ML20151U343
| ML20151U343 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1988 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8805020032 | |
| Download: ML20151U343 (14) | |
Text
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i Duxe Powen Gowavr P.O. StoX 33189 CHARLOTTE. N.O. 98949 MAL H,1TGKER ts ut.=eu ms ema reesseeet (704) GM-4834 l
stusan periservice April 18,1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-413 Proposed Amendments to Facility Operating License Fire Protection Program Gentlemen On August 12, 1986 Duke Power Company submitted a proposed amendment to License Condition 8 of Facility Operating License NPF-35 in response to Ceneric Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.
Please find attached a proposed revision to FSAR Section 9.5.1 which summarizes all fire protection related correspondence and commitments submitted to the NRC by Duke Power Company. These proposed FSAR changes supersede the revision to FSAR Section 9.5.1 submitted per my December 14, 1987 letter. The proposad changes will be incorporated into the Catawba Nuclear Station FSAR in a future update.
Since this letter is a supplement to a previously transmitted Facility Operating License amendment, no license fee is required to be submitted.
Very truly yours.
~
Hal B. Tucker JGT/10018/sbn Attachment xc:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
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Dr. K. Jabbour v0 office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission i
Washington, D. C.
20555 g
g Mr. P. K. Van Doorn i
NRC Resident inspector 50 gog ggo418 goo 4 a Catawba Nuclear Station P
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.i CNS i
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4 9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 9.5.1.1 Desian Bases The Fire Protection System is designed to achieve the following objectives:
1.
Provide fire protection in areas of the plant by means of portable extin-guishers and manual hose stations.
2.
Provide appropriate fire control strategy in areas of the plant containing equipment required to bring the unit to a safe shutdown condition.
3.
Provide automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room for areas of the plant containing combustibles.
4.
Provide automatic fixed fire protection systems over oil hazard areas.
Provide automatic CO2 extinguishing systems in selected areas of the plant 5.
with appropriate alares and warning devices to alert personnel to pending discharges.
6.
Provide automatic Halon 1301 fire protection systems for document storage areas in the Service Building.
7.
Provide retaining walls, curbs, or drains in areas protected with sprin-klers to prevent spread of fires.
Provide maximum protection against an unsafe condition or damage to safety 8.
class equipment due to failure of any portion of the Fire Protection System.
Manual fire fighting equipment (i.e., fire hoses and portable fire extinguish-ers) or activation of fixed water or gas extinguishing systems provide capabil-ity for control and extinguishment in the incipient stages of a fire, thereby minimizing potential consequences of fire in these areas.
Passive fire protection (i.e., fire barriers) including walls, ceiling / floors, fire rated doors and penetration seals reduce the possibility of fire crossing fire boundaries
- separating fire areas.
Confining a potential fire within a single fire area mitigates the scope of damage.
l Inadvertent operation of or a crack in a fire suppression system would not preclude safe shutdown of the plant since redundant trains of equipment re-quired for safe shutdown are located in separate rooms, have adequate spatial separation or have appropriate water spray shielding.
In addition smoke control is provided by the installed ventilation and exhaust l
In the Auxiliary Building an exhaust system for numerous compartments systems.
containing equipment maintains a slight negative pressure within the building 9.5-1
(TO BE INSERTED INTO FSAR PAGE 9.5-1)
The information presented hereinafter in Section 9.5.1 provides a general discussion of the various fire protection features at Catawba Nuclear Station.
In addition, the following documents have been provided to address certain features of the fire protection program in greater detail:
Letter of October 23, 1981, William 0. Parker, Jr. (DPC) to Harold R. Denton (ONRR) submitting the August 1981 revision (Rev. 2) of the Catawba Nuclear Station Response to Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.
This document superceded the previous submittals and additionally provided an evaluation against the technical requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR50.
(Reference SER, Page 9-34.)
Letter of January 14, 1982, William O. Parker, Jr. to Harold R. Denton responding to NRC request to provide a comparison of the Catawba fire protection program to Appendix R to 10 CFR50.
This letter indicates that the revised DPC response to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, submitted with the letter of October 23, 1981, contains a comparison of the fire protection program to Appendix R to 10 CFR50.
