ML20137Y671
| ML20137Y671 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1986 |
| From: | SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137Y656 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-82-096, CON-NRC-3-82-96 TAC-51292, NUDOCS 8603120354 | |
| Download: ML20137Y671 (64) | |
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ENCLOSURE c
SPDS PROGRESS REVIEW TROJAN 1
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January 13, 1986 '
Prepared for ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission .
Washington, D.C. 20555 Contract No. NRC-03-82-096
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Science Applications InternationalCorporation Post Office Box 1303,1710 Goodridge Drive, McLean, Virginia 22102,(703) 8214300 0603120354 060303 PDR ADOCM 05000344 p PM
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page
SUMMARY
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- 1. System Objectives (Initiation Phase). . . . . . . . . . . . 3
{ 2. System Design (Development Phase) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 3. Implementation ...................... 11 r 4. - Training ......................... 12 l 5. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 6. Maintenarce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Attachment A; Parameter Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
( 14 Attachment B. Human Factors Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
\ Attachment C: SPOS Di splay I .-intouts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Attachment D: ' Attendance Lists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 l
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1 SPDS Progress Review Trojan
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SUMMARY
An NRC team visited the Trojan site on August 6, 7 and 8, 1985, to observe the installed SPDS. The team included a member of the NRC's Human
( Factors Engineering Branch and contractors from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and Comex Corporation. This was one of six r visits to representative nuclear power plants with operational SPDSs to i assess the general status of $PDS implementation and to determine the need for post-implementation audits of operational SPDSs.
( Trojan is a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor owned by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E). In 1980, PG&E purchased a generic Westinghouse SPDS to be tailored to the Trojan plant. The system was declared operational in July, 1985, one month before the NRC visit. In its current status, the l Trojan SPDS clearly exhibits unacceptable performance. The system is highly <
unreliable and is not used by the operators. Training has been inadequate.
Extensive developmental efforts are still underway on the system with site
{ acceptance testing still ongoing and verification and validation to follow.
Data accuracy and validity have yet to be assured. Moreover, the system has not been integrated with other emergency operating procedures. When func-tional, the SPDS is intended to be used as a redundant source of control
[ room information and as a high-level indicator of emergency events.
r During the three day site visit, numerous problems were identified, l Since the Trojan operators were not involved with the design and implementa-tion of the SPDS, there seemed to be a lack of direct interest in the system. No one at PG&E appeared to be responsible or accountable for the system. Considerable program modifications and debugging are currently
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underway and there have been significant installation problems. Time delays to process information were so severe (on the order of minutes) that a
[ fourth CPU had to be added to the system. At present, the biggest problems t are associated with system performance in the automatic mode of operation.
When the system is available the information displayed is often invalid and inaccurate. One display was noted to show an invalid low steam generator
{ 1evel (a problem noted at other plants wnich purchased the same basic system), an erroneous radiation alarm, and an iconic spoke out-of-commis-sion. Displays such as this could mislead and confuse the operators and emergency response personnel.
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The SPDS is destgned to provide a large amount of infcrmation to the r operators with two top level displays and two sublevels; . there are over 30 l- pages of individual dispitys. Information is well organized and easily paged through in an hierarchical order. Displayed infornation is concise for most pages. Others, such as the iconics, may be difficult.to comprehend
( in an emergency situation. The iconics and the sublevel displays have incorporated human factors principles, but they do not meet operator information expectations and therefore place a premium on training. The
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capabilities which the SPDS provides for trending and the mimics of plant status, however, are useful features. The parameter set chosen appears-
. thorough considering the overall availability of data in the system.
l The Trojan SPDS has the potential to be a very useful operator aid in providing confirmation of off-normal conditions. However, until the hard-
[ ware and software have been thoroughly tested and validated, and the I operators adequately trained, the system is a potential source of confusion in the control room and should not be used.
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L l~ SPDS Progress Review Trojan August 6-8, 1985 l
- 1. SYSTEM OBJECTIVES (Initiation Phase)
( l.1 Plant conditions for which the SPDS is intended to be used.
The licensee purchased the standard Westinghouse system. It is
( designed to function in two basic modes, identified as the " terminate" and the " mitigate" modes. The terminate mode _is composed of a narrow range iconic display which is displayed during normal operations. The wide-range l iconic is displayed following a reactor trip. Display pages at two levels t "under" the two top level iconic displays can be called by the operator to provide additional information on individual data points. (The two levels "under" the top plant system summary are (1) subsystems and functions, and
{' (2) sensor values and status of error checks.)
1.2 Modes of plant operation in which SPDS is to be available for use.
k The SPDS is maintained in an operable condition and displayed during all modes of plant operation. The displays are therefore useful in all
[- plant operating, shutdown and emergency conditions. However, if an alarm I condition comes in it can be misleading because it is not " normalized" for off normal conditions. The Bypass and Inoperable Status Indication (BISI) is not usable under all modes.
f 1.3 Functional requirements 1.3.1 Critical Safety Functions.
