ML20141B777
| ML20141B777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1986 |
| From: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141B760 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0654, RTR-NUREG-654 PROC-860331, NUDOCS 8604070105 | |
| Download: ML20141B777 (23) | |
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o-SFABRDOK STATION March 1986 FNFNBinf CIASSIFICATIGE SYS'DM Page 1 of IR CROSS REMMNCF WM11 APPENDIX 1 OF NIRFr06%
INUSilAL EVENT NURkB - 06% EXAWlE SFABROOK STATI(N FWRGFJOf CINDITION DISCIISSI(N
- 1. Bnergency Core Cooling Syst m (ECCS) initiated 14a. (*) Reactor trip or safety injection See Attachment I and discharge to vessel. WIDEXfr return to nomal n1=it procedures l 2. Radiological effluent taledd i.Mifistim 12a. Site botniary dele boily dose rate Consistent with NURFfr06% exmple.
) limits exceeded ~> 0.06 mR/hr h is done rate is the instantaneous
- ' technical specification Raseous effluent limit for Seahwa Station.
- 3. Ebel dmage indication. Duseples:
i
- a. High offgas at IWR air ejector monitor (greater than 500.000 tC1/sec; corresponding Ibt applicable l
or an to 16 isotopes increase decayed of 100.000 to 30within uCi/see minutes;F a
minute time period)
- b. High coolant activity smple (e.g., 8a. Reactor coolant gross activity > 60 Seabrook Station neergency con 11 tion exceeding coolant technical specifications tCi/ce. as fruticated by letdown ~ conservatively aAfresses the i for iodine spike) m uitor ant chemistry s m pling NURFr06% exayles.
' results.
- c. Failed fuel monitor (LWR) indicates increase greater than 0.1% equivalent fuel falltres j within 30 minutes
(*) Rese designations are fran Baergency Response Procedure ER-1.1, " Classification of Deergencies".
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n =s0. i 8604070105 960402 PDR ADOCK 05000443 p PDR 1
Page 2 of 18 UNLEUAI. EVDfr (Continued)
NLME - 06% EXA WIE SEAllH00K STATION DFJIGNCY CtNDITION DISCIESION
- 4. Abnormal coolant temperature and/or pressure or lla. Initiation of shutdown to Omstatent with NtRfr,-06% exanple abnormal fuel teasperatures outside of technical the cold condition as requir specification limits by technical specifications 1 ,,)
- 5. Exceeding either primary / secondary leak rate 11a. Initiation of shutdown to the cold Omststmt with NURfD-06% exanple technical specification or primary systems leak condition requ rate technical specification specifications )by technical
- 6. Failure of a safety or relief valve in a safety 14a. Reactor trip or safety injection Consistent with NURFL-06% example relatal systen to close following reduction of WI~INDUT re applicable pressure procedures )to normal plant
- 7. Ines of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power 6a. Bus E5 AND E6 cannot be powered fross Cmaistent with NUR.'T,-06% example capability an offsite source 6b. Bus E5 and E6 carnot be powered frosn the diesels.
- 8. loss of contairment integrity requirirg shutdom 11a. Initiation of shutdown to the cold Consistent with N1ME-06% example by technical specifications condition as r specifications 4 j{ )red by technical
- 9. ioss of engineered safety feature or fire protection lla. Initiation of shutdown to the cold Consistent with NURFE-06% example system fmetion requiring shutdom by technical condition as r red by technical specifications (e.g., because of malfmetion, specifications )
personnel error or procedural inadequacy)
!UTE: Seabrook Station technical specifi-cations do not require shutdown due to fire protection malfmetton.
(**) See page 18 for footnotes listing specific technical specification sections.
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Page 3 of 18 LNUSUA1. EVENT (Continued)
NIREG - 06% EXAMPIE SEABanOK STATI(N FNFKJNOf CONDITION DISCIESI(N
- 10. Fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minutes 16a. Fire in protected area > 10 minutes Consistent with NtRE-06% exmple Wint no impact on safety related equipment.