Letter of July 29, 1982, William O. Parker, Jr. to Harold R. Denton.
The following information is included in this letter:
Commitment to comply with guidelines contained in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.1.a in development of 'tation Fire Plan (Program).
(Reference SER, Page 9-35.)
Commitment to have administrative controls and station directives in place for each unit prior to fuel loading of the unit.
Commitment te develop administrative controls with comply with guidelines in BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.2.
(Reference SER, Page 9-35.)
Commitment to establish and train a fire brigade which complies with guidelines in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3. -(Reference SER, Page 9-36.)
Discussion of spiral staircases between fire areas within the l
Auxiliary Building.
(Reference SER, Page 9-36.)
Commitment to install fire barrier penetration seals which have been tested and approved in accordance with IEEE 634-1978 and ASTM E119-1976.
(Reference SER, Page 9-36.)
Discussion of labeled and unlabeled fire doors in committed fire I
barriers.
(Reference SER, Pages 9-36 and 9-37.)
Commitment to provide a safe shutdown analysis in accordance with the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.b, at a future date.
(Reference SER, Page 9-37.)
Commitment to comply with NFPA 30-1977, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids".
(Reference SER, Page 9-38.)
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Commitment to provide fixed emergency lighting in accordance with BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.g.(1).
(Reference SER, Page 9-39.)
Commitment to provide a multifrequency radio system with a dedicated frequency for fire brigade use.
(Reference SER, Page 9-39.)
Discussion of compliance with NFPA 13-1980 and use of unlisted valves.
(Reference SER, Pages 9-41 and 9-42.)
Commitment to comply with NFPA 12-1980, "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems".
(Reference SER, Page 9-42.)
Discussion of fire separation between vital battery rooms and related equipment.
(Reference SER, Page 9-45.)
Complete listing of rooms within the safety related buildings including room description, and the type of detection utilized when provided.
(Reference SER, Pages 9-39 and 9-40.)
Manufacturer's data concerning the critical radiant heat flux of the control room carpet.
Details of interlocked armor cable usage and use of PVC jacketed flexible conduit.
(Reference SER, Page 9-38.)
Drawing providing details of the physical arrangement of the three fire pumps.
(Reference SER, Page 9-40.)
Date of 90% cable pull completion.
Discussion of cable separation outside of containment and schedule for completion of the separation study within containment.
(Reference SER, Page 9-39.)
This letter also includes 13 items of clarification, 4 of which were generated following review of the draft SER and 9 which were generated following initial l
review of Revision 3 of NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan.
Letter of September 14, 1982, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton.
This f
letter submitted a revised list of fire detectors located within the i
safety related buildings.
This submittal was made as the original list I
submitted with the letter of July 29, 1982 was found to contain numerous typographical errors.
(Reference SER, Pages 9-39 and 9-40.)
1 Letter of December 15, 1982, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton.
The following information is included in this letter:
Clarification concerning use of an interim barrier between units and fire protection features to be in place on the Unit 1 side of the barrier prior to Unit 1 fuel load.
This clarification was made based on review of the draft SER.
(Reference SER, Page 9-35.)
Details of unlabeled hollow metal doors and composite steel doors including location and use.
Also provided were examples of manufacturer's certification letters addressing compliance with listed construction methods.
(Reference SER, Pages 9-36 and 9-37.)
Letter of April 14, 1983, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton.
This letter provides a number of clarifications generated following review of the SER (issued 2/22/83).
The following information is included in this letter:
Bulk hydrogen system submittal consisting of marked drawings indicating pipe routing in the Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings.
(Reference SER, Page 9-38 and SSER No. 2, Pages 9-2 and 9-3.)
Commitment to provide a safe shutdown analysis and supporting information for Unit 1 by July 1983.
(Reference SER, Page 9-37.)
Use of photoelectric smoke detectors and ultraviolet flame detectors.
Also included in the submittal was a list of rooms within the safety related buildings which are not provided with fire detection and a sketch detailing power supplies to the fire detection system.
(Reference SSER No. 2, Page 9-3.)
Water supply capability including greatest water demand for a fire suppression system and graphs of fire pump test results.
(Reference SSER No. 2, Page 9-3.)
