ML20141F867
| ML20141F867 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1986 |
| From: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Randazza J Maine Yankee |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8604230208 | |
| Download: ML20141F867 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000309/1985099
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APR 171986
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Docket No. 50-309
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
ATTN: Mr. J. B. Randazza
Vice. President
Nuclear Operations
83 Edison Drive
Augusta, Maine 04336
Gentlemen:
Subject: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report No.
50-309/85-99
This refers to the evaluation of the nuclear facility operated by Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company conducted by the Region I staff on December 20, 1985. This
report was discussed in a meeting held on February 20, 1986 at the Maine Yankee
Nuclear Power Station.
.The list of attendees is attached as Enclosure 1. The NRC Region I SALP Report
is provided as Enclosure 2. Our letter of January 24, 1986 (Enclosure 3) forwarded
the SALP Board Report and solicited comments within 30 days of the February 20
meeting. Your response of March 24, 1986 (Enclosure 4) has been reviewed. Based
on this response and dialogue during the February 20 meeting, no changes to the
SALP Board Report are considered appropriate.
Our overall assessment of your facility operation is that your initiatives have
improved performance and that there is effective management attention and involve-
ment oriented toward nuclear safety in all functional areas evaluated. Specific-
ally, management action has resulted in four Category 1 assessments and an improv-
ing trend in two other categories. We encourage your continued management atten-
tion to provide for feedback and ongoing evaluation of your operating activity
initiatives.
We consider that our meeting and interchange of information was beneficial and im- l
proved our mutual understanding of your activities and the regulatory program. '
No reply to this letter is required. Your actions in response to the NRC System-
atic Assessment of Licensee Performance will be reviewed during future inspections
of your licensed facility.
Your cooperation is appreciated.
Sincerely,
Origrnal bigned by
2T.ocas E. Murley
Thomas E. Murley
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Regional Administrator
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ADOCK 05000309
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 2
APR 171986
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Enclosures:
1. SALP Management Meeting Attendees
2. Region I SALP Report 50-309/85-99 dated December 20, 1985
3. Region I Letter, T. Murley to J. Randazza, dated January 24, 1986
4. Maine Yankee Letter, J. Randazza to T. Murley, dated March 24, 1986
cc w/encls:
C. E. Monty, President
C. D. Frizzle, Assistant Vice President / Manager of Operations
J. H. Garrity, Plant Manager
P. L. Anderson, Project Manager
G. D. Whittier, Licensing Section Head
J. A. Ritsher, Attorney (Ropes and Gray)
Phillip Ahrens, Esquire
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of Maine
Chairman Palladino
Commissioner Roberts
Commissioner Asselstine
Commissioner Bernthal
Commissioner Zech
bcc w/encls:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)
DPRP Section Chief
M. McBride, RI, Pilgrim
H. Eichenholz, SRI, Yankee
P. Sears, LPM, NRR
T. Murley, RI
K. Abraham, RI (2 copies)
D. Holody, RI
J. Taylor, IE
SALP Management Meeting Attendees
/ RI:RA
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imroth/meo we7z nger Allan ley
4/3/86 Trgpp 'SgagoSltecki
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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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ENCLOSURE 1
SALP MANAGEMENT MEETING ATTENDEES
FEBRUARY 20, 1986
1. Licensee Attendees
J. Randazza, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
P. Lydon, Vice President, Finance and Administration
C. Frizzle, Assistant Vice President / Manager of Operations
J. Garrity, Plant Manager
T. Boulette, Assistant Plant Manager
D. Whittier, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing
P. Anderson, Project Manager, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
2. NRC Attendees
T. Murley, Regional Administrator
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
T. Elsasser, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C, DRP
C. Holden, Senior Resident _ Inspector
J. Robertson, Resident Inspector
A. Thadani, Director, PWR Directorate 8, NRR
P. Sears, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SYSTCMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
INSPECTION REPORT 50-309/85-99
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION
ASSESSMENT PERIOD: JULY 1, 1984 - OCTOBER 31, 1985
BOARD MEETING DATE: DECEMBER 20, 1985
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pag.e
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................... 1
A. Purpose and 0verview........................................ 1
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B.
C.
SALP Board Members.......................................... 1
Background.................................................. 2
- II. CRITERIA......................................................... 5
l III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS............................................... 7
A. Overall Facility Evaluation................................. 7
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B.
C.
Training Evaluation.........................................
Quality Assurance Evaluation................................
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l D. Facility Performance........................................ 8
i IV. . PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS............................................. 9
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A. Plant 0perations............................................ 9
B. Radiological Controls...................................... 13
C. Maintenance................................................ 16
D. Surveillance............................................... 18
E. Fire Protection and Housekeeping........................... 20
F. Eme rgency Prepa redness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
G. Security and Safeguards.................................... 24
H. Refueling and Ou; age Management............................ 25
i I. Li censi ng Acti vi ti es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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V. SUPPORTING DATA AND 4UMMARIES................................... 29
A. Investigations , Petitions and Allegations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Escalated Enfor:ement Actions.............................. 29
C. Management Conferences..................................... 29
TABLES
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TABLE 1 - INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES................................ T1-1
l TABLE 2 - INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY..................................... T2-1
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TAB LE 3 - VIO LAT ION SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T3-1
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TABLE 4 - LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA.......................... T4-1
TABLE 5 - LER SYN 0PSIS................................................ T5-1
TABLE 6 - UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAMS AND FORCED OUTAGES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T6-1
TABLE 7 - SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES............................. T7-1
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose and Overview
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an integrated
NRC staff effort to collect the available observations and data on a
periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based on this infor-
mation. SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory processes used to
ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations. SALP is intended to
be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocating
NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to the licensee's man-
agement to promote quality and safe plant operation.
A NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on
December 20, 1985 to review the collection of performance observations
and data to assess the licensee's performance in accordance with the
guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance". A summary of the guidance and performance criteria is
provided in Section II of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety per-
formance at the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station for the sixteen month
period of July 1, 1984 through October 31, 1985.
B. SALP Board Members
Chairman
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
Board Members
S. Ebneter, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
E. Butcher, Chief, Technical Specification Coordination Branch, NRR
E. C. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, DRP
J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Branch, DRSS
T. Elsasser, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C, DRP
C. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Sears, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS
W. Kane, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
A. Thadani, PWR Project Directorate No. 8, Division of Licensing, NRR
Other Attendees
D. Vito, Senior Emergency Specialist, DRSS
M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim Station
T. Martin, Performance Appraisal Section, IE
J. White, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS
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C. Background
1. _ Licensee Activities
At the beginning of the assessment period the facility was at ap-
proximately 40 percent power and increasing load following the cycle
8 refueling outage. On August 8,1984, the plant lowered power to
80 percent to recover from a dropped Control Element Assembly (CEA).
The plant returned to 100 percent power the same day.
During September and October power was reduced three times in order
to perform maintenance or routine surveillance. One of the main-
tenance items was repairs to the Heater Drain Tank Level control
valve (HD-A-180). This was a recurring problem during this cycle.
The plant tripped from 100 percent power on November 3, 1984 because
of low steam generator level. The cause of the low level signal
was a secondary system pressure spike and subsequent shrink in steam
generator level. On November 4, during the plant startup, an
operator opened the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (MFRV) isolation
valve while the MFRV had a full open signal. Steam Generator #3
overfilled, cooling down the cold leg, causing a Variable Overpower
Trip. On November 5, during the subsequent plant startup, operators
noted that the turbine governor valves were opened further than
necessary for the power level. An investigation revealed that the
disc for #1 turbine stop valve had become separated from the
operating arm. This explained the cause of the secondary pressure
spike on November 3. The plant was taken off the line on November
6 to repair #1 turbine stop valve. The plant returned to power on
November 8.
Twice in November the plant tripped from approxiamtely 100% power,
first on low steam generator level and then one day later on low
suction pressure to the turbine driven feedwater pump. Both trips
were attributed to failures of the main feedwater pump recirculation
valve. Later that month (November 20), power was reduced to make
repairs on a Feedwater heater.
