ML20148N687

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Requests That Encl Proprietary Amend 2 to RESAR-SP/90 Pda Module 13, Auxiliary Sys, Be Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)
ML20148N687
Person / Time
Site: 05000601
Issue date: 03/24/1988
From: Wiesemann R
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To: Rubenstein L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19302D408 List:
References
AW-88-026, AW-88-26, NUDOCS 8804070243
Download: ML20148N687 (38)
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Text

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) Westinghouse Power Systems $0'gnpennsfvana israa cass Electric Corporation 4

March 24, 1988

  • AW-88-026 bocument Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  :

Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Lester Rubenstein, Director Standardization & Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate <

APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Subject:

Submittal of Amendment 2 to WAPWR RESAR-SP/90 PDA Module 13 "Auxiliary Systems'

Reference:

Letter No. NS NRC-88-3317, Johnson to Rubenstein dated March 24, 1988

Dear Mr. Rubenstein:

The application for withholding is submitted by Westinghouse Electric Corp: ration ("Westinghouse") pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. It contains commercial strategic information proprietary to Westinghouse and customarily held in

confidence.

The affidavit previously provided to justify withholding proprietary information in this matter was submitted as AW 82-57 with letter NS-NRC-86-3175 l dated October 29, 1986, and is equally applicable to this material.

! Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the subject information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.

Correspondence with respect to this application for withholding or the accompanying affidavit should reference AW-88-026 and should be addressed to the undersigned. i 8804070243 880324 Ver ruly yours,

{DR ADOCK 05000601  %

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WMS/bek/0036B ober A. Wiesemann, anager

! - Enclosure (s) Regulatory & Legislative Affairs ~ - '

i cc: E. C. Shomaker, Esq. I Office of the General Council NRC

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l PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE TRANSMITTED HEREWITH ARE PROPRIETARY AND/0R NON-PROPRIETARY VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO THE NRC IN CONNECTION WITH REQUESTS FOR GENE PLANT SPECIFIC REVIEW AND APPROVAL.

IN ORDER TO CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR 2.790 0F THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION SO SUBM TO THE NRC, THE INFORMATION WHICH IS PROPRIETARY IN THE PROPRIETARY VERSIONS IS CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS AND WHERE THE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION HAS BEEN DELETED IN THE NON-PROPRIETARY VERSIONS ONLY THE BRACKETS REMAIN, THE INFORMATION THAT WAS CONTAINED WITHIN THE BRACKETS IN THE PROPRIETAR HAVING BEEN DELETED.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CLAIMING THE INFORMATION S0 DESIGNATED AS PROPRIETARY IS INDICATED IN BOTH VERSIONS BY MEANS OF L LETTERS (a) THROUGH (g) CONTAINED WITHIN PARENTHESES LOCATED AS A SUPERSCRIPT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE BRACKETS ENCLOSING EACH ITEM OF INFORMATIO IDENTIFIED AS PROPRIETARY OR IN THE MARGIN OPPOSITE SUCH THESE INFORMATION.

LOWER CASE LETTERS REFER TO THE TYPES OF INFORMATION WESTINGHOUSE C HOLDS IN CONFIDENCE IDENTIFIED IN SECTIONS (4)(ii)(a) THROUGH (4)(ii)(g) 0F THE AFFIDAVIT ACCOMPANYING THIS TRANSMITTAL PURSUANT TO IOCFR2.790(b)

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AW-82-57 l I

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AFFICAV!Y  !

i CCMMONWEALTri 0F PENNSYLVANIA:

ss 1 COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY:

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Sefore me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared John D. McAdoo, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authori:ed to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse") and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best.of his kncwledge, information, and belief:

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wwCn=

n D. McAcco, Assistant . Manager Nuclear Safety Cecartment i i

Sworn to and suescribed

) before me this / day

! of /_[M%wlv>_/1982.

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Notary Public
  1. 6attfit sitestA,40fAlf PulUC
,;ctetrvint Ccm Aututtf o00m at 0 MMl!!!cq 0F130 EARCH 10, ISN' nomeer, P,sasunn.a Assooetion ef ww"

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(1) I am Assistant Manager, Nuclear Safety Capartment, in the Nuclear j

, Technology Division, of Westingneuse Electric Cor; oration and as i such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing

the proprietary information sougnt to be withheld from public dis-I closure in connection witVnuclear. power plant licensing or rule- l making proceedings, and am authori
ed to apply for its withnolding 1

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on behalf of the Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions.

1 (2) I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.7g0 of the Commission's regulations and in con- I junction with the Westinghouse acolication for withnolding ac-companying thir Affidavit.

j (3) I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utili:ed by Westinghouse Nuclear Energy. Systems in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or

] financial information.

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(4) Pursuant to the provisions of paragrapn (b)(4) of Section 2.7?O of the Ccmmission's regulations, the following is furnisned for  !

consideration by the Commission in determining wnether the in-formation sought to be withheld from cublic disclosure sneuld be withheld.

