ML20137Y156
| ML20137Y156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1985 |
| From: | Pilant J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| CNSS867184, NUDOCS 8603120170 | |
| Download: ML20137Y156 (19) | |
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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT JANUARY 1, 1985 TilROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1985
'iSNRC DOCKET 50-298 1
8603120170 8 PDR ADOCK O P R'
TABLE OF CONTENTS, SECTION PAGE NUMBER I. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS AND TESTS I
' Fuel Performance 2 MSV and MSRV Failures and Challenges 3 Reportable Special Procedures /Special Test Procedures 4 II. FACILITY CHANGES' REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.59 6
~III. PERSONNEL AND MAN-REM BY WORK AND JOB FUNCTION 14
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d I. PERFORMANCE CllARACTERESTICS AND TESTS i
FUEL PERFORMANCE 4
The plant was shut down from September 16, 1984, through August 25, 1985, for refueling and reactor recirculation piping replacement. The plant started up on August 25, 1985. Of f-gas activity in the August 25, 1985, . through October 5,1985, ' operational period showed no increases indicative of fuel failures. High vibration on the Main Turbine required the plant to shut down on October 5, 1985. Upon inspection, significant damage was found in the low pressure rotors and an extended repair outage commenced. The plant was returned to operation on November 23, 1985. The off-gas activity level continued at e'sentially a steady state levels during the periods of operation
- in 1985 with the release rates being well within the limits specified in the
- CNS Technical Specifications.
Comparisons of the actual control rod density during the period of August 25, 1985, to December 31, 1985, to the control rod density predicted by computer programs at various core. average exposures indicated reactivity anomalies less than 1% Ak/k.
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l MSV AND MSRV FAII.URES AND CllALLENCES (Ref: NUREG-0737, Action item II.K.3.3)
There were no clia11enges or failures of any safety or relief valves during 1985.
REPORTABI.E SPECIAL PROCEDURES /SPECIAL TEST PROCEDURES SP 85-4 Procedure: The purpose of this procedure was to provide guidance in maintaining flow through the Core Spray piping system whfic performing IIISI.
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Description:==
This procedure outlined the method of maintaining the required cooling water flow through the Core Spray system by cross-connecting the RilR nnd Core Spray systems through their candensate supply connections. A minimum flow was required to remove the heat from the IllSI process.
Safety Annlysis: This procedure was performed prior to fuel loading so that the respective systems would not be required for core or containment cooling. No permanent changes were made to existing equipment and the af fected systems were returned to normal at the conclusion of the Ills 1 process.
S_TP 85-1 Procedure: This test procedure was used as the master program description for the 1984/85 outage Restart Test Program.
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Description:==
All major preoperational and startup tests deemed necessary to recover from that outage were developed as an amendment to this master procedure. Some of the larger scope test procedures were developed for the following: Renctor Recirculation system. ECCS systems, Condensate and Feedwater system, Electrient systems, 10 year ASME hydrostatic testing, and refill and flushing of systems placed in dry layup. Also included was tenting to verify thermal expansion and vibration measurements were within code tolerances.
Safety Analysis: All test packages developed were based on test procedures used during originni plant startup, surveillance procedures currently being used and current operating procedures. The tests were used to verify that the plant had been returned to a condition equal to or better than prior to shutdown for the outage.
STP 85-8 Procedure: This test procedure van used to document the temporary removal of the RllR head spray injection spool piece, i
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Description:==
The head spray mode of shutdown cooling operation has not been used since initial plant startup testing. It has been determined to be unnecessary for the safe shutdown of the plant. The benefits of removing the piping include decreasing the amount of piping exposed to the reactor coolant pressure boundary, removing a chronic drywell head load problem, and decreasing the time required to disassemble and reassemble the vessel head, thereby reducing personnel exposure.
Safety Analysis: ~ Disabling the head spray subsystem does not affect the RilR system safety or power generation design specifications.
Integrity of the primary pressure boundary is enhanced by removal of this piping. Additionally, the station emergency operations procedures describe an alternate shutdown cooling lineup. The permanent removal of the piping will be documented as a design change.