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The licensee has included coverage of all critical safety functions on two
[ top level displays (pages) and on two sublevels with over 30' individual l pages available. The licensee's terminology for the SPDS is PSSD which was the original Westinghouse terminology. There are additional data points and logic presentation modes available in the same purchased package under the
( BISI and 0TSC operating modes.
The NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the Trojan SPDS
[ concluded that the variables selected were generally adequate with the t exception of omission of Steam Generator Liquid Sample. According to the SER the licensee should indicate how radiation status (Radioactivity Control Critical Safety Function) of the secondary system (steam generators and
( steam lines) can be rapidly assessed when the steam generators and/or steam lines are isolated. Also, the staff stated that, "P.G.E. has addressed the selection of parameters by reference to WCAP-9725 and WCAP-10170 with the following exceptions: Rod Bottom Indication, Pressurizer Heater Breaker
{ Status, Reactor Vessel Pressure Drop, Long-Term Condensate Supply Level, Steam Generator Liquid Sample, and Fan Cooler Temperature." (Page 4, Safety 3
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l Evaluation Report for Trojan Safety Parameter Display System. Division of Human Factors Safety, May 20,1985.)
It may be debatable whether parameters selected to feed the critical l safety functions on the top. level displays are complete, and fully reflect the CSFs. However, the overall availability of data in the system package o is large and use of that data as a secondary source of information could I back up the top level displays.
1.3.2 Intended users.
k The licensee's procedures do not identify specific control . room users for the SPDS prior to or during an emergency. All licensed operators (SR0s, I CR0s, SS), receive training on the SPDS, but the level'of training is very I general and covers its intended use and its design rather than its operational implementation. Discussions with operators indicated that the users most likely to use it would be the Shift Superv.isor or the Station
- l. Technical Advisor.
Users in the TSC also received training on the SPDS and it is assumed that similar training will be provided to EOF personnel when it is wired
{-- into that facility.
1.4 Relation to other NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 initiatives.
Was the E0P upgrade program integrated into the SPDS?
l .The SPDS was designed and built without specific intent to integrate emergency actions as called out in the Trojan 'EOPs with the SPDS. It stands alone. E0Ps need to be considered and SPDS.made consistent. Specifically, l E0P action points and SPDS alarm setpoints have not been considered for L consistency. Overall, there is a lack of integration of SPDS into the plant. Furthermore, Supplement I to NUREG- 0737 states the SPDS is an essential element in the E0Ps and needs to be ' integrated. Transient analysis for E0Ps should be used to verify the SPDS.
Was the SPDS integrated into the DCRDR7 The DCRDR had been accomplished prior to the SPDS visit. The DCRDR only looked at the location ~of the SPDS displays. The PSSD (SPDS) has not yet been accepted from the vendor -- although it has been declared
" operational . " They stated that they will go back to review the system separately for human factors. According to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 the DCRDR (Task analysis) results should be used to verify SPDS parameter selec-
[ tion, data display and functions. This was not done. I
- Are Reg. Guide 1.97 parameters used to feed SPDS?
b The SPDS is fed from data points which also branch into the plant process ' computer. Some Reg. Guide 1.97 parameters are included (e.g.,
RVLS); however, a notable exception is containment isolation. (It shows 4
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demand status for Phase A/B isolation only.) It is planned to include these points, which will be obtained from control board lights utilizing a digital isolator, procurement of which is now in the PGE purchasing system.
Does emergency response structure necessitate SPDS in TSC or EOF 7 The SPDS utilizes the TSC computer and is available in the TSC.
[ planned to wire all signals directly to the E0F following acceptance of the It is system from Westinghouse.
Does the SPDS supply a portion of the ERF data acquisition system?
Yes, as described above.
( 1.5 Verification, Validation and Testing Program Was a program plan developed?- Is it available for review?
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No to both questions. The Westinghouse system was purchased June, 1980, prior to the requirement for a V&V program and, after the requirement l was established, PG&E did not add it to their purchase specification. As the PG&E system was one of the early purchases from Westinghouse, perhaps the first, the V&V done by Westinghouse, if any, was not documented and had
{ few of the checks and balances now included in such a program. A document labeled as the Trojan V&V program outlines test programs conducted at the factory and.the site acceptance tests, but is not a design or even a very thorough post-installation test program.
It is recommended that a V&V program involving operator input be con-ducted following acceptance of the system from Westinghouse,. and that
{ findings be incorporated into the SPDS.
Implementation: The first testing efforts were in September 1983; the time response of hardware was very poor - sometimes minutes. They added a
{ fourth CPU; at present all four CPUs are running satisfactorily in manual but not automatic (only for the past four weeks). Reliability is the biggest question.
Was the plan executed by the SPDS development group or by an independent party?
There is presently no plan to conduct a PG&E V&V on the system.
(Bechtel was the architect-engineer for computer implementation and inte-grated the system into the plant.)
Did the plan include a process for review and analyses of the SPDS requirements?
l There is no plan. (PG&E did some review but very little.) They indi-cate that their onsite " input verification" is incomplete.
