ML20148M920
| ML20148M920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1988 |
| From: | Branch M, Hunegs G, Jenison K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148M895 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-88-17, 50-328-88-17, NUDOCS 8804060255 | |
| Download: ML20148M920 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000327/1988017
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGUL ATORY CO'AMISSION
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101 MARIETT A STREET, N.W., SUIN 2900
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Repor. Nec.:
60-327/88-17, 50-328/88-17
Licensce:
Tennessee Val'.cy Authirity
eN OFA Lookcut Place
11G Markrt Equare
Chattanooga, TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-327 and 50-328
License Nos.:
DPR77 and DPR-79
Facility Name
Sequoyah Units 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
February 12, 1988 thru February 26, 1988
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Project Engineers:
J. Brid/, M cO6ct
gineer
Date signed
R.
Carroll, Projec. Engineer
G.
Hunegs, Pro.iect Engineer
T.
Powell, Project Engineer
Shift Inspectors:
P.
Harmon, Shift Inspector
<
D.
Lovel ess, Shift Inspector
W.
Puertner*, Shift Inspector
G.
Humphrey, Shift Inspector
W.
Bearden, Shift Inspector
K.
Ivey, Shift Inspector
Shift Manager Approval:
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Shift Manager
Date Signed
K.
J'ni o .
Er_c k ab 19 W
M.
Branch, Shift Manager
Date Signed
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8804060255 880324
ADOCK 05000327
(A
rateJet
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Summary
Scope:
This announced inspection involved onshift and onsite inspections by
the NRC Restart Task Force.
The majority of expended inspection effort was in
the areas of extended control room observation and operational safety verifi-
cation including operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection,
and safeguards and housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included
maintenance observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of
events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up
items.
During this period there was extended control room and plant activity
coverage by NRC inspectors and managers.
Results:
One violation was identified, 327,328/88-17-01: Failure to follow
procedure - three enamples. (paragraphs 10 and 11).
An additional example of
previous violatiori 327,328/87-78-01 was also identified (paragraph 3.b)
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Empicyees
H.
Abercrombie, Site Director
J.
Anthony, Operations Group Supervisor
R.
Buchhol:, Sequoyah Site Representative
J.
Bynum, Assistant Manager of Nuclear Power
M.
Cooper, Licensing Supervisor
H.
Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager
R.
Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor
J.
Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager
- M.
Harding, Licensing Group Manager
- G.
Kirk, Compliance Supervisor
J.
La Point, Deputy Site Director
L.
Martin, Site Quality Manager
R.
Olson, Modifications
R.
Beecken, Maintenance Superintendent
R.
Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
R.
Prince. Radiological Control Superintendent
- H.
Rogers, Plant Operations Review Staff
D.
Jeralds, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
E.
S11ger, Manager of Projects
- S.
Smith, Plant Manager
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J.
Sullivan, Plant Operations Review Staf f Supervisor
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Willis, Operations and Engineering Superintendent
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Enit Interview
The inspection scoce and findings were summarized on March 9,
1988, with
those persons indicated in paragraph
1.
The Startup Manager described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings
listed below.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did
not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspec-
tors during the inspection.
The following new items were identified:
Viciation (VIO) 327,328/88-17-01; Failure to f ollow procedure when
returning resistance temperatura detectors to service following
cr oss-c al i b r at i on , and maintenance activities associated with the volume
control tank divert valve that were not adequately described or imple-
mentoj.
(paragraphs 10 and 11)
Unresolved Item (URI) 027,328/88-17-02: Entry into Technical Specifica-
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tion (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) without the licensee's
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knowledge.
(paragraph 0)
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An additional example of Violation 327,328/87-78-01; failure to maintain
plant staff overtime limits.
NOTE:
A list of abbreviations used in this report is contained in
paragraph 14.
3.
Sustained Control Room Observation (71715)
The inspectors observed control room activities and those plant activi-
ties directed from the control room on a continuous basis for the entire
period of this report.
The observation consisted of one shift inspector
per shift supported by one shift manager per shift and other Office of
Special Pro.iects (OSP) management,
a.
Control Room Activities Including Conduct of Operations
The inspectors reviewed control room activities to determine that
operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and
conditions; operators remained in their designated areas and were
attentive to plant operations, alarms and status; operators employed
communication, terminology and nomenclature that was clear and
formal; and operators performed a proper relief prior to being
discharged from their watch standing duties.
b.
Control Room Manning
The inspectors reviewed control room manning and determined that
Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met and a profession-
al atmosphere was maintained in the control room.
The inspectors
found the noise level and working conditions to be acceptable.
The
inspectors observed no horse-play and no radios or cther non-Job
related material in the control room.
Operator compliance with
regulatory and TVA administrative guidelines were reviewed.
No
deficiencies were identified.
In addition, the control room appeared to be clean, uncluttered. and
well organi:ed.
Special controls were established to limit person-
nel in the control room inner area.
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An insoector reviewed the shift schedule for the purpose of deter-
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mining operations personnel overtime actually worked.
Three of s i ).
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operating crews were reviewed.
It was identified that one Unit
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Operator (Unit i Licensed Reactor Operator) had not received a break
of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> between work ceriods without prior approval of
the Plant Manager or his deputy as r equired by AI-30. Rev. 12,
Conduct of Operations.
Specifically, the individual worked until
ll:4o p.m.
on February 22 and was instructed to return for work at
7:00 a.m.
on February 23.
Thi s f ailure to maintain plant staff
overtime limits is a further e::ampl e of prior violation 327,028/
87-78-01.
c.
Routine Plant Activities Conducted In or Near the Control Room
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The inspectors observed activities which require the attention and
direction of control room personnel.
The inspectors observed that
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necessary plant administrative and technical activities conducted in
or near the control room were conducted in a manner that did not
compromise the attentiveness of the operators at the controls.
The
licensee has established a shift engineer office in tne_ control room
area in which the bulk of the administrative activities, including
the authori:ed issuance of keys, take place.
In addition, the
' licensee has established hold or6er (HO), work request (WR), sur-
veillance, and modification matrix functions to release the licensod
operators from the bulk of the technical activities that could
impact the performance of their duties.
These matrixed activities
were transformed into the Work Control Center (WCC) which is located
in the Technical Support Center (TSC) spaces.
d.
Control Room Alarms and Operator Response to Alarms
The inspectors observed that control room annunciator and alarm
evaluations were performed utili:ing approved plant procedures.
Control room alarms were generally responded to in the horseshoe
area with adequate attention by the operators to the alarm indica-
tions.
Alarms outside of the horseshoe area had longer response
times by the operators.
