ML20133Q080
| ML20133Q080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1985 |
| From: | Verrelli D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8511010365 | |
| Download: ML20133Q080 (1) | |
Text
CECLb SEP 101985 arolina Power and Light Company
/ ATTN:
Mr. E. E. Utley Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
FEMA FINAL REPORT - SHEARON HARRIS POWER STATION EXERCISE ON MAY 17-18, 1985 Enclosed is the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Final Report of the Sherron Harris Emergency Exercise conducted on May 17-18, 1985. As described in the Enclosure, FEMA has identified a number of apparent offsite deficiencies to which your attention is directed.
We en:ourage you to assist the State of North Carolina and Harnett County to resolve the deficiencies identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise.
We also encourage you to work closely with the State of North Carolina and
.Harnett County in the development of the scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test those areas in which the previous deficiencies were disclosed.
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely, David M. Verrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects cc:A.A. Watson,VicePresident J. M. Parsons, Project General Manager bec: NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk State of North Carolina RII RII RII t,
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- l Washington, D.C. 20472 AUS 71985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Edward L. Jordan-Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response c3 i
Office of Inspection and Enforcement P
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission EG FROM:
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs
SUBJECT:
Interim Findings on Offsite Radiological Emergency Response (RER) Plans and Preparedness for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station The Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station is located in the extreme southwest corner of Wake County, North Carolina, approximately 16 miles southwest of Raleigh.
The State of North Carolina and Wake, Chatham, Harnett and Lee-Counties, which are located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone (EPZ),
have developed RER plans and have participated in the first full participation exercise conducted May 17-18,.1985.
Attachment # 1 is a copy of the exercise evaluation report for the May 17-18, 1985, full participation exercise.
The exercise report, dated June 28, 1985, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV and transnitted to FEMA Headquarters on July 9,1985.
No Category A deficiencies were identified during the exercise.
- However, there were five NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, deficiencies observed during the exercise that require a schedule of corrective actions.
These deficiencies, which are typically classified as Category B deficiencies, can be corrected through training and additional resources.
These deficiencies did not detract from the overall capability demonstrated 6y the State of North Carolina and Wake, Chatham, Harnett, and Lee Counties to protect the health and safety of s
the public in the event of a radiological emergency.
FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of the exercise report to the State The Region of North Carolina and will obtain a schedule of corrective actions.
will assure completion by the State of the neccessary corrective actions.
The FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) has completed a review of the North Carolina Emerpency Response Plan (Rev.
1., dated September 3, 1984) which consists of the four local plans including the changes incorporated through April 1985.
WM 4 0fficia W
2-Attachment # 2 is a copy of the FEMA Interim Findings on the adequacy of offsite RER Plans for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station.
The Interim Findings Report, dated June 12, 1985, was prepared by FEMA Region IV and transmitted to FEMA Headquarters on June 18, 1985.
A c opy i s being fo rwa rded to the State of North Carolina for their use in upgrading the offsite RER Plans for the Shearon Harris NucYear Power Station.
Based on a review of the 'above information, FEMA finds that the State and, 1 ocal energency pl ans are adequate and capable of being impl enented, and the exercise demonstrated that offsite preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station in the event of ~ a radiological energency.
If you have any questions on the above, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.
Attac hment As Stated e
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Federal Emergency Management Agency I
Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309
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July 9, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
RICHARD W.
KRIMM, ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OFF
- OF NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS PO S.
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FROM:
Ma o M y, Regional irector
SUBJECT:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Station Exercise Report Attached are two copies of the exercise report 'for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Station Exercise conducted May 17-18, 1985.
Based on a review of the attached report and the recommendation from the Natural and Technological Hazards Division Ch'ief dated June 18, 1985, this office concurs that the off-site prepared-ness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appro-priate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
The report was distributed to the Regional Assistance Committee and to the exercise evaluators.
Minor changes were made which are incorporated in the enclosed report.
Please notify us when tha report is transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission so that final copies may be sent to the State.
Enclosures l
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SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR STATION EXERCISE Conducted on May 17-18 1985 fs O~?
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SC A LE 18. MILES Revision 2 C AROLlh A POWE R &.lG i COMPAN V SHE ARON H ARRIS NUCLE AR POn.ER PL ANT l
EMERGENCY PL AN
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INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY l
50 MILE EPZ FIGURE 1.5-1 J F E BRUARY 1934
i CONTENTS-i 1
1 1 E X E R CIS E SU M M A R Y....................................................
I 1.1 State Emergency Response Team Headquarters..........................
I 1.1.1 Accide nt Ass e ss m ent.........................................
2 1.1.2 D os e As s e ss m e n t.............................................
Em ergency Operations Facility........................................ _ 2 1.2 2
1.3 M e di a C e n t e r.......................................................
2 1.4 Mobile Radiological Laboratory.......................................
2.
1.5-Radiological Monitoring Tea ms........................................
3 1.6 W ak e C ount y.......................................................
3 1.6.1 Em ergency Operations Center.................................
4 1.6.2 O u tsid e A c t ivitie s............................................
4 1.7 C h atha m C o u nty....................................................
4 1.7.1 Emergency Operations Center.................................
4 1.7.2 O u tsid e A c tivitie s............................................
5 1.8 Le e C o u n t y.........................................................
5 1.9 H ar n e t t C o unty.....................................................
5 1.9.1 Emergency Operations Center................................
5 1.9.2 O u tsi d e A c t i v it i es............................................
6 1.10 Traf f ic a nd Ac c e ss Control...........................................
6 1.11 F ir e Ac t iv i ty.......................................................
7 2 - D ET AILED D IS C U SSI O N..................................................
7 2.1 State Emergency Response Team Headquarters..........................
8 Accide nt Ass ess m ent.........................................
2.1.1 Dose Ass e ss m e nt.............................................
2.1.2 E rr.ergency Operations Facl11ty....................................... 10 2.2 M e di a C e n t e r......................................................
1 1 2.3 De ficie n cie s Noted..........................................
13 2.3.1 Suggestions for Improve ments................................. 13 2.3.2 Mobile Radiological Laboratory....................................... '14 2.4 Radiological Monitoring Teams.......................................
14 2.5 W a k e C o u n t y......................................................
15 2.6 Emergency Operations Center................................ 15 2.5.1 Outside Activities......... :................................. 19 2.6.2 C ha t ha m C o un t y................................................... 2 0 2.7 Emergency Operations Center................................ 2 0 2.7.1 O utside Ac tivities........................................... 2 2.7.2 L e e C oun ty........................................................ 2 2 2.8 Emergency Operations Center................................ 22 2.8.1 Outside A c tivities..........................................
2.8.2 H arne tt C o u n t y.................................................... 2 4 2.9 Em erg ency Operations Center................................ 2 4
, 2.9.1 Outsid e A c tivitie s.........................................
2.9.2 2.10 Traf fic and Acc ess Control..................................
H arn e tt C o unty.............................................
2 7 2.10.1 LeeCounty.................................................27 2.10.2 W ak e C o unt y............................................... 2 8 2.10.3 C hath a m Count y............................................
2 9 2.10.4 F i r e A c t iv it y...................................................... 3 0 2.11 v
5 CONTENTS (Cont'd) 3 SUM M ARY LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES.................................... 31 APPENDICES..............................................................32 h
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1 1 EXERCISE
SUMMARY
This was a full-participation licensing exercise conducted on May 17-18, 1955, and was observed by 21 Federal evaluators representing four Federal agencies.
The evaluation was based on NUREG-065.4-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support,of Nuclear Power Plants."
The objective of the exercise was to test all major elements of the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, from initial notification through protective actions.
This objective was accomplished. The few deficiencies observed in the exercise can be corrected through additional training and the acquisition of additional equipment.
The following is a brief summary of the Federal evaluators' reports regarding the involved State and county facilities and activities.
1.1 STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (SERT) HEADQUARTERS The SERT headquarters activities were conducted from the State Emergency Operations center (EOC) in Raleigh. All of the amenities expected in the State EOC State agency and county participation in briefings and communications were available.
capabilities were excellent.
1.1.1 Accident Assessment The Radiation Protection Section (RPS) of the Department of Human Resources at SERT was very effective and thorough. The RPS recommendations for protective actions were timely, appropriate, and founded on a technical basis. The section provided excellent support for SERT.
1
2 1.i.2 Dose Assessment Dose assessments, both primary and backup calculations, were performed promptly and correctly.
Some telecommunications difficulties were encountered in transmitting the dose projections to SERT.
f 1.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
The State deployed four persons to the licensee's EOF.
These individuals interfaced directly with the Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) emergency response team, and this interface enhanced the overall coordination and communications between the utility and the State.
1.3 MEDIA CENTER Effective, coordinated use of the emergency broadcast system (EBS) was not achieved. Rumor control was not adequately coordinated and managed. There was not a usable system to respond to telephone queries from the media. The physicallayout and use of the space for the public information staff and the media were not efficient. The scenario activity failed to adequately test the public information staff.
1.4 MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY In this exercise the mobile laboratory was used strictly for communication and coordination of field team activities. Cornmunication with the field teams, the State EOC, and the EOF worked well; coordination of field monitoring team sampling activities was good.
1.5 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAMS The field teams performed adequately; however, some additional training and expanded standard operating procedures (SOPS) would be beneficial.
3
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1.6 WAEE COUNTY 1.G.1 Emergency Operations Center The management and staff were knowledgeable and dedicated. Public officials participated. EOC management improved as the exercise progressed. The decision.to activate sirens occurred 47 minutes after the Site Area Emergency was issued. This delay resulted in a message from the plant announcing the Site Area Emergency but ordering no protective action. The EOC manager called for clarification but received none from the plant or from the SERT. The manager should have followed SOP and issued a siren order much earlier.
Management during the second day improved considerably and was effective, more decisive, and more aggressive.
First-day briefings were timely, but information flow was only from the cperations manager to staff. During the second day a two-way flow of information was established, and this allowed the staff to be more active. This is believed to be an important improvement.
Access to the Message logs were kept, but the system can use improvement.
EOC was excellent.
Communications capability was established during the exercise.
Some difficulties were initially experienced in establishing a conferencing network.
Initial Installation of a dedicated network in the EOC could resolve some problems.
activation and verification of the emergency broadcasting system need improvement, which was made during the course of the exercise. Lengthy delays were experienced in receiving hard-copy messages, and equipment did not function at all between the Media Center and Wake County EOC.
Information was not released early in the emergency, prior to activation of the Little information was available to the EOC staff regarding what the media center.
public was being told during the entire exercise. Finally, with respect to information, some improvements are needed in rumor-control procedures.
4 1.'6.2 Outside Activities One fully operating shelter was evaluated. Two shelters were observed that were staffed but not fully activated. One decontamination center for personnel and vehicles was also operated.
All staff members were dedicated, knowledgeable, and well trained. There was strong participation by all organizations present.
All facilities were well selected and thoughtfully laid out, and personnel were very aware of procedures and responsibilities.
Provisions for wheelchair-bound and nursing-home residents were present.
At the decontamination center for personnel and vehicles, the staff was well-prepared.
Personnel were familiar with instrumentation, exposure control, and had thought through the implications of their actions; e.g., personnel were prepared to impound the grassy area containing seh!cle washdown if the vehicles had been contaminated.
1.7 CHATHAM COUNTY 1.7.1' Emergency Operations Center The Chatham County EOC was adequately staifed and supported by elected officials. With additional training and correetions in procedures and equipment (known by the staff), an emergency can be effectively handled.
1.7.2 Outside Activities The activation and operation of the shelter were adequately dem'onstrated. The radiological monitoring and decontamination could be improved by additional training.
5 1.1 LEE COUNTY The EOC operations exceeded expectations for a first exercise.
Both the facilities and operations management were excellent.
The County has already recognized areas for fine tuning.
These include message handling, an individual to explain plant and radiological conditions, and an individual to handle miscellaneous staff functions currently assigned to the Director. The Lee County field-response operations were,in ger.eral, conducted very well. Traffic and access control, route alerting, and the activation and operation of the reception center were outstanding. It is recommended that volunteer fire personnel receive additional training in exposure control and decontamination.
1.9 HARhTIT COUNTY 1.9.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency-response operations at the Harnett County EOC were conducted in an exemplary fashion despite somewhat difficult physical conditions relating to facility layout, available space, and communications. Management was effective and thorough, and the full participation of elected ' officials in appropriate dbeision mcking is to be commended. The EOC staff members showed themselves to be a dedicated and cohesive group.
1.9.; Outside Activities In the sheltering demonstration, participation at both schools was excellent.
Although most players were knowledgeable, a need exists for coordination between agencies.
