ML20138Q618

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Insp Repts 50-413/85-48 & 50-414/85-56 on 851026-1125. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Tech Spec 3.0.4 for Changing Plant Modes & Failure to Follow Procedure for Nonconforming Items
ML20138Q618
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/12/1985
From: Dance H, Skinner P, Van Doorn P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138Q595 List:
References
50-413-85-48, 50-414-85-56, NUDOCS 8512270320
Download: ML20138Q618 (8)


See also: IR 05000413/1985048

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULA7ORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: -50-413/85-48 and 50-414/85-56

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.:

50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.:

NPF-35 and CPPR-117

Facility Name:

Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted:

October 26 - November 25, 1985

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Inspectors:

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C. Da'nce', Section Chief

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Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 109 inspector-hours on site

in the areas of followup of licensee and NRC identified items (Units I and 2);

management meeting (Units 1 and 2); plant operations (Unit 1); surveillance

observation (Unit 1); maintenance observation (Unit 1); preoperational test

program implementation (Unit 2); observation of ' modifications for human

engineering discrepancies (unit 2); and review of nonconforming items (Unit 2).

Results:

Two violations were identified

Failure to follow Technical

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Specification 3.0.4 for changing plant modes; and, Failure to follow procedure

for nonconforming items.

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

H. B. Tucker,.Vice President, Nuclear Production

G. R. Vaughn, General Manager, Nuclear Stations

  • J._W. Hampton, Station Manager

E. M. Couch, Project Manager

  • H. L. Atkins, QA Engineering Supervisor

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H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

  • W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer

W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance

  • H. D. Brandes, Analytical Engineer
  • T. B. Bright, Construction Engineering Manager

B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent

  • J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services

T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer

L. R. Davidson, Project QA l.ianager

J. R. Ferguson, Assistant Operating Engineer

- *C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer

R. A.' Jones, Test Engineer

C. S. Kelly, Instrumentatio1/ Electrical Technical Support

R. D. Kindard,.HP Coordinator

  • J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
  • P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling

R. L. Medlin, QA Technical Services

C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer

T. D. Mills, Construction Engineer, Electrical

D. B. O'Brien, Administrative Methods Supervisor

C. L. Ray, Principal Design Engineer

T. Robertson, Construction Engineer

G. Robinson, QA~ Engineer, Operations

F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer

  • G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent

D. Tower, Operating Engineer

  • E. G. Williams, Project QA Technician
  • J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office

personnel.

  • Attended exit interview

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2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 24, 1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The violations and unresolved

items described in paragraphs 3, 5, 8 and 9 were discussed in detail. The

licensee acknowledged the findings and had no dissenting comments.

The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or

reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

a.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item 414/85-43-01:

Fillet Weld Leg Size for Joint

Geometry Configuration With 1/16 to 3/16-inch Gap Not Considered at

Final Weld Inspection. The inspector met with licensee representatives

to discuss this issue and also reviewed licensee documentation of their

position relative to this issue. The licensee considers that they have

met AWS code requirements and have had adequate surveillance

inspections and audits to verify that fillet weld sizes were increased

relative to fitup gap as required by the code. The licensee documenta-

tion was forwarded to NRC:RII for further review.

This item remains

open pending further review by NRC.

b.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 413/85-31-02:

Failed Containment Spray Pipe

Support.

This item involved a Containment Spray System (NS) pipe

support 2-R-NS-0080 discovered by an NRC inspector to be partially

pulled out of the wall.

The licensee conducted further evaluation at

the request of the inspector and discovered that the damage to the

hanger was caused by a water hammer which occurred in April 1985. The

licensee further indicated that a Nonconforming Item Report (NCI) was

not issued at the time of the occurrence and only a partial system

walkdown which did not include the damaged, hanger had been conducted to

evaluate the effect of the water hammer.

The licensee has now

completed a total walkdown and is also conducting further evaluation of

the NS heat exchanger at the request of engineering personnel. These

evaluations are being documented on NCI Nos. 19890 and 19956.

Construction QA Procedure Q1, Revision 24, Control of Nonconforming

Items, requires licensee personnel to initiate an NCI for items which

do not meet design requirements. Since a water hammer is an occurrence

which has a high potential for damaging piping systems, this situation

should have been documented on an NCI.

Therefore, this item is

considered to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V

which requires that activities affecting quality be performed in

accordance

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established

procedures.

This

is

violation

414/85-56-01:

Failure to Follow Procedure for Control of Nonconforming

Items - Water Hammer in Containment Spray System.

c.

(0 pen) Unresolved Items 413/85-20-01, 414/85-16-01:

Verification of

Adequate

Installation of Instrumentation.

The

inspector held

discussion with licensee personnel and reviewed documentation relative

to this item. Licensee's seismic analysis has shown that transmitters

for the instrument loops questioned, Refueling Water Storage Tank

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Level, are adequately mounted.

