ML20141E738
| ML20141E738 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1997 |
| From: | Curry D External (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141E632 | List: |
| References | |
| PP-02, PP-2, NUDOCS 9707010151 | |
| Download: ML20141E738 (13) | |
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" PARSONS PP-02 l O
MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PROJECT PROCEDURES
Title:
Accident Mitigation Systems Review l l
REVISION 2 l l
Prepared by:
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g h*M Date: b/27 7 Approved by: fws [M Date: 6/I2/97 adger, Compa Quality Program Approved by: 'D Date:
Project Direct [
REVISION HISTORY REVISION DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION 0 04/03/97 Procedure initiation 1 06/09/97 Incorporation of NRC Comments 2 06/27/97 Revision for AMSR Process Details
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PROJECT PROCEDURES
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l n TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW U REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 2 OF 13 i l
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES I l
l l Pace No. Revision No. Pace No. Revision No. l l
1 2 8 2 2 2 9 2 3 2 10 2 4 2 11 2 '
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 P U R P O S E . . ... . . ......... .. .. . ..... ..... . ... . ...... .... . ..... . . . 3 )
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2.0 D E FIN ITI O NS . .. .. ... . . .. . .. . . . ..... . .... ..... ... .. . .. ....... 3 3.0 A M S R B A S 15 .. ... ... . . .. . .. .... . ..... .. ..... . . . . ... .. .. . .. ..~... 3 4.0 RES O U R CES .... . ... . .. . ... . . ... .. . .. . . . .. . .... . .. 4 5.0 P R O CE D U RE ... .... .. .... ...... . . .. .... .. .......... . .... . . . . ... 4 5.1 CDC DEVELOPMENT - DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS . .. 7 5.2 CDC DEVELOPMENT -IDENTIFY CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS.. .9 5.3 CDC VERIFICATION -IDENTIFY AS. DOCUMENTED DESIGN . . .10 5.4 CDC VERIFICATION - COMPARE ANALYSIS TO AS-DOCUMENTED DESIGN.. .. . .11 5.5 CDC VERIFICATION - VALIDATE FSAR CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS.. . .12 t
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l a PARSONS PROJECT PROCEDURES O TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 3 OF 13 l
1.0 PURPOSE The Accident Mitigation Systems Review (AMSR) will identify and verify the critical design characteristics for accident mitigation systems and their components required to ,
meet the Design Bases Events (DBEv) identified in Chapter 14 of the Millstone Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analyses Report (UFSAR).
2.0 DEFINITIONS 2.1 Design Bases Event (DBEv) - Design Bases Events are defined as those initiating events as presented in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR and form the bases for the operating license of the Millstone Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant.
(-] 2.2 Critical Safety Functions (CSF) " Critical Safety Functions" are defmed as the required V specific set of activities that must occur in order to ensure that a success path associated with the design bas event mitigation is met and maintained.
2.3 Critical Design Characteristic (CDC) - A critical design characteristic is defined as that aspect of the functional / system design that must be provided to ensure that the system or component will meet the performance criteria identified in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR.
2.4 Critical Parameters - A numerical value associated with a CDC.
3.0 AMSR BASIS The following documents are the basis for the ICAVP AMSR
- Chapters 14,6,7,8 and 9 of the UFSAR
- Accident Analyses & Supporting Calculations
- Technical Specifications
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-PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW i
V REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 4 OF 13 1
- Design Basis Documents (DBD) l
- System P& ids & Diagrams
- System Design Descriptions (SDD)
- Design Calculations e Emergency Operating Procedures
! . Safety System Logic Documents
. Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
. Regulatory Commitments 4.0 RESOURCES l The following resources are utilized to perform the AMSR
- System Engineer (O] e Accident Analyst
. Electrical Engineer i e Mechanical Engineer
. Controls Engineer
. Operations Engineer
. Tiet-2 Database 5.0 PROCEDURE l Overview: Determine the critical design characteristics for systems and components that must be confirmed in order to ensure that the plant complies with the safety analyses l
identified in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR. Validate the presence of the critical design l characteristics in the as-documented and installed plant design. The simplified process I flowchart is presented in Exhibit 2-1. The DBEv groups covered by this procedures are identified in Exhibit 2-2.
