ML20153D761
| ML20153D761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1988 |
| From: | Shelton D TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 1569, NUDOCS 8809060031 | |
| Download: ML20153D761 (45) | |
Text
_
_7 y' u-(I TOLED3
%mm EDISDN A Caterior Emegy Cm DONALD O. SHELTON va w e.r Docket No. 50-346 P'838' "
License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 1569 August 25, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Vashington, D. C.
20555 Subj ec t : 1987 Annual 10CFR50.59 Rsprt of Pacility Changes, Tests and Experiments Gentlemen:
The Toledo Edfson Company hereby submits, pursuant to 10CFR50.59(b)(2), the 1987 Annual 10CFR50.5) Repor' of f acility changes
'ests and experiments for "Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1.
Those changes, tests and experiments identif'tr' via the safety review process during the reporting period of January 23, 1,a/ through January 22, 1988 are enclosed. provides an executive summary of those changes, tests and experiments contained in the enclosure.
Very truly yours, f
+
CJO/ tit Enclorure cc: DB-1 tGC Resident Inspector A. V. DeAgazio, Project lianager A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator (2 copies)
G8090!20031 080025 PDR ADOCK 05000346 R
PNU f
THE TOLEDO EOGON COMPANY EOfSON PLAZA 300 MAD' SON AVENUE TOLEDO. OHIO 43652 l
5%f'6.Dockht N2.-50-346
!3 Lic nsa No. NPF M-Serial !!o.1569.
Page 1 3..
ATTACHMENT 1 1
SUMMARY
SHEET NUMBER TITLE DCR 87-0027 Drawing change to F.-302A, "Electrical Notes, Standards, and Details" FCR 78-201, Supp. 1 USAR Drawing Changes FCR 79 176, Rev. A, Removal of the Interim Anticipatory Reactor Trip Supp. 6 System (ARTS)
FCR 79-307, Rev. A Auniliary Shutdown Panel Spare Svitch Modifications FCR 83-130 Reactor Protection System (RPS)' Buffer Amplifier Modules t
FCR 84-111 Service Vater Pump (SVP) Discharge Strainer Setpoint Changes FCR 85-046, Rev. A Emergency Lighting DC Power Cable Reroute FCR 85-148 Aoxiliary Feedvater Pumps (AFP) Strainer Basket Removal FCR 85-199 Turbinc Plant Cooling Vater (TPCV) System g
Modificatione 4
FOR 85-231 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) Pressure Gauge Installation i
FCR 85-243, Supp. 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Room Cooler Fan Temperature Svitch Replacement FCR 85-244 liigh Voltage Tap Setting of Start-Up Transformers 4
No. 01 and 02 FCR 85-334 Door No. 215 Replacement FCR 86-030 Modificatf or.s of Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Fiping Support FCR 86-035, Supp. 2 USAR Draving Change (combined vith FCR 78-201, Supp. 1)
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. Lic nss Ns. NPF.
Serial No. 1569 Attar.bment 1 Page 2 FCR 86-105 Makeup and hirification System Feed and Bleed Flow Test FCR 86-310 Installation of Crane Model IGS-3K-152H-IS Emerger.cy Core Cocling (ECCS) Room Sump Pumps FCR 86-396 Service Vater Valve Room No. 2 Piping Penetration tieal Repair FCR 86-411 Radvaste Ventilation Heater Setpoint Change FCR 86-421 Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbins (AFPT) Trip and Throttle Valve Hand Grip FCR 87-003 Fuse Rat,ing Increase On Essential Instrumentation Power Supply FCR 87-026 Component Cooling Vater Pump Room HVAC Setpoint Changes FCR 87-045 Plov Transmitter FT-2799 Range Resistor Replacement g
FCR 87-087, Supp. 33 USAR Draving Changes SE 87-022 Evallate Installation of Jumper Vires in the Fire Detection System SE 87-029 Temporary Hechanical Hodification fnr Installation of a Temporary Fire Hose SE 87-031 Temporary Hechanical Modification (THH) to Auxiliary Feedvater System SE 87-135 Temperary Hechanical Modification for Hain Steam Safety Valve (HSSV) Gagging SE 87-140 Test Procedures, TP 870.29, Turbine Bypass Valve Stroke Testing SE 87-359 Temporary Hechanical Hodification for Auxiliary Feedvater Pump Turbine 1-1 Inboard Bearing Housing Cover Replocement THH 87-005 & 6 Temporary Hechanical Modification For Installation Of Temporary Fire Detectors THH 87-008 Temporary Hechanical Modification For Installation of Putnp For Decay Heat Valve Pit Leakage THH 87-012 Temporary Hechanical Modification to the Control Room Normal !!VAC
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Serial No.11569 Attachment.1 Page 3-b'
~THM 8'7-016 Temporary Mechanical Modification to.the Component s
D-
. Coo?.ing Vater, Ventilation System i
THM 87-019 Temporary. Mechanical modification for Control Room Emergency: Ventilation System (CREVS).