Control room operatcru appeared in some
cases to question the validity of some alarm indications.
The
inspectors identified no violations; however, this area will contin-
ue to be carefully reviewed.
e.
Fire Brigade
The inspectors reviewed fire brigade manning and qualifications on a
routine basis.
Both manning and qualifications were found to meet
TS requirements.
f.
Shift Briefing / Shift Turnover and Relief
The irispectors observed that reactor operators (ROs) completed
turnover checklists, conducted control panel and significant alarm
wal kdown revi ews, and significant maintenance and surveillance
reviews prior to relief.
The inspectors observed that sufficient
information was transferred on plant status, operating status and/or
events and abnormal system alignments to ensure the safe operation
of the Unit.
Senior reactor operators (SROs) were observed review-
ing shift logbooks prior to relief.
Sufficient information appeared
to be transferred on plant status, operating status and/or events.
and abnormal system alignments to ensure the saf e operation of the
unit during SRO relief.
Shift briefings were conducted by the offgoing SRO in charge of the
control room (shift supervisor).
Personnel assignments were made
clear to oncoming operations personnel.
Significant time and effort
were expended discussing plant events, plant status, expected shift
activities, shift training, significant surveillance testing or
maintenance activities, and unusual plant condit cns.
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g.
Shift Logs, Records, and Turnover Status Lists
The inspectors reviewed the shif t supervisor (SS), shift technical
advisor (STA), and reactor operator (RO) logs and determined that
the logs were completed in accordance with administrative require-
ments.
The inspectors ensured that entries were legible; errors
'were corrected, initialed and dated; logbook entries adequately
reflected plant status; significant operational events and/or
unusual parameters were recorded: and entry into or exit from TS
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) were recorded promptly.
Turnover status checklists for ROs contained sufficient required.
information and indicated plant status parameters, system align-
ments, and abnormalities.
The following logs were reviewed:
Night Order Log
System Status Log
Configuration Control Log
Key Log
Temporary Alteration (TACF) Log
During this inspection, it was determined that the below listed
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) were unknowingly entered,
not suitably controlled, and not appropriately logged:
(1)
On February 26, 1988, at 12:38 p.m.,
the licensee made
inoperable one train of the component cooling system (CCS)
without recognizing it or entering TS LCO 3.7.3 until
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approximately eight hours later,
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(2)
On February 15, 1988, at 11140 a.m.,
the licensee made
inoperable both trains of Control Room Emergency Ventila-
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tion System (CREVS) without recognizing it or entering TS
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LCO 3.0.5 until 12:37 a.m.
the ne::t day.
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(3)
On February 9,
1988, at 12:30 a.m.,
the licensee failed to
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meet the time constraints of Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.1.d without recognizing it or entering TS LCO
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3.4.6.2.b until 5:05 a.m.
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This issue is under review and is identified as Unresolved Item
(URI) 50-327,328/88-17-02.
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Control Room Recorder / Strip Charts and Log Sheets
The inspector observed operators check, install, mark, file, and
route for review, recorder and strip charts in accordance with the
established plant processes.
There were no events that caused the
immediate control room review of recorder / strip chart peaks during
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this inspection period.
Control room and plant. equipment logsheets
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were found to be complete and legible; parameter limits were spect-
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fled
and out-of-specification parameters were marked and reviewed
during the approval process.
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4.
Manaaement Act i vi t i es
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TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the NRC shift
inspectors, shift managers, and startup manager.
a.
Daily Control of Plant Activities (War Room Activities)
The licensee conducted a series of plant activities throughout each
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day to control plant routines.
These activities were referred to by
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the licensee as War Room activities.
War Room activities were
observed by the shift manager an a daily basis and were found.to be
an adequate method to involve upper level management in the
day-to-day activities affecting the operation of the units,
b.
Licensee's Response To Plant Activities and Events
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During this inspection period, several events occurred that could be
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attributed to personnel error or procedure inadequacy:
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Inadvertent removal of a train A EDG from service with B train
Control Room Ventilation inoperable.
(Inadvertent entry into
Technical Specification 3.0.5.)
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Inadvertently exceeding the }2 hour (plus 25%) TS time con-
straint for the performance of SI-137.2, RCS Water Inventory,
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Inadvertently making one train of component cooling system
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inoperable without recognizing it or entering TS LCO 3.7.3
un ti l approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> later,
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Inadvertent actuation of the Cold Overpressure Protection
System (COPS) resulting in a slight (15 psi) RCS depressuriza-
tion event due to the combination of an inadequate test proce-
dure and improper procedure implementation on the part of
a
maintenance technician.
(This i tem i s the sub.iect of a viola-
tion which is further discussed in paragraph 10 of this re-
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port.)
The licensee's reaction and immediate response to these specific
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events was considered to have been adequate.
It is important to
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note, however, that the effectiveness of all licensee corrective
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actions needs to be demonstrated long term by absence of operational
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events induced by procedure or personnel inadequacies and errors.
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This must be effectively demonstrated prior to Mode 2 entry.
Observations of the licensee have been made with respect to the
following five equipment malfunctions which occurred:
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Malfunction of the OA-A Centrifugal Charging Pump due to
bearing damage ii.duced by a non-safety speed changer oil pump
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problem.
The licensee reported this pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72
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and is evaluating it for Part 21 reportability.
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Suspect cold leg Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) perfor-
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mance due to inadvertent circuitry grounding in a penetration.
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Malfunction of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW)
pump due to binding of the pump rotating element.
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Inadequate Safety Injection (SI) pump room cooler performance
(excessive tripping) due to undersized thermal overloads.
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Inability of group 1 steam dump valves to respond appropriately
to controller inputs.
NRC observations reflect that, to date, the licensee has adequately
maintained satisf actory compliance with Technical Specifications
during resolution of these problems and, in most cases, has effected
reasonably prompt resolution and correction of the problems.
Substantial improvement over pre-shutdown practices has been ob-
served.
Insuf ficient data exists to assess root cause analysis and
permanent corrective actions to prevent recurrence at this time.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the effectiveness of
management to properly resolve equipment problems.
During the course of Mode 4 operation one problem was observed with
program implementation to assure readiness for restart.
This
problem involved the fact that licensee personnel failed to fully
recognize that some Unit i systems, equipment, and maintenance or
modification work could have a direct effect on Unit 2 operability.
This problem manifested itself in several difforent examples:
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Ray-Chem splicing required for a Unit i electrical supply cable
for a common Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) unit.
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The previously mentioned Unit 1 cable work which resulted in
the inadvertent actuation of common seismic monitor,
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The potential for preventing automatic positioning of a common
EGTS damper due to herculite associated with Unit i work
interfering with the damper handle.