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- 2. SYSTEM DESIGN (Development' Phase) 2.1. Design Requirements 2.1.1 Events for which the SPDS can be used.
The SPDS can be used for emergency transients, abnormal transients and l normal evolutions. It is not really operable during shutdown.
l r Information is available on the SPDS at all times; however, its utility
- 1. has been hampered to date by lack of reliability. The hardware has fre-quently been out of service and the time response of.the system has been frustratingly slow. Design changes have been implemented (additfon of CPUs)
{ which improved system response. Once the operators find that the system is reliable, it should be useful in the terminate and mitigate modes of opera-i tion for which it was designed. !
2.1.2 Parameter selection
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As the system was purchased from Westinghouse, there was no original l input parameter selection done by PG&E. Westinghouse had originally designed the system with generic inputs and then came to PG&E with their requirements. At a meeting with PG&E personnel, the matter was resolve.d by l PG&E providing the signals requested by Westinghouse which were. available, and the best possible substitute where Westinghouse desires could not be met. This often resulted in " manual" inputs, e.g., where Westinghouse t wanted an open or . closed valve indication and at Trojan the valve is t normally locked open, PG&E provided a manual signal always indicating open.
Attachment A shows the parameters on the two top level iconic displays
( and some of their sources. The table is not complete because a Westinghouse proprietary document needed to gather all the information was not provided.
j 2.1.3 Basis for establishing display . requirements.
Predetermined by vendor selection - with PG&E providing what they t could. PG&E stated that they did provide some input for parameters selected I by looking through piping and instrumentation drawings. Operator input was not obtained. The parameter selection process included specific responses from PG&E; one stipulation was that the TSC and EOF should not have more or l different information than the control room. SPDS design philosophy is for the operator to use it high level indication, always using the control boards to verify indications.
2.1.4 Basis for logic used for CSFs The SPDS stands alone and was not designed with the idea of supporting l the E0Ps. System logic was developed by the vendor and embraced by PG&E.
There was not evidence that a separate plant-specific task analysis or engineering studies were performed to design the. displays and determine what
( information was needed for display.
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l l 2.1.5 Description of SPDS logic Is the SPDS logic fully described in the Safety Analysis Report? If not, where is it described?
l The SPDS logic (electrical engineering descriptor for the means by l which input parameter functions are. logically grouped to display the CSFs)
L- is. presented by the degree of the displacement of the octagonal iconic from normal conditions. It is based on a standard Westinghouse design. Trojan's Safety Analysis Report, dated October 20, 1980, provided the design philos-l ophy of the system as described in WCAP-9725 Westinahouse Technical Sucoort Center (June 1980). WCAP-9725 was the bulk of their SAR and provided early design concepts that have since been modified. During the audit, the team l
found that PG&E had only minor input into the destjn of the logic in the system. The audit team could not evaluate the means by which parameters were selected and how they were designed to drive alarms and the CSFs. PG&E did not have that type of system description. (Westinghouse has description i of SPDS logic. Acceptance of.the system is incomplete.)
2.2 Design Specifications - Software f
2.2.1 Software Design, Programming, and V&V 1 Software design was accomplished by Westinghouse and separately l reviewed by the NRC. The NRC review was based on documentation submitted by Trejan which was descriptive of the Westinghouse design defined in WCAP-9725
(" Westinghouse Technical Support Center," June 1980) and WCAP-10170 ("Emer-f gency Response Facilities Design and V&V Process," April 29, 1982). The system software has not been turned over to PG&E. The Trojan staff visual-izes their future efforts as primarily change control. There is a procedure l in place for controlling software changes, but it lacks peer review and human factors input, and doesn't adequately address the broad spectrum of organizational elements which might be affected by a software change. The l procedure needs to be strengthened to include the above mentioned reviews I and to require more approvals.
2.2.2 Software development quality control procedures?
k Software was not developed by PG&E for the SPDS, and the development of "new" software programs in support of the SPDS is not contemplated. They do expect changes for which they have a procedure.but it did not appear to have
( peer review or inspection for quality assurance as a part of it. Westing--
house did Lomg o review of software but PG&E does not have all of the Westing-house generic studies. Changes in software in order to tailor a generic
{- system to a plant-specific one appears to require extensive effort.
2.2.3 Software reliability f
The system has magnetic storage, and system failure contingencies have been identified. A backup computer exists for failure countermeasures;
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however, the team believes the system should have an automatic reboot capa-
-bility at some time in the future.
l 2.2.4 - Utility of displayed information Define location of each parameter for each CSF.
l- See sample display printouts in Attachment C. As the SPDS includes over 30 total displays containing most of the parameters monitored in the s
[ plant, most of the critical information is available if the operators know -
l where to go for it. With adequate training, this should be the case.
System performance testing with the operator in the loop can provide better evidence that information displayed is useful and can be rapidly and
( reliably assessed.
Display indicates departure from normal conditions?
Yes, the top level iconic shows slowly developing departures while at normal operating conditions, and the wide range iconic shows changes in the post-trip condition.
