IR 05000295/1996018
| ML20135D406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135D365 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-96-18, 50-304-96-18, NUDOCS 9612090365 | |
| Download: ML20135D406 (2) | |
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S U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Docket Nos:
50-295; 50-304 Licenses No:
50-295/96018(DRS); 50-304/96018(DRS)
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company i
Facility:
Zion Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 i
Location:
101 Shiloh Blvd.
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Zion, IL 60099 Dates:
October 28 - November 1, 1996
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Inspector:
J. L. Belanger, Senior Physical Security Inspector Approved by:
James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
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9612090365 961202
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Zion Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-295/96018; 50-304/96018 Routine, announced, security inspection covering the areas of Audits, Corrective Actions, and Management Support; Effectiveness of Management Controls; Security Program Plans; Protected Area Detection Equipment; Security Organization; and Followup on Previous Inspection Findings. Overall, the security program was adequate to protect public health and safety.
No
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violations of NRC requirements were identified.
e The conduct of security operations was professional, with
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marked improvements in the clarity and thoroughness of shift turnovers and staff communications in general.
(Section Sl.1)
e Security contract staff shortages in the contract security organization continued to result in the use of overtime and adversely impacted the ability of the training organization to conduct response team exercises.
(Section S6.2)
e NRC observed functional tests of the perimeter alarm system and protected area ingress search equipment demonstrated the operability of the equipment.
e X-ray operators responded promptly and effectively to the discovery of actual contraband during ingress search.
(Section SS.1)
e A tour of plant security areas showed good worker security awareness.
Good corporate support, in the form of guidance and personnel e
assistance, was provided to the new Station Security Administrator names in August 1996.
e Permanent corrective actions for contingency response weaknesses identified during the OSRE are still being implemented, while adequate interim measures continue.
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