ML20151N918
| ML20151N918 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/1985 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0896, RTR-NUREG-896 SBN-914, NUDOCS 8601030224 | |
| Download: ML20151N918 (25) | |
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SEABROOK STATION Engineering Office December 27, 1985 Pub 5c Service of New 6 SBN 914 T.F. B7.1.2 Now Hampshire Yankee Division IJnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) USNRC NUREG-0896 Supplement No. 3, " Safety Evaluation Report, Related to the Operation of Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2," dated July 1985 (c) PSNH Letter SBN-839, dated July 17,1985, "Suppic.nental Information as a Result of Continued Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) at Seabrook Station," J. DeVincentis to G. W. Knighton
Subject:
Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) at Seabrook Station (SER Outstanding Issue No. 19)
Dear Sir:
Provided herewith are Attachments 1 through 5 which address all the remaining DCRDR concerns identified in Reference (b) and in our telecon of August 19, 1985, with the staff.
In addition, we have provided in revised resolutions to HEDs which were previously submitted to the staff for review and acceptance. Since we are proceeding based on the enclosed responses, we request a decision regarding their acceptability by January 24, 1986.
We also believe that the enclosed completes our respanse to the above referenced SER Outstanding Issue.
Accordingly, we also request that the resolution of this outstanding issue be reflected in the next supplement to Seabrook Station's SER.
Very truly yours, 8601030224 851227
/
(DR ADOCK 05000443 e1r/
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PDR John DeVincentis, Director Engineering and Licensing Enclosures "3
1 cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List j
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P.O Box 300 Seabrook,NH O3874 Telephone (603)474-9521
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'l FOM (BENAHOYA)
William S. Jordan, III Donald E. Chick Diane Curran Town Manager Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Town of Exeter 20001 S. Street, N.W.
10 Front Street Suite 430 Exeter, NH 03833 Washington, D.C.
20009 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Robert G. Perlis RED Dalton Road Office of the Executive Legal Director Brentwood, NH 03833 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor City Hall Robert A. Backus, Esquire Newburyport, MA 01950 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Calvin A. Canney Manchester, NH 03105 City Manager City Hall Philip Ahrens, Esquire 126 Daniel Street Assistant Attorney General Portsmouth, NH 03801 Augusta, ME 04333 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Mr. John B. Tanzer Assistant Attorney General Designated Representative of-Office of the Attorney General the Town of Hampton 208 State House Annex 5 Morningside Drive Concord, NH 03301 Hampton, NH 03842 Anne Verge, Chairperson Roberta C. Pevear Board of Selectmen Designa ad Representative of Town Hall the Town of Hampton Falls South Hampton, NH 03827 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Patrick J. McKeon Selectmen's Office Mrs. Sandra Gavutis 10 Central Road Designated Representative of Rye, NH 03870 the Town of Kensington RFD 1 Carole F. Kagan, Esquire East Kingston, NH 03827 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Wcshington, DC 20555 Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau Mr. Angi Machiros Department of the Attorney General Chairman of the Board of Selectmen One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Town of Newbury Boston, MA 02108 Newbury, MA 01950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Town Manager's Office U.S. Senate Town Hall - Friend Street Washington, DC 20510 Amesbury, MA 01913 (ATTN: Tom Burack)
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Diana P. Randall 1 Pillsbury Street 70 Collins Street Concord, NH 03301 Seabrook, NH 03874 (ATTN: Herb Boynton)
r SBN-914 ATTACHMENT 1 Response to SSER Section 18 - Conclusions Remarks There have been two communications between Seabrook and the staff which are not reflected in SSER-3.
The first is a PSNH letter (SBN-839), dated July 17, 1985 [ Reference (c)]. The second was a telephone call on August 19, 1985 which addressed the information provided by this letter.
Based on this call, it is our understanding that, with the exception of three items which required further clarification, the information in this letter was acceptable to the staff.
In order to preclude any confusion, the following addresses each of the items specified in the conclusions of SSER-3, Section 18.
We consider the following items to be closed.