Degree of departure?
l The iconic provides an indication of the degree of departure based on the displacement of corners of the octagon. Some-parameters are integrated and some are digital, but the changes are very apparent to the operators.
SPDS has capability to store and recall information?
.The TSC computer has the capability of storing information fcr five and l 30 minute trend indications Th!re is also memory available which will store data for up to eight days.
SPDS has capability to display trends?
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Yes, as noted above. The trend information is used by the operators.
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Is command structure appropriate to the complexity of the soft-ware? ... to the sophistication of the uter?
( The' system does not have an operating manual; one should be provided.
The system is user-friendly with help screens and the use of a cursor to retrieve information. However, dedicated function keys would be more appro-priate for the system users who are under time constraints.
l Upon departure from normal conditions, does the SPDS direct the g operator to the appropriate E0P7 If not, is this a significant I deficiency?
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There is no direct relationship between the E0Ps and the SPDS. Trojan philosophy is that.the SPDS is intended to be just another indicator, and that all actions are taken based on board instrumentation.
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Other (1) The RVLS display is somewhat confusing (it provides value in per-I cent and must be converted to useful units), and not designed to meet operator needs. (2) A high point of the SPDS information is that it pro-vides numerous operator options for trending and building point value i displays.
2.2.5 Potential for misleading operators k -
Time delays in displaying information
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- Do any of the data points originate from.a mass storage l -
system (e.g., process computer)? Yes
- Are any signals to the SPDS time averaged before
( entering the system? Yes, typically it takes 2-5 seconds to perform the averaging with 3 of 4 CPUs.
- Does ' the SPDS internally time average any data (either
{ for reliability or avoidance of screen flicker)? Yes, most inputs are averaged.
- f. - Are any screen updates more than 5' seconds older than real ' time? No.
l - Is the sampling frequency of each parameter displayed adequate to ensure detection of significant changes, particularly accident conditions?
Yes, this appeared adequate but every parameter was not checked.
( - Does the SPDS depend on a processing system serving other users? If so, is there a possibility that SPDS display updates will be delayed significantly by other
( demands on the system? If SPDS is part of a multi-user or multi-task system, how are priorities for competing tasks resolved? Does SPDS have priority?
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CPU serves TSC and EOF; the control room ~has top priority. The CPU also serves as the plant process
{. computer. An additional CPU was added to improve response time.
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Is key information missing from the displays?
Containment Isolation.
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Is extraneous information present?
l Probably, because there are possibly up to 100 pages. There is pro-I grammer information. irrelevant to operations.
Does the SPDS alert the operators to invalid or questionable data?
Yes. Data appears in magenta color code.
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Does the SPDS alert the operator to system malfunctions?
Yes, time, date stops and the cursor turns magenta when a key is hit.
( The display remains when the computer is down. It could be displaying out-of-date information.
l 2.2.6 Software security There are administrative controls over unauthorized modifications, including a password system. A double password exists for computer program-
{ mers, but is temporary. The system is potentially vulnerable to compromise because of the check-outs in progress. !!ith the extension of the SPDS to g the E0F (outside the controlled area), the security system should be reexam-t ined to make sure that unauthorized modifications cannot be made from that or other locations. Software change procedures should be more stringent to assure that the system is.not inadvertently compromised.
k 2.3 Design Specifications - Hardware 2.3.1 Design verification and validation
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Not performed by PG&E. A program which does the best after-the-fact V&V possible should be implemented. PG&E should maintain availability l records.
2.3.2 Human Factors Engineering k Attachment B provides an informal human factors engineering assessment of the SPDS displays.
I 2.3.3 Reliability l The sensors which supply signals to the process computer and the isolating devices are classified IE. Power to the TSC computer is from uninterruptible power supplies, but power supplied to the displays (CRTs) and to some isolators is not interruptible.
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l The TSC computer has four CPUs and can survive the failure of one of them. If a CPU fails, the entire system drops off the line and must be rebooted. When rebooted, the load on the three remaining CPUs is auto-( matically . redistributed. There is an automatic reboot system which is not presently operable and is an open item which Westinghouse must fix prior to system acceptance.
- 3. IMPLEMENTATION 3.1 Procurement The NRC team did not see any procurement documents. However, the SPDS was purchased from Westinghouse with only limited input from the utility.
j It was bought in June 1980 as a generic Westinghouse system to be tailored for Trojan along with two other plants. Site acceptance testing is underway but the system is not yet functioning accurately.
l 3.2 Installation The Purchase Order for the Trojan SPDS was written in May 1980; in l winter 1982, the hardware was delivered. It was started for tests in September 1983.
[ During 1982 through winter 1983, the Trojan SPDS underwent hardware L
customizing. Software modifications may come when it is turned over to PG&E and operations.
l Because the time response was slow, a fourth CPU was added, but it is still unreliable.
l The SPDS has been declared " operational" but is yet to be accepted by PG&E. 'The factory acceptance test has been completed but the site acceptance test is still in progress with several deficiencies. Much customizing to i PG&E requirements might be required of Westinghouse as part of site I acceptance.