During the months of January and February,1985, the plant reduced
power to 80 percent nine times for chloride intrusion problems with
the main condenser. During the winter months the plant is more
susceptible to seawater leaks in the condenser due to a temperature
irduced resonance. Three of those reductions in power were to gain
access to a waterbox for eddy current testing of the condenser tubes.
The other six reductions in power were to search for leaky tubes
in the waterboxes of the main condenser. The plant also reduced
power to 47 percent on January 15 to repair a hydraulic leak on A
Moisture Separator Reheater valve. Maintenance was also performed
on Feedwater Heater E-11A on February 8. Power was increased to
100 percent on February 18.
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The plant reduced power five times between March 8 and April 9 to
. perform maintenance on the Heater Drain Tank level control valve
(HD-A-180) and for inspection and maintenance of the main condenser
waterboxes. On March 10, the plant was manually tripped when the
main condenser experienced high differential pressure between the
two sets of waterboxes. The high differential pressure was a result
of inadequate circulating water flow while returning A waterbox to
service.
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On April 30, power was reduced to 95 percent power in order to re-
place three blown main generator exciter fuses. On the same day,
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while working on the steam powered feedwater pump control circuit,
a technician caused an inadvertant low pressure signal which caused
a plant trip. A plant startup was conducted on May 1 and the plant
returned to 100 percent power on May 2. The plant was taken off
the line on May 4 so the main generator exciter diodes could be re-
placed. Power was returned to 100 percent on May 9 following a
delay for chloride cleanup. On May 10, power was reduced to 55
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percent to remove the steam driven feedwater pump from service and
place the two electric driven fe6dwater pump in service. Power was
returned to 97 percent (maximum power using electric driven feed-
water pump) on May 11. Loose parts from a heater drain pump were
found in the steam driven feed pump (which required repair). On
June 8, plant power was reduced to 56 percent to return the steam
driven feedwater pump to service. Plant power returned to 100 per-
cent on June 9.
On June 21, the turbine governor valves reached 100 percent open
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and cold leg temperature coastdown operations began.0n July 1, a
technician caused an inadvertant trip while calibrating #3 Steam
Generator Feed Flow recorder by accidentally generating a loss of
flow signal. The plant was phased on line on July 2 and plant power
reached a maximum of 93 percent power in coastdown on July 3.
The plant was shut down on August 16, 1985, for Cycle 8/9 refueling.
Major work accomplished during this outage included replacement of
the main condenser, replacement of the generator stator, replacement
of a reactor coolant pump motor as well as implementation of a
Special Functional Testing program and repairs to the primary com-
ponent cooling water piping. The reactor was taken critical on
October 22, 1985 at the conclusion of the outage.
On October 23, the plant tripped from 4 percent power due to low
level in #3 steam generator. Feedwater flow was in manual control
at the time of the trip because of leakage past the feedwater regu-
lating bypass valve. The plant was returned to power for testing
the main generator and then shutdown on October 24 for maintenance
on #2 Reactor Coolant Pump. The reactor was taken critical on
October 25 and tripped later that same day because of an inadvertant
closure of an excess flow check valve. The plant was manually
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tripped again on October 26 when another excess flow check valve
shut. The cause of these two events was insufficient torque of the
excess flow check valve rupture discs. The plant was taken critical
again on October 27 and.was at approximately 80 percent power at
the end of the assessment period.
During this SALP period the unit availability factor was 84.7 per-
cent with a capacity factor of 79.7 percent.
2. Inspection Activities
One NRC senior resident inspector was assigned to the site during
the entire assessment period. A second resident inspector was as-
signed to the site in mid-August 1985.
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The total number of inspection hours for the sixteen month period
was 4663 as summarized in Tables 1 and 2. This corresponds to 3497
hours on an annualized basis. Contributing to this total were two
team inspections. The first was a Post Accident Sampling inspection
involving 5 inspectors and 160 inspection hours, conducted in Octo-
ber, 1984. The second was an NRC Headquarters sponsored Performance
Appraisal Team (PAT) inspection conducted in May - June, 1985. This
- inspection was performed by 10 NRC inspectors involving 871 inspec-
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tion hours. The objective of the PAT inspection was to evaluate
the management control systems that support licensed activities.
Two special inspections were conducted to establish the circumstances
surrounding the loss of low steam generator pressure protection.
A NRC Emergency Preparedness Inspection team also witnessed the
emergency exercises on September 19,-1984 and June 22, 1985.
In this period nine violations were issued including one proposed
Severity Level II violation. Tabulation of violations and inspec-
tion activities are attached in the Tables section of this report.
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II. CRITERIA
Licensee performance is assessed in sectional functional areas depending on
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whether the facility is in operation or shutdown. Each functional area nor-
mally represents areas significant to nuclear safety and the environment, and
are normal programmatic areas.
The following evaluation criteria were used to assess each functional area.
1. Management involvement and control issues from a safety standpoint.
2. Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
4. Enforcement history.
5. Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
6. Staffing (including management).
7. Training effectiveness and qualification.
Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated was
classified into one of three performance catagories. The definitions of
these performance catagories are:
Catagory 1. Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee management
attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety;
licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of
performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.
Catagory 2. NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Licensee
management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuc-
lear safety; licensee resources are adequate and reasonably effective so that
satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.
Catagory 3. Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. Licensee
management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety,
but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained, or not
effectively used so that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to
operational safety is being achieved.
The SALP Board also assessed each functional area to compare the licensee's
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performance during the last quarter of the assessment period to that during !
the entire period in order to determine the recent trend for each functional l
area. The trend catagories used by the SALP Board are as follows: i
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Improving: Licensee performance has generally improved over the last quarter
of the current SALP assessment period.
Consistent: Licensee performance has remained essentially constant over the
last quarter of the current SALP assessment period.
Declining: Licensee performance has generally declined over the last quarter
of the current SALP assessment period.
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III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A. Overall Facility Evaluation
Increased attention of plant management has significantly improved the
performance of several areas. This is due, in part, to management's
approach to problem resolution. An inquisitive, resolution oriented
attitude is being fostered throughout the organization. Corrective ac-
tion on identified deficiencies has been effective in preventing small
problems from growing into larger problems. Responsiveness by licensee
management to observed violations has been exemplary. Daily activities
are closely monitored, assistance from the Plant Engineering Department
is used to resolve anomalies observed during equipment operation and the
Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) keeps itself informed of a
variety of plant activities. Planning and coordination among the various
departments has been enhanced during the morning managers meetings. Com-
munication between all levels of staffing at the plant has been improved.
Of the eight automatic and two (preventive) manual plant trips, two were
caused by operations personnel error, four by maintenance personnel
error, and four were the result of component failure.
B. Training Evaluation
Training effectiveness is assessed in each functional area by direct ob-
servation. The licensee has a strong commitment to training as is evi-
denced by good licensed operator examination results, license training
for Nuclear Safety Engineers, screening of candidates by a Qualifications
Review Board, comprehensive refueling modifications training and the use
of the site specific simulator for non-routine evolution practice.
Training support for other personnel is good. Auxiliary operator train-
ing provides theoretical background information as well as job specific
information. Fire brigade training utilizes onsite simulated drills and
actual fire fighting offisite. Maintenance training is frequent and
covers pertinent topics. Some improvements are needed in health physics
and chemistry technician training and corrective action has been initi-
ated. However, the overall result is effoctive training for all personnel.
C. Quality Assurance Evaluation
Management oversight of quality activities is apparent in the morning
manager's meeting and aggressive PORC review activities. Quality Assur-
ance is integrated into daily activities through early repair order re-
view and normal audit and surveillance functions. The Quality Assurance
function needs to expand to provide more neaningful audits through cri-
tical self-evaluation. Radiation Protection, Maintenance and Licensing
show consistent performance in SALP ratings at the Category 2 level;
however, an aggressive programmatic quality assurance review in these
areas should be able to identify areas for improvement.