TMM 87-020 Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Steam Supply and Exhaust Piping Temporary Methanical Modifications THM'87-155 Temporary Hechanical Hodification to the Hydrogen
+
Recombiner System
'4s" THM 87-196, Rev. 1 Temporary Hechanical Modification for the Chlorination System TMM 87-305
. Temporary Mechanical Modification to Install a Controlled Bleed Off System for Decay Heat Valve DH-76 Leakage UCN 87-014 Selection of Instrument Setpoint Ranges for Safety Related Systems UCN 87-046 Surveillance Program for Reactor Vessel Material Integrity UCN 87-047 Recalculation of Hydrogen Generation Rate i
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a SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
TITLE:
Revision of design requiremento for Class IE conduit seismic supports as shown on drawing E-302A, "Electrical Notes, Standards, and Details.
CHANGE:
Revise drawing E-302A to delete redundant seismic support requirements.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Revise Class 1E conduit design requirements to reflect the correct single failure criteria.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Revise drawing E-302A, "Electrical Notes, Standards, and Details" to delete the requirements for redundant seismic supports when Class 1E conduits of different safety channels share a common support. Current single failure criteria excludes passive failure of passive components.
Therefore, seismic support failure is not a credible failure and is not postulated.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist, f
e O
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 78-201, SUPP. 1 AND FCR 86-035, SUPP. 2 TITLE:
USAR Drawing Changes CHANGE:
Revise various Piping and Instrument Diagrams or Figures presently contained in the USAR to reflect current as-built configurations for the systems concerned.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The FCR's involve. changes to drawings for previously approved and controlled modifications to non-safety related systems. Safety evaluations were written due to the drawings being revised appearing in the USAR.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
According to 10CFR50.59, changes to drawings contained in the USAR require a safety evaluation even if the drawing relates to non-safety related systems or components. The changes to these USAR drawings were made solely to conform the drawings to current as-built configurations for the systems involved.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Thecefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 79-176, REV. A, SUPP. 6 TITLE:
Removal of the Interim Antic'patory Reactor Trip System (ARTS).
CHANGE:
Remove the interim ARTS system.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Installation of permanent safety grade ARTS system.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
A non-safety grade ARTS system has been installed under FCR 79-176. The system functions of the interim system are now being accomplished by the safety grade ARTS which has been installed under FCR 79-184. Therefore, the non-safety grade sistem is not needed and removal precludes human factors confusion between the interim and safety grade system.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accideat or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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t A
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
s
'FOR FCR 79-307, REV. A TITLE:
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Spare Switch Modifications.
CHANGE:
Remove'the handles from four spare switches and add guards to four spare pushbutton switches.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Improve Human Factors conciderations.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
By removing the handles of Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) spare switches HIS 106D, HIS 107D, HIS 599D, and HIS 608D, and adding "Cutler-Hammer" guards on spare pushbutton switches HIS 106B, HIS 107B, HIS 599B, and HIS 608B the seismic analysis of the ASP is not affected. Adding these switche guards does not affect the safety function of the ASP.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. Tb2 proposed action will not create the possibility for an accid;nt or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously is the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Te.hnical Specifications.
Therefore, an un.eviewed safety question does not exist.
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l-SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 83-130 TITLE:
Reactor Protection System (RPS) Buffer Amplifier Modules CRANGE:
Remove capacitor C2.1 on the Input Stage board of the Buffer Amplifier module.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
5.
Vendor safety concern with the instability of the buffer amplifier modules with system configuration which employs a jumper between pins 9 and 10 on the module backplane connector. This configuration has the potential to be unstable during power-up and thereafter.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Capacitor C2.1 has no safety function.
It was originally installed to compensate for noise pickup when the amplifier was set up for a gain of.5 (jumper installed between pins 9 and 10).
In this configuration, this places a loadios capacitor (C2.1) on the output of the Input Stage operational amp 11fier, thereby making the circuit potentially unstable. This instability appears as asymmetrical oscillations and thus can be integrated into DC signal errors in downstream modules in the string.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evalusted in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any mergin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 84-111 TITLE:
Service Water Pump (SWP) Dische de Strainer Setpoint Changes.