6 1.i0 TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL The Shearon Harris exercise adequately tested the transportation portion of the plan and fulfilled the stated exercise objectives, Traffic control poirits and road blocks in Wake County were manned o
by a sufficient complement of State Highway Police and Sheriff's Po!!ce.
The. police were very well trained and performed well in most e
functions, especially f amiliar police functions and procedures.
Some officers were uncertain as to relationship between radioiodine e
exposure and use of potassium lodine (KI).
The distribution of dosimeters to persons entering the emergency e
planning zone (EPZ) was done at command posts pursuant to written instructions instead of at road blocks as called for in the county plan. This modification is probably an improvement, although it was not in accordance with the county plan at the time of the exercise.
.The system of identifying road blocks and traffic control points e
should be changed so that a road block and a traffic control point cannot have the same identification number.
Traffic and access control personnel in Chatham County were knowledgeable about The traffic evacuation routes, location of shelters, and Storker exposure requirements.
and access control activities were adequately demonstrated.
1.11 FIRE ACTIVITY -
An onsite fire drill provided an opportunity for one offsite fire department (from I
Holly Springs) and the onsite fire brigade to combine efforts in extinguishing a simulated fire. The offsite department responded promptly, was admitted quickly to the plant, and 7
reported to the brigade officer with proper turnout gear for assistance in controlling the simulated fire. The drill was an indication of effective preplanning and training, i
7 2 DETAILED DISCUSSION 2.1 STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (SERT) HEADQUARTERS The State emergency response team operated from the State Emergency Operations Center in Raleigh. This arrangement is due to the nearness of SERT to the Harris plant, a situation that provides for a rapid mobilization of equipment and staff.
Two hundred and twenty individuals, representing 28 State departments or agencies and other organizations (Red Cross, Salvation Army, Civil Air Patrol),
participated in the exercise at the SERT headquarters.
Good support was provided bp elected and appointed officials. The secretary and assistant secretary of the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, the State Insu ance Commissioner, and commissioners from the counties were present throughout the exercise.
The emergency operations management and leadarship displayed in th'e SERT headquarters were excellent. Briefings were conducted in a timely-manner and were very effective. A good exchange of information took place among SERT agencies.
Coordination between the Director of the Division of Emergency Management and the Chief of the Radiation Protection Section was prompt and effective. Proper recommendations and decisions were made based on information available to the decision
~
makers.
, he 10-mile emergency planning zone was Coordination with counties in t
i effective. All briefings were provided to counties directly by way of speaker phones.
Each county coordinator was provided an opportunity to comment and ask questions at
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the conclusion of all briefings.
The facility and space provided were excellent. Communications facilities and capabilities are outstanding.
SERT headquarters security and badging were also outstanding.
8 The exet cise demonstrated that control mechanisms and structure were well planned and executed.
2.1.1 Accident Assessment Activation of SERT's radiation protection section was timely and effective, with staff a. riving at the State EOC (SEOC) from their normal daily duty station by 1308.
The RPS section at SEOC was well-staffed with communications, assessment, and operations functions. The staff was knowledgeable and well-trained.
The RPS representative at SERT effectively screened and transmitted radiological and plant data to the SEOC operations group. His. briefings were thorough and accurate and avoided technical jargon. He actively participated, as appropriate, in
~ SEOC decisions on protective actions.
The RPS facilities at the SEOC are adequate, although a relocation of the operations grorp to a location more central to communications and assessment would facilitate communications and message flow. Message handling was generally adequate, y
although preprinted data logs for plant and assessment data were not available to f acilitate accurate recording of large amounts of incoming data.
Communications were excellent, with radio and telephone links to CP&L, the mobile laboratory, and survey teams.
Radiological and plant data were readily obtained from CP&L with no apparent Celays or omissions.
The RPS recommendations for the public and emergency workers were timely, appropriate, and technically founded.
Suggestions for Improvements (other than deficiency corrections) 1.
The RPS operations should be relocated to a location central to
. communications and assessment to facilitate information flow.
9 2.
Preprinted datn/missage logs for incoming plant and radiological data should be used to facilitate accurate' recording of large amounts of data.
2.1.2 Dose Assessment Dose assessments were capably performed using both State and utility computer programs.
The utility program served as a backup to and as a check on the State Calculations of projected dose rates and allowable " stay times" at traffic program.
control points (TCPs) were performed. This type of calculation could be used to assess population doses. There were some problems in communicating the dose-assessment data to SERT via telecommunications. During most of the first day and early in the second day, this system functioned poorly and delayed the sending of computerized data files for as much as a half-hour. Also, the coordinates of the TCPs were not tabulated and had to be measured off the 10-mile EPZ map. This delay led to unnecessary but brief (10 minutes average) delays in the TCP calculations.
Deficiency Noted Dose assessments were sent to the SERT from the Dose Assessment Office ~via telecommunications (0.4.b). During most of the first day and euly in the second day, this system functioned poorly and delayed.the sending of computerized data files for as much as a half-hour. It appears to be a training rather than an equipment problem.
Suggestion for Improvement The coordinates of the TCPs and other locations where dose projections might be needed should be tabulated.
10 Superior Item -
The State used a computer program written by its staff and also used a computer program written by the utility as a crosscheck on the validity of its calculations.
2.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
The State deployed four persons to the licensee's EOF.
Although these individuals were not senior State decision makers and were not directly responsible for performing accident assessment analyses, their presence and actions effectively enhanced the overall interface between the utility and the SIRT. One representative of the North Carolina Emergency Management Agency worked directly with the utility's emergency director; the other three State representatives provided technical support to the North Carolina Division of Radiological Health.
Their responsibilities included coordinating the State field monitoring teams with the licensee's monitoring teams and following and reviewing the licensee's accident assessment analyses.
Communications available in the EOF include commercial land lines, a dedicated telephone to the SERT, and radio communications from the EOF to the State's mobile All three systems effectively moved both administrative and technical information, van.
and no hardware problems were experienced. Overall, the flow of technical information from the EOF to tbc 5ERT was accurate and rapid. These data allowed the Radiation Protection Scetion at the SERT to perform *an independent accident assessment in a timely fashion.
The licensee's EOF is a " hardened" facility and is more than adequate to effectively manage an onsite emergency. The State emergency-response personnel at this facility interfaced directly and worked well with the utility's emergency-response personnel, a situation that contributed to the overall effectiveness of emergency management during the exercise.
11
- The State is also commended for its use of quallfled technical volunteers from an academic and private resource base, demonstrating how useful these volunteers can be in-the event of a real emergency in the State.
5 1
2.3 MEDIA CENTER.
The physical layout of the Joint Information Center (JIC) contributed directly to.
Inadequacies in the coordination of public information activities among the utility, State; and county government staffs. The public information staffs were separated from each other, and it was necessary to hand-carry information from office to office in order to This coordinate news releases or simply relay information about each other's status.
liaison system did not always work. In more than one instance the utility staff had b
. current information, which the State and county staffs did not have, and vice versa. This lack of identical information among the various information staffs resulted in at least cne inaccuracy in a news release, although not a serious inaccuracy.
Additionally, the Media Briefing Room and media workspace were located in a building separated from the JIC, and the Media Building could only be reached from the JIC by walking on city sidewalks and across a parking lot. The potential for " ambush" interviews, as spokespersons moved from the Public Information Staff Building to the Media Building, was therefore great. In this setup, only one telephon~e was available for i
calling and receiving calls at the media briefing area (for PIOS to use).
During'this exercise, no PIOS were available to the reporters except during the media briefings and immediately thereafter. For literhily hours, the reporters were lef t to themselves.
i Nisual aids for the plant, although available, were not used at all. The 10-mile EPZ map was under-utilized during briefings on evacuation progress.
There was not a usable system to respond to telephone inquiries from the i
media. Media were given several telephone numbers to reach State and county PIOS,
12 ariother number for the utility PIOS. Because of the separation of the staffs, no one of the nformation staffs would have been able to respond effectively to a telephone interview.
All State and county phones designated for incoming media calls were rnultibutton sets located on one, crowded table.
No hard-copy transmission capability was on hand in the State and county government public information staff area, although the utility did have a telecopier in its workroom.
Pertinent information about the simulated accident and, in particular, the State and county response to it, was not made pub!!c in a timely manner in all cases. For instance, the statement' ordering early evacuation of boaters,on a lake was not made l
publicly known (except to the boaters) for hours after it was released.
(General evacuation of several zones was not ordered until later in the exercise; the early lake evacuation-therefore required prompt explanation to avoid panic and spontaneous evacuation of the residential zones.) Weather data were not promptly and continuously provided (as the data would affect a potential plume). The public announcement of the i'
escalation to General Emergency was not made until almost an hour after it was 2
declared.
The rumor-control function was not adequately coordinated and managed. No effort was observed to insure periodic contact with rumor-c Ttrol phone operators, and there was no method observed of coordinating the utility's rumor staff with the State staff (G.4.c.)
Before the State emergency-response team assumed control, there were some 4
-Indications that procedures for activation and use of the EBS needed attention. Even after the SERT assumed control, the initial instructions to evacuate certain zones and take shelter in others were incomplete; subsequent use of the system to provide adequate coverage of the area was never realized. Instructions to the public were prepared for j
only two of the three siren activations, and one of these messages was incomplete (G.4.b).
4 w
,,,,.-,,.,-,-------s
13 It is especially noteworthy that, had the events of the scenario baen real, a 'arge inGux of media into Raleigh and an enormous load of telephone nqu r es wowd have been i
ii inevitable.
Yet, actual testing of the public information capability of the staffs to respond to such demands was virtually nonexistent during this exercise. Only a handful of area media were represented at the media briefings, and the reporters esked ve.y few questions and tended to report the exercise as a news event rather than a simulated accident. There were less than a dozen telephone inquiries from media into the State and county staff room, and, here again, the inquiries were concerned with the exercise as an event. Without either simulated reporters in the briefings or controller phone calls simulating those from reporters, or both, there is little realism in. an exercise such as this for public information staffs.
2.3.1 Deficiencies Noted 1.
Management and coordination of the rumor-control function were.
Inadequate (G.4.c).
2.
Use of the EBS was incomplete and ineffectively managed (G.4.b).
- 2.3.2 Suggestions for Improvements (other than deficiency corrections) 1.
Lead public information offices from the utility and from the State, Federal, and county governments should be located together in one work room, where information sharing would be constant.
2.
Media briefing space should be located in the same building in which the public information staffs work.
3.
More effective, usable telephone systems and procedures need to be developed to-handle rumor control and incoming media calls.
l I
-. - _ ~.
14 25 MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY In this exercise the mobile laboratory activity was limited to relaying communications to the field teams and directing them to take air samples at predetermined locations.
The laboratory was set up at a State Department of Transportation (DOT) maintenance garage.
The mobile. laboratory was activated in a timely manner and had extensive communication facilities including a State radio, police radio, mobile and fixed telephones, UHF radio, and CB radio. Communications generally worked well, and the staff used the facilities effectively.
The staff members of the mobile laboratory all had health-physics backgrounds and were well-trained.
Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated by All presentation of a list with home and work phone numbers of extra personnel.
_ personnel listed have been trained to handle a number of different functions in the Direction of the field teams was well-handled by the field team mobile laboratory.
coordinator, and the teams were always in good position to take samples. There was also good discussion among staff members and good anticipation of possible problems by the field team coordinator.
A slight problem with commrnication between one field team and the mobile laboratory developed during the second day of the exercise. The problem was rectified by relaying messages through the EOF.
2.5 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAMS Members of the field monitoring teams were mobilized from their work places in a timely fashion. The State has equipment to staff only two teams. Equipment for an additional team, as well as backup equipment, is desirable.
Items of the-team's equipment differ from those listed in the plan; the State is aware of this difference and plans to update the equipment list. The' equipment the State teams have is state-of-the
15 art except for two low-volume air samplers.
Both samplers were last calibrated in January 1984.
Team members in general were adequetely trained; however, additional training
+
in the use of the low-volume air sampler is needed. One team used the sampler once and determined an air-flow rate of 1.7; the next time the same sampler was used, it showed a J-reading of almost 3.5.
The team taking the sample never questioned this change.
Written SOPS were available but generally not used. Data-sample labeling followed SOPS but did not include the flow rate. Any change in flow rate from semple to sample, such as the one noted above (1.7-3.5), would affect the analysis of the sample taken.
One field team had problems communicating with the mobile laboratory on the second day. This team was able to overcome the problem by relaying information. The teams had adequate exposure control.
The scenario did not fully demonstrate the State's capability to track a plume or the team members' capability to. deal with elevated readings and exposure control. Both o
of these problems were due to the compressed exercise scenario. The team members had only one hour to demonstrate their technical capabilities once the release began.
f 2.6 WAEE COUNTY 2.6.1 Emergency Operations Center Generally, the activation and staffing functions that were tested were found to Before the Alert was received, only the emergency management be well-performed.