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D. Facility Performance
Functional Area last Period This Period Recent Trend
(July 1, 1983 (July 1, 1984
June 30, 1984) October 31, 1985)
A. Plant Operations 3 2 Improving
B. Radiological Controls 2 2 Consistent
C. Maintenance 2 2 Consistent
D. Surveillance 2 1 Improving
E. Fire Protection and 2 1 Consistent
Housekeeping
F. Emergency Preparedness 1 1 Consistent
G. Security and Safeguards 1 1 Consistent
H. Refueling 1 2 Improving
I. Licensing Activities 2 2 Consistent
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Plant Operations (41%, 1927 hours0.0223 days <br />0.535 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.332235e-4 months <br />)
This assessment finds that licensee performance throughout this SALP
period has been one of improvement. Direct management involvement in
plant operations through daily managers meetings, improved operations
turnover practices, aggressive Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)
reviews and relatively few operations personnel errors are indications
of that improvement.
Plant management has implemented a morning managers meeting to review
plant operations for the preceding day and plan for upcoming events with
focused attention on safe plant operations. The operations turnover re-
port is used as an agenda for these meetings. All of the site depart-
ments are represented. Integration of operations, maintenance, surveil-
lance and support organizations is planned during these meetings. De-
ficiencies identified during shift turnovers are addressed and assign-
ments are made for followup action. Meeting minutes are kept and widely
distributed shortly after the meeting to keep personnel informed on plant
activities. Followup action, with deadlines, is assigned to specific
individuals. All personnel are encouraged to report confusing /off-normal
indications so that corrective action can be assigned and future problems
can be avoided.
Management involvement in daily plant operations was also evident in a
number of changes throughout the plant which by themselves are not sig-
nificant but collectively have had a positive effect on plant operations.
Shift turnovers are now conducted by the oncoming Plant Shift Supervisor
and the Shift Operating Supervisor prior to the individual watch stations
conducting their turnovers. The result is an operating crew that is
cognizant of all activities for their shift instead of just their watch-
station. The professional attitude of the control room was enhanced by
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a change to the dress code for supervisory personnel. General access
to the control room has been altered to reduce distractions of the
operators. A processing area for work request and tagging orders is now
in use. Corporate managers have frequent contact with the plant and they
j participate in a variety of plant meetings and monitoring activities such
as plant tours. During special evolutions, corporate staff supplements
the plant's shift efforts by assigning personnel to the site. Plant En-
gineering Department is represented at daily managers meetings and is
routinely involved in planned corrective action.
The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) provides an aggressive re-
view of plant activities. Meeting agendas are distributed well in ad-
vance of the meetings and closely followed. The PORC keeps informed of
special plant evolutions by requesting presentations by key personnel
during informational meetings. PORC discussions are lively and open and
well documented in the meeting minutes.
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All personnel are encouraged to identify problems so that they can be
resolved. The licensee uses Plant Information Reports (PIR) ard Unusual
Occurrence Reports (UOR) for problem identification, evaluation, correc-
tive action followup and resolution. PIRs and UORs are tracked and l
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closed out and are used to keep plant personnel aware of observed prob-
lems. Additionally, the morning managers meeting solicits the help of
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all personnel through their meeting minutes when unexplained indications
or events take place for which additional information is needed for
resolution.
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Licensed Operator training is considered a strength at Maine Yankee.
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Contributing factors include: nine of eleven staff members in the Train-
ing Department hold Senior Reactor Operator licenses, the use of a
Training and Qualification Review Board which oversees candidate perfor-
mance, and comprehensive training for plant modifications. During this
assessment period, four of four Reactor Operators and four of four Senior
Reactor Operators passed license examinations. The Training Department
becomes involved in plant problems through the use of the plant specific
simulator to assist in analyzing equipment problems in the plant. The
quality of the Annual License Operator Requalification Program is oood;
however, a mechanism for ensuring participation and timely completion
of quizzes is needed. Overall, the plant operators are well trained as
evidenced by their high level of performance throughout this evaluation
period.
The licensee's corrective action for chloride control has been timely
and thorough. During the winter months when cold temperatures aggravated
main condenser tube leakage, the plant reduced power and conducted eddy
current testing of the condenser to identify and plug the tubes which
were leaking. This corrective action was in addition to the planned
replacement of the main condenser during the September 1985 refueling
outage. Modifications were made to the condenser leak detection system
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to improve the plant's ability to quickly locate the problem waterbox.
The plant has begun a plant wide valva labeling program which should
eliminate ambiguity in manual valve operations. The plant has also
completed a handwheel painting program designed to distinguish between
containment isolation valves and emergency core cooling systems valves.
Pride in the plant was enhanced by major cleaning and restoring efforts
which has resulted in an improvement in plant appearance and a reduction
in the radiation levels throughout the plant.
The area of containment integrity presented some problems to the licensee
this cycle including: failure to tag shut a local handwheel during
maintenance; lack of administrative controls for containment coolcrs,
vent and drain 0 'es, and the interpretation given to remotely operated
containment itCat on valves. The licensee has submitted a proposed
change to la mic Specifications to allow the use of manual valve iso-
lation foi m i. .nce. Additionally, the licensee installed modifica-
tions to piping ana valving during the outage to enhance containment
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boundary valve testing and to simplify the containment boundaries for
the primary sampling system. Even though the licensee has taken action
in this area, continued vigilance is required to prevent recurrence of
similar problems.
One Operations Area problem is the volume of administrative reviews that
are assigned to the Plant Shift Supervisor (PSS) prior to the refueling
outage. The detailed review of procedures and plant modifications are
best performed by someone with the level of experienre that the PSS pos-
sesses. However, the time involved with these reviews impacts on the
ability of the PSS to monitor and direct plant activities. The assign-
ment of an additional assistant to the Operations Department head has
helped the situation but numerous reviews are time sensitive. Better
coordination of procedures reviews, plant modifications and system test-
ing is needed to prevent future problems in this area.
Of the eight automatic and two manual (preventive) plant trips during
this period, two were the result of operations personnel error; one was j
a variable overpower trip resulting from excessive feedwater flow to a I
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steam generator; and the other was during the return of the circulating )
water system to operation which caused high differential pressure across !
the main condenser. Additionally, the feedwater system was a source of
problems during this SALP period. Two trips were attributed to personnel
error during feedwater system maintenance associated with the feed pump
recirculation valve controller. Anomalies in the recirculation control
and heater drain tank control systems could have resulted in several
plant trips had the operators not taken manual control during these
( situations. The potential exists for the feedwater system malfunctions
to challenge plant safety systems. Emphasis is needed in this area to
resolve feedwater issues.
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The plant experienced a number of power reductions this cycle. The two
prime contributors were support of chloride leak reduction in the main
' condenser and feedwater pump shif ting because of problems in the feed-
water control systems. Planned reductions were in accordance with man-
agement's corrective action plan. Unplanned reductions were quickly fol-
lowed by corrective maintenance. In each case, management was involved
in resolving the cause of problem.
In the previous SALP evaluation, several problems were noted in the
operations area. In all cases, the licensee has initiated corrective
action to resolve these deficiencies. The licensee effectively resolved
chloride intrusion issues both during the cycle with eddy current in-
spection and tube plugging and in the long term with the replacement of
the main condenser. Temporary guidance that had the capability to cir-
cumvent the review and approval process has been eliminated. The prob-
lems observed in Source Range Instrumentation have been corrected during
the recent outage. With the exception of pre-outage procedure / test re-
views conducted by the PSS, operational support activities have enhanced
the operator's ability to focus his attention on his watchstanding re-
sponsibilities.
- . - - - - - - - - - - ._
,
. .
-
12
Management involvement in daily plant operations and the overall coordi-
nation of the various departments throughout this SALP period has focused
attention on safe plant o,erations. As problems are identified, correc-
tive action responsibilities are assigned and tracked. As a result, cor-
rective action is timely and thorough. Coordination among onsite de-
partments has improved. The effect of these actions has been a signifi-
cant improvement in the Operations area.
Conclusicn:
Rating: Category 2.
. Trend: Improving.
Board Recommendations:
Licensee
Continue strong management oversight of daily plant activities.
NRC
l
l None,
i
,
I
I
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-
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13
B. Radiological Controls (9%, 432 hours0.005 days <br />0.12 hours <br />7.142857e-4 weeks <br />1.64376e-4 months <br />)
Day-to-day review of ongoing activities was provided by resident inspec-
tors. There were six inspections performed in the area of Radiological
Controls during the assessment period by Radiation Specialists. The in-
spections performed during the period examined several program areas in-
cluding Radiation Protection, Transportation and Independent Measurements.