In addition, the licensee has

reinsulated heat traced Loop No. 1FWLT5000. Therefore, no questions of

operability remain for the questiened instrument loops.

The inspector

requested the licensee 'to evaluate why the seismic analysis had not

been performed prior to being questioned by the NRC and why the

insulation was found to be missing from Loop No. IFWLT5000. This item

remains open pending this additional licensee evaluation.

No violations or deviations, except as described in paragraph 3.b., were

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identified.

~4.

Unresolved Items *

New unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 8 and 9.

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5.

Plant Operations Review (Unit 1) (71707 and 71710)

a.

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting

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period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical

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Specifications (TS), and administrative controls.

Control room logs,

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danger tag outs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the

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removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.

Shift turnovers

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were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with

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approved procedures.

The . inspectors verified by observation and interviews, that measures

taken to assure physical protectior, of the facility met current

requirements.

Areas ' inspected included the security organization, the

establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in

the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and

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procedures followed.

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In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were

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observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included

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such things ~ as combustible material control, fire protection systems

and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance and

construction activities.

b.

The inspector reviewed Operations Division Nonconforming Item Reports

(NCIs) to determine if documentation was clear and complete and whether

appropriate resolution and corrective action was specified.

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  • An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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c.

The licensee informed the NRC on September 22, 1985, that reanalysis

for their McGuire Nuclear Station had shown that containment peak

pressures would exceed the previously assumed design value of 15 psig

by 0.8 psig. The inspector requested information as to whether this

reanalysis also affected the Catawba plant. The licensee informed the

inspector that analysis for Catawba indicated that pressure would be

reduced from 14.68 psig to 13.3 psig and also forwarded a copy of the

proposed Rev. 14 to the FSAR.

Licensee actions appear acceptable.

d.

On November 19, 1985, the licensee identified that they were in violation

of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.4 in that they entered into Mode 4

and subsequent higher modes with one train of the containment air

return system (VX) inoperable. TS 3.6.5.6. requires both trains of the

containment air return system to be operable.

A review of this occurrence

identified that a work request had been written on November 4,1985 to

repair a failed damper in the VX system. Through errors in the raview

process, this work request had not been identified as TS related work

and therefore mode dependent. Jpon identification of this problem, the

licensee took prompt action as specified by the TS. This is the second

similar occurrence of this type,

i.e.,

entering into a mode without

satisfying all operability requiremants, within the rast 12 months.

The other example is discussed in Inspection Report 50-413/84-106.

It appears that the corrective actions for the previous violation may

not have been sufficient to preclude other occurrences of this nature.

This is identified as Violation 50-413/85-48-01; Failure to meet

TS 3.0.4 requirements for changing operating modes.

6.

Surveillance Observation (61726) (Unit 1)

During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were

in compliance with various TS requirements.

Typical of these requirements

were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry,

refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency

safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical

power sources.

The inspector verified that surveillance testing was

performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test

instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met,

appropriate removal

and restoration of the affected equipment was

accomplished test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel

other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies

identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by

appropriate management personnel.

Typical of the surveillance items that were witnessed in part or in full

were various calibrations of the nuclear instrumentation radiation

monitoring systems instrumentation, battery testing, auxiliary feedwater

system testing, and heat removal system testing.

No violctions or deviations were ident*fied.

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7.

Maintenance Observations (62703) (Unit 1)

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were

observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with

the requirements.

The inspector verified licensee conformance to the

requirements in the following areas of inspection:

the activities were

accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or

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calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to

service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were

accomplished by qualified personnel; and parts and materials used were

properly ~ certified.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of

-outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related

equipment maintenance which may effect system performance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Licensee Identified Items 50.55(e) (Unit 2) (99020)

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a.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of a potentially

reportable item involving plastic melted onto stainless steel piping

systems.

This problem .was referenced in NRC Report Nos. 413/85-43,

414/85-46. The licensee found no detrimental effects on the piping and

therefore informed the NRC that this item was not reportable. Licensee

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actions are acceptable.

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b.

The inspector also held discussions with licensee personnel relative to

a potentially reportalle item involving cold springing of safety-

related piping.

The NRC was informed of this issue as potentially

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reportable on November 8,

1985.

This issue involves a concern

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expressed by a licensee employee in a licensee conducted interview that

a craft pipefitter foreman had allowed cold springing of safety-related

piping in order to accomplish weld joint fitup. This is prohibited by

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licensee QA procedures unless design analysis is accomplished.

The

licensee has formed a task force which has interviewed 21 craftsmen,

two inspectors, two technicians, and the accused foreman.

Three

instances of possible cold spring have been identified. One situation

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was apparently corrected at the time it occurred and two others are

being evaluated by the licensee.