II. Indications or alams in process or effluent 9a. loss of VAS _AND hardwirsi alam systen Consistent with NURE-06% exmple parmeters not functional in control rcxu to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other 9b. Failure of qualified RIMS panel (CP-180) significant loss of assessmet or countmi-cation capability (e.g., plant camputer, 9c. Ioss of local and remote met tower data Safety Parmeter Display Systan, all meteorological instrumentation) 9d. loss of automatic and reanual SPDS 10a loss of all control rcxa ecnsntmication
- 12. Security threat' or attempted entry c,r 18a. Hazards experienced or projecte! dich Consistent with NURFLO6% exmple attempted sabotage involve potential degraiation of station safety. NUIE: Incitsled here for security relatem! events are a security threat in a vital area, an attempted entry in a vital area (with malicious intent) or an attempted sabotage in a vital area
- 13. Natural phencumenon being experienced or projected 184. Hazards experienced or projected which Consistent with NURFLO6% exmple beyond usual levels involve potential degraiation of sta-tion safety. NDIE: Incitsled here for
- a. Any earthquake felt in-plant or detected on natural phenomena are seimnic activity station seismic instnmentation less than OBE levels, tomaio observed to strike the site, a hurri-
- b. 50 year flood or low water, tatsunt, hurricane cane w rning in effect for the site surge, seich environs, or a tidal wve wrning for Rampton and Seabrook beaches.
- c. Any tornado on site
- d. Any hurricane 11 At%V).3
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UNUSUAL EW Nr (Continued)
NUR E-0654 EXMflE SEABROOK STATION FMRrhNCV GNDITim DISCIESTON
- 14. Other hazards being experienec4 or projected 18a. Hazards experienced or projected d ich Consistent with NURE-0654 cxanple involve potential degradation of j a. Aircraf t crash on-site or musual activity station safety. NITIE: Incitsled here for i over facility other hazards are aircraft crash on-
' site or tsussual alteraft activity over
- b. Train derailment on-site the site, train derailment on-site, near
.i site or onsite explosion, near site or
- c. Near or on-site explosion onsite toxic or flamunable gas release or
- plant shutdom due to turbine d%e 2
- d. Near or on-site toxic or flaunable gas release without casing penetration.
l e. harbine rotating cosponent failue causing i rapid plant shutdown i
4 Critical Safety Punctions (GF) Cmsistent with NURE-0654 example Status tree indicators;
) 15. Other plant conditions exist that w rrant increased C Yellow awareness on the part of a plant operating staff or H Yellow (Except FR-H.5)
State and/or local offsite authorities or require P Yellow p' ant shutdom mder technical specification require- Z Yellow ments or involve other than nonnal controlled shut-I down (e.g., cooldom rate exceeding technical spect- 11a. Initiation of shutdown to the cold fication limits, pipe cracking fomd during operation) conditionasregedbytechnical specifications 14a. Reactor trip or safety injection W11H0tfr return to nonmal plant procedures l
(**) See page 18 for footnotes listing specific technical specification sections 11ht%50.4 9
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Page 5 of 18 UNLSthL EVDir (Cmtinued)
NUitEC-0654 EXAMPIE SFAM00K STATION HOCH4CY (INDITHW DISCIESI(N 18a. Hazards experienced or projected d ich involve potential degrafation of static:
safety. N[IIE: Incltsled here is the df . 341m of the Shift Superintendent that an event is in progress or has occurred d ich indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the station.
- 16. Transportation of contminated injured individual 19a. Biergency transport of containated and Consistent with MRFC-0656 esuunple ~
fras site to offsite hospital injured person to local support hospital
- 17. Rapid depressurization of IMt secondary side. CSF status tree indicators Consistent with MRFC-0654 example H Yellow P Yellow 14a. Reactor trip or safety injection WITNDUT return to nonnal plant procedures 11/?t%50.5
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MREG-06% EXMetE ceABROOK STATIG1 PMitCFNY (XE8DITIN DISCUS"> ION
- 1. Severe loss of fuel claddirg
- a. High offgas at IMt air ejector monitor (greater Not applicable than 5 ci/sec; correspond 1rg to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes)
- b. Very high coolant activity sa ple (e.g., 8b. Reactor coolet gross activity Consistent with NURGO6% exmple 300 uCi/cc equivalent of 1-131) > 600 uC1/cc or dose equ! valent T-131 ,> 300 uct/ce.
