ML20135A761
| ML20135A761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1992 |
| From: | Spence B NRC |
| To: | Ruland B NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135A581 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351 NUDOCS 9612040034 | |
| Download: ML20135A761 (79) | |
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l NOTE TO: Bill Ruland l AIT team leader
- FROM
- Bob Spence <q h l
. Jose Ibarra AEOD/DSP/ROAB !
, DATE: Dec.15,1992 j
SUBJECT:
Salem 2 Dec 13,1992 Loss of Annunciators AIT l Attached are our initial information and interview requests, ENS report, and excerpts from the draft memoranda of Understanding with States. We are bringing a cassette i recording of the ENS phone call made by the licensees and will need to use a tape ;
recorder to hear it. j t
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9612040034 961120 PDR FOIA O'NEILL96-351 PDR j
O Human Factors Interviews Can we use the simulator facility for interviews with the operators who were on shift during the event? If so, the simulator should be set for ti.e plant conditions I
that existed at the time of event discovery. The use of the simulator can greatly help jog the operators memories and let them point out indication they looked at, how they used their procedures, and other human factors. l Can the operator interviews be scheduled from the bottom to the top,i.e from the person closest to the event up to shift management. If so, we can understand the facts from the lower echelon personnel, then ask the shift management how and why they reacted. Can the interviews be scheduled as soon as possible after the licensee briefing to make best use of the operators memory?
Suggested interview order:
reactor operators extra reactor operators (if any) control room SRO shift technical advisor shift supervisor ;
shift engineer (manager) l plant management contacted by shift personnel
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INFORMATION REQUEST The human factors portion of the AIT will need the following, if possible before the operator interviews:
' Annunciator Response Procedure
'EPIP on EAL declaration on loss of annunciators / computer
- Partial and total loss of annunciator procedures
- Partial and total loss of computer (SPDS, plant, process...) procedures
' Computer rebooting procedure
- Individual events statements and operator logs for:
reactor operators reactor building auxiliary operator control room supervisor (SRO) shift technical advisor shift supervisor shift manager
- Imss of annunciator and computer trouble shooting procedures
- Imss of annunciator and computer post-maintenance functional test procedures
' Compensatory measures check-off pocedure/ sheets used for LOA / LOC
- Manual reactor physics calculation procedure on loss of computer Technical Specifications relying on or affected by loss of computers / annunciators FSAR statements regarding reliance on computers and annunciators 50.59 Evaluation and supporting documentation of the latest computer modification l l
Electrical diagrams and description of annunciator system Lessons plans / training manual chapter on annunciator and computer systems Lesson plans dealing with loss of annunciator and/or computer systems Loss of Annunciator / Computer training scenarios I
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 24752 l
- J ZLITY: SALEM REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/14/92 UNIT: [] [2] [ ] STATE: NJ NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:04 [ET]
RX TYPE: [1] W-4 -LP, [2] W-4-LP EVENT DATE: 12/14/92 EVENT TIME: 17 : 00 [EST)
ERC NOTIFIED BY: SAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/14/92 HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: RICHARD KEIMIG RDO AARC 50.72 (b) (1) (v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP CALVO EO JORDAN AEOD GIITTER IRB CHAF"EE EO UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 2 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION EVENT TEXT 1 LICENSEE REPORTED THAT THEY HAD LOST OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATORS ON 12/13/92
.1:26 BUT IT WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE UNTIL 12/14/92 e 17:00.
ON 12/13/92 e 21:26EST, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT UNIT 2 OV2RHEAD ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERABLE. WITHIN 15 MINS (ACTUAL TIME APPROX 2 MINS) OF DISCOVERY, THE OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATORS WERE RETURNED TO SERVICE AND SATISFACTORILY TESTED. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM WAS INOPERABLE FOR APPROX. 1 1/2 HRS PRIOR f3 ITS INITIAL DISCOVERY. THE ALERT CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS WERE NOT EXCEEDED BECAUSE THE INITIAL INFORMATION DID NOT INDICATE THAT ANNUNCIATORS WERE LOST FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINS. SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION, HOWEVER, WARRANTS A MAJOR LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY NOTIFICATION. THE CAUSE IS.STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. NO PRESS RELEASE WILL BE MADE. THE RI WAS INFORMED.
HOO NOTE: AN AIT HAS BEEN FORMED AND DISPATCHED TO THE SITE.
