ML20059A742

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in Russia & Eastern Europe

ML20059A742
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Issue date:	06/16/1992
From:	Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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NUDOCS 9401030107
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STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

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TO THE i

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES l

UNITED STATES SENATE i

i CONCERNING i

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SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE i

I PRESENTED BY J

IVAN SELIN CHAIRMAN i

SUBMITTED:

JUNE 16, 1992 9401030107 930121 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR _

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i Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am' pleased to be able to.

I discuss with you how nuclear safety issues are evolving in the countries of I

the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

This topic is particularly timely, in light of the growing concerns about nuclear safety and energy I

security in that region, of the Secretary of State's recent nuclear safety initiative at the Lisbon Conference, and in view of the fact that nuclear safety will be on the agenda of the forthcoming G-7 Economic Sumit meeting in j

Munich, Germany in early July.

As you are aware, the mission of the NRC is protection of public health

-and safety, the environment, and national security.

Therefore, the technical i

and safety aspects of this testimony, which are within the purview of the NRC, l

t represent the views of the Comission.

However, I will provide my personal views on matters such as electricity pricing and energy supply and demand considerations.

Also, I will respond to your request.for my views on U.S. and' international efforts now being made to address the problems posed by these reactors in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

My expertise in these areas is based upon my extensive travels to the former Soviet Union in my current post, my previous position at the Department of State, and as a CEO in the private sector. Thus, my testimony in the areas which are outside the mission of the NRC represent my personal views.

I believe my views are i

consistent with the policies of the United States government.

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INTRODUCTION Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and other countries of Eastern Europe such p

i as Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) are all y,~a e a j

I dependent to some degree en Soviet-designed nuclear power plants for l

electricity.

In addition, Armenia has stated its intention to restart two 1

Soviet-designed plants in the near future. All of these nuclear plants have t

serious safety deficiencies, and this is particularly true for two types of I

plants, the Chernobyl-type RBMKs and the older pressurized water reactors f

termed VVER 440/230s.

I visited these and other types of plants while on a lin n.a visit to Russia, Ukraine,38ulgaria and the CSFR and drew some conclusionsfromwhatIsawthere.hhaveattachedacopyofthereportI prepared on my personal observations during this trip for the Comittee's

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information I might ma note that two later model VVER 440 plants are under g

i construction in Cuba, and there have been expressions of concern about some i

aspects of their safety. Here I plan, however, to focus on nuclear safety l

problems with the currently operational reactors in the former Soviet Union f

I (FSU) and Eastern Europe.

I want to stress at the outset that responsibility-i 1

for the safety of these plants rests with the national authorities of these l

countries; but, of course, operational problems that could lead to releases of radiation are of international interest.

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There is growing international concern about nuclear safety in these Soviet-designed plants, and a number of international activities are underway to address these concerns. As part of a substantial U.S. effort in the last few years to help improve safety, the NRC has played a leading role, particularly in the fonner Soviet Union, through a cooperative effort 71ving mainly information exchanges, inspector visits, etc., but the problem goes well beyond what this effort, helpful as it has been, can realistically accomplish. The seriousness of the situation requires a major international effort to establish a concrete and effective approach to resolve d

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4 these concerns.

I believe what is needed from the West is combination of assistance and support on three levels:

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Immediate but relatively low levels of support (on the order of half a billion dollars, or $10 million per reactor) for operational safety and near-term technical improvements on all operational Soviet-designed reactors, such as better procedures -- based on improved understanding i

of normal and off-normal plant behavior, operator training, funding of

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independent regulatory inspectors, and quick steps in the direction of reducing fire hazards; 1

2)

A larger, but still safety-related program for improving the safety of Soviet-designed plants on a triage basis -- a third (about 25 reactors) should be closed as soon as possible, another third (about 30 reactors) need relatively major upgrades, and a third cov1d benefit from major-investments in their completion (about 25 reactors).