NRC Item No. 1 The function and task analysis method and documentation format, as provided in the draft sample attached to the January 7, 1985 submittal by the applicant, should satisfy the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. This analysis will be performed for all emergency operations and the results made available to the NRC for confirmatory review by July 1, 1985. Any HEDs regarding instrumentation availability and suitability resulting from a comparison of the Control Room inventory with the task analysis results should have proposed resolutions and a schedule for implementing any corrective actions reported to the NRC at least 120 days before the loading of fuel.
Response
Attachment III to SBN-839 [ Reference (c)] presented these HEDs, their proposed resolution, and the schedule for implementation. The additional clarifications requested (referenced telecon with staff, dated August 19, 1985) regarding this item are provided in Attachment 3.
NRC Item No. 2 Final evaluation of the Control Room environment (temperature, humidity, airflow, acoustic noise, and auditory signals) will be completed and reported to the NRC for confinmatory review within 1 year af ter commercial operation is achieved. Should any HEDs be identified, proposed resolutions and a schedule for implementing corrective actions should be included in the report.
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SBN-914 ATTACHMENT 1 Response to SSER Section 18 - Conclusions (Continued)
Response
Seabrook Station will meet this submittal schedule.
NRC Item No. 3 The following items should be submitted to the NRC for confirmatory review at least 120 days before the loading of fuel:
(a) a plan or administrative procedure and acceptable implementation schedule to ensure that consistent abbreviations are used throughout the Control Room (i.e., main control board, CRTs, and procedures),
(b) a description of the method for ensuring tnat procedural documents are returned to storage in proper order, (c) an acceptable schedule for the addition of hierarchical labeling.
Response
(a) The plan will be developed by January 15, 1986. We will makes this plan available for NRC staff review out of our Bethesda Licensing Office.
(b) The method will be developed by January 15, 1986. We will make the description of the method available for NRC staff review out of our Bethesda Licensing Office.
(c) The addition of hierarchical labeling and demarcation lines to the MCB has been completed.
NRC Item No. 4 The following are areas in which the review is still incomplete. Each review must be completed and proposed resolutions of any HEDs resulting from the review must be submitted to the NRC at least 120 days before the loading of fuel, along with an acceptable implementation schedule for correcting the HEDs:
(a) radiation monitoring system panels, (b) main steam isolation valve panel, (c) status light matrix - the staff disagrees with the current proposed resolution as stated in the applicant's letter of July 30, 1984 (Appendix C, Item 5.29),
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SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 1 Response to SSER Section 18 - Conclusions (Continued)
(d) tabulation of the use of color as a code in all display contexts, (e) fire panel, (f) clarification as to how demarcation and labeling assist operators in reading the steam dump meter located 15 ft from the controls, (g) correction of annunciator system HEDs before startup, (h) movable bench to reach atmospheric dump valve controllers unacceptable to the staff.
Response
(a) With the exception of the CRT and printer, the information on this system was submitted in SBN-839, Attachment III,Section VI.S.
The information on the CRT and printer is provided in Attachment 4.
(b) Information on this panel was submitted in SBN-839, Attachment I, Item 4.8.
(c) A revised resolution was submitted in SBN-839, Attachment I, Item 5.29.
(d) This tabulation was submitted in SBN-839 as Attachment IV.
With the exception of the use of color on the CRTs in the Control Room, it was found acceptable.
A further study of the use of color on the CRTs has been done. The results of the study, including HEDs, proposed resolutions, schedule for implementation and tabulation of colors is provided in Attachment 4.
(e) The fire panel was reviewed and HEDs, proposed resolutions, and the schedule for implementation were submitted in SBN-839, Attachment III,Section VI.R.
(f) This clarification was submitted in SBN-839, Attachment I, Item 9.7.
(g) The present status of all HEDs for the hard-wired annunciator system is provided in Attachment 5.
(h) A revised resolution was submitted in SBN-839, Attachment II, Item VI.O.3.
SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 2 Items Not Included in SSER-3 Section 18 - Conclusions l
Remarks Our review of the information submitted and of the SSER indicated that four items need to be addressed which were not specifically identified in the conclusions of Section 18.