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II. FACILITY CIIANCES REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.59
] REPORTABLE MINOR DESIGN CllANGES (MDC) COMPLETED IN 1985 1 MDC 80-84-2 i
Component: Extended Range Effluent Monitors for Reactor Building Turbine Building, and Radwaste Building l
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Description:
MDC 80-84, submitted in the 1983 Annuni Report, authorized the l replacement of existing effluent monitoring and sampling equipment with new Kaman Instrumentation units. Amendment 2 nuthorized the reconnection of the originni NMC samplers to
- serve as backups to the Kaman effluent monitors.
Safety Analysis: The Kaman units were installed in order to enhance the effluent monitoring capabilities of the pinnt, by providing instrument j range overInp from normal to accident conditions. Reconnecting j the NMC samplers as backups to the Kaman units will, in turn,
, enhance the capability of performing any required sampling even
! if the Kaman units are out of service.
i MDC 82-101 Component: Technical Support Center / Instrument and Controls Shop IIVAC Filter Unit 4
Description:
This MDC authorized the modification of the TSC/IAC Shop ilVAC system to include a profilter, llEpA filter, and activated j charcoal filter and associnted support equipment. This
- modification provides the capability for removal of airborne i radionuclides in this aren during those emergency situations
! that create an airborne radiation hazard.
[ Safety Analysis: 10CFR50.47 requires that adequate emergency facilities and l equipment to support emergency response be provided and j maintained. The modifications made per this MDC help ensure
) these requirements can be met and the plant returned to a safe i condition during and following an accident situation.
t l HDC 83-3 and Amendment 1 l
Component: Repincement of Essentini RTDs and Thermocouples Inside 1 Containment l
Description:
MDC 83-3 nuthorized the repincement of 16 environmentally unqualified RTDs and thermocouples, located inside the drywell, with qualified elements. Amendment I to the HDC nuthorized the j use of qualified cable splices in lieu of terminni blocks as
{ addressed in IE Notice 84-47. Cable splices were used during i
the replacement of the RTDs and thermocouples.
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Sq Safety Analysis: The repincement elements' meet or exceed the requirements of the original equipment in' addition to now meeting the environmental qualification requirements addressed in IE Bulletin 79-01B.
The use of essential circuit cabic splices will not degrade the present circuit specifications since the material used was tested and proven fully qualified. In addition, the splices will enhance the qualification level by eliminating the possibility of leakage currents from the present terminal boards.
MDC 83-34 and Amendment 1 Component: Augmented Off Gas System Design Reclassification
Description:
This MDC and amendment updated the seismic and quality group classifications and quality assurance provisions of the non-safety reinted portions of the Air Removni, Off Cas..and Augmented Off Cas systems to enhance system reliability, operability, and availability. The basis for the reclassifica-tion of radwaste systems was provided by USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.143.
Safety Analysis: At the time of pinnt design and construction, Reguintory Guide 1.26 stated that specific guidance on quality group classification of radioactive vaste management systems was under development. Regulatory Guide 1.143 clarified the radwnste system classifications stated in the USAR, thereby reducing the probability for error involving radwaste system design and quality work and insuring increased system availability.
MDC 84-13 Component: Plant Air Compressor
Description:
This MDC authorized the upgrade of two pinnt air compressors to-enpacities equivalent to the remaining plant air compressor.
Safety Analysis: This modification increased the relinbility of the plant air system by making each nir compressor independently capable of supplying the pinnt instrument air load. This increased reliability will, in turn, reduce the potentini for failure in systems which utilize instrunent air.
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MDC 84-19 Component: 12.5kV Ring Bus
Description:
This MDC authorized the. rerouting of the 12.5kV underground I electrieni ring bus prior to the crection of the Multi-purpose i Facility building (MDC 84-26; 1984 Annual Report). The original location was in the excavation area for that building.
Safety Analysis: Any failure of the overhead line, the underground cable, or the 12.5kV switchgent after the modification does not affect operation of safety-related equipment nor does it affect the emergency buses load. Therefore, the effect on overall plant safety is not changed.
t MDC 84-21 Component: Station ifcating Boiler
Description:
This MDC authorized the removal of one of two station heating boilers in conjunction with the installation of two new electric boilers (MDC 80-57; 1983 Annual Report).
