ML20154D043
| ML20154D043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/29/1988 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154D032 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8805190030 | |
| Download: ML20154D043 (5) | |
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NUCLEAD REGULATORY COMMISSION THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS DURING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1986 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 I
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1 8805190030 880429 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
i Thirteenth Annual Report on Domestic Safeguards Introduction Pursuant to the requirements of National Security Decision Memorandum 254, this report advises the President on the effectiveness of domestic nuclear safeguards in the comercial licensed sector under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission in FY-1987.
Background
In accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission regulates safeguards in licensed nuclear facilities and activities to assure protection of the public health and safety and the national defense and security. In this regulatory context, "safeguards" denotes measures which are taken to deter, prevent, or respond to the unauthorized possession or use
- of significant quantities of special nuclear material through theft or diver-sion and to protect against radiological sabotage of nuclear facilities. In general, safeguards for licensed nuclear fuel facilities and non-power reactors emphasize protection against theft or diversion of special nuclear ,
raterial while safeguards for pcwer reactors stress protection against radiological sabotage.
During FY-1987, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's safeguards requirements were applied to 109 power reactors, 54 non-power reactors, and 28 fuel cycle facilities. They were also applied to 120 shipments of spent fuel,19 shipments of special nuclear material involving more than one but less than five kilograms of high-enriched uranium, and one shipment of special nuclear material involving five or more kilograms of high-enriched uranium.
The following infomation sumarizes the status of domestic safeguards for licensed nuclear reactors, fuel facilities, and transportation. The status of threat assessr.ent is also discussed.
Reactor Safeguards Status o Power Reactors ;
In response to revised regulations, all power reactor licensees submitted J
amended security plans to ensure that safeguards systems maintain current levels of protection while minimizing any potential impact on plant or i
personnel safety. In addition, licensees amended their security plans in accordance with revised regulations clarifying requirements for entry searches.
- Protection at power reactors was also enhanced by the issuance in March 1987 of I d
a new regulation requiring fingerprinting and Federal Bureau of Investigation
- criminal history checks of persons having unescorted access to nuclear power plants or access to Safeguards Infonnation. The regulation was developed to implement Section 606 of Public Law 99-399, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.
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The staff continued the Regulatory Effectiveness Review program evaluating the practical effectiveness of safeguards systems at licensed reactors. These reviews were conducted to assure that safeguards programs, as implemented by licensees, are effective against the design basis threats defined in 10 CFR 73.1. One finding was categorized as a "Potential Sabotage Vulnerability,"
a combination of significant weaknesses which collectively could have posed an undue risk to the public health and safety. This was promptly remedied by compensatory measures voluntarily implemented by the licensee pending :
pemanent fixes. l During the year, Nuclear Regulatory Comission teams reviewed safeguards effectiveness at 16 power reactors. They found a number of safeguards deficiencies that warranted attention. Many of these findings reflect concern I about the potential for a skilled and dedicated adversary to enter the !
protected area of a nuclear power plant undetected. Review teams often found ,
that structures and equipment located near a site's intrusion detection system 1 could be useful for circumventing that system. Distinguishing between nuisance )
or false alarms and alarms activated by an actual intreder could also be a l problem in some situations. NRC review teams found weaknesses in vital area l barriers at several sites where ventilation openings and ducting, walls, and i hatches provided little resistance to penetration by someone using hand tools available within the protected area. At one site the team found an x-ray machine that did not achieve the desired metal detection capability.
Most Regulatory Effectiveness Review findings have been or are being corrected through voluntary actions by the licensees. Additional corrections beyond those taken voluntarily are being pursued through regional inspections, 1 security plan changes, rulemaking, improved guidance, or by other appropriate i rethods in accordance with agency regulations and procedures.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's inspection program is designed to evaluate safeguards performance and compliance with regulatory requirements and to ,
provide feedback so that appropriate corrective actions can be promptly i initiated. During FY-1987, safeguards inspectors from the five Regional offices conducted hundreds of inspections at licensed reactors throughout the United States. Resident inspectors at operating power reactors also l contributed to the safeguards inspections program at their respective sites.
There were 12 safeguards enforcement actions which involved civil penalties either proposed, imposed, or paid during FY-1987 at licensed power reactors.