These items are:
o Review of Control Room furnishings, their adequacy, obstacles to operator movement, presence of unnecessary furnishings and equipment.
o Review of operator protective equipment and emergency equipment storage, o
Review of the compatibility of emergency gear with operator's need to perform operations while wearing the protective equipment.
o Tabulation of those single bulb indicating lights which come on when a condition changes.
The following responds to these items:
VI.V Review of Control Room Furnishings The Control Room furniture is not completely installed and will not be completely installed until February 1986. However, we have reviewed both the layout of the furniture and the actual furnishings in the Simulator and did not identify any HEDs. It is expected that the actual Control Room furnishings will be similar to those used in the Simulator.
Accordingly, we do not believe any HEDs will be found.
We will review the Control Room furnishings subsequent to the completion of installation and any HEDs found will be resolved by the end of the first refueling outage.
Priority 3C.
VI.W Storage of Protective and Emergency Equipment This equipment has not yet been purchased; however, the storage space has been reviewed and judged to be adequate. Once the equipment has been purchased and installed, the space will be re-evaluated.
Any HEDs found will be resolved by the end of the first refueling. Priority 3C.
VI.X Compatibility of Operator Emergency Gear Because of the design of the Seabrook Control Room, including its air supply system, the Control Room operator will not need to don special equipment during any emergency. Therefore, this particular concern is not applicable to Seabrook Station.
SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 2 Items Not Included in SSER-3 Section 18 - Conclusions (Continued)
VI.Y Single Eulb Indicatinz Lights-We have reviewed those single bulb indicating lights on the Main Control Board which come on when a condition changes. For those bulbs that are not testable, we have determined that they come on only during a system test or as a result of some other operator actions. Therefore, failure of any of these bulbs to come on can readily be detected. A replacement of the bulb will quickly indicate if there is a bulb failure or if the system did not function.
No HEDs exist.
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SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 3 Clarification of HED Resolutions Submitted in SBN-839 Attachment III. Item VI.T.4 The SG recire. and drain pump switch is inconsistent with respect to throw.
STOP is to the right, not to the left as on other similar switches.
Resolution The pump can only be started locally, so this switch is used only to stop it.
There is no chance for error, since the pump switch can only be turned to the STOP position, no change will be made. Priority 3E.
Clarification Requested Is the switch a spring return switch?
Response
Yes, and therefore, it cannot be inadvertantly left in the STOP position.
Attachment III. Item VI.T.9 Clarification Requested Provide the specific, final resolution.
Response
The HED and its resolution have been revised to better address the problem.
HED VI.T.9 (Revised)
Procedure E-0, Step RNO 31 - This step, in the right hand column of the procedure, calls for determination of the position of the RHR, letdown, and seal return relief valves.
It is not provided. These valves are not accessible under accident conditions since they are inside containment.
If determination of relief valve position is important, then a means to determine it should be provided.
If not, the proceduro should be revised.
Resolution The step calling for the determination of RHR, letdown, and seal return relief valve position was not included in the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG)
Guidelines. It is an additional step added to the Seabrook plant-specific Emergency Responso Procedures (ERPs). The step has been added to be used as an aid to the operator in diagnosing the situation. There are no specific operator actions based upon the results of this determination.
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SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 3 Clarification of HED Resolutions Submitted in SBN-839 (Continued)
Resolution - Continued These valves are inside containment, and no remote position indication is available. Therefore, under accident conditions, determination of the valve positions may not be possible.
In that case, the operator simply proceed *: to the next step in the left hand column of the procedure.
The operator training program addresses the fact that a procedural step may not be able to be completed. The Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines Executive Volume, Users Guide Section, contains the following guidance:
"If the contingency action cannot be performed or is not successful and further contingency instruction is not provided, the operator should again return to the next step or substep in the left-hand column."
Based upon the guidance provided to the operators and the lack of specific actions to be taken in response to this step, we believe that no change to either the existing hardware or the procedure is warranted. Priority 3E.
Attachment III. Item VI.T.17 Procedure ES-0.1, Step RNO 4.d HCV-189, 190 - Process feedback is not available.
If isolation is required for this procedure step, there is insufficient information about valve closure.
Resolution Process feedback is available when letdown is in service using the letdown flow indication. Failure of the process to respond to control manipulations (indicative of failure of the letdown valve controls) can be determined from the flow indication and the position demand signal.
