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I NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OM8 NO. 3160-0104 l-g_ gej EXPIRES 04/30/98 T1oN R QU S O ATO COLL O
S E RT D L n^c"."'?o^"Ao'5?."! "*! Sat '04'a" olo"ffs'S ^Sta o
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 1*W3*n '! ',tglf a"A'g/1g "'gg,gagao'a%=" gc o
s Mnh'ea!"1'l=!#1'fs%?r"o;"?!!!a?" *-
(See reverse for required number Of digita/ characters for each block)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1 of 4 Tr,'tt (4) l P-6 Bistable Reset Function Set Non-Conservatively Resulting in Technical Specification Violation J
EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVislON MONTH DAY YEAR FACluTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 1
05
.27 97 97 033 00 06 26 97 OPERATING 5
THIS REPORT is SUBMITTED PURSUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS oF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or morel (11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 2o.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) -
20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) oTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v)
Specify m Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(sv) 50.36(C)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii).
LICENSEE CONTACT FoR THis LER (12)
)
ImME TELEPHONE NUMtlER (include Area Code)
David A Smith, MP3 Nuclear Licensing Manager (860)437-5840 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE l
TO NPROS TO NPRDS l
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES X No sUBMissloN DATE (15)
(if yes, Complete EXPECTED Submission DATE).
1 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,l.e., approximately 15 single-spacedtypewrittenhnes) (16)
I l
i On May 27,1997, with the Unit in Mode 5, a system engineering review of Technical Specification (TS) interlocks concluded that the intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock was calibrated in a manner that did not comply with TS, Table 2.2-1, " Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Setpoints," Functional Unit 18(a). The P-6 interlock reset value of 5.0 E-11 amps, where the interlock function is automatically reinstated on decreasing power, is set per approved procedures lower, and therefore, less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in TS Table 2.2-1 of greater l
l.
than or equal to 6.0 E-11 amps. This would result in instances between 5.0 and 6.0 E-11 amps where the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock would be bypassed and the Source Range Neutron Flux monitoring instrumentation not re-energized and OPERABLE as required. This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
'i i
This is an historical event and the cause is indeterminate. The potentialimpact of the P-6 interlock bistable reset j
value'on TS compliance was only recognized recently during the reviews of design and licensing basis documentation.
The Source Range Neutron Flux trip is not credited within the safety analyses but provides a tertiary backup to j
the Power Range Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint trip if an uncontrolled rod withdrawal error event from a subcntical or i
' low power condition occj red. Consequently, even though a violation of the TS occurred there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock bistable calibration will be brought into compliance with the TS.
9707090427 970626 PDR ADOCK 05000423 S
PDR
gR FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 2 of 4 97 033 00 TEXT Uf more space is required, vse additionalcopies of NRC form 366A) (17) 1.
Descrintion of Event On May 27,199~7, wnh the Unit in Mode 5, a system engineering review of Technical Specification (TS) interlocks concluded that the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock was calibrated in a manner that did not comply with TS, Table 2.2-1, " Reactor Trip System [RTS] Instrumentation Setpoints," Functional Unit 18(a). The P-6 interlock reset vslue of 5.0 E-11 amps, where the interlock function is automatically reinstated on decreasing power, is set per cpproved procedures !ower, and therefore, less conservative than the Allowable Value (AV) specified in TS Table 2.2-1 of greater than or equal to 6.0 E-11 amps. TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2.2.1, Action b states;"With the Rractor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2-1,.. (which leads to Action b.2 which states] Declare the channelinoperable and apply the rpplicable ACTION statement of Specification 3.3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value." TS Table 3.3-1," Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," Functional Unit 17(a) specifies that the P-6 interlock is required to be OPERABLE in Mode 2##. The double asterisk notation signifies that the interlock is to be OPERABLE *Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint."
The P-6 bistable reset setpoint, as currently set, would allow the Source Range Neutron Flux neutron monitoring instrumentation (NIS) to remain bypassed on decreasing reactor power down to the P-6 interlock bistable reset setpoint of 5.0 E-11 amps, which is less than the AV of 6.0 E-11 amps specified in the TS. This could result in instances between 5.0 and 6.0 E-11 amps where the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock would be bypassed and the Source Range Neutron Flux monitoring instrumentation not re-energized and OPERABLE as required. This condition is r: portable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
j A descriptionof the licensing bases for the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock is provided in the Bases to the Millstone Unit 3 TS and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Millstone Unit 3.
The TS Bases states,"On increasing power P-6 allows manual block of the Source Range trip (i.e., prevents premature block of Source Range trip) and deenergizes the high voltage to the detectors. On decreasing power, Source Range 1: vel trips are automatically reactivated and high voltage restored." The NRC SER for Unit 3 states: "The source range trip provides protection during reactor startup and shutdown when the neutron flux channel is below the P-6 interlock setpoint (6 E-11 amp)[ Allowable Value for the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock). This trip can be minually blocked above the P-6 interlock setpoint and automatically reinstated when power is reduced below the P-6 int rlock setpoint."
The intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock bistables were first calibrated during preoperational testing of the i
RTS instrumentation using calibration information supplied by the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor in tccordance with approved plant procedures. This condition has existed since prior to startup At the time of discovery, th;re was no immediate impact on equipment operability and immediate corrective actions were not required as the intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock is required to be OPERABLE in Mode 2 and the plant is currently in Mode 5 in an extended shutdown.
11.
Cause of Event
This is an historical event and the cause is indeterminate. The potential impact of the P-6 interlock bistable reset value on TS compliance was only recognized recently during the reviews of design and licensing basis documentation.
NAC F0FIM 366A (4-95)
- ~,,.
NRC FDRM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (0)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISloN Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 3 of 4 97 033 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17) ill. Analysis of Event
_ Th3 Source Range Neutron Flux trip is not credited within the safety analyses but provides a tertiary backup to the Power Range Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint trip if an uncontrolled rod withdrawal error event from a suberitical or low power condition occurreo. Consequently, even though a violation of the TS occurred there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.
As described in FSAR Section 15.4.1, "an uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) withdrawal from a subcritical or low power condition is defined as an uncontrolled addition of reactivity to the reactor core caused by withdrawal of RCCA banks resulting in a power excursion. While the occurrence of this type of transient is highly unlikely, such a transient could be caused by a malfunction of the reactor control or control rod drive systems. This could occur with the reactor either subentical, at hot zero power, or at power. Should a continuous RCCA withdrawal accident occur the transient is terminated by [one of) the following automatic features of the reactor protection system."
These features include the Source, intermediate, Power (Iow or high settings) Range High Neutron Flux trips or the High Neutron Flux Rate Trip. FSAR Section 15.4.1.2 indicates that the Power Range Neutron Flux (Iow setting) is credited in the safety analysis for providing the reactor trip to terminate the transient (at an analysis assumed value of 35 percent power). FSAR Section 15.4.1.3 concludes that"the core and [ Reactor Coolant System] RCS are not
~ dversely affected since the combination of thermal power and coolant temperature result in a [ Departure from a
Nucleate Boiling Ratio] DNBR greater than the limit value." The reactor power at the P-6 interlock level is extremely low (l;ss than 1 percent), consequently the impact of an accident at that power level compared to the FSAR 15.4.1 analysis r:sults is negligible.
I
IV. Corrective Action
No immediate corrective actions were required as the intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock is only required to be OPERABLE in Mode 2 (as described previously) and the plant is currently in an extended shutdown.
The following corrective actions will be taken, prior to entry into Mode 4:
2 I
1.
The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 interlock bistable calibration will be brought into compliance with the Technical Specifications.
V.
Additional Information
None
Similar Events
LER 97-031-00 identified an historical condition where the bistables in the Residual Heat Removal System had been set nonconservatively resulting in a violation of Technical Specification requirements.
LER 97-031-00 Residual Heat Removal System Valve Low' Pressure Open Permissive Bistable Setting Set Non-Conservatively EC FORM 366A (4-95) l J
R$RC FDRM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I4 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMisER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 4.of 4 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 97 033 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Manuf acturer Data Ells System Code Plant Protection System..
..JC i
Ells Component Code l
l Control Device, Permissive.
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| 05000245/LER-1997-001-02, :on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired |
- on 970110,liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Leaking Automatic Isolation Valves.Valves Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-001-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970110.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001, Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | Submits Commitments Re LER 97-001-00,documenting Condition Determined at Plant on 970104 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-001-01, :on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures |
- on 970104,discovered Lack of Verbatim Compliance W/Ts SRs for 125 Volt Batteries & Battery Chargers.Caused by Misconception That Performing Surveillances Was Acceptable.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-002, :on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised |
- on 970108,torquing of Battery Connections Not Performed as Part of Connection Tightness Checks Occurred. Caused by Lack of Effective Verification & Validation of Maint Procedure.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970114,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000245/LER-1997-002-02, :on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled |
- on 970114,inadvertent Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred During Sys Removal from Svc for Maint. Caused by Inadequacy in Preparation of Clearance Required to Perform Maint.Individuals Involved Have Been Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970108,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position |
- on 970108,damper 2-HV-210 Could Not Be Manually Operated within Ten Minutes as Required in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Mechanical Binding.Damper Was Placed in Fail Open Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents Condition That Was Determined at Mnps,Unit 3 on 970113,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) (B).List of Commitments,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-003-01, :on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue |
- on 970113,potential for Recirculation Spray Sys Piping Failure Occurred Due to RSS Pump Stopping & Restarting During Accident Conditions.Performed Evaluation of RSS Water Column Separation Issue
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1997-003-01, Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revis | Corrected Page One to LER 97-003-01:on 961216,discovered Discrepancy in Plant Procedure Utilized to Perform Periodic Insp of Fire Protection Sys Smoke Detectors.Caused by Failure to Properly Incorporate Ts.Ts Partially Revised | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 970306,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-003-02, :on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised |
- on 970306,svc Water Effluent Was Not Monitored Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Procedures to Ensure That SW Effluent from Reactor Bldg Operated within Design Basis Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised |
- on 970123,violation of TS 3.1.2.3 Requirement for Number of High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Capable of Injecting Into RCS Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. HPSI Pumps Have Been Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-01, Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | Forwards LER 97-004-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16213-1.Includes Commitments Made within This Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-004-02, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Sys Single Failure Vulnerability Occurred.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.No Immediate CA Are Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-004, :on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled |
- on 970127,RBCCW Containment Isolation Valve May Not Close within Specified Time.Caused by Failure to Adequately Establish Design Basis.Plant Is in Cold Shutdown W/Reactor Defueled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-004, :on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed |
- on 970114,lack of Verbatim Compliance with TS Surveillance Requirements for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Occurred.Caused by Addl Lack of Verbatim Compliance. Corrected 18 Month Surveillances Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-005-01, Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | Forwards LER 97-005-01,documenting Closure of Commitment B16236-2 & B16236-3,including Commitments Made within Ltr | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-005, :on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately |
- on 970115,discovered That Radwaste Storage Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Discharges Directly to Atmosphere.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Operation of Exhaust Fan HVE-14 Was Prevented Immediately
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1997-005-02, :on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented |
- on 970204,inservice Test Instrumentation Did Not Meet Ansi/Asme Chapter XI Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Structure for IST Program. Procedure to Administer IST Program Was Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 2 on 970204.Commitments Made,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1997-005, Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | Corrects Numbering Inconsistency in Commitments Addressing LER 97-005-00 | | | 05000245/LER-1997-006-01, :on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided |
- on 970131,failure to Exert Best Efforts to Restore Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor to Operable Status Occurred.Caused by Failure to Provide Clear Management Expectations.Management Will Be Provided
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006, :on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined |
- on 970117,RHR Suction Isolation Valves Open But Not Under Administrative Control as Required in Mode 4 by TS SR 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Failure to Identify Conflict Between Requirements.Rhr Required Position Determined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-006-01, Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | Forwards LER 97-006-01 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments in Response to 970117 Event Contained within Attachment 1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006-02, :on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented |
- on 970211,main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Event Could Result in Exceeding Design Pressure of Primary Containment During Certain Scenarios.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation.Ca Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Station,Unit 1 on 970131, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Util Commitments Made within Ltr, Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-006-00 Which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970211.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-007-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970131,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-007-02, :on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure |
- on 970308,inadequate Surveillance Procedure Used for Verifying Operability of RCS Vents.Caused by Failure to Incorporate TS SRs Into Plant Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-007, Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | Provides List of Commitments for LER 97-007-00 Re Event That Occurred on 970308 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-007, :on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 970123,non-conservative Assumptions Used in TSs Shutdown Margin Curve Identified.Caused by Lack of Procedures for Generation & Documentation of Reactor Operational Info.Engineering Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970203,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1997-008, :on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95 |
- on 970124,TS 3.0.3 Action Statement for MSIV Closure Was Entered Due to TS Being Inconsistent W/Msiv Safety Function & Design.Submitted Proposed License Amend Request Ptscr 3-13-95
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | Forwards LER 97-008-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970310.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed as Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-008-02, :on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised |
- on 970310,repts Review Facility Compliance W/ GL 96-01 for Reactor Protective Sys Received.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-008-01, :on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR |
- on 970203,discovered Starting Air Sys Operating Outside Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Properly Identify & Verify Design Basis.Design Basis Established & Documented in FSAR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | Forwards LER 97-009-00,which Documents an Event That Occurred on 970325.Commitments Made within Ltr,Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-02, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01 Review Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Surveillance Procedures Fully Implement TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated |
- on 970212,reactor low-low Level ECCS & Primary Containment Initiation Setpoints Were Not Conservative. Caused by Deficient Setpoint Methodology.Calculations Will Be Revised & TS Change Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-009-00,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 on 970212.Util Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised |
- on 970325,insufficient ESFAS Surveillance Testing,Per GL 96-01,noted.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure Sps Fully Implement TS Requirements.Operational Surveillances Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1997-009-01, Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | Forwards LER 97-009-01,documenting Condition Originally Determined Reportable at Unit 3 on 970123.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 2 on 970112.Commitments Made within Ltr Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1997-010, :on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised |
- on 970129,electrical Calculation Discrepancies Identified in Min Voltage Analysis for Class 1E Electrical Sys.Caused by Lack of Configuration Mgt for Comprehensive Calculation Program.Program Being Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1997-010-01, :on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified |
- on 970214,determined LLRT Pressure Being Used May Be Less than Accident Pressure.Caused by Weakness in Mgt Commitment to App J Program.Llrts Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1997-010, Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | Forwards LER 97-010-00,documenting Event Occurred at Unit 1 on 970214.Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted as Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1997-010-02, :on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised |
- on 970112,heavy Dummy Fuel Assembly & Handling Tool Weight Exceeded TS Limit Occurred.Caused by Weight of Handling Tool Never Considered to Be Part of Load.Temporary Measure & Appropriate Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
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