- c. Failed fuel monitor (14t) indicates increase greater than 11 fuel failures within 30 minutes or total fuel failures
- 2. Rapid gross failure of one staan generator th 6a. Bus E5 and E6 camot be pnuered Consistent with NURG06% exmple with loss of ofisite power fram an offsite source.
NG 7a. Primary to secondary leakage greater than 500 apd. or stem generator specific activity greater than 0.1 uct/cc dose egiivalent I-131
- 3. Rapid failure of steam generator tubes (e.g., 7b. Indication of a steam generator tube consistent with NIRLO6% exmple several htsidred spa primary to seccMary npture by mergency procedure E-3 leak rate)
- 4. Steam line break with significant 'e.g., greater 7b. IMication of a steam generator tube . Consistent with NistECME% exmple than 10 gpm) primary to secondary leek rate (IWt) rupture by emergency procedure E-3 or PEIV malftsiction causing laakaee (IMt) 11/M%50.6
Page 7 of 18 Alarr (Caitinued)
NIEEC-06% DEAWE *E:ABil00K STATIGI iMBWJECY CGmlTION DISCIESION -
- 5. Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpa 15b. Iteactor coolant leak > 50 mps Consistent with NIREU-06% exmple
- 6. Radiation levels or airborne contamination d ich 12b. Site houndary sole body dose rate Consistent with NUREE-06% exmple indicate a severe degradation in the control of > 0.6 mit/hr or increase in one or ratioactive materials (e.g., increase of factor of more area radiation monitors by >~
1000 in direct r=11ation readirus within facility). 1000
- 7. Irms of offsite power and loss of all onsite AC 6c. Bus E5 and E6 camot be pourred Consistent with NUREC-06% example power (see Site Area IberFency for extended loss) frun the diesels or an offsite nource to the operable train.
- 8. loss of all onsite DC power (see Site Area Bnergency 6d. Simultaneous loss of vital DC Consistent with NIRFE-06% exmple for extended loss) busses 11A.118.11C & IID
- 9. (bolant pump seizure leading to fuel failure 8b. Iteactor coolet gross activity > Consistent with NURIT',-06% example 600 uC1/cc dose equivalent 1-13T J,300 uC1/cc 17a. Control ikxus evacuation anticipated Consistent with NtRITME% example or required with safe shutdown capahility established.
- 10. Camplete loss of any ftmetion needed for plant 18b. Hazards experienced or projected cold shutdown drich involve subs e ttal degratation of station safety.
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e Page A of 1R AIERr (Continued)
NUkED-06% EXAMP!I SFABR00K STATION FWRCPNCY CnNDITION DISrtESION
- 11. Failure of the reactor protection systen to CSF status tree indicator; Consistait wim NtRE,-06% exmple initiate armi cosplete a serm sich brings the reactor stecritical S Orarme
- 12. Ebel d= mage accident with release of radioactivity 13a. Ebel damage accident with release Consistent with NtRm-06% exmple, to contairmwnt or fuel handling building of radioactivity
- 13. Fire potentially affectirg safety systans 16b. Fire potentially affecting safety Consistent with NURFTA6% example, related syntans
- 14. test or all alatus (annunciators) lost 9e. VAS AND. hardwired alane systen not Consistent with NIRFE-06% exmple, fisictTHnal for greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Continuent on stable plant corwittion and with stable plant conditions. throts:bott restoratim period, a period of tw> hours provides for restorire the lost syntaa.
- 15. Radiolological effluents greater than 10 times 12b. Site botniary hle taly dose rate (bnsistent with MDFC-06% exmple, tectinical specifications instantaneous limits > 0.6 mR/hr or increase in one or Site boundary done rate is ten times (an instantaneous rate d ich, if continued over more area radiation monitors by > the instantancotm tecnnical specifi-2 hours, would re ult in about 1 mr at the site 1000. cation gaseous effliwnt limit, botsidary snier average meteorological conditions)
- 16. Ongoirs security comprmise 18b. Hazards experienced or prola ted Consistent with NIRFE-06% example, which involve substantial degradation of staticri safety. N[ FIT.: Incitated here for security events in an on-anirut security comprcanise in a vital area.
