ML20149J924
| ML20149J924 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149J894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-97-11, NUDOCS 9707290150 | |
| Download: ML20149J924 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1997011
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~ ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOi'Y COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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Docket No.:
50-382
License No.:
Report No.:
50 382/97-11.
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location:
Hwy.- 18
Killona, Louisiana
Dates:
May 18 through June 28,1997
Inspectors:
L A. Keller, Senior Resident inspector
.W. F. Smith, Senior Resident inspector, River Bend
R. V. Azua, Project Engineer
~ G. E. Werner, Project Engineer
Approved By:
P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D
Attachment:
Supplemental Information
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9707290150 970722
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ADOCK 05000302
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
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NRC Inspection Report 50-382/97-11
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This routine, announced inspection included aspects of licensee event response,
operationsi maintenance, engineering, and plant support.- The report covers a 6-week
period of resident inspection.
Ooerations
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Observed operations activities including reactor coolant system (RCS) reduced
inventory operations were generally well~ coordinated and consistent with safe
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operation of the facility (Section 01.1).
A violation was identified regarding the failure to implement procedural requirements
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for a tagout which contributed to the spill of approximately 5000 gallons of
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radioactive water from the spent fuel pool (SFP) (Section 01.2).
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' Control room operators demonstrated poor judgement in not promptly clearing an
- SFP high-level alarm (Section 01.2).
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' The licensee root cause investigation into the SFP spill event was thorough and
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accurate (Section 01.2).
Operators responded very effectively to a partialloss of offsite power while at'
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midloop (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
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Weaknesses in the licensee's work control process resulted in a technician being
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provided a work package that required revision, despite the errors being previously
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identified (Section M1.2).
Emergency diesel generator (EDG) integrated safeguards testing was well planned
and executed (Section M1.3).
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Engineering generally provided good technical support to operations and
maintenance (Section E1.1).
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The proposed design changes to provide 13 air-operated containment isolation
valves with the capability to be closed remotely and remain closed for 30 days after
the design-basis accident were found to be adequate (Section E2.1).
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The' procedure changes required as a result of the implementation of a modification
Were not being tracked to ensure completion prior to entry into
Mode 4 (Section E2.1).
- Plant Sucoort
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l Observed radiation protection activities were performed in accordance with
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procedures and were consistent with ALARA' principles. t The'small amount of
contaminated areas continued to be a strength (Section R1.1).'
' Planning.and preparation for the upcoming hurricane season were good
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(Section P1.1).
The site drill conducted on June 11,1997, provided good training for emergency
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response personnel. Plant management's willingness to conduct a full participation
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drill during the refueling outage demonstrated commitment to excellence in
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emergency preparedness (Section P1.1).
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status
Throughout this inspection period the plant was shut down for Refueling Outage (RFO) 8.
L._Qperations
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Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors performed frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, control
room board walkdowns, and plant tours. Observed activities were generally
perfo.med in a manner consistent with safe operation of the facility. The inspectors
observed good operator performance during RCS reduced inventory operations and
a partial loss of offsite power event. However, an operator procedural violation and
failure to clear an annunciator contributed to an SFP spill event as discussed below.
01.2 SFP Soill
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a.
Insnection Scope (93702. 71707)
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The inspectors reviewed the circumstances involving the inadvertent overflow of
the SFP on May 21,1997.
b.
Observations and Findinns
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At approximately 9 p.m. on May 20, the shift support center (SSC) was approached
by a plant mechanic with Work Authorization 01159118, which involved the repair
of a body-to bonnet leak on Valve FS-405, an SFP purification system isolation
valve. The SSC operator (a licensed reactor operator) prepared clearance tags for
Valve FS-405 under an existing tagout, Tagout 97 0864. Tagout 97-0864 was
issued previously to isolate drains from the refueling cavity during refueling. In
preparing the clearance tags for Valve FS-405, the SSC operator failed to consider
whether the refueling water storage pool (RWSP) purification pump might be
running and did not inform the control room that additional tags were being added
to an existing tagout. Additionally, the required independent review was not
performed prior to issuing the tags to be hung in the field. The inadequate tagout
preparation resulted in the failure to secure the RWSP purification pump prior to
hanging the tags. This resulted in dead-heading the RWSP purification pump, which
in turn resulted in higher than normal system pressure and subsequent leakage into
the SFP via isolation Valve FS-345.