3.3 System Verification and Validation System verification and validation is essentially the site acceptance test. A complete V&V should be run as soon as PG&E accepts the system.
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Results of site acceptance are that its operability and utility are low because accuracy is not assured. Plant-specific validation of the paraneter set has not been done. Operator comprehension of the system is yet to be determined. Follow-on for a functional V&V has not been mentioned.
In a July 3, 1985, letter from B. Withers, PG&E, to H. Thompson, NRR, NRC, PG&E stated that they expect a "d? tailed and complete input verifica-l tion will be performed by March 1, 1986.*
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- 4. TRAINING 4.1 Training recipients k
Training was provided to all licensed operators and to the system's users in the TSC. It was a vendor course which the operators interviewed
( found to be of little value. PG&E is just starting on a lesson plan for the annual licensing review which should be better than the vendor training.
The length of the new course has not been determined nor has the extent of the testing to be. included.
4.2 Training Program Structure j
{ It appears that most operators have had some training before the SPDS was declared " operational." A more extensive program to train operators is needed and wanted by operators. The length and depth of the program is yet j to be determined. The operators interviewed requested a comprehensive I
program conducted external to the control room (i.e., not a do-it-yourself program while on duty). (The trainer had thought help pages were suffi-cient.) They also need a user's manual.
4.3 Training Program Content l 'There has been some limited training but operators are eager for a more formal training program. As mentioned above, operators requested an in-depth program to understand the system better.
! Presumably the program will be based on the Westinghouse training, but contain more practical information regarding the use of the system during operations. Weekly quizzes have included SPDS information, but the l questions have not been well thought out from the operators' standpoint.
The trainer was asked if the program included a method to test operator comprehension of the system. They had not thought about that type of testing.
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- 5. OPERATION The operators interviewed are not very familiar with the system. The training they received was not very complete, and the system is frequently down. All operators indicated that they would like to know more about the
{ system and receive more training. They do find that the displaj for trending is useful. One operator, however, expressed his belief that if more training were given, then the system would require more knowledge and I he would be tested more than he wanted to be. He said he was saturated now I and more knowledge requirements would actually make his performance worse, and contribute to possible accidents. However, if operators were included in the . implementation of the system, knowledge would be transferred and such
- l. anxieties with the system would diminish.
As yet there is no tendency by the operators to rely on the system, and
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danger exists that~the system is being implemented without operator input; specifically, differences between the SPDS parameters and indications on the control boards could be identified by operators.
There are no operating manuals and the operators want one.
l The Reactor Vessel level Indication System provides an example of the lack of operator. knowledge of the SPDS. Its operation in the system is not known nor is the meaning of the level presentation on the control board
( understood by the operators interviewed. RVLIS has not yet been accepted by i PG&E; before it is, the board display and the SPDS should make sense.
One operator felt the iconics were useless. ' Comments such as this need
( to be considered in acceptance or improvement of the system.
- 6. MAINTENANCE 6.1 Software Maintenance There is a formal procedure to control software modifications. The l procedure does not call for peer review and is not subject to review by all organizations which might be affected by a change. It also has no provision for human factors review. The procedure should be expanded to include the
{, above. A program maintenance manual has not been developed for computer programmers.
6.2 Configuration Control Are there effective procedural controls for identifying and approving changes to the SPDS?
k Station controls may not be effective because PG&E did not play an active role in the SPDS design; therefore, configuration control will be difficult to achieve. In addition, no one seemed to be responsible or accountable for the system at the time of the audit. Staff attitude appears to range from hesitant acceptance to outright ridicule. It was recommended t to PG&E that a team be assembled tc ^111y implement the SPDS; to manage the t interface with Westinghouse regardi U system acceptance, developing a train-ing program, developing a software maintenance program, coordinating the system with E0Ps, and obtaining input from operators on a regular basis,
- f. .- Are human factors personnel included in the approval process?
No l
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I ATTACHMENT A k^ PARN1ETER SELECTION I
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I ATTACHMENT A PARAMETER SELECTION (Iconics only)
Narrow Range Display Wide Range Display
- 1. Reactivity Control
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Power Mismatch Start-up rate
[ Nuclear Av. S.R. Flux l 2 ' Source Range Av. Int. R. Flux 2 Intermed. Range 4 Power Range
( Turbine first stg press.
steam flow
- 2. Reactor Core Coolin /
Primary Heat Remova f Pressurizer Press. RCS Pressure 4 channels 2 channels RCS Tav. Core exit temp.
{ 4 loops 65 in-core tes.
Steam Gen. Level 4 loop Th & Tc 12 NR channels S.G. level
- 4 WR channels
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- 3. Reactor Coolant System Integrity Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Level 3 level channels 3 level channels Net charging flow RV level
{ Let down flow RVLIS(notaccepted)
I channel Containment Press.
( Charging flow Rad. Monitoring I 1 channel RCP seal inj.
4 channels
( RCP seal leak off 4 channels Radiation Monitoring Containment Cond.