Within coordinator (EMC), his assistant, and a handful of EOC staff were present.
minutes of receipt of the Alert, calls alerting 16 agencies were made. A Sheriff's Police lieutenant placed calls to his people.
Other calls were placed by the EMC and his A roster showing a primary EOC staff member and three alternates for that assistant.
primary member was used.
The alternates would be used for new shifts. Saturday
-_c
..,_,,mz.
.._.m...
16 morning, the EOC was fully staffed at 0700. Friday, the EOC fully staffed at 1400.
Calls were placed over a 15-minute interval, tying up the EMC and his assistant. It is felt that an improvement would be for the activation calls to be delegated, allowing the EMC to direct operation ot ;he EOC during the early phase of the Alert.
Generally, the staff of the EOC displayed adequate training and knowledge. The agency personnel were well aware of their respons'bilities.
Management and staff members performed their tasks in a dedicated fashion.
Management was performed by the county manage and the as::istant county manager.
Initially, certain aspects of management needed improvement; however, many of these aspects were improved during the second day's activities.
One of the largest problems encountered in the Wake County EOC was that the Site Area Emergency was received at 1450 on the first day, yet sirens were not sounded until 1537. The plant actually announced the Site Area Emergency but did not issue a The ma' ager sought clarification from the plant (after the protective action order.
n State controller indicated tne problem) but received no response to his calls for clarification.
Th'e manager should have followed SOP describing siren and EBS coordination during a Site Area Emergency.
Initially, many of the staff members were not involved in decision making.
However, this improved later during the exercise. Briefings were held, but information moved only from the operations manager to the staff. For example, the Red Cross (mass
' care) should have been made aware of activation of traffic and access control steps undertaken. The second day's staff did participate in several briefings. This change improved operations.
Staff members had copies of SOPS for each position, and each member was told to review them when the Site Area Emergency was declared.
Message logs were kept, but the system was not efficient.
Messages were received by the communications officer and one staff person. Both had separate logs.
~.-
17 One log was official, the other was not. These two communications personne! should be located near each other but were not.
Facilities at the Wake County EOC were adequate, and EOC staff members operated in close but workable quar'ters. There were sufficient amounts of furniture, lighting, and telephones. Resource maps were available for observing evacuation rout'es, relocation centers, access and traffic control locations, and population of the area. The EOC lacked an EPZ map with sections labeled by wind direction. Backup power is available in the building.
Although the EOC layout worked well for staff members, it could be improved for senior operating aad management personnel; those senior ' officials did not have a designated location where they could calmly confer. During the exercise, many decisions were made ar.d much information was presented during impromptu meetings held all over the EOC.
A status board was available. After the declaration of the Site Area Emergency, however, it was largely ignored through the remainder of the first day; messages were n:t recorded on it. This oversight was corrected during the second day, when emergency classification notices were posted.
Security control was excellent.
The Wake County communications capability was established during the exercise.
However, some problems were experienced.
The conferencing capability, which should allow the State and all counties to confer, could not conveniently be established. The telephone numbers for some facilities were not dedicated and would be busy, thereby adding lengthy delays in establishing the net. Once all parties were on a conference call, keeping an open line helped to eliminate the delays in getting all parties on line.
The mechanics of activating the EBS necessitated terminating a conference call then in progress. This presented numerous problems.
i i
f
18 The future installation of a dedicated ring-down telephone network in the EOC promises to resolve these noted problems for conferencing. However, EBS activation needs to be reviewed and streamlined. Improved communications with EBS might be a consideration. Activation of the EBS'did improve as the emergency continued.
A hard-copy capability was available, but not functioning, between the Me'dia Center and the Wake County EOC.
Lengthy delays were experienced between the receipt of hard copy at either of the two offices and the time when the infctmation became available to the staff of that office.
EBS Verification of the EBS was not managed effectively through the use of established plans. We suggest introducing radio and television into the EOC to allow on-site monitoring; we also suggest designating appropriate staff members,in an SOP, to do that monitoring. During the second day, radios were available, and the deputy PIO did monitor stations for EBS messages.
Public Alerting Information provided to the public was not made available to all members of the EOC staff. Although the EOC nianagement was kept advised of the information, the i
information was not posted or distributed to the rest of the EOC staff.
Rumor-control procedures were not established during the exercise, and staff training in this area of operation is needed.
In the early stages of the exercise emergency, informstion releases were not l
l I
Information was not made available to the public via the l
developed by the County.
media about the Wake County response activities that were underway. In an emergency, Wake County does have responsibilities in public information prior to the activation of i
the Media Center.
19 Suggestions for Improvements 1.
The rumor-control program should be given additional emphasis.
- 2.
A dedicated telephone communication network in the EOC should be installed.
3.
The EBS procedures shou!d be improved.
4.
Hard-copy capability between EOC and Media Center should be Improved, and the information received in this manner at either office should be quickly and efficiently disseminated to each office staff member.
5.
The County should take a more active role in public'information in the early stages of an emergency, prior to establishing the Media Center.
2.6.2 Outside Activities One fully operating shelter was evaluated. Two shelters were observed which were staffed but not fully activated. One decontamination center for personnel and vehicles was operated.
All staff members were dedicated, knowledgeable, and well trained. There was strong participation by all organizations present.
All facilities were well-selected and thoughtfully laid out, and the personnel Provisions for staffing them were very aware of procedures and responsibilities.
wheelchair-bound and nursing-home residents were present.
At the area of decontamination of personnel and vehicles, the staff was well-prepared and adequate in number. Staff members were familiar with instrumentation and exposure control and had thought through implications of their actions; e.g.,
- personnel were prepared to impound the grassy area containing vehicle washdown if the vehicles had been contaminated.
9
- + -
y-
-y,,,--,
20 Suggestions for Improvements 1.
At the vehicle decontamination station, official record logs should be available. (A sheet or a clipboard was used at this exercise.)
2.
The personnel decontamination plan should be updated to note whether a contaminated individual should b-ent to a hospital, cr whether any other action should be taken, at.ar a second or third -
shower has failed to decontaminate the person.
2.7 CHATHAM COUNTY 2.7.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC of Chatham County was activated with an adequate staff from supporting agencies and including elected officials. Proper supervision was exercised and control maintained. Physictl facilities are marginal in terms of area and equipment.
Status boards and maps with zones, evacuction routes, shelter locations, traffic control points, and decontamination posts were properly displayed.
A map or overlay with Communication with degrees is needed, however, to plot the plume when one is present.
other agencies was adequate. A hard-copy machine was available; however, procedures for receiving incoming messages were not satisfactory. The transmission of messages
~
seemed.to be adequate. Public notification was well-planned and, with the exception of one radio station failing to comply with EBS procedures, well-executed. Evacuation procedures were demonstrated by the processing of a number of " evacuees" through one shelter.
Suggestions for Improvements 1.
Steps should be taken to control noise in the center.
2.
More telephones should be installed for use of the agency representatives.
=
21 3.
Internal message distribution should be improved.
4.
More briefings should be conducted, and they should include agency representatives.
5.
Maps or overlays with degrees should be available for plotting the plu m e.
6.
More activity for participating agencies should be provided.
f Superior Item The Chatham County EOC director did an outstanding job, especially considering that this was his first exercise.
2.7.2 Outside Activities The shelter was activated within a half-hour after notification. The shelter manager and chief of the monitoring and decontamination teams were knowledgeable in their areas of responsibility. The shelter was staffed by seven orgari!zations; ~31 people were present to perform the sheltering functions.
The registration and handling of evacuees were adequately demonstrated. The facilities are excellent, but the ability of the shelter to serve 2028 evacuees (assumed capacity) should be reviewed. The rate at which evacaees would arrive should be established to determine the number of monitoring teams required.
The proficiency of the monitoring and decontamination teams should be improved by additional training.
I Suggestions for Improvements l
1.
Add phones to sheltering and registration area.
2.
Provide hand-held radios to sheltering personnel.
3.
Provide backup radiological monitoring instruments.
4.
'ide a wheelchair.
l l
l I
22 5.
Improve flow of Information to shelter.
6.
Provide additional onsite training for monitoring and decontamination teams (an improved SOP would help).
2.8 LEE COUNTY 2.8.1 Emergency Operations Center Direction and control over the simulated emergency were handled effectively by the acting director. The EOC staff members exhibited sound training but would have benefited greatly by more dialogue with their counterparts in the State EOC. The physical facilities are excellent. These include space, room arrangement, maps / charts, and communications. The use of amateur radio was demonstrated effectively. Elected officials _were present. Sirens and EBS soundings were monitored. The scenario was comprehensive, but it was not challenging for many individual agencies.
Suggestions for Improvements 1.
Consider relocating the speaker phone to a less congested area.
2.
A radiological defense officer (RDO) on the EOC staff would be helpful to explain radiological and plant conditions.
3.
A hard-copy capability would prove beneficial between the County and the Media Center.
i 2.8.2 Outside Activities i
The West Lee Junior High School was observed only after activation and staffing were completed.
The capabilities and resources observed were excellent.
Communications were available through the Radio Amateur Club, the primary communications link. Telephone, police radio, and fire department radio were available 4
' ' ' ~ ^ " '
23 as backup. Seven members of the fire department were available for monitoring and decontamination of evacuees. Registratlon of evacuees was run very smoothly. Support services in lunchroom operations, a nursing station, counseling, and other assistance were available at the reception center. Administrative staffing of the East Lee Junior High School was also observed.
The center was staffed by a Red Cross coordinator, Lee County volunteer fire personnel, a county deputy sheriff, and volunteers. The staff and the coordinator were well-versed in their responsibilities at the center.
The capabilities of the decontamination team at the West Lee High School, as well as the individual administratively in charge of decontamination at the East Lee Junior High School, are very good. In discussing the rationale ~ for the way they set up their operations, coordinators at both schools gave very good descriptions. They were very knowledgeable about good practice in monitoring and decontamination and proved they could do an excellent job. Although there are some potential problems with cross-contamination due to the space where the coordinators have to conduct their operations,
~
they a e aware of those problems and are attempting to address them.
It is recommended that all areas where potentially contaminated individuals might walk be covered with a disposable floor covering (i.e., paper).
Lee County demonstrated a very well-organized congregtte care center at West Lee Junice High School. A large number of volunteer workers were at that school. All necessa y personnel were present and did a very good job.
In general, the evacuee monitoring and decontamination functions were much better handled than the vehicle monitoring and decontamination functions. Based on the traffic observed at the three locations for vehicle decontamination, several traffic problems could develop at State roads 1466 and 1428. Traffic would be severely congested during an evacuation; individuals might not be willing to wait for their vehicles to be checked af ter being told to evacuate the area. Preferable location for this activity might be the parking lots of the reception centers. Fire department personnel need more
24 training on vehicle decontamination to ensure they follow good practices when monitoring vehicles.
2.9 HARNETT COUNTY i
i 2.9.1 Emergency Operations Center Activation and full staffing of the EOC were completed in a timely fashion (one hour from declaration of the Site Area Emergency), and backup methods 'of staff notification are in place.
The staff members demonstrated that they can act as a i
dedicated and cohesive group; members of the County Board, who were directly involved in decision making throughout the exercise, contributed to this integrated effort.
Management of the situation by the EMC was thorough and effective, despite the fact that he of ten had to repeat briefings as many as four times to different groups due to the layout and noise levelin the interim EOC facility. This facility was inadequate in almost
~
insufficient furniture and space for pe.rticipants, poor lighting, inefficient every respect:
traffic-flow pattern, far too few telephones for a "real-world" emergency, and an excessive noise level. However, visual aids (maps and displays) were effective and visible to all staff members. In general, the players at the EOC made the very best of a bad More phone lines should be added to enab'is direct communication physical situatiot..
from the EOC staff to thei' respective field personnel: there was excessive reliance on r
message transmittal through the county warning point.
Nevertheless, with, the participation of the amateur radio emergency system, ~
l overall communications capabilities'were good to excellent. Use of the speaker phone j
l line needs some improvement; some transmissions had to be repeated more than once because they were garbled or the messages misunderstood.
Public alerting and instruction were timely and coordinated, although the EBS raessage was canned.
Protective actions assigned to or issued by the County were performed or simulated in a l
L i
25 timely and organized fashion. No, media relations were conducted at the Harnett County EOC.
Deficiencies Noted 1.
Physical facilities were inadequate in almost every particular (H.3).
2.
There is excessive reliance on a single landline through the county warning point for backup communications with other EOCs and other facilities (F.1).