At 10:45 p.m. on May 20, the SFP high-level alarm annunciated in the control
room. In response to the alarm: (1) an operator locally verified SFP level was at
the high-level mark of 44 feet, which represented a 1-inch rise in level from when it
was checked 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> carlier, (2) SFP influent valves were verified closed (including
FS-345), (3) chemistry sampled the SFP, which indicated no dilution of the SFP, and
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~ (4) the auxiliary operator was instructed to periodically check the SFP level. The
operators discussed the possible cause of the high-level alarm and speculated that,
since the component cooling water (CCW) makeup pump (a source of makeup to
the SFP) had been running, there could have been leakage past the CCW makeup
pump isolation valve into the SFP. The crew discussed the need to lower the SFP
level and clear the alarm; however, this was given a low priority due to the false
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assumption that the SFP level rise had stopped (or was very slow) and due to
ongoing outage evolutions (i.e., EDG run and high-pressure safety injection system
venting). At this point, the control room was blind to any further SFP increase
since there was nc SFP level indication in the control room and the high-level alarm
. remained energized.
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At 2:41 a.m. on May 21, the control room received reports that the SFP was
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overflowing into the spent fuel cask decon pit and from there draining 'into the fuel
handling building (FHB) railroad bay. At 2:46 a.m., RWSP purification was secured,
which stopped the ingress of water into the SFP. Approximately 5000 gallons of
radioactive water overflowed from the SFP into the FHB; of this, approximately
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2500 gallons 'were contained in the FHB railroad bay. The licensee estimated that
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between 230 and 1850 gallons escaped outside the FHB through the railroad bay
doors where it spread out over a large area of asphalt and gravel within the
protected area and into the storm drain system. The remainder of the spilled fluid
was captured in the reactor auxiliary building sump and waste systems.
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Immediate corrective actions included pumping excess SFP water to the RWSP,
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draining the cask decon pit, isolating the spill area to prevent spread of
contamination, and taking soil and liquid samples to determine if any reportable
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releases to the environment occurred. Sample results indicated that the effluent
concentration limits of 10 CFR Part 20 were not exceeded. Condition
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Report (CR) 97-1284 was initiated and an event review team was convened on
May 21 to investigate the event. Throughout the next several weeks, extensive
cleanup was conducted, which included removal of contaminated gravel, soil, and
asphalt and flushing of *.he storm drain system. The inspectors observed portions of
the cleanup activities and concluded that the spill was adequately contained and
that no 10 CFR Part 20 limits were exceeded.
The licensee's event review team concluded that the spill was the result of a
combination of tagging and communication errors, which resulted in dead-heading
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the RWSP purification pump combined with an SFP purification isolation valve that
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leaked. Contributing to the event was the failure to promptly clear the SFP
high-level alarm due to other ongoing shift evolutions. The event review team's
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investigation revealed that the travel stop nuts on SFP isolation Valve FS-345 were
incorrectly positioned 1/8 inch lower than required by the valve technical manual
during a maintenance activity in May 1992. This resulted in the valve not fu!!y
blocking flow when it indicated shut. The inspectors reviewed the event review
team report and concluded that it was thorough and accurate.
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Administrative Procedure UNT-005-003, " Clearance Request, Approval, And
Release," Revision 14,' Section 5.3, " Preparation of the Clearance Form," requires,
in part,' that, if tags are added or deleted to a clearance, the individual making the
char:ges shall ensure that the clearance affords the same level of protection or
better than the original clearance, the clearance shall receive an independent review
by a licensed operator to verify that the boundaries chosen are adequate, and the
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clearance is forwarded to the shift supervisor / control room supervisor for review.-
The failure of the SSC operator to comply with the tagging procedure requirements
is a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a (50-382/9711-01).
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Conclusiong
The SFP spill was the result of an inadequate tagout due to procedure
noncompliance, poor communications between the SSC and the control room, and
an isolation valve not being fully closed. Control room operators demonstrated poor
judgement in not promptly clearing the SFP high-level alarm. The spill was
adequately contained and no 10 CFR Part 20 limits were exceeded. The licensee
root cause investigation into the SFP spill event was thorough and accurate.