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This approach would raise electricity prices as gas and oil prices go up. There are enough unfinished modern nuclear plants in Russia and Ukraine to replace the power from the Chernobyl-type reactors. With funding from a range of potential sources, these plants could be finished, the Chernobyl types replaced, and the profits (from the market electricity prices) used to pay off much of the cost.

Of course, higher prices would also encourage conservation, and alternative sources of energy might be used if considered appropriate by the FSU and Eastern Europe.

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With regard to electricity pricing, the situation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is very different from our country.

Unlike American utilities, those in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe do not worry about covering variable costs, amortizing capital investment or providing shareholders with a profit.

In fact, the price of electricity is not even based on costs of production as we use the term in the Western economies.

To an American business manager this is like " Alice in Wonderland" -- it does not represent economic reality.

n In my testimony today I will outline what I see a's'the key safety l

problems faced by the nuclear industries and regulatory authcrities in the f

countries of concern, and offer some specific suggestions as to how we might assist these parties in improving both their nuclear safety. infrastructure and also their energy economies.

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UNSAFE FEATURES OF CERTAIN SOVIET REACTOR DESIGNS Before presenting my thoughts on the safety of nuclear power in these countries, let me begin by summarizing some key design features of the problem j

plants.

U.S., Japanese and West European nuclear reactors (and some. Soviet j

designs as well) operate using water for two functions -- both as a coolant to l

remove the reactor heat and as a moderator to slow down the neutrons for control of the fission process and therefore the reactor power, which changes i

water to steam.

The electricity is then produced through steam-driven turbines. These water-cooled, water-moderated reactors employ the principle of " negative reactivity feedback". Simply put, this means that when reactor l

power increases and more heat is generated, the chain reaction of the fission j

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process naturally slows down and, in the absence of deliberate countervailing control action, the power increase is reversed.

The Russian RBMK design is quite different.

It uses gr dphite as a moderator in conjunction with water coolant, in a configuration such that i

these reactors, under certain conditions, have a " positive reactivity feedback" property.

Under these conditions, when reactor power increases and more heat is generated, the fission process, in the absence of other controls, is enhanced, and power increases even further. This effect is especially pronounced when the water boils, turning to steam.

The phenomenon of increase in reactivity upon creation of steam voids in the water, termed a " positive void coefficient," was at the root of the overpower condition that developed to the point of catastrophic results at Chernobyl, when a test was conducted without required precautions.

t Even with all of the safety inherent in their design physics, our water-moderated, water-cooled reactor designs include numerous backup systems.

For example, if a leak develops and the water used as coolant escapes, emergency core cooling systems. inject new water to help dissipate the heat.

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designs, with their redundant backup systems, are d~ signed to ensure that t

water is always available to cool the reactor core.

I Other features of Western plants include fast-acting control rods for rapid emergency shutdown; the availability of at least three redundant i

supplies of cooling water; and finally, a reinforced containment structure j

which encloses the entire reactor coc, lex. These containments are designed to i

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contain all the steam released and withstand the pressures that could occur if there were a serious accident at the plant.

They stand as the final barrier in assuring the protection of the public.

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RBMK (Chernobyl-Type) Reactors The Soviet RBMK design, in contrast, includes a confinement system only for small coolant-loss accidents.

The system can accommodate only a small fraction of the steam that could come from a major accident.

The power plant is protected from the elements by a steel framed building, covered with sheet metal and a tar-paper roof.

It is not designed to be a protective barrier between the reactor core and the public.

Indeed, it can be a fire hazard.

The RBMX reactor design was developed as a military production reactor which could also produce electricity, with little attention to nuclear safety as we understand it in the West. While there have been improvements in each subsequent generation, the overall design is seriously flawed.

r Briefly, to summarize, the major design deficiencies of the RBMXs are:

f Because of its " positive reactivity feedback" characteristics under a

certain conditions, it is a fundamentally unstable reactor design, and l

employs a poorly designed system for shutdown of the reactor.