Suggestion for Improvement (other than deficiency corrections)
In general, there was excessive reliance on the amateur radio emergency system capabilities as the primary backup communications between ths EOC and field locations; this level of reliance should be avoided, despite the excellent performance of personnel from the system. Also with respect to communications, the SEOC speaker phone should be isolated from those involved in other communications, due to noise level.
/
~
2.9.2 Outside Activities A sheltering capability was demonstrated by the administrative opening of the Lillington Middle School and by the full opening of the Harnett Central High School. Two evacuees went through monitoring, decontamination, and registration and into the shel-tering process at Harnett Central. Participation in both schools was excellent. Players were generally knowledgeable'about their respective duties, and, since this was its first exercise, Harnett County should be commended for the competence of its personnel.
Some problems were noted, however, that reflect a need for closer coordination of outside functions and better understanding by personnel responsible for them.
26 Problem Areas 1.- Both shelter managers, as well as the Department of Social Services (DSS) representative, stated that the American Red Cross will "take over" the shelters a few days into an operation -
management, feeding, cost underwriting, etc.
If this is true, agreements with the American Red Cross should be secured. If -
such agreements are not secured, DSS personnel should be informed of the situation so that they do not have unrealistic expectations.
2.
Shelter personnel were under the impression that evacuees arriving at shelter would have been monitored, at decontamination stations on evacuation routr3, and that those still needing decontamination would be identified by phone to the shelter. Specific procedures at both the decontamination stations and at the shelters need to be understood by all concerned personnel.
3.
Personnel responsible for radiological monitoring at both schools were unprepared to keep personnel monitoring and decontamina-tion records on contaminated evacuees. The Emergency Manage-ment Director stated that the forms were in prepacked kits at the shelters; however, shelter personnel indicated no knowledge of these kits.
~
4.
The staging area (for reception, staging, and dispatch of emergency service units) is directly in front of the shelter, where hundreds of evacuees would be entering, parking, etc.; this physical L
arrangement would undoubtedly create confusion, traffic problems, and general chaos.
27 4
2.10 TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL 2.10.1 Harnett County Highway transportation protection and evacuation were thoroughly exercised in Harnett County by the manning of TCPs and installation of evacuation route signs.
Public boat rataps at Harris Lake have warning signs to alert boaters of a possible emergency and to give specific instructions about what action should be taken.
Procedures for notification to air and rail carriers were exercised in accordance with the plan.
2.10.2 Lee County Eight traffic control points were observed during the exercise, and four associated road blocks were observed.
All personnel at these locations indicated familiarity with the evacuation routes and the location of reception centers. The TCPs and road blocks were manned by a combination of State Hih.iway Patrol personnel and County Sheriff's personnel. Personnel at the control points can communicate with other control points manned by similar authorities. Several officers were asked if they knew the status of the emergency, but none of the officers had received updates on the plant Officers at the road blocks have authority to allow persons back in the EPZ for status.
emergency pu poses, but there are no clear criteria for the officers to use in making those decisions. As an example of the c"onfusion caused by this lack of criteria, one
! officer stated that he would positively.not allow anyone to enter; another stated he would make his decisions on a case-by-case basis. Materials at the road blocks were pre-positioned by the State Department of Transportation.
The route c.lerting was conducted at the request of the evaluator. It took 45 minutes to alert all residences along the route. This period was longer then it should l
have been; the officer doing the alerting realized, as the process continued, that he could
]
J 28 reduce the amount of time by not using the alert procedure while backtracking on certain roads. The officer was told that he did not need to demonstrate the PA and siren during the route, just that appropriate stops would have to be made to realistically assess the amount of time it would take. The officer conducting route alerting exercised good professional judgment when he began making all announcements as close to residenc possible instead of strictly following the SOP that announcements be made every quarter mile.
State Highway Patrol, Lee County deputy sheriffs, and Lee County volunteer fire department personnel were equipped with dosimeters. All State Highway Patrol officers
~
had high, mid, and low-range self-reading dosimeters, a thermo-luminescent dosimeter (TLD), and well-maintained record cards. Lee County deputy sheriffs had low-range dosimeters and record cards.
The record cards were maintained.
The Lee County volunteer fire department personnel in some cases had low-range dosimeters or a combination of low-and high-range dosimeters.
Record cards in some cases were maintained by the fire department personnel; in others only an initial reading was recorded. No Lee County pctsonnel had TLDs.
The scenario for the Lee County EOC was not very demanding. The schedule of events was known by most parties in the County. There were even announcements on commercial radio broaccasts when the exercise would terminate.
Thus, emergency management and response were not challenged. Understandably, since this is the first test of the emergency plan for the Harris plant, the scenario should not have severely
~
challenged the County's emergency-response capability, but the schedule of events should not have been distributed as widely as it was.
2.10.3 Wake County There was a sufficient number of traffic controllers and highway police for traffic control points, and sheriff's police for road blocks. Both groups did very well in
l 29 performing their more familiar activities. They gave accurate directions, knew what to do in the event of road obstruction, knew who to allow into the evacuation zone, knew enough to wait until commandt.d before taking certain actions (e.g., to take KI), and knew they should contact the command post if they had questions. Two officers tried to guess correct answers, however, and failed. One road block was not manned.
These personnel had low-range dosimeters, which were read and recorded periodically. Some of the personnel were weak in understanding the relationship between radiolodine exposure, the thyroid system, and the use of KI. Current SOP on the function of road blocks was not followed. Dosimeters were distributed at the command post for persons entering the EPZ. Some dosimeters that were expected were not received from CP&L.
Suggestions for Improvements Personnel should be re-trained on the significance of radiciodine 1.
and on K1 as a blocking agent. Also, health personnel should be' present when KI is distributed.
Different identification numbers for. road blocks and for traffic 2.
control points should be assigned. Both road blocks and traffic control points are identified by a "W" followed by a one-or two-digit number so that a road block and a traffic control point,
~
possibly at different locations, can have the same identification number. This can be very confusing.
2.10.4 - Chatham County.
The The traffic and access control activities were adequately demonstrated.
Highway Patrol was very well-trained and knowledgeable about operations. The trooper at each location had backup material and procedures to refer to if he did not know I
30 answers to questions.
The troopers kept records of their own exposure and were knowledgeable about the maximum exposure rates allowed. At the road blocks, one trooper stated he would use own judgment for re-entry of emergency vehicles.
I f
Suggestion for Improvement Criteria for EPZ re-entry should be established.
2.11 FIRE ACTIVITY An onsite fire drill provided an opportunity for an offsite response of the Holly Springs Fire Department.
Response time was prompt (16 niinutes), and admittance -
through the plant gate was very satisfactory (two minutes). Six volunteer firefighters came to the site on a fire pumper and were adequately equipped with turnout gear and air masks. Timely contact was made with the fire brigade, and actions were taken to relieve the " exhausted" personnel on the hose lines. It was apparent that trair.ing and
~
preplanning had been conducted jointly by brigade and offsite personnel.
Radio communications between onsite and offsite units would increase the efficiency and capabilities of all fire departments.
i i
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_._._r
31 3
SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES The following is a summary listing of deficiencies observed during the Shearon Harris Nuclear Station Exercise.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA NUREG 0654 ITEM.
CORRECTIVE ACTION DATE OF COMPLETION,
0.4.b.
Radiological Training Emergency Response Training Media Center G.4.b.
Public Education Training
~
and Information G.4.c.
Public Education Training and Information Harnett County H.3 Emergency Facilities Facility and Equipment Acquisition F.1 Emergency.
Equipment Communications Acquisition Wake County None Lee County None Chatham County None
32 APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario r
en 4
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4 FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT-May 17-18, 1985 CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC IV CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)
EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY (EOF)
Bob Trojanowski (NRC) i STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (SEOC)
John Heard (FEMA)
Anna Hart (USDA)
Dave Lassiter (DOE)
MEDIA CENTER Jack Glover (FEMA)
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH LABORATORY Les Poch (FEMA)
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ACTIVITIES Tony Foltman (FEMA) e RADIOLOGICAL FIELD TEAMS Chroline Herzenberg (FE11A)
Karen Gaziel (FEI1A)
MOBILE EVALUATORS Al Hall (DOT)
Tom Hawkins (FEliA)
WAKE COUNTY ECC Cheryl Stovpil (FE!!T.)
Elliott Levine (FEMA)
Phil Kier (FDIA)
LEE COUNTY EOC Brad Loar (FRiA)
John Tatar (FEMA)
CHATHAM COUNTY EOC Russ Yarbrough (FEtiA)
Duane Knudson (FEMA)
HARNETT COUNTY EOC Chris Saricks (FEMA)
Virginia Baker (FEliA)
w N.C. EXERCISEINSTRUCnUNF j
' for the 3.i SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PONER PLANT 4
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NORTH CAROLINA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER FIAh"I May.17-18, 1985 l
1.
GENERAL A.-
A full participation emergency preparedness exerci'sc
-will be conducted for the Carolina Power and Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant near New.
Hill, North Carolina on May 17-18, 1985.
B.
The exercise will consist of a simulated accident at the Shearon Harris Plant which will escalate to a general emergency and involve response, evacuation, reentry / recovery actions and ingestion pathway considerations.
During the simulated emergency, an of f-site radiological release will ~ occur and require responses by off-site personnel.
II.
OBJECTIVES:
In accordance with NUREG 0654, the objectives of this exercise are as follows:
A.
To test and assess the initiation and implementation of North Carolina's plans with respect to a radiological emergency at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.-
the ability of North Carolina to assess the 3.
To test impact of a radiological emergency on the public and to carry out the required alert and notification of response forces and the'public.
C.
To test the State and County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and State Emergency Response Team (SERT) with respect to:
1.
Adequacy of facilities to support operations under ccergency conditions.
2.
Ability. of the organization components to coordinate operations.
3.
Adequacy of resource materials and data to assist in decision-making and plan implementation.
4.
Adequacy of communications systems to maintain contact with other components of the emergency response system.
To test the ability of the off-site radiological D.
procedures to accurately determine the public danger and institute appropriate protective action recocmendation.
1
.E.
To. test the ability of a joint news media center representing the State, local gov ernm ent and the.
utility to Provide accurate and timely information.
F.
To exercise medical handling and arran gem ents for contaminated injured individuals.
G.
To exercise the S t a te's ability to plan for reentry / recovery and coordinate such activities in the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ.
III.
SCOPE A.
All major elements of the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (hereinaf ter referred to as the Plan) from initial notification through protective actions will be exercised.
This exercise will involve the State and af f ected local governments and their supporting agencies.
State and local staffing and the level of play.will be B.
determined by the simulated nuclear accident scenario except as identified below.
C.
Evacuation will be played.
D.
Local emphasis for Wake, Lee, Chatham-and Harnett Counties will be:
1.
Alert and-notification of the public, to include use of EBS to disseminate public information.
2.
Ability to assist in evacuation.
to provide Traffic Control Points, Capability 3.
secure evacuated areas and to perform other roles and responsibilitie's as identified in the local plans.
4.
Test fire protection measures and medical support.
Exercise warning and notification procedures to 5.
alert boaters and others on Jordan and Harris Plant Lak es.
l E.
State emphasis will include the following:
reporting of representatives from each I
1.
The department shown in paragraph IV, Participation, to the State EOC.
These representatives comprise the SERT.
2
t 2.
The ' dispatch of the Radiation Protection Emergency Tea = and mobile lab.
3.
The declaration of a simulated state of disaster by the Governor.
4.
The exercise of the Southern Agreement for Mutual Radiological Assistance and the supplemental agreement thereto..
5.
The radiological monitoring of personnel, material, and areas and the reporting of simulated data and severity levels.
Actual and simulated dosimeters will be used.
6.
The recommending and executing of radiological protective actions.
7.
The simulated issuance of thyroid blocking agents as appropriate.
8.
The exercising of all essential communications systems and warning systeur to include the actual sounding of outside warning devices in the area to be evacuated.
9.
The establishing of traffic control points and m aintaining a log of exercise pe.rsonnel and vehicles entering and leaving designated zones.
i 10.
The use of the Emergency Broadcast System (E35) to disseminate public information.
11.
The evacuation of personnel on a representative basis by privately-ovred vehicles, ambulances, state and local governm ent-owned buses, and military vehicles and aircraf t.
12.
The sheltering and feeding of evacuees in public shelters.
13.
The preparation for the decontamination of personnel exposed to radiation.
The preparation for the decontamination of vehicles 14.
and equipment on a representative basis.
IV.
PARTICIPATION expected to A.
The following organizations are participate:
- 1. State level:
3
The Governor.or his representative.
a.
.b.
State Departments and agencies as identified in the Plan.
2.
County -level:
Wake County - full participation a.
b.
Lee County - full participation Chatham County - full participation c.
d.
Harnett anty - full participation 3.