Safety Analysis: The removal of this heating boiler has no effect on overall plant safety. The installation of 'the new electric boilers ensures that original plant heating needs are still being met.
MDC 84-24 Component: 480 VAC Electrical power and Station Communications
Description:
This MDC authorized the installation of permanent 480 VAC power supplies to the craft change, toilet and utility buildings and the north well. In additfor, it authorized the installation of communication circuits to these buildings and the north warehouse.
Safety Analysis: The addition of this equipment does not affect operation of the equipment inside the plant nor does it affect the loads on any emergency buses. Therefore, the affect on overall plant safety is not changed.
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MDC 84-28 Component: Reactor Equipment Cooling Surge Tank Level Control Valve Bypass
Description:
This MDC nuthorized the addition of a bypass loop around the surge tank level control valve feed from the demineralized water system.
Safety Analysis: This modification increases the system reliability by ensuring a continuous supply of surge tank makeup water in the event the level control valve should fail. This reduces the potentini for a loss of REC, thereby increasing the margin of safety in systems that utilize REC as a cooling medium.
MDC 84-37 Component: pinnt Manngement Information System
Description:
This MDC and its amendments authorized the installation of a new process computer and associated equipment. The installed equipment provides state of the art monitoring of plant conditions during all normal and accident situations. The associated components installed, in addition to the computer, include data acquisition and computer periphernis, a RWM/RPIS microprocessor subsystem, an uninterruptible power supply system, an tlVAC system for the computer and a Halon fire suppression system in the Computer Room.
Safety Analysis: No systems are directly affected by this MDC since the pMIS computer system is a plant monitoring system only. The PMIS does not serve as a safety system in that no PMIS components are required in order to achieve a safe plant shutdown. The pMTS points connected to the RWM/RpIS microprocessor provide the same operationni function as the originni system.
MJC 84-110 Component: Teleph)ne Ductbank Relocation
Description:
This MDC authorized the installation of a new manhole and ductbank and rerouting of the stntion telephone cable due to the Emergency Operations Facility addition to the Security Building.
Snfety Analysis: This modification did not affect any safety reinted equipment nor did it nffect overall plant conditions.
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MDC 84-174 Component: Standby Gas Treatment Electric Ileater Control Circuits
Description:
This MDC authorized the removal of the moisture and temperature elements instrument loops from the control circuits of the standby gas treatment electric heaters. The MDC additionally removed the control and time delay relays in the heater control circuits.
Safety Analysis: The removal of the contrM function of the items stated in this MDC increase the system capability to perform its design function in an emergency. The elements were not environmentally qualified and their failure could have prevented the heater from operating as designed, thereby reducing the overall performance of the Standby can Treatment system.
MDC 84-142 Component: 12.5kV Power Feeder to North Warehouse Deecription: This MDC authorized the installation of a new permanent 12.5kV underground electrical feeder to the north warehouse which replaced a temporary overhead power supply.
Safety Analysis: The addition of the underground circuit removed the hazards normally associated with temporary equipment installations.
Thic increased the safety of personnel and reduced the potential for an accident that could affect the safe operation of plant equipment.
MDC 84-154 Component: Yarway Level Switches
Description:
This MDC authorized the replacement of microswitches and magnetic cams in existing Yarway level instruments with environmentally qualified switches and cams.
Safety Analysis The original assembly components did not meet the compliance requirements for environmental qualification per 10CFR50.49.
Repincement of these components removed a potential common mode failure mechanism, i.e., steam environment, thereby restoring the Yarways to their original design requirements and enhancing their operability in post-accident conditions.
MDC 84-173 and Amendment 1 Component: Repincement of Direct Current Motor Starters
Description:
This MDC authorized the replacement of 28 DC motor starters with nuclear qualified motor starters. Amendment 1 to the HDC authorized the use of qualified cabic splices during the installation of the new starters.