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(i) The information sought to te withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westingneuse.

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AW-32-57 l l

i (ii) The infomation is of a type customarily held in confidence t j by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public.

Westinghouse has a rational bas'is for determining the types  !

of infomation cust:marily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utili:es a system to determine when and  :

I whether to hold certain types of information in confidence.

I The acolication of that system and the substance of that  !

system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis retuired.  !

Under that system, information is held in confidence if it '

j falls in one or more of several types, the release of wnien

] might result in the loss .of an existing or cotential ecm-petitive advantage, as follows:

(.a ) The information reveals the distinguisning as;ects of .

a prccess (or c:mponent, stru'cture. ::ol, method, etc.) l where prevention of its use by any of Westingneuse's  ;

j c:meetitors w'ithout license frem Westingneuse cdnsti.

I tutes a c:mpetitive economic advantage over other l companies. I

! (b ). It consists of sue;erting data, including :est data, I relative to a process (or cemconent, structure, t:el,  !

]

1 mathed, etc.), the a:clication of wnich data secures a ecmpetitive ec:ncmic advantage, e.g., by cotimi:stien j or imeroved marketability.

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AW-82-57

, (c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure '

of resources or improve his competitive position in the >

j design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance  ;

of quality, or licensing a similar product.

(d) It reveals cost or price information, production cap- .

1 acities, budget levels, or comeredal strategies of  !

Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.

(el It reveals aspects of past, present, or future West-

! inghouse or customer funded development plans and pro-grams of potential comercial value to Westingneuse. .

I l (f). It contains patentable ideas, for which patent cro-taction may be desirab.le. I (gl It is not the property of Westinghouse, but must te treated as proprietary by Westinghouse ac:ording to I

agreements with the CWner.

i There are sound policy reasons tenind the Westingneuse system wnich include the following:

i (a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its com-I :etitors. It is, therefore, withheld from cisclosure to protect the Westingneuse comoetitive cosition.

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! l (b) It is infomation which is marketaele in many ways. l ll The extent to which such infomation is available to l ccmcetitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to l i sell products and services involving the use of the '

information.

. (c) Usa by our c:mpetitor would put Westingnouse at a j competitive disadvantage by reducing his ex:enditure of resources at our expense.

(d). Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is ;otentially as valuable as the total ccmcetitive advantage. If j c mpetitors acquire c:meonents of proprietary infor-mation, any one component may be the key to the entire j puz:le, thereby depriving Westingneuse of a cem:etitive

advantage.

(e) Unrestricted disclosure would jec:ardi:e the ;csition 4

of preminence of Westinghouse in tne world market, j and thereby give a market advantage to tne c:mpetition j in those c:untries.

(fl The Westingneuse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the sue
ess j in obtaining and maintaining a ccmcetitive advantage.

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a i (iii) The information is being transmitted to one Comission in l

] confidence and, under the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790, i

j it is to be received in confidence by the Ccmission. I (iv) The information sought to be protectid is not available in l J

public sources or available information has not been pre-I viously employed in the same original manner or me: nod to the best of our knowledge and belief. '

(v). The proprietary infomation sought to be withheld in this sub-  ;

mittal is that which is appropriately marked in the "Westing- l 1 house Advanced Pressuri
ed Water Reactor (WAPWR) Licensing .

J Control Document." This document identifies specific design l l features and improvements which the WAPWR will have in order  !

! to meet current reguTatory requirements. In addition, it  !

j establishes the WAFWR position with resoect to each require-l

.ent.

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ruolic disclosure of this information is likely to cause suo- ,

l stantial harm to the comoetitive position of Westinghouse as l 1 it would reveal the description of the improved design features l j of the WAPWR; Westinghouse plans for future design, tes;ing and l i analysis aimed at design verification; and demonstration of :ne  :

i design's capability to meet evolving NRC/ACRS safety goals.

) All of this information is of comoetitive value because of the ,

large amount of effort and money expended by Westingneuse over l a period of several years in carrying out tnis ; articular 1 i 4

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l development program. Further, it would enable c m;etitors to l i use the infomation for comercial purposes and also to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation, each without purenasing the right from Westingnouse to use the information.

Information regarding its development programs is valuable to l

) . Westinghouse because:

(.a) Infomation resulting frem its development programs gives

] Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its c mpetitors. I It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse comeetitive position.

l i (b) It is infomation which is marketable in many ways. The j extent to which such information is available to cem;eti-ers diminishes the Westingnouse ability to sell pr: ducts 3 and services involving the use of the infor atien.

l l (.c i Use by our cem;etitor would put Westingnouse at a ccm- ,

attitive disadvantage by reducing his ex;enditure of )

resources at our expense.  !

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(d) Each ccmconent of proprietary information pertinent to

! a particular competitor advantage is potentially as j valuable as the total c:meetitive advantage. If c:m-Petitors acquire c:meonents of proprietary infomation, any one ecmponent may te the key :: the entire cu::le

) theracy depriving Westingnouse of a ccmcetitive advantage.

