ML20150C398

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Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting Refs to Upper Head Injection Sys from Tech Specs in Order to Eliminate Confusion Re Applicability of Extraneous Specs
ML20150C398
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/14/1988
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20150C391 List:
References
NUDOCS 8803180223
Download: ML20150C398 (15)


Text

.

ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES l

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I INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND J"9VEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor Coolant System....................................

3/4 4-30 FIGURE 3.4-2a UNIT 1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EFPY.........................

3/4 4-31 FIGURE 3.4-2b UNIT 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS-APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EFPY.........................

3/4 4-32 FIGURE 3.4-3a UNIT 1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM C00LOOWN LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EPFY............................

3/4 4-33 FIGURE 3.4-3b UNIT 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLDOWN LIMITATIONS-APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EPFY............

3/4 4-34 TABLE 4.4-5 REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM -

WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE..................

3/4 4-35 3/4 4-36 Pressurizer..........

s 3/4 4-37 Overpressure Protection Systems...........

3/4 4-39 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY......................................

3/4 4-40 3/4.4.11 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT SYSTEM.........................

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS 3/4 5-1 C ol d Le g I n j e c ti o n........................................

\\

CD e. l e r e d); n f e c t i e r.....................................

3/4 5-3 L';;;r "e+e-3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T

> 350 F.............................

3/4 5-5 avg 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T

< 350*F.............................

3/4 5-9 avg 3/4.5-11 3/4.5.4 (0eleted]..................................................

3/4 5-12 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK...............................

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 IX Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

Amendment No.

(Unit 2)

.o ac s l,

}

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS COLO LEG INJECTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1.1 Each cold-leg injection accumulator shall be OPERA 8LE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 6870 and 7342 gallons, c.

A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2100 ppm, d.

A nitrogen cover pressure of between 585 and 639 psig, and e.

A water level and pressure channel OPERABLE.

i APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

(L'HI ;hy:f::11y di:ee eeeted e-f ec'et e-

l;;;
1;;;d.

0;id L;; Acce;;ieter; e-d di;;herge path;..it

b?3 ::di' icd.)

ACTION:

With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed a.

isolation valve or boron concentration less than 1900 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration less than c.

1900 ppm and:

l 1)

The volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators 1900 ppm or greater, restore the in-operable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the low boron determination or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

2). The volume weighted average baron concentration of the three

~ limiting accumulators less than 1900 ppm but greater than 1500 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status or return the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators to greater than 1900 ppm and enter ACTION c.1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

"Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-1 Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

Amendment No.

(Unit 2)

M~* ' ' ' ~ -

wee

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS O

O ACJ6 S LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) 3)

The volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators 1500 ppm or less, return the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulator to greater than 1500 ppm and enter ACTION c.2 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pres-sure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

a.

1)

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and 2)

Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is open.

b.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to UK of tank volume not hang resulting from normal makeup by verifying the boron conceatration of the accumulator solution; and At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig c.

by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected by removal of the breaker from the circuit.

4.5.1.1.2 Each cold leg injecticn accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days by the performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL a.

OPERATIONAL TEST, and b.

At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

l s

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l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.64 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.45 (Unit 2)

{

.5__

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ENE 3/4 1 ACCUMULATORS COLO L INJECTION

\\

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Each\\oldleginjectionaccumulatorshallbeOPERABLEwith:

3.5.1.2 a.

The is ation valve open, b.

A contai d borated water volume of between 8022 and 8 6 gallons, c.

A boron co entration of between 1900 and 2100 ppm, d.

A nitrogen c er pressure of between 430 and 484 p g, and e.

A water level a d pressure channel OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, a d 3*.

(VHI operability equired).

ACTION:

a.

With one accumulator in erable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron oncentratio less than 1900 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator o OPERAB status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within he ne 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer' v hin the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

pressure to less than 1000 ps b.

With one accumulator inopersbl e to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately ope t italation valve or be in at least HOT STANLB7 within 6 trurs d red e pressurizer pressure to less tnan 1000 psig within the liowing

hours, etable due to \\oron concentration less than c.

With one accumulator in 1900 ppm and:

\\

1)

The voltime wei ted average boron cor.c ntration of the three limiting acc ulators 1900 ppm or great

, restore the in-operable ac mulator to OPERABLE status

' thin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the low boron etermination or be in at least OT STANOBY within the next hours and reduce pressurizer pre ure to less than 1000 ps'g within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

2)

The olume weighted average boron concentration f the three

11. ting accumulators less than 1900 ppm but grea er than

~1 0 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator to OP ABLE status r return the volume weighted average boron concent tion of the three limiting accumulators to greater than 1900 ppm nd enter ACTION c.1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of the low boron determinati or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce press izer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 ho rs.

"Pre surizer pressure above 1000 psig.

