ML20140F958
| ML20140F958 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1986 |
| From: | Constable G, Gilbert L, Ireland R, Tapia J, Tapio J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140F924 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-86-01, 50-498-86-1, 50-499-86-01, 50-499-86-1, NUDOCS 8604010230 | |
| Download: ML20140F958 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1986001
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APPENDIX B
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/86-01
Construction Permits: CPPR-128
50-499/86-01
CPPR-129
Dockets: 50-498
50-499
Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company
P. O. Box 1700
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Houston, Teu s 77001
Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas
Inspection Conducted: January 6 - February 28, 1986
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Inspectors:
!
.S//S/86
/
L
D. Gilbe~rt, Reactor Inspector, Engineering
Date'
Section
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apih, R6ac r Inspector, Engineering
Date
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-3//jf/92,
Approved:
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R. E. Ireland, Chief, Enginebring Section
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G. i_. CohTEabG CHT~ef, Reactor Projects
Date
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Section C
B604010230 860324
ADOCM 05000498
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted During January 6 - February 28, 1986 (Report 50-498/86-01;
50-499/86-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of design and construction
deficiencies and construction activities associated with welding safety.-related
reactor components and piping systems.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to
follow procedure, paragraph 3).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
- J. E. Geiger, Manager, Nuclear Assurance
- J. T. Westermeier, Project Manager
- T. J. Jordan, Project QA Manager
- A. C. McIntyre, Project Engineer
Other Personnel
EBASCO Services Inc. (ESI)
- R. M. Bedford, Construction Superintendent
- A. M. Cutrona, QA Manager
- J. R. Parks, QC Manager
- F. G. Miller, Welding Superintendent-
The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor employees
during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on February 14 and 28,1986.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on February 14 only.
2.
Review of Design and Construction Deficiencies
An inspection was conducted of selected deficiencies found in design and
construction which were reported pursuant to the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50.55(e) in order-to determine whether corrective actions were
taken as stated in submitted reports and whether engineering evaluations
were adequate and met regulatory requirements and commitments. 'The
following items were reviewed during this inspection:
a.
Undersized Beam Connections for Category I Structural Steel. During
' the 1978 design verification of the end connections for structural
steel beams in the Reactor Containment Building (RCB), a failure to
properly consider the application of certain postulated loads was
discovered. An expanded engineering review of Brown & Root (3&R)
design calculations was subsequently conducted by HL&P and revealed
additional examples of the failure to properly consider loadings and
loading combinations in the RCB internal steel design.
Engineering
evaluation of the beams in question concluded that, if left
uncorrected, the design deficiency would not have resulted in a signif-
icant safety hazard. Application of all required loads produced
bending stresses beyond the yield strength of the material, but less
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than the ultimate strength. This type of material behavior is
acceptable for localized areas subject to missile impact,. pipe whip,
design basis accident pressure loads, and safe shutdown earthquake
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forces. As a result of HL&P's consideration that-a generic problem
existed with B&R's design verification for structural steel design,
the specified corrective actions included reverification of all RCB
structural steel calculations. Per letter dated December 27, 1978,
HL&P committed to reverify and correct all RCB structural steel
calculations. On June 5,1979, HL&P submitted a final report on this
matter pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e). .This
submittal was subsequently deemed to be premature and therefore
reopened as described in the following paragraph.
b.
Beam to Column Connections. The final 50.55(e) report described in
the above paragraph was requested to be reopened on September 24, 1980,
for the following reasons:
(1) the reverification program had not been
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completed prior to the report submittal, (2) a significant deficiency
in the final design of installed structural steel was identified when
consideration was given to accident temperature conditions, and
(3) additional examples of a failure to consider all applicable loading
conditions were identified. Reanalysis and additional calculations
indicated the need for replacement of some connections with expansion
joints, the modification of certain connections, and the addition of
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stiffener and cover plates. .During this inspection, the NRC inspector
independently verified the reanalysis of structural steel in the RCB
at elevation 37'-3".
Loading and loadLg combinations for four beams
and their respective connections were randomly selected for independent
calculation. Drawings that were issued to the field for modifications
were also included in this review. -Selected details were verified by
. inspection. As a result of this inspection, the deficiencies discussed
in this and the preceeding paragraph are considered closed.
c.