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Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Startuo Transformer (SUT) Failure (93702,71707)
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On May 28,1997, the plant was in Mode 5 with the RCS at midloop in support of a
reactor coolant pump seal replacement. Both shutdown cooling trains were in
service'with the decay heat load evenly split between the two trains. At 9:01 a.m.,
an internal fault occurred in SUT B which resulted in the loss of Train B offsite
power. EDG B started and energized the Train B safety foads per design. As a
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result of the event, SFP cooling and Shutdown Cooling Train B were temporarily
lost, with only negligible temperature increases in the SFP and RCS prior to their
being reenergized. The inspectors responded to the control room within minutes of
the SUT failure. The inspectors observed very good command and control, formal
communications, and good procedural compliance. At 9:40 a.m., the control room
supervisor held a briefing on current status and priorities.. The inspectors observed
good decision making during the briefing, including the c3 cision to stop noncritical
work in the plant and restrict access to EDG A and other Train A electrical
components.
At 11:30 p.m., on May 29, the Train B loads were reenergized from offsite power
by backfeeding through the main transformer. EDG B was subsequently unloaded
and secured after having supplied the Train B loads for over 38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br /> without
incident. Train B was energized via backfeed from the main transformer throughout
the remainder of this inspection period. SUT B was shipped offsite for disassembly,
inspection, and' repair. ' A replacement transformer was subsequantly purchased and
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delivered onsite. As of the end of the inspection period, the replacement
transformer was undergoing re Apt inspections in preparation for testing and
eventual installation.
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-Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
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08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-382/9613-02: Failure to properly isolate CCW
containment penetration.
During development of work procedures for Valve CC-807A, a containment fan
cooler CCW inlet isolation valve, operators determined that they could not isolate
the containment penetration since only a check valve existed between the
penetration and the temporary chiller system. The inspectors were in the control
room while this issue was being discussed and recalled that a check valve had been
credited for containment penetration isolation during a similar maintenance activity
performed from October 23-25,1996, for Valve CC-808A, another containment fan
cooler CCW inlet isolation valve, which isolated Containment Penetration 20.
Subsequently, the licensee initiated CR 96-1726 to review and evaluate the
circumstances related to isolating the containment penetration. The licensee
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determined that operators had not isolated all flow paths by use of a deactivated
automatic valve, a manual valve, or a blind flange as specified in the actions for
TS 3.6.3. Instead, operators had used a check valve as a containment isolation
valve barrier for the penetration. This issue was identified as unresolved pending
review of Task Interface Agreement 96TIA017, which requested that the Office of
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Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) resolve the regulatory requirements associated
with isolation and closure capability for the containment fan cooler isolation valves.
The inspectors reviewed the response to Task interface Agreement 96TIA017 and
determined that a violation of TS 3.6.3 occurred. As part of the corrective actions,
the licensee discussed this issue with all(perators and issued a letter reinforcing TS
operability expectations. In addition, the licensee is planning to modify: (1) CCW
prints to provide easier interpretation, and (2) the CCW system to provide positive
train boundaries for the temporary chill water supply lines.
Although the inspectors questioned this issue before the CR was written, the
licensee identified that it was inappropriate to credit the check valve, and the
inspectors concluded that a CR would have been initiated absent the inspectors
question. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a
noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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Specifically, tho violation was identified by the licensee, was not willful, actions
taken as a result of a previous violation should not have corrected this problem, and
appropriate corrective actions were completed by the licensee (50-382/9711-02).
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08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9603-03: ~ Inoperable steam supply system for
. turbine-driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump.
This item involved the failure to perform the required TS actions because operations
' incorrectly assumed only one admission valve was required for operability.
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- Corrective actions included training of all. operations personnel and a change to
- Procedure OP-100-014, " Technical Specifice*Jon Compliance," which added specifa
guidance that both steam supplies for the turbine-driven EFW pump are required to
be operable. .This item was part of a generic concern regarding failure to enter
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appropriate TS limiting conditions for operations. The generic concern was ;
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dispositioned under Unresolved item 50-382/9605-03, which was closed in NRC
Inspection Report 50-382/96-13.
. 08.3 ' (Closed)' Viol'ation 50-382/9'613-03: Failure to enter appropriate TS for inoperable
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wet cooling tower (WCT) fans.