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AW-82-57 ,

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(e) The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in I researen and development depends upon the success in i obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.

Being an innovative concept, this information might not be ,

discovered by the comcetitors of Westinghouse independently.

To duplicate this infomation, competitors would first have l

to be similarly inspired and would then have to ex:end an effort similar to that of Westinghouse to develop the cesign. ,

Further tne deponent sayech not.

WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 O AMENDHENT 2 TO RESAR-SP/90 PDA HODULE 13 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS O

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O WAFWR AS AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MAREN, 395S

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l AMENDMENT 2 TO RESAR-SP/90 PDA MODULE 13 REGULATORY CONFORMANCE l

l 1 Instruction Sheet O o Replace current pages xi and xii with revised pages xi and xii j l respectively. l o Replace current pages xiii and xiv with revised pages xiit and siv respectively.

i j o Replace current pages av and xvi with revised pages xv and xvi j J

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l o Replace current pages 9.5-31 through 9.5-49 with revised pages 9.5-31 through 9.5-49. .

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WAPWR-AS AWENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH 1988

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

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Reference f SAR i l  :

Section l  ;

Section Title M Status j

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I 9.5.1.4.6 Smoke Contro) 9.5 18  !!! i 9.5.1.4.7 Access / Egress 9.5-18  !!! l 9.5.1.4.8 Construction Waterials and Combustible 9.5-19 Ill i l

j Contents f 9.5.1.5 Interaction with Other Systems 9.5-19  !!!

l j 9.5.1.6 Preoperational Testing 9.5-20  !!!

l l 9.5.1.7 Administrative Controls, Quality Assurance, 9.5-22  !!! t d

Fersonnel Qualification and Training l l 9.5.1.8 Su eary 9.5-31  !!!

! 9.5.2 Communication Systems 9.5-32  !!! l 1 9.5.2.1 Design Bases 9.5-32  !!!  !

! 9.5.2.2 System Description 9.5-32  !!! l

! 9.5.2.2.1 Public Address System 9.5 32  !!!

] 9.5.2.2.2 Intraplant Telephone System 9.5 33  !!!

) 9.5.2.2.3 Sound-Powered Phone System 9.5-33  !!!

] 9.5.2.2.4 Emergency Offsite Communications 9.5 33  !!! 2 j 9.5.2.2.5 Emergency Evacuation Alarm System 9.5 34  !!!

. 9.5.2.3 Evaluation 9.5-34  !!!

l 9.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 9.5 35  !!!

] 9.5.3 Lighting Systems 9.5-36  !!!

9.5.3.1 Design Bases 9.5-36  !!!

i 9.5.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-36  !!!

) 9.5.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-36  !!!

9.5.3.2 System Description 9.5-37  !!!

9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting System 9.5-37 11.1

9.5.3.2.2 Essential Lighting System 9.5-37  !!!

l 9.5.3.2.3 Emergency Lighting System 9.5-37  !!!

9.5.3.2.4 Exit Lighting Syttom 9.5-39  !!!

9.5.3.3 Failure Analysis 9.5-39  !!!

h'APWR-AS xi AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1968 3

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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Centinued) g Referen:e SAR Se: tion Sectio's Title Pace Status 9.5.3.4 Test and Inspections 9.5-40  !!!

9.5.4 Emergene) Diesel Engine fuel Oil Storage and Trans'er System 9.5-40  !!!

g 9.5.4.1 Design Bases 9.5-4D Ill 9.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-40  !!!

9.5.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-41 111 9.5.4.2 System Description 9.5-41  !!!

l 9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-42 111 9.5.5 Eeergency Diesel Engine teoling Water System 9.5-42  !!!

9.5.5.1 Design Bases 9.5-42  !!!

9.5.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-42  !!!

g 9.5.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-43  !!! W I

9.5.5.2 System Description 9.5-43  !!!

9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-44  !!!

9.5.6 Emergen:y Diesel Engine Starting System 9.5-44 Ill 9.5.6.1 Design Bases 9.5-44  !!!

9.5.6.1.1 Safety Design Esses 9.5-44  !!!

9.5.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5 45  !!!

l 9.5.6.2 System Description 9.5-45 Ill 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-45  !!!

l 9.5.7 Emergency Diesel Engine Lubrication System 9.5-46  !!!

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9.5.7.1 Design Bcses 9.5-46 Ill l

9.5.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-46  !!!

9.5.7.1.2 Power Genaration Design Bases 9.5-47  !!!

9.5.7.2 System Description 9.5-47  !!!

9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-48  !!!

9.5.8 Etergen:y Diesel Engine Cembustien Air Intake 9.5-48  !!!

and Exhaust System O

WAFWR-AS xii AMEN'? MENT 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Reference SAR Section O ..

Section Title Page Status I 9.5.8.1 Design Bases 9.5-48 III 9.5.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-48 III 9.5.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-49 III 9.5.8.2 System Dascription 9.5-49 III 9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-49 III 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10.0-1 NA 11.0 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 11.0-1 NA 12.0 RADIATION PROTECTION 12.0-1 NA 13.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.0-1 NA 14.0 INITIAL TEST PROGRAM 14.0-1 NA g 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.0-1 NA  !