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- 4. Containment Conditions Containment Monitoring Containment Pressure Temperature Radiation Monitoring g Pressure t Sump Level Radiation Monitoring
( 5. Radioactivity Control TBD l .
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I I ATTACINENT B HUMAN FACTORS ASSESSMENT l
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ATTACHMENT B l
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT l Evaluation plan to assess human factors principles in VDU designs.
- Adapted from " Human Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation and Assessment of Video Display Units" W.E. Gilmore, May,1985.
k Score: 0K or NO I. Visual Displays k-
- a. Evaluate the display for image quality and legibility (by visual observation; adjust brightness control)
- 1. Flicker No, could be better on some CRTs.
- 2. Contrast Ratio OK
{ 3. Brightness OK
- 4. Resolution / Sharpness No, could be improved. i
- 5. Phospher Persistence OK l
- 6. Glare Control Some l- 7. Screen Resolution OK Comments:
- b. Screen structure and content
( 1. Cursor Design
- 2. Text (Prose) Characteristics (text content evaluated later)
- a. Concrete OK, except iconics may
[ require extensive train-t ing to recognize patterns.
- b. Organized, grouped OK, but slight differences in formats could be con-f fusing on 2nd level displays
- c. Easy to comprehend It's not simple; will require extensive train-ing particularly for the potential patterns on the iconics.
- d. Consistent format Within levels
- 3. Labeling
- a. Concise OK l b. Familiar OK
- c. Visibility / legibility Page identification should be centrally labeled es-pecially for 2nd and 3rd level l displays
- d. Capital vs. lower case OK
{ 18 l .
l
- e. Size graduation Yes, for hierarchical r purposes I f. Distinct from data OK
- g. Consistency TBD, with boards and E0Ps
( 4. Messages
- a. Factual Inaccurate or invalid' J l data observed I b. Short and meaningful Net charging - (Negative 4GPM) on Iconic
- c. Simple sentences N/A
( d. Stated in the affirmative OK
- e. Useful/ understandable (Iconic-is confusing)
- 5. Abbreviations KBH (1000 lbs mass per hr)
(- May be an unconventional l
unit of measure
- 6. Error statements
- a. Entry error is flagged OK
( b. -Statement is specific OK
- c. Brief and informative OK
- d. Neutral / polite wording OK
- e. Minimize disruption OK l f. System response time No
- 7. Alphanumerics
- a. Code is consisten't/ standard OK
- b. Meaningful and short OK k 8. Data Display (obtain a sample page of displayed data)
- a. Data presented to reduce search time OK
- b. Directly useful for task TBD
( c. Consistent / standard Yes
- d. Does not rely on user memory RVLS may be confusing,
- e. Information limited to user needs No. See point details on
( Level 3 displays and alpha-numerics on PSSD map and
( alphanumeric labeling on each
( page. This information may not be needed except for programmers' use.
( f. Information perceptually organized OK, data fields are consistent within levels.
l .
( 19 I - - - - - - - -
L I
L
- 9. Data Entry l a. Devoted function keys or simple command Yes
- b. Distinctive prompts Yes Comments:
C. Alphanumeric Characters
- 1. Font or style OK
- 2. Character size and proportion OK
- 3. Character case OK
{ 4. Emitter size, shape, spacing OK Comments:
j D. Screen Organization and Layout l' 1. Screen Size (Inspect from normal viewing distance)
- a. Information is discriminative
[ and legible. OK
- 2. Grouping
- a. Data is functionally or meaningfully grouped. OK
{ b. Grouped data is consistently placed. OK j 3. Display Density
- a. Info density is reduced. OK, but use of a large number of colors, symbology, etc.
i- tends to make displays busy.
However, most colors and symbols used were necessary.
( 4. Display Partitioning
( a. Techniques applied to I organize screen elements. Yes
- 5. Frame / Specs / Info / Location OK k
- 6. Interframe Considerations Some recall of data maybe required of user scrolling through
{ levels.
f 20 l.
1
[-
I Comments: .The large number of display pages will r'equire extensive training
[ and need to be considered as detracting from the purpose of the i SPDS, the purpose being a top level display of critical safety function status.
( E. Visual Coding Dimensions (Identify all coding dimensions)
-1. Color Magenta holds at least 3 different meanings and
{ appears confusing
- 2. Geometric / Shape Coding Yes
[ 3. Pictorial Coding Yes i 4. Magnitude Coding (Direction of change not immediately apparent on iconic)
( 5. Visual Number Coding Yes
- 6. Inclination Coding N/A'
. 7. Use of. Color -
[ o Identify all uses and contexts of color (meanings)
L (Text, background, symbols, lines,etc.)
o Is color used as a redundant means to attract attention?. Yes (Ex: redundant to blinking) l o Identify which colors displayed simultaneously and which are adjacent to one another, o Does display have a control to adjust brightness? Yes l Does it affect color contrast? Yes o What colors used for fine detailed text? Yellow / Black (On what background?)
