ML20138R097
| ML20138R097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1985 |
| From: | Reinaldo Rodriguez SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | Thompson H, Thomson H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RJR-85-542, TAC-59691, NUDOCS 8511180435 | |
| Download: ML20138R097 (32) | |
Text
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT [] 6201 S Street, P O. Box 15830. Sacramento, CA 95813; (916) 452-3211 AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CAllFORNIA RJR 85-542 November 13, 1985 DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION ATTENTION HUGH L THOMPSON JR DIRECTOR DIVISION OF LICENSING U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D C 20555 DOCKET 50-312 RANCHO SEC0 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NO. 1
SUMMARY
AND SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM TRANSIENT OF OCTOBER 2, 1985 At the request of the NRC Rancho Seco Project Manager, Syd Miner, the District is formally transmitting several revisions to attachments from our letter of October 25, 1985, (RJR 85-531). The District sent these attachments, via telecopy, at various times between October 26, 1985 through November 7,1985. They include:
Attachments 2 (Rev. 2) - HPI "A" Flow Anomoly Also, we have included as an addendum to Attachment 2, NCR-5150, Rev. 2*
Attachment 5 Part I & II (Rev. 1)** - Auxiliary Feedwater/ Main Feedwater Failure Analysis Attachment 8 - Oil Levels On Safety Related Pumps Attachment 10 - Housekeeping and General Surveillance in Safety Related Areas If you have any questions, contact Jerry Delezenski of my staff.
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k R. J. R RIGU ASSISTANTGENERA} MANAGER NUCLEAR Attachments f 0\
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s 8511180435 851113 PDR ADOCK 05000312 P PDR
- An Addendum to Attachment 2 was added as requested
- An Addendum to Attachment 5, Part II was sent on November 1, 1985 (RJR 85-539) and is not included with this letter
[
of ATTACHMENT 2 (Rev 2)
HPI "A" FLOW ANOMALY s prescribed by plant operating procedures for pressurizer level careasing below 100 inches, the operator started the High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump (P-238 B) lined up the borated water storage tank and opened loop "A" HPI valve. The loop "A" nozzle is also the path for normal additions necessary to maintain pressurizer level. Although the above actions increased flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS), the pressurizer level continued to decrease.
The operator opened the remaining three loop HPI valves, allowing HPI flow through all four paths to the RCS. At this point, he observed "zero" flow on the "A" HPI flow indicator. To further augment the HPI supply, he started the third HPI pump and the loop "A" HPI flow increased to about 80 gpm.
Subsequent analysis of plant computer data verified this phenomenon and showed a recovery of flow indication in about 30 seconds, coincident with start of the third HPI pump.
The district has performed an exhaustive investigation consisting of system flow testing, non-destructive examination and formal analysis. This investigation led us to the root cause; a shift in the zero point of the flow transmitter. This shift occurs as the device is calibrated with the system depressurized and then brought to system operating pressure. In the case of these transmitters, this shift can result in no flow indication with as much as 75 gpm of actual flow. Note that, although this problem creates imprecise indication to the operator, it did not affect the ability of the HPI system to perform its safety function. Hydraulic calculation showed that, for the period of "zero" flow indication, the expected loop "A" HPI flow would be nearly identical to the measured zero shift.
The nature of the identified error is that the HPI flow transmitters (Rosemount Model 1153HB6) have a particular characteristic which affects the zero setting as the process pressure changes. Per Rosemount literature, this can be as much as .66% of full range per 1000 psi.
Since the normal procedure is to calibrate at ambient pressure, the maximum error for this application could be 6.6" H20 out of 1000" H 20 range.
Although the amount of shift differs for each transmitter, the error is repeatable (within the limits of their repeatability specification), and causes a constant dp offset over the range. The net effect then is to introduce a large error at low flows, the flow error diminishing as flow increases as a function of the square root of the error.
The High Pressure Injection system is designed as a fully automatic system.
During a Safety Features Actuation, the pump starts, injection valve throttling and make-up and miniflow isolation all occur without operator actions. With the injection valves in any position, they will travel to the properly throttled position upon Safety Features Actuation.
Thus successful mitigation of the accident does not depend on flow indication.
In addition, for the entire range of Small Break LOCA's, that is any loss of RCS inventory that would result in RCS pressure dropping below 1600 psig, the flow produced by a single HPI pump through each of the four nozzles would be greater than 100 gpm. Resulting flow indication will be in the linear range and conservative.