This item involved the failure of operators to recognize that curtains placed in front
of the WCT rendered it inoperable. This violation was caused by engineering input
that did not clearly communicate that a TS entry would be required and an
inadequate review of the work package by operators. Corrective actions included
removing the curtains, eliminating the use of engineering inputs to make operability
determinations, and incorporating this incident into training for operators. - This item
was part of a generic concern regarding failure to enter appropriate TS limiting
conditions for operations. The generic concern was dispositioned under Unresolved
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Item 50 382/9605-03, which was closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/96-13.
11. Maintenance
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Conduct of Maintenance (62707,61726)
M1.1 General Comments -
The inspectora observed all or portions of the following maintenance and
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surveillance ac tivities:
DCP-3623
Override of Safety injection Actuation Signal (SlAS) and
Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) for Containment
isolation Valves :
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OP-903116 Train B Integrated EDG Engineering Safety Features Test
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M1.2 Override of SIAS and CSAS for Containment Iscation Valves
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Inspection Scope (62707)
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The inspectors reviewed Design Change Package (DCP) 3623, " Override of SlAS
and CSAS for Containment isolation Valves," and observed selected maintenance
activities associated with the DCP.
b.
Observations and Findinos
On May 23, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities being
performed under DCP 3623.~ The technician performing this activity stated that he
had not progressed very far because he had discovered errors in the DCP. He then
stated that when he notified design engineering of the errors, he was informed that
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another technician, who had been working on the DCP prior to him, had identified
the same errors and that a Document Revision Notice (DRN 197017998) had
already been issued to address the errors. The technician stated that he obtained a
copy of this DRN from document control. The inspectors were concerned that the
technician was given a work package that was in error and required revision,
- despite the errors being previously identified. The inspectors were informed that
the original technician responsible for this activity had called in sick and, as a result,
no turnover was provided when the responsibility for completion of this effort was
reassigned. The inspectors noted that no log was maintained with the DCP that
provided any insight to the fact that errors had been found in the DCP and that a
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DRN revision was being developed.
The licensee's Administrative Procedure MD-001-014, " Conduct of Maintenance,"
did not provide 'any guidance regarding turnovers. The licenseo stated that,
normally, an effort was made to keep the same technician working on a task
through completion to minimize the potential for these types of errors. The licensee
issued CR 971306 to address this problem. In addition, the maintenance
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department instituted the use of a job status log, which will be added to all work
packages.
The inspectors questioned whether a process existed by which craft personnel were
notified when a DRN was issued. The licensee indicated that it was the
responsibility of the document control department to make such notifications, The
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inspectors reviewed the licensee's Site Procedure WS.201, " Document Control
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Systems," and Procedure UNT 004 009, " Handling and Use of Technical
Documents," and found that, although a requirement existed for notification of
controlled document holders regarding revisions that had been issued, no specific
guidance on timeliness or how that contact was to be made was provided. The
inspectors found that, although the document control department had a process for
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notification; which included a data base for recording such notifications, it was not
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proceduralized. The inspectors questioned if their records indicated that the holder
of the controlled copy of DCP 3623 had been notified of the issuance of
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DRN 1-97017998. They stated that their records did not indicate that such a
notification was made. The licensee subsequently discovered 13 other examples
where the document control progrsm failed to notify document holders of revisions
to their documents. In all cases, the end users were aware of the revisions and
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therefore no work errors had resulted due to the notification oversight.
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Conclusions
The lack of any turnover or requirements for a turnover, specifically in the case of a
complex work package, was considered a weakness in the licensee's maintenance
program. The failure by the document control department to notify the holders of
controlled documents regarding revisions to their work packages is a weakness in
the licensee's document control program.
M1.3 Train B Intearated EDG Encineerina Safetv Features Test (61726)
On June 20,1997, the inspectors monitored the licensee's activities in preparation
for and performance of Procedure OP-903116. The licensee held a prejob brief in
accordance with licensee requirements for infrequently performed activities. The
briefing was found to be thorough, including a discussion on the steps necessary to
back out of the surveillance test in the event of any problems. The surveillance
coordinator was clearly identified and the responsibility for each person involved
was clearly specified. During the performance of the surveillance, the licensee
performance was found to be good with no problems noted.
M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followoo item 50-38249603-02: Review licensee's testing
methodology.