Carolina Power and Light Company 4.
Other Organizations:
American National Red Cross a.
b.
Radio and television stations identified as EBS Amateur Radio Service c.
d.
National Weather Service
~
Corps of Engineers e.
f.
Team of Radiological Em er gen'cy Volunteers (TOREV) of the N.C.
Chapter of the Health Physics Society are those individuals participating in the Players B.
exercise by performing the responsibilities assigned to The number their agency or organization in the Plan.
and type of players will be determined by participating agencies / organizations.to satisfy the requirements of this exercise.
See Annex A - Player Information.
V.
MESSAGES:
To avoid the possibility of an exercise message involved in the exercise being intercepted by personnel not all' written -
and an inappropriate reaction on their part, and oral messages will be preceded and ended with the "THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE."
It is mandatory phrase:that'this phrase be used in all voice radio transmissions as well as on written messages to include the Police Information Network.
All laws and safety rules shall be observed during VI.
SAFETY:
the conduct of the exercise.
During exercise missions, emergency lights and sirens should not be used and traffic rules and regulations governing vehicles should be obeyed, l
4
If aircraft are employed, all Federal Aviation Administra-tion rules and regulations should be obeyed and flight safety should be emphasized.
VII. PUBLIC INFORMATION:
A.
All news releases to the news media, including cxercisc play releases, releases about the exercise as an event, and EBS will be coordinated between the counties and State Government prior to release.
Copies of all news releases will be provided to the B.
Control Group.
VIII. EXERCISE ORGANIZATION:
See Annex B A.
Exercise Players - See Annex A, Appendix 1 B.
Exercise Control Group - See Annex C -
C.
Exercise Evaluators - See Annex C D.
Federal Observer Group - See Annex H II.
EXERCISE IDENTIFICATION On all vehicles used by the players while participating A.
in the exercise, a white panel such as a white hand towel or similar cloth or tape will be attached on the driver's side of the vehicle so as not to restrict The cloth may be tied to the door handle, vision.
radio antenna or below the outside rear vision mirror.
Vehicles assigned to the Control Group will be marked in a similar manner using red cloth or tape.
Vehicles assigned to the Evaluation Group will be marked in a similar manner using blue cloth or tape.
Players will' wear white arm bands or shoulder loops on B.
the lef t arm or shoulder.
Those players entering the SERT Headquarters area must wear SERT Identification (ID) Cards previously issued.
New or replacement ID Cards for SERT members may be obtained at SERT Headquarters.
Members of the Control Group will wear red numbered C.
badges, arc bands or shoulder loops on the left arm or shoulder.
Evaluators, including f ederal observers performing an evaluation function, will wear blue bands similarly.
Visitors will be identified with brown numbered badges D.
]
or cloth.
E.
Controllers and Evaluators entering the EOC SERT Headquarters area must display numbered badges prior to adm it tance.
These badges will be provided by the Control Group.
F.
Each organization is responsible for procuring panels and arm bands for its participating acmbers.
X.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
- See Annex F XI.
BRIEFINGS, MEETINGS AND CRITIQUES
- See Annex G XII.
TABLE TOP EXERCISE.
A table top exercise vill be conducted.
immediately af ter the full participation exercise.
See Annex E.
XIII. DISTRIBLTfl0N
- See Annex I Attachments:
Annex A - Player Information Annex B - Exercise Organization Annex C - Exercise Controllers / Evaluators Annex D - Exercise Scenario and Schedule of Events (Limited Access)
Annex E - Table Top Exercise -
Re. entry & Recovery /50-mile Ingestion Pathway Considerations Annex F - Administrative Matters
~
Annex G - Briefings, Meetings and Critiques Annex H - Federal Observers Annex I - Distribution l
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6
~
-. -- - ~
NORTH CAROLINA EKERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON BARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18. 1985 Annex A - Player Information I.
GENEPJLL SITUATION The Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant is being built A.
in New' Hill, N.C. about 16 miles southwest of Raleigh and about 15 miles northwest of Sanford. The plant will, '
contain one generating unit, using a pressurized water reactor capable of producing 900 megawatts of electric The unit.will start to produce power in 1985.
pow er.
Commercial operation will start in 1986.
B.
North Carolina, the counties concerned and other organizations have developed the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.
The Plan establishes the to be used to respond to an off-site procedures emergency caused by an accident at the Shearon Harris Its general purpose is to protect people from Plant.
radiation exposure and in a variety of accidents that could produce an off-site threat. It accomplishes this purpose by providing for the integration of State, local and Federal resources and emergency response the health and actions into a common base to protect safety of the general public.
The initiating action will be in the SPECIAL SITUATION:
II.
form of a message from the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.
The message will be transmitted to the State Warning Point and simultaneously to the Wake; Chatham; Weather data for Harnett.and Lee County Warning Points.
the exercise will be canned and will be provided by the plant and the National Weather Service.
All personnel who will participate in INITIAL REQUIREMENT.
the exercise must be familiar with the Plan and the tasks III.
assigned to each response organization.
Each organization should take actions to ensure that it is prepared to carry out its responsibilities.
. SUBSEQUENT SITUATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS:
Subsequent IV.
situations will be announced in messages from the Shearon Harris Plant and other messages that might be injected by the Control Group.
Subsequent requirem ents must be determined by the p)syers in accordance with the Plan and the given situations.
V.
EXERCISE PLAYERS:
See Appendix 1.
A-1
NORTH CAROLINA EKERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON BARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18,1985 Appendix 1 - Anne 2: A - Exercise Players SERT Team Lee. der:
Joseph F. Myers, Director Ass' t SERT Team Leader: Vance E. Kee, DCC&PS AGENCY FUNCTION / ACTIVITY ASSIGNED INDIVIDUAL SERT Support Staff
- T 0 BE A N N O U N C E D******************
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9 1
A. 1....
NORTH CAROLINA EKERCISE INSTRUCTIONS MR HE 1
i
-SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18, 1985 Annex B - Exercise Organization
.I.
Control Group - See Annex C.
Exercise Control Group, known as Controllers, will A.
The composed of representatives of the a gencies 'and e
be Basic Plan.
organizationc referred to in paragraph IV, During the exercise, this group will inject prewritten l
messages into the exercise and such additional messages of the local within the scope and intent of the test Plans.
The Controllers will also observe the exercise, prepare B.
critique notes and submit written recommendations to 4
improve the response plans and future exercises.
During tLa exercise they will be lo c a t e'd in the basement of the Administration Building, Room B-41.
l II.
Evaluators - See Annex C.
Federal Observer Group - See Annex H.
III.
The Federal Observer Group will be composed of representatives of several Federal agencies who observe the 4
level evaluators.
i exercise in a manner similar to statethe Observer Group will be located Offices for F
Administration Building.
State Contacts (Pre-Exercise) - The primary contact points IV.
at the state level are:
Tonia Youno A.
Exercise Director:
Div. of Emerg. Management DCCPS - (919)733-3867 Tonia Young, Chief B.
Chief Controller:
Education / Radiological Br.
Div of Emerg. Management DCCPS - (919)733-3867 C.
Ass't. Controller:
Al Joyner, Planner Plans Branch Div. of Emerg. Management DCCPS - (919)733-3867 Phil Riley, Deputy Comm.
D.
Chief Evaluator:
Div. of Fire & Rescue Dept. of Insurance (919)733-2142 B-1 Rev 2-13-85
E.
Ass't. Evaluator:
Gil Green, State Forrester Information & Training N.C. Forest Resources NRCD - (919)733-2162 i
F.
Radiological Evaluator:
Julian H. Bradberry, Jr.
Health Physicist General Electric (919)343-6180 G.
Shearon Harris R. G. Black, Jr.
Plant Exercise Director:
(919)836-6194 H.
Shearon Harris H. R. Goodwin Plant Controller:
(919)836-6551 1.
Public Information:
Chrystal Harris Stowe information Services DCCPS, (919)733-5027 Local Level Contacts (Pre-Exercise)
V.
Primary contact poincs at the local level are Emergency A.
These Manag< mer.t personnel identified below by county.
persor.a vill be Trusted Agents.
(A trusted agent is an exercise participant who, because of his assigned role must be entrusted with information i
in the exercise, relating to the play of the exercise which cannot be lest disclosed to the Players until the proper time, the training value of the exercise be compromised).
i Russ Capps, Coordinator 1.
Wake County Wake Co. EM' Agency (919)755-6245 Mark Scott,-Coordinator 2.
Chatham County Chatham Co. EM Agency (919)542-2911 i
l 3.
Harnett County Henry Johnson, Assistant Coordinator Harnett Co. EM Agency (919)897-8130 1
I J. T. Kirkman, Coord.
4.
Lee County Sanford-Lee Co. EM Of fice (919)775-3941 During the exercise, the telephone nurbers listed above B.
may change.
Rev. 2-13-85 B-2
NORTE CAROLINA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18, 1985 Annex C - Exercise Controllers / Evaluators 1.
General Exercise Controllers / Evaluators are those individuals assigned to make certain that events outlined in the A.
scenario (Limited Access Document) are exercise See received for action by the appropriate agency.
Appendix 1 - Controller / Evaluator assignments.
B.
This document outlines the responsibilities of the to insure a successful Exercise Controllers / Evaluators exercise.
II.
Responsibilities items directly Review the Plan with emphasis on thoseagency of your Contr A.
related'to the assignment.
Attend the pre-exercise meeting and such other meetings B.
as identified in Annex G.
Maintain confidentiality of the exercise scenario (Limited Access Document) so as to not compromise the C.
exercise.
during exercise with Controller / Eval-uator Headquarters located in DEM offices in the D.
Maintain contact Administration Building, Raleigh, N.C.
exercise scenario, each agency Upon receipi of the controller / evaluator should identify those elements ' or E.
~
List responsibilities within the Plan for the agency.in the scenario them in order of action for each event the so that you will have a checklist to insure that agency's goals and objectives are met.
~
Provide a written evaluation report with your Exercise Worksheets to the Chief Evaluator no later than May 31, F.
1985.
III.
Checklist - Use the following checklist as a guide for control purposes.
notify A.
Upon arrival at your duty station each day,ify the Controller / Evaluator Headquarters and ver specific phone number at which you can be reached during the day.
o
a Controllers / Evaluators should provide a schedule of activities if - duties are in the field.
Since times indicated in the scenario are the times an B.
is inj ected by the plant controller, it may be event necessary to allow at least 15-30 minutes for the event to be acted upon at the plant before the plant notifies county and/or state government.
If an event which action by county and/or state government has requires been received within approximately 45 minutes, not notify Controller / Evaluator Headquarters.
to take over play of the C.
Controllers / Evaluators are not exercise, but should use the scenario checklist
+
(paragraph II E - above) to insure adequate agency response to the event.
D.
Exercise Scenario and Exercisc Worksheets (Limited Do cum en t s) will be provided to Access controllers / evaluators only.
r f
l f
I f
Appendix 1 - Controllers / Evaluators Assignments l
_ ;2_
C
NORTH CAROLINA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18,1385 Appendix 1-Annex C - Controllers / Evaluators Assignments Chief Controller:
Tonia L. Young, DCC&PS Ass' t Chief Controller:
Alvin H. Joyner, DCC&PS Chief Evaluator:
TBA Ass' t Chief Evaluator:
TBA AGENCY FUNCTION / ACTIVITY ASSIGNED INDIVIDUAL CONTROL
- TO BE IDENTIF7.ED LATER**********************
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j l
NORTH CAROLINA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT i
May 17-18, 1985 Annex D - Exercise Scenario and Schedule of Events 72 TIME (Item)
EVENTS
-35 12,00 1
Steam l e~a k causes a g ound in cable tray above the auxiliary feed pumps which causes a fire.
1108 2
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED.
Initial notif2 cation to c.f f s i t e aut hot-i t i es.
1120 3
Offsite fire assistance tequested.
Apex Volunteer Fire Depart rnent to respond.
Auxiliary feedwater-purnp inopetable due to isolation of steam leak.
1200 4
ALERT DECLARED.
Notification to offsite euthotities.
Alert and notification plans to responding egencies i rnp l eraent ed.
Miniraurn staffing of County and State EOC's begins.
Utility TSC activated.
1310 5
Offsite medical essistence requested for-cont arni net ed i n,) u i e d 2ndividual.
Apex Rescue Squad to respond.
1505 6
Condensate purnp tt'ips which esults in a
feedwater purnp tri p, eactor
- trip, and t ut bine trip.
Auxil iary feedwat er-syst ern fails entirely.
- LIMITED ACCESS
- its is a controlled access doeurnent distributed only on a need know basis.
It is gener ally liraited to the Exci cise Director,
A ents for contt ol and
. trollers, Evaluators, and Trusted D
.luotion of the exercise.