The design criteria for the HPI system is defined as follows:
>1600 psig, in the RCS, balanced flow is not required; at 11600 psig, a single HPI pump provides a nominal 400 gpm, which provides 100 gpm per nozzle meaning that each flow meter is in its linear range; at any pressure, SFAS initiation (auto or manual) will balance flows without operator action; at 600 psig, acceptable flow is 100 to 150 gmp, in each line, with total flow ?.450 gpm, but not to exceed 525 gpm from a single pump per SBLOCA analysis.
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Thus low rangc inaccuracies are of concern only because they may be dis-tracting to the operator during a transient. Based on the District's analyses, the following action will be performed:
Operators will be informed of the characteristic of the .
flow indication. .
Each of the flow (AP) transmitter has been calibrated such that, with the worst case zero shift, the actual flow will be greater than the indicated flow.
As a long term corrective action, the District will investigate means to reduce the error in the flow indication.
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, R4N SECO . .
NOl4CENFORMIN'] REPORT P ge : Of 3 NO.S 3:3e Rev. 2 I. DESCRIPTION OF NONCONFORMANCE with Attachments f , Quality Class 1 EQ Item: 9 Yes O No Date In/?Afo*
System " T' t Equipment I D. No. "T-2't907 Location -M -? '1 '
Equip.
Name IrdT T?1 rn.r A P. O. / Contract No. -
ECN No. A-16513tOD No. I1 Work Request No.
STP-184 testing of HPI Flow A indicated that installed flow transmitter IT-23307 cignal was approximately 75 GPM low. -
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retraman av M-II. DESIGN REVIEW AND 10 CFR SECTION 50.59 REVIEW REQL1 RED
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% Yes. 50.59 E.og Noj J96 - . No l Eis?im"assic.sto _J._tg11-14--
.N N r Ihh ' Oper.
//- / Q,[Ng) oper. l O putpu m m MA.%4(.En. hlT1f.4m orKarrit)'es DATE f III. DISPOSTION ACTION: 9 ACCEPT (3) O REJECT @ REPAIR (2t,1) O REWORK O REPLACE THIS DISPOSTION AND TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION WILL REQUIRE: (Any "l'es" Decision Requires a Buy.Ogin Section VII) .
> A Design Calculation > A Design or Drawing Change > A Retest of the System / Unit M Yes O No O Yes. ECN or Trans. No. .$ No $ Yes. Test No.- T n ut O No Z-SDi-10099
- Z-SDt-IO100 [
h 1. Recalibrate all four (4) HPI transmi(ters to assure that indicated flow is always less than or equal actual flow, per attached technical justification. Revise I-038 to test sero-shift characteristics. (N.9.) -
-2. Provide a method to ideniify to the operator that flow indication below 100 spa is questionable. (N.E.) .,
- 3. Determine as-found zero-shift characteristic of Prz. I.evel. RCP Seal Inj. flow.
AFW flow, and DH flow transmitters. (QA to verify) -
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NCR 5150 REVISION 2 III. DISPOSITION (Cont'd)
Background
The nature of the identified error is that the HPI flow ' - transmitters (Rosemount Model 1153H86) have a particular , characteristic which affects the zero setting as the process - pressure changes. Per Rosemount ' literature, this can be as much as + .66% of full range per 1000 psi. Since the normal procedure is To calibrate at ambient pressure, the maximum error for our application could be + 6.6" H2O out of the 1000" H2 O range. Per-Rosemount the error is repeatable (within the limits of their " repeatability specification), and causes a' constant dp offset over the range. The not effect then is to introduce a large error at low flows, the flow error diminishing as flow increases as a function of the square root of the error. This effect is shown in Figure 1 for an assumed pressure (HPI' header) of 1000 psig for the
- four FT's using as-found charaqteristics. Note that except for ,
the D loop, the errors are in a direction such that actual flow is greater than indicated, and that the D loop error diminishes to 1% of maximum flow at approximately 30 gym. Analysis A search was made of all known pertinent documentation: SAF., i operating procedures (normal and E0Ps), STP-085/4, ECCS Training Manual, and the original Station (Design) Manual. The result of ; i this search is that there is no identified requirement to control , , (and the efore to indicate) flow below 100 gpm. Minimum continuous flow through each pump is 105 gym. The minimum
" balanced" flow per STP-085/4 is 100 gym per loop. The Instrument Engineers Handbook states that a turn-down ratio of 10:1,
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i.e. attempting to read 60 gym out of 600 gpm, is very marginal for most flow instrument loops. This is substantiated by C?lculation No. Z-SIM-10100 (Attachment 2) which shows that the HPI flow nozzles, themselves, are not accurate below about 60 gpm. The effect of system pressure on the zero shift was calculated for all four (4) transmitters at various pressures, resulting in the curves shown in Figure Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5. These curves indicate that, with proper selection of the calibration pressure, the zero error can be caused to always be in a minus direction (indicated flow less that actual). For example, on the A loop (worst case), hat.--9 indicated flow could vary from 60 gpm, at 3000 psig header . e pressure, to 100 gpm at 600 psig, for an actual flow of 100 gpa (Calculation No. Z-SIM-10099, Attachment 3, substantiates these curves). In actual operation, pump discharge header pressure will not vary as much as this example, therefore errors will be smaller. 4 NCR5150 '
,, ..r......_- - . - - . _ . . . . . _ _ . _ . _. - _ _ . . . . . . _ . .