V 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 16.0-1 NA 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 17.0-1 1 I

17.1 QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DE,IGN AND 17.0-1 I CONSTRUCTION 17.1.1 References 17.0-1 1 18.0 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING 18.0-1 NA O l l

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WAPWR-AS xiii AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

KEY TO "REFERENCE SAR SECTION STATUS" COLUMN:

Category 1 Those sections which are complete and for which no additional information s to be provided for the PDA application.

Category II Those sections which are complete insofar es providing material relevant to this system module but for which additional information will be provided in support of subsequent modules, l

Cate; cry III Those sections for which information on interfacing systems will be provided at a later date.

E Those sections for which categorization is not applicable. Only the section j titles are included for clarity.

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O WAPWR-AS xiv OCTOBER, 1986 7515e:1d

t TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF TABLES Number Title Page 1.6-1 Material Incorporated by Reference 1.6-2 i 1.8-1 Standard Review Plan Deviations 1.8-2 9.1-1 New Fuel Storage Design Data 9.1-57 ,

9.1-2 Spent Fuel Storage Design Data 9.1-58 9.1.3 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System - Fai. lure Mode and 9.1-59 Effects Analyses 9.1-4 Spent Fuel Cask Bridge Crane and Polar Crane Data 9.1-61  !

9.2-1 Essential Service Water System - Flow versJs 9.2-26 l

Operation Mode 9.2-2 Component Cooling Water System - Flows and Heat Loads 9.2-27 l 9.2-3 Component Cooling Water System - Failure Mode 9.2-31 l and Effects Analysis  ;

9.2-4 Principal Reactor Makeup Water System - Equipment 9.2-43 Parameters 9.3-1 Sampling System - Principal Equipment Parameters 9.3-50  :

9.3-2 Post Accident Sampling System - Failure Modes 9.3-51 l

and Effects Analysis i 9.3-3 Chemical and Volume Control - System Parameters 9.3-57 l 9.3-4 Chemical and Volume Control System - Principal 9.3-58 Component Data Summary 9.3-5 System Parameters 9.3-67 l 9.3-6 Equipment Design Parameters 9.3-68  !

9.4-1 Main Control Room Air Handling System - Single 9.4-46 l Active Failure Analysis i 9.4-2 Switchgear Room Air Handling System - Single 9.4-48 l Active Failure Analysis '

9.4-3 Reactor External Building Ventilation System - Single 9.4-49 .

Active Failure Analysis l O

WAPWR-AS xv OCTOBER, 1986 l 7515e:1d l l

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) g LIST OF TABLES Number Title Page 9.4-4 Annulus Air Cleanup and Fuel Building Emergency 9.4-52 Exhaust - Single Active Failure Analysis 9.4-5 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System - Single 9.4-53 g Active Failure Analysis W 9.4-6 Essential Chilled Water System - Single Active 9.4-55 Failure Analysis 2

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O WAPWR-AS xvi AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

l o Most favorable direction to attack a fire, o Designation of plant systems, including location of local and remote controls, that should be managed to reduce the damage j potential during a fire.

o Designatic, of vital heat-sensitive systems or components that I should bc kept cool while fighting a . fire. j I

O o Assignment of fire brigade special duties.

l o identification of radiological and toxic hazards. l l

o Ventilation system operation.

o Operation requiring shift supervisor or control room coordination. )

o Instructions for plant operators during a fire.

9.5.1.8 Summary The WAPWR NPB configuration and layout provides inherent separation of redundant trains of safety-related equipment. The overall Fire Protection Program as described herein provides additional defense-in-depth to enhance protection of redundant safety-related systems, contain potential property I damage to acceptabla levels and minimize potential for personal injury due to fire.

The programs for Quality Assurance, Preoperational Testing, Administrative Controls and Personnel Training will assure attentlon to detail, which is

, essential to maintain overall concepts of the program for the life of the unit.

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WAPWR-AS 9.5.31 OCTOBER, 1985 7515e:1d L_ - _ - - . . - - - _ . . - _ . _ _ _ - _ _ - - - . - .

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l 9.5.2 Cc=unication Systems l

l 9.5.2.1 Design Bases

A comprehensive communication system is provided to ensure reliable intraplant l

l communications, plant to offsite telephone and radio comunications, and plant to offsite emergency communications with public safety agencies. Effective

! ce=unica; ion between personnel during plant startup, operation, shutdown, refueling and maintenance activities is provided by the use of private automatic branch exchange (PABX) telephone, sound powered telephone, public address, plant-to-offsite two way radio and plant-to-offsite emergency telephone systems. These diverse means of communication are independent to prevent loss of all systems as a result of a single failure.