o Does use' of color exhibit cognitive fidelity with user expectations? (Look at other uses or contexts of color in control room and particularly displayed information.) TBD o Do any colors appear blurred? OK l o Is any information difficult to read or perceive because of color? OK
- a. Data Quality Yellow Good XXXB Bad Closedg Manual Only (Valve normally open)
(colorcoded)
. Closed Poor (co1Orcoded)
Magenta Poor HHH Out of Range XX y Input Sensor Voltage Outside of Limits
- b. CRT Color Code Magenta Caution Red Value exceeds alarm limit (also uses blink coding)
Yellow Update or change 21
f Cyan Reference Material (static)
Dark Blue Tabs
- c. Reverse Video Yellow Caution
( Red Alarm Magenta High Priority (on Alarm Review)
Comment: Use of color on the SPDS may be inconsistent with the control room. For example, yellow is used for good text / data; however, it is commonly used to denote a caution situation such as on indica-
{ tor lights. If contexts are sufficiently different or the components to which color is applied are different, it may not be a serious concern. What is most serious is assigning more than one meaning to a color in one context such as we see with the use of yellow and magenta on this SPDS. The team also found that it was difficult to clearly see cyan from any distances.
( F. Enhancement Coding Dimensions
- 1. Brightness Intensity N/A
{ 2. Blink Coding Yes, it is reserved for an alarm condition
- 3. Image Reversal Yes, reverse video (boxed)
( with color 1
- 1) RED for alarm and
- 2) Yellow for caution and l 3) Magenta for high priority on the alarm review.
- 4. Auditory Coding N/A
[ 5. Voice Coding N/A
- 6. Audio-Visual Warning and Signal Devices N/A
- a. Visible Alarms Supplement Audible Ones for high N/A (No audible alarm)
{ noise conditions.
- b. Visible indication is The indication /CRT can-
! . within 60 degrees of not be viewed from all I direct line of sight. locations outside of the inner horseshoe. Blink rate not observed for l emergency conditions.
- c. Dimensions applied to visi-( ble indication for for attention-getting and to OK, except blink rate to distinguish priorities. be determined.
{
f 22 I _ - - - - - - -
I
- d. Dimensions combined Yes, for an alarm it used I for high attention- Red / Reverse video / blink 1: getting value. and for~a caution condi-tion it uses Yellow / Reverse video
- e. Visible dimensions This workstation sensed from long- should not be used l viewing distance, from long distances.
- f. Absence of visual Yes, yellow denotes good indication denotes normal. data except Reverse Video Yellow denotes caution.
(Collect relevant dimension and applications for later evaluation assinst guidelines.)
Comment: Also, special symbols are added to these color dimensions, and to.
I Reverse Video dimensions to flag error messages 'or the data i quality. 'This is done by marking data with a B for bad data, P for poor data, M for manual data only. Symbols are also used to l
indicate out of range data or sensor voltage out of limits. j l
G. Dynamic Display Characteristics i (Observe screen in a dynamic ~ mode to assure that dynamic features can be detected and that dynamic features do not legibility of critical informa-tion.
~
- 1. Display (animated) motion N/A l
- 2. Digital counters TBD
- 3. Rate of change is perceivable TBD
{ 4. Graphic displays are updated TBD
'at a rate consistent with cperator data handling capabilities.
H. Information Formats (Short of a task analysis, assess the formats' capability to meet operator information requirements.)
- 1. Format provides concise Yes, if the amount of infor-information needs mation includes 2nd level displays for system status I mimics and curves, however, I
if one is using a lower level display it should present a message to return to the iconic if alarm occurs.
f 23 L
l
- 2. Info is limited to immediate See comment at the end of
,. needs and direct to actions Section D. The display i should be assessed for extraneous information.
l 3. Graphic display techniques 3 levels with 16 pages each are limited in variety plus BISI and OSTC; this maybe too much (+100 on 1 3 systems OTSC, PSSD, and l
BISI) l l 4. Info is displayed to appro-priate limits and precision required for actions / decisions TBD, RVLS is in %
- 5. Redundancy is avoided TBD, there is redundancy unless needed for reliability between the PSSD and the OSTC l
- 6. Operator and maintainer info For point detail displays l 1s not combined on a single programmmer info is added. l l display l
- 7. Failure of display is clear Cursor turns purple.and time /date stop
{
- 8. Demand and actual status OK, except containment is differentiated isolation may only reflect f demand status
- 9. Format is most natural No. See top level iconics
( or expected
- 10. Format is effective for OK, for single operator i environment and viewing workstation I conditions
- 11. Formats exhibit " good" l H.F. standards:
- a. Legible OK
- b. Uncluttered OK
- c. Consistent OK l d. Labeled OK, could be better
- e. Visible N0 i f. Conspicuous NO i g. Interpretable NO
- 12. All parts represent the Operators don't like l whole (as in multiple iconics dimensional formats) and are parameters legible and discriminable l
24 l _______________ _______
I l
l
- 13. Do formats that attempt to TBD, based on performance i provide pattern recognition tests for iconics. Steam I cues actually aid detection Generator Level on the of abnormal events? Wide Range Iconic is not normalized. Spike shows l low level. They claim that it can't be normal-ized. This will need to
( be accounted for by train-ing operators to a design fl aw.
k Comments: The pattern recognition required to use the iconics (profi-ciently) will depend on extensive training.