The potential for significant errors being caused by the zero ! shift problem was reviewed for all Rosemount dp transmitters in Class 1 service. This included the level transmitters shown in Attachment 1, plias RCP Seal Injection, AW, and DH flows. It was' !
- determined that all flow transmitters plus Pressurizer level would i be tested to' determine if a significant.zero shift error existed. .
Conclusions The flow indication errors, induced by zero shift 1. characteristics, which were in existance during the 10/2/85- - trip, as indicated by as-found calibration data, did not jeopardize the proper function of the HPI system. Actual flow was greater than indicated for all nozzles except for D, which was well within reasonable tolerances. "
- 2. HPI flow indication below 100 gym is not necessary for proper operation of the HPI system. Since the pressure shift error is repeatable, indicated flow can still be used to provide the operator with adequate information to perform his function.
- 3. The capability to use the existing instrumentation will require selective calibration of each transmitter considering its unique characteristics, and notification of the operators of this situation.
- 4. Additional work should be performed to address other types of errors in the HP! flow loop, the significance of the ;
( pressure shift on other dp appitcations, and to develop : short and long ters projects to upgrade HPI flow indication. Action Items
- 1. Nuclear Operations to recalibrate HPI transmitters to assure that indicate flow is below actual flow as noted in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5.
- 2. Nuclear Engineering to develop numan engineered method to alert operators that lower portion of indicators are not accurate.
- 3. Nuclear Operations to notify operators of HPI flow accuracy limitations.
- 4. Nuclear Engineering to evaluate short/long term upgrade of HP! flow, submit Pre-Mods as appropriate.
- 5. '
Nuclear Operations to determine zero shift characteristics of other Rosemount dp transmitter applications, spcifically for Pressurizer level, RCP seal injection now, AFW flow, and DH flow. NCR5150 s e e
- e. ~ ;-
J - HPI DP FLOW ERROR - AS FOUND DATA 10/26/85 ZERO SHIFT ONLY 200 190 - 180 ^- . 170 - ^ 160 - ,/ 3 150 -
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, ..L , . - . . . . - - . -.. .. - .. -.... . - .- SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT OFFICs MEMORANDUM . , T0: J.V. McColligan - DATn: October 28, 1985 85-28 , PROM: Norm Brock /// suaJact HPI FLOW INDICATION PROBLEM 7 The investigation'of the HPI flow problem has resulted in the identification of a previously unidentified error in our HPI flow indications. The PRC has determined that a 10CFR-21 Report is justified, and Nuclear Notepad hasbeennotifiedtoalertothyrutilitiesofapossibleproblem. The instruction manual for the Rosemount 1153HB6 pressure transmitters used for high pressure injection flow measurements here at Rancho Seco has a serious onesission. There is no instruction to provide a calibration that takes into account the large zero. shift caused by system operating pressure changes. In fact this zero shif t'is .not mentioned. A calibration performed by these instructions can resultzin large flow errors at low system flows.