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t Page 4 of 1 A AIERT (Cbntinumi)
NtRHME% EXAM E SEARN10K STATION DHGNrY (X)pmITimi DISC,IESirm
- 17. Several natural gdwnounma beira experienced 18b. Hazards experienced or protected Consistent with MRW,-06% exmple or projected sich involve substantial dearmiation of station safety. MRE: Inc1tated natural
- a. Earthquake greater than OBE levels phermma are ORE earthquake, tornado striking and damaging facility, sus-
- b. Flood, low water, tsmasi, hurrieme surge, tained hurricane force winds exeecting seiche near design levels 90 mph or site flonding meer level approaching the top of the sea all.
- c. Any tornmlo striking facility
- d. Itzrricane winds near design basis level
- 18. Other hazards beirg experienced or projected 18b. Hazards experiencat or protected Consistent with Mmm,-06% exmple dich involve substantial deara-
- a. Aircraft crash on facility dation of station safety. NrfrE:
Incitated here are aircraft crash or
- b. Missile impets fran datever source on missle impact on plant structures or facility campanents, station dwe caused by explosion, toxic or fl M le gases
- c. Known explosion damage to facility affecting d ich may be or are in concentrations plant operation dich may affect station operations, or turbine failure with easing pme-
- d. Entry into facility environs of moontrallat tration.
toxic or flaunable gases
- e. Turbine failure causing casirm penetration
- 19. Other plmt conditions exist that wrrar.t pre- 18b. Hazards experienced or projectei which Consistent with NLRW,-06% exmple cautionary activation of technical stprort any involve substantial degradation cmter arsi placing near-site Bnergency Operations of station safety. N[UEr Inclisted bere Facility and other key emnergency persannel cn standby is the Shift Sigerintendent discretion that an event has occurrai dich involves an actual or potential stestantial degrata-tion of the level of safety of the station.
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9 Pane 10 of 1A AIBff (Omtinued) mg m SFABROOK STATIM DGGSICY CONDITION DISOESIN
- 20. Evacuation of Control Rooms anticipated or 17a. Anticipated or required with safe Gesistet with NUMG-06% example required with control of shutdown systens shutdans capability estat.lished established from local stacions 11/4'30.10
e Page iI of 18 SITE AREA DtJtCDeCY NLRL-06% EXA NiE SEARRLIAt STATIOi Uf3tGDICY (DIDITION DISCIESIGN
- 1. Known loss of coolant accident greater than GF status tree indicator; Cmaistent with MRFT,-06% example, makeup ptmp capacity C Orange 15c. loss of Reactor or Secondary rmlet (E-1)
- 2. Degraded core with possible loss of coolable GF status tree indicator: Cmsistent with NittFP,-06% example geometry (indicators should include instru- C Orange metation to detect inadequate core cooling activity and/or contairmwnt radioscrivity 8c. Cbntainment post-IDCA monitors reading levels) 12.5E3 R/hr
- 3. Rapid failure of stema generator tubes (several 6a. Bus E5 and m cannot be p m ered consistent with NURIT.-06% exmple htmdred gpa Idage) with loss of offsite power frtze offsite source.
AND 7b. IndicattorM a stema generator tube rupture by m g.,.cv procedure E-3
- 4. BWR steam line break outside contairement with-out isolation M>t applicable
- 5. FWR steam line break with greater than 50 gpa 7b. Indication of a stems Renerator tube Consistent with NURFr,-06% example primary to secondary leakage arvi indication rupture by energency procedure E-3.
of fuel d=m,e g 8b. Reactor coolant gross activity > 600 uCi/cc or dose equivalent todirG - 131 activity 1300 uC1/ce.
- 6. Ioss of offsite power M loss of onsite AC power 6e. Bus E5 and m camot be powered frrie omststent with NLR10G-06% example for more than 15 minutes the diesels or an offsite source with-in 15 minutes to the operable train.