It is characterized by a general lack of separation and redundancy in

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critical electrical and fluid systems, and its safety systems show a general susceptibility to failures that have a common cause.

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None of the RBMKs exhibit adequate levels of fire protection,

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Their emergency core cooling system is limited in effectiveness to pipe j

a breaks in certain locations.

l They have no containment system.

Rather there is a confinement system

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that can accommodate certain pipe breaks outside the reactor but not i

breaks of more than one or two -- or, with improvements, a few -- of the r

over 1600 pressure tubes in the reactor core.

VVER 440/230 (early PWR) Reactors f

While the VVER 440/230 was the first production model of the pressurized water reactor (PWR) concept, it was designed in a manner that is below Western 1

nuclear safety requirements. Although there are some inherent positive features of the design (such as large water inventory and low power density of the fuel), there are also some major design deficiencies, such as:

'l Absence of containment for any but the smallest breaks in the primary i

coolant system.

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No substantial emergency core cooling system.

s Lack of separation and redundancy in critical electrical and fluid

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systems.

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A general susceptibility of systems which are important to safety to j

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common-cause failures.

l Inadequate built-in fire protection.

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i AN ACTION PLAN TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY l

There is a growing interna ional consensus that the remaining 15 RBMKs and 10 VVER 440/230s should not be operated any longer than absolutely necessary, and that the better-designed plants (17 VVER 1000s and 14 VVER 440/213s) should be upgraded to achieve an acceptable level of safety.

In addition, 21-25 reactors under construction could be completed if economic conditions permit: 17 VVER 1000s in Russia and Ukraine, two each in Bulgaria and the CSFR, and perhaps four smaller VVER 440/213s in the CSFR. While Western countries are not in a position to demand shutdown of the worst plants, we can, through negotiations for alternative energy sources and conservation, seek agreement with the states of the FSU and other Eastern European countries on limiting the remaining lifetime of these plants. The ultimate responsibility for the safety of these plants rests with these republics and the operating organizations.

r SPECIFIC STEPS TO IMPROYE SAFETY IN THE SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG TEPR Beyond shutting down the unsafe nuclear plants, further analysis of the energy supply and demand picture in the FSU can provide additional insight on strategies for reducing safety risks.

I believe the basic steps that can enhance nuclear safety may be divided into short, intermediate and long-term I

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actions, which should go hand-in-hand with our support for economic i

development.

i In the short term we should seek to help the states involved i

improve operational safety through such means as training and use l

l of improved procedures for dealing with abnormal situations.at nuclear plants; help to develop and implement effective and independent regulatory authorities that will ensure that power I

production is not at the expense of safety; and undertake key i

interim actions to reduce the risk of accide^nts in the RBMKs and VVER 440/230s for several years, after which operations would be discontinued.

In the medium term we should help them determine energy l

requirements and the feasibility of reducing energy demand, and help to identify energy alternatives that will increase their incentives to shut down the RBMKs and VVER 440/230s.

This effort will involve studies to determine energy supply and demand projections, and programs to improve supply efficiency and demand management, as well as energy pricing and regulation.

This information should be used to work with them to improve their overall energy system, including replacement power that will be needed to allow the shut down of these plants.

Rememberitis their responsibility to operate their plants safely and to develop their own energy plans--however, the West can help.

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t In the long term they need assistance, through emphasis on

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economic stability and market-ba' sed energy pricing, to upgrade and/or complete the better plants, the VVER 1000s and 440/213s.

Price reforms will be crucial to encourage conservation and to i

facilitate funding of improved plant operations and repayment of l

loans for safety enhancements and replacement power.

Known safety problems that have a significant impact on safety and are amenable to effective interim corrective actions should be addressed in the near term to reduce the risk from these plants while the mid-term and long-term upgrade programs proceed.

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During my trip to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the Fall of 1991, I had the opportunity to visit the Loviisa nuclear power plant'in Finland, which, as you may know, consists basically of Soviet VVER 440/213s l

constructed and upgraded to meet Western safety standards.