In the case where letdown is being placed into service, no feedback exists sinco isolation valves upstream of the letdown valves are closed (resulting in no letdown flow). Should the letdown valve operator fail in this situation,
'the valve may remain open in spite of a demand signal for valve closure.
In this case, the failure of the valve to close would not be detectable. The subsequent opening of the isolation valves to establish letdown flow could cause a thermal-hydraulic transient in the letdown flow path.
This scenario will be analyzed to determine its impact on the heat exchanger and the associated piping.
If it is determined that the consequences of this transient have an adverse safety impact, then appropriate corrective measures will be taken. Priority 2A.
SBN-914 ATTACHMENT 3 Clarification of HED Resolutions Submitted in SBN-839 (Continued)
Clarification Requested Provide the specific, final resolution.
Response
Subsequent to the response provided in SBN-839, but not because of this HED, a design change was made to the air lines of the isolation valves. This design change, the addition of needle valves to the air lines, slowed the stroke times of the isolation valves.
The design changes have been implemented and the stroke times measured (i.e., during Hot Functional Testing).
Based on the above, we re-evaluated the potential for a thermal-hydraulic transient in the letdown flow path due to the scenario described in the above HED " Resolution." Our evaluation concluded that with the new stoke times there would be no adverso consequences associated with this HED. Accordingly, no hardware changes will be made. Priority 3E.
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SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 4 Additional HEDs The following HEDs came from three sources. They are:
1.
Review of RDMS CRT and Printer 2.
Review of resolution on two previous HEDs 3.
Review of the use of color on Control Room CRTs VI.S EDHE 10.
The labeling on several of the push buttons does not accurately describe the displays called up on the CRT.
a.
Push buttons are labeled Grid 1, 2 and 3.
The information displayed are the Area, Process, and Airborne monitors.
b.
Push buttons are labeled Grid 4, 5 and 6.
These are for Unit 2 information, not used in Unit 1.
c.
The selection controls for the computers are labeled Primary /
Alternate. The computers are labeled System 1/ System 2.
d.
A push button is labeled Alarm Acknowledge, but it does not perform this function.
Recommendations a.
Change the push button labels to read Area Process and
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j Airborne.
b.
Make these push buttons blank.
I c.
Change the controls to read System 1/ System 2.
d.
Change the push button to read System Acknowledge.
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Priority 3C i
i 11.
There are many colors used on the CRT.
In particular, it is very i
difficult to distinguish between the three shades of blue.
Resolution f
All three shades of blue indicate some type of equipment i
malfunction.
In all three cases, the operator takes no action except to inform Health Physics that there is an equipment t
j malfunction. No change to the color is necessary. Operator training should address the operator's action of informing 'lealth l
Physics upon any blue indication. Priority 3E.
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4 SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 4 Additional HEDs (Continued)
V.L 2.
HED V.L addresses inconsistency between switch handles with respect to function and type (pistol grip, etc.).
In particular, S, T, and P safeguards actuation and reset switches as well as the Reactor Trip switches were pistol grip, similar to normal pump start /stop switches.
The proposed resolution was to make all the safeguards actuation switches and the Reactor Trip switches oval, to distinguish them from the pump switches.
This was done.
During training with the new switches, two problems arose. First, because of the dual train capability of the Safety Injection and 4
i the Reactor Trip switches, the torque necessary to actuate the switches was high enough that some operators had trouble overcoming it with one hand on an oval switch handle.
Second, in four instances during training an operator confused the Reactor Trip switch on the A panel with the Safety Injection switch.
After discussion with the operators and a review of the switches on the Main control Board, the following HEDs and resolutions were developed:
a.
The Reactor Trip switches and the Safety Injection switch are difficult to actuate using the new oval switch handles.
The dual train capability of these switches create a higher torque than on other trip switches.
pesolution:
Replace the oval handles on the Reactor Trip switches and on the Safety Injection switch with a pistol grip switch. The pistol grip handle for these switches is a different size than for pump switches. The size, color code, and demarcation used will provide sufficient differentiation.