These civil penalties ranged from $15,000 to $200,000. Violations involved such security matters as degraded vital area barriers, improper access ccntrols, failure to properly protect Safeguards Information, sleeping security guards, failure to report degraded security systems, and failure to implement adequate compensatory measures when the security system was degraded.
The Comission continued efforts to assure that all nuclear power plant personnel with access to protected areas at operating plants are fit for duty.
Following the publication of the Comission policy statement on fitness for duty (51 FR 27921), the staff began reviewing and evaluating a number of licensee fitness for duty programs. Information developed during these 3 reviews and other data concerni49 the effectiveness of industry programs will
! be considered by the Comission in deciding upon further regulatory action.
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i o Non-Power Reactors Following publication in FY-1986 of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's final rule requiring non-power reactors to be converted from the use of high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium or to as low an enrichment as possible, affected licensees began the task of conversion. The full conversion process will typically require 2-3 years and is broken into three phases.
These phases are initial study of necessary core changes and safety considerations, fabrication and delivery of the low enriched uranium fuel, and loading of the new fuel and removal of the old fuel off site. Conversion was made contingent on funds being provided by the Federal Government. By the end of FY-1987, 10 facilities had received funding from the Department of Energy to begin the conversion process.
Fuel Cycle Facility Safeguards Status During FY-1987, the number of licensed fuel facilities subject to Nuclear Regulatory Comission safeguards requirements totaled 28, of which 10 are major fuel fabrication facilities. Seventeen of these facilities maintained both physical security and material control and accounting systems. Four of these 17 facilities had actual holdings of formula quantities of st* ategic special nuclear material requiring the implementation of extensive physical security and material accountability measures. The activities of the 28 facilities include full-scale reactor fuel production, pilot plant operations, decomissioning efforts, and the storage of sealed items.
In August 1987, the staff issued license conditions to the four licensees holding formula quantities of strategic special ruclear material to incorporate improvements into their physical security plans.
The improverrents were recomended by the Nuclear Regulatory Comission/
Department of Energy Corrparability Review Team and ai; proved by the Comission.
The improvements include 100 percent search of personnel and hand-carried packages entering the protected area, night qualification in all assigned weapons for security force personnel, and the use of amed guards at material access portals during operation. Three additional improvements recomended by the Review Team and endorsed by the Comission will be proposed through rulemaking. These include a requirement for security system perfomance evaluation through response force tactical exercises, a change to the design basis threat to include the use of land vehicles by adversaries to commit a theft, and a requirement for two protected-area barriers.
During FY-1987, material control and accounting inspections were conducted at the 10 major fuel fabrication facilities. Physical security inspections were conducted at six of the ten, including the four that possess fomula quantities of special nuclear material. No civil penalties were proposed for fuel cycle facilities in FY-1987.
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A final rule revising material control and accounting requirements for fuel cycle facilities licensed to possess and use formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material was issued on March 30, 1987. The rule shifts the emphasis of raterial control and accounting away from periodic physical inventories and toward the use of process monitoring information for accounting purposes. Timely detection of anomalies indicative of potential material losses and enhanced loss localization capabilities are the principal benefits that will be realized.
Transportation Status The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved 38 transportation routes as accept-able for protection against radiological sabotage. One hundred and twenty spent fuel shipments were made over these routes. To keep the public informed about spent fuel shipments, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission periodically publishes information on approved routes. The sixth revision to this document, entitled "Public Information Circular for Shipments of Irradiated Reactor Fuel,"
is presently being published.
No significant problems were identified during the inspections of selected shipments and the domestic segments of import and export shipments of spent fuel.
Licensees shipping materials began compliance with the reporting requirements of the international Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which became effective on March 26, 1987. The information was then forwarded I to the Department of State for appropriate international notifications, l
Threat Assessment The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff assesses threats to licensed facilities, material, and activities and prepares incident response plans for responding to actual thefts of nuclear material or radiological sabotage of nuclear facilities or activities. A continuing working relationship was i maintained with other Federal agencies that are concerned with threat-related ma tters . Particular attention was paid to foreign terrorist groups, their activities, and their relationship with possible state-sponsored activities. l Based on its review and its interaction with other agencies, no significant l change in the threat environment affecting current safeguards regulations was discerned. Both the domestic and foreign threat environments were reviewed on l a continuing basis to assure the adequacy of current domestic safeguards ,
regulations. The Commission, as part of its reconsideration of the design l
, basis threats, continued to solicit other agency views on the domestic threat I environment.
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