CHANGE:
Change SWP discharge strainer setpoints for pressure switches PSH-2917, 2917A 2918, 2918A, 2919, and 2919A.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Service Water strainer motors run continuously, thereby reducing the life of the' motors. The setpoint changes will decrease run time of the strainer motor, thereby increasing motor life.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The resetting of the SWP discharge strainer motor start /stop setpoints will ensure that strainer motors will not be continuously run during periods of low service water flow demand. The resetting of the setpoints will ensure that SWP manufacturer minimum flow requirements are still met.
t As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85-0046, REV. A TITLE:
Emergency Lighting DC Power Cable Reroute CHANGE:
Reroute cable No. APD 112A through Room 514 (heater bay area) and delete the routing through Room 422 (cable spreading room).
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The cable is rerouted outside the cable spreading room to avoid the possibility of a fire inducad fault in the cable caused by a fire in the cable spreading room.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Rerouting cable APD 112A will not change the operation or function of the emergency lighting system. The modification is consistent with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements.
As sumearized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85-148 TITLE:
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (AFP) Strainer Basket Removal CHANGE:
Remove strainer baskets from AFP strainers S-201 and 206.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Due to the location and mesh size of strainers upstream of the AFP strainers, strainers S-201 and 206 are redundant and can be removed.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The AFPs take suction from the condensate storage tsnk and from the Class I service water system. These systems provide in line strainers of appropriate mesh size prior to entering the AFPs suction lines. As these upstream strainers are considered "passive" compcnents, a failure of them in such a mode as to cause failure of both AFPs is not considered to be credible event.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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o SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85-0199 TITLE:
Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) System Modification CHANGE:
Install a chemical addition tank and associated equipment in the TPCW system.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
'i This change will allow the addition of water treatment hemicals directly to the TPCW low level tank.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The proposed change will not affect any safety related components nor will it change any plant conditions. There are no safety related compouents in the vicinity of the low level tank. All piping for this modification is below the elevation of all other piping and will not affect any Seismic Class I equipment. A drain in the immediate vicinity of the change is capable of handling a line failure.
The chemicals to be used are those currently employed in other plant systems therefore no corrosion or oxidation effects are of concern.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not cres'te the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the f
USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
i Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does net exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85-0231 TITLE:
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) Pressure Gauge Installation CHANGE:
Add a pressure gauge of 0 to 30 psig range so that operators may monitor normal RCDT pressure.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Normal RCDT pressure is approximately 4 psig. The installed pressure gauge, PI-1720, has a 0 to 100 psig range which is inadequate for monitoring RCDT pressure.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
PI-1720, which is presently used for RCDT local pressure indication, serves no safety function since the RCDT is not safety related. The new gauge will be the same model as the existing gauge except for graduation span and figure intervals. The new gauge will allow operators to monitor RCDT pressure more accurately than with the existing gauge. The new pressure gauge, PI-6369, also serves no safety function.
1 As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluatad previcusly in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85-243, SUPP. 2 TITLE:
1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Room Cooler Fan Temperature Switch Replacement.
CHANGE:
Replace temperature control switches for the ECCS equipment Rooms 105, 113, and 115.
Revise switch setpoints to ensure room temperature is maintained below 95'F during normal plant operation.
LEASON FOR CHANGE:
Relocating Auxiliary Feedwater System Turbine steam admission valves created a harsh environment in this room during a postulated high energy line break. This required replacement of existing temperature switches with switches environmentally qualified to higher temperatures.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This modification will act effect the operation of ECCS room coolers during normal plant operation and emergencies. The switches are set to maintain a maximum temperature of 95'F during normal plant operation.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Speel.fications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFE 1Y EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85-244 l
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TITLE:
High Voltage Tap Setting of Start-Up Transformers No. 01 and 02.
t CHANGE:
Change transformer tap settings from position 3 to position 2 during plant outages.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
During plant shutdown, voltages on plant buses are higher than normal operating voltage. This is detrimental to plant equipment required to function during an outage.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The changing of high voltage tap setting of the start-up transformers during light load conditions, such as plant outages, does not affect the operation of equipment required during the plant outage. This change improves operating life of the equipment because the plant buses will be maintained at normal operating voltage.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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e SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 85-334 TITLE:
Door No. 215 Replacement CHANGE:
Replace Door No. 215 with new door of better design.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Improper operation and excessive door weight lead to a failure in the door mechanism. Once this happened the door could no longer function properly.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Door No. 215 is a pressure, fire, missile, and flood barrier between Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms 237 and 238. The safety function of the door is to protect one train of the Auxiliary Feedwater System from fire, flood, missile, or high energy line break in the adjacent auxiliary feedwater pump room. The new door meets all seismic, pressure, and temperature design criteria.