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Exhibit 2_1 m
-4 AMSR Process 3 33 0 'O FSAR Chapter 14m k
- 0 2 r identify Develop 59 m u)
Tech. Spec w Define Each Develop System r
Emera Op PrC Critical A Safety
+ Generic Safety '
F Boundary Diagrams o
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_t O r Safety Fm M Function -g Z
M Functions Diagram n "d a
g NNECo Data }
W O n- Reg. Review Lic. Requirements _
J Analysis Priority DBEv CDC .<
y to NRC for Review +To Tier 1 E O r-Review Critical Parameters &
8 Develop T2 Determhe Characteristics by System u h 32 LM o > Database + Design Y Critical r m
g ITI -4 Structure Basis Events Characteristics 4 .. g; OO o :$ 2 l
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y Documented > Documented Design 4 j( l71 4 g Design Validation T
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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 6 OF 13 1
l I Exhibit 2 2 l DBEv GROUPS l
DBEv Variation )
Increase in Heat Removal Decrease in Feedwater Temperature by the Secondary System Increase in Feedwater Flow Increase in Steam Flow Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve l Steam Pipe Failure Inside and Outside containment Decrease in Heat Removal Loss of External Load by the Secondary System Turbine Trip Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow Decrease in Reactor IAss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow p Coolant System flow Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure Reacthity and Power Uncontrolled Control Rod Bank Withdrawal From a Distribution Anomalies Suberitical or Lew Power Startup Condition Uncontrolled Control Rod / Bank Withdrawal at Power Control Rod Misoperation Startup of an Inactive Loop CVCS Malfunction That Results'in a Decrease in the Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant Control Rod Ejection Accident Decrease in Reactor Inndvertent Opening of a Pressurizer PRV Coolant inventory Steam Generator Tube Failure - Rad Consequences LOCA From Breaks in the RCP Boundary Radioactive Releases from Waste Gas System Failure a Subsystem or component Fuel Handling Accident Spent Fuel Cask Drop Accident Non-Standard Review Plan Containment Analyses Events Hydrogen Accumulation in Containment Radiological Consequences of the Design Bases Accident i
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PP-02
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l f 5.1 CDC DEVELOPMENT - DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop
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! e System Boundary Diagrams
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- Tier-2 Database Structure Action 1.1 Review UFSAR Chapter 14 and identify design bases events by groups (refer to Exhibit 2-2).
l l 1.2 Evaluate DBEv groups to identify Critical Safety Functions essential to achieve and maintain a controlled condition following an event. (e.g. RCS Heat Removal, i Reactivity Control, RCS Inventory Control, etc.) .
1.3 Define Critical Safety Function objectives and system level processes / actions to achieve objectives.
1.4 Create generic Critical Safety Function Diagrams for each Critical Safety l
Function.
j 1.5 Identify system level active components that support the process or action.
(Example shown as Exhibit 2-3) 4 O
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i e. TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW
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REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 8 OF 13 1.6 Develop a Boundaly Diagram for each System involved with the DBEv.
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l 1.7 Develop a data base structure to record the system and component critical characteristics and parameters for each DBEv.
I Exhibit 2-3 SAFETY FUNCTION DIAGRAM l
I.oss of Feedwater Flow I
RC3 Pressure & Reactmty inventory Control Control
""**"**I Memtes Meatma insert Concel Piumde weis es l
Remar Pmesure et ? Pets
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! Component Critical Design Criteria i
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5.2 CDC DEVELOPMENT-IDENTIFY CRITICAL CIIARACTERISTICS AND l PARAMETERS Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop
= Functional / system level critical characteristics a Database file and reports of the critical parameter for each system and DBEv safety function.