- 2 This was the cause of the appa nt flow anomaly in the high pressure inject 1( system A nozzle during the October Z incident. Even though this characteristic of the transmitter is not described in the supplied vendor manual, it.is described in the other vendor literature. This literature states that a maximum of .66% of the upper range limit per 1000 lbs. process pressure can result. Attachment 1 shows the differential pressure (dp) vs flow for the installed flow elements. It is appa-ent that the dp produced by the element is based on the square root of the flow-te a dp error of -20 inches at 300 GPM actual flow results in an error of approximately -15 GPM. The same -20 inch.
dp error at 85 GPM actual flow where dp is only 20 inches results in an indication error of -85 GPM, and an indication of zero; -
-- This error of -20 inches dp almost exactly' corresponds to the error of the A HPI transmitter at a system pressure of 3000 psi and agrees with the observed results of the Oct. 2 event and STP-180 and 184 data.
Rosemount has verbally stated that the zero shift with system pressure is a characteristic for a particular transmitter and is a constant and will not change with other system parameters. Therefore, it is possible to measure that shift for a particular transmitter and calculate the error in indicated flow at any given static pressure. The four HPI pressure transmitters have been tested and exhibit the following characteristics:
- 1) HPI A flow error is approxima.tely .69% per 1000 lbs.
- 2) HPI B is approximately +.05% per 1000 lbs.
- 3) HPI C is approximately .48% per 1000 lb's.
- 4) HPI D is approximately +.1% per 1000 lbs.
. . , . .. u .-.----- ... ~. . - - -
. . . . - - . . -. . . . . . - - .. - - - - . -=
l J.V. McColligan Page Two October 28, 1985
# This static pressure induced error can be zerced out at any particular pressure, and for a' range of system p essures, the indication error can be calculated for the entire range. These calculated errors have been determined and compared with the required characteristics for the HPI flow instrumentation. . '
HPI system pressure can be expected to range from approximately 600 lbs. to
~3000 lbs. The flow error for the A and C transmitters is a negative error, this means that as static pressure increases the indicated flow decreases.
Transmitters B and 0 both have~ a positive error.-This means that as static pressure increases the indicated flow increases, m. The criteria has been established that at no time will actual flow be less than the indicated flow. In order to meet this criteria several considerations must be met. Transmitter A and transmitter C must be zerced at a pressure at the bottom of the operating pressure range. Transmitter B and 0 have to be zeroed at a pressure at the top of their operating range. This assures that the errors in indicated flow are always negative. At high operating pressures such as those which we normally encounter for HPI injection under normal, non-accident conditions, there is no serious concern of pump run out. Pump run out can only occur at low system pressures. At 1600,1bs., the automatic-initiation point for safety features, automatic f7ow balancing occurs equalizing the flow in the 4 lines at 125 GPM each.. 4 This 125 GPM flow is sufficiently'large to ensure that all 4 flow meters are on 1 1 scale. If system pressure then- decays towards 600 lbs. the indicated flow ; i from the worst transmitters, transmitters A and C becomes increasing - ( accurate. With indicated flow equaling actual flow at 600 lbs. system pressure.
. Transmitters 8 and 0 become less accurate at these low system pressures, but.
1-the maximum flow error in transmitter 0 only approaches 30 gallons per minute error at zero actual flow. The- operator can be sure that his indications will be either accurate or lower than actual flows, he can use the limit switch _1
. lights on his valves to indicate valves closed and therefore zero flow.
Indicated vs actual flows.are shown on attachment 2-5 for a range of system pressures.,LThese curves demonstrate that the indicated flows are indeed always less than actual flows and that at the flows of normal interest, namely greater than 90 gallons per minute, the flow errors are acceptabley small. At 1600 lbs. when the flows are automatically balanced all four flows read . within 30 GPM of the 125 actual. 3 Other applications of these transmitters have been identified and the errors due to static pressure zero' shift are being evaluated. A preliminary look indicates
.that the only concern will probably be the pressurizer level, which may have an error as'large as i 11 inches. It should be possible to zero out this error at system pressure.