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The common vent boards (electrical panels) supplied from the
Unit i shutdown boards had undersi:ed input breaker trip
settings, since Unit 2 accident loads were not considered
during final trip setting establishment.
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The failure to fully response time test Unit i ERCW pumps when
these pumps would be required for Unit 2 operation.
This
testing was mode 3 required testing.
In each case the licensee assured and/or effected proper Technical
Specification compliance.
The licensee has effected action to
address these problems generically prior to mode 3 entry.
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Site Quality Assurance (OA) Acti vi ti es in Support of Coerations
The inspectors reviewed the activities of the WCC which includes OA
oversight.
No discrepancies were noted.
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Chronoloav of Unit 2 Plant Operations
At the beginning of the the NRC Restart Task Force shift coverage, Unit 2
was in cold shutdown (mode 5) with three reactor coolant pumps operating
and the 2A-A residual heat removal pump in service.
The reactor coolant
system
was at 180 degrees F and 370 psig.
Pressuri:er level was at 26
inches. All steam generators were filled to the operating range, the
condensate system was on long cycle recirculation, and there was a vacuum
in the main condenser.
On February 4,
1988, the NRC approved entry into mode 4/3 (Hot Shutdown /
Hot Standby).
The plant was heated using RCPs and entered mode 4 on
February 6,
1988.
On February 10, 1988, RHR cooling was returned to service and the
licensee suspended all non-essential testing and maintenance for about 48
hours.
This was done following a series of events which included genera-
tion of a reactor trip signal, inadvertent MSIV closures and feedwater
isolations, and a loss of the VCT level due to maintenance activities.
During this period of licensee evaluation and corrective action, the
MSIVs remained closed and the unit was maintained in Hot Shutdown using
During this inspection period the unit was maintained in hot shutdown
(Mode 4) with four reactor coolant pumps operating.
The reactor coolant
system was maintained between 250 degrees F/350 psig and 545 degrees
F/550 psig.
A number of events occurred during this inspection period
and are listed below:
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February 12; 2A-A charging pump declared inoperable when speed
changer overheated /nmoked.
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February 1~; Emergency Gas Treatment System suction damper found
blocked.
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February 14; Fire on the 706' elevation of the railroad bay.
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February 16; Inadvertent spill of ERCW from outside of a C :ene.
February 18: Cold overpressure protection system unintentionally
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initiated causing a pressurizer PORV to open.
February 19: Control and Auxiliary building vent boards 1Al-A and
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1B1-B declared incperable due to improper breaker trip settings.
February 25: Loss of auxilirry boiler
"A" resulting in loss of steam
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to secondary components.
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February 9
15, and 26: TS LCOs entered unknowingly by licensee.
A detailed discussion of the events that occurred during this inspection
reporting period is contained in paragraph 10.
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7.
Operational Safetv Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2
a.
Plant Tours
The inspectors observed control room operations; monitored conduct
of testing evolutions; reviewed applicable logs, including the chift
logs, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration
log, and TACF log; conducted discussions with control room opera
tors; observed shift turnovers; and confirmed the operability of
instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the operability of select-
ed emergency systems and verified compliance with TS LCOs.
The
inspectors verified that maintenance work requests (WR) had been
submitted as required and that follow-up activities and prioriti:a-
tion of work was accomplished by the licensee.
Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine
buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire ha:ards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations,
and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
System Walkdowns
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the auxiliary
f eedwater system on Unit 2 to verif y operability and proper valve
alignment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Safeguards Inspection
In the course of the NRC inspection activities, the inspectors
included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The
performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in
the conduct of daily activities, including: protected and vital area
access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of
visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; patrols; and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and
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protected and vital area barrier integrity.
The inspectors verified
interfaces between the security organization and both operations and
maintenance.
Specifically, the shift inspectors inspected security
during the outage period and r evi ewed licensee security event
reports.
The licensee is reviewing the possible entension of the
power block security concept.
No violations or deviations were identified
d.
Radiation Protection
The inspectors observed health physics (HP) practices and verified
the implementation of radiation protection controls.
On a regular
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basis, radiation work pe.'its atWP) were reviewed and specific work
activities were monitored :o ensure the activities were being
conducted in accordance wit.1 applicable RWPs.
Selected radiation
protection instruments were verified operable and within calibration
frequency.
The following RWP was reviewed:
88-013
General Cleanup in Containment
No violations or deviations were identified
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Shift Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)
The inspectors observed and reviewed TS required surveillance testing and
verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate proce-
durest test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were mets test results
met ,.cceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other
than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as
tppropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were
7.'roperly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system
'estoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector verified
that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified
individuals.
The following activities were observed and reviewed:
SI-2, Shift Log;
The inspector reviewed the data package for SI-2
conducted on February 23, 1988.
The inspector noted that page 1 of 5,
(data sheet 1 of data package B) had not been completed by the the second
shift.
This data sheet perf orms the channel check of the 6.9 KV shutdown
board loss of voltage required by TS 4.3.2.1.1.
The inspector verified
that the TS surveillance interval requirement had not been exceeded as a
result of not performing the data shest on the 1500-2300 shift.
The
inspector informed the shift engineer of the observation and determined
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that the deficiency would have been identified by the assistant shift
supervisor's review after completion of the SI.
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SI-7, Electrical Power Systems:
Diesel Generators; The inspector ob-
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served portions of this SI that was performed on the 1A-A EDG from the
control room.
No deficiencies were identified.
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SI-7.1, Diesel Generator Surveillance Frequency Unit O.
The SI was
observed by the inspector and no problems were identified.
SI-37.4, OB Containment Spray Pump.
This SI was observed in part and no
deficiencies were identified.
SI-90.82, Rsc .or Trip Instrumentation Monthly Functional Test (SSPS).
Portions of this SI were observed and reviewed by the inspector.
During
the assistant shift supervisor's review, it was discovered that the
referenced TS was wrong.
This deficiency was properly corrected prior to
releasing the procedure for work.
No other deficiencies were noted on
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the portion of the procedure observed.
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SI-118, Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Automatic Actua-
tion.
The inspector observed that SI-118 was stopped by operations
personnel.
A procedure sequencing problem was identified which existed
when the accident signal was reset prior to resetting the main feed pump
"A"
trip signal.
Thi s was resolved by instruction change form 88-0405
which added resetting the main feed pump
"A"
trip signal prior tc reset-
ting the accident signal.
SI-118.1, Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Automatic
Actuation.
Portions of this SI were observed.