9.5.2.2 System Description 9.5.2.2.1 Public Address System The intraplant public address system provides two separate means of ce=unication, page and party lines. The page party line loud speakers are driven by individual amplifiers and the power to this system is supplied from a source which is available during loss of offsite power. l l

The public address system permits paging and two-way communication from all lo:ations vital to the operation of the plant and the safety of personnel.

The system has one paging line. The pagir; line is divided into two separate zones, administrative area and power plant area, to minimize paging interference. Manually operated switches are provided in each zone to allow plant-wide paging. The system also includes a nunter of party lines which provide two way co=unication between all important plant areas. Access to all party lines and the page channel is available at inost handset stations.

The system is designed to ensure that the paging output is audible over the expected noise levels under both normal and accident conditions. The system includes jack stations as well as handset stations. Headsets are provided which are designed for use in high noise areas.

WAPWR-AS 9.5-32 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d HARCH, 1988

9.5.2.2.2 Intraplant Telephone System 4

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b An independent telephone system is provided to ensure uninterrupted private communication between critical plant areas. The system utilizes a private automatic branch exchange (PABX) which is powered from a source available upon O loss of offsite power. Designated telephones are directly connected to the public telephone system and derive power from the public system.

l 6 9.5.2.2.3 Sound-Powered Phone System

  • l A sound phone system is provided which co,nsists of three separate and independent subsystems
1. Maintenance subsystem -

A multichannel hard-wired link between the control area and critical plant areas, l

2. Refueling subsystem -

A two channel hard-wired link between the Control Room, fuel handling area, and reactor operating floor. This 2 s subsystem is primarily provided for refueling operations.

3. Emergency subsystem -

A two channel hard-wired link between the auxiliary shutdown panel and areas of the plant which may require local operation during an emergency shutdown. The cables in this system are routed in dedicated conduits.

Conduit for all sound powered phone subsystems is seismically installed in all safety related areas. All conduit for the emergency subsystem is seismically U installed. Heavy duty industrial quality jacks and mounting boxes are used I throughout the system. All locations served by the emergency subsystem are also served by the maintenance subsystem to provide redundancy. l 9.5.2.2.4 Emergency Offsite Communication Emergency offsite communication details are site specific and will be determined during the final design phase. The system will have the following features as a minimum:

WAPWR-AS 9.5-33 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

1. Emergency Notification System phones will be located in the Control Room and Technical Support Center. These phones will provide a communications link with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The system will be independent of the PABX and will be directly conneuted to a local long distance carrier.

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2. Two-way radio communication links will be provided between the site and local public safety agencies via microwave and/or VHF radio.
3. A power line carrier or microwave link will provide direct communication with the system dispatcher located at a remote station with additional communication channels available.

9.5.2.2.5 Emergency Evacuation Alarm System The evacuation alarm is generated by a solid state tone generator which can be heard over all plant paging zones via the plant paging system. The evacuation alarm system includes rotating beam lights as a visual indication of an alarm condition in selected high background noise areas.

9.5.2.3 Evaluation The following evaluation is intended to establish the adequacy and redundancy of the plant communication system design:

1. Intraplant Systems Each intraplant system (PABX, paging, sound poaered system) is designed to provide the required intraplant communications during and after accident conditions as well as for plant operation and maintenance purposes.

Failure in any one of these systems will not result in the failure of any other system. Power supplies for the various systems are not dependent on offsite power. Upon loss of all AC power to the PABX, designated phones remain operable, deriving power from the public telephone system.

O WAPWR-AS 9.5-34 Av.ENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1958

The sound powered telephone system is independent of all external power sources with jack stations conveniently located throughout the plant. In addition, redundant components and cabling in the sound powered telephone system are provided to prevent loss of service to any critical area because of a single failure. Reliable service can be expected from this system because of the ruggedness of these components, the simplicity of operation, and the independence from any external power source.

2. Plant-to-Offsite Systems A minimum of three plant to offsite communications systems are available to the Control Room operators. The diversity of these systems ensure that adequate communication is available during and after accident conditions.

The public telephone lines are connected to the plant PABX telephone system. This extends the use of public telephone lines throughout the plant-The plant to offsite-to-offsite two way radio communication serves as a backup to 'he public telephens system. This provides communication betneen the plant operators and public safety agencies. The power to this system is provided from a source available upon loss of offsite i I

power.

The plant has additional communication channels via direct long distance telephone ties for the Emergency Notification System and normal power system dispatching circuits.

9.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing Recuirements All communication systems are inspected and tested (including adjustments if required) at the completion of installation to ensure proper coverage and audibility. The functional testing is performed under conditions that l simulate the maximum plant noise levels being generated during the various operating conditions, including fire and accident conditions, to demonstrate system capabilities.

WAPWR-AS 9.5-35 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

Paging and PABX :ystems are used on a routine basis, and periodic testing is not required. Periodic testing of the sound powered system, radio equipment and all standby power sources is scheduled on a routine basis to ensure 2 operability.

Periodic testing of the emergency evacuation alarm signal is performed as outlined in ANSI N2.3.

