assembly cladding), within the power plant, was poorly maintained during its use. Over time, foreign material from the outside environment (from poor maintenance practices and improper monitoring ofinventory) entered the Reactant Cooler System. The debris then would bounce around in the system, eventually finding its way into the reactor. Once in the reactor, the foreign material would lodge between tubing (cladding) of the fuel assembly. At that point, the velocity of the Reactant Cooler Flow would contact this foreign material and allow it vibrate against the cladding of the fuel assembly to a point where it would chaff a hole in the cladding. At that point, raw radioactive fuel was been released into the Reactant Cooler System because the cladding damage was so great. As a result, regular outages 43
i became severely more radiologically dangerous to personnel. This fuel, with the damaged cladding which leaks out a higher amount ofradioactive particulate, is now stored in the fuel pool permanently.
i This fuel pool, however, is not designed to accommodate the amount of raw radioactive
{
{
fuel combined with debris and material from the cladding that it currently contains. The fuel, currently exposed to the water in the pool, is creating a potential safety danger beyond that which the apparatus and plant is equipt to handle: The fuel pool is designed with specific time and capacity limits, and those limits are currently overextended.
l Plant Zion has underestimated the severity of any problem that may arise from the fuel pool because even the worst case scenario procedures fail to account for the levels of debris and cladding in the fuel. Consequently, efforts needed to combat a potential problem arising from a breach or leak in the pool equipment will be very shortcoming. The result will be a higher release of radioactive material into the atmosphere.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
1 For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. 6 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a fmding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
L CONTENTION 16 Statament Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2): The Applicant's request for amendment circumvents the Commission's decommissioning process by failing to provide a 44 l
valid decommissioning plan or acceptable altemative decommissioning, resulting in the unsafe removal of the plant from operational service. Su Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Frnlanation of Basin for Contention Reanired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statament of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Supoort Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): Commonwealth Edison Co. has determined that its Plant Zion has reached the end ofits useful life and it has stated an intention to seek decommissioning. The Commission's definition of" decommissioning" states that it "means to remove a nuclear facility safsly_from service and to reduce residual radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property for unrestricted use and termination of the license." NUREG-0586, " Final Generic
' Emironmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," p. 2-5 (emphasis
' added). However, the Applicant's request to amend its license would result in reductions in the margin of safety, the safety-related staffing of the plant, the safety related technical specifications and the safety-related personnel conditions within the corporate structure, radiation protection and the control room prior to submitting a decommissioning plan for Plant Zion. Sag explanations in Contentions I through 15, above. Until Applicant submits a decommissioning plan and receives approval of such a plan from the Commission it must be considered an operational facility subject to the nuclear safety regulations and standards applicable to operating nuclear power plants. Applicant's request for amendment will violate these nuclear safety regulations and standards and place the public health and safety at risk. Sag explanations in Contentions 1 through 15, above.
Applicant wants these changes to its license without applying for a formal decommissioning, without submitting a decommission plan, and without NRC approval of I
l 45
decommissioning. By not taking these appropriate steps, Applicant seeks through the requested amendment to its license the benefits of decommissioning without requesting and obtaining approval of a decommissioning plan in violation of NRC regulations and in violation of nuclear safety regulations, laws and standards. Granting the amendments ' vill serve to delay the necessary safety review process which should be undertaken prior to the commencement of decommissioning and will permit Plant Zion, which is still an operational nuclear power plant,'to avoid adherence to nuclear safety regulations and standards applicable to operational plants.
