ML20147H569

Revised Proposed Tech Spec Pages 3/4 3-30c & 3/4 4-1a, Reflecting Change to Anticipatory Reactor Trip Sys Arming Level & Reactor Protection Sys High Pressure Trip Setpoint, Respectively

ML20147H569
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	02/26/1988
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20147H561	List: ML20147H557 ML20147H569
References
NUDOCS 8803080529
Download: ML20147H569 (2)

Text

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i f TABE 3.3-15 (CONTINUED)

ACTION STATEMENTS l ACTION 16 - With the number of channels CPERABE one less than #

required by the Minimus Channels OPERABE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to CPERABE sta within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or reduce reactor power to less than reent of RATED THERW 1 POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 45 ACTION 17 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less t.han required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERAB 2 status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABU channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and POWER OPERATION

'may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a) The control rod drive trip breaker associated with the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped i condition within one hour, j b) The Miniana Channels OPERABM requirement is me.t; however, one additional control rod drive trip .. .

breaker associated with another channel may be f tripped for up to*2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.3, after reclosing the l control rod drive trip breaker opened in a) above.

• l 8803080529 DR 080226 ADOCK 05000346 -

PDR DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES j1 S -1 n - < n 23 5 The pressurizer co s ety valve m tb t such that the peak Reactor Coolant System pre. ur does not eed 10% of design system pressure (2500 psig) or, 27 5 sig. The tr rod group withdrawal accident will result in th mo t limiting ig pressure in the RCS. The analysis assumes RPS high e ure trip a sig and the code safety valves open at 2500 ps' he tolerance on the RPS instrument accuracy is 30 psi and, it is + % or the code safety valve settings. The pressurizer electromatic re ef valve was assumed not to open for thi The resulting system peak pressure was calculated to be EH46_ psig._ _

Therefore, the code safety valve setpoint is conservatively ~ set at < 2525 psig which is the maximum r 2500 psig +1% for tolerance.

overp*5Skre The pressurizer electro t open before the code s re ref valve should be set such that it will y valves are opened. However. It =hnnld .d f

open on any anticipate ransientsJ Loss Feedwater (LO as ident l the l' ' ting antici ated transi t for RC ssure. The ana sis -

ass es RPS h pressur rip at 3 sig; with ig for instr t errors, the resu peak R r ssure i Iculated to 2380 psig.

khisinc ,p a 50 ps ressure hoot on a FV transien a 3AW 18%, oMer l985 idenbped bb b I" Ai"' h". P k"* h PR" mid chwre {Le l4r3,st over pre smre Irnusi*HD -

IS "'P*"D demonstrated Wat with A WS W3k pressure in't se$at o( 2.355 psi $

% resuhin3 oversbe.t in 'R CS pressure wouta be limited b 50 psi .

Conse e wcwtig , (Le minimum ~PO R V Set P oint ns.t.d s t. mmod ate botb

{Le VCS pressure overske.t and tb e R'PS in strument sWaj e rver o{ 30 psi.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 4 *a AmendmentNo.33,N