Use of manual sprinkler systems for the reactor coolant pumpe and pipe corridor areas within each Reactor Building and proposed sprinkler protection arrangement within each annuius area.
(Reference SER, Page 9-42.)
Details of
.ctor Building HVAC system penetrations being equipped with dr which are not fire rcted.
Clarific t on that Control Room pressure doors are not listed fire doors.
.Rtference SER, Pages 9-36 and 9-37.)
Confirmation t at the standby shutdown system is available following a fire in the sifety related battery room area for each unit.
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(Reference SER, ? age 9-45 and SSER No. 2, Page 9-3.)
Letter of May 31, 1983, Hal B. Tucker to Harold,R. Denton.
This submittal l
included the fire testing summary report for embedded steel concrete block
(
firewalls and supporting information.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-10.)
Letter of July 5, 1983, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton submitting information concerning cable separation within the Unit 1 Reactor Building, associated circuits methodology, and standby shutdown system l
l design.
Letter of July 25, 1983, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton submitting tables and figures inadvertently omitted from the July 5, 1983 submittal concerning the standby shutdown system.
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Letter of November 4,1983, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton submitting the July 1983 revision (Rev. 3) of the Catawba Nuclear Station Response to Appendix to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.
Letter of January 17, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton submitting a description of the proposed manual sprinkler system for each Reactor Building annulus area and supporting drawings.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-14.)
Letter of February 10, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing responses to concerns raised during the site audit conducted November 1-4, 1983.
The following information was provided in this letter.
Commitments to complete the following features noted as outstanding:
1)
Replacement of cork expansion joint material between fire areas.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-8 and 9-9.)
2)
Installation of cable wrap systems in Fire Areas 2 and 3.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-16.)
3)
Installation / replacement of fire doors and hardware.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-9 and 9-10).
4)
Installation of emergency lighting units.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-12.)
5)
Installation of fire barrier penetration seals.
(Reference SSER l
No. 3, Pages 9-8 and 9-9.)
6)
Installation of smoke detectors.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-12 through 9-14.)
7)
Installation of sprinkler systems.
(Reference SS'!R No. 3, Page 9-15.)
8)
Installation of HVAC duct access panels for fire dampers.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-11.)
9)
Protection of embedded steel members in stairway enclosures of the control complex.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-10.)
- 10) Installation of fire hose stations in Fire Areas 9 and 10.
l (Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-15.)
- 11) Supervision of control valves for fire protection water supply l
piping.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-13 and 9-14.)
- 12) Provision of equipment for fire hose houses.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-15 )
1 13)
Installation of a radio communic 0 tion repeater.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-12.)
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Protection of embedded steel members will be carried out in accordance with criteria established in the fire test (Bletzaker) report.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-10.)
Cable trays will te supported at (above) the floor slabs and within two feet of either side of fire barrier walls.
Automatic sprinklers will be provided where seismic cable tray supports penetrate the fire barrier walls of the cable shafts and adjacent corridors on Elevations 574+0 and 554+0.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-9.)
Mechanical penetration seals in masonry block fire walls have sealant material which extends beyond the surface of the wall.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-8.)
Fire barrier electrical penetration seals were tested to IEEE 383 acceptance criteria rather than ASTM E119 acceptance criteria. Tests conducted meet ASTM E119 criteria (temperature) except for a small zone extending from the penetrating member.
There are no ordinary combustible materials cr sensitive electronic equipment in these zones which would be affected by heat transfer.
(Reference SSER No.
3, Page 9-8.)
Two and one half gallon water filled portable fire extinguishers will be provided in the Control Room and the Essential Switchgear Rooms.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-15.)
Cables will be rerouted as appropriate in the annulus to maintain at least 20 feet of separation.
Cables do not have exposed plastic insulation and there are no other in-situ combustibles.
(Reference SSER No. 3, page 9-16.)
Due to difficult access for manual fire fighting, a fixed fire suppression (sprinkler) system will be installed in the annulus.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-14 through 9-16.)
Additional lh inch fire hose will be stored in the fire brigade locker for use in fighting fires in the pipe tunnel area adjacent to Fire Area 1.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-14.)
