ML20137M039

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Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-9 & NPF-17,revising Containment Pressure Control Sys Setpoints,Correcting Sys Channel Trip Logic & Adding Doghouse Water Level Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.Fee Paid
ML20137M039
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/06/1985
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To: Adensam E, Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20137M043 List:
References
TAC-59696, TAC-59697, TAC-60710, TAC-60711, NUDOCS 8509130123
Download: ML20137M039 (5)


Text

P Duxu Powen Coxem 1

P.O. nox 33115D CitAttLOTTE. N.C. 28242

!!A1. B. TUCKER reternome 904Hmi-4mi m......,

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September 6, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:

Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Number 50-369/370 Proposed Technical Specification Changes Relative to Containment Pressure Control System and Doghouse Water Level Instrumentation

Dear Mr. Denton:

Attached are proposed license amendments for McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses NPF-9 (Unit 1) and NPF-17 (Unit 2).

The proposed changes:

1) revise and clarify Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) setpoints; 2) correct CPCS channel trip logic indicated in Table 3.3-3; and 3) add doghouse water level instrumentation surveillance requirements to Table 4.3-2.

Attachment I contains the proposed Technical Specification changes. Attachment II provides a Technical Justification and Safety Analysis in support of the proposed changes. Attachment III provides an analysis conforming to the standards contained in 10CFR50.92 as required by 10CFR50.91. This analysis concludes that the proposed amendments would not have adverse safety or environmental impact.

This request involves one application for amendment to the McGuire's Technical Specifications. Accordingly, pursuant to 10CFR170.21, a check for $150.00 is enclosed.

Please feel free to contact us if you require any additional information.

Very truly yours, d $. x Hal B. Tucker

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qjg/SS?27 ljDOCK0123 850906 05000369 P

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O Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Page 2 cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 W. T. Orders Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station Mr. Dayne Brown, Chief Radiation Protection Branch Division of Facility Services Department of Human Resources P. O. Box 12200 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 l

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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Page 3 HAL B. TUCKER, being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this revision to the McGuire Nuclear Station License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17 and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

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eg Hal B. Tucker, Vice President Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of September,- 1985.

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V' -R, dsb W Notary Public My Commission Expires:

September 20, 1989

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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Page 4 bec:

K. S. Canady N. A. Rutherford R. L. Gill P. B. Nardoci W. H. McDowell J. B. Day R. W. Quellette E. O. McCraw (MNS)

P. M. Abraham M. D. McIntosh T. L. McConnell (MNS)

D.' H. Gabriel G. W.- Hallman R. F. Banner File: MC-801.01 MC-813.20 i

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ATTAClefENTS:

1.

The Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications II.

Justification and Safety Evaluation III. Analysis of Significant Hazards Consideration i

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION HINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 5.

Turbine Trip &

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Feedwater Isolation a.

Automatic Actuation 2

1 2

1, 2 2'1 Logic and Actuation Relay b.

Steam Generator 3/stm. gen.

2/sta. gen.

2/stm. gen.

1, 2 15*

Water Level--

in any oper-in each oper-High-High ating stm gen.

ating stm. gen.

c.

Doghouse Water Level 3/ Train /

2/ Train /

2/ Train /

1, 2 264 (Feedwater Isolation Doghouse Doghouse Doghouse Only) 6.

Containment Pressure 8( 4/ Train) 4/ Train 8

1,2,3,4 25 Control System O

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Action 25 - With any of the eight channels inoperable, place the inoperable channel (s) in the start permissive mode within one hour and apply the applicable action statement (Containment Spray - T.S. 3.6.2, Containment Air Return / Hydrogen Skimmer - T.S. 3.6.5.6).

Action 26 - With one of the two trains of doghouse water level instrumentation inoperable (less than the minimum required number of channels operable), restore the inoperable train to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. After.72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with one train inoperable, or within one hour with 2 trains inoperable, monitor doghouse water level in the affected doghouse continuously until both trains are restored to operable status.

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McGUIRE - UNITS I and 2 3/4 3-24a 1

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES 4.

Steam Line Isolation a.

Manual Initiation N.A.

N.A.

b.

-Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

and Actuation Relays c.

Containment Pressure--High-High 5 2.9 psig 5 3.0 psig d.

. Negative Steam Line 5 -100 psi /sec 5 -120 psi /sec Pressure Rate - High e.

Steam Line Pressure - Low 1 585 psig 1 565 psig 5.

Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation a.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

and Actuation Relays b.

Steam Generator Water level--

5 82% of narrow range 5 83% of narrow range High-High (P-14) instrument span each steam instrument span each steam generator generator c.

Doghouse Water Level - High 12" 13" (Feedwater Isolation Only) 6.

Containment' Pressure Control System Start Permissive / Termination (SP/T) 0.3 $ SP/T $ 0.4 PSIG 0.25 5 SP/T $ 0.45 PSIG t.

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTLM INSTRUMENTATION

-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TRIP i

ANALOG ACTUATING, MODES CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE j

FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST IS REQUIRED

4. Steam Line Isolation a.

Manual Initiation N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2,. 3 b.

Automatic Actuation N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

M(1)

Q 1, 2, 3.

Logic and Actuation Relays.

c.

Containment Pressure-- S R

M N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3 High-High I

d.

Negative Steam Line S

R H

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N. A'.

3 Pressure Rate-High

.e.- Steam Line S

R M

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3 Pressure--Low

5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation a.

Automatic Actuation N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

M(1)

-Q 1, 2 Logic and Actuation Relay b.

Steam Generator Water S

-R M

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2 Level-High-High (P-14) c.

Doghouse Water-S N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1,2 Level-High (Feedwater Isolation Only)

6. Containment Pressure Control System Start Permissive /

S R

H N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3, 4 Termination 6'

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TRIP-

. ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE - FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST-LOGIC TEST TEST-TEST IS REQUIRED

7. Auxiliary Feedwater a.

Manual Initiation N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3 b.

Automatic Actuation N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

M(1)

Q 1, 2, 3 Logic and Actuation lays 4

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 3)

Verifying that the Containment Pressure Control System functions within the setpoint limits specified in Table 3.3-4, Item 6.

d.

At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

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4 McGUIRE - UNITS I and 2 3/4 6-21

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN AND HYDROGEN SKIMMER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.6 Two independent Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.6.1 Each Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

Verifying that the air return and hydrogen skimmer fans start a.

automatically on a Containment Phase B Isolation (S ) test signal p

after a 91 1 minute delay and operate for at least 15 minutes; b.

Verifying that during air return fan operation with the air return fan damper closed and with the bypass dampers open, the fan motor current is less than or equal to 32 amps when the fan speed is 870 1 30 rpm; Verifying that with the hydrogen skimmer fan operating and the motor c.

operated valve in its suction line closed, the fan motor current is less than or equal to 21.5 amps when the fan speed is 3599 20 rpm; d.

Verifying that with the air return fan off, the motor operated damper in the air return fan discharge line to the containment's lower compartment opens automatically with a 10 i I second delay after a Containment Phase B Isolation (S ) test signal; p

Verifying that with the air return fan operating, the check damper in e.

the air return fan discharge line to the containment's lower compartment is open; f.

Verifying that the motor operated valve in the hydrogen skimmer suction line opens automatically and the hydrogen skimmer fans receive a start permissive signal; and Verifying that with the fan off, the air return fan check damper is g.

closed.

McGUIRE - UNITS I and 2 3/4 6-41

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-CONT'AINMENT SYSTEMS S_URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.5.6.2 At least once per 18 months, each Containment Air Return and Hydrogen' Skimmer System shall beJdemonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the containment pressure control system functions within the setpoint limits spe'cified in Table 3.3-4,, Item 6, f

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L Attachment II i

Technical Justification and Safety Analysis A.

CPCS Setpoint ab t

I The Containment Pressure Control' System'(CPCS) is provided to preclude-underpressurization"of the containment. The CPCS interlocks with the containment spray.and containment air return / hydrogen skimmer systems to prevent operation when containment pressure is below approximately.25

-PSIG. -As containment ~ pressure-increases, the CPCS provides a~ start permissive signal-to allow operation of the Engineered-Safety Features

-(containment' spray and air return systems). The setpotut (containment high-high pressure).for these ESF systems is 2.9 PSIG; the CPCS start permissive may occur at any containment pressure below 2.9 PSIG, and will

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not affect' system operation.

The current Technical Specification setpoint for the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS).is conservative and somewhat ambiguous, in that the start permissive and termination both occur at the same value of differential containment pressure (.25 psid). The proposed change will create an operating band bdtween.the start permissive and the termination setpoint.

1 In. addition, the new setpoints will correct two relatively minor' inconsistencies. Currently the trip setpoint -(start / termination) for the j.