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. t Page 12 of 18 SITE AltEA DDGDICY (Continued)
M str-06% EXAlf!I SFABIK10K STATION DOCDICY C[MDITION DISOESION
- 7. loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 6f. Simultaneous loss of vital DC busses Consistent.with MRF,-06% exmple 15 minutes 11A 118,11C & IID for more than 15 minutes
- 8. Caplete loss of any ftmetion needed for plant hot shutdown CSF status tree indicator; H Red, S Ited Consistent with NURW,-06% ex>seple
- 9. Trasient requiring operation of shutdown GF status tree indicator; Consistent with MRK,-06% exmple, systems with failure to serm (continued power generation but no core d= age S lied immediately evident)
- 10. Ptajor d= age to spent fuel in contairunent or fuel 13b. Dropping heavy object onto irradiated fuel Consistent with MRW,-06% exmple, hadling building (e.g.. large object d = ages or loss of water in spent fuel pool or l fuel or water loss below fuel level) reactor cavity and irradiated fuel present.
l l 11. Fire cceptuaising the ftmettons of safety systems 16c. Fire affecting one train of safety Consistent with NURW,-06% cxmple, related equipment.
- 12. Ptut or all alarms (armteciators) lost and plant 9f. loss of VAS ADO hardwired alans systen transient initiated or in progress with an tmanticipated transient in Consistent with MRW,-06% exmple, proaress.
13a. Efiluent a]nitors detect levels corresparmling to 12c. Site hotadary teele body dose rate > Consistent with NURTME%.
greater than 50 ar/hr for % hour or greater 50 mR/hr or thyroid dose rate 2, ~ Actual meteoroloav is used for more than 500 mr/hr 13.8. for tim > mirutes (or five times 250 mram/hr accurate real time done estimates.
these levels to the thyroid at the site boundary for afverse meteorology 11/M%VI.12
e Page 13 of I A SITE AREA 98m3MY (Cbntinued) par--06% E(AffiE SEAmamK STATION DeGNCY OrMDITI(N DIS (ISSI0tt
- b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., raitatico level in contairunmt with leek rate appropriate for existing contairusent pressure) or are measured in the environs.
- c. EPA Protective Action Osidelines are projected to be exceeded outside the site tsumdary.
- 14. Inninent loss of physical control of the plant 18c. Hazards experienced or projected Consistent with MRFE-(M% exmaple.
dich involve major failures of station functions needed for public protection. N7IE: Incitsled here is a detenmination by the Shift Superintendent or notificacion by the Security Sigwr-visor that a physical attack or the station is in progress d ich will result in imminent ocesgotion of vital areas.
- 15. Severe natwal phenommal being experiences or 18c. Hazards experienced or projected dich projected with plant not in cold shutdome Consistent with NURFr,-06% example involve major failures of station fune -
tions needed for public protection. ImE:
- a. Earthquake greater than SSE levels Natural phenamena events incitste SSE earthquake, tornado or hurricme force
- b. Flood. Icma water, tstmast, hwricane surge wirs5s exceedirgt 10G aph; or site flond-meiche greater than design levels of failure inn as indicated by water level over the of procedction of vital equipment at lower see wall.
levels
- c. Sustairwd wirmis or tornados in excess cf design levels 11ht%%.13
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Page 14 of 1R SITE AREA ENEIGNCY NURFD-06% EXAMPE SEABF100K STATION DFEENCY CfNDITION DISCIESIGN
- 16. Other hazards being experiencal or projectal with 18c. Hazards experimcal or projectal ennsistme with FARFU-06% exmple plant not in cold shutdom shich involve major failures of station fmetions needal for phlic
- a. Aircraf t crash affecting vital structures by protection. PCTE: 1his incitates air-imp. set or fire. craft crash causing d mage or fire in any vital structures, severe damage to
- b. Severe dmage to safe shutdom equi; net fan safety related equipomt frtu missles missles or explosion or explostm, or mcontrolini release of fissnable or toxic gases into the
- c. Entry .,1 tricentrolled flassele gases into vital vital areas.
areas. Ehtry of uncontrolled toxic gases into vital areas eere lack of access to the area j m nstituras a safety proble.
- 17. Other plant conditions exist that mrrant activation 18c. Hazards experiencal or projected Cmsistent with NURFGO6% exmple of emergency centers and monitoring teans or a pre- shich involve major failures of l cautionary notiticatim to the public near the site station fmettons neede1 for pelic l protection. NOIE: Incitatal here is Shift Superintmient discretion that an evet is in progress ditch involves actual or likely failures of station fisrtions nental for public protection.
te. Evacuatim of control rotn .nl control of shutdom 17b. Evacuation without safe shutdom Consistent with FRjRFLO6% exmple swstes me established frca local stations in capability established within 15 minutes 15 minutes.