Mc IRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-2a Amendment No. 64 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 45 (Unit 2)

Me.m0V8 6

ERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS _

/

LI ING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) 3)

The volume weighted average boron concentration of the thre limiting accumulators 1500 ppm or less, return the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiti accumulator to greater than 1500 ppm and enter ACTION c within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the low boron determination or be in T

STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressuriz pressure o less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIR ENTS

/

X 4.5.1.2.1 Each cold 1 injection accumulator shall be d onstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once r 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1)

Verifying th contained borated water olume and nitrogen cover pressur in the tanks, and 2)

Verifying that e h cold leg inje ionaccumulatorisolation$

valve is open.

b.

At least once per 31 days nd with' 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater han equal to 1% of tank volume not lj resulting from normal makeup y erifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution; d

l c.

At leas't once per 31 days w en t RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power t the is ation valve operator is disconnected by removal the brea er from the circuit.

4.5.1.2.2 Each cold leg inject' n accumulator ter level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated PERABLE:

a.

At least once per 1 days by the performan e of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TES, and b.

At least onc per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION M VIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 6-2b Amendment No. 64 (Unit )

Amendment No. 45 (Unit

I EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1.3.4 UPPER HEAD INJECTION (Deleted] _;;. ;..;;f x! cx:;9 e' +" ey-+-]

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l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.

(Unit 2)

Amendment No.

(Unit 1) j l

j 1

1 RGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3 e.*rnoVe 70CJ8. ---

\\

UPPER HEAD INJECTION LIMITI CONDITION FOR OPERATION

/

3. 5.1. 3 Ea Upper Head Injection Accumulator shall be OPERA 8LE with:

a.

The olation valves open, b.

The wat filled accumulator containing a minimum of 18 cubic feet of rated water having a concentration of betwee 1900 and 2100 ppe o boron, and c.

The nitrogen eating accumulator pressurized to b ween 1206 and 1264 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,.2, and 3*.

(UHI operability r uired. Cold leg accumulators nd discharge paths ng itably modified.)

5 ACTION:

a.

With the Upper Head In tion Accumula r System inoperable, except as a nsult of a closed olation va' e(s), restore the Upper Head Injection Accumulator Sys to OPE

@LE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAN0BY wit in th next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressur-izar pressure to less then 1 sig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

Witn tha Upper Head Injectio umulator System inoperable due to the isolation valve (s) bein clo

, either immediately open the isolati;.; valve (s) or be i at lea t HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizar press to less han 1900 psig within the follo'r ing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS

\\

/

4.5.1.3 Each Upper Hea InjectionAccumulatorSystems 11 be demonstrated i

OPERAS

.4 l

a.

At least ce per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

l 1)

V ifying the contained borated water volume a nitrogen t

ssure in the accumulators, and 2)

Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is pen.

  • P essurizer pressure above 1900 psig.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-3a Amendment No. 57 (Unit 1 Amendment No. 38 (Unit 2)

~

36mo\\/8 8-RGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SUR LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

I X

b.

t least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solut n

lume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank vol by ve ifying the boron concentration of the solution in the w er-fil d accumulator; c.

At lea t once per 18 months by:

1)

Ver ing that each accumulator isolation valv closes ically when an actual or simulated wat level signal au of 76.

  • 3.3 inches above the bottom insi edge of the water-fi led accumulator exists. If actus water level is used, the the accumulator shall be at a spheric pressure.

2)

Verifying th the total dissolved nit gen and air in the water-filled cumulator is less tha 80 scf par 1800 cubic feet of water uivalent to 5 x 10 pounds nitrogen per pounds water).

d.

At least once per 5 year by replaci the membrane installed between the water-filled nit n bearing accumulators and verifying that the removed r

burst at a differential pressure of 40 1 10 psi.

UIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-3b Amendment No.57 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.38 (Unit 2)

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'McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-4 Amendment No.

(Unit 2)

Amendment No.

(Unit 1) e

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Leg Accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pres-sure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe rup-tures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The allowed down time for the accumulators are variable based upon boron concentration to ensure that the reactor is shutdown following a LOCA and that any problems are corrected in a timely manner.

Subcriticality is assured when boron concentration is above 1500 ppa, so additional down time is allowed when concentration is above 1500 ppe. A concentration of less than 1900 ppe in any single accumulator or as a volume weighted average may be indicative of a prots bles, such as valve leakage, but since reactor shutdown is assured, additional time is allowed to restore boron concentration in the accumulators.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are conside. red to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are e.ot met.

In addition as these accomulator isolation valves fail to ment single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason ex-cept an isolation valve closed minimizes the time expusure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

The original licensing bases of McGuire assumes both the UHI system and the Cold Leg Accumulators function to mitigate postulated accidents.