- Discrepancy report Action 1.1 Review each FSAR chapter 14 DBEv, including supporting analyses and calculations, to identify design requirements. Using the Critical Safety Function Diagrams, identify functional / system level critical characteristics for each DBEv.
1.2 Using the System Boundary Diagrams identify the components and their critical parameters essential to achieving the functional / system critical characteristics for each DBEv.
1.3 Identify additional component design requirements from FS AR chapters 6,7, 8, and 9.
1.4 Enter DBEv critical characteristics and parameters into the Tier 2 database (T2DB) .
1.5 Document source of analyses parameters and key assumptions.
j 1.6 If an inconsistency exists, a discrepancy report shall be prepared in accordance l
with the discrepancy report process (PP-07).
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q TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 10 OF 13 l
1.7 Submit the DBEv functional / system level critical characteristics to the NRC for review.
1.8 Provide system and component critical design data to Tier I for Systems selected .
l for review.
5.3 CDC VERIFICATION -IDENTIFY AS-DOCUMENTED DESIGN l
l Purnose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop
= Critical System / Component listing including performance requirements and capabilities
. Discrepancy Reports (V]
Action l 1.1 Develop system composite database for critical safety function systems using documented information (plant design drawings, calculations, DBDs, etc.).
I 1.2 List component design performance requirements into the T2DB.
j 1.3 Document references and source information used to identify the important to safety components and systems.
1.4 If a component or system is found to contain a discrepancy, a discrepancy report shall be prepared in accordance with the discrepancy report process (PP-07).
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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 l DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 11 OF 13 '
l 5.4 CDC VERIFICATION- COMPARE ANALYSIS TO AS-DOCUMENTED l DESIGN i
l Purpose
( 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop
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l Comparison of the T2DB "as-documented" parameters with the AMSR ;
requirements for critical systems / components.
- Discrepancy Report I
Action 1.1 Compare the critical design characteristics and parameters versus the as-i documented design for 100% of the functional / system level characteristics derived
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! 'V from FSAR chapters 14,6,7,8 and 9.
l 1.2 Review Emergency Operating Procedures versus critical design characteristic to determine consistency.
1.3 Document the following information:
Critical system / component design requirement from the FSAR DBEv review
. As-Documented configuration and references a
Confirmation that the as-documented design meets the design requirement 1.4 Discrepancies between "as-documented" and "as-analyzed" data will be identified in a discrepancy notice and resolved in accordance with PP-07.
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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 12 OF 13 5.5 CDC VERIFICATION - VALIDATE FSAR CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to e
Validate that the Functional / System level Critical Design Characteristics are present in the installed plant design.
Action l.1 Validate 100% of the functional / system level critical characteristics derived from FSAR chapters 14,6,7, 8 and 9. Tirs validation will be based on review of plant test data, Technical Specifications, calculations, or attemate methods, as appropnate.
l.2 Tier 1 personnel will validate that the Critical Design Characteristics are in place and properly documented for the NRC selected systems.
13 Tier 2 personnel will validate that the Critical Design Characteristics are in place and properly documented for the remaining systems.
1.4 For Tier 1 systerr.s, the Tier 1 Team will validate the Critical Design I
Characteristics. The SVSR Team will provide the validation through responses on the Tier 2 Validation form. An example of the Verification Form is shown as Exhibit 2-4.
1.5 Systems and components not meeting the Critical Design Characteristics will be identified as a discrepancy in accordance with PP-07.
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(.) TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 2 DATE: 06/27/97 PAGE 13 OF 13 1
Exhibit 2-4
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AMSR-CDC Verification Form AMSR- -
System:
Component:
Characteristic:
Parameter (s):
T2 Engineer:
Date: .
1 Comoonent Location:
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Testino/ Surveillance Document l Name:
tO Number:
'u Revision:
Data found!
Characteristic Found - O -
Characteristic Verified - O Discrepancy - O Characteristic Missing - 0 Assessment of Effect from missino characteristic:
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\ Engineer Signature: Date:
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