A special announced inspection of the licensee's post-accident sampling
system was also conducted during the period.
The reviews of routine operations, planning and preparation for the 1985
refueling outage and outage radiation protection activities indicated
management attention is directed at maintaining an effective radiation
protection program. The organization and staffing of the licensee's
radiation protection organization provided effective control of radiation
protection activities. Staffing is adequate with no routine use of over-
time to staff positions. Man-rem expended during the twelve month period
from November 1984 through October 1985 was 668 man-rem. This is an im-
_provement compared with Maine Yankee's 883 man rem expended during calen-
dar year 1984.
Training and qualification programs were adequate to support normal oper-
ations and the outage. Weaknesses noted in the radiation worker training
program for training individuals working or frequenting restricted areas
were promptly corrected. An adequately defined program for training and
qualification of outage personnel was conducted prior to and early in
the outage. Training and qualification programs for contractor radiologi-
cal controls technicians contributed to good personnel performance and
adherence to procedures during the outage.
Documentation of radiation protection activities was complete, well main-
tained and available including routine and special radiological surveil-
lance records. Dosimetry records were particularly well organized. A
major effort was made in the reduction of radiation areas which resulted
in opening over half of the 40,000 sq. ft. of formerly radiation con-
trolled areas for general use. The requirements for protective clothing
have similarly been reduced. Some weaknesses were noted in the airborne
sampling program, personnel contamination control, and sorting of low-
level waste. The licensee has initiated corrective action on these
findings.
A special inspection of the licensee's post-accident sampling system
(PASS) was conducted to assess the operability of the system, and to as-
sure that all of the requirements identified in NUREG-0737 were met. One
violation was identified. This violation indicated problems in obtaining
representative samples for effluents and monitoring of the containment
atmosphere. Additional areas for improvement identified by this inspec-
tion were the analytical capability for on-site chloride and boron analy-
sis, training of personnel in post-accident sampling and additional veri-
fication of calculational methods. The licensee needs to assure that
design requirements are incorporated in the final design and that train-
ing in modifications is accomplished for all necessary personnel.
. ,
-
14
The licensee also had several events involving personnel in areas for
which they were not authorized due to a lack of radiation work permits
(RWP) and with personnel not having the proper protection required by
an RWP. The cause of these events was attributed to personnel error.
These events were reviewed by management and strong corrective actions
were taken. The effect of these incidents could have been significant,
however no overexposures occurred. The potential exists for events of
this nature to have serious consequences. Contributing factors for these
events appear to be 1) Health Physics Technician coverage of numerous
simultaneous jobs during the outage and 2) training of personnel in
strict compliance with RWP requirements. Even though the licensee has
taken action in these areas, additional attention is warranted to prevent
recurrence.
One inspection of the transportation program area was conducted by a
Radiation Specialist during this assessment period. Review of the or-
ganization structure showed all positions were adequately identified with
appropriate authorities and responsibilities. Staffing was adequate as
indicated by limited backlog and overtime. Training and retraining pro-
grams were defined and implemented for the licensee's transportation
staff.
One inspection of the Independent Measurements Program area was conducted
by a Radiation Specialist. This inspection reviewed routine quality
control of analytical measurements and performance of radiological an-
alyses of split effluent samples. Good agreement of sample analyses in-
dicated the ability of the licensee to achieve and maintain adequate
methods of analyses. Reviews of staffing and organization structure
showed all positions were identified, authorities and responsibilities
well defined, and adequate staff was available. Reviews of procedures
in this program showed procedures were complete, weil maintained and
available.
The licensee has addressed weaknesses noted in the last SALP evaluation
,
through restructuring of the Radiation Protection Organization and in-
creased management attention. The restructuring of the Radiation Pro-
tection Organization eliminated one level of management resulting in
closer communication between Health Physics Technicians and management.
An Assistant to the Technical Support Department Head position was
created to allow in-depth review of problems and better coordination
of activities. Increased management attention has been evidenced by
prompt and thorough corrective action.
The licensee has implemented an effective Radiation Protection Program.
The program is well defined and the training and qualifications of the
staff is adequate. Recent cleanisg efforts have reduced the size of the
radiation controlled areas. Notwithstanding the overall adequate per-
formance, some problems still exist in personnel compliance with RWP
requirements as noted above, and efforts to eliminate such occurrences
should continue. In addition, the PASS inspection identified deficien-
. ,
15
cies in obtaining representative samples for effluents, monitoring of
containment atmosphere, and several weaknesses in the analytical process
and calculational methods.
Conclusion:
Rating: Category 2.
Trend: Consistent.
Board Recommendation:
Licensee
Conduct a critical self-evaluation of the Radiological Controls area to
identify areas for improvement.
NRC
Conduct an inspection of Yankee Corporate Quality Assurance to evaluate
effectiveness of the radiological controls audit program.
_,
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..-
16
C. Maintenance (9%, 412 hours0.00477 days <br />0.114 hours <br />6.812169e-4 weeks <br />1.56766e-4 months <br />)
During this assessment period four routine regional inspections and fre-
quent Resident inspector reviews were conducted in the Maintenance area.
The licensee has a comprehensive preventive maintenance program for both
safety. related and non-safety related equipment. Maintenance is involved
in a quarterly review of Discrepancy Reports (DRs) and Repair Orders
(R0s) for repetitive equipment failures. The preventive maintenance
program was modified as a result of these reviews. Additionally, the
licensee's program for maintenance of Limitorque valves has provided for
an increase in the reliability of these valves. There is frequent man-
agement involvement in routine maintenance activities. Quality Control
of maintenance activities is apparent. The Quality Assurance Department
reviews Repair Orders for proper system classification prior to work.
Hold points are effectively utilized. Coordination of maintenance acti-
vities and plant conditions is conducted during the morning managers
meeting.
The training program for the maintenance staff is effective. The fre-
quency of training sessions, the subjects taught, the use of site speci-
fic simulator demonstrations and the selection of instructors who are
experienced technicians contribute favorably to the program. The main-
tenance department is a small organization that uses contractors to sup-
plement the work force during outages.
Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) control appears to be a weakness.
A number of problems were identified in this area including; evaluations
of test equipment which is less than four times the accuracy of the
equipment being calibrated, logging of test equipment use and evaluations
of the validity of calibrations that used M&TE which were later dis-
covered out of tolerance. Followup inspection in this area af ter lic-
ensee corrective action found similar problems. Continued licensee at-
tention in this area is warranted.
Four plant trips were attributed to maintenance; two because of personnel
errors during the performance of maintens'ce on the feedwater control
circuits and two others as a result of incorrect torque va'ues for excess
flow check valve rupture discs. As discussed in the Operations Section
of this report, more work is needed to resolve feedwater problems that
impact plant operations. Additionally, the failure to specify the cor-
rect torque values for the excess flow rupture disc combined with the
delay for implementing a program for vendor technical manual control
indicates a need for further licensee attention.
The maintenance program incorporates strong preventive maintenance with
frequent management attention to corrective maintenance. The morning
managers meeting has helped prioritize maintenance activities and reduce
the backlog of maintenance actions noted in the last SALP evaluation.
Quality control activities are an integral part of repair activities.
. .
. _. - __ _ _ - _ _ _
-
i
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!
17
The licensee's coordinated program of Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) main-
- tenance and testing is exemplary. Through this program, the licensee
has been able to trend performance of each RTB and identify degradation
in performance long before the breaker exceeds the acceptance criteria.
Additionally, the program has been able to identify problems with RTB's
through receipt inspections and provide feedback to the breaker manufac-
turer.
Deficiencies noted during th'; evaluation period include control over
measuring and test equipment, and the contribution of maintenance errors
L to plant trips.
- Conclusions
l Ratiag: Category 2.
Trend: Consistent. '
Board Recommendations:
Licensee
Conduct a critical self-evaluation of the maintenance area to identify
I areas for improvement. Resolve feedwater problems which have potential
to challenge safety systems.
!~
NRC -
None.
l
l
l
l
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l
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18
D. Surveillance (11%, 522 hours0.00604 days <br />0.145 hours <br />8.630952e-4 weeks <br />1.98621e-4 months <br />)
The resident inspector examined surveillance activities as part of the
routine inspection program. Inspections were conducted of containment
leak rate testing, post refueling startup testing, and the inservice
inspection program. Surveillance was also reviewed during the Perfor-
mance Appraisal Team (PAT) inspection.