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safety and productivity, Loviisa is one of the best plants in the world, with -

t capacity factors above 85%. What are the lessons we can draw from the Finnish l

example?

I believe there are three:

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With upgraded (Western) safety systems and operating standards, Soviet-designed reactors of the 3rd generation are not intrinsically inferior to plants in the West.

In fact, this design is particularly forgiving when problems develop, as well as easy to run.

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Given a reasonable level of design sophistication and intrinsic safety, j

it is personnel and management, more than superior design, which determine both safety and economic performance.

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These two factors, superior safety and superior economic performance, are more likely to go hand-in-hand than to be in conflict.

l In Russia and Ukraine, it appears that the larger and newer VVER-1000s (the third generation Soviet-version pressurized water reactors) can be operated at an acceptable level of safety.

This is in 'no small part due to the fact that they employ a number of advanced safety systems, common in

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Western plants, such as containments and emergency core cooling. Those plants where construction has been suspended could be finished and operated i

I effectively with adequate financial support.

These pl<nts may require new or l

modified steam generators for long-term operation.

On the other hand, as I

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indicated earlier, the Chernobyl-type RBMKs, with, among other shortcomings, serious problems in their electrical, fire protection, and instrumentation l

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systems, are very worrisome.

I express this concern even in light of the safety improvements that have been made since the Chernobyl accident.

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It is my opinion that, in the interest of safety, the FSU should i

concentrate on finishing the larger VVERs, as well as construct nonnuclear power plants, to allow for shutdown of the RBMKs as quickly as possible.

As a side note, this strategy could well be attractive to financial institutions outside Russia willing to invest in the VVER-1000 plants.

Safety assistance for the RBMK reactors will have only limited effectiveness in view of their 11 1

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i substantial fundamental design and fire safety problems and it could be viewed as sanctioning the continued operation of unacceptable plants.

On the other hand, some of the RBMKs will be around for years, little as we might like it.

We cannot put our heads in the sand--safety problems still need our immediate attention.

The costs of. fully implementing this approach are significant and will require local and foreign private investment. A working group within the G-7, composed mainly of Treasury and Finance group representatives, has been

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established to develop an agreement on this issue.

Effective international assistance will also depend on reaching a j

consensus among-the Western nations and with the leaders of the countries of the FSU that these measures.should be taken to address the safety problems.

The recipient countries have to play a key role in developing the approaches to be used.

PERSONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATORY REFORM Perhaps as important as the upgrades and plant fixes in the countries 2

with which we are concerned is the need for regulatory reform, beginning, in each instance, with a fundamentally new attitude towards nuclear safety.

In September 1991, I attended a special meeting in Paris organized by the OECD/NEA for the heads of the nuclear regulatory organizations of seven major OECD countries.

This group, the so-called " senior regulators," concluded that 12 i

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L the highest priority of NEA should be ensuring the establishment of effective I

governmental nuclear regulatory authorities in the Eastern European countries.

During the senior regulators' meeting and later at the IAEA General Conference in Vienna, I tried to emphasize the point that taking a stronger role in the former i iet Union and in Eastern Europe means much more than coordinating technical assistance. The program should be like a modern International Monetary Fund (IMF) program -- a little immediate humanitarian assistance, plus short and long-term aid conditioned on fundamental reforms.

Assistance to these countries must be coupled with a comitment on their part to realistic policies in pricing energy, establishir.g autonomous power production operations, actively pursuing alternative energy sources, and implementing strong independent regulatory structures.

f Elaborating on these points, I firmly believe, whether discussing domestic or foreign nuclear power, that programs without solid and predictable l

cash flows are a considerable concern. Maintenance, repairs, and capital i

reinvestments are essential ingredients for nuclear safety and adequate cash is the foundation for these improvements. Also, in the FSU there appears to be no autonomy for nuclear operating units. The disintegration of the central Soviet state gives rise to serious questions concerning comand and control, and the maintenance of technical competence. The substantial ambiguity regarding responsibility for nuclear safety must be addressed and resolved at the individual plant sites.