The licensee is documenting each

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interview and intends to prepare a report on their investigation and

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evaluation.

Preliminary indications are that this situation is

isolated to a particular crew and time frame and that the cold sprung

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piping will be acceptable for its intended service.

However, further

evaluation by the licensee and NRC is necessary and therefore, this is

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Unresolved Item 414/85-56-02:

Evaluation of Cold Spring in Safety-

Related Piping.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9.

Preoperational Test Program Implementation (Unit 2) (71302)

The inspector conducted tours to verify that turned over equipment was

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' adequately protected and controlled. This review included observation

of construction activities, observation for fire hazards and observa-

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tion of security boundaries.

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b.

The inspector observed conduct of portions of the preoperational test

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program.

This included discussions with the test program director and

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test engineers, general observation of testing and operations in the

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control room and observation of specific tests described below. This

inspection was performed to assess whether the licensee was conducting

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a well organized program, personnel had a good understanding of

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responsibilities and conduct of specific tests, control or organiza-

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tional interfaces was good, procedurcs were properly approved, control

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of test schedule was adequate and current drawings and manuals were

used by the licensee.

The tests observed were as follows:

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TP/2/A/1100/02A, Section 13.11, Diesel Generator consecutive

starts - observed start No. 42 for Diesel Generator 2A. This was

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the tenth valid start of 35 required.

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PT/2/A/4200/09A, Section 12.37, Checkout of auxiliary safeguards

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electrical logic for Containment Spray System Train A.

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The inspector also reviewed Construction Nonconforming item Reports to

verify that appropriate ' documentation and evaluation was acconplished

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for nonconforming conditions on systems being

turned-over

to

operations.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Special Inspection of Modifications for Human Engineering Discrepancies

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(Unit 2) (70302)

The licensee has conducted a detailed Control Room design review to identify

improvements necessary to correct Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).

These modifications provide for improvements in consistency of labeling,

consistency of status lights, meter scale units, visibility of meters,

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location of switches and meters, etc.

The licensee has committed in their

response to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to complete modifications for 55% of

the HEDs identified prior to fuel load.

The inspector verified through

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discussions with if censee personnel, record review and physical observation

of all or portions of 77 HED modifications that at least 55% of HED

modifications have been implemented. Modifications were observed for HED

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Nos. C-1-51, 84, 87, 91, 98,117,119, 204 (partial), 211, 235, 238, 241,

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244, 255 (partial), 256, 304, 307, 327, 338, 341, 361 (partial), 367, 368,

369 (partial), 387, 390, 395, 399, 400, 402, 403, 405, 408, 411, 417, 423,

467, 509 (partial), 5, 8, 9, 10, 22, 42, 43, 45, 53, 58, 68, 72, 78, 89,

105, 251, 283A, 283E, 301, 324, 332, 344, 345, 350, 353, 354, 357, 358,

392B, 438, 416, 422B, 424B, 426, 467, 468, 4708, 536, and 537.

During this review, apparent discrepancies between the actual installation

and Design Change Authorization requirement were identified.

These

discrepancies include the numbers on I/R Amps meter; Steam Generators B and

C SM Flow meters inconsistent with other similar meters; NS Train B SI and

Containment Ventilation Phase A Isolation push buttons; legends not removed

for valves 2RC*3, 2RC4, 2ND26, and 2ND60; CFPT 2A and 2B T-GR status lights;

and labels for valve 2NV238A, CFPT 2A and 2B, Chill Surge Tank, Steam Dump

Select, Steam Generator Stm Flow Select, and 2YM100 UST Level Ctr1.

The

inspector requested construction personnel to evaluate these discrepancies.

In addition, the inspector requested operations personnel to evaluate an

apparent inconsistency in range markings on the Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure

meters and to reevaluate installation of non glare meter lenses since these

lenses appear to blur the meter images,

e.g., S/R Count Rate and I/R Amps

meter.

These questions are assigned Unresolved Item No. 4154/85-56-03: Evaluation

of Human Engineering Discrepancies in Control Room.

No violations or deviations were identified.

1;.

Previously Identified Inspector Findings (Units 1 and 2) (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Follow'up Item 413/85-41-01, 414/85-40-01: Evaluation of

Testing of PORV NC34A. The inspector held discussions with licensee test

personnel and a vendor representative and reviewed the licensee's pressure

vs. time plot of this valve appears to be adequ' ate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Management Meeting (Units 1 and 2) (30703)

NRC:RII Management (Mssrs. R. D. Walker, J. P. Stohr, V. L. Brownlee, and

H. C. Dance), and NRC Licensing Project Manager, K. N. Jabbour met with

licensee management onsite on November 15, 1985, to assess readiness for

Unit 2 licensing.

Plant tours were conducted and discussions were held

relative to status of construction completion, test status, procedure

status, diesel generator status, staffing, licensing issues, TS, and Unit 1

operating history.