Station fire fighting plans will address available options for manual fire fighting using fire hoses in the event that a diesel generator room fire prevents usse of the room fire hose stations.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-14 and 9-15.)
One hour fire rated "wrap" will be installed on the conduit containing fire Pump "B" cables beneath the intake structure.
The fire wall separating fire pump "A" from fire pump "B" will be extended.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-14.)
Conduit ends of conduits (passing through fire barriers) which do not terminate at boxes, devices or cable seal connectors will be sealed.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-9.)
A number of HVAC ducts (12 gauge stainless steel welded pipes) ranging in diameter from 2h inches to 8 inches are not provided with fire dampers where penetrating fire rated barriers.
These unprotected openings do not occur in barriers which separate equipment necessary for safe shutdown.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-11.)
Connections to the diesel generator day tanks which exist above the dike walls are either under low pressure or are above the normal operating level of the tank and do not constitute a spray hazard.
Failure of the supply solenoid would result in increased pressure and possible flange leak.
This is considered remote due to fail closed valve design and redundant level control switches and high level alarm.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-10.)
Continuous flow hose reels will be provided in Fire Areas 2 and 3.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-14.)
Fire detection zone circuits and interconnection circuits are "Class A" supervised.
Back-up battery supplies are provided.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-13.)
Sprinkler system waterflow signalling and valve position signalling circuits are not electrically supervised.
Supervised fire detection zones are provided in all sprinklered areas.
The position of fire protection related valves will be verified on a monthly basis (where accessible).
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-13.)
Fire detectors will be provided for Rooms 300 (hatch area), 510, 561, 571, 580, 590, 801, 802 and the hatch area outside of Room 331.
Duct type detectors will be provided to monitor Rooms 204, 206A, 2068, 207, 301, 302 and 331.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-12 and 9-13.)
Letter of February 20, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing information concerning the reactor coolant pump motor oil collection system.
Letter of February 29, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing clarification that fire p.otection valves which were equipped with tamper switches will be locked with the exception of motor operated valves.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-13 and 9-14.)
Letter of March 14, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing information concerning composition of the station fire brigade.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-6.)
Letter of April 9, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing a summary of substantive changes in the Response to Accendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, submitted on November 4,1983.
This letter also provides additional information in response to concerns raised during the fire protection site audit (11/1-4/83) as follows:
Detailed description of Reactor Building mechanical penetration sealing methods.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-7.)
i Detailed description of Reactor Building electrical penetration sealing methods.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-7.)
Details of the Reactor Building bypass leakage enclosures for the personnel access portals.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-6 and 9-7.)
Within the Reactor Buildings, automatic sprinkler protection and detection is provided in the vicinity of certain cables which are not separated by 20 feet (Annulus). Automatic sprinkler protection and detection is not provided throughout the Reactor Building.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-16.)
Protection of embedded steel in walls of stair towers and duct shafts between fire Areas 4, 11, 18, 22, 38 and 47 will not be provided.
These areas could be combined into a single Fire Area without degradation of shutdown capability.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-10.)
Cork expansion joint material will be replaced in wall, floor and roof interfaces between Fire Areas 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 19 and 20.
Voids will be filled with a minimum 1111 inch depth of foam.
Cork will not be removed from any other interfaces as shutdown capability will not be degraded in the event of fire penetrating these interfaces.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-8 and 9-9.)
The fuel systems supplying the emergency diesel generators deviate from the requirements of NFPA 30-1981, Section 2-4.4.3, in that automatic cutoff valves er similar devices are not provided.
These devices would be of limited benefit considering the design of the system and may degrade reliability.
Penetrations occurring in exterior walls and roofs are generally not sealed for fire protection purposes.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-8.)
Emergency lighting units will be provided in areas required to be attended for operation of the standby shutdown system including access and egress routes with the exception of the yard.
Normal exterior lighting units would be available in the yard area in the event that operation of the standby shutdown system is required.
Curb box type fire protection valves are not to be locked.
These valves require a "T" wrench for operation.
Fire doors located in fi"e barrier walls will be inspected per "Appendix R" requirement:..
HVAC dampers may be supported or divided by steel plate which has been protected by a thickness of Pyrocrete.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-11.)