Safety Analysis: The installation of the qualified starters and use of qualified l cable splices ensures the affected equipment can withstand a !
more harsh environment than original equipment. This increnses the reliability of the components to operate as intended during any accident condition, thereby increasing the safety margin of each system. The use of essential circuit enble splices will not degrade the present circuit specifications since the material used was tested and proven fully qualified. ;
i MDC 84-224 Component: REC, PC, and SW System Motor Operated Valve Local Control Switches
Description:
This MDC authorized the removal of the local (Reactor Building) motor operated valve control switches in the REC, PC, and SW systems. The switches were Type GE-CR2940 and did not meet environmental qualification requirements.
Safety Analysis: Removal of the affected switchen restored these systems to single failure criteria which meet the intent of 10CFR50.49 for safety reinted equipment. This, in turn, restored the systems !
to their original design requirements, thereby meeting or exceeding the originni system margins of safety.
MDC 84-235 Component: Control Room Communications
Description:
This MDC authorized the installation of communications equipment for new consoles installed in the Control Room. It authorized the installation of a new telephone cable to provide I nore, circuits for the Of fice, Control, and Turbine buildings.
It also permitted the relocation of the emergency / fire alarm ,
tone generator within the Control Room.
Safety Analysis: This modification had no effect on overall plant safety nor did it directly interface with any engineered safeguard systems.
MLC 85-7 Component: Service Water Pump Room Air Conditioning
Description:
This MDC nuthorized the modification of the Service Water Pump Room air conditioning system from the originni cooling tower-arrangement to two new direct expansion 25-ton condensing units. This modification was necessary because of the inadequate cooling capabilities provided by the originni system.
Safety Analysis: Failure of the new units do not create a condition any more severe than that created by the failure of the originnt equipment. During normal operation, this modification will significantly improve the aren cooling for the Service Water Pump Room thereby improving the relinbility of this equipment.
MDC 85-10 Compenent: Plant Management Information System Uninterruptible Power Supply llattery
Description:
The new PMIS computer requires an uninterruptible power supply.
This MDC nuthorized the installation of a 125 voit battery snd racks to supply power to the PMIS Inverter when the normal and n1 ternate AC power sources are not available.
Safety Analysis: The PMIS battery installation does not interface with or have any effect on any safety reinted system. Its installation niso necounted for personnel safety and protection of nearby plant equipment should the battery fall in any manner.
MDC 8! .20, Component Service Water Pump Ginnd Seni Supply
Description:
This MDC nothorized the installation of a backup ginnd sent water supply to the service water pumps from the Fire Protection system. The backup supply was necessary beenuse there is n lack of separation between power nupplies and control circuitry in the existing ginnd seni pumps which is n requirement of 10CFR50 Appendix R.
Safety Analysis: Thin modification will improve the safety of the pinnt by ensuring that cooling water is always nyniinble to the service water pump bearings even with n fire an depicted in 10CFR50 Appendix R. The Fire Protection system in minimally affected.
MDC 85-37 Component: Emergency Condensate Storage Tanks Local Level / pressure Indication
Description:
This MDC authorized the installation of local level indication at the emergency condensate storage tanks. This indication was necessary because the existing level transmitters are powered from the same essential division which viointes the require-ments of 10CFR50 Appendix R.
Safety l Analysis: By providing a backup level indication for the emergency condensate storage tanks, the safety of the plant is enhanced in the event of a fire as depicted by 10CFR50 Appendix R. The local level indication is normally isolated and would only be needed in an emergency fire condition. Therefore, the effect on safety systems in the event of a failure in thin installa-tion is minimal.
MDC 85-44 ;
Component: Local Reactor Pressure Instrumentation
Description:
This MDC authorized the installation of a local pressure gauge l in the Reactor Pullding to monitor reactor pressure. This indication was necessary because existing instrumentation may not be available in the event of a fire as depicted by 10CFR50 Appendix R.
Safety Analysis: Thin installation is considered safety related equipment and as auch was designed to meet all the requiremente cf a nuclear C1sas I system. The overall plant reliability is enhanced by providing a hackup inst,rument to monitor reactor pressure in the event of a fire.
ESC 85-17 Component: Check Valve in Reactor Water Cicanup Return Line to the Vessel
Description:
This MDC authorized the replacement of RWCU check valve 15 ;
because of its failure to pass the required local leak rate testing.