Change the Reactor Trip reset switch from a pistol grip to an oval handle. The shape difference will provide sufficient differentiation, and the reset switches do not have a high torque to overcome. Priority 1A.
b.
There have been four instances where an operator has had trouble differentiating between the Reactor Trip switch and the Safety Injection switch on the A panel.
Resolution
)
'The Reactor Trip switch on the A panel will be color-coded the samo as the Reactor Trip switch on the D panel.
It will be made white with a red stripe. The Safety Injection switch will be color-coded red with a white stripe, l
SBN-914 ATTACHMENT 4 Additional HEDs (Continued)
The color code change along tiith the existing demarcation will provido sufficient differentiation for these switches.
priority 1A.
VI.U Use of Color on CRTs The Review Group performed an evaluation of the use of color on the CRTo in the Control Room. The final resolutions for use of color on the CRTs is shown in Figure 1.
A revised color tabulation for the Control Board is shown in Figure 2.
The original intent for all CRTs was that the colors used to indicate priority would be in spectral order red, orange, yellow, green, cyan. The colors dark blue, white, and magenta would indicate status and provide general information.
For four of the five CRT systems, that intent was met.
For the SPDS, red is highest priority, orange second, yellow third and green in normal.
For the RDMS, red is again the highest, with yellow as the second level.
For the computer graphics, red indicates an active component, yellow indicates uncertain information about a component, and green indicates an inactive component.
For the VAS Recommended Action CRTs, yellow is used foe headings and background for actions, white is used for mossages.
For two of the three systems which provido alarms to the operator, the SPDS and RDMS, rod is the highoot priority. This is followed by orango whero four levels of priority are used (SPDS) and yollow where theco levels or loss of priority are used.
For those two systems which provido information for the operator's use, in the Graphics System red indicates an activo component and yellow indicates a component where uncertain information is present, deserving operator attention.
In the VAS Recommended Actions, red is not used and yellow indicates those steps an operator should be concerned with.
The exception to the abovo lo the Video Alarm System (VAS).
During the development of the VAS, it was found that yellow and cyan surpassed red and orange when providing alphanumeric information to an operator. As judged by those designing that system, the ranking in order of clear presentation of information was yollow, cyan, and orange. Thereforo, those throo colors woro chosen by the donignora of the system.
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SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 4 Additional HEDs (Continued)
During the review, three color-related HEDs were found, and will be resolved. With this resolution, we find that the use of color on the CRTs is reasonable, and aids the operator in assessing the information presented by the various alarm systems.
The HEDs are:
1.
The use of the color orange as the third (lowest) priority on the VAS does not fit into the logical color scheme developed for the CRTs in the Control Room.
Resolution The Human Factor Review Team evaluated this HED not only on the basis of the deviation from the spectral color scheme, but also on the basis of what type of information is presented, the format in which that information is presented, and how the operator would use the information.
The information presented is alphanumoric in nature, and is presented as one full line of characters.
It in important that the operator be able to easily road the information presented. We confirmed that the yellow-cyan-orango does moet this criterion, and also have agreed that the yollow is eastor to read than the orange.
The operator should know during an emergency if the information being presented is high priority or low priority, and ho or she should be able to distinguish between them.
Because of the similarity between the yellow and the orange, the choice of placing cyan between them is a reasonable way to handle the problem.
Additionally, a significant amount of work has been done to order the incoming alarms during an abnormal condition.
After the initial four alarms come in, filling the unacknowledged section of the first page, all additional alarms are cont to buffers, ordered by priority, then displayed in that ordor. The highost priority are yellow, next priority are cyan, and the lowest are in orange. The operator knows that as he or she scans yellow alarms he or she is looking at high priority. When he or she gets to the color chango to cyan, ho or she knows those are a lower priority. When orango appears, he or she is looking at the lowest priority alarms.
SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 4 Additional HEDs (Continued)
During periods of low alarm activity, all alarms receive a quick response.
Any message appearing on the VAS CRT is an alarm, and requires response.
The colors only play a role during periods of high alarm activity; 1
and then only to help the operator filter out low priority alarms.
i Based upon the above analysis, the Human Factor Review Team believes that the use and order of colors on the VAS CRTs does not present a problem to the operator, j
No change needs to be made. Priority 3g.