CPCS is equal to the allowable value. According to Vestinghouse-setpoint methodology, the trip setpoint should differ from the allowable value by at l' east an amount. equal to instrument. drift. Second, the Technical Specifica.tions allow the termination of CPCS at say value less than or equal to'.25 psid. - The FSAR,. however, requires that termination. occur at a value greater than -1.5 psig. A termination setpoint of, for instance,

-2.0,awould satisfy the Tech. Specs. but not the FSAR.

The new setpoints are not significantly different from the existing

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setpoints, and will not affect the.respos e-of-containment spray or

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containment air return / hydrogen skimmer systems in the' event-of a -

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challenge. The setpoints are chaaged primarily to' create a' separation between the termination and start p,ermissive setpoints, and to provide meaningful allowable values. The setpoints are sufficiently~far from the extremes of the span betw' en the safety limits' to ensure 'that no excursions e

j into unacceptable pressure'c'onditions will occur. The new~setpoints are identical to,those currently in useiat' Catawba.

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B.

ESF Actuation System Instrumentation (Table' 3.3-3)

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Item '6 of > Table 3.3-3 lists the -CPCS as having 4 channels per train with

. 2-cut-of-4 trip logic and at least 3 channels required to be. operable.

.However, each.of the four.cInndels has a'different function in the

' ? hp?tration:of the 'CPCS.

Each 'of'the pressure switches /provides a start I O 'ermissive/ termination signal to one or two of the following components:

p Containment Spray '(NS) Pump, ' Air Return Fan (VX), Hydrogen Skimmer Fan, Air. Return Damper, Hydrogen Skimmer l Inlet) Valve, and NS Isolation Valves.

4' Therefore,;in'ordertoassureproperoperationofthelCPCS, ball.four

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channels must be operable. Table 3.3-3 is being revised to reflect that there are two trains of 4 channels each, and that all eight channels are required to be operable, or the affected system (Containment Spray or Containment Air Return / Hydrogen Skimmer as applicable) must be declared inoperable and actions taken pursuant to the appropriate Technical Specification. The Action Statement, which requires that any inoperable channels be placed in the " Start Permissive" mode, will ensure that the components required to control containment pressure will be available when needed. See Figure 11-1 for CPCS Logic.

C.

Doghouse Water Level - High (New Tech. Spec.)

As a result of an incident at McGuire, surveillance requirements are being added for existing doghouse water level instrumentation. Doghouse water level instrumentation consists of 3 level transmitters per train in each doghouse. The instrumentation is designed to detect accumulation of water in the doghouse, which is indicative of a feedwater line break, and will provide a feedwater isolation signal on high doghouse water level. The instrumentation has an alarm at 6 inches and an isolation signal at 12 inches. The new surveillance requirements, a channel check once per shift and a trip actuating device operational check once per 18 months, will provide added assurance that the instrumentation will function as intended.

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High-High Containment P ressure

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Start Permissive 2, w$ 8 Start Permissive c

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Start Permissive

'mz-wr-M Start Permissive YSE s-p p p p p

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START START START r-AIR HYDROGEN CONTAINMENT RETURN SKIMMER SPRAY FAN FAN PUMP STOP STOP STOP

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OPEN OPEN OPEN CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN AIR RETURN SPRAY DISCHARGE SKIMER DAMPER CONTAINMENT INLET VALVE ISOL VALVES CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE n

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I Attachment III J

ANALYSIS'0F SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS i

A.

CPCS Setpoints

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The proposed changes are intended to clarify the required setpoints and i

allowable values, and do not significantly change the intent or operation i

of the CPCS.

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B.

ESF Actuation System Instrumentation a

1-The proposed changes are corrective in nature and are intended to more accurately reflect the function of the CPCS, thus resulting in an overall increase in the likelihood of proper system operation.

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Doghouse Water Level Instrumentation t

Surveillance requirements and LCOs are proposed 'for. existing doghouse water level instrumentation to provide increased assurance of operability of the instrumentation. The 18-month frequency for trip actuation testing

-is not expected to degrade the equipment.

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D.

, Summary i

The three changes proposed are administrative and/or corrective in nature i-and do not involve hardware modifications or design changes.

i The proposed amendments would not:

1)

Involve a significant increase in the. probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluate; or l

2)

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from i

4 any accident previously evaluate; or 4

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Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the preceding, Duke. Power Company concludes that the proposed 4

amendments do not involve a significant hazard consideration.

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