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Page 15 of 18 CDWRA1. ENDGM NUkm-0654 EXAMPiI SEAIGOOK STATION FNDONCY ONDITION DISOESION
- 1. a. Efflumt amitors detect levels corres;xrmling 12d. Site botniary sole toly dose rate > 1 consistent with MJRFT.-06% ex:pple, to i rm/hr W.B. or 5 ress/hr thyroid at the ress/hr or thyroid dose rate 15 rm7hr.
site bourmfary inter actual meterological ecnficions
- b. These dose rates are projected basal on other plant parameters (e.g., ra11ation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing contairment presure with some confir-mation frta effluent monitors) or are measured in the environs CFS status tree indicators; consistent with FAJRFT.-06% example.
- 2. Loss of 2 or 3 fission product barriers with a C Orange AND Z Red potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g., loss of primary coolant botniary, clat failure, s:mt high Z Rai AND 20a Failure to isolate contairamt potential for loss of contairment)
- 3. loss of physical control of the facility 18d. Hazards experienced or projected d ich '
Consistent with FAJRrT.-0654 exmple, involve substantial core degralation armi/cr gross loss of contairment integrity. FUIE:
Inclisted here for a security event is a determination by the Shift Superintermient oc notification by the Security Stpervisor that a physical attack m the plant has resulted in mauthorirst personnel occupving a vital area.
- 4. Other plant conditions exist, frm datever source, GF status tree indicators; Consistent with NURFr 06% exmple, that mare release of large amomts of ratioactivity bl$ Mt!m D th N b fic' kx*a E lkT '
s.9 wnces below. C Orange g Z Red C Orange g H Rat i 1/M%50.15
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I Page 16 of 1 A GDEllAL DUQNCY (Cbntinued)
NtatEG-06% EXAffiI SFABannK STATI(BI DG31GHrY CIMDITION DISC 119Sf0N 5.a. Small arsi large IDCNs with failure of EECS to CSF status tree indicator; Corisintent. with MRFC-06% exmple perform leading to severe core degraiatice or melt in fram minutes to hours. Ultimate failure C Red of containment likely for melt sequmees.
(Several hours likely to be available to complete
( protective actions tsiless contairment is not isolatal) l b. Trmstent initiated by loss of feeducer ed conden- .
l sate systems (principal heat removal systema) follcmaM H Raf ADO 6e. linergency pauer IM restored Consistent with MRFC-06% exmple by fa11tre of asergency feeducer system for entendet to at Tcast one
- rain of operabTe safety period. Core meltirm possible in several hours, relatal equissient within 15 minutes.
Ultimate failure of contairusmt likely if core melts,
- c. hansient requiring operation of shutdown systemas C Red Consistent with NIRFG-06% ermple
! with failure to scran drich results in core damage or H ped Aim 6e. IW #i est F4 canot be l additional failure of core cooling and askew systens gewermTTrcs the d u sels or e offatte j (dtich could lemi to core melt) source within 15 minutes.
Consistent with NURFC-06% cxmple
.t. Failure of offstre arsi onsite gewer along with total H lied AfD C Orarwe loas of energency fe.dwater makeg capability for H Red 'AlEl 6e. Bus E5 and E6 casmot be l several hours. Would lead to ev e tuni core melt pouereTTrcus the diesels or e offsite I arsi likely failtre of cor.tairment. source within 15 minutes.
l e. Small IDCA and initial *y successful E0CS. Subsequent C Orange _AND Z lla! Consistent with M'RFG-06% exmple l failure of cmtairment tmat re= ural systane over
! several hours could leaf to core melt and likely l tallure of cuntatremt.
i MEE: Piast likely contairemet failure mode is melt-through l with release of gases only for dry contairunent; quicker att larger releases likely for ice corstenser contairammt for melt sequmees. Quicker releases expected for failure of contairment isolation systes for any E%t.
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- e Pane 17 of 18 CDERAL DERGMCY (Continued)
]SE8n-06% DUMU SEABRDOK STATIM FMR2NCY (ENDITi(38 DISCIESI(N
- 6. 5'===ple of 54t Sequmees Not applicable
- a. hansient (e.g.. loss of offsite power) plus failure of requisite core shutdomes .ystems (e.g.. scram).