Pipe Whip Restraint Welding Defects. On September 26, 1980, HL&P
notified the NRC of a potentially reportable item concerning defects
in the welding of the main steam line pipe whip restraints. The
defects included cavities, porosity, weld splatter, undercut, and
insufficient or excessive weld material . Although the defects
identified did not meet the requirements of American Welding Society,
Code D1.1 - 1977, they were analyzed and determined not to be capable
of preventing the individual pipe whip restraint from performing as
' intended, cause an overstress condition, or cause a safety hazard if
.left uncorrected. Nevertheless, Bechtel, upon reevaluation of this
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. matter, elected to fabricate new pipe whip restraints utilizing a
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limited amount of material from the original pipe whip restraints.
The NRC inspector identified the previously fabricated pieces used in
current pipe whip restraints and then performed an inspection' of two
installed restraints for the purpose of verifying the adequacy of the
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original welds utilized in the new fabrications. As a result of this
inspection and of the limited amount of original material utilized,
this potentially reportable item is considered closed.
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3.
Welding of Safety-Related Reactor Components and Piping Systenis
a.
Review of Procedures
The NRC inspector reviewed the following procedures to assure that
adequate controls have been established relative to welding of reactor
- coolant pressure boundary and other safety-related piping.
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ESI Procedure SSP-18, Revision 1, General ASME III Welding-
Requi~ement
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ESI Procedure SSP-29, . Revision 0, Post Weld Heat Treatment
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ESI Procedure SSP-30, Revision 0, Weld Filler Material Control
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ESI Procedure SSP-31, Revision 0, Welder Qualification
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ESI Procedure ~ SSP-36, Revision 1, Work Package Control
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ESI Procedure SSP-10, Revision 0, Installation and Field
Fabrication of Piping
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ESI Procedure WP-6, Revision 17, Supplement 1, Revision 3,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-24, Revision 21, Supplement 2, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-39, Revision 20, Supplement 2, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
o
ESI Procedure WP-43, Revision 19, Supplement 3, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-44, Revision 7, Supplement 1, Revision 2,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-50, Revision 13, Supplement 1, Revision 1,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-56, Revision 3, Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-67, Revision 0, Supplement 1, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-68, Revision 9, Supplement 1, Revision 2,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-72, Revision 5, Supplement 1, Revision 1,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-89, Revision 9, Supplement 1, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-115, Revision ~ 2, Supplement 1, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-116, Revision 4, Supplement 1, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-120, Revision 0, Supplement 2, Revision 1,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-121, Revision ~ 5, Supplement 1, Revision 3,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-141, Revision 0, Supplement 3, Revision 4,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-158, Revision 6, Supplement 1, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-164A, Revision 3, Supplement 5, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-170, Revision 0, Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-178, Revision 0, Supplement 1, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-181, Revision 0, Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-1116, Revision 0, Welding Specification
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ESI Procedure WP-1176, Revision 2, Supplement 1, Revision 0,
Welding Specification
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Westinghouse Procedure WPS 8-8-GT-6, Welding Specification
b.
Observation of Welding Activities
The HRC inspector observed the storage and issuance of welding filler
material by EBASCO for compliance with procedural requirements of
SSP-30.
The NRC inspector observed the welding and quality control activities
of EBASCO associated with fabricating the following safety-related
pipe and pipe penetration welds:
Unit
System
Line No.
Weld No.
Class
Size
1
RH
1312
FW6542
2
8"
1
RH
1302
FW6731
2
3/4"
<
a
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7
1
RH
1302
FW6732
2
3/4"
1
1006
FW0006
2
8"
1
1006
FW0002
2
6"
1
CV
1213
FS6291
2
4"
1
1416
FW0038
3
1/2"
1
1416
FW0039
3
1/2"
1
1416
FWOO40
3
1/2"
1
1416
FW0041
3
1/2"
1
1416
FW0056
3
1/2"
1
1620
FW0004
3
6"
1
1620
FW0003
3
6"
1
CV
1082
FWOO36
2
3/4"
1
RH
1301
FW0003.
1
12
1
RH
1301
FW6023
2
12
1
CV
1082
FW0037
2
3/4"
1
1012
FW0018
2
18
2
RC
2402
FWOO29
1
31"
2
MS
2003
FW0054
MC
54"
2
RC
2412
FW3110
1
16"
2
2325
FW0002
2
6"
2
RC
2412
FW3113
1
16"
2
RH
2310
FW0007
2
4"
2
RC
2412
FW3112
1
16"
2
2206
FW0045
2
6"
2
EW
2105
FW0001
3
30"
2
CV
2091
FW0002
2
3"
2
CV
2093
FW0005
2
4"
2
CY
2093
FW0004
2
4"
2
RH
2204
FW0013.