During the performance of
this SI, the pump shaft appeared to be binding and 2-FCV1-15 tripped on
overload.
The SI was stopped and repairs commenced.
Further testing
revealed a problem with the trip / throttle valve which was later resolved.
SI-127, RCS and Pressuri:er Temperature and Pressure Limits.
This SI was
reviewed in part.
No deficiencies were identified.
This SI assures that
unacceptable stresses affecting system integrity will not occur and that
any operations in excess of the limits are analyced.
SI-129, revision 28, part A,
Emergency Core Cooling Safety Injection Pump
Operability.
Portions of this SI were observed.
This SI verifies that
the safety injection system (SIS) pumps, and their associated discharge
check valves, minificw check valves. and inlet check valve are operable.
It i s performed by starting each pump and verifying that pump inlet
pressure, discharge pressure, differential pressure, flow rate, bearing
temperature, vibration and lubrication level are within the acceptable
range.
The surveillance failed the flow test portion for SIS pump 2A-A.
However, SIS oump 28-B passed.
The 2A-A pump was subsequently retested
and passed the SI acceptance criteria.
This subsequent test was also
observed.
SI-229.1, Safety Injection Pump Casing and Discharge Venting.
This SI
was reviewed and no problems or deficiencies were identified.
5I-120.2. Motor-Driven Auniliary Feedwater Pumps.
The inspector observed
the satisfactory performance of this SI.
SI-137.1. Reactor Coolant System-Unidentified Leakage Measurement.
The
inscector reviewed the data package for performance of this SI conducted
February 25, 1988.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-137.2. RCS Water Inventory.
The inspector performed an independent
check of the SI-157.2 calculaticns, using an NRC computer routine.
This
independent check produced leakage rates consistent with what the
licensee had calculated.
SI-165, Channel Functional Test of SIS Accumulator Tank Water Level and
Pressure Instrumentation (Monthly).
Thi s SI was reviewed as it r el ates
to PI63-62 cn the number 4 RCS cold leg accumulator.
No deficiencies
were identified.
SI-166.6, Post Maintenance Testing of Category A and E Yalves.
This 2I
was observed being performed on salve 2-LCV?-164
The closing time
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acceptance criterion was satisfactorily met.
No deficiencies were
identified.
SI-166.10, Accumulator / Safety Injection Primary and Secondary Check Valve
Integrity.
This SI was observed by the inspector.
This SI verifies the
integrity of the RHR check valves.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-166.32, AFW Check Valve Opening Test During Hot Standby and Hot
Shutdown.
The inspector reviewed and observed this SI. The purpose of
the surveillance is to provide a method of verifying and documenting that
the system check valves will fully stroke.
During the review, the
inspector noted that when the AFW pumps started, the blowdown valves
associated with the applicable SGs went to the closed position.
This
feature was not addressed in the procedure and the re-opening of these
valves was not addressed.
In addition, the procedure does not address
the starting or stopping of the AFW pumps.
Notations were made in the
package to require these revisions.
This SI was technically adequate and
no violations were identified.51-297, Pressurizer Heater Capacity.
This SI was observed in part.
Heater capacity is verified by measuring current to the heaters once
every 92 days.
During the performance of this procedure the operator was
unable to deenergize the 2A heaters.
An operator was immediately dis-
patched to trip the heaters locally.
A malfunction of the trip coil was
suspected and a WR was initiated to repair the heater breaker.
SI-488, RCS RTD Sensor Verification of Calibration.
This SI is performed
in con.iunction with TI-60, Incore Thermocouple (TC) and RTD Cross Cali-
bration, to gather raw RTD resistance versus temperature data from the
With this data, the present RTD calibration curves are evalu-
ated and recalculated as required.
Additionally RCS Thermocouple data
recorded during performance of this instruction is used as a basis for
RTD/TC calibration.
This SI reauires that the plant remain in a stable
isothermal condition with RCS temperature not drifting and no change in
SG stearning rate during data acquisition.
Successful performance of this
instruction is dependent on a high level of coordination by the test
director and operations personnel.
Data is taken at each of a minimum of
4 temperature plateaus (250 F,
335 F,
450 F,
and 530 F)
Various revi-
sions were made to SI-488 and additional planning occurred prior to
testing at the second plateau.
During the actual performance of data
accuisition at 335 F.
no problems were noted by the inspector.
The
performance of this SI is further discussed in section 10 of this report.
9.
Shift Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and cocoo-
a.
nents were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry
codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this reviews
LCOs were
met while components or systems were removed from services redundant
components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiat-
ing the works activities were accomplished using approved procedures
___ _ ____ _________- - _ . _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _
o
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E
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12
and inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to
control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and
the repair record accurately reflected what actually took place;
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
returning components or systems to services quality control records
were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified person-
nel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological
controls were implemented; Quality Control (OC) hold points were
established where required and were observed; fire prevention
controls were implemented; outside contractor activities were
,
controlled in accordance with the approved Quality Assurance (OA)
program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
b.
Temporary Alterations (TACF)
The following TACFs, werc reviewed:
2-88-2003-68; This TACF installed temporary thermocouples on
loop seals for 2-SRV68-563, 564, and 565.
No discrepancies
were identified.
2-88-5057-68: This TACF dealt with #3 RCP matc" phase A stator
'
RTD.
No discrepancies were identified.
L
!
2-88-2005-68;
This TACF replaced an existing loop 1 narrow
range RTD (2-TE68-2A) with an installed spare RTD (2-TE-62-2B)
by moving the cable terminations.
The original RTD was deter-
mined to be inocerable as a result of data obtained during the
performance of SI 488.
The individual RTD calibraticn curves
were compared f or the two RTDs.
The resistance values were
wall within the allowed difference of the Westinghouse setpoint
methodology.
Therefore, recalibration was not required.
Additionally, the inspector reviewed the USOD associated with
this TACF.
Since use of the existing spare RTD does not alter
the design function of the system nor change the scope of
existing procedures, the inspector had no further questions.
No violations or devi ations were identified.
c.
Work Requests (WRs)
The following WRs were reviewed:
WR B285642 and Wh B288798, initiated to repair valve 2-LCV-3-164A,
were reviewed by the inspectors.
'3,
Remote Shutdown Monitoring
Auniliary Feedwater Steam Generator Laval Instrumentation, was run
to calibrate the valve after r ep ai r .
A licensee engineering review
determined that further calibration would be reautred.
No deficien-
!
cies were identified.
WR B229447
Feplace Thrust Eearing on Ob-B AFW pump.
This mainte-
f
nance activit. was observed b/ the intnocto- and no deficiencies
were identified,
i
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, - . . .