Attachments ' cc: S. Redeker J. Field J. Williams / - L
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CMUD RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION NCR S-5150 Atta7hmsnt C 3 f]f*' CALCULATION COVER SHEET tusatCT N N - CALC.NO. 2*8IlU 'ICO i7 ritg no. A W. M
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N* l mEvtstoN DESCRIPTION l OATE l CRl4 l CKM q , I DOE OSE toJT7i (W O / f57/E"' (ORIGIM t.) JS8 ft/1%f} c V f /7 ! l i i l : i l l , I I ! I I I I I RESULTS OF CHECKEM MEVIEW ITEM OEsCMtrTION ' IO f (: . riN At. mEsui.T NuwEn CAL OirrenENCEs An t agz sioniriCANY: NO CONNECTIONS D ., NECEas A R Y INITI A l. OATE d$h' i I2 /0/J$hf HQ r1N Al. R Esut.T NU MEMICAl. OterEM ENCEs INITIAL ' y JAP S:GNirtCANT, NECEssARY CORREC. g TlCMs N AV E sEEN M AGE. gAyg ) 4. 4CM M ADE 3Y ATTACHEO Al. TERN ATE I I I* r.A i.C ui.A Tia N s.
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{ggyg, CALCULATION COVER SHEET SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O 6201SStreet,P.O Box 15830.SacramentoCA958521830(916) 452 3211
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RECORD CF ORIGINAL ISSUE AND REVISIONS A CEPT "gIVo,' REVISION DESCRIPflON DATE ORIC p CKR. fEV W OE SE O l.$ su r 27arsf ?HA NI W db ( j
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RESULTS OF CHECKER REVIEW REVISION NO. ITEM DESCRIPflON ggggg i F NAL RESULT NUMERICAL OlFFERENCES ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT; NO CORRECTIONS NECESSARY. FINAL RESULT NUMERICAL DIFFERENCES ARE INiflAL SIGNIFICANT, NECESSARY CORRECTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE. D A TE
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'RANeiHO,S . ,e' REQUIRES CLOSURE PRIOR TO STARTUP NOpO. INO REPORT Page 1 Of 8 No.S 5150 Rev. 1 I[ DEsCarTION OF NONCONFORSIANCE with attachments
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Quiscius 1: EQ Itern; E Yes O No ' Date 10/24/85 System bb _ Eppment I.D. No. FT-23707 Location Any 2n' M C IRE Flowg hff 3, , cga,act No p g ECs go A-3651EstoD No. 11 work Request No. Ww
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I CB'1' PCTt 8'4E esting of l@l"J1jst A indicated tMIE ind :alled flow transmitter FT-23807 signal era approximately 75 GPM low'. ' Gt,s.y g. tqsia..rol W i NUCLEAR ENGINEERING ! ThEwegsf "*3#- O ^
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- 11. DESIGN REVIEW AND 10 CFR SECTION S0.59 REVIEW REQUIRED ,
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Ill. DISPtdTION ACTifbs E ACCEI'r (3) O REJECT 3D REPAIR (1&2) O REWORK O REPLACE Tills DISPOSTION AND TECllNICAL JUSTIFICATION WILL REQUIRE: (Any "Tes" Decision Requires a Buy-Ogin Sectma Vll)
, > A Design Calculation > A Design or Drswing Change > A Retest of the System / Unit k 10 Yes O No O Yes ECN or Trans. No. ,01 No @ Yes, Test No. T-038 O No %
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G p\. Recalibrate 1 all four (4) HPI transmitters '.o assure that indicated flow is always #2 r 1ess than or equal actual flow, per'attact ed technical justification. NRevise I-038 to test zero-shift characteristics. h iu (N.O.) , Ero 2.
'j Provide is questionable.
method to identify to the operator that, flow indication below 100 gpm (N.E.) . - . Q.
. 4 11 3. Determine as-found zero shif t characteristic of Prz. Level, RCP Seal Inj. flow, #
H AFW flow, and Dl! flow transmitters. (QA to veri ) N* M norc ; hriso 64 GI A co lo/To/a r - '# #'-
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[I III 8. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE l .. Inherent characteristic of flow I None, error will be compensated transmitter. . . I for otherwise (Items 1 thru 3 above).
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ATTACHMENT 5 Rev- 3 Part I: Auxiliary Feedwater Control Logic Modification I. Purcose of Design Change A. Initiate ICS control of AFW valve on same parameter as that which initiates AFW pumps, low MFWP discharge pressure. B. Reduce probability of loss of AFW during re-establishment of MFW. II. Sumary of Change A. Scoce
- The work to be performed is entirely in the ICS cabinets. This change will mocify relay logic for initiation of AFW auto flow control and MFW block valves. No other systems are affected.