Finally, I found that there was no sensible 1

national energy planning.

If countries are going to have a nuclear power 13

t program, they must be willing to make a full financial commitment, and 'they must have a good regulatory system in place.

Nuclear power requires technical sophistication and the resources to operate plants safely.

i As an example of these problems I noted, after my first visit abroad as Chairman of the NRC, that the Kozloduy plant in Bulgaria, which includes j

six reactors, four from the first generation and two from the third generation i

of Soviet pressurized water reactor technology, demonstrated several related problems:

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There were not enough trained personnel to run more than half the i

reactors, and pay was insufficient to retain those who were there;

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The enterprise did not have the income or the autonomy to adjust pay and living conditions to meet the labor competition; 3)

The price for electricity was so low that there was no incentive to j

conserve and not enough cash flow to support proper maintenance, let alone needed capital improvements; t

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The government had neither the will nor the power to raise prices and take other steps to reduce the country's great dependence on electricity l

generated at Kozloduy.

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i Add to all this the fact that the technology of the 'first four reactors,

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especially the two oldest, is intrinsically unsafe, and they have a very

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l serious safety problem.

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As a result of the low pay structure dictated by the central government, l

Bulgaria has been plagued with an inability to retain its skilled plant operators, shift supervisors and key management personnel.

There is a serious problem when a cab driver in a city earns more than a nuclear plant operator.

l The organization running the nuclear power plants has neither the autonomy nor the authority to increase salaries or to provide other incentives necessary to

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retain these key people.

l In response to such concerns, Bulgaria did give the operators a substantial pay bonus, which has helped stem the exodus of skilled personnel.

Nevertheless, a one-time pay raise is not an adequate compensation policy in j

the face of stiff inflation.

Safety risks could increase unless the government authorities make fundamental changes and give the plants the freedom to take those steps necessary to retain key people.

In the absence of such changes, a major program of safety assistance to Bulgaria would, in my view, be ineffective.

Similarly, in the former Soviet Union, while there has been some recent' progress, electricity prices have been consistently set far below the cost of power generation.

The net result is an absence of adequate financial resources for plant maintenance, improvements, and safety enhancements and, even worse, no incentive for energy conservation.

Construction practices are 15 i

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E substandard, and there are still no strong and independent regulatory organizations with sufficient authority to ensure safety.

IMPROVING HUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION To assist the states of the former Soviet Union in nuclear safety regulation a number of issues need to be addressed.

First, the breakup of the Soviet Union created a variety of organizational entities with nuclear activities (or which used to have such activities) that are candidates for future cdoperation with the West. It is important to coordinate assistance and training so that western efforts benefit the appropriate organizations.

Second, as the Chairman of the nuclear regulatory authority in the U.S.

I am well aware that regulatory decisions are difficult to enforce without independence from those we regulate, but independence is lacking in the FSU.

The U.S. has provided Russian and Ukrainian regulators with copies of nuclear legislation and regulations, and both states have laws pending similar to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which will give them the authority and independence to regulate effectively.

These laws should be passed by late summer.

Third, financial resources are needed both to enable regulatory authoriti's to perform their functions and to allow operators to implement regulatory requirements. Without adequate assistance in this regard, little increase in nuclear safety can be expected.

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i Finally, the scope of regulation needs to extend beyond that of nuclear reactor safety to adequate nuclear materials safety and safeguards, as well as to regulation of radioactive sources.

The FSU is currently ill-i equipped to assume these responsibilities.

In order to improve nuclear safety regulation in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union it is therefore necessary to take a number of specific actions with regulatory personnel there to assist them in developing the legislative, regulatory and liability framework for an effective, independent regulatory infrastructure.

Specifically, we should:

Provide Reculatorv Assistance to Russian and Ukrainian regulators to improve safety standards and procedures among entities involved in nuclear power in the FSU.

This will include, but is not limited to, power ministries, design organizations, manufacturing entities and research establishments.