Subse-quant analyses, documented in "McGuire Nuclear Station, Safety Analysis for UHI Elimination" dated September 1985, and docketed by Duke letter dated October 2,19Q6, support the determination that UHI is no longer required pro-vided the Cold Leg Accumulator volume is adjusted to be consistent with that assumed in the Safety Analysis.

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McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

Amendment No.

(Unit 2)

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3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERA 8ILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction witn the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

i t

(

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 8 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.

(Unit 1)

Amendment No.

(Unit 2) i

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ATTACHMENT 2 JUSTIFICATION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS

JUSTIFICATION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS

Background

The upper head injection (UHI) system was originally installed at McGuire as an integral part of the emergency core cooling system.

Due to operational problems encountered with the UHI system, a new safety analysis for_ McGuire was performed with the intent of removing UHI.

The results - of these analyses were submitted to the NRC with a proposal to change the McGuire Technical Specifications to allow operation of McGuire with UHI disabled or removed. The proposal was approved and the Technical Specifi-cations were issued on May 13, 1986 in McGuire Operating License Amendments numbers 57 (Unit 1) and 38 (Unit 2).

Technical Specifications were issued such that McGuire was allowed to operate with or without a functional UHI system, dependent upon specified modifica-tions to the cold leg accumulators. The modifications to the cold leg accumu-lators were completed during the 1986 refueling outages and the units each operated one fuel cycle (approximately one year) with UHI functionally dis-abled.

During the 1987 refueling outages, the UHI system piping and valves were physically removed as to make the qualified applicability statements extraneous.

Discussion of Proposed Changes The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications seek to delete references to the upper head injection system from the Technical Specifications.

The-

-changes would not affect any requirements on any other system.

The first change is to delete reference to UHI from the Index.

This is strictly an administrative change.

The next change is to remove the qualification statement from the Applicabil-ity of Specification 3/4.5.1.1.

The statement to be deleted is "URI physi-cally disconnected or isolation valves closed.

Cold Leg Accumulators and discharge paths suitably modified".

The UHI system has been physically removed and the cold leg accumulators and discharge paths have been suitably i

modified, thus the qualification statement of the Applicability is permanently satisfied within the operational modes specified.

Based upon plant condition.

l deletion of the qualification statement is an administrative change.

The following specification, 3/4.5.1.2, provided requirements for the cold leg injection accumulators for the case that UHI operability was required. As UHI operability is no longer required and this specification is not applicable under any circumstances the proposal is to totally remove pages 3/4 5-2a and 3/4 5-2b from the Technical Specifications. As the specification is no longer applicable, removing the pages from the Specifications is an administrative change.

The specifications that formerly governed the UHI system are also proposed to be deleted. The system has been physically removed and the specifications are thus not applicable in any plant condition. This proposal seeks to mark pages 3/4 5-3 and 3/4 5-4 as "Deleted" and to totally remove the suffixed pages, 3/4 5-3a and 3/4 5-3b.

The proposal is to remove blank pages from the Tech-

I

. nical Specifications (thus removal of the suffixed pages) without disrupting the page numbers of the section nor renumbering the remainder of the section (thus 3/4 5-3 and 3/4 5-4 remain as nearly blank pages).

In conjunction with the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications, the Bases are also brought up to date.

The Bases formerly went into detail explaining the "transition specifications", which contained provisions for all possible plant statuses during transition to include:

UHI required; UHI present, though isolated (not required); and UHI physically removed (final state).

As the plant is in the final condition, that is, UHI has been physically removed and the cold leg injection accumulators and their discharge pathways have been modified in accordance with safety analysis assumptions as pre-viously described in the Bases, this section is deleted.

Overall, the proposed changes are intended to simplify the specifications by removing extraneous specifications and preclude any possible confusion over applicability of the extraneous specifications.

As modifications to the station are complete, these changes are purely administrative.

Annlysis of Significant Hazards Considerations Pursuant to 10CFR 50.91, this analysis provides assurance that the proposed changes to the McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifications do not involve any significant hazards considerations as defined by 10CFR 50.92.

(1)

The proposed changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The changes proposed would not affect station operation or equipment. The deletion of the UHI system was justified as documented in McGuire License Amendments numbers 57 (Unit 1) and 38 (Unit 2).

As the system has been physically removed from the station, the proposed changes are administrative enhancements to the Technical Specifications.

(2)

The proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or dif-ferent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

As discussed above, deletion of UHI was previously justified and documented, therefore the proposed changes are administrative enhancements.

The changes would not allow any further hardware modifications in the station, thus no accident scenarios are created or otherwise affected.

(3)

The proposed chantes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed changes are administrative enhancements to the Technical Specifications, and as they are administrative changes, no margins of safety are affected.

Based upon the preceding analysis, Duke Power concludes the proposed amend-ments to the McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifications do not involve any significant hazards considerations as defined by 10CFR 50.92.