It is equivalent to the three hour fire rated door required for this area.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
s SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-0030 TITLE:
Modification of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Piping Support CHANGE:
Replace the #2 anchor bolt and add a shim plate for support 40-CCB-16-H3.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The change resolves a nonconformance report which identified items requiring repair.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The modifications comply with the original support design criteria and the repaired support will therefore, be capable of performing its design function.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-105 TITLE:
Makeup and Purification System Feed and Bleed Flo> Test.
CHANGE:
i Demonstrate feed and bleed cooling injection capability using the makeup system.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Demonstrate the capacity of the system for feeding with two makeup pumps operating and the makeup control valve in the wide open position. The purpose of this test is to gather system flow capacity data to be compared with analytical input.
1
. SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The test procedure provided precautionary limits on RCS pressure, temperature, pressurizer level, and secondary side temperature during the performance of the test. The test did not invalidate any SAR assumptions and did not affect the ability of the makeup system to operate if it were required for any reason during the test. The test was performed in Mode 3 when the decay heat levels are low. The test did not involve any changes
]
to boron concentrations during its performance.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the i
probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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1 SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-310 TITLE:
Installation of Crane Model IGS-3K-152H-IS Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Room Sump Pumps.
CHANGE:
Replace two existing sump pumps with new model sump pumps.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Replace with pumps of greater reliability.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The repla-cement pumps are made by the same manufacturer and have an increased capacity. The pumps are safety related and seismically installed.
The pumps have adequate NPSH and discharge pressure to perform their safety function of pumping water from the sump to the receiving tanks. The pumps are capable of starting at 70% undervoltage.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-0396 TITLE:
Service Water Valve Room No. 2 Piping Penetration Seal Repair CHANGE:
Rescal penet- ';on of 30" Service Water line HBC-36 at south wall of the intake str-are.
Cement based grout will be used to reseal the penetratic REASON FOR CHANGE:
Ground water is leaking into the valve room.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The proposed action has no effect on the safety functions of the Service Water System. Grouting the penetration does not affect the stress analysis of the piping and the increased loading to the south wall is determined to be acceptable. The modification has no adverse effect on any Seismic Class I systems within the valve room.
Resealing this penetration prevents the room from potential flooding by water entering through this penetration.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-411 TITLE:
Radwaste Ventilation Heater Setpoint Change.
CHANGE:
Lower the heater pressure switch setpoint from 1.6 inches water column (W.C.) to the manufacturers' recommended setpoint of 0.4 inches W.C.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
At the present setpoint, the heater is continuously in the "off" mode, defeating the purpose of the heater. Revising the setpoint will allow the heater to operate normally.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Revision of the heater setpoint from 1.6 inches W.C. to 0.4 inches W.C.
will provide the proper control band, given the normal static pressure of 1.0 inches W.C.
The purpose of this heater is to provide comfort heating to the access control area, and neither the heater nor the pressure switch controlling its operation serves a safety function. The setpoint change does not affect the radwaste area or access control area exhaust ventilation system.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an ur. reviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 86-421 TITLE:
Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) Trip and Throttle Valve Hand Grip CHANGE:
Add a hand grip and associated key and set screw to the trip hook shaft on the trip throttle valve for each AFPT.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
This change will enhance the capability of manually tripping the auxiliary feed pump turbines.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This hand grip will not affect the operation, performance, response time or actuation of the trip throttle valve nor will it cause the trip throt-tle valve to become locked, sealed, or cause a mis-trip. The grip is recessed and cannot cause a trip due to bumping or knocking. The hand grip will not affect the function of the AFPTs nor will any possible grip failure affect the AFPTs function.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
2 SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 87-003 TITLE:
Increase the fuse rating for circuits Y103 and Y203 of the essential instrumentation power supply.
CRANGE:
Increase fuse ratings from 10 amps to 15 amps.
REASON FOR CRANGE:
Fuse rating at 10 amps provided insufficient margin to accommodate normally anticipated current transients (such as circuit energization) without needlessly opening the fuse and affecting the main inverter fuse. Main inverter fuse failure led in turn to rendering the associated AC bus inoperable and resulted in exceeding a Limiting Condition for Operation needlessly.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
c Increasing the fuse rating from 10 amps to 15 amps is acceptable because the circuits by design can accept a maximum fuse rating of 20 ampa.