The licensee has adequately addressed and resolved issues previously
identified in the previous SALP Report in the Inservice Inspection (ISI)
program. Personnel assigned to perform ISI during the refueling outage
were knowledgeable of the procedures and NDE methods and staffing levels
were adequate. The Inservice Test program incorporates the use of vi-
bration tests, ultrasonic tests, and system flow tests for equipment
reliability monitoring. These data are used to trend equipment perform-
ance has also been used to diagnose equipment problems prior to failures.
The Maine Yankee Plant Management has demonstrated their commitment to
identifying and correcting equipment deficiencies before they become a
problem or a challenge to safety systems. Two examples of this commit-
ment are steam generator eddy current testing and RTD respense time
testing. Eddy current inspections were conducted on #2 steam generator
during the refueling outage as required by Technical Specifications.
Because of defects found in the vertical strap region, the licensee ex-
panded their inspection to include all three steam generators. The addi-
tional eddy current testing expended considerable licensee resources and
resulted in testing more than four times the number of steam generator
tubes required by Technical Specifications. The outcome was a better
understanding of the observed indications. The expanded testing under-
taken voluntarily by the licensee demonstrated a high concern for steam
generator integrity.
The licensee has also implemented a surveillance program for RTD response
time testing which is beyond Technical Specification requirements. Based
on test results, improvements were made during the outage by cleaning
RTD wells. Additionally, the lessons learned from the retest of modified
systems (corrective action for violation noted in the Refueling Section)
were integrated into routine surveillance testing.
The inspectors have noted the involvement of QA/QC personnel in surveil-
lance activities throughout the assessment period. During periods of
increased work activity the licensee has supplemented the QA/QC staff
with contract personnel. However, a weakness was identified in the
limited scope of the 1983 and 1984 audits of Technical Specification
surveillances. The licensee was aware of this weakness and significant
improvements in the scope and performance of the 1985 audit conducted
in August were noted.
. ._ - . . . - . _ __
,
'
, - .- ,
-
,
19
a
Other weaknesses noted in this area included the failure to incorporate
, acceptance criteria into procedures consistent with established require-
ments and inconsistent recording of as found test data. Surveillance
procedures are currently being reviewed and revised to correct these
weaknesses.
'
Generally,-the surveillance program is well implemented in that personnel
are knowledgeable, surveillances are performed in the required periodicity
and procedures are strictly followed. This area is improving due to the
expanded audits and procedure reviews.
Conclusion:
Rating: Category 1.
I TrerJ: Improving.
Board Recommendation:
Licensee
None.
1
NRC
i None.
!
1
1
1
4
i
1
-
+
4
_ . _ _ _ - . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - _ - _ - - _ _ - - - - - - - - _ - _ . _ .
. .. _. - - -
- . .,
-
20
E. Fire Protection and Housekeeping (8%, 364 hours0.00421 days <br />0.101 hours <br />6.018518e-4 weeks <br />1.38502e-4 months <br />)
Inspection activity in this area is based on routine Resident Inspector
observations and the Appendix R Inspection which was conducted during
this cycle.
The Fire Protection Program at Maine Yankee is well defined and imple-
mented by station procedures. Increased awareness of personnel to fire '
protection standards was noted throughout the SALP period. Corrective
action for identified problems was timely. The Appendix R Inspection
Report noted one violation involving an inadequate fire protection bar-
,
rier between two trains of shutdown equipment. The licensee implemented
prompt corrective action. Problems with fire barrier and personnel
knowledge and responsiveness to Technical Specification requirements
noted in the last SALP evaluation have been corrected.
'
Fire Brigade Training includes hands-on training under actual fire con-
ditions offsite in addition to simulated drills onsite. Training of
contractor personnel in preparation for fire watch duties during the
refueling outage was comprehensive. Routine Inspections noted good
performance in this area.
, A Fire Protection Coordinator is located onsite and participates in man-
i
agement meetings to incorporate fire prevention into plant schedules.
Plant and corporate managers provide frequent walkdowns of the plant and
incorporate housekeeping as well as fire prevention observations. The
Fire Protection Coordinator is assigned corrective action responsibility
-
for their observations. This increased management attention has enhanced
Plant housekeeping has steadily improved during this SALP cycle. Contri-
buting to this effort has been the reduction of radiological controlled
areas. After thorough cleaning, contamination levels were reduced to
allow unrestricted access to a number of areas. The licensee expects
to continue to reduce radiologically controlled areas through cleaning.
Different areas of the plant are assigned to various departments as
cleaning areas; this personal assignment has increased the vigilance of
those responsible for their area to maintain the high standards expected.
A storage review was conducted by the licensee which identified numerous
areas needing improvements. As a result, many locations are no longer
cluttered with seldom used equipment.
The licensee continues to implement an effective Fire Protection Program.
Personnel are knowledgeable of Fire Protection requirements; routine
tours of the plant are conducted by upper level management. Training
for Fire Brigade members is effective as was training for contractor
personnel. The licensee continues to make improvements in plant house-
keeping.
_ __ __
. .
_ . __ .
. .
21
Conclusion: )
Rating: Category 1.
Trend: Consistent
Board Recommendation:
Licensee
None.
NRC
1
None.
l
1
l
1
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!
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22
!
- F. Emergency Preparedness (9%, 399 hours0.00462 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.597222e-4 weeks <br />1.518195e-4 months <br />)
During this assessment period, one routine unannounced inspection was
conducted and two full scale exercises were observed. An inspection on
February 4-8, 1985, of critical areas in emergency preparedness indicated
a high level of upper-level management involvement in controlling and
assuring quality. This was supported by (1) the licensee's audits which
were found to be complete, timely and thorough (2) a complete and well
maintained recordkeeping system and (3) emergency procedures which are
well stated, controlled, and explicit. Changes to the Emergency Plan
(EP) and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) receive timely,
thorough, and technically sound reviews. The Plant Operations Review
Committee also maintains direct involvement in program changes and ap-
proves revisions to the EP and EPIPs.
The licensee's responses to previously identified items resolved two
outstanding notices of violation. All open items were adequately ad-
dressed with the exception of two aspects of the meteorological program
l which are still under review. Audits also indicated that the licensee's
corrective actions were effective and timely.
The licensee conducted a full scale emergency exercise on September 19,
1984, and another full scale exercise on June 22, 1985. The licensee's
execution and participation in both of the exercises demonstrated thorough
planning and a strong commitment to emergency preparedness. Examples
of thoroughly planned activities observed by NRC team members included
timely staff briefings in each emergency response facility and demon-
stration by emergency personnel of familiarity with emergency duties and
use of EPIPs. Each NRC team determined that within the scope and limi-
tations of both scenarios, the licensee's performance demonstrated that
they could implement their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a
manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health
and safety of the public. In addition, violations and discrepancies
observed in 1984 did not recur during the 1985 exercise.
l A training and qualification program exists for the major portion of
emergency response staff. The training program was not entirely imple-
mented since practical training provided to personnel identified as
Emergency Coordinators had not begun. In general, training of emergency
personnel was demonstrated during the two emergency exercises and was
shown to be effective.
The licensee provides for continuity of the emergency preparedness func-
tion through the assignment of one full time emergency response coor-
I
'
dinator located in Augusta. Additional corporate personnel are effec-
tively used to support ongoing emergency preparedness activities.
The licensee continues to implement a sound Emergency Preparedness Pro-
gram. No significant deficiencies were identified during the previous
SALP. Management involvement continues to be evident and corrective
j action was effective.
t
i
L - - ______ _ _ _ __ ____.______ .__ ___
. .
23
! Conclusion
Rating: Category 1.
Trend: Consistent.
Board Recomendations
Licensee
None.
i
'
NRC
l Reduce drill observation inspection and increase routine inspection.
1
!
l
,
,
f
l
!
l
l
l
.
.
t
I
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l
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ._.
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24
.
!
G. Security and Safeguards (3%, 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br />)
This evaluation is based on two routine, unannounced inspections con-
ducted by a region-based inspector and routine resident inspections con-
ducted throughout the period.