2
8"
In the areas inspected for the above welds, the welding was
accomplished in accordance with the welding procedure; the entries on
the process data checklist for releasing QC hold points were consi!. tent
with the status of the weld; the welding filler materials were
controlled consistent with SSP-30; repair welding was consistent with
the weld precedure; and the welders or welding operators were qualified
consistent with SSP-31 for ASME B&PV Code Section III welding.
The NRC inspector also observed the welding and quality control
activities of Westinghouse associated with installation of three
thermowelds into Loop C of the Unit 2 reactor coolant system. The
work was identified in Traveler T-TGX-079 for welds FW-001, FW-002,
and FW-003. Welding was consistent with the welding procedure and
being performed by a qualified welder using certified welding filler
material. The entries on the Traveler for releasing hold points were
consistent with the status of the welds.
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c.
Review of Records
The NRC inspector reviewed the quality documentation for the following
Unit 1 safety-related piping welds which were designated as complete
by EBASCO.
Weld Identification
Size
Class
System
AF 1090 - FW2948
6"
3
AF 1090 - FW2949
6"
3
AF 1090 - FW2950
6"
3-
AF 1090 - FW2952
6"
3
AF 1090 - FW2953
6"
3
CV 1019 - FW0013
3/4"
2
Chemical & Volume Control
CV 1004 - FW0007
2"
2
Chemical & Volume Control
CV 1004 - FWC008
2"
2
Chemical & Volume Control
MS 1003 - FW0054
54"
MC
RH 1105 - FW0002
4"
2
RH 1204 - FW0052.1
14"
2
RC 1000 - FW0001
4"
1
SI 1101 - FW0052
24"
2
Safety Injection
RH 1103 - FW0016
1/2"
2
RH 1116 - FW0002
3"
2
RH 1208 - FW0007
3/4"
1
RH 1308 - FW0001
8"
1
SI 1105 - FW0025
8"
2
Safety Injection
RC 1036 - FW0008
8"
2
RC 1324 - FW0004
3/4"
1
RH 1103 - FW0002
8"
2
RC 1402-NSS-FW0032
36"
1
FW 1012
-FW0013
42"
MC
MS 1004 - FW0058
30"
2
FW 1012 - FW0004
18"
2
AF 1008 - FW0024
4"
2
CV 1002 - FW0004
4"
2
Chemical & Volume Control
RC 1036 - FW0003
3"
2
SI 1108 - FW0003
8"
1
Safety Injection
CS 1105 - FW0002
3"
2
RH 1101 - FW0001A
12"
1
CS 1101 - FW0001
12"
2
CV 1006 - FW0003
4"
2
Chemical & Volume Control
AF 1006 - FW0021
12"
2
AF 1006 - FW0001
6"
2
RC 1102-NSS-FW0006
36"
1
CV 1163 - FW0001A
3"
2
Chemical & Volume Control
SI 1101 - FW4000
10"
P
Safety Injection
MS 1001 - FW0006
30"
2
RC 1121 - FW8311
-2"
1
RH 1208 - FW0008
1"
1
RC-1032 - FW0003
1"
2
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The NRC in~spector also reviewed the Westinghouse documentation for the
three. welds that attach the Unit i upper internal disconnect device to
the reactor vessel head penetration. These welds were identified as
Weld Nos.1, 2, and 3 in Traveler T-TGX-016.
In the areas inspected, the. weld records were complete, accurate and
retrievable except that the record for weld MS 1003 - FWOO54 was
incomplete because of an improper sign off for the post weld heat
treatment hold point. The QC Hold Point.on the Process Data Checklist
for the post weld-heat treatment operation was signed off by QC as not
applicable when, in fact, post weld heat treatment was required by the
Process Data Checklist but had not been performed on the weld.
A review of the Process Data Checklists for the other welds requiring
post weld heat treatment in Units 1 and 2 identified two other Process
Data Checklists which were improperly signed off for the post weld
her.t treatmer.t QC Hild Point. The other two Process Data Checklists
with Hold Points improperly marked as not applicable were for weld
MS 1002 - FWJ052 in Unit 1 and weld !!S 2002 - FW0052 in Unit 2.
This is an apparent violation for failure to follow Quality Control
Procedure QCP-9.3 which requires that when the post weld heat treatment
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operation has been found to be acceptable, the QC- Supervisor-Mechanical,
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or his designee, shall sign the Hold Point on the Process Data Checklist
(498/8601-01 and 499/8601-01).
4.
Exit Interview
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The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
and Mr. C. Johnson, the NRC Lenior Resident Inspector, on February 14 and 28,
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1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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