9.5.3 Lighting Systems g The plant lighting systems to provide adequate lighting during normal plant operation and accident conditions, including the effects of a loss of offsite power.

9.5.3.1 Design Bases 9.5.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases The lighting system is nonsafety related and therefore serves no safety function.

9.5.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases Adequate lighting systems are provided in areas used during normal, shutdown, and emergency operations, including the appropriate access of exit rolutes.

Lighting intensities are designed to the levels recommended by the 111uminating Engineering Society. The use of high pressure sodium, fluorescent, and mercury vapor lamps is restricted; these lamps are not used l in the following major areas:

1 o Containment o Above the fuel transfer canal.

o Above the new and spent fuel storage areas.

o The radwaste building (only mercury vapor is restricted). I W

WAPWR-AS 9.5-36 AMENDMENT 2 l 7515e:1d MARC 4, 1988

Incandescent lighting is used in these areas except as noted in the radwaste building.

9.5.3.2 System Description O The plant lighting systems consist of normal, essential and emergency system.

9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting System O The normal lighting system will be supplied from two sources:

a. A 480/277-V ac lighting load centers,
b. Lighting panels fed from non-Class 1E motor control centers through 480-208Y/120-V dry-type transformers.

Power source for these lighting systems will be taken from the normal auxiliary power system (non-Class 1E).

9.5.3.2.2 Essential Lighting System i

l The essential lighting system will be used in conjunction with the normal i lighting system especially in main walkways and stairs, Class 1E equipment, switchgear rooms, ar.d areas used for safe shutdown. The power for essential

. lighting system will be supplied from non-Class 1E motor control centers i backed by the emergency diesel generators. I l

9.5.3.2.3 Emergency Lighting System The emergency lighting system is defined as the system that is powered from either 250 volt DC bus or from self-contained battery pack with charger units, as indicated below:

1 O

WAPWR-AS 9.5-37 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

a. Main Control Board Emergency Lighting The 250 volt de lighting system, which is normally de-energized, provides operating level lighting in the Control Room. The emergency lighting is energized automatically by an undervoltage sensing relay mounted on the individual essential lighting panelboards located in their associated areas. Control power for the undervoltage transfer circuit is provided from the essential lighting system. A test button is provided at each panel-board to test the operability of the system without affecting essential lighting. All 250 volt de lighting units are incandescent,
b. Shutdown Panels Emergency Lighting i

Emergency lighting for the remote shutdown pane:: diesel generator panels, and auxiliary feedwater the access route between the main control and the shutdown panel rooms and all areas required for safe shutdown operation shall be illuminated by sealed beam fixtures.

c. Fire Protection Lighting O

fixed 8-hr rated sealed beam fixtures shall be provided in all plant areas to supply sufficient illumination for safe ingress and egress of personnel following a loss of normal and/or essential lighting. The fixtures shall have self-contained battery and its charger units powered from the normal lighting system.

The use of specific type of emergency lighting fixture (250 volt de or sealed beam with charger unit fixturel for the different areas of the plant other h

than the areas covered by 9.5.3.2.3 A, B, and C will be established during the design stage.

O Ol  ;

WAPWR-AS 9.5-38 AMENDMENT 2 1 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

_ _ _ _ = _

9.5.3.2.4 Exit Lighting System Plant exit lighting shall generally consist of 1.5-hr battery-backed fixtures, which are powered from normal ac power system. The restricted areas indicated in Subsection 9.5.3.1.2, with the exception of the radwaste building, shall be provided with nonbattery-backed exit fixtures, which will be powered from the essential lighting system.

9.5.3.3 Failure Analysis The only areas that require lighting for safe shutdown are the control room and shutdown panel rooms and ingress / egress routes to and~from these locations.

a. Those portions of the lighting system that service the main control room, shutdown panel rooms, diesel gen +rator panels, and auxiliary feedwater panels will be designed and constructed so that a safe shutdown earthquake will not cause any structural failure that could reduce the function of any post-safe shutdown earthquake item to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to cccupants in these areas,
b. The emergency lighting system will be designed to provide necessary lighting at all times during shutdown or emergency. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the emergency lighting will be maintained through the use of self-contained batteries and/or from non-Class 1E de power sources as outlined in Subsection 9.5.3.2.3.

O c. Functional operability of the lighting systems is not a requirement during or after a design basis event.

A failure mode and effects analysis for the emergency and essential lighting O- systems will be established during the design stage.

O WAPWR-AS 9.5-39 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

i l

-1 9.5.3.4 Test and Inspections g

The ac lighting circuits are normally energized and require no periodic testing. The battery-backed lighting will be inspected and tested periodically to ensure the operability of the components in the system. The g

^

undervoltage transfer circuit for the 250 volt de system will be inspected and W tested periodically to ensure the operability of the transfer system.

9.5.4 Erergency Diesel Engine fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System The basic function of the emergency diesel. engine fuel oil storage and transfer system (EDEFSTS) is to provide ensite storage and transfer of fuel oil to the diesel engines.