More significantly, the Applicant's request for amendment is not an acceptable substitute for, or attemative to, decommissioning because it will place Plant Zion (during its pre-decommissioning phase) in a condition that will pose an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. Prior to decommissioning Commonwealth Edison Co. should be required to conduct a review that includes a root cause analysis of why Plant Zion suffered from so many QA and other safety-related problems during the operational phase, and the Applicant should be required to provide a detailed plan to correct these problems prior to any approval of any amendment which is directly or indirectly related to decommissioning.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contentions 1 through 15.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the
- burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. { 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered
. preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
46
l 1
CONTENTION 17 Statement Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2h Plant Zion's Radiation Protection Monitors should not be eliminated, and those Radiation Protection Monitors which are remaining i
in use need to be upgraded and/or properly maintained. San Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Fvnlanation ofBasic for Contention Reanired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and j
the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Supnort Contention Reauired 1
under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Viih The Radiation Protection Monitors which are being eliminated through Commonwealth Edison's requested amendment are needed to protect the public health and safety, prevent the release ofradiation and radiation contamination offsite and to protect worken at the plant from exposures to radiation. At Plant Zion active systems remain in operation which need to be properly maintained to protect the health and safety of Plant Zion employees and the general public. These monitors quantify the amount of radiation released into the area and quantify air quality radiation levels. San Affidavit ofRandy Robarge,111. The 1
i monitors need to be retained or replaced with updated monitors. M. The monitors or upgraded monitors also need to be maintained and serviced to assure quality detection in accordance with nuclear safety regulations and accepted safety standards. M. Without these monitors, improper levels ofradiation may go undetected and radiation contamination may be released to the general public, plant workers, and the local environment, placing the health and safety of the community,
. plant workers, and their families in jeopardy. M.
Plant Zion has a history of radiation and radiation contamination exposures of plant I
j.
47 J
l
workers and improper releases ofradiation contamination off-site due to lax adherence to radiation protection procedures and faulty or malfunctioning radiation protection monitors.
Petitioner will rely upon the NRC Notices of Violations and NRC Inspection Reports issued by the NRC concerning these issues in the last five years. In addition, Petitioner will rely upon the testimony, evidence and record presented in Steven Boudrie v. Commonwealth Edison Comnany, DOL Case No. 95-ERA-15, that demonstrates the Applicant's failure to meet radiation protection procedures and Plant Zion's faulty or malfunctioning radiation protection monitors.
Petitioner incorporates herein the entire Boudne DOL record in support of this contention. In addition, Petitioner will rely upon the testimony of Mr. Robarge and other employees or former employees at Plant Zion who are knowledgeable ab out these issues to prove this contention.
Additional bases for this contention are contamed in the explanation sections of Contention 1, Contention 3 and Contention 10.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set fonh under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material funher demonstrates why a finding of no significant hazarc's cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 18 Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2): No changes should be made to Applicant's license until the harassment and intimidation of employees is halted. San Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Explanation of Basis for Contention Reauired under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statement of Facts. Ooinion. and References which Suonort Contention Required 48 l
l
undar 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Vii): As set forth in the DOL case filed by Randy Robarge, current DOL cases pending before OSHA and the July 22,1997 letter from Beach to Maiman, a " chilling effect" exists at Plant Zion which prevents the proper disclosure of safety related problems at that site. Until the Applicant can demonstrate that it has solved this " chilling effect" problem and has eliminated the root causes of employee intimidation, any change to Applicant's license must be denied.
. Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of Contention 1 and Contention 3.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the t
. burden set forth under 10 C.F.R. { 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a finding ofno significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
CONTENTION 19 Statement Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2h The license amendments should be denied in their entirety because a loss of coolant accident (hereinafter "LOCA") could result from the changes requested by Applicant. San Applicant's Application, Attachment A.