Neither the circuit design nor capacity is affected by changing the fuse size. The new fuses will still serve their intended function of opening in the event of a fault in the Process and Radiation Monitoring Cabinet.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
s SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 87-026 IIyrE:
Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Room Heating and Ventilation System Setpoint Changes CHANGE:
Correct the setpoints of fan and damper temperature switches TS-5443 and 5444 by implementing the values 99*F/80*F (I/D).
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The current values of 104*F/80*F in combination with tolerances of +5/-10*F exceeds the USAR stated maximum value of 104*F for the systems affected.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
There is no detrimental effect on safety caused by correcting the setpoint to incorporate the +5'F tolerance and corresponding 99'F setpoint in order to comply with the 104'F to 60*F range noted in the USAR. The decrease in deadband caused by lowering the high setpoint would not be a concern because of increased fan cycling operation. The system is equipped with damper actuators that are designed for cycling / modulating service.
Modulating dampers preclude continual fan cycling operation.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical i
Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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1 SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 87-045 TITLE:
Flow Transmitter FT-2799 Rat.ge Resistor Replacement.
CHANGE:
Replacement of the range resistor in the frequency to current converter of flow transmitter FT-2799. This flow transmitter is in the Cooling Tower makeup flow line to the collection box.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The converter output is used by computer point F200 to provide flow rate in gPm. The computer converts the converter output to 0-30,000 gpm.
It was noted that the flow was reading 10% higher than the estimated output from the pump curve.
The vendor suggested the frequency range should be increased for the 0-30,000 gpm range.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The information from this flow transmitter along with two other flow transmitters is used in the estimation of dilution flow for radwaste discharge. Operable flow transmitter or pe.mp curve estimates are required to determine the dilution flow. This modification enhances the instrument range and provides more occurate flow information which matches the pump curve. Failure of this component will not cause an accident and this component is not used to mitigate consequences of an accident. This modification does not change the function of the component.
As summarized above, the proposed accion will not increase the i
probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously i
evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the l
possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR FCR 87-0087 Supp. 33 TITLE:
USAR Drawing Changes l
CHANGE:
R draw Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID) on the computer aided draftieg system (CADD). Split P& ids into two or more drawings where necessary.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Improve readability of the drawings, east drawing updates, and provide reliable and economical storage cf the current drawings. Some drasings are overcrowded thereby reducing their clarity.
I SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
According to 10CFR50.59, changes to drawings contained in the USAR requtre a safety evaluation, even if the drawing relates to non-safety related systems or components. Redrawing the P& ids and splitting crowded drawings will not affect tLe safe operation of any plant system. Bechtel Associates performed an independent review prior to issuing the drawings to Davis-Besse.
Design Engineering performed an additional independent review upon receipt before issuing the drawings.
i As snamarized above, the proposed ection will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the L.AR.
The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR. and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
1 Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not extat, t
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR JUMPER & LIFTED WIRE TAG 87-123 (SE 87-022)
TITLEt
)
Evaluate the Installstion of Jumper Wires in the Fire Detection System.
CRAN [_
Install jumper wires to jumper out smoke detector DS 8679E in Room 478.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Yhe detector is in a constant alara condition with no fire conditions present which will prevent.he detection of a real fire in that fire zone.
SAFETY EVALUATION SLMMARY:
Installation of jumper wires for this detector did not af fect the fire detection capability in the fire zone covered by this detector.
Technical Specificutions require 12 fire detectors for this zone. Even af ter jumpering this detector, there are 14 operable detectors available for this zone.
Installation of jumpers alleviates the constant alarm condition. A roving fire watch was provided to meet NFPA requirements.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed ac*'on will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an uareviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-029 (SE 87-029)
TITLE:
I Temporary Mechanical Modification for Installation of a Temporary Fire Hose
_ CHANGE :
Install a temporary fire hose from hose reel HR-52 to the screen wash line that supplies traveling screen No. 2.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To provide a temporary,nurce of supply w4ter to facilitate chlorinating the Circulating Water at, Service Water systems.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMK' i
The installation of a temporary 2\\ inch hose from the Station Fire Protectica system to the Traveling Screen wash system allowed for a temporary water. supply source to allow for chlorination of the Circulating and Service Water systems. This temporary jumper was used approximately 30 minutes every 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and had no impact on the Station e
Fire Protection System availability or operation.