This item involved the potential for preconditioning for timing the opening of the
steam admission valves for the turbin -driven EFW pump. The licensee, by
procedure, timed the valves on the second pump start rather than the first. The
first start of the pump tested the turbine mechanical overspeed trip device, and the
second start timed the opening of the steam admission valves. The licensee revised
Procedure OP-903-046, " Emergency Feed Pump Operability Check," so that the
steam admission valves would be tested in the as-found condition. The inspectors
noted that the stroke times for these valves remained satisfactory and did not
appreciably change as a result of the change in testing methodology and, therefore,
previous testing had not masker' ey valve degradation. The inspectors concluded
that the procedure enhanceme its were adequate to resolve the preconditioning
concern.
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Conduct of Engineering
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GenergLComments (37551) -
in general, engineering provided good technical support to operations and
maintenance. Daily reviews of CRs indicated engineering personnel had an
appropriately low threshold for identifying problems.
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Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1
Correcdon of Air-Onerated Containment isolation Valve Deficiencies
a.
inspection Scone (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the design change (DC) initiated by the licensee to enrrect
deficiencies in the original design of 13 containment isolation valves. These valves
were designed and installed to fail open to support the associated system safety
functions, but were not capable of being closed and maintained closed for 30 days,
as required by the Standard Review Plan, Section 6.2.1, should the containment
isolation function be needed concurrer.t with a loss of nonsafety-related instrument
air. The scope of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of licensee actions
to correct this proalem prior to restart from RFO 8.
b.
Observations and Findinos
NRC Inspection Reports 50-382/96-24 and 97-13 addrecsed the following safety
concerns:
Air-operated Containment Spray isolation Valves CS-125A(B) were designed
to open on a CSAS and to fail opern on a loss of nonsafety-related instrument
air to the operator. However, Valves CS-125A(B) were also designated
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containment isolation valves, which were required to be capable of being
closed manually from the control room and remain closed for 30 days
following an accident. However, these valves were unable to be closed in
the presence of a CSAS, nor were they capable of remaining closed for
30 days if instrument air was lost.
Air-operated CCW to Containment Fan Cooler isolation Valves CC-807A(B),
-808A(B), 822A(B), and -823A(B) were in a circumstance similar to the
above containment spray valves, except that the valves did not have remote
manual switches in the control room. These valves automatically opened
and closed in response to their respective containment fan cooler fan
operation, but could not be closed in the presence of an SIAS.
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The licensee had previously identified Containment isolation Valves CC-641, -710,
and -713, which were designed to fail open to ensure CCW cooling for the reactor
coolant pump shaft seals and the control element drive mechanisrn fans; however,
the three valves were not designed to remain closed for 30 days upon ioss of
instrument air. These valves automaticaily closed on a CSAS. Consideration of a
supplemental source of instrument air was addressed in Licensee Event
Report 50-382/92-015, when it was discovered that postaccident radiation levels if
the vicinity of the manual operators for Valves CC-641 and -713 could be higher
than postulated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
in addition, the licensee identified that outboard charging system Containment
isolation Valve CVC-209 was designed to fail open upon loss of instrument air and
the valve had no accumulator to hold the valve closed. Further, the solenoid control
valve supplying air to the actuator and the position indication were not Class 1E.
For the short term, the licensee elected to correct this problem by designating
remote reach-rod actuated Manual isolation Valve CVC-208 as the containment
isolation valve in place of Valve CVC-209. Valve CVC-208 was 3 feet upstream of
Valve CVC-209 and could be operated from Switchgear Room B within 10 minutes
from the time it was identified that the containment isolation function was needed
for Valve CVC-209. The valves and piping were Seismic Category 1 and Safety
Class 2. Additional barriers upstream of Valve CVC-208 included the charging
pump discharge check valves, the positive displacement pump internal valves, and
the charging pump suction check s sive. The containment penetration isolated by
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Valve CVC-209 (Containment Penetration 27) is listed in Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report Table 6.2-43 as not requiring a local leak rate test because it is
connec'ted to a closed Seismic Category 1, Safety Class 2, system. In a letter to
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the NRC dated May 6,1997, the licensee committed to restore Valve CVC-209 to
full compliance with NRC regulations during the next RFO by providing 30-day
closure capability and upgrading the controls and indication to Class 1E in
accordance with DC 3529. This allowed time for final project scoping, materiallead
time, and DCP development. The inspectors considered the licensee's short-term
corrective action acceptable for startup from RFO 8.