Brief Exninnation of Basis for Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2VI) and the Concise Statament of Facts. Oninion. and Referencae which Sunnort Contention Required under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(bV2Viih Mr. Edwin Dienethal and other expert witnesses shall testify that the proposed amendments could increase the potential for a LOCA, or a lesser accident, to occur at Plant Zion. The combination of staffing changes such as the elimination of the cite vice president, the elimination of senior operators, the elimination of radiation protection supervisors, 49
and the use of only cenified fuel handlers to perform functions on site or be present on site could 7
i result in a LOCA. Specifically, the absence of the types ofpersonnel which would be eliminated or downgraded in Applicant's proposed amendments would result in the elimination of I
experienced professionals on site. In an unpredictable situation, this lack of experience could prove catastrophic to the public health and safety. The downgrading of the skill, knowledge, and experienced pool of talent on site in combination with the problems identified in Contentions 1 and 3 could reasonably result in a LOCA due to human error. This matter will be the subject of l
expert testimony by Mr. Dienethal and other witnesses.
Additional bases for this contention are contained in the explanation sections of l
Contentions 1 through 18.
For each of the reasons set forth above, the NRC and the Applicant cannot meet the burden set fonh under 10 C.F.R. Q 50.92. In addition, this material further demonstrates why a l'
finding ofno significant hazards cannot be issued in this matter and why a stay should be entered l.
preventing the July 24,1998 decision of the NRC Staff from being implemented.
l 1
50 5
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners' request to intervene, and all of the contentions set forth above, should be admitted. Moreover, on the basis of the factual record set forth herein, Petitioner's request to stay the issuance of the No Significant Hazards Detennination until a full and complete hearing on the above-referenced contentions should be granted.
Respec 1 su i ed, Stephen M. Kohn Michael D. Kohn David K. Cole. pinto l
KOHN, KOHN & COLAPINTO, P.C.
3233 P Street, N.W.
t Washington, D.C. 20007 202-342-6980 (phone) 202-342-6980 (fax)
Attorneys for Petitioners l
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on August 18,1998 a copy of this document was served in accordance with the service procedures set forth in Vol. 63 Federal Register No.155, p. 43201 by deliv g a copy of this document to the NRC Public Document Room and serving a copy of this doc ent on the NRC General Counsel and the attomey for the licensee.
Mephifn M. Kohn 340/ petition.nsh i
51
____._.___._.m
l
(
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
)
In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-295/304-LA
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
)
)
(Zion Nuclear Power Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
August 18,1998
)
i EXHIBITS TO INTERVENER'S TO INTERVENE AND INITIAL STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS AND REOUEST FOR STAY Stephen M. Kohn Michael D. Kohn David K. Colapinto KOHN, KOHN & COLAPINTO, P.C.
3233 P Street, NW Washington, DC 20007 Phone: (202) 342-6930 Fax: (202)342-6964 Attorneys for Petitioners August 18,1998 1
I J
- = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
l INDEX OF EXHIBITS I
1.
Affidavit of Edwin D. Dienethal (July 31,1998).
I 2.
Affidavit of Randy D. Robarge (July 31,1998).
3.
Notices of Violation (NOV) and Enforcement Actions (EA) Resulting From Quality Assurance Breakdown.
4.
Notices of Violation (NOV) and Enforcement Actions (EA) Resulting From Failure to Follow Procedures.
5.
Redacted Excerpts of Deposition of Rodney Bauman from Robarge v. Commonwealth Edison,98-ERA-2.
6.
Redacted Excerpts of Deposition of Brent Robinson from Robarge v. Commonwealth Edman,98-ERA-2.
7.
Redacted Excerpts of Deposition of Ronald Schuster from Robarge v. Commonwealth Edison,98-ERA-2.
l 8.
Redacted Excerpts of Deposition ofJohn C. Meyers from Robarge v. Commonwealth i
Edison,98-ERA-2, 1
9.
Redacted Excerpts of Hearing Transcript from Robarge v. Commonwealth Edis2n,98-ERA-2.
j i
10.
Tedimony of Allen Mosbaugh from Hearing Transcript for Robarge v. Commonwealth Edison, 98-ERA-2.
11.
Redacted Excerpts of Hearing Transcript from Robarge v. Commonwealth Edison. 98-ERA-2.
l L
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l EXHIBIT 1 l
Q i
Y I
k l
t I
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