This assistance could help the new regulators develop the importance of

" defense in depth" and " safety first" in the philosophy and practice of j

nuclear power plant regulation.

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Train Personnel including, if desirable, former weapons scientists and r

engineers in quality control techniques for manufacturing nuclear components i

and control and instrumentation for nuclear power plants, and place them in manufacturing facilities to monitor, as part of the regulatory function, the 8

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i Encourace Collaborative Activities among the various ministries and j

other organizations within the FSU which bear on the development of an independent regulatory authority.

Joint meetings and joint research should i

also be encouraged wherever possible.

Provide Radiation Protection Assistance by training their regulators in t

nuclear materials safety, safeguards accounting tachniques, regulatory law,-

l and use of equipment for monitoring radioactive sources.

i INTERNATI0KAL NUCLEAR SAFETY CONVENTION Efforts are currently underway by the U.S. and numerous other countries to develop an international convention with a goal of achieving a tough minimum level of safety for all nuclear installations throughout the world, and ther ?by strengthen the hand of those trying to raise the level of. safety

. i in nucleir power programs worldwide.

The convention would specify acceptable l

qualitative safety objectives to be met by all parties.

Its objectives would be achieved primarily through the self-inspection and enforcement programs of l

the individual nations, and through periodic meetings of the parties to review compliance.

International peer pressure, bilateral agreements, membership in

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international organizations, and operation in a forum open to public scrutiny would provide assurance to all concerned parties of compliance with the convention. This would be analogous to the approach used in implementing the Helsinki Convention.

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1 In addition to specifying safety norms, I believe that an international nuclear safety convention should also call for all associated parties to i

provide for the following, which I have mentioned earlier:

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Financing and investment in nuclear facilities adequate to assure operational safety.

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Assured autonomy for nuclear power producing organizations.

This would enable them to attract and retain adequate numbers of skilled personnel.

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An independent regulatory agency.

These regulators should have enough' expertise and authority to ensure appropriate safety standards are developed for and implemented in facility operations.

THE SECURITY CONTEXT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY i

Finally, as we witness the changing events in this region, I believe we l

must view nuclear safety in the overall context of two other important developments: the need to prevent nuclear proliferation, and the broader issue-l of nuclear arms control.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union raises several important issues in these areas. The most obvious area of concern is the control and dismantling of former Soviet nuclear weapons.

Following that, l

there is the issue of ensuring that nuclear weapons and materials are e

adequately safeguarded.

The U.S. is working closely with Russia and other states of the FSU on the safety, security, and dismantlement of former Soviet nuclear weapons.

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In this connection there has been much discussion about the possibility l

of unemployed Soviet nuclear scientists selling their expertise to other nations aspiring to join the "ruclear club." One of the key questions is how to hold together Soviet scientists and engineers long enough to solve the technical problems associated with dismantling and destroying their nuclear weapons. The U.S. and other countries are working to establish International i

Science and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine, through which we will work to engage nuclear weapons experts of the former Soviet Union in i

productive work within the FSU in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear f

explosives expertise.

NRC has proposed a number of projects that could be used to put former nuclear weapons scientists and engineers to work on areas i

f that could enhance nuclear reactor safety in the Soviet-designed plats. NRC t

is also providing its safeguard:; expertise as part of a U.S. government l

cooperative exchange with Russia and Ukraine to help ensure the effectiveness f

of systems for nuclear materials accountir.g and control.

1 In summary, Mr. Chairman,

-- There are major problems facing the West regarding the need to j

improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

-- Substantial assistance will be needed from the U.S. and others to reduce the risks of a serious nuclear plant accident in these countries.

-- Ultimate responsibility, however, lies with the states of the FSU and the countries of Eastern Europe. We must help, but we cannot supplant their responsibility.

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The interest and concern of the international comunity about this l

problem have been very encouraging.

We now have an historic opportunity and I sincerely hope it will not i

I be missed.

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