The inspectors reviewed DC 3429, " Essential Air Supply to Fail Open Containment
isolation Valves," Revision 3. The documentation in DC 3429 provided a backup
supply of safety-related instrument air so that, if there was a need to isolate any of
the containment penetrations protected by any of the above 13 valves and there
was a loss of nonsafety-related instrument air, the isolation could be accomplished
for at least 30 days, and the operators could place the backup air supply in service
from a low radiation area after a design-basis accident. The DC package contained
all of the elements required by the licensee's administrative controls over design
changes, including a safety evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The safety
evaluation did not identify any unreviewed safety questions and had sufficient basis
to support that conclusion.
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Briefly, each of the 13 valves had a safety-related accumulator connected to the air
actuator capable of closing each valve and holding it closed for 6-10 hours upon
loss of nonsafety-related instrument air in accordance with the original design.
-DC 3429 consisted of installing and connecting a safety-related, Seismic
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Category 1, stainless steel air manifold to the accumulators such that the
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safety-related air supply would last for.30 days at the design maximum leakage
rate. To maintain safety train separation and minimize tubing runs, four
high-pressure stations were to be installed,;each consisting of five refillable
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high-pressure air bottles that would be maintained at 2250-2500 psig. Each station
had its own reducing valve, which reduced the pressure to approximately 98 psig.
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A relief valve was provided to protect the low-pressure side of the four subsystems,
and_the high-pressure air bottles were protected by the standard rupture disc.
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Twelve of the 13 accumulators for the valves listed above were located outside
containment; however, the accumulator for Valve CC-710 was located inside
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_ An existiny service air penetration was utilized to provide a path for
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containment.
the supplemental air source.
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The new air stations were to be normally isolated from the valve accumulators. The
operators would place the air stations in service by opening two manual valves on
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each station located on the auxiliary building 21-foot elevation in an area of low
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postaccident radiation. The added' containment isolation valve for the air supply to
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Valve CC-710 was a solenoid valve that was controlled from Control Room
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Panel CP-8. With the existing accumulators installed and periodically tested, the
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operators would have several hours to get to the stations if nonsafety-related
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instrument air was lost during or after an accident.
Acceptance testing requirements specified in the package for DC 3429 were
appropriate and comprehensive. Although the special test procedure was not fully
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written as of the time of this inspection, the licensee indicated that it was going to
reflect the DC package requirements as a minimum.
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During this inspection, the inspectors performed a field check of the installation and
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found that only about half.of the tubing runs were completed and the air station
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installations were not started. However, the tubing and supports that were installed
appeared to be of good quality and workmanship.
The inspectors reviewed DC 3523, " Override of SIAS & CSAS for Containment
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isolation Valves," Revision O. This design' change was completed except for the
acceptance testing and revision of affected procedures. DC 3523 installed key-lock
switches on Auxiliary Panels 1 and 2 in the relay room located on elevation
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+35 feet. The switches were wired to allow manual remote closing of
Containment Spray isolation Valves CS-125A(B) and CCW to Containment Fan
Cooler isolation. Valves CC-807A(B), -808A(B),-822A(B), and -823A(B) when there
-was a CSAS and SIAS present, respectively, and the containment isolation feature
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was needed. DC 3523 also installed annunciators in the control room designed to
alarm when the override key-lock switches were out of the reormal nonoverride
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position.
The inspectors performed a walkdown inspection of the DC 3523 installation in the
plant. The key-lock switches were installed on Auxiliary Panels 1 and 2 with the
correct labeling in accordance with the DC package. The inspectors also noted that
the annunciator windows were installed in the control room with the correct
wording to indicate the presence of an override signal.
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The inspectors reviewed Special Test Procedure STP-99003523, "DC 3523
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Acceptance Test," Revision 0, which was reviewed by the Plant Operations Review
Committee and approved by the General Manager, Pltnt Operations. The procedure
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had sufficient scope to thoroughly test the installation for operability. The
inspectors had a few minor comments, which were resolved with the procedure
author.
The inspectors questioned how the licensee was managing the timely revision of
procedures affected by DC 3429 and DC 3523. Of particular concern were several
operating, abnormal operating, and annunciator response procedures. The
inspectors found that the operations department did not have a listing of those
procedures that were required to be revised and implemented in support of
proceeding to Mode 4. The inspectors were subsequently informed that a list was
generated identifying procedures that were considered Mode 4 constraints.