.,,_.m__
_,-_,,.m,
, , .
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_ , , _ _ , , ,
13
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WR B267211. Investigate and Repair Stiff Spot or. Unit 2
Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Shaft.
The TDAFW pui9
turbine would not roll at approximately 80 psig steam pressure.
Upon disassembly the licensee found svidence of binding / galling
between a pump impeller and an adjacent' stationary ring.
The pump
rotor assembly was subseauently replaced ppr MI10.4.2, revision
1,
Replacement of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary FeLjwater Pump Rotor Assem-
bly, Ingersoll Rand Model #5HMTASSTAGE.
The inspector reviewed the
associated WR and observed various portione of the disassembly and
reassembly ar
4 ties including OC cleanliness inspection, installa-
tion of the '
casing, and upper casing bolt torquing.
WR B274142, B Condensate Storage Tank.
The WR was reviewed and no
deficiencies were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified
d.
Hold Orders (HOs)
The inspectors reviewed various HOs to verify compliance with AI-3,
revision 38, Clearance Procedure, and that the HOs contained ade-
quate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the
system being tagged.
Additionally the inspectors inspected the
affected equipment to verify that the required tags were installed
on the equipment as stated on the HOs.
The following HOs'were.
reviewed:
Hold Order
Eautement
2-88-002
Incore Detectors
,
2-88-201
2-88-218
B Condensate Storage Tank
No violations or deviations were identified
10.
Event Follow-uo (93702. 62703)
'
!
On February 9,
1988, at 12:30
a.m.,
the licensee ym c 2ed e d the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
plus 25Y. time constraints of SR 4.4.6 2.1.d without recogni:ing the fact.
At 5:05 a.m. they recogni:ed this oversight and entered LCO 3.4.6.2.b.
A
performance of SI-137.2, RCS Water Inventory, was run, meettnq FR
4.4.6.2.1.d and allowing the licensee to exit LCO !.4.6.2.b at 8:59 a.m.
A violation was not issued because thin item mat the enforcement criteria
for being licensee identified.
On February 12, 1988, the OA-A centrifugal charging pump (CDP) was taken
out of service when smoke was observed com'nq from the CCP Poom.
It
appeared that the speed changer bearings t.ver heated and failed which
caused the oil to smoke.
The licenses exited TS LCO 3.1.2.0,
Baration
Flow Paths, and TS LCO 3.2.4.
Charging Pumps, after completion of mainte-
nance activitios.
Upon investigation. the licensee disccvered that the
sealing gland bolts on '5e attached oil pump of the speed changer were
loose enought to allow air to enter and cause frothing of the oil.
This
resulted in inadecuate lubrication of the speed changer, and.hence the
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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sunsequent speed changer damage.
- The licensee issued PRO 2-88-54 to
3 address this prt,blem.
On February 13, 1988, at about 3:30
p.m.,
the emergency gas treatme t
system (EGTS) suction damper from Unit 2 annulus (0-65-523) was founo
blocked closed by a roll cf herculite.
The roll had apparently been
stored sitting on the dampe- / >csition indic& tor.
LCO 3,6.1.8 requires
the EGTS to be operable when Unit 2 is in mode 4.
The LCO was not
entered because the auxiliary unit operator (AUO) immedi ately removed the
herculite.
On February 14- 1980, at 4:10 p.m.,
a fire was reported on tha 706'
elevation of the railroad bay.
Workers in the area were purging a
nitrogen header using a diesel drive air compressor.
The fire had been
i
reported because of smoke coming from the air compressor.
An investiga-
'
tion determined that the air compressor was putting atomized oil into the
surrounding area which looked like smoke.
The air compressor was secured
and the event terminated.
The licensee's response to the event appeared
to be adequate.
,
On February 15, 1988, at 11:40 p.n.,
emergency diesel generator (EDG)
1A-A was removed from service to perform surveillance testing.
With the
'j
B train control building emergency ventilation inoperable (2/12 entered
the relieving STA noted that per TS 3.0.5,
s
was removed from ssrvice, the A train control building emergency ven;ila-
tion was inoperable.
Thi s placed Unit 2 in LCO 3.0.5.
returned to service 57 minutes into the event.
The staff is investigat-
ing how this event occurred.
On February 16, 1988, at 4:18
a.m.,
during the performance of SI-11E,
Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Automatic Actuation, Data
Sheet 7, titled Testing the Automatic Operation of FCV-3-116A and
FCV-3-116B for AFN pump A-A, operations personnel opened valve 3-LCV-116A
per procedure causang ERCW water to flow out the "tell-tale" drain and
into a catch basin.
The flow was so great that it overflowed the basin
,
l
onte the floor of the 690' elevation in the auxiliary building.
The
operators quickly closed the valve which stopped the flow.
HP personnel
were' called to evaluate the water.
The water outside of the C :one was
determimed to be not contaminated.
Immediately following this, opera-
tions opened valve 3-LCV-116B c&using a greater flow from the cendensate
s
,
storage tank (CST) to go through the "tell-tale" drain.
This tLme the
overflowing water flowed through a "C-:ene" before HP could dem the water
utilizing anti-C clothing.
The Plant Operation Review Staff (PORS) is
reviewing this issue.
The cause of the Above two events was determined to be an inadequate
procedure.
The procedure did not coution the operators about the amount
of water flow that should be expected to flow out the tell tale drain.
,
On February 17, 1988, with Unit 2 in Hot Shutdown (Mode 4). iverage RCS
temperature at 250 F, and pressure at 460 psig, the Cold Overpressure
Protection System (COPS? kas unintentionally initiated which resul tud in
the opening of a pressuricer power operated relief valve (PORV).
a
-+-
- - - .
- - . ~
. . . _ _ _ _ _ ,
_
<
'
,
,
<
..
-
1B
'
,
a
pressure dropped to 445 psig.
The inadvertent deprescurization'was
terminated by the Unit Operator who placed the PORV in manual and closed
the valve.
At the time of the event, Ins'rument Maintenance personnel were perform-
ing RCS resistance temperaturu detector (RTD) crcss-calibratien in
f'
accordance with SI-488 and TI-60.
Thi s evol ution involves the removal ' of'
a specific RTD from service, aligning the instrument channels to a known
resistance, logging the channel data, and then returning Ahn,RTD to
service.
The RTD is removed from service by means'cf a test ~ switch
ta
the circuit which places the channel in seri.;s wi th- the tes t resistan = .
While in its normal position, a shorting bar is p{ aced across the switc>
contacts to reduce the switch's resistrxe.
'he thorsing bar should only
be in pl ace while the switch is in its normal ocsition.