F As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the i
probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the j
possibility for an accident or mal 2 unction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
l Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR SE 87-031 TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification (TMM) to Auxiliary Feedwater System CHANGE:
Remove cheL4 valve internals from Auxiliary Feedpump Turbine case drain steam traps ST 148 and 150.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Ensure the turbine case always remains drained.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The steam traps provide a drain path so water does not accumulate in the turbine case during normal operation (when the turbines are in the standby mode). Removing the check valve internals will allow a greater degree of sssurance that the turbine case remains drained. A failure of the steam traps may pass some steam around the turbine, but this will not affect turbine operation or create an unsafe condition.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR-The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR SE 87-0135 TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification for Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV)
Gagging CRANGE:
Evaluate the effects of gagging MSSV SP17B5.
REASON FOR CRANGE:
This safety evaluation is performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.59 to ensure no unreviewed safety question exists as a result of gagging SP17B5.
i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
l Gagging a safety valve results in its being unable to lift and relieve an overpressure condition thereby rendering the valve inoperable. Actions to be taken with an inoperable safety valve are delineated in Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) of the Technical Specifications. The LCO allows for continued operation with one or more MSSVs inoperable provided thermal power is reduced and the high flux trip setpoint is reduced. The high flux trip setpoint and thermal power are reduced to ensure operable MSSVs are capable of providing removal of sensible and decay heat in a postulated accident thereby fulfilling heat removal from the reactor.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Ttchnical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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A SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR SE 87-0140 TITLE:
Test Procedure TP 870.29, Turbine Bypass Valve Stroke Testing L
CHANGE:
Review the affects of performing TP 870.29.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
This safety evaluation is performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 to ensure no unreviewed safety question exists as a result of performing this test.
SAFETY EvALUoTION
SUMMARY
Testing of,t.he Turbine Bypass Valva (TBV) does not affect the ability of the Main..eam system to perform its safety functions. With a Main Steam Isolation Valve open, the TBV opening vill cause an estimated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown of not more than 10*F/ min. As a result of this cooldown pressurizer level will be reduced approximately 50 inches per minute, RCS pressure will be reduced, and there will be a positive reactivity addition for the core. To mitigate the potential consequences i
of these affects, TP 870.29 defines the steam generator lesel to be held during test performance to assure the calculated cooldown rate remains conservative. Boron concentrations and control rod positions are defined to ensure adequate shutdown margin. Minimum pressurizer levels are defined for initiating the test. RCS cooldown limits are defined as are appropriate actions to stop the cooldown. Requirements for reestablishias steam generator level, RCS temperature, and pressurizer levels are given prior to testing subsequer.t TBVs.
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The above administrative actions ensnre that the test performance will not place the plant in a previously unanalyzed condition.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different '.ype than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications, i
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR SE 87-0359 TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine 1-1 Inboard Bearing Houcing Cover Replacement CHANGE:
Replace existing cover plate with a plate of the sa;a dimensions manufactured from A36 carbon steel.
REASON TSR CHANGE:
Existing cover plate has a hairline fracture that is leaking oil.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The existing cover plate is made of A278 cast grey steel. ASTM A36 carbon steel plate has a higher yield strength than the plate material being replaced and is more ductile so that it will not crack as easily.
Both materials have the same coefficient of expansion and similar chemical compositions. A36 material is compatible with the oil presently used in the turbine bearings and will riot impact operation of the turbine in any way. No structural changes will be made thereby eliminating seismic concerns.
As summarized above, the proposed action vill not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety qsestion does not exist.
a SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-CSS,87-006 (SE 87-005,87-006)
TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification (THM) for Installation of Temporary Fire Detectors CHANGE:
Install temporary fire detectors to plant Fire Detection Zones 211 and 400 (FDZ 211, 400). An hourly fire watch patrol is implemented with thia change.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Provide adequate protection for inoperable fire barriers in Stairwells AB-3 and AB-3A.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This temporary modification has no direct impact on the safe shutdown systems of the plant. Temporary fire detectors will be installed on the ceilings of Stairwells AB-3 and AB-3A.
A temporary electrical jumper will
've installed from existing detectors to the temporary ones to provide fire coverage until such time dedicated circuits can be installed for these detectors. Zone checks will be performed per station procedures and any alarm conditions will be displayed in the control room. This action satisfies Technical Specification requirements and pr)vides adequate protection until such time when a permanent detector can be installed or the fire barrier made operable.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accioent or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-008 (SE 87-008)
TITLE:
[
Temporary Mechanical Modification for Installation of Sump Pump to remove Decay Heat Valve Pit Leakage.
CHANGE:
l Install a temporary pump to remove leakage from the bottom of the Decay Heat Valve Pit.