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1 DATE: December 19,1992 l i
TO: Robert Gallaher l l Operating Engineer
- FROM: David W. Lyons j l
Technical Engineer - l&C Systems ( d
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SUBJ: CONTROL OF OHA REMOTE CONTROL WORKSTATION II l
In order to help ensure integrity of the Overhead Annunciator System (OHA) the ,
! Technical Department iequests you instruct the Sr. Nuclear Shift Supervisors (SNSS) l l to do the following:
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- 1. Disconnect the keyboard trom the Remote Control Workstation.
- 2. Place a Shift Supervisor's Administrative Blocking Tag on the )
keyboard plug. The "SpecialInstructions" on the Tagging Request should state ,"To be released only for System Engineer use." ,
i Release the Blocking Tag only when the designated System j
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Engineer is present or is in direct communication with the SNSS, l
such that he may direct the evolution being performed on keyboard.
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Currently, the only designated System Engineers are:
William Lowry Daniel Laughman.
This list will be updated if the System Engineering assignments are changed.
! Thank you for your assistance in this matter, if there are any questions, please call 4 me at 2087.
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TITLE: JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION'OF SALEM UNITS 1 AND 2 i WITH OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATOR CONCERNS f NLR-I92621 ,
l 1.0 PURPOSE l
This evaluation has been prepared to justify the continued safe operation of the Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 in light of the recent ,
I overhead annunciator system lockup without immediate detection. l This evaluation will provide a discussion of the functional condition of the overhead annunciator system and the temporary compensatory actions that have been initiated by PSE&G.
2.0 SCOPE This evaluation is applicable to the operation of both Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2.
3.0 DISCUSSION 3.1 History of Overhead Annunciator System Lockup On December 13, 1992, Salem Unit No. 2 experienced an overhead annunciator failure that caused a lock up of a Beta SER A Main / Aux controller system, disabling the overhead annunciator system. Upon discovery, the system was reset and returned to normal operation in approximately three minutes. Investigation revealed that ;
the system had been locked up for approximately !
90 minutes. SER A (primary SER) had locked up, and SER B j (backup SER) had failed to take control of the overhead annunciators. SER B had recorded all alarms received during the lock up of SER A, including the " Annunciator Logic Failure" on SER A. i 3.2 Current Status of the Overhead Annunciator System The functional capability of the overhead annunciator system was proved after the manual reset on December 13, 1992. The control operator verified the Beta CRT time was updating, overhead alarm windows A-9 Annun Logic Fail, A-41 Aux Alm Sys Printer, and A-6 RMS Trbl The
( alarmed and were reset by the control operators.
alarm summary associated with the Beta system had no error -
messages. b Page 1 of 4
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- NLR-I92621 The shift supervisor requested the system engineer perform additional checks to verify functionality. The system engineer performed functional tests and confirmed that the f system war functionflig~pr6sierly. l On December 14, 1992, additional testing to demonstrate l the functional capability of the software, hardware, and the capability to receive an alarm from a field parameter !
was initiated. The specific actions taken were: i
- a. Verify OHA Window A-1 Annun Pwr Fall, A-9 Annun Logic Fail, and A-17 Annun Grd Det are clear.
- b. Verify the Beta CRT clock is updating to the correct ,
l time (s 4/ ,
- c. At the Annunciator's Panel, perform a functional test l
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and an alarm summary test. --
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- d. Verify the primary LED's are lit on the SER boards. j
- e. Open a Reactor Protection Cabinet Door causing an OHA :
alarm. In addition, Peactor Protection System surveillance tests are being performed six days per i week which bring up various overhead alarms and )
verify the functionality of the overhead annunciator system._ The surveillance procedures which are used {
are Category 1 procedures.
In addition, it should be noted that any plant operation or condition that initiates an alarm will verify the status of the overhead annunciator system.
On December 18, 1992, procedure TS2.IC-ZZ.OHA-0001(Q) 4100 Beta Sequential Events Recorder Troubleshooting Procedure was performed on the overhead annunciator system. A summary of the test is described below:
A jumper was removed from SER A and automatic swap-over to SER B was observed. Functional tests were performed to ensure SER B was controlling. SER A main controller board was removed. A spare main controller board was installed in SER A and automatic swap-over to SER A was observed.
Functional tests were performed to ensure SER A was
,gs functioning properly. In addition, actuation of at least two alarms on each scanner and two alarms on each window
, ~s except the F (First Out) window were performed. The test was completed satisfactorily.