The IMs removed
the appropriate shorting bar s,
then placed tha. switch ir.the test pas 2-
tion as required by procedure.
After logging the test data, the IMs
placed the shorting bars back in position prior to 'pl acing the switch in
normal, in violation of the sequence specified in TI-60.
This caused the
instrument channel to have both the test resistance (via the test switch)
and the RTD (via the shorting bars) in parallel at the same time.
This
resulted in the circuit experiencing low total r esi stanc e.
This low
resistance equates to low Tave.
Tave (auctioneered low) is used to vary
the setpoint of the PORVs wher/RCS i s below 350 F.
The minimum pressure
setting of the PORVs is 435 psig, which was below the actual pressure at
the time of 460 psig, causing the affected PORV to open.
TG 6.8.1 states that written procedures shall be established. Implemented
and maintained covering the activities specified in Regulatory Guide 1.33.
Contrary to the above, the sequence of returning the RTDs to service as
stipulated in TI-6C wac not followed, restJting in the inadvertent
opening of the FORV as described.
This ir Ja viol ation of TS 6.8.1 and is
iduntified as Violation 327,328/88-17-01.
This event was handled in an expeditious manner by the unit operator and
by an incident investigation team # rom the Plant Operations Raview Staff
(PORS), which arrived within twenty' minutes of tne twent.
Ti m e F7(S team
interviewed all the IMs. operators, and test directnes and took state-
ments from all individuals involved.
The IMs were in;tructed i n f ollow-
ing the procedure in proper sequence and th e procedu9e was changed to
caution the IMs to perform the restoration F.teps in sequence.
On Feb uary 19, 1988, at 1:57
a.m.,
control c9d auxiliary building (CSA)
vent boards 1Al-A and 181-B were declared incperable.
The Division of
Nuclear Engineering (DNE) nad calculated thnc the Vent boards had imprcp-
er breaker trip settings.
The normal feedor breaker to 1 Al- A has c 4s?
amp setting, however, the board could be leaded tu 500 amps.
The norr.l
feeder breaker to 1B1-B has a 500 amp settirg a .d the board could be
loaded at 475 amps.
The board load must be at least 10% l ess thar- the
feeder breaker setting.
Loss of CSA ver.t boards IAl-A and 181-B causes
both trains of EGTS to be inocerable. both trains :f CREV to be inopera-
ble and both component cooling system air handlins, units to be inoperable
along with numerous Unit 1 Items.
Thi s cond % tt on Was identi' led in SCA
{
_
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_
_ _ _ _ _ _
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16
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.
.
,
SONEEB 86124.
At 2:06 a.m.,
February 19, 1988, CPA vent board 1Al-A was
returned to an operable status by transferring to its alternate feeder
breaker (set at 500 amps) and tripping tbc f ollowing loads:
Annulus Vacuum fan 1A
El. 669 Penetration Room Cooler Fan 1A
El. 690 Penetration Room Cooler Fan 1A
Tornado Damper Transformer
RM-90-130
.
RM-90-119
i
Primary Water Pump 1A
s/
Permanent H
Mitigation System (Unit 1 only)
2
' Tripping the above loads reduced the maximum load current to less than
'
450 amps.
On february 19, 1988, at 2:09 a.m.,
CLA vent board 191-B was returned to
an operable status by tripping the following loads:
Pipn chase cooler 1B
669 Penetration Room Cooler Fan 1B
~
690 Penetration Room Cooler
At the end of this reporting period the licensee was evaluating why
corrective action had not been taken earlier.
Further investigation into
,
the issue of the C&A vent boards revealed the problem had been originally
identified on October 9,
1986 and had been documented on SCR EEB 86124.
The issue was also addressed in licensee event report (LER)87-001.
On
March 4
1987, calculations done for OIR EEB 87193 determined that rework
on Unit 1 CLA vent boards was not required for Unit 2 restart.
LER
87-001 was c'.osed in Inspection Report 327,328/87-65 as follows:
The trip setpoints f or ACBs on shutdown boards that feed
control and auniliary building vent boards were incorrect
due to a design error.
ECN L6883 has been issued and the
loads have been analy:ed to determine proper trip setpoints.
,
WP 12636 has been issued and is being worked.
The work
recuired to satisfy this LER has bean completed.
Licensee's
corrective actions appear to be acceptable.
On February 16, 1988, the load analysis f or Unit 1 CLA vent boards was
reviewed.
It was determined, on February 19, 1988, that the Unit 1 CLA
!.
vent boar ds were not capable of supportin( Unit 2 operations.
It 3ppears
- the cause Cf this oversight was bad assumptions made for the calculations
in QIR GEB 87193.
The calculations did not apply diversity factors, and
the breaker Lettings did not correlate with the load calculations as
ths-& was unce .t.ainty over required loads.
The licensee has issued
n o'.:an t i it 1 y reportable occurrence (PRO) 1-88-71 to address this issue.
l
l
The licensee's corrective actions for tEs CLA vent board concerns includ-
l
eds
l
__
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. ________________ ___________________________ ____________ _ _ _ _
<
..
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17
,
(1)
All 480 VAC boatds were reviewed.
All breaker settings were
above full connected loads except the C&A vent boards in
question and the reactor MOV boards.
This is not a problem for
the reactor MOV boards because the breakers trip within 500
seconds and the loads on the board include mostly valves which
should cycle within approximately 60 seconds.
A USOD was
performed for the CLA vent boards.
(2)
All Unit i boards were evaluated considering normal and cycling
loads as normal loads for mode 5 operations.
Also, all Unit 2
accident loads were assumed.
No additional problems were
identified.
The auxiliary boiler is being used to supply steam to certain secondary
components.
On February 25, 1988 the A train auniliary boiler was lost
resulting in the licensee manually breaking main condenser vacuum. In
anticipation of the protection signals resulting from breaking vacuum,
the shift engineer placed the TDAFW pump in pull-to-lock and opened the
secondary PORVs.
The TDAFW pump is not required for mode 4.
No plant
transients were observed and no ESF actuations were received.
The A
train auxiliary boiler was returned to service at approxima:ely 1:00 a.m.
on February 26. 1988.
On February 26, 1988 the licensee unknowingly entered LCO 3.7.3 upon
taking the CA-A CCS pump out of service due to not recogni:ing the effect
of single failure on the opposite train.
Approximately eight hours later
the licensee made the correct determinaticn and entered a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action
statement for LCO 3.7.3.
Both trains of CCS were returned to an operable
status within approximately three hours.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ .
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18
11.