The design of the EDEFSTS is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must be compatible with the criteria given below.

9.5.4.1 Design Bases 9.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases O

The design of the emergency diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system (EDEFSTS) is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must meet the following criteria:

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 1: The EDEFSTS will be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and external missiles (GDC-2). h SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 2: The EDEFSTS will be designed to remain functional after a SSE and will perform its intended function following the postulated hazards of fire, internal missile or pipe break.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 3: The design will ensure the capability to perform safety f' unctions assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power (GDC-44).

WAPWR-AS 9.5-40 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

Q SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 4: The active components will be capable of being tested during plant operation. Provisions will be made to allow for inservice inspection of components at appropriate times (GDC-45 and 46).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 5: The EDEFSTS will be designed and fabricated to O' codes consistent with the quality group classification assigned by Reg.

Guide 1.26 and the seismic category assigned by Reg. Guide 1.29. The power supply and control functions will be in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.32.

SAFETY DE5IGN BASIS 6: The system will be capable of providing onsite storage and delivery of fuel oil--following a loss of offsite power--for at least seven (7) days of operation of the diesel generators at their continuous rating.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 7: The EDEFSTS will be designed to supply fuel oil at all times--following a loss of offsite power.--under the most severe environmental conditions postulated at the plant site. The EDEFSTS design O will comply with Reg. Guide 1.137.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 8: The system will be designed to conform to fire protection and separation requirements.

9.5.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The EDEFSTS serves no power gene'ation function and has no power generation

bases.

9.5.4.2 System Description See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for a description of the EDEFSTS, and its components and system operation.

O WAPWR-AS 9.5-41 AMENDHENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation l See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for the results of the EDEFSTS system evaluation.

9.5.5 Emergency Diesel Engine Cooling Water System The basic function of the emergency diesel engine cooling water system (EDECWS) is to provide cooling water to the emergency diesel engines. The system will be a closed cycle system, and will serve as an intermediate system between the diesel engines and the essential service water system.

The diesels will be totally redundant and will not share systems. There will be no interconnections between the two engine cooling systems. Therefore, no failure of, or between, any of the engine cooling subsystems will result in degradation of the other diesel engine.

The design of the EDECWS is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must be compatible with the criteria given below.

9.5.5.1 Design Bases 9.5.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases The design of the emergency diesel engine cooling water system (EDECWS) is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must meet the following criteria:

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 1: The EDECWS will be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and external missiles (GDC-2).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 2: The EDECWS will be designed to remain functional OI l after a SSE and will perform its intended function folloring the postulated hazards of fire, internal missile or pipe break (GDC-3 and 4).

O WAPWR-AS 9.5-42 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 3: The design will ensure the capability to perform safety functions assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power (GDC-44).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 4: The active components will be capable of being

- tested during plant operation. Provisions will be made to allow for inservice inspection of components at appropriate times (GDC-45 and 46).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 5: The EDECWS will be designed and fabricated to O codes consistent with the quality group classification assigned by Reg.

Guide 1.26 and the seismic category a.ssigned by Reg. Guide 1.29. The power supply and centrol functions will be in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.32.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 6: The EDECWS will be designed to remove heat from the diesel engines to permit their operation at the maximum nameplate rating.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 7: The EDECWS will be designed to maintain the diesel engine in a het standby condition to ensure quick starting of the diesel engine.

9.5.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The EDECWS serves no power generation function and has no power generation design bases.

9.5.5.2 System Description See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for a description of the EDECWS, and its components and system operation.

0 l WAPWR-AS 9.5-43 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for the results of the EDECWS system evaluation.

9.5.6 Emergency Diesel Engine Starting System The basic function of the emergency diesel engine starting system (EDESS) is to provide a reliable method for starting the emergency engines for all modes of operation.

The EDESS will be designed in two parts--a safety-related portion which will be downstream of and will include the air start tank check valve, and the remainder of the system which will be nonsafety-related.

l The design of the EDESS is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must be compatible with the criteria given below. l 9.5.6.1 Design Bases h 9.5.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases The design of the emergency diesel engine starting system is the respcnsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must meet the following criteria:

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 1: The EDESS will be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and external missiles (GDC-2).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 2: The safety-related portion of the EDESS will be designed to remain functional after a SSE and will perform its intended function following the postulated hazards of fire, internal missiles or pipe break (GDC 3 and 4).

O WAPWR-AS 9.5-44 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 3: The design will ensure the capability to perform ,

safety functior.s assuming a single active component failure coincident l with the loss of offsite power (GDC-44).

q SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 4: TS active components will be capable of being

() tested during plant operation. Provisions will be made to allow for inservir.e inspection of components at appropriate times (GDC-45 and 46). i l

l SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 5: The safety-related portion of the EDESS will be I O designed and fabricated to codes consistent with the quality group classification assigned by Reg. Guide 1.26, and the seismic category assigned by Reg. Guide 1.29. The power supply and control functions will be in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.32.

l SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 6: The capability to isolate components, systems, er piping will be provided, when required, so that the system's safety function will not be compromised. This includes isolation of components to deal with leakage or malfunctions, and to isolate nonsafety-related portions of the system.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 7: The design of the safety-related portion of the EDESS will ensure the capability of storing sufficient air to allow for at least five consecutive crank cycles of approximately 3 seconds, or 2 or 3 revolutions of the diesel engine without external support or assistance.