2.
The use of the color magenta as an alarm in the Graphics System does not fit into the logical color scheme developed for the CRTs in the Control Room.
Resolution Delete the use of the color magenta for alarms on the Graphics System. This information is available in other places, and is not needed. Priority 3C.
3.
The color orange is used for labels on the RDMS CRT. This does not fit into the logical color scheme developed for the CRTs in the Control Room.
Resolution i
This use of orange has been evaluated and judged to be acceptable J
on the RDMS CRT. The red and yellow alarms, their meanings, and j
the use of the color orange are sufficiently different so as to cause no problem for the operator responding to a system alarm.
Priority 3g.
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f SBN 914 ATTACHMENT S, Hard-Wired Annunciator HEDs i
The following is the present status of the resolutions and implementation schedules for hard-wired annunciators.
Note that with two exceptions, all HEDs to be resolved have an A priority (i.e., HEDs to be resolved before fuel load). The exceptions are VI.N.2 and VI.N.4.
These HEDs have a 3C priority because the HEDs are for operator convenience, not for some emergency operation. Because of this, their resolution can wait until the first refueling.
VI.L Hard-Wired Alarms 1.
Grouping of Tiles Within Boxes On Panel 8 the tiles for the two trains do not correspond. There are two Train B tiles on the A trata box which should be movsd to the B traln box.
The SCCW alarms on the Panel H box ought to be on the Panel F box.
On Panel H, the left-hand box is 4 x 6, the right one is 6 x 6 At least the left-most 4 x 6 portion of the right-hand box should correspond to the left-hand 4 x 6 box.
On all annunciator boxes, some alarms come up on panels that are
{
separated from the controls and displays associated with the 4
alarm. Additionally, the wording on some tiles does not indicate the correct parameter alarmed.
A general revlew has been undertaken to determine correct grouping and wording on the tiles, and necessary changes have been made, i
Priority 2A.
2.
Readability of Tiles TLles can be read easily when standing directly in front of the
(
corresponding box. However, when standing at the silence-acknowledge stations at Panels B and H, there is some diffleulty in reading some of the tiles acknowledged from those stations -
partly because of angle of view, partly because of distance.
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Jtesolution The hard-wired annunclators are a backup to the CRTs. The letters have been increased in size to 5/16 inch to improve readability of j
the tLlos and this resolves the concern.
Priority 3A.
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SBN 914 ATTACHMENT 5 Hard-Wired Annunciator HEDs (Continued) 3.
Alphanumeric Tile Locater Tile locater code should be painted or otherwise 1.idicated with letters along the left edge to indicate row, numbers along top edge to indicate column. Tiny locater codes on tiles themselves can stay, since they can be useful to prevent putting tile back in the wrong location.
Resolution This code and matrix has been developed and will be installed.
Priority 3A.
4.
The flash rates specified in the annunciator specification do not agree with the flash rates observed on the annunciator in the simulator. The following are the desired flash rates based upon simulator observations:
Incoming Alarms - Fast Flash, 2 per sec.;
Clearing Alarms - Slow Flash,1 per sec. ; and both with equal on-off times.
Resolution The flash rates for the annunciator in the MCB will conform to those guidelines. Priority 3A.
VI.N.
Conunon Alarm System 1.
The first-out reset push button is not installed.
Resolution This will be installed. Priority 1A.
2.
The slience, acknowledge, and reset push buttons are duplicated on the keyboard and are insufficiently discriminable. Each set is dedicated to either the VAS or the backup annunciator requiring additional operator actions to acknowledge alarms that come in on both systems.
In addition, two keystrokes are required to acknowledge VAS alarms from the keyboard.
Resolution The existing push-button stations with silence, acknowledge, and reset will be wired to interface with both systems. For operator convenience, the acknowledge push button will also silence the horn.
-... -.- -. - - -. - ~.-
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ATTACHMgNT 5 Hard-Wired Annunciator HEDs (Continued)
Resolution - Continued The silence push button will be made distinctive from the other l
two push buttons. Silence, acknowledge, and reset push buttons shall be distinguishable from each other by color as well as location relative to the others. The silence push button shall be gray, the acknowledge magenta, and the reset white. Priority 3C.