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NLR-I92621 3.3 Alternate Indications f The control room overhead annunciator system consists of ten panels each containing 48 alarms for a total of 480 windows. Of the 480 possible alarm windows, 379 windows are utilized. 104_of _t_heJ79 windows contain at least one
~ alternate indication in the control room. Based on a review of the annunciators without alternate monitoring capability, contingency assignments have been identified.
Sources of alternate indication in the control room are many and varied. These include the control conaala, the
_,RP (back) panels, the Doric alarm scanner, the process )
(P-250) computer, the auxiliary alarm typewriter, and the l SPDS computer. ~ -~
In addition to alternate indication in the control room, I many overhead annunciators are initiated from incal alarm panels located throughout the plant. These local panels can be monitored periodically to ensure no alarms have been initiated. They can also be used to initiate an l overhead alarm in the control room Ly usino local test pushb.uttons to verify proper operation of the system.
3.4 Compensatory Actions In order to ensure continued safe operation of Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2, the following compensatory actions have been ,
l initiated: I
- a. An additional licenned roactor operator has been stationed in each control rnom to provide' additional monitoring of'the above listed alternate indication without increasing the work load of the normal board operator,
- b. The hourly functional test and an alarm summary are being manually initiated by the additional reactor operator every 15 minutes. The alarm summary is used to verify that alarms being received by the SERs are alarming on the overhead annunciators.
- c. An additional equipment operator has been stationed in each unit's secondary plant to monitor remote alarm panels and indications. The equipment operator will verify that alarms received in the Control Room are valid, and that alarms indicated on the remote panels are alarming in the control room.
- d. An individual has been stationed in the service water structure as a roving watch. This individual will perform a visual inspection of the entire service water structure to identify any abnormalities.
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- NLR-I92621
- e. Once per shift, each overhead alarm window except the ,
F (First Out ) Window panel will have at least one alarm initiated from a remote location.
- f. Three times per week, the system engineer will download the overhead annunciator computers to monitor for error messages. I
- g. Upon failure of the overhead annunciator system, the unit will be placed in a stable condition, additional personnel will be stationed at various locations in the plant, and the actions of the Event Classification Guide will be followed.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
S i The continued operation of Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 is justified based on the previous discussion. The use of compensatory measures ensures the continued safe operation of the plant.
These actions p ovide reasonable assurance that both the overhead annunciator system is functional, and that failure of the overhead annunciator would be detected in a timely manner.
Upon completion of the investigation and implementation of the appropriate corrective actions, compensatory actions will be re-evaluated.
5.0 SIGNATURES W s l l ,
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0 /19/1 2 - l Ofiginato Date' l Asd/f/ p / 2 - (Mz--
Veet'fier F' 9' Date ,
IA/lfh NQ tr gineering Manager Date SO$C k 4%'1 a' man W' h Meeting No.
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'Date (h~
Genbral Mnnager
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- Salem Operations h!Date Page 4 of 4
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TO: V. POLIZZI
- FROM
- R. GALLAHER
SUBJECT:
OHA QUESTIONS DATE: 12-21-92 THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT LICENSED ON SHIFT OPERATORS WERE ASKED ABOUT THE OHA'S. 11 NSS'S AND 18 NCO'S PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES:
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! WERE YOU AWARE OF THE RESETS OF THE OHA CONTROLLERS?
15 NCO'S WERE NOT AWARE OF THIS FEATURE UNTIL THIS RECENT EVENT. 3 NCO'S AND 1 NSS WERE AWARE OF THE MANUAL RESET FEATURE.
1 NCO RESET THE CONTROLLER COMING OUT OF UNIT 2 OUTAGE DURING TESTING AND TROUBLESHOOTING OF THE SYSTEM. THE NSS AND THE NSSS ALONG WITH THE INSTALLATION ENGINEER <
WERE AWARE OF THIS RESET.
l ANOTI*ER NCO HAS RESET THE SYSTEM 3 TIMES. THE FIRST TIME WAS BACK IN NOVEMBER. THE NCO WAS TROUBLESHOOTING THE A-45 WINDOW ALARM. THE NSSS WAS WORKING WITH THE NCO IN ATTEMPTING TO FIND THE INPUT FOR THE ALARM. THE NCO CLEARED THE OHA WITH THE NSSS PERMISSION BY MANUALLY RESETTING THE SYSTEM. THE TWO OTHER TIMES WERE ON 12/12/92 AND 12/13/92. THE 12/12 RESET WAS TO CLEAR OHA A-45 WITH NSS PERMISSION AND THE 12/13 WAS THE EVENT. NO WORK REQUEST WAS GENERATED FOR THE NOVEMBER OCCURRENCE.