1510 7
SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARED.
D-1
Notification of offsT4e authoritiks.
SERT is established and has operational contiol of state agency suppott.
County EOC' s fully staffed and in cont i-ol.
Piimary and back-up notification and EBS infor mation to the public activated by the counties.
1$20 8
Counties petition the Governor to e
ass arne direction and conti-ol CONTROLLER INJECTED.
1720 9
Exercise will be suspended with respect to time and scenario.
SERT fully established-and has ditection and control.
.5-85
'0700 10 Exercise : esurnes.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY continues.
0710 11 St earn genes ator tube leak detected with fuel f ailure confierned.
0810 12 GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED.
Notification to offsite authorities.
Potential for radiological release exists within the next 31/2 hours.
Source projection is for-a minimum of 15 REM thyroid.
Recomtnendation to of f site authorit ies for-a 5-rnile radius and 10-rnsle downwind evacuation.
Field assesstnent tearns deploy along ptojected back round plurne path and record D
readings.
Pr irnary and back-up notification and EBS infortnat ion to the public activated by the SERT.
Shc1ters opened and staffed.
1130 13 St earn generator-safeties lift for appioxirnately 1
rn i nut e, releasing cont arninat ed wa t en-to the a t inos ph e re.
Field essessinent t earns moni t or-and repott radiation readings and RPS verifies plume.
1230 14 In-place agency critiques conducted.
1300 15 Table Top Exercise (Re-entry and
- / '.
Recovery /50-mile Ingestion PathwayA - ^ Y, #
considerations).
See Annex E.
'W;e fr*'
,,s 7,6.:.
'(d T
1900 Closed Joint Federal / State critique.
See Annea G.
D-2
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BRIEF NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS--EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE May 17/18
.The Shearon Harris Nuclear power plant has been operating at 100%
power for the preceeding two months.
Surveillance is in progress on "A" Auxiliary Feed pump; the moton/ pump coupling is disassembled.
RCS chemistry has reported gross activity slowly increasing over the last L
W week, *I131 level is 2 x10.
The load dispatcher has notified SHNPP that a critical need for power on the grid exists.
The sprinkler fire suppression system for the RAB is depressurized for valve repairs. Wind t
is SSW to NNE at 20 knots.
The weather is clear.
At 1100 on May 17, 1985, the valve bonnet gasket on the Auxiliary Feed pump turbine throttle valve blows out.
The A0' reports to control that The steam is leaking in the RAB, in the area of the Aux. feed pumps.
steam jet penetrates and causes a ground in the cables over the pump, At 1107 this fire which causes a fire to start in the cable tray 1801.
At 1108 the fire alarms in control from smoke in is reported to control.
The sprinker system does not operate, and the Shift Foreman this area.
declares an UNU5UAL EVENT _ at 1103.
At 1110 off-site fire assistance is At 1130 an assessment team is sent to investigate damages.
requested.
At 1145 this team reports that the steam leak is coming from the supply At 1147 Control shuts V-8 and V-9, which to the /
iliary feed pump.
stops the steam leak and renders the Auxiliary feed pump inoperable.
t At 1148 the damage assessment team reports to control that the steam i
leak is stopped, and that arcing and smoke continue in the cable tray over the Auxiliary feed pumps.
The. damage is unknown.
l
G
, l
?
At 1200 the Shift Foreman declares ALERT because the EAL flowpath k j i.
dictates this level when one shutdown system is inoperable.
He does not j
i
.j declare site emergency because he considers both A and B Auxiliary Feed f.1 pumps operable, within the Tech. Soecs rule.
At 1205 control begins k
c--
notifications of State and other off-site authorities.
The Staff of the r.*
s.;
TSC is called, the TSC is activated.
At 1230 the fire stops when the power j
supply breaker to 120VDC control power for the Auxiliary Feed pumps is
- . 4 opened.
This detail is not communicated to. control, only that the fire
'j
<)
is out.
N' I:
AT 1302, a man compacting contaminated waste in the waste disposal area
..+,
is injured when a barrel bursts and cuts his leg.
The injury is bleeding profusely, and contaminated.
First aid is given at the scene, HP and yi site medical respond, recomending to control that off-site medical rescue a
is needed.
At 1310 control notifies Rex hospital that the injured man is r{
also contaminated.
At 1345, the ambulance transports the casualty off-site.
L' f:
At 1350, extensive utilization. of condensate storage tank water begins for
' ' ~
area decontamination.
P At 1445 I & C reports that the control cables for "B" Auxiliary feed pump are extensively damaged by fire, and deenergized.
At 1455, control notifies load dispatcher that orderly shutdown is being comenced because of inoperability of redundant safety systems; ie: Tech. Specs. 3.7.1.2 requires operability of 3 Aux. Feed pumps in Mode I.
At 1500, one condensate pump trips, which causes a feed pump trip, reactor trip, and turbine trip.
r J
At 1506 alarms indicate that steam dumps have opened, and decreasing levels in all three Steam generators.:no Auxiliary feed pumps are running.
Emergency repairs are attempted on "A" Auxiliary feed pump coupling, withouti i
At 1510 SITE EMERGENCY is declared because the EAL i
immediate success.
I flow chart requires that level when the heat sink is threatened by loss of two trains of a safety system.
i
}
i 1520, the RCS temperature has peaked, steam is continuing to dump At l
At 1600 RCS samples indicate a further increase through the steam dumps.
9# ' At 1700 exercise is suspended.
4 ingrossactihily;I131is1x10 I
l s
i At 0710, HP reports that new RCS sample At 0700 exercise resumes.
uc/ml, definate proof of a fuel cladding failure.
indicats I 131 of 1 x 10 At 0745, both A and C Steam Generators'cre Empty, efforts to start a Main Feed pump have failed because condensate make-up water is not available; decontamination of the rad waste building has used it all.
At 0750, level is increasing in B steam generator, indicating a primary /..
The "B" Main steam isolation valve is shut, to secondary tube leal'.
minimize contanination of the secondary plant.
1 At 0303, level increases are plotted; it is calculated that the steam The generator will be solid full of contaminated RCS water at 1130.
possible release through a safety valve at that time would be a public exposure.
T-
\\
??4 hd
.t At 0505 GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared on the basis of the EAL flowchart;j
?
E 14, and PEP 104 flowchart which dictates recommendation of a 5 mile r{
radius and 10 mile downwind evacuation.
Sufficient time to evacuate is
.-d j
Meteorology indicates given by the time before the steam generator is full.
wind at 10 MPH from NE to SW.
At 0815 Shift foreman recommends notification 9:
r--t
'S to evacuate.
Ai hl 1:j At 1000 HP reports no At 0900 HP reports no off-site contamination.
r1 off-site contamination.
At 1100, RCS temperature has been.successfully i:.1 i.:a Ed lowered so that saturation pressure in the Steam Generator is below the The Pressurizer t.-
Safety setpoint, by utilization of RCS feed and bleed.
PCRV was opened while utilizing the SI high head injection pumps to inject h
SI is reset, and recovery operations begin. The PORV
'[
cool borated water.
is shut.
"B" steam generator is solid.
1130, reset of reactor trip breakers inadvertently starts SI, instantly A:
1 raising RCS pressure to 1500 psi, raising "B" steam generator secondary to 1500, and the "B" steam generator safeties lift, releasing approximately 130 gallons of contaminated water to atmosphere.
I
~
At 1210, At 1200, stations 11, 12, and 13 report increasing activities.
HP reports site boundry exposure levels at 15 REM thyroid.
AT 1230 recovery begins, at 1330 exercise suspended.
i F
tiessage No.
Time Initiated Emergency Class Event dem iption frem/to 1
1050 Cr/alist.
Initial conditions communicated to all players
Exercise begins------------exercise begins---------------------------
Sterm leak from supply valve to steam driven auxiliary 2.
1100 RAD /CR feed pump.
Fire begins in overhead cable tray.
3.
1107 RAD /CR Fire is reported.
Damage unknown.
Sprinkler malfunction reported.
4.
1108 CR UNUSUAL EVENT Shift Foreman declares Unusual Event: designates Emergency Communicator, notifies state /off-site authorities.
CONTINGENCY !!ESSAGE Shift Foreman requests off-site fire assistance; 5.
1110 CR
' CONTINGENCY MESSAGE Assessmbnt team renotts. steam leak coming from supoly 6.
1145 RAD /CR headec to Auxiliary Fecri pump.
Fire is in cable tray.
If CR shuts V-8 and V-9, reports steam leak stopped, 7.
1148 RAD /CR fire continuing in cable tray.
8.
1200 CR ALERT Shift Foreman declares Alert when EAL flow path in(icates "one safety system train defeated", ie: steam auxiliary feed pump is now inoperative for unknown duration CONTINGENCY MESSAGE Shif t Foreman notifies county and state authorities of 9.
1205 CR Alert status, notifies TSC staff, begins TSC activation.
CONTINGENCY MESSAGE 10.
1230 RAD /CR Fire stopped, local efforts opened supply breaker to 120VDC supply to Aux. Feed pump controllers.
This detail not communicated to control room.
it.
1305 Waste Disposa'l/CR Reports "one man injured while compacting solid waste into a barrel.
Wound i~s bleeding profusely and also I
contaminated.
Event Description Lags No.
Time initiated Emergency Class From/to.
Off-site medical r'escue is requested.
1310 CR CONTINGENCY MESSAGE Ambulance arrives, HP/ Medical handling casualty, 1345 Waste Disposal /CR preparations completed.for transportation to hospital.
Damage Control Assessment team leader reports that fire in cable tray has damaged the control power cables for 1445 RAD /CR "B" Auxiliary feed pump, which is now inoperable.
Shift Foreman notifies load dispatcher of commencement of orderly shutdown.
Tech Spec. violation if more than
~1445 CR one hour operation with inoperative Aux. Feed pumps CONTINGENCY MESSAGE One running condensate pump trips, one Main Feed. Pump
~
trips, Lo/lo Steam Generators, Reactor Trip Turbine Trip 1505 CR Shift Foreman declar'es Site Emergency of basis of failure 1510 CR SITE EMERGENCY of both trains of safety system ie: all three aux. feed pumps failed to start. Notifications to all authorities.
CONTINGENCY MESSAGE I
Plant stabilizing, core exit temperatures decreasing, 1.
1520 CR RCS temperature dropping, Feed and Bleed working, RCS Sample indicates increase in gross activity =1x10 uc/ml RCS sample increased to 1x10 uc/ml 9.
1600 Chem /CR
Exercise suspended------------------
0.
1700 CR/all st.
Exercise resumed--------------------
1.
0700 CR/All st pri/sec tube lead in Steam Generator "B" is confirmed.
2.
-0710 HP Secondary sample indicates 1x10 uc/ml Level increasing RCS sample indicates' fuel failure has occurred.
e
Event description ssage 110.
Time IniLiated Emergency Class from/to.-
IIP reports that when Steam Generator "B" is solid full 0800 IIP /CR -
of RCS, PEP 104 flowchart dictates General Emergency due to caly one barrier to fission product release.
SteamGenerator"B"willbesolidfullin31[2 hours,
).
0805 STA/CR ",
or about 1125. Possible release from Safeties at that time.
Shif t foreman recommends 5 mile radius and 10 mile dow J.
0810 CR GENERAL EMERGENCY _
immediate evacuation.
CONTINGENCY MESSAGE.
j Wind will be from NE to SW at 1130 today 0815 Met Background radiation levels at all site boundries and P.
0900 HP/CR all off-site automatic stations.
Background radiation levels at all site boundries and all 1000 HP/CR all off-site automatic stations.
RCS cooled sufficiently to prevent S/G safety lifting.
(9.
1100 CR Stop Feed and bleed, shut PORV, reset SI.
RCS~ pressure 1500, S/G "0" pressure 1500,'
Inadvertent SI.
00.
1130 CR S/G "B" safeties open one minute, Release begins l'
' Field assessment teams report ine,,reasing readings, Stations 01.
1200 HP/CR-11,12, 13 report increasing radiation readings.
Site boundry dose calculated 015 REM thyroid cJ2.
1210 HP/CR 33.
1330 CR/All st;tions------------------Exercise suspended S
o
HORTH CAROLINA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18,1985 Annex E - Table Top Exercise (Reentry and Recovery /50-mile Ingestion Pathway Considerations)
(
To exercise that portion of the North Purpose.
I.
Carolina Radiological Emergency Response Plan. in of the Sharon Harris Nuclear Power Plant support that addresses those reentry, recovery and ingestion pathway actions to be taken during the post emergency period.
Reentry, Recovery and 50-mile Ingestion Concept.
II.
Pathway will be exercised through a free play Table Top Exercise whereby each represented state agency will interf ace to discuss its role during the post accident period.