Corporate management involvement in the security program remained evident,
as indicated by the continued assignment of a corporate security manager
- to the site, by efforts to improve the efficiency of the security force,
and by requiring outage contractors to submit their access control plan
outlining access eligibility criteria. Supervision, staffing and train-
ing of the security force for the conduct of routine activities was
adequate.
Review of security program audits revealed thtt program records were
complete, well maintained, and readily available, but identified facets
'
of the program that were not covered by the audits. The overlooked areas
included protection of safeguards information and reporting of security
events. The licensee responded to this deficiency by modifying an up-
coming audit checklist to include one of the deficient areas and sched-
uling the remaining area for a subsequent audit.
The licensee was very responsive to an NRC identified item concerning
security guard requalification examinations. The corrective action was
prompt and thorough and indicative of management's commitment to a qual-
ity program. Additionally, corrective action for another minor violation
was similarly effective.
The licensee's performance in the security area has been consistent dur-
ing this cycle as evidenced by corrective actions which were prompt and
thorough. The licensee's security plan was well implemented by the con-
tract guard force and management oversite was effective.
Conclusion:
Rating: Category 1.
Trend: Consistent.
Board Recommendation:
Licensee
None.
NRC
None.
_ __ _ ___ _ __ ___ _ _- - ___ - - -_ _ _ - - _
-
. ..
-
25
H. Refueling and Outage Management (10%, 487 hours0.00564 days <br />0.135 hours <br />8.052249e-4 weeks <br />1.853035e-4 months <br />)
The Cycle 8/9 refueling outage (August 17 - October 24,1985) was con-
ducted during this SALP period. Five NRC inspections were conducted by
region-based inspectors in addition to the Resident Inspector's routine
inspection and the followup inspection of Special Functional Testing re-
sulting from the loss of Low Steam Generator Pressure protection during
Cycle 8 operations. Areas reviewed included Integrated Leak Rate Testing,
Welding, In-service Inspection, Radiological Controls during outage,
Special Functional Testing, Modification and Surveillance, and routine
outage activities. The Performance Appraisal Team reviewed the Design
Change area which is included in this section.
Outage coordination is assigned to the Maintenance Department Head with
high level attention of both senior corporate and site management placed
on scheduling, planning and control of activities. The total number of
onsite contractors is limited to ensure proper coordination of activi-
ties and the shifts are staggered to reduce the impact of shift turnovers.
l Daily planning meetings are used to coordinate activities, establish
priorities and track critical path work. The Plant Manager, Assistant
Plant Manager and the Outage Manager are all heavily involved in all
phases of plant outages. The overall effect is a responsive outage
organization.
,
The licensee also reassigned three licensed Senior Reactor Operators
(SRO) to outage control business. Two were used to coordinate various
job', thereby relieving the onshif t crew of the responsibility of coor-
dinating the contractor's activities. The third SR0 was used to coordi-
nate the tagging of systems on day shift. This allowed the onshift crew
to concentrate on performing plant evolutions. Additional licensed and
non-licensed personnel were used to coordinate and track job progress,
thereby separating the conduct of the outage from plant evolutions.
Human Factors modifications to the main control board and seismic anchor-
ing of the control room ceiling were identified as work that had the
potential for disrupting the operators' ability to monitor plant condi-
tions during the outage. These jobs were carefully analyzed and addi-
tional controls were placed on these jobs, such as limiting the work-
force, controlling access to the control room, repositioning critical
indications, scheduling some work during backshifts and removing noisy
equipment from the control room. These measures served to limit the
impact of these major modifications on the control room watchstanders.
Other major jobs accomplished during the outage were plant refueling,
,
replacement of the main condenser, replacement of the main generator
! stator and replacement of Number 2 Reactor Coolant Pump. Some unantici-
pated jobs included repairs to circulating water pumps and repairs to
primary cooling water piping. The licensee also initiated an RID response
time testing program during the outage which was beyond
the Technical Specification Requirements.
l
L
. _ - . ._
, .. ,
-
26
During this assessment period, a Level II Violation and Civil Penalty
was issued for the failure to have Steam Generator Low Pressure Protec-
tion for most of Cycle 8. The causes of this event were the lack of
specific requirements in plant procedures to reposition root valves after
testing, inadequate design review and inadequate retesting after a system
modification. Procedural inadequacies were identified in test procedures
involving a number of departments during testing. Design reviews and post
modification testing were conducted as a result of this violation. The
corrective action for this violation was extensive and directly impacted
the schedule of the outage. It is an indication of the resolve of the
licensee to prevent future problems in this area. The NRC was involved
in evaluating the adequacy of the licensee's corrective action. Incor-
poration of the lessons learned from the Special Functional Testing Pro-
gram and Design Reviews will help prevent future problems.
In the Design Change area, the NRC found strengths in the establishment
of a consolidated design change program between the site and Yankee
Atomic Electric Company, and the program for closeout of Engineering
Design Change Requests (EDCR). Weaknesses noted included the poor con-
trol of design information in the conceptual design stage and isolated
,
problems with a hanger installation and some problems in drawing control.
l
Recent changes in this area appear to have corrected these problems.
l Refueling outages continue to be well planned and coordinated. Critical
l jobs are assigned dedicated project coordinators. Additional management
personnel are reassigned to track outage work. This allows the plant
-
! operators to concentrate on refueling evolutions. The events which led
to the Level II violation originated during the last SALP period. Minor
problems noted in the last SALP Report included violations in the control
'
of modifications that had no relation to this violation. The plant
Operation Review Committee (PORC), through review of modification pack-
ages for the outage, determined that requirements for retesting modified
systems needed to be upgraded. As a result, the plant was revising im-
plementing instructions incorporating these new criteria when the Level
!
II Violation was identified. The corrective action implemented as a re-
sult of this Level II violation will further enhance those retest va-
l
quirements already dictated by PORC.
1
Conclusion:
.
l Rating: Category 2.
Trend: Improving.
i Board Recommendation: !
Licensee
None.
NRC
None.
!
. __. _ . . . . _ - - - _ _ . . _ _
.
l
.. ,
l.- 27
l
l I. Licensing Activities
l The assessment of licensee performance was based on the licensing actions
'
listed in Table 7 of this report.
!
The licensee's management demonstrated active participation in licensing
i activities and kept abreast of current and anticipated licensing actions.
l~ In general, submittals reflected good quality and proper management con-
trol. Two examples of quality submittals were the Thermal Shield In-
spection and Repair, and the Effluent Reduction Submittal of 10 CFR 50
l Appendix I. During the review of Item II.B.3.2. of NUREG-0737, " Post
l Accident Sampling Modification", there was consistant evidence of prior
l planning and assignment of priorities. During this SALP period, much
! licensing time was consumed by the Auxiliary Feedwater Limiting Condition
l for Operation issue. This issue has been ongoing for several years and
j should have been resolved last year.
i
'
The licensee's staff has demonstrated technical understanding of issues
involving licensing actions. For the majority of licensing actions, the
submittals were technically sound, thorough, and well referenced.
l The licensee's responsiveness appears to vary widely on different tech-
l nical issues. For example, the submittal concerning the Technical Speci-
!
fication change on snubbers was significantly delayed by the licensee; -
l- the resuomittal concerning Technical Specifications for Limiting Overtime
! isapproximately4monthsoverduebecauseofstaffinglimitations;and,
i the Steam Tube Surveillance" submittals, were not complete in the origi-
l
'
nal form and as a consequence, time was lost unnecessarily. Other actions
such as Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equip-
ment, Detailed Control Room Design Review and Main Steam Line Break Report
were timely.
Training and qualification of the Licensing Staff are considered a
strength. Personnel from licensing are rotated into positions at the
plant during refueling to supplement the plant staff and provide valuable
expertise for the staff.
The licensee's management has demonstrated active participation in lic-
ensing activities. Although problems with the timeliness of submittals
continue to be noted from the previous SALP report through this evalu-
ation, the licensee's submittals, in general, are technically sound and
l of good quality.
[
'
Conclusions:
Rating: Category 2.
Trend: Consistent.
l
l
l
. _____ _ _____ _____ _--__-_____----. _
e
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28
Board Recommendation:
Licensee
None.
NRC
None.