Wiring will be removed from contacts of 86-1/AFWPT and 86-1/BFWPT and added to spare contacts of 86/AFWPL and 86/BFWPL. B. Design Basis Improve probability of AFW successfully ccepleting its design function on demand. C. Eauicment Class & Power Recuirementi , SMUD QA Class 2. No mcdifications to existing power is required. D. Testing A special test procedure has been written and approved by the Plant Review Cemittee. Testing was completed on October 25. III. Calculations and Design Information A. Design Features Currently, "A&B MFW pump tripped" affects three ICS functions:
- Pseudo Auto MFW pump control
- MFW Black Valve
- AFW Valve Control
Rev. 1 This modificatien has the following impact: Pseudo Auto Control - tio change. MFW Block Valves - The "A&B MFW pumps tripped" signal will be replaced with the "M5W pumps discharge pressure low" signal. The remainder of the logic will remain the same (4RCP's tripped to (Rev. I close the block valve). AFW Valve Control - The "A&B MFW pumps tripped" signal will be replaced with the " MEW pumps discharge pressure icw" signal. This signal will allow the ICS to control the AFW valves on Icw OTSG level.
- 8. Functional Descriotion The two functional signals associated with this ECN are "MfWP Icw discharge pressure" and "MFW pumps tripped " "MFWP low discharge pressure" provides the best indication of MFW status. "MFWP trip" provides the best indication of MFWP not running.
- Signal to initiate ICS control of AFW ficw valves will be "MFWP low discharge pressure" vs. current "MSWP trip" signal.
- Signal to MFW block valve logic will be NFWP Icw discharge pressure vs. current MFWP trip signal; however, it shall require at least 1 RCP tripped to activate this function, as at present.
- Signal to pseudo auto logic which is used to run MFWP s;eed demand to minimum will still require the MFWP trip signal in crder that
. the MFW pumps may be started without retuiring the logic to be disabled.
- Signal to ICS runback logic will remain MfWP low discharge pressure.
!Y. Locic Diacram The logic diagram frcm the Design Basis Report is attached. (SeeFigureA) l
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ATTACHMENT 5 g,y, i l l Part II: Auxiliary Feedwater/ Main Feedwater Failure Analysis The NRC requested information regarding single failures as relating to MFW/AFW during the phone conversation of October 25, 1985. A particular question raised was: "Is there a scenario in which one failure in the ICS could close all four MFW valves, interrupting MFW to both OTSG's, . < and not result in automatic start of AFW flow?" T'1e ICS controls the MFW valves and the automatic OTSG 1evel control AFW valves. Since the ICS is control grade and not designed to single j f.silure criteria, it cannot be conclusively stated that the above scenario . Is impossible. The following discussion, however, shows that there is no single failure which can interrupt MFW flow and result in the inability ! to manually from the control room, provide AFW flow in a timely manner using class 1 equipment which is completely independent of the ICS. The design of the AFW system was presented in detail to the NRC staff ' during the October 23, 1985, meeting in Bethesda. It was clearly shown g' that there are twe separate and distinct activate / control systems and flow paths within AFW (see Figure 8 attached). Either system can supply < AFW to the OTSG's regardless of failures in the other. The systems are briefly described below.
- 1) The first system is the ICS Control / Class 1 Pump Start System. '
It automatically starts and controls OTSG 1evel when loss of feedwater/ main feedwater pumps is sensed by low main feed pump . discharge pressure or when all four (4) RCP's trip. Manual start and flow control is available in the control room. The control grade ICS, which also controls MFW, operates one of two parallel flow path valves to each OTSG (FV 20527 OTSG A, . FV20528OTSGB). The other flow path to each OTSG is a class 1 l safety feature (SFAS) valve (SFV 20577 OTSG A,SFV 20578 OTSG P). The ICS controlled FV's automatically operate to control OTSG , level once main feed pump discharge pressure drops below 700 psig. A class 1 circuit (independent of SFAS) automatically starts both i AFW pumps (P319 motor and P318 turbine drive) when main feed pump discharge pressure drops below 850 psig. The pumps and valves also autcmatically operate when all four (4) RCP's are not running, as sensed by class 1 underpower/ phase imbalance monitors.