NRC Inspector Follow-up Items. Unresolved 4 tems. Vi ol at i ons . Bulletins
and Licensee Event Reports
(Closed) LER 327,328/87-052; Design Error Resulting in Nonrepresentative
Load Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators.
This LER describes a
condition where the capability of EDG 2B-B tc recover from the transient
of the containment spray pump starting following a phase B containment
isolation with other random loads connected was uncertain.
A remote
possibility exists that the electric board room air handling Unit could
start at precisely the same time that the containment spray pump starts
which would result in the speed of the EDG dropping below the five
percent limitation Lescribed in the final safety analysis report (FSAR).
This issue did not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 but
was reported voluntarily to inform the NRC.
The NRC will address this
issue, among others, in a safety evaluation report (SER) on electrical
(> sign calculations.
This LER is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 327/328/88-02-03: Unusual Event Resulting f rom
Maintenance on VCT Divert Valve.
On February 9,
1988, with Unit 2 in
mode 4 and the reactor coolant system (RCS) at approximately 250 F and
475 psig, WR B285685 was approved for performance which involved the
tr oubleshooting and repair of VCT divert valve 2-LCV-62-118.
The defi-
ciencies which required a WR were that both valve handswitch indicator
lights remained energi:ed regardless of handswitch position and that the
v al ve stem rotated when the valve was stroked.
The intended work includ-
ed checking the limit switch arm actuator for proper position and secur-
ing the device, if loose, and removing the top of the diaphragm housing
to determine if the stem had been staked and locktite applied.
This work
required isolation of air to the valve operator but no tagging was deemed
necesuary.
Upon removal of the valve cover, it was discovered that the
stem locknut was loose and that the diaphragm was damaged requiring
replacement.
The ASE was notified of this finding and an enpeditor was
sent to power stores in an attempt to obtain a replacement diaphragm.
Work ceased until a replacement diaphragm could be obtained.
Maintenance
began disassembly of the valve operator in order to perform the diaphragm
repairs after receipt of the replacement parts.
At approximately 7:00
p.m.,
a loss of RCS inventory was noted and LCO 3.4.6.2,
RCS operational
leakage, was entered.
The VCT divert valve operator had been decoupled
from the valve body at the stem to facilitate valve diaphragm replace-
ment.
Valve control was subsequently lost allowing the valve to move
from the VCT to the divert position.
At 7:22 p.m.,
the Maintenance
foreman was notified of the urgency to return the valve to the VCT
position.
At 7:55 p.m.,
Maintenance attempted unsuccessfully to accom-
plish the valve positioning requested.
While Maintenance was continuing
to complete the work as quickly as possible, the pressuri:er level
dropped from 33% to 25%. which equals an approximate volume of 465
gallons.
At 7:58 p.m.,
normal letdown and charging were i sol ated in
accordance with SOI-62.1G. Chemical and Volume Control System, and AOI-6,
Shutdown LOCA was exited.
In accordance with IP-2 Emergency Plan Classi-
fication Logic, a notification of unusual event (NOUE) was declared and
exited at 9: 00 p.m.
Letdown was reestablished at 9:35 p.m.
PRO 2-68-43
was initiated as a result of the above described incident.
-
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.
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e,
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19
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f-
I
This event has safety implications for operational Modes 1 through 4,
in
that this identified leakage exceeded the LCO 3.4.6.2.d identified
leakage criterion of 10 gpm.
As a result of this and other events, the
licensee established a work control group to perform plant operations
impact evaluation in order to ensure that the scope of work is clearly
defined, adequate clearances are established, and plant configuration is
controlled.
]
Technical Specifications 6.8.1 states that written procedures shall be
established, implemented and maintained covering the applicable proce-
dures recommended in Appendin
"A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
February 1978.
Included in these required procedures are maintenance
procedures, and clearance procedures.
Standard Practice SOM2, Maintenance Management System implements these
requirements through work request (WR) control and documentation of
maintenance work activities.
Contrary to the above, maintenance activities conducted on valve
.2-LCV-62-118 were not adequately described or implemented on WR B285685
and resulted in an inadvertent loss of approximately 465 gallons of RCS
water, and an entry into LCO 3.4.6.2.d.
This is identified as a second
example of violation 327,328/88-17-01.
Administrative Instruction (AI)-3. Clearance Procedure, implements the
requirement for an equipment clearance procedure through the use of hold
orders.
AI-3 states that no work shall be performed except under the
applicable clearance procedure unless authorized on a case-by-case basis
'
to perform troubleshooting on equipment which cannot be accomplished
under a normal clearance or to perform work of a limited scope where full
control can be provided and maintained in the immediate proximity to the
invnived equipment.
In addition the shift supervisor shall verify that
pressure is zero and equipment drained prior to issuing a mechanical
clearance.
4
Contrary to the above, maintenance personnel and the shift supervisor
'
failed to establish a mechanical clearance for the air supply to valve
2-LCV-62-118 or a mechanical clearance for the valve itself.
They
further failed to remove system pressure from a component that
was
disassembled, and was at a pressure greater than =ero. This is identified
as a third example of violation 327,328/88-17-01.
This Unresolved Item is closed.
I
l
12.
Shift Insoector Follow-up Issues
i
,
Issue Number
Descriotion
Resolution
i
1/23/88-2-2
SI 166.12 needs to be
This issue is still
revised to reflect the
under review.
j
proper position of
I
valves HCV-74-36 and 37.
2/11/88-1-1
Reported vibration
This item has been
i
I
1
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20
problems on train A of
resolved and ic
RHR when one train is
addressed in detail
supplying all four
in paragraph 13.
cold legs.
,
2/14/88-1-1
Problems associated with
This item was deter-
the steam dump drain
mined not to require
tank associated with auto-
NRC follow-up because
matic valve opuration as
it is a balance of
necessary for draining
plant issue and does
tank.
not affect the safety
of the plant.
2/14/88-2-1
Continue observation of
This item was resolved.
The bearing was
bearing temperature
replaced and is
during runs of SI-118.
currently reading
within the limits of
normal operation.
2/15/88-1-1
Follow-up on ability
This was resolved by
to isolate a steam
ICF 88-0405 to step
generator after reset
33 of SI-118 which
of a SI signal,
added resetting the
"A" MFP trip signal
prior to resetting
SI signal.
2/15/88-2-1
Verify method of return
The licensee has pro-
ing pressure switches to
vided an information
service f or SI-118 is
package, which is under
adequate.
review by the NRC.
2/16/88-2-1
CR inspection items:
This issue is
key cor. trol , shift turn
still under review.
over checklists, and shift
engineer log keeping prac
tices.