3.
For audible signals, there is presently insufficient discriminability between alarm onset and reset, and between primary and secondary alarms.
Resolution These signals have been reviewed. The consensus of the review team is that the following signals, in their specific Betatone terminology, be used
" yelp" at two Hertz for first-out alarm.
" warble" at one Hertz for primary alarm.
" beep" at one Hertz for secondary alarm, where single frequency tone is set midway between the two frequencies comprising the
" warble."
" gong" for both resets, with higher frequency tone than " beep" or
" warble" and slightly lower intensity. Both the primary and secondary reset horns will be set to give identical sounds.
" wow" for fire, set loud at about one Hertz and different in frequency from " yelp."
Priority 2A.
4.
The test station for the hard-wired annunciator boxes on Panel H is too far from the acknowledge station for efficient operation.
Resolution The test push button will be moved to a position nearer the acknowledge station. Priority 3C.
Justification:
The testing of the hard-wired annunciator system is not an emergency operation. The reason for making a change is only for operator convenience, not for operator action during an t
emergency. Priority 3C.
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SBN 914 7
ATTACHMgNT 5 e
Hard-Wired Annunciator HEDs (Continued) 5.
To make the acknowledge stations more efficient, the acknowledge button should also silence the alarm.
Resolution This will be done. Priority 2A.
6.
For the first-cut annunciator, the test sequence causes all tiles to flash red.
1 Resolution The red bulbs will be removed from all hard-wired annunciators except the first-out designated windows in UA-52.
The white bulbs will be tested later in the sequence. Priority 3A.
7.
Alarm and reset messages cannot be readily discriminated on the alarm printer.
Resolution Reset messages will be identified by indenting the message from the left-hand margin. Priority 3A.
8.
Printers have no generic labels, such as Alarm, Alert, Status, etc.
Resolution These labels will be added. Priority 3A.
9.
The operators in the Control Room cannot hear the annunciator reset audible ringback.
The current design is not acceptable per NUREG-0700, Section 6.2.2.1 use of auditory signals.
Resolution Relocate the ringback Betatone speakers to the front side of the Main Control Board directly above the access doors.
Startup has temporarily moved the speakers to this location.
The operators prefer this location as they can now hear the audible ringback.
Priority 1A.
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SBN 914 ATfACHMENT 6 Revised Resolution to Previous HEDs VI.A.14 There is a need for a sensitive containment pressure (scale 0-5 psi) indicator on the front panel to read to one-half psi as required by emergency operating procedures.
Original Resolution "There is presently an indicator on the back panel. This will remain there.
A narrow-range indicator will be added to panel BF adjacent to the existing containment pressure indicator." Priority IB.
Revised Resolution Further study indicates tht the procedure calls for verification that the containment pressure is less than the Hi-1 setpoint. This point is 4.3 psi and can be read on the 0-60 psi indicator which is presently provided. As stated in the resolution to HED VI T.1, the operators will be instructed that the procedure "setpoints" do not have to be read as exact values. Therefore, there is no need for a narrow-range indicator. Accordingly, this item is no longer classified as an HED.
VI.C.12 0
Need a narrow-range (0-100 F) delta T indicator and recorder for natural circulation conditions.
Original Resolution
'We will add required indicator and recorder. Priority 1A.
Revised Rosolution This delta T indication is a backup variable. Therefore, display on demand with trend capability is acceptable and will be available on the CRTs.
Priority 1A.
VI.D.9 The main turbine impluso chamber pressure is mislabled, possibly should be SG reference temperature.
Original Resolution The indication is not necessary and will be removed.
Priority 3A.
SBN-914 ATTACHMENT 6 Revised Resolution to Previous HEDs (Continued)
Revised Resolution The indication is not necessary and will be removed.
Priority 3C.
The implementation schedule originally proposed is being changed because:
(a) since the operator does not use this meter, there is no safety concern, (b) at this time, the demarcation labeling and touch-up painting in this area of the board has been completed, and (c) changes in other areas of the MCB would make it extremely difficult, to make this modification and to revice the completed demarcation and labeling per the original implementation schedule.