THE 3rd NCO ONLY NEW ABOUT THE RESET, HE NEVER UTILIZED THIS FUNCTION.
THE NSS WAS AWARE OF THE MANUAL RESET FROM TESTING BEING COMPLETED DURING THE OUTAGE.
l DID YOU EVER USE THE KEYBOARD TO ACCESS THE SYSTEM 7 6 NCO'S AND 1 NSS HAVE USED THE KEYBOARD TO ACCESS THE SYSTEM. NO INDIVIDUAL HAS USED PROCOMM.
IN ALL BUT 2 CASES, A PROCEDURE WAS USED TO OBTAIN REPORTS EITHER FOR GETTING ALARM DATA ASSOCIATED WITH A REACTOR TRIP OR DETERMINE A PARTICULAR ALARM POINT HAS BEEN RECEIVED.
THE 2 NCO'S WHO DID NOT UTILIZE A PROCEDURE WHEN TO THE MENU SCREEN FOR INFORMATION ON CORRECTING THE TIME IN OCTOBER AND TO RETRIEVE RCP LOW BEARING FLOW ALARM INFORMATION.
ALL INDIVIDUALS INDICATED SOME TRAINING IN THE SIMULATOR. NO OPERATORS COULD RECALL TRAINING ON THE BACK PANEL.
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NUCTTELR LICENSING WORK STANDARD NRC TNSPECTION MANAGEMENT l
l ATTACHMENT 1 l QUESTION AND ANSWER TRACKING FORM l ITEM NUMBER:
SOURCE: Q SE&G (SELECT ONE)
DATE: /2 E.
NRC CONTACT: c
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- NLR REVIEW: YES / NO (SELECT ONE)
RESPONSE ACCEPTED BY NRC: YES / NO (SELECT ONE) .
l INSPECTOR'S NAME: ,
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Revision 0 May 29, 1992 17 of 18 l
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HERE'S THE FAX !!!! t o TO ~~~# ~
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PHONE # _ __________ ____ f g o FROM: DAVID W. LYONS SALEM GENERATING STATION
@g[ggg,g & S~
/ i PUBLIC SERVICE ELEC & GAS (r'<dfur NM -
PHONE: 609-339- 2087 FAX: 609-339-2749
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(INCLUDES THIS COVER SHEET) 7 '
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A BY: 12-29-92 : 2:08PM : PSE&G E&PB- 009 339 2749:s 2/ 2 PSEG l Pubhc Service Electuc anij Gas Comoony PO Box 23(i Huncocks Budge, New Jmey 080% !
MEC-92-844 l Nuclear Depadment l
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TO: D. Lyons Technical Engineer
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,1(t 4(s t 1 FROM !! . Barrick O 0* Af-Salem Mechanical Engineer *ng Supervisor
SUBJECT:
RWST DRAIN TIMES DATE: December 29, 1992 While specific engineering calculation could not be located in our files for the requested response times, the time involved can be readily determined using the methodology and FSAR references as provided below.
It would take a minimum of 15 to 15.7 minutes to drain RWST from the Tech Spec. minimum volume of 364,500 gallons to the volume of 150,500 gallons corresponding to the RWST low level alarm setpoint.
It would take a minimun of 9 to 9.5 minutes to drain the RWST from the low level set point of 150,500 gallons to the low-low level set point of 21,200 gallons.
i These times are based on all ECCS pump running as indicated on FSAR Table 6.3-13 with a combined flow of 13,600 gpm and FSAR Table 6.3-8 with a combined derived flow of 14,300 gpm.
As identified in TSAR Section 6.3.2.6, considering the volume of 15,500 gallons below the ECCS suction line, it leaves approximately 5,700 gallons of available water at the RWST low-low level setpoint. ,
As identified in FSAR Table 6.3-13, there is adequate NPSH available to all the ECCS pumps corresponding to the RWST low-low level and further to the RWST zero level point of 101'-8".
k fkRD:kb C J. Carey M. Danak l J. Ranalli l
J. Rowey J. Wiedmann MEC File Standards Records Coordinator