Discussion will be guided through a Radiation Protection Section facilitator, however, the overall intent.is. co surf ace potential problem identify mutual support opportunities, and
- areas, create a full awareness of the post ~ accident mission.
Par t icipan t s.-
SERT representatives of the following III.
departments or agencies are expected to play their responsible roles in the exercise.
Division or branch players m ay be represented for those departments with several mission tasks in a post accident scenar io.
In any case this decision will rest with the departmental representative.
A.
State Government.- All state agencies tasked within the N.C.
Radiological Emergency Response Plan to initiate reentry, recovery and ingestion accident scenario pathway actions in the post in are expected to play their responsible roles the exercise.
Some agencies with specific responsibilities are identified below:
1.
NC Department of Agriculture 2.
NC Department of Human Resources a.
Division of Health
- Services, Environmental Health Section.
1)
Water Supply Branch 2)
Sanitation Branch
3)
Solid and hazardous Waste Branch b.
Division of Facility Services, Radiation Protection Section.
Division of Social Services.
c.
d.
Division of Mental Health.
3.
NC Department of Natural Resources and Community Development, Division of Environmental Management.
a.
Air Quality Section.
b.
Water Quality Section.
Enforcement Emergency Response.
c.
4.
Wildlife Resources Commission.
5.
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.
SERT Leader, a.
b.
SERT PIOS.
B.
Local Government
- Chatham, Harnett, Lee and Wake Counties' Representatives to SERT C.
Federal Government U.S.
Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations,0ffice D.
Volunteer American Red Cross Representative
~
IV.
Exercise Time and Location.
The exercise will be the State Emergency Operations played internally at Center (Room B-24) Administration Building, Raleigh, NC at 1 :00 p.m., May 18,198 5.
Estimated duration is two (2) hours.
V.
Discussion Topics.
The scope of the exercise will
^
embrace full ingestion zone planning with first consideration being given to those immediate.
actions necessary to return evacuated residents to l
their homes af ter the accident condition has been abated.
The below topics are considered germane to this planning and are listed for player This list is not inclusive and is consideration.
listed only to give a direction for participation.
Air, soil, water and dairy sample collection Milk purity Water purity Agriculture Crop Effects Livestock Observation and Testing Marine and Fish Observation and Testing Wildlife Observation and Testing Disposition & Transportation of Contaminated Materials Recommended Measures to Protect People Shelter Emergence Public Information Post Accident Information/ Assistance Centers e
4 e
e l
NORTH CAROLIMA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18, 1985 Annex F - Administrative Mattera Facilities for actual medical treatment Medical Treatment.
are located in all counties participating in the exercise.
I.
11.
Transportation.
Transportation for all exercise controllers and evaluators, will be
- players, participants, provided by their department or agency.
All participants in the exercise will make their Meals.
III.
own arrangements for meals.
Lodging Facilities.
While the m aj ority of exercise participants live and/or work in Raleigh, there may be a IV.
need for lodging accommodations during this exercise; have been made with the Holiday therefore, arrangem ents Inn, Downtown, to set aside a block of rooms under the na
" Harris Exercise."
26, 1985 as follows:
May 16 - $40.00 plus tax a.
b.
May 17 and 18 - $34.95 plus tax The telephone number is 919/832-0501.
i G
e
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t HORTE CAROLINA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHEAROH HARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18, 1985 Annex G - Briefings, Meetings and Critiques meetings have been.
Pre-Exercise Meetings--The following I.
scheduled:
A.
SERT Meeting:
March 14,1985, DEM Operations Room B.
SERT Player s Meeting:
May 13,1985, 10:00 a.m.,
DEM Operations Room C.
Controllers / Evaluators Meetings:
1.
April 2, 1.985, 10:00 a.m., DEM Operations Room 2.-
April 30, 1985, 10:00 a.m., DEM Operations Room 3.
May 14,1985,10:00 a.m., DEM Operations Room Pre-Exercise Briefing--State Controllers /Evalur tors and Federal Observers:
May 16, 1985, 2:00 p.m., C.T. Bow er s II.
National-Guard Center, Reedy Creek Road.
III.
Post-Exercise Activities:
A.
May 18, 1985 Exercise participants will hold agency critiques 1.
in-place immedictely following the exercise.
See Annex E.
2.
Table Top Exercise at 1:00 p.m.
Closed County, State and Federal critique will be held at 5:00 p.m.,
C.
T. Bowers National Guard 3.
Center, Reedy Creek Road.
Participants will include SERT representatives from each agency, Chief Evaluator, Chief Controller and their duputies, and Federal Observers.
B.
May 19, 1985 CP&L critique at 1:00 p.m., Harris Plant Site.
1.
G-1 (Rev. 4-1-85)
2.
Public Meeting / Critique at 3:30 p.m.,
Apex Senior High School, Laura Duncan Road, Apex.
C.
May 31, 1985 I
1.
Each agency will provide the Exercise Director with recommendations for changes to the N.C. Emergency Response Plan in support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.
2.
State Evaluators will send an evaluation report with a copy of the individual item evaluation sheets to the Chief Evaluator.
The evaluation report should include problems identified. and recommended agency changes.
l i
l F
l l
(Rev. 4-1-85)
G-2 r
i
NORTH CAROLINA EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 3HEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR EXERCISE May 17-18,1985 Anner I - Distribution I.
North Carolina Departments and Agencies:
Governor's Office Adoinistration Agriculture Auditor Correction Division of Prisons Crime Centrol & Public Safety (3)
Division of Emergency Management (15)
State Highway Patrol (5)
National Guard Civil Air Patrol.
Alcohol Law Enforcement Cultural Resources Education Human Resources (10)
Radiation Protection Section, DFS E=ergency Medical Services Section, DFS Division of Aging Division of Health Services Division of Social Services Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation & Substance Abuse Services Insurance Justice State Bureau of Investigation Police Information Network Labor Natural Resources & Community Development Division of Forest Resources Division of Environmental Management Rev enue Secretary of State Transportation Division of Highways Treasurer State Fire Commission State Warning Point Utilities Commission Wildlife Resources Commission Local Governments (Emergency Management)
II.
Wake County (5)
Harnett County (5)
Lee County (5)
Chatham County (5) 1-1
III.
Federal Agencies:
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Region IV, Atlanta, Ga. (10)
Thomasville, Ga. (2)
National Weather Service - RDU (2)
Corps of Engineers, Wilmington Corps of Engineers, Jordan Lake IV.
Others:
Amateur Radio Service Accrican National Red Cross - Raleigh (2)
CP&L Company (10)
E=crgency Broadcast System WQDR - FM, Raleigh WPTF - AM, Raleigh N.C. Association of Rescue Scuads N.C. Sheriff's Association Salvation Army, Raleigh Southern States Energy Board TOREV (3) e e
e e
--..I-2
/t&c b Ne o T W ^
.?3Uhky
{g.g Federal Emergency Management Agency
.$Jgrg Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 9.g June 18, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
RICHARD W. KRIMM, ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS, SL-NT FROM:
Major P. May 42 4 '.
Regional Director
SUBJECT:
Interim Findings Report Plant Harris, Nortn Carolina Attached is the Interim Findings Report on the ad~equacy of off-site preparedness in the vicinity of Plant Harris, North Carolina, as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The April 1985 revisions to the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Revision No.
1, dated September 1984, have been reviewed by FEMA, Region IV and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC).
The Plant Harris Exercise was conducted on May 17-18,.1985, and to FEMA National Office copies of the exercise report will be sent and to the State of North Carolina about July 1, 1985.
Based on a review of the above information and the recommendation from the NTH Division,, this office concurs that the State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and the exercise demonstrated that off-site preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vincinity of Plant Harris in the event of a radiological emergency.
Enclosure
/f y Federal Emergency Management Agency
- g y
Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 INTERIM FINDINGS REPORT on the Adequacy of Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness for-Plant Harris, North Carolina June 12, 1985 Prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Natural and Technological Hazards Division
4 f'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
-I.
INTRODUCTION pace A.
General. Characteristics of Plant Harris 1
B.
-Emergency Response Organization 1
C.
Plans 1
D.
Basis for Findings 1-2 E.
Evaluation Format 2
II.
EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR PLTTT' HARRIS A.
Assignment of Responsibility 3-4 E.
On-site Emergency Organization 5
.C..
Emergency Response-Surport and Resources 6
D.
Emergency Classification System 7
.E.
Notification Methods and Procedures 8
F.
Emergency Communications 9
G.
Public Education and Information 10-11 H.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment 12 I.
Accident Assessment 13 14 J.
Protective Response 15 K.
Radiological Exposure Control L.
Medical and Public Health Support 16 M.
Recovery and Reentry Pla ning and Post-Accident 17 operations 19
-~N.
Exercise and Drills O.
Radiological Emergency Response Training 19 20 P.
Responsibility for the Planning Effort:
Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans
I I.
INTRODUCTION i
A.
General Characteristics of Plant Harris The plant is located in the extreme southwest corndr of Wake. County, North Carolina, approximately 16 miles southwest of Raleigh.
Approximate coordinates of the plant are. latitude 35'38'01" N. and longitude 78'57'23" W.
The region within a 50-mile radius of the SENPP site contains both urban.and rural areas with-industry, farming, business, education, research,~and military facilities.
B.
Emergency Response Organizations The Departments of Crime Control and Public Safety (DCCPS) and
. Human Resources (DHR) have the major responsibility.for responding to amcrgencies resulting from an incident at Plant Harris.
However,.any State agency may be tasked with an emergency mission.
The following county governments have responsibilities during emergencies at Plant Harris and will activate emergency oper-ating centers in the indicated cities:
Chatham County, Pittsboro, NC Harnett County, Lillington, NC Sandford-Lee County, Sanford, NC Wake County, Raleigh, NC C.
Plans North Carolina Emergency Response Plan In Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Rev. 1, September 1984
-(Parts 1-5).
Part 1:
State Procedures Part 2:
Chathan County Prodedures Part 3:
Harnett County Procedures Part 4:
Lee County Procedures Part 5:
Wake County Procedures D.
Basis for Findings TheLstatus of emergency preparedness for off-site response to possible incidents at Plant Harris has been based on:
(1)
The EEMA/RAC review of the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan In Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Rev.1, September 1984 (Parts 1-5).
~.
(2)
The FEMA /RAC evaluation of the Plant Harris Exercise, May 17-18, 1985.
E.
Evaluation Format The following report combines the previous evaluations into an overall Interim Findings Evaluation for each planning standard (A-P) of the criteria contained in NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.
Narrative statements follow and address each planning standard.
These are followed by summary stat 2ments, generally divided into three parts, numbered (1), (2), and (3):
(1)
The FEMA /RAC evaluation of State and county plans
~
and the exercise.
(2)
The State and County response to FEMA /RAC evaluations.
(3)
A determination of the current adequacy of the-planning standard based on the above evaluations and on the States' and counties' re sponse s.-
If the FEMA /RAC review of the plans and the exercise report indicate no deficiencies or problems, no State or local response was necessary, and a simple statement of the adequacy of the planning standard is given.
o e
i
- 2 c
.m,
II. EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR PLANT HARRIS A.
Assiement of Responsibility (Oraanizational Control)
Planning Standard Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear f acility licensee and. by State and local organiza-tions within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned.
The emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal' response organization ~has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.
The North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in support of Plant Harris assigns responsibility for directing and conducting emergency operations within the plume exposure
. pathway jointly to. State and local governments.
At the State level'the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety (DCCPS) has responsibility for directing and super-vising emergency operations conducted by the State.
This includes dispatch and operation of the State Emergency Response Team (SERT), headed by the Director of the Division of_ Emergency Management.
The Department of Human Resources (DER) provides technical expertise and coordinates emergency medical services at the accident site.
Other State agencies are assigned both primary and secondary emergency responsibilities.
The relationships between all involved organizations are depicted in block diagram format.
All responsibilities are summarized in tabular form.
At the county level control of response operations is vested with the Chairman of the County Board of Cc.nmissioners.
Counties are expected to be fully responsible for population protection until arrival of the SERT.
County plans establish operational responsibilities.for other county agencies and
~
depict these in both tabular form and in block diagrams showing interrelationships.
The State plan lists Federal sources of assistance and
-summarizes the types of assistance the State would seek from.these' sources.
State and local plans reference or include the specific
, authorities for conducting emergency operations.
The State plan contains copies of agreements with the facility operator, University of North Carolina, North Carolina State University and General Electric Company relative to health physics resources and treatment capabilities.
3
(1)
The FEMA /RAC review of the plans indicated a need for identification of, and letters of agreement for, some private sector agencies having energency roles.
The exercise, however, was not hindered because of this necd.