9.5.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases j The EDESS serves no power generation function and has no power generation bases.

9.5.6.2 System Description See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for a description of the EDESS, and its components and system operation. I WAPWR-AS 9.5-45 AMENDHENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988 I

I

._ - 1

1 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation g

See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for the results of the EDESS system evaluation.

9.5.7 Emergency Diesel Engine Lubrication' System The basic function of the emergency diesel engine lubrication system (EDELS) is to provide essential lubrication and cooling for the components of the emergency diesel engine.

The design of the EDELS is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must be compatible with the criteria given below.

9.5.7.1 Design Bases 9.5.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases The design of the emergency diesel engino lubrication system (EDELS) is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must meet the following criteria:

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 1: The EDELS will be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and external missiles (GDC-2).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 2: The EDELS will be designed to remain functional after a SSE and will perform its intended function following the postulated hazards of fire, internal missiles or pipe break (GDC 3 and 4).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 3: The design will ensure the capability to parform safety functions assuming a single active component failure coincident I with the loss of offsite power (GDC-44).

O WAPWR-AS 9.5-46 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

\

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 4: The active components will be capable of being O tested during plant operation. Provisions will be made to allow for I inservice inspection of components at appropriate times (GDC-45 and 46). ,

SAFETY DESIGN BAS!f 5: To the extent practicable, the EDELS will be l designed and fabricated to codes consistent with the quality group l classification assicned by Reg. Guide 1.26, and the seismic category l assigned by Reg. Guice 1.29. The power supply and control functions will be in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.32.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 6: The capability, to isobu components or piping will be provided to decl with leakage or malfunctions (GDC-44).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 7: The EDELS will be designed to provide adequate lubrication and cooling for the various moving parts of the engine to permit it to be operated at continuous nameplate rating for at least 7 days without replenishing the system.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 8: The EDELS will be designed to maintain the lubricating oil in a warm c.ondition when the engine is on standby to facilitate quick starting, when required.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 9: The system will be designed to conform to fire protection and separation requirements.

9.5.7.1.2 Power Generation Dasign Bases The EDELS has no power generation function and no power generation design bases.

9.5.7.2 System Description O See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for a description of the EDELS, and its components and system operation.

I O

WAPWR-AS 9.5-47 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:Id MARCH, 1988 r

9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation g

See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for the results of the EDELS system evaluation.

9.5.8 Emerger.cy Diesel Engine Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System The basic function of the emergency diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system (EDECAIES) is to supply combustion air of suitable quality to the diesel engines and exhaust the combustion products from the diesel engine to the atmosphere.

The design of the (EDECATES) is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must be compatible with the criteria given below.

9.5.8.1 Design Bases 9.5.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases The design of the emergency diesel engine combustion air intake and transfer O

system (EDECAIES) is the responsibility of the plant specific applicant. The design must meet the following criteria:

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 1: The EDECAIES will be protected from the effects of natural phenonena, such as earthavakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and external missilas (GDC-2).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 2: The EDECAIES will be designed to remain functional after a SSE Snd will perform its intended function following the h

postulated hazarda of fire, internal missiles or pipe break (GDC-3 and 4).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 3: Provisions will be made to allow for inservice inspection of cow enents at appropriate times specified in the ASME Boiler and Vessel Code,Section XI.

O WAPWR-AS 9.5-48 AMENDMENT 2 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

t SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 4: To the extent practicable, the EDECAIES will be designed and fabricated to codes consistent with the quality group classification assigned by Reg. Guide 1.26 and the seismic category assigned by Reg. Guide 1.29.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 5: The EDECAIES will be designed to supply combustion air to the diesel engines and to exhaust to the atmosphere the products of  ;

combustion so that the diesel generator can' be operated continuously ct  !

nameplate rating.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS 6: Exhaust system effluents will be routed in the design to not impact plant intake air supplies.

9.5.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases l

The EDECAIES has no power generation function and no power generation design bases. i 1

9.5.8.2 System Description l

See the plant specific applicant's safety analysis report for a description of l

th) EDECA!ES, and its components and system operation.  !

l 9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation See the plant specific applicant's safety anslysis report for the results of the EDECAIES system evaluation.

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O WAPWR-AS 9.5-49 AMENDMENT 2 1 7515e:1d MARCH, 1988

)

TABLE 9.5-1 .'

COMMUNICATION EQUIPHENT AND LOCATIONS AVAILABLE FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN l

l i

l 2

(Table deleted in Amendment 2)

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^ 'R 9.5-50 AMENDHENT 2 f5 e MARCH, 1988

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