. . .- _- . . . . - -. - . .
-. .
~
29
V. Supporting Data and Summaries
A. Investigations, Petitions and Summaries
During this assessment period 3 allegations were received. One concern-
ing welding practices and two concerning radiological controls for res-
pirator use. All three allegations were found to be unsubstantiated by.
the Senior Resident Inspector.
B. Escalated Enforcement Actions
1. Civil Penalties
'
Proposed $80,000 civil penalty for the failure to have Steam Genera-
l tor Low Pressure protection during Cycle 8 operation was issued
October 29, 1985.
2. Actions Pending/ Resolved
l
None
3. Orders
None
C. Management Conferences
On September 14, 1984 at Maine Yankee, a management meeting was held to
present the results of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
(SALP) for the assessment period 7/1/83 through 6/30/84.
On September 9, 1985, an enforcement conference was held at the NRC Re-
i gion I Office in King of Prussia to discuss the failure to have Steam
l Generator Low Pressure protection.
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T-1-1
TABLE 1
,
INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)
MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
INSPECTION INSPECTION
REPORT NO. HOURS AREAS INSPECTED
84-11 336 Appendix R
84-16 75 Routine, Resident
84-17 160 Post-accident sampling system, post accident effluent
!
monitoring, radiation monitoring and in plant radio-
iodine measurements
84-18 68 Quality Assurance Program
84-19 67 Design change and modification program and maintenance
84-20 30 Security
84-21 164 Emergency Preparedness
84-22 171 Routine, Resident
84-23 151 Routine, Resident
84-24 26 Nonradiological chemical program
84-25 46 Degraded Grid Voltage procedures
84-26 35 Radiation Protection
84-27 120 Routine, Resident
85-01 135 Routine, Resident
85-02 38 In-Service Inspection Program and Welding
85-03 66 Emergency Preparedness
85-04 30 Transportation activities
85-05 33 Materials procurement, receipt, storage and hardling
85-06 137 Routine, Resident
l
85-07 60 Cycle 8 post refueling startup testing
TWW = ~" ~~
M "#- ' '
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T-1-2
INSPECTION INSPECTION
REPORT NO. HOURS AREAS INSPECTED
85-03 ---
Operator Licensing Examinations
85-09 147- Routine, Resident
85-10 68 Document control and corrective action program
85-11 34 Security
-85-12 142 Emergency Preparedness
85-13 ---
Operator Licensing Examinations
85-14 149 Routine Resident
85-15 871 Performance Appraisal
85-16 115 Routine, Resident
85-17 33 Alara, pre-outage
85-18 127 Integrated Leak Rate Testing
85-19 82 Circumstances surrounding mispositioned root valves
for steam generator pressure transmitters
85-20 290 Refueling, Resident
85-21 66 Radiological chemical measurements program
85-22 30 Welding and eddy current testing
85-23 31 Inservice Inspection Program
85-24 28 Security
85-25 ---
NRC and licensee management meeting report
85-26 38 Outage health physics
85-27 15 Circumstances surrounding inoperable Channel A low
85-28 160 Corrective actions taken for RPS channel A low SG
pressure trip deficiency
85-29 102 Fuel load verification, startup testing, surveillance,
and calibration of maintenance and test equipment
85-30 187 Routine, Resident
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T-2-1
TABLE 2
INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)
MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
HOURS % OF TIME
1. Plant Operations ..................... 1927 41
2. Radiological Controls ..................... 432 9
3. Maintenance ..................... 412 9
4. Surveillance ..................... 522 11
5. Fire Protection ..................... 364 8
6. Emergency Preparedness ..................... 399 9
7. Security and Safeguards ..................... 120 3
8. Refueling ..................... 487 10
9. Licensing Activities ..................... NA NA
- Total 4663 100%
- Allocations of inspection hours vs. Functional Areas are approximations based
upon inspection report data.
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T-3-1
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l TABLE 3
i
VIOLATIONS (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)
MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
A. Number and severity Level of Violations
,
Severity Level
L
,
,
TOTAL 9
B. Violations vs. Functional Area Severity Levels
FUNCTIONAL AREAS I II III IV V
1. Plant Operations
i 2. Radiological Controls 4
3. Maintenance 1
4. Surveillance
.
5. Fire Protection 1
7. Security and Safeguards 1
8. Refueling 1
9. Licensing Activities
' Totals 1 6 2*
- 0ne Level V violation was issued for deficiences in the area of Quality
Assurance.
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T-3-2
Inspection Inspection
Number Dates _ Subject Requirements Severity
84-11 10/22-26/84 Redundant trains of safe shut- 10 CFR 50 IV
down equipment located in App. R
reactor MCC rooms did not have
required fire protection
provided.
84-17 10/9-12/84 Installation for effluent NUREG-0737 IV
monitoring of particles and II.F.1-2
radioiodine was insufficient
to provide representative
samples. High range radiation
monitors in containment were not
environmentally qualified.
84-18 9/13-17/84 Failure to audit results of T.S. V
actions taken to correct
deficiencies.
84-20 8/27-31/84 Failure to adhere to the Train- Physical IV
ing and Qualification Plan. Security Plan
84-22 10/4-11/12/84 Failure to monitor containment T.S. IV
atmosphere for leakage by a sys-
tem sensitive to radioactivity.
84-26 12/10-14/84 Transport of licensed material 10 CFR IV
without copies of drawings and 71.12
documents referenced in the (c)(1)
certificate of compliance.
85-04 2/12-15/85 Failure to conduct a complete 10 CFR IV
quality control program on two 20.311
radioactive waste shipments. (d)(3)
85-05 2/11-15/85 Failure to limit access in App. B-XIII V
warehouse and perform preventive
maintenance on items stored in
warehouse.
85-19 8/8-16/85 Three of four channels for the T. S. II
and RPS low SG pressure trip and
85-27 9/3-4/85 feedwater trip system were in-
operable because root valves in
the sensing lines were closed.
The fourth channel of the RPS
low SG pressure trip was in-
operable due to a design error.
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T-4-1
TABLE 4
TABULAR LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
Area Number /Cause Code Total
1. Plant Operations 3/A 1/B 4/D 1/E 2/X 11
2. Radiological Controls 0
3. Maintenance 5/A 1/B 1/0 7
4. Surveillance 1/A 3/E 4
5. Fire Protection 1/A 2/8 3
7. Security and Safeguards 0
8. Refueling 2/8 1/0 3
9. Licensing Activities 0
Total 28
Cause Codes A. Personnel Error............. 10
8. Design / Man./Const./ Install... 6
C. External Cause............... 0
D. Defective Procedures......... 6
E. Component Failure............ 4
X. Other........................ 2
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T-5-1
TABLE 5
LER SYNOPSIS (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)
LER NO. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION
84-08 Loss of Load reactor trip during plant startup.
84-09 Startup Rate trip during startup, and manual trip because post trip
review had not been completed prior to startup.
84-10 Four high energy line break isolation valves would not close.
84-11 Cracked shunt trip paddles in reactor trip breakers.
84-12 Loss of radiation sensitive reactor coolant leak detection method required
by TS.
84-13 Unsealed cable penetration in control room.
84-14 Fire protection deficiencies.
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84-15 Reactor trip due to turbine stop valve failure.
.
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84-16 Two plant trips caused by Feedwater system malfunctions.
!
84-17 Reactor trip on variable overpower resulting from overfeeding S/G.
84-18 Partially open containment integrity valve.
85-01 Out of service ECCS valve handwheel was not locked open as required by
T.S.
85-02 Manual reactor trip on high condenser differential pressure.
85-03 Unit trip due to personnel error when replacing suction pressure indi-
cator on the turbine-driven main feed pump.
85-04 Startup rate trip during reactor shutdown due to electronic noise.
'
85-05 Lack of administrative controls on vent and drain valves on primary com-
ponent cooling piping required for containment integrity.
85-06 Common mode failure of air supply piping for primary component cooling
water temperature control valves to each diesel engine.
85-07 Plant trip while repairing a feedwater flow recorder due to personnel
error.
85-08 Valve stem failures on hydrogen analyzer isolation valves.
,
.
.
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T-5-2
LER N0. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION
85-09 Steam generator pressure sensing line root valves not fully open.