Reactor Building fire protection piping for the manual sprinkler / spray systems protecting the pipe corridor, reactor coolant pumps, and lower containment filters is not supervised.
Mineral insulated cable is used for encore thermocoupling cabling inside the Reactor Building.
The construction of this cable consists of a substantial metal jacket which is considered to be a radiant energy heat shield.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-16.)
In the same manner as HVAC dampers, large wall / floor penetration openings may be subdivided using steel plate which has been protected by a thickness of Pyrocrete.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-11.)
Letter of April 11, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton discussing the methodology and bases for conducting associated circuit reviews.
(Reference SSER No. 4, Page 9-2.)
Letter of April 25, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing the following clarifications:
The two 150 lb. hydrogen cylinders associated with the gas blanket for the reactor coolant pump drain tanks have been relocated from the Reactor Building to the hydrogen shed in the yard.
Excess flow valves are to be installed on the supply piping to each unit prior to fuel load.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-10.)
The annulus area of the Reactor Building is considered to be inside containment.
The sprinkler system is arranged for automatic actuation to comply with requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2.e.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-16.)
Letter of May 8, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing supplemental information regarding the associated circuit review submittal of April 11, 1984.
(Reference SSER No. 4, Page 9-2.)
Letter of May 11, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton providing the following additional information:
The hatch covers over the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump pits are supported by W16x64 structural steel members.
No fire resistive coating has been applied to this steel based on the minimal fire insitu and potential transient combustible loading.
A CO2 suppression system as well as early warning smoke detection system are provided.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-16 and 9-17.)
f Rubatex R1800 FS or FR/Armaflex cellular foam insulation is used on a limited basis for insulation of HVAC ducts and cold water pipes.
These materials have a flame spread index of 25; smoke development index of 150 or less; and fuel contribution index of 30 or less.
These materials do not significantly increase the combustible loading in any fire area.
Additionally, fire detectors are generally orovided in areas where this material is used.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-11.)
Automatic sprinklers protection is provided in each auxiliary feedwater pump room area (Fire Areas 2 and 3) with the exception of the area above each auxiliary feedwater pump pit.
A one hour cable
r a
s "wrap" is used in each auxiliary feedwater pump room area, including the unsprinkled portions.
This arrangement is considered satisfactory since combustible loading is minimal and a carbon dioxide suppression system has been provided to protect the main hazards.
Smoke detection has also been provided throughout the area with the exception of the bay directly above each turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit hatch cover.
(Reference SSER NO. 3, Page 9-16.)
Wall or floor penetrations which exceed the 6'x9' tested assembly dimensions are subdivided by steel plate which as been coated with a thickness of Pyrocrete.
Letter of June 29, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton indicating that the fire protection program would be in place inside the Unit 1 nrotected area prior to Unit 1 fuel load with the following exceptions:
The features listed below will be complete prior to initial criticality:
1)
SSF diesel fuel line modification.
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Standby makeup pump capacity modification.
3)
Train "A" disconnect enclosure cover modification.
4)
Standby makeup pump SSF flow gage modification.
5)
SSS related emergency lighting modifications.
6) 555 related equipment access platforms.
Damage control measures and cold shutdown procedures which will be in place prior to initial criticality.
Floor drains near component cooling pues 1Al and 1A2 are to remain l
capped until the interim barrier is removed.
The sprinkler systems for the Unit 2 component cooling pumps 281 and 282 (located on the Unit 1 side of the interim barrier) will not be in service until the interim barrier is removed.
The CO system for diesel generator 1A will not be completed until 2
overhaul of the diesel generator is complete.
The system will be in service prior to initial criticality.
A fire detector will be installed in the bay above the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump hatch cover.
This detector will be in service prior to initial criticality.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page I
9-16.)
Cork expansion joint material in the Reactor Building / Auxiliary Building interfaces east of Column Line EE will be replaced with RTV silicone foam such that Fire Areas 4, 11, and 18 will be completely separated.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Pages 9-8 and 9-9.)
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Letter of July 6, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton requesting partial exemption from GDC3 of 10 CFR50, Appendix A for the following items (to be completed by initial criticality):
CO system for diesel generator 1A.