VI.D.13 There is a need for DP meter plus/minus 0 - 300 psi to go with PIS07 and 508.
Need better way to watch SG feed and main stream delta P.
Requirement is to hold the programmed delta P across feed regulator valves. This is especially needed if auto system fails.
Original Resolution The feedwater control valve controllers presently have a delta P indicator with a 0-100% scale. The scale will be changed to delta P in psig, resolving this problem.
Priority 2A.
Revised Resolution The feedwater control valve controllers presently have a delta P indicator with a 0-100% scale. The scale shall be changed to delta P in psig. Priority 2C.
The implementation originally proposed is being revised because:
(a)
The operators can maintain the required delta P across the feedwater contol valve using the 0-100% scale, (b) other instrumentation (eg., SG water level) would be used by the operator if the feedwater control valve was in the manual mode, (c) based on (a) and (b), we do not believe there is a safety concern associated with delaying implementation and (d) vendor problems as well as ongoing changes in other areas of the MCB, make this modification difficult to complete per the original implementation schedule.
SBN 914 i
ATTACHMENT 6 Revised Resolution to Previous HEDs (Continued)
VI.E.17 The generator breaker switch interferes with the indicating light below it.
Original Resolution This is a hardware problem. A longer stem could be used, extending the switch further out of the board. Priority 3B.
Revised Resolution The control switch does not interfere with the indicating lights; but rather while operating the switch, the operator's hand could contact the indicating light.
If the operator's hand contacted the indicating lights, he could " skin his knuckles" on the rough edges.
Since a longer shaft switch is unavilable from the vendor, the indicating lights below this control switch will be filed smooth to minimize any problems with the operator's hand contacting these indicating lights. Priority 3A.
4 VI.S.4 On the RDMS printer, the format'does not presently reflect the UE&C tag numbers for the radiation monitors that are shown on plant documentation.
Original Resolution The RDMS printer will be reviewed along wlth the CRT.
Priority 2A.
Revised Resolution A hardcopy cross reference between vendor tag numbers for radiation monitors (i.e., the identifier used in the RDMS printer output and CRT display) and the i
UE&C tag numbers will be developed and made available for use by the operators at the RDMS console.
Priority 2A.
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SBN-914 Page 1 of 1 FIGURE 1 Use of Color on Control Room CRTs Dark Red Orange Yellow Green Cyan Blue White Magenta VAS-Separation 3
1 2
reset Hardwired 1
2 Annunciator (first out)
(All other Sy tem slarms)
SPDS 1
2 3
4 RDMS 1
labels 2
reset uncertain informatiqn Gr phics active uncertain inactive analog lines inter-information-information-mediate values VAS heading messages R:conunended background Actions N:to:
Priorities - 1, 2, 3, 4
r-FIGU USE OF COLOR ON SEAE COLOR COI. OHS :
CODING ORANGE LIGHT CATEGORY RED (AMBER)
YELLOW GREEN BLUE Indicator danger abno t7na l n o tina l Scale Bands Indicating active caution inactive Lights Lighted active caution inactive Pushbuttons Unlighted t r ip reset Pushbuttons Pump, V a l v r.,
train A Switch Handles Switch normal no t7na l Position F1its at t er st art after stop Reco"ders leti scale Mimic 1.inen emerg. flow suction gas alt ernate pat h path f lowpat h (discharge)
LabeIs tcain A/
Accident channe1 4 channel 1 Monitoring I n s t rumen t (AM1)
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SBN 914 Page 1 of 2 2
OOK CONTROL _B0__ARD BLUE HAGENTA BROWN WHITE BLACK GRAY ower avail.
power avail.
(SWYD BKHS)
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silence acknowledge reset
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non train channel 2 related
.A FIGU USE OF COLOR ON SEAI COLOR COLORS:
CODING ORANGE LIGHT CATEGONY RED (AMBER)
YELLOW GREEN BLUE Computer erase, etc.
paging erase, etc.
Keyboards abnormality levels:
Hardwired first out Alarms Indicator temperature pressure level Type Demarcation, Generic Labels Te1ephoner NHC Emergency Not if ic at ion System (ENS)
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