The exercise evaluation report found nd defi-ciencies in this planning standard.
(2)
North Carolina has included the necessary letters of-agreement in the latest plan revision.
(3)
The planning standard is now adequately addressed.
O G
e D
e 4
E.
On-Site Emergency Organization Planning Standard On-shift' facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation.of response capabilities is available, and the. interfaces among various on-site respense activities and off-site support and response activities are specified.
Technically, this standard applies only to the licensee, Carolina Power and Light Company.
However, there are, of course, off-site implications.
During the plan development stages, North Carolina worked closely with the utility to establish coordination procedures for on-and off-site response.
d S
e t
O 5
.C.
Emergency Response Support and Resources Plannina Standard Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State.and local staff at the licensees near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been iden'tified.
Section V-A, page 62, of the State Plan addresses emergency support and resources.
Types of Federal assistance that can be made available are listed.
The Director of the Division of Emergency Management is designated as the person authorized to request services and assistance..
Among the sources of assistance listed is the Southern Mutual Radiation Assistance Plan (SMRAP) and technical staff personnel from universities and private industry in accordance with letters of~ agreement.
A State representative is designated in this section to assure that resources are committed in a manner that will assure maxi-t -
mum effectiveness and efficiency.
This representative will serve at the Harris Plant Emergency Operations Facility.
-(l)
The initial FEMA /RAC plan review' indicated the North Carolina plans needed additional letters of agreement.
(2)
This inadequacy has.been corrected.
(3)
The planning standard is now adequately addressed.
S kO e
6
--.....v..
D.*
Emercency Classification System Planning Standard A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of'which include facility syrtem and effluent para-meters, is in use by the nuclear facs licensee, and State and local response plans call for relio ;e on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial off-site response measures.
Emergency classifications adopted by the State of North Carolina are in accordance with the requirements set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.l.
The emergency classification system provided in the plan (page 32) is consistent.with that established by the Carolina Power and Light Company.
The four classes of emergencies are:
Notification of an Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency The plan contains the rationale and actions to lxa taken for each emergency classification as well as examples of emergency action levels for each classification.
This plan'ning standard is adequately addressed in the plans and was demonstrated by the State and counties during the May 1985 exercise.
O
+
e a
9 7
-,-r
+-e
E.
Notification Methods and Procedures Planning Standard Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee of~ State and local response crganizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all response organi-zations; the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction
- to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Energency Planning Zone have been established.
Section IV.B. (page 34) of the State Emergency Response Plan provides that initial notification of any of the four incident classes he transmitted to both the State and county warning points.
Commercial, via automatic ring-down (ARD), phone would be used to notify State; dedicated lines would be used for counties.
Radio back-up exists for State and county notification.
Call-back verification systems are established in both State and county plans.
Incident classifications are consistent with those set-forth in Appendix 1 to'NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.
All plans have adequa'tely provided for the alert, notification and mobilization of emergency response personnel.
Regardless of whether State direction of response operations has been effected, counties are responsible for public alerting and information.
The primary means for alerting the public will be fixed siren systems.
This system is backed up by a mobile siren / loud speaker system.
The L
siren alert is sounded to notify the public to turn radios /
televisions on to the area EBS station.
The EBS will be acti-vated prior-to or concurrent with the siren alert.
State and county warning points are monitored 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.
-Systems have been established at all levels of government for effecting public notification on a 24-hour basis, i
This standard is adequately. addressed in the plans and was demonstrated by the State and counties during the May 1985 exercise.
. The official FEMA testing of the Alert and Notification System has not yet been conducted.
8
F.
Emergency Communications
~
Planning Standard Provisions exist for prompt communications _among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.
T Provisions have been made for communication networks to support all emergency response organizations throughout the course of an emergency.
These networks utilize ~dedi-
+
cated phone lines, commercial telephone service, Carolina Power and Light Company systems, local government emergency service two-way radio systems, and State and Federal govern-ment communications.
Commercial telephone is the. primary means of communication between State emergency response organizations in North 4
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, and
'between State government and Federal response organizations.
Commercial-telephone via dedicated lines is the primary means of communication.between SERT headquarters and'the EOCs in the four 10-mile EPZ counties.
Two-way radio and Police Information Network (PIN) are the back-up.means of communication.
The primary means of communication between the SERT headquar-ters and the Harris Emergency Operations Facility is commercial telephone via automatic ringdown (ARD) circuits.
Back-up commu-nication between these two points is commercial telephone lines and two-way radio systems.
These systems will be expanded as required.
A dedicated ARD circuit is the primary means of communication between the Harris Plant and the State and county warning points.
The back-up means of' communications to the warning points are commercial telephone lines a'nd two-way radio systems.
(1)
The FEMA /RAC review of the plans indicated that this
-standard is adequately addressed.
The may 1985 exercise indicated a need for addit.ional communications equipment.
in Harnett County (NUREG-0654 deficiency F.1).
(2)
The final exercise report has not yet been transmitted to the State,~therefore, no State or county response to this deficiency has been -received.
(3)
Although this deficiency should be corrected, the lack of this equipment is not significant enough to seriously namper emergency response in Harnett County.
9
G.
Public Education and Information Planning Standard Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they'will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local. broadcast station and remaining indoors) the p.rinci-pal pointslof contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.
Section IV(D), page 41, of the State plan provides for the dissemination of two types of public information.
The first type is " Educational" in nature in that it accuaints the public with the biological and environmental effects of the accidental release of radioactivity.
The second type of information disseminated includes instructions concerning safety measures to be taken by.the public should an emergency condition develop which results in a radioactive release off-site.
The means by which these types of information are made available to the public (both permanent and transient) are listed-in the Plan.
Information of the instructional type is prepared just prior to or during an emergency.
The plan indicates that the Director, Division of Emergency Management is the principal individual authorized to represent the State in matters dealing with the presentation and release of emergency public information.
.n addition, instructions relative to nuclear radiation incidents or accidents are the responsibility of.the SERT Public information Officer.
The plan provides coordinating instructions for release of public information and designates the public information officer assigned to the State Emergency Response Team as responsible for overall coordination of public information activities between State and local governments and Duke Power Company.
(1)
The Standard is adequatelIy addressed in the plans.
During the May 1985 exercise, there were two deficiencies observed within this planning standard.
These deficiencies were observed at the media center and involve the timely exchange of information among designated spokespersons" and " coordinated arrangements for dealing with remors" (G. 4.b. and G. 4.c. ).
10
(2)
The final exercise report has not been transmitted to the State, therefore, no State response to this deficiency has been received.
(3)
Although these~ deficiencies should be corrected,
~they are not significant enough to seriously hp.r.per emergency response.
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Emergency Facilities and Ecuipment Planning Standard
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Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.
Operational facilities listed in the plan are:
l.
The State EOC in Raleigh 2.
Chatham County EOC 3.
Harnett County EOC 4.
Sanford-Lee County EOC 5.
Wake County EOC The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will be located at the SEOC in Raleigh.
All physical facilities are adequate in space and arrangement and provided with adequate equipment.
(1)
The Harnett County EOC was found to-be inadequate during the May 1985 exercise (NUREG-0654 H.3).
(2)
The final exercise report has not yet been transmitted to the State, therefore, no State or county response to this deficiency has been received.
(3)
Although this deficiency should be corrected, it is not significant enough to seriously hamper emergency response.
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Accident Assessment Planninc Standard 4
- Adequate methods, systeps and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of-a radiological emergency condition are in use.
Section III (D), page 15, of the plan lists the require-ments and actions to be taken by the radiation protection section of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources to assess the extent of off-site radiological problems as a_ result of an accident at the Harris Plant.
The Plan
. provides for a mobile radiological laboratory equipped with instrumentation for gamma ray spectroscopy and field analysis of collected samples.
This section specifically addresses radiciodine in air, general field monitoring capability, assessment capability and relationship of environmental radiation measurements to protective action guides.
' This standard is adequately addressed and was evaluated as adequate during the May 1985 exercise.
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Protective Response A range of Protective Actions have been developed for the Plums Exposure-Pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
Guidelines for the choice of protective actions
. are developed and in place and protective actions for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.
- Protective response,Section III, D, page 15, of the Plan provides for the requirements and actions to be taken by
-the Radiation Protection Section of the. Department of Human Resources.
These actions will assure that necessary measures will be taken to protect the public from an acci-dent at the Harris Plant.
The Plan provides for the RPS of the Department of Human Resources to base its recommenda-tions for protective respon'e upon protective action guidelines s
developed by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and the
- U. S. Food and Drug Administration.
Provisions for use of radio protective drugs (KI) are addressed in Section IV (E), page 44.
Protective measures to be used for the ingestion pathway are adequately provided for.
Time estimates for evacuation for all sectors of the Plume Exposure Pathway are addressed in-Section IV(E), page 44.
Protective actions for the Ingestion Pathway ar,e included in Section IV (F).
This standard is adequately addressed in the plans and was evaluated as adequate during the May 1995 exercise.
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. Radiological Exposure Control Planning Standard Means for controlling. radiological exposure in an emergency are established for emergency workers.
The means for con-
-trolling radiological exposure shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.
Radiological exposure control for the public and emergency workers is addressed in Section IV(G), page 56, of the Plan.
The radiation protection section of the Department of Human Resources uses the EPA recommended Protective Action Guides as the maximum acceptable levels of radiation to which the public and emergency workers may be exposed durine an emergency at a Nuclear Power Electric Generating Plant.
This planning standard is adequately addressed in the plans and was evaluated as adequate during the May 1985 exercise.
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Medical and Public Health Support Planning Standard Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated individuals.
The State plan identi.fies'and lists hospitals in the vicinity of the reactor which are capable of. handling radiation injuries and contaminated casualties.. The listing provides information concerning capabilities.
This information indicates that adequate service can be provided.
This planning standard is adequately addressed in the plans and was evaluated as adequate.during the course of the May 1985 exercise.
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Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-Accident Ooerations,
Planning Standard
~
General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.
This planning standard is adequately addressed in the plans.
Recovery and reentry operations were discussed during the' Harri's Exercise; however, North Carolina demonstrated this capability in previous exercises.
Recovery, reentry and post-accident operations are described
- in Section IV,H, page 60, of the State Plan.
The Plan provides that the head of the Radiation Protecion Section reviews reports and findings of the radiological monitoring teams and health physics teams.
When he determines that radiation levels are reduced to a point that the health and safety of the public is no longer a threat, he recommends to the SERT Leader that reentry and recovery operations begin.
The plan directs that Regulatory Guide 1.109 be used in making evaluation to assure that PAG's are not exceeded.
The Director, Division of Emergency Management, recommends to the Governor the date and time reentry and recovery opera-tions should begin.
This planning standard is adequately addressed.
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5.
Exercise and Drills Planning Standard Periodic exercises will be conducted to evaluate. major portions of emergency response capabilities.
Periodic drills will be conducted to develop and maintain key skills and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises, or drills will'be corrected.
An exercise and drill plan and schedule is established in the State Plan in Section VII, page 80.
This Plan / schedule
' is consistent with the criteria established in NUREG-0654-
- FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.
Exercise development and conduct is the responsibility of the Department of Crime control and Public Safety.
Drill plans are the responsibility of the particular element or sub-elem rt of the various emergency response organizations.
Joint drills are encouraged.
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This' planning standard has been adequately addressed.
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Radiological Emercency Response Training Planning Standard Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called upon to assist in an emergency.
-Training is prescribed for the following categories of response perso.nnel.
Responsible agency is indicated:
Personnel. Category Responsible Acency Team Leaders / Coordinators crime control and Public Safety Accident Assessment Personnel Department of Hwman Resources Radiological Monitoring Teams Division of Emergency Management Law Enforcement / Fire Appropriate Agencies EMS and Rescue FMS Section of Department of Human Rsources Local Emergency Services Personnel Local Emergency Managegment Coordinator Medical Support Local Emergency Management Coordinator Communic.
..s Appropriate Agencies (1)
The FEMA /RAC review of plans indicated that this standard is adcquately addressed.
The May 1985 exercise indicated a need for additional training in the area of dose assess-ment (NOREG-0654 Item 0,4.b. ).
(2)
The final exercise-report has not-been transmitted to the State, therefore, no State response to this deficiency has been received.
(3)
Although this deficiency should be corrected, it is not significant enough to seriously hinder emergency response.
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Responsibility for the Planning Effort: Develocment, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans Planning Standard Responsibility for plan development and-review and for dis-tribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.
At the State level, the~ Director, Division of Emergency Management, is responsible for the development and update of i
plans.-
Among his. responsibilities is the requirement to certify annually that the plans are current.
At the local level, the county Emergency Management coordinator is given the same responsibility.
This planning standard is adecuately addressed.
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