85-10 RPS channel design error.
85-11 ECCS train inadvertent activation during shutdown.
85-12 Fire system sprinklers isolated without required fire watch.
85-13 Enviornmental Qualification of Rosemont transmitters.
85-14 Type A test failure due to integration of Type C test.
85-15 SIAS "A" train actuation during shutdown.
85-16 Plant trip on low steam generator level
85-17 Automatic and manual plant trip caused by spurious Excess Flow Check
Valve closures.
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T-6-1
TABLE 6
REACTOR SHUTDOWNS
Date Power Level Cause
10/6/94 100% Orderly shutdown to repair packing leak on CH-48
(charging header isolation).
11/3/84 80% Reactor Trip - #1 turbine stop valve caused secondary
side pressure spike, and low S/G 1evel trip. Cause
was component failure.
11/4/84 15% Reactor Trip - feed flow was excessive resulting in
a variable overpower trip. Cause was operator error.
11/6/84 80% Orderly shutdown to repair #1 turbine stop valve.
This repair was the result of the trip on 11/3/84.
11/10/84 99% Reactor Trip - turbine driven main feedwater pump
valve failed to open causing low S/G level trip.
Cause was component failure.
11/11/84 100% Reactor Trip - turbine driven main feedwater pump
recirculation valve failed open resulting in Reactor
Trip. Cause was component failure.
3/10/85 80% Manual Trip operators tripped the plant because
of an administrative limit on condenser differential
pressure. Cause was personnel error while altering
circulating water valve lineup.
i
4/30/85 95% Reactor Trip - loss of load trip due to personnel
error during maintenance.
5/4/85 100% Orderly shutdown to replace main generator exciter
diodes.
7/1/85 95% Reactor Trip - turbine trip due to maintenance per-
sonnel error.
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8/16/85 73% Refueling Outage.
10/23/85 4% Reactor Trip - low S/G level trip. Because of fail-
ures in the feedwater regulating circuit, operators
were controlling S/G level in manual for extended
periods. Cause was component failure.
10/24/85 20% Orderly shutdown - removal of #2 reactor coolant
pump anti-rotation device.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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T-6-2
Date Power Level Cause
10/25/85 25% Reactor Trip - variable overpower trip caused by
- 1 S/G excess flow check valve inadvertent closing.
Cause was improper maintenance.
10/26/85 30% Manual Trip - #3 S/G excess flow check valve shut.
Operators tripped plant. Cause was improper main-
tenance.
,
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T-7-1
TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES
1. NRR SITE VISITS
October 30-31, 1984 Management Meeting
November 9, 1984 SALP Meeting With Licensee
January 16-17, 1985 RETS Meeting
March 13-14, 1985 Final RETS Meeting
June 7-8, 1985 Plant Familiarization
September 18-19, 1985 Concrete Block Wall Inspection
2. SCHEDULED EXTENSIONS GRANTED
None
>
3. RELIEFS GRANTED
None
4. EXCEPTIONS GRANTED
Exception granted for compliance to a certain requirement of subsection III.G.2
of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 concerning separation in the Reactor Containment
Incore Instrumentation Area & Lower Pressurizer Cubicle.
5. LICENSE AMENDMENTS ISSUED
License Amendment No. 79 Technical Specifications (TS) Modification con-
cerning Manning of Shift and License Event
,
Reporting
License Amendment No. 80 TS Modification to Ensure Containment Integrity
t
License Amendment No. 81 TS Modification Concerning Operational Safety
Instrumentation, Control Systems, and Accident
l Monitoring Systems
License Amendment No. 82 TS Modification Concerning Reactor Containment
Integrity
License Amendment No. 83 TS Changes concerning Modifications to add a
Variable Setpoint to the Low Temperature Over-
!
pressure Protection System
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License Amendment No. 84 TS Changes to require more extensive inspection
of Steam Generator Tubes in Critical Areas
'
License Amendment No. 85 TS Changes to Reflect Power Distributions, In-
sertion Limits, Peaking Factors, and other
, characteristics for Cycle 9 Fuel Reload.
6. EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ISSUED
None
7. ORDERS ISSUED
None
8. Licensing Actions Completed
Seismic & Other Qualifications on 8" Ven/ Purge Valve 52173
Emergency Exercise Exemption Request 54431
Appendix I Tech. Spec. Implement Review 07752
4
Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electric Equipment 42490
Seismic Qualification of AFW System 48582
Fire Protection 48582
Appendix J Tech. Spec. Change 48632
Detailed Control Room Design Review Program 51173
2nd ISI Interval 52011
Control of Heavy Loads 52241 l
Post Trip Review Program Description and Procedures 522770
Preventive Maintenance Program Reactor Trip Breakers 52130
Fire Protection-Extra Exemption Requests 53408 ;
Revised Definition of Containment Integrity 53449
'
Tech. Specs. Covered By Generic Letter 83-36 and 83-37 (0737) 54543
Thermal Shield Inspection and Repair 54958
!
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LTOP 54959
Neutron Source Data for Flux Reduction Verification 55044
Cask In Spent Fuel Pool 55092
Proposed Change 105 55296
Power Supplies For Safe Shutdown 56099
CEA Ejection Analysis 56775
Revised Confirmatory Order 56818
Backfit Determination for AFWS Turbine Driven Pump 58016
Backfit Determination - Testing Frequency of Auto Initiation Logic 58017
Emergency Feedwater Pump
Cycle 9 Core Performance Tech Specs. 58031
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[. , f Sa =%g* umTE] STATES ENCLOSURE 3
,, NUCLEA3 CECULATORY COMMISSION
"
- S nEcion i
9 'l j sai >Asen Avenut
% g ulna or rflUS$8A.MNh5YLVANI A 19406
Docket No. 50-309
- N 2 41986
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
ATTN: Mr. J. B. Randazza
Vice President
Nuclear Operations
83 Edison Drive
Augusta, Maine 04336
Gentlemen:
Subject:
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report No.
50-309/85-99
The NRC Region I SALP Board conducted a review on December 20, 1985 and evaluated
the performance of activities associated with the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.
The results of this assessment are documented in the enclosed SALP Board report.
A meeting has been scheduled for February 20, 1986 at the site to discuss this
assessment.
relating to thisThis meeting is intended to provide a forum for candid discussions
performance.
At the meeting,
to improve you should be prepared to discuss our assessment and your plans
performance.
discussed at the meeting. Any comments you may have regarding our report may be
Additionally, you may provide written comments within
30 days after the meeting.
Following our meeting and receipt of your response, the enclosed report, your re-
sponse, and a summary of our findings and planned actions will be placed in the
NRC Public Document Room.
Your cooperation is apprecia'ed.
Sincerely,
.--
.
Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
Enclosure: HRC Region I SALP Report 50-309/85-99
.
.
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 2 JAN 24 198b
o
cc w/ enc 1:
C. E. Monty, President
C. D. Frizzle, Assistant Vice President / Manager of Operations
J. H. Garrity, Plant Manager
P. L. Anderson, Project Manager
G. D. Whittier, Licensing Section Head
J. A. Ritsher, Attorney (Ropes and Gray)
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of Maine
. .
.
B
[a + " * . ENCLOSURE 4
l
(.
O
EDISON DRIVE
MAIRE AT0ml0POWERCOMPARUe AUGUSTA, MAINE 04336
g (207) 623 3521
i vu ,
March 24,1986
FN-86-43 GDW-86-72
l
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Attention: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator
References: (a) License No. OPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)
(b) USNRC Letter to WAPCo dated January 24, 1986
(SALP Report No. 50-309/85-99)
Subject: SALP Report No. 50-309
Gentlemen:
This letter is in reference to the Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance Report No. 50-309/85-99, Reference (b). We found the report to be
a fair and accurate assessment of our performance over the evaluation period.
We were pleased that your evaluation indicated that our performance is
improving. We plan to continue our efforts to achieve excellence in all areas.
Very truly yours,
MAItE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER C0l4)ANY
-
'd.$ /it/ A
G. D. Whittier, Manager
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing
GDW/bjp
cc: Mr. Ahsok C. Thadani
Mr. Pat Sears
Mr. Cornelius F. Holden
\1 ,
Ay -
g(p M
7349L-GOW