4 REASON FOR CHANGE:
i To ensure the level of any water accumulated in the pit remains less than six inches.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Installation of a temporary pump to remove operational leakags from the bottom of the decay heat valve pit does not adversely affect seismically installed safety related equipment and does not interfere with any Class 1E electrical systems or cross-connected separate electrical i
channels. The asseciated pump tubing material is sufficient to resist heat and radiation tffects, and does not interfere with the function of the decav heat valve pit vent.
Installation of the pump ensures that the decay heat v.!ve pit will perform its intended safety function in the event of a desigo basis LOCA.
L As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the I
possibility for an accident or malfunction of a differrat type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety av defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-012 (SE 87-012)
TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification (TMM) to the Control Roor Normal HVAC CHANGE:
Replace existing Auxiliary Building Chilled Water Chiller with new model chiller.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Replace with chiller of greater reliability. This new chiller will be permanently installed under FCR 87-0002.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
i The replaceinent of the Auxiliary Building Chilled Water Chiller with a different model chiller has no effect on naiety. The operation of the L
chilled water system will not be adnasely affected by this change. The new chiller has the same cooling capacity and is esse...ially an equivalent replacement for the original plant equipment. The r.. sting chiller I
piping, and conduit is installed Seismic Category
- and the new installation will meet Seismic Category II requirveents. The existing water flooding and seismic analysis will bound *.ne new installation.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-016 (SE 87-016)
TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification (TMM) to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Ventilation System CHANGE:
Fail open exhaust damper HV-5443A and fail closed recirculs*.*9n damper KV-5443B by de-energizing breakers for the damper's actuators.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Due to problems with temperature controller TIC-5443, the dampers have not been actuating properly. Thim TMM will enable Train 1 of the CCW ventilation system to perform its specified functions.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The safety function of the CCW ventilation system is not affected by this TMM. Failing exhaust damper HV-5443A in the open position and failing recirculation damper KV-5443B in the closed position will maintain the CCW ventilation system in a configuration that will provide maximum cooling to the CCW pump room until the problems with TIC-5443 are corrected.
The flowpath will always be from outside to the CCW pump room and then to the turbine building. De-energizing the breakers for these dampers will in no way affect any other control function of the CCW ventilation system. No fire dampers are atfected by this TMM and the CCW ventilation system will remain within the bounds of the USAR.
As summarized tbove, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
SAFETY EVALUAT10N SLHMARY FOR-TMM 87-019 (SE 87-019)
TITLE:
Temporary Hechanical Modification for Contsol Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS).
CHANGE:
Install covers over CREVS Train 1 and 2 Condensing Units pampdown control switches NS-0331 and 0332.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
This change will prevent inadvertent switch actuation to ensure CREVS train operability.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The installation of switch guards will not affect the switches function.
The switch guard design consists of a Westinghouse supplied metal housing designed for this type of switch. The guard assembly will be fitted i
around the switch using the existing front locking ring on the switch.
De-energization is not necessary for the installation therefore the CREVS system will remain operatie. Seismic considerations are negligible due to the small mass of the switch. Environmental considerations for the switch guards are negligible as analyzed.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident i
or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specificatious.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-020 (SE 87-020)
TITLE:
Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine (AFPT) Steam Supply and Exhaust Piping Temporary Hechanical Modifications.
CHANGE:
Temporary installation of temperature monitoring devices for AFPT steam traps ST-148, 149, 150, and 151. Temporary throttling of AFPT exhaust piping low point drain valves MS 51 and 53.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
To allow for monitoring of steam trap performance and to provide continuous removal of condensate from AFPT exhaust piping.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
This Temporary Mechanical Modification (TMM) provided for the installation of externally mounted temperature thermocouples upstream and downstream of steam traps ST-148, 149, 150, and 151 to provide operators with a means of evaluating and monitoring AFPT associated steam trap pe r fo rmance. This TMM also allowed for the throttling of AFPT exhaust piping low point drain valves MS 51 and 53 to allow for continuous removal of condense.te.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence cf an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-155 TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification to the Hydrogen Recombiner System CHANGE:
Purge the containment via the Hydrogen Recombiner piping using a temporary (portable) filtration unit.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Numerous work activities inside containment have resulted in containment-to-annulus differential pressure approaching Technical Specification limits.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Implementation of this temporary modification will have no affect on the safety function of the Containment Isolation System. The recombiner containment isolation valves will remain unaffected and capable of isolating upon receipt of a SFAS signal per denign. The Hydrogen Purge system in required to be operable only in Modes 1 and 2.
This modification will be utilized in Modes 3 or greater and with no fuel movement evolutions in progress.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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e SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR THM 87-0196 (SE 87-0196, REV. 1)
TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modific tion (TMM) for the Chlorination System CHANGE:
Install a temporary chlorination system. A permanent system utilizing sodium hypochlorite is to be installed at a later date.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Existing chlorination equipment is being removed. The temporary system will allow the plant chemistry department to chlorinate the service water and circulating water systems.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The chlorination system serves no safety function and is not interconnected with any safety feature system. The temporary system will utilize sodium 4
hypochlorite as the chlorinating agent. The chlorine detection system is not physically or functionally affected by this TMM. With the removal of the existing gaseous chlorine system and the temporary system installed, the potential for a substantial release of chlorine will be eliminated.
2 The chlorine detection system is not required to protect the control room from a chlorine release from the temporary system. The temporary system tank, pumps, and associated equipment have been evaluated for potential accidental releases and environmental concerns.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SUMMARY
FOR TMM 87-305 TITLE:
Temporary Mechanical Modification to install a controlled bleed off system for Decay Heat Valve DH 76 leakage.
CHANGE:
Install a system for constant bleed of f of system water and nitrogen at vent valves DH 74 and DH 74A immediately upstream of va.ve DH 76.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Valve DH 76 is leaking by its seat.
The leakage rate is within Technical Specification requirements but causes plant operational problems by pressurizing the Decay Heat Systems.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The installation of this venting system and the controlled venting of the decay heat piping to maintain normal system pressure does not have an adverse affect on plant safety or the safety of the public. The total leak rate from the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) system through this vent at normal operating pressure will not exceed Technical Specification requirements. The core flood and borated water storage tanks levels will not decrease below their low limits due to the controlled vent. These tank levels are reviewed each shift per station procedures. The continuous venting will result in a release of nitrogen to the containment atmosphere, however the cmount released will not result in a significant increase in containment pressure or personnel hazard. The installation will be seismically supported and all materials are compatible with borated water chemistry.
As summarized above, che proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR UCN 87-014 TITLE:
Selection of Instrument Setpoint Ranges for Safety Related Systems a
CHANGE:
Revise USAR Section 7.1.2.7 wording in regards to a specific range, i.e.,
50-60%, for the setting of a setpoint.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
The USAR currently states that instrument ranges were established by making the actuated setpoint settings required to operate at 50 to 60 percent of full scale. The actual intent of the USAR text was to state that the setpoint would be selected to actuate within the accurate region of the equipments design range.
It is not possible to select a single range in which all instruments actuate.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The change will not result in any plant modificctions, but will eliminate inconsistencies between the USAR text and the field setpoints. The field setpoints selected were chosen to be consistent with the manufacturers reconnendations on setting, drif t, accuracy, and adjustability.
l As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR UCN 87-046 (SE 68-0041)
TITLE:
Surveillance Program for Reactor Vessel Materici Integrity CHANGE:
Revise USAR Section 5.4.7 description of the surveillance program for reactor vessel material integrity.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
A facility change implements the installation of dosimetry in the cavity between the reactor vessel and concrete shield wall.
The dosimetry will be used to determine neutron fluence outside ar.J inside the vessel which is now analytically determined.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The cavity dosimetry installation and its associated material surveillance program do not perform a safety function nor are they needed for safe shutdown of the plant. The installation will have no effect on the plant's hydraulic systems, electrical systems, or rea.: tor system integrity.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previous'y evaluated in the UFIR. The proposed action will not create the possib:.lity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
FOR UCN 87-047 (SE 88-042)
I TITLE:
Recalculation of Hydrogen Generation Rate CHANGE:
Revise USAR Section 6.2.5.2 and associated tables due to a recalculation of the hydrogen generation rate inside containment.
REASON FOR CHANGE:
Additional hydrogen generating material was added to the inside of the containment since the previous calculation. The recalculation was per-formed to show new hydrogen levels inside containment would not exceed l
4 percent by volume.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The Combustible Gas Control System maintains hydrogen levels less than 3 percent by accounting for sources of hydrogen within the containment.
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The function of the containment is to act as a barrier between fuel and the environment. A containment hydrogen concentration of four percent by volume could ignite and explode. USAR Figure 6.2-45 notes that containment 7
hydrogen concentration could reach 3 percent in 21 dsys without operator j
action. The recalculation shows the additional hydrogen generating material decreases this period to 20.6 days which is essentially the same.
The 4 percent limit would not be reached, therefore, safety is not impacted.
As summarized above, the proposed action will not increase the probability or consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. The proposed action will not create the possibility for an accident j
or nalfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR, and does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the Technical
.j Specifications, j
t Therefore, an tmreviewed safety questica does not exist.
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