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c.
Conclusions
The licensee implemented appropriate design changes to the plant, thereby
providing 13 identified air-operated containment isolation valves with the capability
to be closed remotely and remain closed for at least 30 days after the design-basis
accident. This inspection activity established the necessary confidence that the
safety issue will be resolved upon satisfactory completion of the work and
acceptance testing prior to placing the plant in Mode 4 and subsequent power
operations.
The short-term compensatory actions addressing outboard charging system
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Containment isolation Valve CVC-209 were appropriate to the circumstances and
suitable for entry into Mode 4 and subsequent power operations until RFO 9, when
long-term corrective actions are scheduled to be completed.
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IV. Plant Suonort
R1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
' R 1.1 : General Comments (71750)
Routine tours of the radiological controlled area revealed that: (1) posting of areas
- was in accordance with requirements, (2) controlled access areas were properly
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locked, (3) personnel were wearing appropriate dosimetry and protective clothing,
and (4) the small number of contaminated areas continued to be a strength.
The inspectors concluded that observed radiation protection activities were
performed.in accordance with procedures and were consistent with ALARA
principles.
P1
Conduct of EP Activities
P1.1
Hurricane Season Prenarations (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for the upcoming hurricane
season. Planning and preparations appeared thorough. Some of the preparations
- included:
walkdowns of dedicated hurricane storage areas and supplies,
' training on the use of' satellite communications systems for duty emergency
planners,
All Hands Meetings conducted on May 20,22, and 27, during which
. Information packets were distributed,
participation in a joint hurricane tabletop drill with the St. Charles Parish
Emergency Preparedness Director,
incorporated nuclear industry lessons learned from Hurricanes Bertha and
Fran into plant procedures.
P1;2 Jyne 11.1997. Site Drill
The inspectors observed the site drill from the technical support center. The
inspectors noted that the drill scenario was challenging. Overall drill performance
was good. The inspectors noted some minor performance weaknesses, but these
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items were independently identified and entiqued by the drill evaluators. The
inspectors concluded that licensee management's willingness to perform this
challenging, full participation drill during their RFO demonstrated a commitment to
excellence in the area of emergency preparedness.
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L Manaaement Meetinas
- X1.
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection'results to members of licensee management
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at the conclusion of the inspection on July 3,1997. The licensee acknowledged-
the findings presented.
The inspectors _ asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the -
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
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ATTACHMENT
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SUPPLEMENTdL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
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C. M. Dugger, Vice-President, Operations
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E. C. Ewing, Director Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs
T. J. Gaudet, Manager, Licensing
J. G. Hoffpauir, Acting Manager, Maintenance
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T. R. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations
D. C. Matheny, Manager, Operations
D. W. Vinci, Superintendent, System Engineering
- A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
37551
Onsite Engineering
61726'
Surveillance Observations
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62707
Maintenance Observations
,
71707
Plant Operations
71750
Plant Support Activities
92901
Followup - Plant Operations
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92902
Followup - Maintenance
93702'
Event Response
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-382/9711-01
Failure to follow tagging procedure (Section 01.2.b)
50-382/9711-02
Fai. lure to properly isolate CCW containment penetration
(Section 08.1)
Closed
50-382/9613-02
Failure to properly isolate CCW containment penetration
(Section 08.1)
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_.50-382/9711-02
Failure to properly isolate CCW containment penetration
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(Section 08.1)
50-382/9603-03
Inoperable steam supply system for turbine-driven EFW
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pump (Section 08.2)
.50-382/9613-03
Failure to enter appropriate TS for inoperable WCT fans
(Section 08.3)
a
50-382/9603-02
IFl
Review licensee's testing methodology (Section M8.1)
LIS_T,OF ACPONYMS USED
T
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as low as reasonably achievable
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component cooling water
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CR
condition report
CSAS-
containment spray actuation signal
de, sign change
design change package
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document revision notice
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emergency feedwater
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FH8
fuel handling building
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
psig
pounds per square inch gauge
refueling outage
RWSP
refueling water storage pool
spent fuel pool
dlAS
safety injection actuation signal
shift support center
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SUT-
startup transformer
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TS
Technical Specification
wet cooling tower
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