Could lead to core melt in several hours with contairummt failure likely. It>re severe consequmees it pasaps trip does not ftmetion.
- b. Small or large LOCA's with failure of EOCs to perform leadirg to core melt degralation or melt in minutes to hours. loss of contairunent integrity may be issninent.
- c. 9 mall or large IDCA occurs armi contairmnent performance is insuccesstul affectirg longer term success of the EECS. Could lemi to core degradation or melt in several hours wittout contairunent boarmiary.
- d. Shutdone occurs but requisite decay heat removal systemas (e.g.. lHt) or non-safety systsums heat reumaval means are termiered tasavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur in ahme ten hours with stesequent contairument failure.
- 7. hty major internal or external events (e.g.. fires. 16d. F' ire affecting both trains of safety Consistent with NURE-06% exmaple, earthquakes. substastially beyond design basis) which related equipment could casse massive ccommon damage to plant systemas results in aiy of the above. 18d. Hazards experienced or projected idtich involve stestantial core degralation and/or gross loss of ctvitairument intestrity. NUIE:
Included is Shift Sgerintendet discretion that an event is in progress or has occurred iditch involves actual or inuminent stestantial core degralation or meltirw with potettal loss of contairunent integrity.
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Pase IR of 1 A Footretes for Specific Tecimical Specification Sections:
- 1. Tecimical Specificatim 3.4.9.1
- 2. Tectmical Specification 3.4.6.2
- 3. Tectnical Specitication 3.4.6.2
- 4. Tecimic41 Specitication 3.6.1.1
- 5. Tectmical Specifications 3.5.3. 3.5.4. 3.6.2.1, 3.6.3. 3.6.2.2
- 6. Tectmical Specifications 3.1.1.1, 3.1.2.2. 3.1.2.4. 3.1.2.6 3.3.2. 3.4.1.3. 3.4.4. 3.4.6.1, 3.4.6.2. 3.4.7. 3.4.9.1 3.4.11, 3.5.3. 3.5.4. 3.6.1.1. 3.6.1.3. 3.6.1.4. 3.6.1.5 3.6.1.7. 3.6.2.1, 3.6.2.2. 3.6.3. 3.6.5.1, 3.6.5.2 3.6.5.3. 3.7.1.1, 3.7.1.4. 3.7.3. 3.7.4. 3.7.5. 3.8.1.1, 3.8.2.1, 3.8.3.1, 3.8.4.2 11/tf%50.1R J
s Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT 1 The station recognizes that the subject EAL does not classify inadvertent safety injection (without degraded plant conditions) as an Unusual Event mder the plan. We do consider however, that such declarations in the absence of an actual or potential degraded safety state, to be contrary to the purposes set forth in NUREG 0654 in that such classifications tend to desensitize both onsite and offsite participants to bonified energency conditions and create unwarranted and inappropriate stress in the population at large.
Potential reduction of plant safety does not result from inadvertent safety injection alone when other degraded conditions are absent. Fhergency response procedures, ES-0.1 and ES-1.1 based on Westinghouse Owners Group Guidelines, assure the continued safety state of the plant through verification of reactor coolant subcooling, stem generator heat sink, reactor coolant pressure either
. stable or increasing and that the pressurizer level is on span. The evaluation of these and other conditions, indicates that the plant is in a safe con-figuration and that safety injection flow can be teminated. The technique of sequential flow reduction assures that positive control of the plant safety state is maintained during the recovery from safety injection actuation.
Degraded conditions if detected during the perfomance of the emergency response procedures disallow return to nomal plant procedures and by definition result in the declaration of an thusual Event at minista. More serious degraded con-ditions such as faulted or ruptured steam generators, as well as the full spectrun of loss of coolant events are appropriately classified by other EAla defined in Procedure ER-1.1.
In addition, it is important to note that inadvertent safety injection actuation is a required NRC innediate notification report as defined in the New Hampshire Yankee Production reporting Manual (NPRE) section 6.0 (10CFR50.72). Also spe-cified in the NPRE is the submittal of a Licensee Event Report for safety injec-tion actuation (10CFR50.73 report). This report provides the NRC with a complete narrative description of the event including an assessnent of the safety consequences and implications.
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