- 2) The second system is the Class 1 Safety Feature Activation System (SFAS). This system provides automatic AFW pump start and flow to !
the OTSG's when LOCA conditions are sensed. Class 1 manual start ) and flow control is available in the control rocm. ; i The SFAS system operates the second of two parallel flow path valves to each OTSG (SFY 20577 OTSG A, SFV 20578 OTSG B). The other flow path to each OTSG is through an ICS controlled valve described above. T The SFAS valves autcmatically fully open and the AFW pumas autcmat-ically start to provide AFW flow,to the OTSG's uoan low RCS pressure i (1600psig)orhighreactorbutidingpressure(4psig). [ l 1
'i * "
Revs 1 l The SFAS system is completely independent of the ICS/ Class 1 Pump Start System. Thus, it follows that there is no single failure which could cause loss of main feedwater flow (for example, closure of all ICS controlled main l feedwater control valves), and cause the inability to provide AFW flow with the SFAS system. SFAS system AFW flow would require manual control room pump start and flow control since SFAS does not detect loss of main ! feedwater. Menual AFW flow start will be rapid and effective because there are specific symptom based Emergene Operating Procedures (E0P's) and extensive operator
, simulator training reg v ding loss of main feedwater events. The loss of main feedwater would result in a reactor trip on either anticipatory trip on loss of main feedwater pump control oil pressure or high RCS pressure due to reduced primary to secondary heat transfer. Upon reactor trip, the operators imediately implement the E0P's which require them to constantly monitor for three main symptoms of off-normal conditions:
a) Lack of subcooling b) Lack of primary to secondary heat transfer (overheating) c) Excessive primary to secondary heat transfer (overcooling) Rapid identification of loss of main feedwater (overcooling) will occur because there are numerous alarms and indicators which will alert the operator. The operators receive extensive simulator training in recognizing . the three main off-normal symptoms. Among the main annunciator audible alarms and other indicators are MFP discharge pressure low alarm, MFP low flow alarm, MFP trip alarm, MFP zero speed alarm, SPOS post trip RCS pressure temperature display, MFP control panel indication of MFP turbine trip, speed, turbine governor valve position, and panel indication of feedwater flow and OTSG 1evels. The E0P for overheating gives specific direction to estabitsh feedwater to the OTSG's using AFW, Additionally the abnormal operation procedure for AFW directs the operator to use the SFAS control valves whenever ICS control is unavailable or undesirable. 2 i
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i ATTACHMENT 8 OIL LEVELS ON SAFETY RELATED PUMPS The District has reviewed its lubrication practices for safety related I pumps and motors. The District will complete the following prior to startup: Operator instructions in:
- proper oil levels
- use of various indicators to verify correct oil levels in pumps
- operation and configuration of automatic oilers l
Maintenance personnel verification of correct adjustment and installation of oilers and sight. glasses for pumps. Inspections included checks for cleanliness of sightglasses, verifications ! for proper oil levels, and assurances that vents ! are functional on vertical sightglasses. If needed, maintenance has added or replaced oilers or sightglasses. . Any pumps with the oil ring $ ump lubrication design that have had maintenance performed on the bearing assemblies since initial operation have had the oil rings inspected for proper assemoly and operation, o The District has determined that completion of the above items satisfies the concern of proper lubrication, i l _-- _- l
6, , ' D ATTACHMENT 10 e t
} HOUSEXEEPING AND GENERAL SURVEILLANCE IN SAFETY RELATED AREAS The District performed a housekeeping survey of selected safety related areas that included the east and west Decay Heat Cooler and Pump Rooms, HP! and Makeup Pump Rooms, and the Auxiliary Feed Pump area. This field ,
survey focused on the observation of oil leakage, proper threaded fastener engagement and fasteners that were Icose and/or missing. The maintenance h I personnel conducting this survey examined an estimated 20,000 fasteners,
' and 33 individual components.
From this survey, no electrical or instrument and control items were identified that could have adversely affected safety. The survey revealed , ten mechanical items that required additional analysis: ! l Nine fasteners had a maximum of 3) threads not engaged on nut; One pipe support was missing a fastener which had previously been identified and accepted; l One wall mounting plate was missing an anchor 1
)
bolt, and; i I One MOV operator had excessive oil drippage
- which Maintenance is opening and inspecting prior to startup to assure proper lubrication.
. The initial engineering evaluations conclude the safety function of the items was not affected. The evaluations will be available to the resident NRC inspector.
. . _ _ _ _ . _ _ - . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _}}