Safety 1 Analynic: This replacement restored the affected portion of the RWCU system to a condition necessary to meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix J. The new check valve cannot fall in any way not previously evaluated and will operate equal to or better ,
than the original valve.
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III. PERSONNEL. AND MAN-REM BY WORK AND JOB FUNCTION
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PERSONMEL AND MAN-REM BY WORK AND JOB FUNCTION Nnm'ber.of Perscnnel Total Man-Rem
( > 100 mrem)
Station Utility Contractor Station Utility Contractor Work and Job Function Employees Employees & Others Employees Employees & Other
_ REACTOR OPERATIONS & SURV.
Maintenance Personnel 2 --
20 0.315 ---
2.284 operating Personnel 57 -- ---
25.138 --- ---
llealth Physics Personnel 19 --
1 7.786 ---
0.056 Supervisory Personnel g Engineering Personnel a 3 1.559 0.950 1.083 15 , 5 10 6.438 0.359 1.074 ROUTINE MAINTENANCE Maintenance Personnel 120 --
102 120.596 ---
49.477 Operating Personnel 4 -- ---
0.113 --- ---
llealth Physics Personnel 11 -- ---
3.636 --- ---
Supervisory Personnel 5 3 1 1.283 0.211 0.952 Engineering Personnel I 9 31 0.071 0.480 5.134 SPECIAL MAINTENANCE Maintenance Personnel 2 1 651 3.485 0.191 823.412 Operating Personnel 6 -- ---
'I.046 --- ---
llcalth Physics Personnel 15 --
29 11.496 ---
24.509 Supervisory Personnel 7 6 96 0.568 5.288 133.685 Engineering Personnel 3 15 11 0.280 6.713 3.312 WASTE PROCESSII;G Maintenance Personnel 4 -- 4 0.034 ---
0.422 Operating Personnel 30 -- ---
5.825 --- ---
llealth Physics Personnel 14 --
1 5.203 ---
0.405 Supervisory Personnel 3 -- ---
0.119 --- ---
Engineering Personnel 4 -- ---
0.985 --- ---
REFUELING liaintenance Personnel -- --
13 --- ---
2.253 Operating Pornonnel 41 -- ---
8.407 --- ---
llealth Physica Personnel -- -- --- --- --- ---
Supervisory Personnel 1 -- ---
0.001 --- ---
Engineering Personnel 4 -- ---
0.358 --- ---
INSERVICE INSPECTION Maintenance Personnel -- --
10 --- ---
6.217 Operating Personnel 1 -- ---
0.002 --- ---
llealth Physica Personnel 1 -- ---
0.059 --- ---
Supervisory Personnel -- -- --- --- --- ---
Engineering Personnel -- -- --- --- --- ---
TOTALS, Maintenance Pernonnel 122 1 742 124.430 0.191 884.065 Operating Personnel 59 -- ---
40.531 --- ---
Ilealth Physics Pernonnel 19 --
29 28.180 ---
24.970 Supervisory Personnel 12 6 101 3.530 6.449 135.720 Engineering Personnel 15 16 41 8.132 7.552 9.520 GRAND TOTAL.S 227 23 913 204.803 14.192 1054.275
GE'IERAL OFFICE Nebraska Public Power District
" ""E&fo"#84'f"^M"*"" -
CNSS867184 February 28, 1986 Mr. Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 P.yan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011
Subject:
Annual Operating Report Cooper Nuc1cnr Station NRC Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46
Dear Mr. Martin:
In accordance with Paragraph 6.5.1 of the Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, the Nebraska Pubile Power District submits the Cooper Nuclear Station Annual Operating Report for the period of January 1, 1985 through December 31, 1985.
We are enclosing one signed original for your use and, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 10.1 Revision 4, are transmitting one copy to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Should you have any questions or comments regarding this report, please contact me.
Sincerely, a bM Jay M. Pflant Technical Staff Manager Nuclear Power Group JMP:ss Enclosure cc: director Office of Inspection & Enforcenent w/l enc 1.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTH: Document Control Desk Divinion Manager of Nuclear Operations w/l enc 1.
Cooper tinclent Station d
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