2/16/88-2-0
Follow-up on discussion
This issue is
items which include key
still under review.
control, shift turnover
checklists and log keeping.
2/17/88-1-1
During SI-488, steam
During preoperational
dumps would only go 60%
testing it was deter-
open with a signal
mined that a 1-3/4 inch
applied which should have
stroke would give full
caused them to be 100%
design steam flow for
the steam dump valves.
open.
Full stroke for the
valves is 2-1/2 inch.
This specific item 1e
resolved.
However,
____
. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
.
I.
s,
.
.
21
the licensee is
currently evaluating
with the vendor the
steam dump performance.
2/18/88-2-1
Improper breaker settings
This issue has been
on C&A Boards 1Al-A and
adequately resolved
181-B.
with DNE by calcula-
tion B25 8800223 803.
2/19/88-1-1
Verify Part 21 issued on
This issue is
2B CCP gland bolting
resolved.
LER
problem.88-005 was issued
instead of a Part 21
report.
2/22/88-2-1
Determine adequacy of not
This issue is resolved.
running the TDAFP as a
TDAFP was tested
PMT f or the element
following element
replacement.
replacement.
2/23/88-2-1
Verify temporary steam
This item is resolved
header pressure gages are
since the gages have
removed prior to
been removed,
approximately 270 psig.
13.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Vibration Problems
As part of the readiness for restart of Sequoyah Unit 2 the NRC reviewed
the correctness of TVA's resolution of preoperational test deficiencies
associated with the RHR system. The purpose of this review was to deter-
mine if any uncorrected deficiencies were being compensated for by
requiring personnel to perf orm normally required automatic saf ety f unc-
tions. During this inspection deficiencies associated with vibrations of
the RHR pump and other system components identified during the
preoperational test were reviewed. The inspector determined that the
purported vi bration problems were associated with the Unit 1 test and
that all vibration problems associated with the Unit 2 test were properly
dispositioned by the licensee as part of the preoperational test.
Subsequent ic tne above review, with the plant in Mode 4,
the inspector
noted that the licensee had entered the TS action statement for specifi-
cation 0.5.3.d associated with the RHR pump safety injection mode align-
ment. When Questioned by the inspector the licensee indicated that system
vibration was the reason the alignment was off normal. The inspector's
review of this alignment, allowed by S01-74.1, which involved isolating
one of the two cold leg injection branch lines which supplies two cold
leg injection points determined that the reason given by the licensee was
not supoorted by either preoperational test data on Unit 2 or review of
testing by the restart test group. The licensee was requested to justify
their entry into the action statement for no apparent documented basis.
r-
6 o
w
,
.
2C
Several meetings were held with the licensee for the purpose of under-
Standing why the licensee felt that a vibration problem existed for the
Unit 2 RHR system. The licensee provided the following:
During unit i preoperational testing vibration problems were noted
when the RHR system was aligned in the cooldown mode
(i.e.,
suction
aligned to the RCS hot leg) and one pump supplying discharge to all
four cold legs.
This vibration was associated with cavitation across the heat
exchanger flow control butterfly valves
Resolution of this problem was to close one of the branch line
isolation valve during the cooldown mode of operation and this
condition was assumed to be applicable to both units. Therefore the
test was not performed during unit 2 preoperational testing and the
operating procedure was changed for both units.
After further discussion on this issue the licensee was requested to
provide a safety evaluation (USOD) to documen' the above conditions and
to provide the basi s that the performance of the system tested during
unit C preoperational testing
(i.e.,
one pump to only two cold legs was
acceptable). USOD PT-45C was provided to the inspector which documented
the above i ssue. This USOD was reviewed by the inspector and found to be
acceptable. The safety evaluation also provided the licenses TS interpre-
tation that manually opening the branch line valve could be considered as
manually realigning of the RHR system as allowed by TS 3.5.3.d.
This
position was discussed
between the licensee and NRC OSP HO staff.
14.
List o.f Abbreviations
AI
-
Administrative Instruction
-
-
Auxiliary Unit Operator
AOI
-
Abnormal Operating Instruction
ASME -
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BIT
-
Boron Injection Tank
-
Control and Auniliary Buildings
CAOR -
Conditions Adverse to Quality Report
-
Centrifugal Charging Pump
-
Component Cooling System
CCTS -
Corporate Commitment Tracking System
COPS -
Cold Overpressure Protection System
-
-
Condensate Storage Tank
l
-
Direct Current
!
DCN
-
Design Change Notice
-
Division of Nuclear Engineering
ECCS -
-
EGTS -
Emergency Gas Treatment System
EC
-
Environmental Qualification
ERCW -
Essential Raw Cooling Water
-
Engineered Safety Feature
i
_
_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
( o
.-
'
23
-
,
.
FCR
-
Field Change Request
FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report
HO
-
Hold Order
-
Health Physics
HQ
-
Headquarters
HVAC -
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IDI
-
Integrated Design Inspection
-
Inspection and Enforcement
IEB
-
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin
IMI
-
Instrument Maintenance Instruction
KV
-
Kilovolt
LER
-
Licensee Event Report
LCO
-
Limiting Condition for Operation
LOCA -
Loss of Coolant Accident
MI
-
Maintenance Instruction
MOVATS -
Motor Operated Valve Testing
MSIV -
NEP
-
Nuclear Engineering Procedures
NRC
-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODCM -
Offsite Dose Calculation Model
Office of Special Projects
-
Positive Displacement
-
-
Pressure Instrument
Preventive Maintenance
-
Post Modification Test
-
PORV -
Power Operated Relief Valve
PORS -
Plant Operation Review Staff
PRO
-
Potentially Reportable Occurrence
OA
-
Quality Assurance
-
Quality Control
RARC -
Radiological Assessment Review Committee
-
-
Reactor Coolant Pump
-
-
Reactor Operator
-
Resistance Thermal Devices
Restart Test Instruction
-
-
Radiatic
Work Permit
RWST -
Reactor Water Storage Tank
-
Safety Evaluation Report
-
-
Surveillance Instruction
-
Safety Injection System
SMI
-
Special Maintenance Instruction
SOI
-
System Operating Instructions
-
Senior Reactor Operator
-
Special Test Instruction
TACF -
Temporary Alteration Control Room
TAVE -
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature
TCAFP -
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
I
TS
-
Technical Specifications
f
-
!
-
Tennessee Valley Authority
l
UHI
-
Upper Head Injaction
l
l
f%
w
P
.
A*
o.
'
.
,
24
USOD -
Unresolved Safety Question Determination
-
Volume Control Tank
-
Work Control Center
WP
-
Work Plan
Work Request
-
t
-