( II. Controls A. Keyboard Layout and Dimensions N/A
- 1. Keystroke feedback OK
- 2. Key actuation force OK
- 3. Key-rollover OK l 4. Key travel OK
- 5. Key color / labeling characteristics TBD
- 6. Key dimension / spacing OK
( 7. Keyboard slope OK
- 8. Keyboard thickness OK
- 9. Special function keys There may be ex-
[ traneous ones, some i are used in TSC but not in CR. Also, given the amount of
{ pages there should be a quick way for opera-tor to access critical
{ information.
- 10. Auxiliary numeric key set OK
- 11. Alternate input device See comment below Comments: Joystick present on keyboard but it is not used; too slow. Also, some displays are not " protected" i.e., capability to int.erfere using the keyboard exists.
( III. Control / Display Integration A. User Dialogue l
- 1. Dialogue design suited to task. Yes
- 2. Menu design
- a. Compatible with control action OK, key tabbing is good feature
( 25 l -
- b. facilitates accuracy / speed Could be faster
- c. Menu hierarchically organized OK k
- 3. Command language (N/A)
- 4. Query language (N/A)
- 5. Natural language Yes Comments: Most displays are menu driven, and is user friendly with prompts B. System Feedback to User Actions (Quesi. ion operators and observe VDU) )
l 1. Display 'fpdate Rate
- a. Time lag between component I and display value This is a problem.
4
- b. Parameter values and realtime time Not evaluated
- c. Update time 3 s or less No
- 2. Response Time l a. Values appropriate for task or 2-4 s max That is their goal.
- 3. System Status Indication
- a. Adequacy of indicator OK
{ 4. Routine Status Ir. formation
- a. Error messages, prompts OK f b. Alarm setting basis given i 1.e., variables covered and critical values TBD
- c. System gives up to date account Not up to speed yet
- 5. Performance Job Aids
{ a. User finds system easy to use Users not trained on and helpful for the task. it. Iconics annoy (Assess these features for some operators.
I their effectiveness in Performance testing l " closing the loop" between with user input needs the operator-machine inter- to be provided.
face) f IV. Workplace Layout A. Anthropometric Aspects of the VDU Workplace
{
- 1. Keyboard dimensions
- 2. Screen height and viewing angle 26
{
t - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - -
L l
- 3. Viewing distance
[ 4. Screen orientation (tilt)
L
- 5. Chair characteristics
- 6. Hard copy printer
- 7. Health and safety factors
{
Comments: The workstation is designed as a sitdown one; however, given the nature of the task to monitor safety systems with confirma-
{ tion against hardware used meters, that is less appropriate than one that could be used standing up and working with the control boards. Also, the operator will be stationed at the VDU with his/her back towards the boards.
B. Environmental Factors Not Evaluated
( l. Background noise
- 2. Temperature / humidity
. 3. Lighting levels
- 4. Ventilation
[
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W 4
i ATTACH 4ENT D ATTENDANCE LISTS 60
4 ATTACHMENT D r Attendance List L
NRC SPDS PROGRESS REVIEW Trojan Site August 6-8, 1985 Name Title Co. / Agency
{
Lisamarie Lazo Project Manager U.S.NRC/DL f Stuart Richards Trojan Senior Resident USNRC Max Snook Acting Quality Assurance PGE
{ Supervisor Alex Roller Electrical Branch Manager PGE Jerry Reid Manager, Plant Services PGE Gary Zimmerman Branch Manager, NSRD PGE Mike Singh Acting Manager, Operations PGE and Maintenance Dick Bennett Control and Electrical PGE Supervisor Scott Bauer Regulation Engineer, NSRD PGE Marvin Dawson Reliability Engineer PGE Mark Peery Electrical Engineer, NPE PGE Al Cohlmeyer Plant Engineering Supervisor PGE Lyn Robertson Computer Engineer PGE George Lapinsky Engineering Psychologist NRC/HFEB Richard Stark Consul tant NRC/SAIC Whit Hansen Consultant NRC/Comex Carol Kain Consultant NRC/SAIC 61
4 Attendance List NRC SPDS PROGRESS REVIEW Exit Meeting PGE Offices August 8,1985 j Name Title Co./ Agency Lisamarie Lazo Project Manager NRC/DL
( George Lapinsky Engineering Psychologist NRC/HFEB Richard Stark Consultant NRC/SAIC Whit Hansen Consultant NRC/Comex I Carol Kain Consultant NRC/SAIC Scott Bauer Regulation Engineer NSRD Dave Modeen Nuclear Engineer NSB/NSRD Marvin Dawson Reliability Engineer PGE/ Trojan Gary Zimmerman Manager, Nuclear Regulation PGE/NSRD Mark Peery Electrical Engineer PGE/NPE Alex Roller Manager, Electrical Engineer PGE/NPE 62
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _