05000423/LER-1997-014, :on 970203,both Trains of CR Envelope Pressure Sys Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Valves Closed, Reestablishing TS Compliance & Terminating Event,Personnel Involved Counseled on Procedure Adherence

:on 970203,both Trains of CR Envelope Pressure Sys Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Valves Closed, Reestablishing TS Compliance & Terminating Event,Personnel Involved Counseled on Procedure Adherence

ML20136B103
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/05/1997
From:	Peschel J NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20136B101	List: 05000423/LER-1997-014, :on 970203,both Trains of CR Envelope Pressure Sys Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Valves Closed, Reestablishing TS Compliance & Terminating Event,Personnel Involved Counseled on Procedure Adherence
References
LER-97-014, LER-97-14, NUDOCS 9703100189
Download: ML20136B103 (3)

LER-1997-014, on 970203,both Trains of CR Envelope Pressure Sys Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Valves Closed, Reestablishing TS Compliance & Terminating Event,Personnel Involved Counseled on Procedure Adherence

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
4231997014R00 - NRC Website

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROYED BY OMB No. 3150-0104 M-95)

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FACILITV NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1 of 3 TITLE I4)

Both Trains of Control Roorn Envelope Pressurization System inoperable Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACluTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER

'^ " "*"'

02 03 97 97 014 00 03 05 97 OPERATING 5

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one Or more) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2Hv>

X 60 73(a><2)(i>

50.73(a)(2)iviii)

POWER 000 20.2203(al(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50,73(a)(2)(iv)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) specify in Abstract below

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20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Codel J.M. Peschel, MP3 Nuclear Licensing Manager (860)437-5840 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAuSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDs TO NPRDs SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR NO SUBMISSION

{

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,i.e., approximately 15 single spacedtypewrittenlines) (16)

On February 3,1997, with the plant in Mode 5 while performing the Control Room Envelope Pressurization System (CREPS) Train A Valve Lineup, instrument Air System (IAS) isolation valves (3-IAS-V644 and 3-lAS-V725) were found open. These valves were last opened in accordance with applicable procedure on January 15,1997 to allow purging the Cable Spreading Room. These valves supply cir to several solenoid valves which control air operated dampers in the Control Building Purge Supply and Exhaust System. These solinoid valves are not qualified as Category I (CAT I) safety related components therefore, it must be postulated that they will fail to the most adverse position. This creates the potential for a breach of the Control Room envelope which would render both trains of CREPS inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statement 3.7.8.b requires suspension of core alt: ration and suspension of positive reactivity changes whenever both trains of CREPS are inoperable in Mode 5. Additionally, it rcquires that action be initiated within one hour to restore operability of the CREPS trains. Contrary to this, both trains were inoperable for 18 days without action being initiated to restore the system to operable status.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by TS.

This event resulted from failure of plant personnel to e<ecute a procedural step, which requires the valves be closed upon completing the purge. Additionally, procedural inadequacies directly led to this event. Upon discovery, the valves were closed, reestablishing TS compliance and terminating the event. Involved personnel have been counseled on the importance of procedure adherence.

Additionally, the procedure for the Control Building Purgo Supply and Exhaust System will be revised.

9703100189 970305 PDR ADOCK 05000423 S

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~ NRC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) ooCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 2 of 3 97 014 00 TEXT (if more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17}

1.

Description of Event

On February 3,1997, with the plant in Mode 5 while performing the Control Room Envelope Pressurization System (CREPS) Train A Valve Lineup, Instrument Air System (IAS) isolation valves (3-IAS-V644 and 3-IAS-V725) were found open. These valves supply air to several solenoid valves which control air operated dampers in the Control Building Purge Supply and Exhaust System. These solenoid valves are not qualified as Category I (CAT l} safety related components therefore, it must be postulated that they will fail to the most adverse position. This creates the potential for a breach of the Control Room envelope which would render both trains of CREPS inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statement 3.7.8.b requires suspension of core alt: ration and suspension of positive reactivity changes whenever both trains of CREPS are inoperable in Mode 5.

Additionally, it requires that action be initiated within one hour to restore operability of the CREPS trains. Contrary to 1

this, both trains were inoperable for 18 days without action being initiated to restore the system to operable status.

l Th se valves were last opened in accordance with applicable procedure on January 15,1997 to allow purging the l

Cable Spreading Room, it is believed that after completing the purge the valves were not closed. As a result, both l

CREPS trains remained inoperab's until discovery of the open valves.

L Upon discovery, the valves were closed, reestablishing TS compliance and terminating the event. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by TS.

l lI.

Cause of Event

This event resulted from failure of plant personnel to execute a procedural step, which required the valves be closed upon completing the purge. Additionally, proceduralinadequacies directly led to this event.

Ill. Analysis of Event

' During the time the CREPS trains were inoperable, the Unit was in Mode 5 and there were no operations involving Core i

Alteration or positive reactivity changes.

I l

This event is significant in that opening the subject valves created the potential for a breach of the Control Room envelope. However, at no time during this event were the dampers actually opened.

IV. Corrective Action

involved personnel have been counseled on the importance of procedure adherence. Additionally, the procedure for the Control Building Purge Supply and Exhaust System will be revised prior April 15,1997 to correct the deficiencies which led to both trains of Control Building Purge Supply and Exhaust System being inoperable.

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,U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMisGloN (4 93)

UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 NUMBER NUMBER 3 of 3 97 014 00 TEXT (11more spaceis required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (11)

V.

Additional Information

None

Similar Events

LER 96-011-00 "Both Trains of Control Room Envelope Pressurization System Inoperable imbalance in Air Conditionina System" i

This occurrence involved inoperability of both trains of the Control Room Envelope Pressurization System due to a failed surveillance test on each train. The root cause was personnel error due to inadequate valve repositioning during rebalancing of the system following modifications to the system. The system was properly rebalanced and the J

surveillance tests were successfully completed and both trains were returned to service.

Corrective action was to revise the description in the Final Safety Analysis Report for a better understanding of the relationship of the Control Room Air Conditioning System to CREPS.

Manufacturer Data Ells System Code:

Control Building / Control Complex Environmental Control System - VI i

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$3RC FORM 366A (4-95)