2 Fire detector over the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump hatch Cover.
Cork expansion joint removal between Fire Areas 4, 11 and 18.
Six features related operation of the SSS.
Damage control measures and cold shutdown procedures.
Letter of August 2, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton addressing concerns raised involving false actuation of main steam isolation valves or steam generator power operated relief valves due to fire induced shorts.
A modification will be implemented for Unit 1 prior to entry into Mode 3 which provides disconnects for the cables providing power to the actuation solenoids.
(Reference SSER No. 4 Page 9-4.)
Letter of August 3, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton addressing compliance with minimum shift crew requirements of Technical Specification 6.2.2.
Sufficient manpower is a/allable on-site to perform the required manual operations in a timely manner to achieve hot standby conditions without reliance on fire brigade members.
(Reference SSER No. 4, Page 9-4.)
Letter of September 18, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton indicating that review of the Catawba SER and supplements identified a number of incorrect descriptions of features of the Catawba fire protection program.
The following items were identified:
l The two 150 lb. cylinders associated with the reactor coolant pump drain tank were identified as being located in the Reactor Building.
These tanks have been relocated to the hydrogen shed in the yard and excess flow valves installed on the supply piping.
(Reference SSER No. 2, Page 9-2.)
Diesel generator room fire detectors are identified as not being seismically qualified.
These detectors meet Catawba seismic qualifications.
(Reference SSER No. 2, Page 9-4.)
Steel sleeves for mechanical penetrations through masonry fire walls are identified as extending beyond the wall surface.
These sleeves do not protrude beyond the surface of the wall.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-8.)
Hydrogen piping associated with the reactor coolant pump drain tanks is identified as being located within the Reactor Building.
This piping is also routed within the Auxiliary Building.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-10.)
Valve tamper switches are identified as being functional on fire protection valves which are to be locked open.
There are no plans to test valve tamper switch circuits for these valves as they are inspected (where accessible) on a monthly basis.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-13.)
Both the conduit and related supports for the "B" fire pump power cable located below the intake structure, are identified as being wrapped.
Due to the low probability of a fire and negligible combustible load beneath the intake structure, the commitment made was to wrap the conduit only.
The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is identified as being separated from the water-driven pumps by a 3-hour fire barrier.
The pumps identified as water-driven are motor-driven.
(Reference SSER No. 3, Page 9-16.)
Letter of November 13, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton advising that the items identified in the correspondence of June 29, 1984 to be completed prior to initial criticality had been completed.
Letter of November 30, 1984, Hal B. Tucker to Harold R. Denton confirming that cold shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a fire event per Standard Review Plan Section 9.5-1, Section 1.C.5.C.
This letter also includes a discussion concerning "T-Hot" determination within the SSF.
Letter of March 21, 1985, Hal B. Tucker to Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-Region II) submitting fire protection layout and boundary drawings as well as marked standby shutdown system flow paths and pressure boundary drawings for use during the upcoming (April 15-19) "Appendix R" inspection.
Letter of April 1,1985, Hal B. Tucker to Dr. J. Nelson Grace submitting marked cable routing drawings, associated circuit analysis study, and various shutdown and damage control procedures for use in the upcoming "Appendix R" inspection of Unit 1.
Letter of 5/31/85, Hal B. Tucker to Dr. J. Nelson Grace submitting calculations addressing the acceptability of unprotected cable tray supports within the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
(Reference SSER No. 5, Pages 9-1 and 9-2.)
Letter of November 27, 1985, Hal 8. Tucker to Roger D. Walker (NRC-Region II), submitting marked flow diagrams, fire boundary and layout drawings, electrical cable routing and power distribution drawings, and associated circuit analysis study for use in the upcoming "Appendix R" inspection of Unit 2.
Letter of March 19, 1986, Hal B. Tucker to Dr. J. Nelson Grace, submitting a fire hazards analysis summary for each doghouse fire area.
(Subsequently, forwarced to ONRR.
Resolution pending.)
=
. s (Editorial Note:
The original SER for Catawba identifies three letters of correspondence, dated 7/22/82, 7/9/82 and 7/9/81.
In each case the date identified was determined to be a typographical error.
The correct date in each case is 7/29/82.)
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